Zainab Usman on Critical Minerals and AGOA

I'm Scott. >> I'm Bill. >> And we're the Trade Guys. >> [music] >> You're listening to the Trade Guys, a podcast produced by CSIS, where we talk about trade in terms that everyone can understand. I'm Alex Kissling, [music] and I'm here with Scott Miller and Bill Reinsch, the CSIS Trade Guys. >> This is the Trade Guys, Scott. >> Thanks for listening to the Trade Guys. On today's episode, Bill and I speak with Zena Wooldridge from the Center of Global Energy Policy at Columbia University. We talk on a range of subjects including critical minerals and the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. All this and more on today's episode of The Trade Guys. [music] >> Well, hello listeners. Trade Guy Bill here with Trade Guy Scott and a special guest that we've had on before and are delighted to have her back, and that's Dr. Zainab Usman, who currently has a very long title. She's senior research scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University's School of International Public Affairs, where she is managing director for international programs at the Energy Opportunity Lab, where she leads the center's work on energy for development in emerging markets. Zainab was last on the podcast 3 years ago, so she's a veteran of the Trade Guys. 3 years ago, we talked to her about AGOA, because at the time she was running the Africa program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace here in Washington, and at that particular moment was for South Africa during the AGOA summit. So, it was timely and we got sort of an on-the-ground perspective about what was going on there, none of which ended up making a lot of difference for renewing AGOA, I'm sorry to say. And we're going to come back to get to AGOA later in the podcast because she still follows it and it still matters and it's still important. And there was one development recently about it that we'll get to. So, we wanted to do that later on. But first, the main reason we wanted to have as I know back with us is because she is an expert on the intersection between trade and critical minerals. And critical minerals is an issue that we have not spent a lot of time on on the podcast, probably a mistake on our part. And so, I'm delighted to have her back to talk about critical minerals and she's just produced a paper precisely on that subject about critical minerals and trade agreements and how they intersect. Let's begin with asking you to just tell us about your paper and its conclusions and then we'll go from there. >> Wonderful. Well, thanks again for hosting me. Always delighted to be on the podcast, but you know, I'm such a huge fan and champion of the podcast. I think it's really the best on understanding US trade policy. So, I recommend it to everyone. >> That's what we tell everybody, too. This is not a paid endorsement. We're having her on for substance. >> It's not at all. Yes, so so very glad to be here. Yes, so I published a paper earlier this year entitled the international trade dimensions of the US critical mineral security strategy. And what I tried to do in the paper is to look at the trade-related aspects of the industrial policy instruments employed by the US and being employed by the US. So, this is work in progress to secure critical mineral supply chains. And one of the key reasons why I decided to write the paper was because I was tracking the critical minerals trade deals, quote unquote, that were being negotiated and some of which had been announced by the White House and the administration. So, as of the time that I wrote the paper, six of these deals had been announced and there were a couple that were being negotiated and then since then I don't think any new deal has been announced. And I realized that there were uh certain trends and certain patterns that merited like you know not only further analysis but communication to the broader policy community that these minerals deals are a thing. They are important. People should pay attention and that they are going to matter. So, the paper examines the six minerals deals negotiated or announced with partner countries including Australia, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, Ukraine, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. And the two key points that I make in the paper are that, you know, first of all, these deals matter even though they originate from executive orders. People should pay attention to them. I think they are going to play a certain role in whether structuring market access and shaping critical minerals industries both in the US and in the partner countries. And that, you know, secondly, the deals themselves have components that are both standard that are very familiar to anyone who has been paying attention to US bilateral economic engagement and partnerships with different countries, be they MOUs, be they bilateral investment aspects of bilateral investment treaties and the like. So, there are those standard components but there are also elements of these deals that are new. We've not seen them before and we need to pay attention as policy experts, as academics, but also as trade experts as well. And I I go into detail about these components. Maybe there's actually a third point that I make in the paper that what I see with the minerals deals that the US that Trump administration has negotiated with these countries is that they also reflect a broader bipartisan shift in US global trade policy that, you know, we cannot deny and we shouldn't ignore because there's often a tendency for many analysts to dismiss, you know, initiatives that come out of the White House as, oh, these are specifically Trumpian in nature and the moment you have another administration, then there's going to be a policy reversal. And what I'm arguing is that actually when you look at the text of the agreements, when you look at, you know, certain other features and aspects, you find that there are actually a lot of parallels with Biden era initiatives as well. And therefore, I would argue that even in the event where you have a different government in the White House, be it Republican or democratic in nature, there will be aspects of these minerals deals and agreements that endure beyond the specific administration. And then finally, I conclude the paper thinking through implications for the US in terms of whether these deals can realistically and feasibly help achieve these mineral security objectives. And then the implications for partner countries as well that have their own objectives and priorities, particularly the low and middle income countries, whether in Africa, in Asia, or in Latin America, that want to industrialize, they want to build value chains, and they want to capture and retain more value domestically. Yeah, so that's kind of the summary of the paper itself. >> You know, one of the things that that uh sparked my curiosity as I read through it and listened to your description now is you have a sort of an upbeat or positive view of the ability of these agreements to survive a change in administration. We have had a number of discussions on the program about this very fact and >> Mhm. >> we admire President Trump for his intensity about making deals, but because as we were reminded in Learning Resources versus Trump that the Congress has the power to regulate foreign commerce and he often moves ahead without the Congress and that makes their survivability at least suspect for those of us who who are kind of old school when it comes to what makes a law and what the difference between a law and an executive order. So, could you talk about why you based your conclusion based on the political dynamics, which makes total sense and I agree with you on that. What does it really take in your mind for these things to survive a change in policy or a change in administration? >> That's a very, very good question and I don't even know that I can fully answer the question, but I can address elements of it. As you rightly said, when it comes to trade policy and negotiating trade agreements, the actual mandate for that lies in Congress, but you know, we've seen the kind of experimentation and put it mildly, like policy boldness and innovation in the executive, whether it's a White House or USTR, in coming up with these new sectoral trade agreements or trade deals. An important reason why I think, so I wouldn't say that I know how these deals are going to survive, but I would argue that I think they're going to survive because, you know, even before the inauguration of President Trump in January of last year, under the previous administration, there was already a shift that was happening towards focusing [snorts] on sectoral trade deals and trade agreements. >> Really? >> This was a shift happening even in USTR, so USTR published, you know, they published they commissioned a couple of studies and then they published them on various aspects of trade including one that actually made the case very clearly. It was published in January 2025, although it was commissioned much earlier. That actually free trade agreements, comprehensive free trade agreements are you know, an instrument of the past. They reflected the global economy at a certain point in time, you know, after the Cold War when there was this shift towards accelerated globalization and global economic integration. So, if you read speeches of whether it's Katherine Tai, the former USDR head at the time, or Jake Sullivan, or Janet Yellen, they all make this case that, you know, the era of free trade or free trade in terms of tariff reduction, zero tariff treatment, that is over. We need to think more carefully about, you know, sectoral trade agreements, thinking about incorporating extensive labor and environmental standards. So, there was already that shift happening from comprehensive trade agreements and even multilateral trade agreements to more bilateral agreements, agreements that are also sector-specific in nature. So, one of the points that I think this paper makes, maybe not very directly, is that in a sense, this is a continuation of that evolution of thinking. And what I suspect would happen when there is a new administration is they might use a different style from Trump, you know, I'm not going to announce tariffs on country X because you're not happy with some aspects of its political system or some decision it has taken in the UN or whatever. But, you are going to see still that kind of reluctance to embark on extensive comprehensive free trade agreement negotiations. So, that would be kind of the broader point that I make. I mean, the second point as to why I think what there's going to be some enduring quality to these sectoral trade initiatives, particularly the critical minerals agreements, is that the first critical minerals agreement actually negotiated by the US was in uh March of 2023 under the Biden administration. This was the USTR under the leadership of Katherine Tai, and this was the US-Japan critical minerals agreement. I think many people at the time were not paying attention, but this was the first critical minerals agreement that was negotiated at the time, and it covered, I think, about seven critical minerals. You know, there are 60 minerals in the list produced by the US Geological Survey. So, it covered just seven of these minerals. And after it was announced, because it was announced just before the Inflation Reduction Act, which in a sense was a complement to the critical minerals agreement between the US and Japan was a complement to the Inflation Reduction Act, which, if you remember, had section 30D, which restricted the imports of critical minerals components for electric vehicles or noble energy technologies to just countries that had a free trade agreement with the US. So, this was a way of getting Japan into the fold. So, after that was announced, a number of countries lined up. Mineral-rich countries, including Indonesia, the Philippines, and others who also wanted minerals agreement. Of course, you know, what happened also at the time was the House Ways and Means Committee and Congress then stepped in and decided, "Actually, we need to reclaim the power of negotiating trade agreements, including minerals agreements." And, you know, that momentum slowed down. So, what I suspect and what I would argue would happen in a different administration is we're going to see elements of continuation of this trend that is already underway. >> We spent a good bit of time during the Biden administration on this podcast criticizing them essentially for their their lack of finishing anything. So, I'm happy to know that they finished the Japan agreement, but that may be the only one. I'm not sure that I agree not so much with you, but with Katherine Jake's view about the demise of the previously existing trading system. I think what I've written about lately has been that surprising amount of that old system continues just without us. That other countries are engaging in fairly traditional trade relationships, trade negotiations, even more comprehensive FTAs, although they're regional. Mercosur, for example, CPTPP, RCEP, things like that. Life goes on in surprisingly conventional trade liberalization ways, but the United States is not participating in that. But, that's not what I wanted to ask you. I wanted to pick up on the last comment you made initially and ask you to talk a little bit about this these things from the perspective of the other country. I think, you know, what's in it for the United States is kind of obvious. We want access to critical minerals and we want to be able to have access to critical minerals so that we're not so dependent on China. And other countries that we're entering into these agreements with have the minerals or at least some of them. What's in it for them? I mean, obviously selling the minerals in it for them, but what else? In particular our experience has been that these are countries that also want to move up the value-added chain themselves and not just be an extractive economy. What do these agreements do about that? And what it was the incentive for these six countries to enter into the agreements in the first place? >> This will to answer that question, I want to step back a little bit, right? To kind of further unpack why these trade or these critical minerals trade deals I mean, choose them my language very carefully here. I try not to say critical minerals trade agreement because you know, trade lawyers would remind you that this is not really an agreement. It's not like legally binding. So, let's just use the term trade deal, a critical mineral trade deal. Starting from the US itself, why trade instruments are being used? These are part of a broader industrial policy toolkit, right? To secure critical minerals supply chains. And obviously, putting industrial policy as a term in the same sentence with the United States is a bit odd to me because I remember growing up in grad school, you know, you couldn't even mention the term industrial policy. It was a dirty word. And now, it's really becoming quite central to economic statecraft. But, these industrial policy tools are being rolled out and there are I would classify them in three categories. There are financial tools that are being used, including you know, you're probably tracking this, the acquisition of equity in a variety of US mining companies and mining operations that we've seen through the DFC, Exim, Department of Energy, and other federal entities. Then, there are regulatory tools as part of the industrial policy toolkit, including permitting reform most notably. So, these are the ones that have been used extensively, but they have not really addressed the key challenge that the US face, which is that it is 50 to 100% import reliant for 31 of the 60 minerals considered to be critical by USGS. And it is heavily reliant on China for at least 14 of these minerals. So, you can understand the challenge here that no matter what you do domestically, you are hampered by geology, geological reality. Some minerals are just not available domestically, but also by the economics of mining and refining and smelting that some of these activities cannot be done domestically and therefore you need mineral-rich countries around the world, many of which are low- and middle-income in Africa, in many parts of Latin America, and then in Asia. So, this is where the other countries come in. So, to your question now, what is in it for them and why are they negotiating these deals? At the end of the day, for many of these countries, especially mineral-rich countries that are not in Europe, they're not high-income, some of them don't have the technical and financial capabilities to undertake the difficult task of mining themselves. They might have state-owned enterprises, some of which are like badly run, some of which are just not very competent or capable, so they do need the foreign direct investment. So, in a situation where also for some of these countries, they've had a long history of mining, whether it's Indonesia, whether it's Zambia or Tanzania, but a lot of the mining historically was conducted by European companies or, you know, Canadian companies or some Australian companies and increasingly Chinese entities, they also want to diversify the sources of inbound investment. So, if you have the US now suddenly getting very interested in critical minerals, they do want to attract that investment. But finally and very importantly, I think a lot of I mean, if I know that I think I know a lot of these countries want to do mining differently this time around. So, in the case of what is Zambia or Ghana or Indonesia, they they mined for like 100 years and they would argue that they've not really captured the economic and maybe the social benefits of mining in terms of, you know, increased incomes, increased levels of development. A lot of the legacy mining companies, mining majors are still involved upstream. They're not doing refining or processing or beneficiation or the manufacturing of end products and components. And where they see a potential area of alignment and synergy between their priorities and that of the US is that the US wants to reduce its dependence on China for the imports of refined minerals and that they hope that maybe they could attract some of the investment from the US in refining and processing of these minerals domestically. So, that's kind of what some of these countries are thinking. Whether they're going to achieve these objectives by negotiating these minerals deals with the White House under President Trump, that I cannot answer. I do not know. But, that I think is the calculus. >> That's the key question. Is there any sign that the United States interest goes beyond extraction? Does our government have any interest in creating refining and processing capabilities in these other countries? I mean, at one point from one point of view, we ought to have that interest because we don't want them here. They're dirty and messy. >> Yeah. >> But, I'm not sure that I see many signs of the Trump administration moving in that direction. >> In addition to the environmental impact, it's also the economics of mining then smelting, processing, refining. In a way, it's quite comparable to the bigger debate around manufacturing, right? There's a reason why manufacturing was offshored over the past couple of decades. In addition to yes, the China shock and all of the other arguments, it's just that it's cheaper to do it abroad. So, you know, those are all of the considerations. But, what I will say is, you know, having done this research, one of the things I found very interesting looking at some of the critical minerals deals with countries like Malaysia, Thailand, and the DRC is that they actually contain explicit language around investing in refining and processing in these countries. That I found very, very interesting. That is one of the points that I make about the novel components of the minerals agreements that they make it very clear that they do want to support refining processing and industrialization objectives of these low and middle-income countries. Now, the language is there. Whether investments will actually follow is a huge question mark. I mean, I would also say that the interesting thing I find about these kinds of non-binding deals and agreements is that yes, they might be non-binding. They might not be based in like law and statutes and you know, legislation. But sometimes they do serve a role in providing interesting signals to private actors to then go into a particular country. So, in the case of, you know, Ukraine, which is one of the countries that I examine, the DRC as well, we're seeing more US private sector activity in these countries. But of course, these are investments that I don't know what shape or form they're going to take and you know, they take time to even yield any uh tangible output in terms of projects and things like that. So, but there is activity that we are seeing. >> That's actually a very helpful way to look at it. My question is, you've indicated the trade components of the critical minerals project, but there's also a number of other domestic market interventions that are being contemplated. And to the extent those two elements work together, we'd probably be better off because as you mentioned, permitting is a big problem of conducting these activities in the US. It just takes forever and there are ways around that the Defense Procurement Act or whatever it might be, but you have to take action. There's There's an intervention required to get around the permitting or shorten the permitting processes. We actually have many of the critical minerals that are stocked in the United States because we have a fairly large share of the Earth's crust, okay, but we don't have the extraction going on now for a lot of reasons those that you mentioned that and that for me is the choice. Also, there's a market intervention required because of China's pricing behavior which is predatory when it comes to new supplies coming online. They'll cut the price and put mines out of business and that requires intervention in terms of a floor price or something that keeps the mines supplying the US and the processing plants that supply the US operating and in business profitably. So, is your sense that these things ought to be integrated? Is there any sign that they are being integrated? What should we think? >> There's a lot of activity in that space right now and for example just last week Friday there was a round table meeting at the White House on critical minerals. It was chaired by President Trump. So, it was at a very very high level with a number of mining industry executives and the focus was mostly domestic in nature. So, announcing support to several US mining companies and mining companies that now have like affiliates or offices or other kinds of operational activities in the US. And then there's a lot of discussion around the price floors that you mentioned, but that's I think part of a much bigger agenda around actually creating a global supply chain that excludes China. I don't know how that is going to happen and I know that several analysts have a lot of questions. Some are skeptical because the ex-China supply chain, it's meant to use both tariffs and price floors or price floors to ensure that there's a minimum price being paid, and then tariffs to keep the Chinese imports out. And then it is all going to be in a sense coordinated by a plurilateral trading zone that the USTR is currently working on. They invited comments a couple of months ago, and I know a lot of organizations and experts and analysts submitted comments. So, there's a lot going on in that space to integrate in a sense the domestic elements with the international elements. I suppose for me, you know, one question that I have on that front and that I would urge quite a number of people to pay attention to would be, you know, the extent to which countries that are not in the EU, that are not, you know, your traditional NATO or defense treaty allies, the extent to which they are going to be included in this notion of a ex-China plurilateral trading zone. And the extent to which they're going to agree to be part of this zone, because what it means is that once you're part of that zone, then you probably would not be able to trade with China. The reality is for a lot of these countries, China is a major trading partner. In some cases, China is a major investor economy. Right? So, I don't know the extent to which it's realistic to expect that outside these defense treaty allies, NATO countries, OECD countries are going to be willing to accept those terms. And again, going back to the paper, we see elements of this, you know, with the Malaysia minerals deal, and even beyond the specific minerals deals, the agreements or reciprocal trade negotiated with Malaysia and with Indonesia that also have annexes that deal with critical minerals. The language there is very very restrictive and for that reason the Indonesian parliament and the Malaysian parliament have not ratified those deals. Those ARTs. You look at some of the language there, it's very very clear that the deals are meant to restrict the participation of third-party actors. Third-party actors here being a you know synonym for China more or less. So, yes, there's a much bigger agenda at play of creating a plural actual trading zone, the tariffs, the plot price floors, the domestic initiatives to support US mining companies and then the individual trade deals that are being negotiated. But whether these countries, particularly the low- and middle-income countries, are going to agree to be part of a zone that excludes their major trading partner, I think it's very questionable. So, it's something for all of us to track. >> That's an interesting point and I think what we're seeing is the view of the administration which is that it's in our interest to try to get countries to choose between the United States and China and that which is not compatible with what most of these countries in the middle want to do which is to sort of straddle the center and not alienate either side. So, it's going to be difficult. Most of the examples you cited recently have been in your last comments were Southeast Asian examples. I want to go back for a second before we lead it into a goal. Let's go back to Africa for a second. The only agreement I think that you looked at that we have with Africa is with DRC. >> Yes. >> And you mentioned Zambia and and some other countries which are well known as you know areas to have some of the minerals in question. Did you see any signs of negotiating additional deals with these other African countries or is the DRC going to be the only one? And is Africa different in some respects from Southeast Asia, or are they all kind of the same? >> Mhm. Will there be other minerals deals beyond the DRC? Potentially, but I have to say the DRC deal too is quite unique in the sense that and when I do the paper is I actually put it in almost a similar category, it's not the same, the similar category with Ukraine because it's quite security, it's related to, you know, some kind of security arrangement. It's security oriented in nature and the US got involved on the invitation of the Congolese government. At the time they were under pressure from militias coming from neighboring countries. So, they wanted US security guarantees and they thought that a minerals deal would be a way to get the attention of the US and the White House in particular. There are, I know, negotiations that were happening. I don't know what what their status is right now with a number of countries as of last year and then also early this year. Obviously now, I think the administration also has its hands full with not only the war in Iran, but obviously the Supreme Court ruling and the fact that they've been having to uh come up with new ways to replace the tariffs that were uh suspended or set aside using different authorities. So, they have their hands full, but I know that there were negotiations happening with a quite a number of countries. And a number of African countries, I don't want to mention any in particular. I know they were proactively also trying to get minerals deals, which I know some analysts and observers would find ironic. They would be like, you know, given the nature of this particular White House, you really want a minerals deal? And interesting response from some African countries is yes, because we still want the US investment, we want to diversify FDI coming into our country in the sector, and if the US is trying to get more refined minerals, maybe we could be the the source of that the refined and processed minerals. So, that's the logic. This is not to say I agree with it, but you know, just trying to explain the logic to you. There was also the case of I think this is public, so I can mention it, the case of Zambia where as you know, the administration has been negotiating also health deals as a replacement to USAID, which was dismantled. And in the case of I think Zambia, Zimbabwe, which are all like mineral-rich countries, they were trying to add into the health deal negotiations minerals, like sections or components of minerals, but that didn't really go far. So, that would be, I think, my assessment when it comes to Africa. >> As we wrap things up here, we'd be remiss if we didn't get your opinion on the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act or AGOA, what on earth we should do with it. Just so you know, Bill and I are both so old that we remember the original debates on the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act and have watched it over the years. They grew themselves. >> Yes. You were there, Bill. I remember seeing you. >> Bill is still in his 20s, so I don't know what >> Yes, so. It's all good. Child labor is one of those things allowed in the halls of Congress, so it In any case, it had a striking set of factors associated with it. First, politics of trade are always controversial, but AGOA attracted a lot of support and very little controversy. A lot of people were in favor of doing this. And yet, if you look over the years, it's very hard to see it making a meaningful impact either among American importers or African exporters. And cuz it's one of those things, it's great the politics are good for it, but after all these years it's hard to find the results. Are we doing something wrong? Would should we do something different this time? What's your overall view? >> Okay, let me see how I can address that question. Maybe I will talk about three things. The context in which AGOA was passed or was enacted compared to our current context today. Why AGOA has not been as successful as initially envisioned. And then what can we do going forward? So first, the context. You're right, you mentioned it was passed enacted at a time when really there was bipartisan support for it. The started the groundwork was laid during the Clinton administration. It was eventually enacted in the early days of the Bush administration, if I'm correct. And at the time, there was an overwhelming desire to get African countries specifically, but low- and middle-income countries around the world incorporated and integrated into the global economy, right? This is the era era of not only liberalization, but global economic integration. You're trying to get these countries to participate in global institutions, to open up their economies, to adopt certain kinds of market reforms. >> And trade not aid was a big phrase at that point in time. >> Exactly, trade not aid. If you have these countries and you know, the enterprises, their businesses being able to export what they produce and they can lift themselves out of poverty. That was the theory of change. That was, you know, the consensus at the time. Fast forward to the 2020s, COVID happened. There's now strategic competition with China, the war in Ukraine, global economy is literally becoming fragmented. I always tell people this, this notion of global economic fragmentation is actually not abstract. Depending on what airline you fly, you cannot fly over Russian airspace. Increasingly, you cannot fly over the Middle East. You know, financial transactions, too. We're having restrictions there. We're having restrictions in terms of the kinds of technologies we can use. So, global economic fragmentation is a thing. We are in a completely different era now. And I don't know that AGOA, as good as it is, is suited for our world today. So, that's the point about the context that we do need something new, something different, more attuned to even US domestic politics, where people feel strongly about trade. Are they really pro-trade or really against trade? And that middle is no longer as strong as it was. Now, when it comes to AGOA, what hasn't worked? Because there are also some things that have worked. What hasn't worked is the fact that this notion that tariff reduction alone is sufficient to drive industrialization, higher productivity, increased manufacture and production of goods and services that would then be exported, right? So, there were all of these other things that needed to happen as well, including, yes, there's trade facilitation, but actually investment in manufacturing activities and industrial activities. And I don't think that there was enough of that happening in a lot of African countries. So, actually, when you compare AGOA to GSP, the global generalized system of preferences, you find that some Asian countries have actually utilized GSP. You know, whether it's Bangladesh, which was able to attract manufacturing FDI in apparel, is the big story of Bangladesh, Vietnam as well, and a couple of the Southeast Asian countries. Whereas, a lot of African countries, barring maybe Lesotho, Ethiopia towards the 2010s, was also starting to attract manufacturing FDI. So, I think that was a missing component. And but when I say missing component, let me be very clear. I'm not actually putting the blame on the tool of AGOA itself that within those African countries, maybe they also needed to do more to attract manufacturing FDI in addition to addressing other non-tariff trade barriers. So, that's what has not worked. But there are certain things that have worked. Lesotho is a big success story when it comes to AGOA, Kenya, Madagascar, Ethiopia as well. Sure, the numbers are not as high as they could be, but they're higher than quite a number of African countries, including South Africa, actually, with automobiles. Now, the third and final element of my response to your question is, what should we do going forward? I've written extensively about this. I think we need to make a case for a different trade preference program that speaks to the realities of today. The US has national security priorities around securing supply chains for minerals, primarily, but also other kinds of supply chains. Can African countries be part of that solution to supply chain security in the US, but also in a way that allows them attract the FDI that they need for production and manufacturing, whether it's of the minerals or other kinds of manufactured components. To me, that is the kind of new case that needs to be made in a way that speaks to American priorities, but also addresses African development objectives. So, that would be my big, you know, solution to AGOA. I even have a name for it, a strategic economic partnership with Africa initiative. So, trying to make step with Africa happen as a replacement. >> Well, we wish you good luck with that. Scale is the missing piece in a lot of cases. That scale is what it takes to be competitive and scale is very difficult, particularly when there are high barriers between countries in Africa. That was certainly the case with the DR CAFTA, Central America that we had an opportunity to eliminate barriers and create some scale. Never really worked out as well as we'd hoped. >> And just maybe very quickly on that to wrap up, I think this is a good point to conclude on is, you know, in the African continent now there's the African Continental Free Trade Area, which aims to address that challenge you mentioned of creating scale, of reducing barriers among countries so that they can have bigger sub-regional markets to begin with and then a larger continental market precisely to the point you made about scale. >> Well, that's a good point to conclude on, I think, because we're at time. This has been really enlightening, Dana, and we appreciate your coming on. Thank you very much. We'll have to have you back later on. The recent event I referred to in the beginning about AGOA was that the Senate's passed bill that would fund the government until December 11th also contains a provision that would renew AGOA for two more years. Through which would mean through the end of 2028 since currently it's scheduled to expire at the end of this year. The House bill on the same subject did not contain that provision. So, this will be an issue that has to be worked out when both bodies return in September. So, right now it's in limbo or purgatory depending upon how you want to look at it. But, it's a little bit frustrating because what has happened consistently with the legislative process with respect to AGOA is everybody's for it. Everybody says we should renew it and everybody says we should spend some time really looking into it to figure out how to make it more effective and then they do none of that. And as expiration approaches, what they do is they pass a short-term renewal, which from a standpoint of trying to stimulate investment in the continent is I guess the second worst thing you can do. The worst thing would be not to renew it at all, but one or two-year extension doesn't provide any certainty for investors. And so, just rolling it over from year to year is not really going to make very much difference, I don't think, in these African economies. Hopefully this time around, if they can buy into a two-year extension, then the committees in the Congress will use the time wisely and actually then develop a long-term plan. I mean, there've been proposals to extend it I think for up to 15 years and maybe longer, which would be a good way to go, but so far, you know, everybody's for it, but it's not in the top 10 of things they have to do. And so, it ends up just getting bumped. When they're lucky, it's bumped along for another year or so, but so we may have to have you back another year or two to find out what's going on and what the perspective looks at that time. But for right now, thank you very much. >> Thank you. We always look for a way to wrap up the show with Bill being optimistic. It's hard to catch him in that mode, but you've managed to do that. So, thanks for being with us. >> And my optimism won't last. >> Great. >> We'll try again when you're back. >> Thank you. >> You've been listening to The Trade Guys, a CSIS podcast. For more audio content, visit csis.org/podcasts. Thanks for tuning in. >> [music]