Why Population Collapse is Closer Than You Think - Stephen J. Shaw
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Stephen J. Shaw argues in this podcast episode that global population collapse due to declining birth rates is an imminent and severe crisis, distinct from other existential risks like climate change or AI because it involves a permanent, unrecoverable societal shrinkage rather than extinction. He emphasizes that no nation in history has successfully recovered from long-term low fertility, noting that the total number of people on Earth peaked around 2013; since then, population growth is merely an artifact of increasing longevity and declining death rates masking a precipitous drop in births. Shaw highlights that by age 30, women have only about a 50% chance of ever becoming mothers if they haven't yet conceived, a statistic he believes has been ignored by educational systems focused on career establishment rather than reproductive realities. He points out that even as total population numbers rise due to aging demographics in countries like Japan and South Korea, the number of children being born is falling rapidly, with nations reaching replacement levels (2.1) becoming increasingly rare globally. The core driver identified for this decline is not a lack of desire among women but rather "unplanned childlessness" caused by socioeconomic shifts such as hypergamy—where high-performing women compete for an ever-shrinking pool of ultra-high-earning men—and the prioritization of careers over relationships due to financial insecurity and divorce risks. Shaw critiques anti-natalist ideologies promoted by organizations like Population Connection, which he claims selectively present data on Africa while ignoring the global fertility collapse occurring in developed nations and even parts of India and Brazil. He uses examples from Japan, where entire suburbs are becoming ghost towns with decaying infrastructure and elderly people living alone, to illustrate how low birth rates lead not just to economic strain but profound loneliness and a loss of "futurehood," leaving communities without the youth energy necessary for societal vitality. Shaw challenges the common misconception that societies can simply glide down to an optimal population size or that there are too many people on Earth; instead, he describes the trajectory as a collapsing spiral where birth rates halve every few decades in places like South Korea and Germany. He asserts that current UN projections are flawed because they unrealistically assume fertility will rebound to replacement levels without addressing the underlying mechanisms of modern life design. The conversation also touches upon cultural factors such as increased acceptance of divorce, which reduces women's confidence in committing to family formation, though Shaw clarifies this does not mean staying in bad marriages but rather weighing the risks of relationship instability against the desire for children. He notes that while some view child-free choices as a liberation from burden, he argues that framing parenthood negatively ignores the deep-seated human desire for it and the tragedy of lost potential for those who wish to parent later or at all. Ultimately, Shaw concludes that there is hope if society can reinvent education systems, career structures, and support mechanisms specifically for young people in their 20s to lower the average age of parenting and increase the "vitality curve." He suggests that employers must adapt by offering flexibility so women do not feel forced to choose between careers and families, while policy makers should focus on providing security to young parents rather than relying on magic policies. The discussion underscores a call for honesty about demographic realities without coercion, urging individuals to consider their personal choices regarding family planning seriously before time runs out. Shaw expresses relief that his research has been peer-reviewed in scientific reports confirming these trends and hopes this awareness will shift the cultural narrative away from denial toward proactive solutions involving life design principles where people can realistically balance aspirations with biological constraints.
Read the full video transcript
nearly 3 years ago since we last spoke.
I want to start a fresh.
What is the big question that you're
tackling? The reason for global birth
rate decline. It's what's kept me awake
for 9 years and continues to do so. The
difference now is I feel I know the
answer. It's the answer that keeps me
awake.
And you know that's why I came to Austin
uh after yeah nearly 3 years to share
what it is that the data is revealing.
And uh frankly
I feel a sense of responsibility. I feel
a sense of uh
awareness of what has to happen to
societies for us to have a chance of
combating this. M
>> um and just a reminder if I can Chris,
no nation in history has been known to
recover from long-term low birth rates,
we don't have an example. So sometimes
it's felt over these years um whilst I
mean can I just say when we last talked
almost no one was talking about low
birth rates.
>> Mhm.
>> And I think frankly the conversations we
had then were part of a catalyst. In
fact, I know they were because people
tell me that.
>> That was the basically the launch of
Birthgap, right? The first documentary
you did. Was I the I was pretty much the
first pod that you'd done.
>> My gosh. At that time, um, you
embarrassed me in your introduction. You
mentioned that I had only 5,000 views.
>> I thought this this this is going to go
badly. You know, obviously, uh, you
know, it got up to close to a million.
Um, I think I had 13 followers on on X
at the time. So, really, it was a a
different world for me then. Mhm.
>> But more to the point, if you take the
oneliner from that
podcast that I think is quoted more
often than anything else, we covered a
lot,
>> but that now this is important. At most,
people forget that at most a woman
turning 30 without a child has a 5050%
chance of ever becoming a mother.
And you know, my gosh, I I know that's
hit a lot of people, young people,
especially young women who are frankly
shocked that by age 30, but it's at most
30. I'll come back to that uh a little
bit later if I can. But at that time, I
think that resonated with a lot of
people thinking, well, why don't we know
this? Why is it that we are educating
our young people is great?
telling them to get established on the
career letter. Great. But we're
completely silent on the fact that by
the way, you very well might run out of
time if you want a child. And if I could
just say one of the most moving moments
to me in the past week was uh dear
Charlie Kirk just uh video, the first
one I saw after the tragedy popping up
in my feed. And there was Charlie Kirk
repeating that exact fact to someone in
a in a debate at a university that a
woman turning 30 without a child has a
5050%. I don't know if you watched the
documentary,
>> but I knew that fact got out there. And
um so that was important. You and I have
kept in touch since then. I know a year
ago I sent you uh a message or two that
okay, I think I found something. And you
were curious, but I wasn't ready. And uh
you know, today I'm ready to share a
little bit more on what it is that's
causing this. It's a big reveal. Yeah. I
look, I I got interested in this
conversation around about the time that
we spoke and that really was kind of
like a like a cognitive hammer blow. I
think the conversation that we had, uh,
it is very stark and since then it's
been something that I've really
struggled to get my mind off. Um, I'm
not an ardent campaigner for tons of
stuff. You know, climate change, I
think, is a a big deal, but it's not
something that I'm like sort of
furiously fighting for. Uh, AGI,
bioweapons, engineered pandemics,
natural pandemics, uh, nuclear risk, all
existential risks I got into for a good
while. Like, I'm I'm worried, but like
I'm not actively campaigning for. And
population decline is the strangest kind
of risk. not a true existential risk,
permanent unreoverable collapse, but
it's really not good because it's the
sort of thing that creeps up on us year
after year. There's no smoke in the sky.
There's no increasing wildfires. It's
just this slow and then increasingly
uh uh rapid decline. And
we've both taken a good bit of stick
over the last couple of years, basically
for that one conversation, which is
strange for me because if if I am
[ __ ] patient zero for like the
horrible get women out of the boardroom
and back into the kitchen person, I I
really think that that shows how much
work needs to be done in order to be
able to get this conversation to move
forward and to get people to understand
the genuine um compassionate
progressive justific ifications for why
this is not a good thing individually,
relationally, culturally, economically,
socially, politically. Like there are
every different thing that you care
about whether you're on left or right
pretty much gets impacted by a reduction
in the population size. And um given
that this is only one thing, one of the
third rails that I've decided to touch,
whereas it's a third rail that you just
continually hold your hand on, uh I it's
it's a an odd sort of bravery that
you're not choosing to like it's keeping
you awake. You're compelled to do it at
night. But um yeah, man, I'm I'm glad
that you're out there and as far as I'm
concerned, as far as I can see, you're
the best person doing like the most
cutting edge research, the most sort of
obsessive approach to this. So it feels
cool. It feels like a full circle moment
to have had that first one to have
launched the birth gap documentary.
You've got the second birth gap
documentary which people will be able to
go and watch for free once this
episode's done. And uh yeah, I
it's been a very strange 3 years for me.
Uh feeling right but early on maybe the
most important topic that is going to
capture it's this and AI for me or like
I guess the other reproductive
technology would be um embryo selection
like genetic embryo selection using IVF.
Um those three for me will be the
stories of the next century. Maybe
there's wars, maybe there's like
conflict and stuff, but of news new
things, AI, population decline, and
embryo selection are the three big ones.
And uh no one wants to talk about it
when it's early. Uh so yeah, I guess a
good place to start, people can go and
watch our first episode if they want,
but I really want to just give a the
best primer that we've ever done on
birth rates and what's going on. Why do
birth rates matter? Why is decline a
problem at all? Why should people care?
I would say that
even if you don't care about birth
rates, you should at least understand
that it's going to impact almost
everything in your life, young and old.
In fact, young more than old. By
definition, the young have more years to
live through and they've got to live
through the youth and all the way
through old age.
And the only thing I can possibly think
of that will not be greatly affected by
birth rate decline is parks. I guess
parks will continue to be there. Maybe
they'll become more wilded in some way.
But that's the only thing I'm thinking,
well, okay, parks will still be there.
Everything else in society from how
we've set up our social care, our
pension systems, our health care systems
will whittle away. And that's because we
need people. we need workers to pay for
those. So yeah, it comes back to
economics. Uh and some people don't like
that. Some people then twist that
deliberately, I'm sure, that oh, so this
is just about money. This is just about
supporting the elderly, supporting the
boomers. I get that a lot. No, this is
everybody. When you go to your local
doctor or hospital, you're competing
effectively for a slot to see that
doctor as soon as possible and to have
the best care possible. you're going to
be competing with a lot more older
people for the health care systems that
our nations can support. So the idea
that this won't matter is a fallacy. Um
the social side worries me even more. If
you take cities and I I spent a lot of
time in Detroit, uh six, seven years in
the city, uh found a company there and
you know the thing about Detroit is um
it's today it's reviving. They're
opening the first Apple store in
downtown Detroit right now which to me
is incredible. I remember when the first
store of any kind um opened in downtown
Detroit some 10 years ago when cities
become hollowed out. Now Detroit's birth
rates are not the issue. It's a city
designed for 2 million people.
'7s it had 2 million and within 30 years
there were 700,000 people living there.
What happens then? You can't afford to
pay for the infrastructure. You can't
afford to pay for the city pensions etc
etc etc. People move away. it becomes
infested with fermen but some people
still live there in amongst these
decaying communities. So you have to
think that birth rate decline will have
a similar impact and it is having an
impact in Japan where I've spent most of
the past 8 years. So cuz the reality is
this impacts everybody. Even if you want
to celebrate that we have reached peak
birth that happened over 10 years ago,
you know, go and celebrate that if
that's really, you know, a thing for
you. Uh I can't say it isn't
>> a important that we in some way stop
population growth. But that happened
already. That was then and this is now.
>> So what I really struggle with is and
I'm sure we're going to see it in the
comments here. Every time I do a
podcast, the comments follow that there
are too many people in the world, that
this is the best.
>> What do you think about that argument
that there's too many people in the
world?
>> To be honest with you,
it's like what's the expression about
that, you know, that the horse is
bolted? You know, that was then. If
there's
>> What do you mean that was then?
>> Population is determined by the number
of births more than anything else.
People think it's births and deaths. No,
it's births. Why? Because birth also
predicts how many future births are
going to be. Old people don't have
children at least for now.
>> So all people just slowly live out their
lives. So by looking at the total
headcount on the planet, the total
number of people here, you're mixing
apples and oranges, people living out
their lives and new children being born
who will grow up and have more children.
So it's all about the number of
children. And we reached the total peak
on the planet in 2013. We're already
down something like 5%.
>> And you don't mean population number
because the population number is still
increasing
>> and it will do for some time for some
decades. But that's because people are
not dying. People are living out their
lives in countries where not long ago
people were dying young.
>> So the analogy here is if you had a wave
that was sort of crashing and you're
taking the total volume of the wave can
have a very high peak of the wave that
continues for maybe even longer. on the
back end of that wave it can be a
slowing slope an ever reducing height of
it and then when that highest peak point
crashes off the end which is those
people that are living longer than
previously dying you end up with a very
precipitous drop uh I think it's you
know was it Hans Russell that does that
really great analogy uh that's in your
documentary and he's saying how is it
that you can have fewer people being
born each year but the population number
overall continues to grow and it's
because of this it's because if you have
better uh healthare care technologies,
people are living longer, you get a
increasing but aging population while a
decreasing birth rate isn't yet felt.
And this is I think sort of one of the
real fundamental uh cognitive issues
that people have. There's lots of people
on the planet and the number is going up
but the birth rate is declining. So it
hides what matters most which is how
many young people we have in an
everinccreasing uh population size. And
that is the sort of um foundation to
this was the population bomb concerns
that existed in the 1960s that there's
going to be too many people. The
planet's going to be overpop populated.
Well, there was some uh guy that you
quote in the documentary saying uh if
you have too many children uh you're
going to be like fined or or or put in
jail. This was the concern in sort of
the 60s and the 70s that this was the
future that we were going into. There is
not is there a single country on the
planet that's concerned about too many
young people, too many births? Well,
there might be in certain countries in
southern Africa, but everywhere birth
rates are falling. And right now, as a
whole, subsaharan
African mothers are having one fewer
child every 15 years. So, we're looking
at subsaharan Africa reaching
replacement level. I hate the term and I
I now try to call it stability level
where you get 2.1 children per mother
where you're not growing and you're not
sinking.
>> Um,
>> subsaharan Africa is going to reach that
around 2050. So, even there eight to 7
to six to five and every 15 years you're
losing one of those.
>> Yeah. So at the moment we're down to
around four I believe it is. So um so
the path is clear effectively
everywhere. There are a few outliers but
by definition there are outliers and you
find interesting things when you
scrutinize those there. There's no
country you can look at and say ah
there's a solution that just doesn't
exist.
>> Just to give some headlines here for
people to uh wet their whistle. The
birth rates in Italy, Japan, and Germany
are falling rapidly at exactly the same
rate. Nations like Italy, Japan, and
Germany that have a birth rate of 1.4
per woman will decay by 1/3 per
generation. That means that in two
generations, the population will fall by
over half and in three generations by
70%. 70% fewer Italians, Japanese, and
Germans. So, this isn't just Japan
anymore. This isn't just something
that's happening weirdly out in the
east. This is slap bang in the middle of
developed Europe. There are half the
number of children in Germany as there
were 50 years ago. Today, 75% of us live
below the replacement rate tipping
point. By 2020, every country in Europe,
apart from Iceland, had more
50-year-olds than newborns. And even in
subsaharan Africa, birth rates have been
falling fast. Women are having one fewer
child each for every 15 years that
passed.
>> Yeah. And you know, let's I mean, we
could talk about South Korea e even
worse where for every South Korean born
today, births are going to half
in less than 20 years. So by the time a
child born in South Korea today reaches
college age, the country is going to
need half the number of daycarees and
soon after elementary schools and high
schools. And by the time a South Korean
gets to the typical age of becoming a
parent, which is late 30s, it's going to
half again. So the communities they grow
up in will have one quarter of the
number of daycare centers. So
we have those, well, I'm not going to
call them outliers because to me they're
a potential
>> first movers.
>> First movers. Exactly. Um,
>> but on the other hand, we have Brazil
with a birth rate of 1.5 now. almost the
same getting down to levels in Europe
and Japan. We have parts of southern
India with birth rates around the same
level too. 32 out of 36 states in India
have below replacement fertility.
>> India
births in India peaked
in 2001.
India has gone through 24 years of
falling births.
We haven't noticed it. In fact, it
overtook China to become the most
populous country on earth not that long
ago. M
>> so why back to Hans Rosling's great
example again using building block using
building blocks to show how we you know
have countries that for a time
>> increased total population people in
India used to die very young they're not
they're living out their lives and just
to go back to you know what this century
might see in terms of the new waves of
uh technologies or crisis uh longevity
keeps coming up and if you put longevity
on the table here let's say we all live
twice twice as long. Well, in simple
terms, overly simple terms, the
population of the planet would double
because we're all going to be here for
twice as long.
>> Now, I don't hear the antiatalists who
attacked me also starting to criticize
longevity. I think they'd be quite happy
to live twice as long.
>> So, it's part of the contradiction to me
and what their motives might be. But,
you know, this is no longer about Europe
and Japan. This is about the US, Canada,
Australia, but it's also about Latin
America. It's also about southern India.
>> Um, Thailand birth rate now 1.2.
>> These are places that I think if you
were to ask a normal person on the
street, do you think that they're having
lots of kids? Oh, they're breeding like
rabbits.
>> Yeah. I mean,
that you know, why is it it takes so
long for us all? I mean, I'm I've been
studying this for 10 years coming from
data science. um feels like 20 years but
uh you know I'm quite new to this
compared to some other demographers who
have for many decades had these
concerns. So why is it that societies we
don't know about this? Why is it such a
shock? And the reality is our education
systems are teaching us about the past
>> and continue to do so. And it's probably
not just about human geography. It's
probably other things too. Uh and that's
part of the problem. We're educating
young people on the idea that birth
rates and I mean a great anti
antiatalist tactic. I know it is because
they're the ones create the charts.
They'll tell you in the year 1800 there
were only 1 billion people and they'll
draw this curve and the curve will go up
and up and now we're up to 8 billion and
then they stop there
and that's in education textbooks and
that's what kids are learning.
>> Roll the roll the projection forward
until 2150 for me.
>> Yeah. And if you ask them that, they'll
then do something quite clever, too.
They'll kind of show it flattens. It's
like, oh, in the year 2100, 2150, we'll
still have billions of people. They
won't tell you, yeah, that most of those
people are going to be over 65 and need
care and the shrinking number of births
will be an ongoing thing at the current
levels.
>> Do the projections for me. What's the
global population going to look like
2050, 2100, 2150, 2200?
>> I I I'm at the point, Chris, where I I
almost don't care. I just want us to
survive. You know, it's a point. It's at
a point now for me, and you made a
comment at the start that it's not
existential. I'm not so sure. I believe
you're right. It's not going to be
extinction, but I think it's going to be
a lot more severe than we expect. I used
to think, well, after a century or so,
some new society will emerge, and maybe
there'll be societies that we like,
maybe societies that we don't like,
maybe they'll be repressive in some
ways, maybe they'll be high in
religiosity. Who knows what might
happen? But there'll be societies that
promote uh having family pronatalism.
>> Pronatalism in some capacity.
I now
think that that's a vast
oversimplification of what has to happen
based on my more recent findings.
>> Trust me, you are like this is all stuff
that for me is cutting edge that you're
now saying is old hat and there's a new
new thing to be scared about. I was
already scared but had a little bit of
hope that on the other side.
>> Yeah, I I'm sorry. The harbinger of
[ __ ] demographic doom here.
>> The good news uh as I see it.
Um
>> [ __ ] I need some good news. Holy [ __ ]
>> The good news is I think it's quite
clear what what what the problem is now.
>> Okay. Um, but maybe I can go back uh to
Japan last summer when I thought I'd
finished. I completed my first research
paper
>> uh which has just been peer reviewed and
published in scientific reports. So I I
was happy a year ago I'd done all that
research
>> and it shows all the key thing we were
talking about in the last podcast is
that mothers across all these countries
are having around the same number of
children as the 1970s and 1980s. That
was the shocking thing that you know I
was sharing uh two to three years ago
and it still shocks people that in the
US in the 1980s mothers were having 2.4
children. No not not average woman
mothers once you had the first child it
was 2.4 and today it's 2.6. So family
size in the US has actually increased.
In the UK in 1970 mothers were having it
2.3 I believe children. Today it's the
same in effect. Japan 2.2 in 1970. Today
the same. This is nothing to do with
family size. It's to do with
childlessness. So the very first, you
know, discovery I made, I believe it was
a discovery because it wasn't being
talked about and still surprises a lot
of people including demographers is that
no, this is actually focused on
childlessness. And then you get into the
debate of why that is. But a year ago, I
was sitting in Kyoto having literally
finished all my charts for the paper
just published and I thought, you know
what? I'm going to prepare some charts
and data for my next paper because I
know what I want to write about or what
I want to study.
And it goes back to our first podcast
and it goes back to that statement that
I made that uh
at most half of women turning 30
50/50 have a 50% chance of becoming a
mother.
And I wasn't very satisfied by that
comment to you because I use this term
at most. And why was that? Because the
data I had at that point was grouped
into five year age spans. 20 to 24 year
olds, 25 to 29 year olds, 30 to 34 year
olds. And I saw it was under 30. So
that's why at most, but I knew it was
probably a little bit less.
>> And I decided, okay, I'm now going to
plot this data. I found all the sources.
I had it for 39 countries going back
decades for 300 million mothers. And
this night in Kyoto, Japan, I set up my
database and I just run the test to make
sure I could see what I was expecting.
Well, what was I expecting? I was
expecting to see by age of mother some
form of curve. Not many people having
children in the teens these days. Sure.
probably a peak after college age, a
little peak, then another peak maybe
around 30. I don't know why it just
seemed around 30 might be an age and
then you would certainly see a peak of
people, you know, who pursue careers
around 35 becoming mothers and you would
definitely see a peak from IVF.
None of those peaks were there. I was
staring at a near perfectly smooth bell
curve by age.
Now this was for Japan
and I looked at the same data for
well multiple countries, multiple years,
one and a half thousand data sets and
with a few small caveats.
There was a smooth curve everywhere.
And I stared at that chart for two to
three hours.
And I wrote myself an email, which I've
only done that one time in my life cuz I
wanted to remember that moment. And the
email said something like, "We're all
the same."
And what I meant was we might think that
we get to decide to become parents, but
we don't. something else decides because
this perfectly smooth curve indicated
there's something much more fundamental
in nature that was determining
parenthood
>> crosscultural
>> cross-cultural cross everything cross
religion
across all sorts of strata
demographically whatever way you want it
all stack
>> different economic setups different
levels of capitalism and not
>> exactly and through economic crisis
changes in political regimes in some
nations uh there is a caveat I I I
should say it now because I don't want
to forget and it's not an exception.
It's just an interesting case and that's
the US. In US you don't have one curve,
you have multiple stacked curves. So you
have a a nearperfect curve for
Asian-Americans who are having children
later than other demographic groups. You
have the start of a curve for
African-Americans who are starting to
have children younger than other groups.
And then in the middle you got this kind
of mix. But it is a stacked set of
curves. I can tell from that immediately
uh it would make a great research
project if anybody's interested to dive
into this for the US but I can tell the
US is not a particularly cohesive nation
because almost every other nation you
have one curve.
>> Oh that's so interesting. So what you're
saying is that uh the multiculturalism
that exists in the US is uh skewing the
US number overall to actually be broken
out by the demographics the different
cultures of the people that are inside
of it.
>> Yes. Right. And is it right to say that
the US is like the most multicultural
nation on the planet?
>> Well, from the data I've seen 39
nations, there's no question of that
because I mean, in effect, what it means
um is that Asian-Americans mostly are
not dating
other races. Of course, there'll be
exceptions. Of course, there are. But I
can see an incredibly clear curve. And
I've heard it said in the past, I think
I have, you know, why don't
Asian-Americans marry African-Americans
so much? I don't know if that's right,
but I can see it in the data because
African-Americans are mostly having
children much earlier than
AsianAmericans are even starting to
think about it.
>> So, um, you know, the US is an
interesting case, but it's kind of the
rule that kind of, you know, proves that
there's something happening at a much
more fundamental level even within the
US now. Um, so that was Kyoto last
summer. I thought I was finished and
suddenly now I have this responsibility.
Um, all I was expecting to come on your
show one more time and tell you the
exact age where a woman has a 50% chance
is 28 28. I thought that was all I was
going to really do that evening.
And no, now I've got another research
question and this one bothers me because
it means that really there's no
autonomy. There's autonomy not to have a
child or at least most places in the
world. And that's a good thing for those
who don't want which isn't that many.
But we're all
linked to some greater factor
force-like factor because it's so
predictable. So let me just share how
predictable this is
>> when I'm doing my research now. 300
million mothers 39 nations multiple
decades. I don't care about the name of
the country. I don't care about the
year. Everything goes into one big pot
for my analysis because it actually
doesn't matter. So here's what matters.
Age.
You might say, "Well, yes. So what? Age?
Fertility? Biology?" No, no, no, no, no.
At all.
It's the average age of parenthood in a
nation
more than anything else that determines
overall rates of motherhood and
childlessnesses and birth rates.
There's an extension to that which is
how far stretched those years are.
And there's a third factor which is
there are some bumps in these curves
which are interesting and they're a
factor too. But with those three things
alone you can get
heristically over 90% accuracy in
predicting rates of motherhood and
childlessness irrespective of the nation
irrespective of anything else. And
because we know that the big difference
in birth rate is between non-mothers and
mothers, not between mothers who have
one child and mothers who have five
children. This is the main thing. So it
maybe is a not reductive, but it's a a
lower resolution way to look at this,
but this builds on your previous piece
of work, which is, hey, the reason for
birth rate decline is not because
mothers are having fewer children. It's
because fewer women are becoming mothers
overall. Once you have the first child,
you are more likely to go on to have
realistically and in some situations
even more children than previous. Uh but
this allows you to work out the average
age of motherhood. So that's if you have
this bell curve that is how left or
right shifted it is. You have the sort
of um uh tail of the distribution which
tells you sort of how long it is, how
wide that thing is and then you've got
some little peaks that are inside of it.
Is that is that a fair way to summarize
it?
>> It's a very good way to summarize it. Um
but there's a a very cunning element to
this almost a trap
when the average age of motherhood and
fatherhood we have some data thankfully
for fathers here we talk too much about
women I do but it's because we've got so
much data on birth records
>> but this is fathers too
>> when the average age of motherhood was
young early 20s the curve had a really
high peak
>> because around the same time people were
on the same page and you had a lot of
evidently in the data pair bonding. 95%
would be a typical number of people
having a child within a few years of
that early 20 peak.
But as the average age of motherhood and
fatherhood has extended, the curve has
flattened and has flattened at a
predictable accelerating rate. So as it
shifts right later, it also gets lower
and longer
>> longer but at an accelerating rate of
collapse,
>> right?
>> And that's what it is. So
>> what does this mean? Just for the people
that don't work well with graphs,
visualizing graphs in their mind.
>> Yes.
>> Uh can you uh give an example? Um
>> yeah. Um so let me try this one. So back
in the day for many of us maybe uh you
know my parents generation uh younger
people's grandparents generation there
might have been of course no internet um
there might have been
the town dance there might have been on
a Saturday night 8:00 p.m. everybody in
the town got together all the young
people and from 8:00 p.m. to 11 p.m.
Everybody would be there and there'd be
a bit of gossip at the start. You know,
anybody new, anybody bring their cousin
from out of town, any breakups, any new
relationships,
um maybe hoping to get to talk to
someone you hadn't talked to or danced
with before. As the evening progressed,
you might get to this midpoint where you
have energy and you get this kind of
maximum point where people are dancing
and laughing and getting to know one
another and maybe some relationships
blossoming from that moment. And then
towards the end of the evening, less
energy as people start to go home some
early and probably not the optimal time
to introduce her to yourself to someone
late in the evening. Well, imagine in
this town, hypothetically, the manager
had a great idea. Instead of opening
from 8 to 11:00, I'm going to open 700
p.m. and stay open till 1:00 a.m. It's
now going to be 6 hours because we're
going to get even more energy. But the
population of the town is the same. So
all you've done now is distribute the
same energy over 6 hours. Some people
come early hoping to meet someone, then
get bored and go home. Other people have
dinner first and come later. Other
people meet someone they think they like
and then turn their head at 9:00 when
someone new comes in that they they want
to get to know and they might get a slap
in their face and that's the end of that
opportunity.
I think what is happening is the exact
same loss of energy. I've got a word for
it, vitality.
I've even got a formula for it. So, as
this curve is stretched, as we have now
what 20 years to consider starting a
family as a woman,
>> 20 to 40ish,
>> right? A man might imagine they have a
little bit longer. That energy is sapped
out. This lack of vitality. Quite
simply, the chance of you meeting
someone that you're prepared to make a
lifetime commitment to, especially if it
involves creating a child together. Um,
the chance of you being on the same page
with someone you happen to meet randomly
goes down rapidly compared to that
really compressed early 20s when the
likelihood was everyone around was
thinking the same thing within a year or
two or three. And that's why I feel um
this sense of I don't want to say gloom
but the sense of scale of what we have
to do
>> because mathematically based on the
evidence of 39 countries and 300 million
mothers and a similar number of fathers
um
I can't see any way out of this crisis
unless the average age of motherhood
goes back to a much much younger age and
I haven't yet worked out what that is.
>> Could you not squeeze the age together
but have it be higher?
>> Right. So,
>> it's an obvious first question.
>> Yeah. Well, actually, it's a good first
question. I haven't been asked it before
to be honest, but you're right. If you,
for example, could keep men and women
apart,
>> Mhm. literally until they're 27 and then
suddenly bring them together. You in
theory could have that same peak within
a 3 to four five year period and you
might have the same high birth rates.
>> But that's not realistic in any scenario
I can see. And that's part of the
problem actually in in every scenario
this curve is still left anchored at
around say age 18. So you can't shift
the curve because people at 18 the race
starts at 18. Some people settle down at
18 and some people are thinking, "Wait a
minute, I like that girl at 18. I I you
know, I've lost her. I've lost him."
>> So the the process starts and again back
to this curve. Why is it that the number
of 18 year olds who become parents is is
less than 19 year olds, 20-year-old, 21,
I mean it just keeps going up and up and
up and then down and down and down.
>> What's the middle of the curve mostly
for most countries?
>> Yeah, it's 30 29.6 30. South Korea,
interestingly, is one of the higher
ones, getting close to 32 now. And I
think that's why their birth rates are
so low because what you can see in the
data for South Korea is a secondary
effect,
which is
almost uniquely a significant increase
in one child families that does not
exist. For example, in Japan,
>> um Japan about 20% of families in Japan
are having one child only. around the
world it's typically 15% 20%. In South
Korea it's 40%.
>> And that's because they're skewed later
which means that you get fertility
problem.
>> Then you get biology becoming a factor
at that point.
>> Yeah.
>> You've said a bunch of times already
that a woman turning 30 without a child
has a 50% chance of ever becoming a
mother at most. Can you just explain the
mechanism that's causing that to happen
because it it it requires a little bit
of explaining.
>> Yeah.
And it's hard to accept because you know
um we want to believe we've got
autonomy. We want to believe uh
adamantly that we
within reason have a good chance of
becoming a parent as much in our 30s as
in our 20s.
>> Especially given that you've got stats
like more women had children over the
age of 40 than under the age of 20.
>> Right. And and again with Yeah. If we
get on to the world of you media
headlines and surveys, you know, that
could be a whole other conversation. So,
there's a lot of misinformation. We are
the reason we're having more births over
40 is not because it's it's an overall
increase. It's that curve has stretched
and crept into our 40s, but at the same
time brought down birth rates at younger
years. to get to answer your question.
Um
I think we overestimate
the challenge of on one level settling
down as we start to form our own lives.
>> Mhm.
>> At a younger age,
we're more flexible. By the time we're
in our 30s, we already know pretty much
probably where we want to live, uh what
neighborhood of town we want to live in,
where we want to go on vacation, where
the kind of friends that we now have, we
want to our our our partner to like our
friends, we want to like their friends.
We we want to have the same pastimes and
hobbies. So the idea that, oh, I'm just
going to randomly meet. No, now your
criteria list is longer and longer and
at the same time there are fewer and
fewer choices. people are becoming
people mostly still do become parents
>> and the potential options to to find
that perfect partner or even
>> with higher standards.
>> Yeah. Right. So what do we do? Well, we
wait longer and then longer and longer
and time fades away. But if you look at
it from a more mathematical point of
view,
um there's, you know, and there's a
a topic called game theory. I don't know
if you come into game theory at all.
It's fascinating. I've taken a class or
two in it and uh
>> I've modeled this exact is this exact
crisis using game theory.
Now in game theory, if anybody wants to
watch the or has watched Beautiful Mind
with Russell Crowe, um wonderful movie
in in its own right, it covers his
discovery of what's called uh the Nash
>> equilibrium
>> equilibrium.
And a Nash equilibrium is when two
people uh decide that it's in their
mutual interest not to change their
outcome. And it it it can be in
financial markets, it can be literally
gaming, you know, it can be playing card
games, it can be sure partnering
and I haven't done it justice there, but
when you look at pair bonding, to me
evidently, it is a Nash equilibrium.
You've got two people who've decided, do
you know what? It's in my best interest
to stay with this person rather than
change to anybody else. And that other
person has to think the same thing,
>> especially when it has a cost. And game
theory talks about cost. So here the
cost is you're going to have a child
together and that makes it more
difficult to um have a child with
someone else. You you're making a
long-term commitment. So it's a big
decision. Now what happens when you
model birth rate decline using Nashig
equilibrium? What do you get? A perfect
bell curve.
You get most people matching somewhere
around the middle and you get this fall
off at either side. And what happens
when you model this? When you stretch
out that curve, when you stretch out
those years, well, you find a collapsing
curve. Exactly like we see
>> less area under the curve as well as a
lower peak.
>> Yes.
>> Right. And I guess you need to add into
this the fact that if you start to shift
it, right, that adds additional
complexity on because of the limits of
biology.
>> Yeah. which is South Korea's problem
right now.
>> It's also our IVF problem right now. IVF
is a wonderful thing for some people,
the lucky ones. But I can see in the
data overall, I mean this is going to be
controversial, but I have to say it. Uh
the more society encourages
later in later reproductive life
technology, the lower the overall chance
of a person ever becoming a parent
>> because they're not going to find a
partner.
>> There's other factors like not finding a
partner. People will delay and delay
thinking, "Hey, all this technology
now."
>> Mhm.
>> And it could be other things too, but
for me, finding that partner is the
biggest one.
>> Okay, I'm going to try and recap because
it is kind of it is a little complex to
even for me, someone that's been
swimming in this for a while, wrap my
head around.
The original vitality curve was a uh
more cohesive uh tighter, sharper peak,
which is most people in their early 20s
went looking for a partner. The dance
party at which they were trying to
couple up was relatively narrow. And
that meant that if you met somebody, it
was reliable that their timeline was the
same as yours, that their goals were the
same as yours, and that you were both
ready and committed to get into a
relationship, get married, start a
family, do all of those things together.
right
>> now because and I'm going to find out
why because why which we haven't got
into uh but at least what's happened in
terms of the numbers this uh curve has
flattened so there are more people
choosing to start
looking for a partner coupling
committing starting uh a family at
differing times which means that of the
overall pool of people which is actually
bigger so you'd think well there's more
likelihood of me finding somebody but
there is a greater variance in when
people want to. I'm 37. I'm ready. You
are 30. You are not. That that's the uh
an imbalance that typically wouldn't
have happened because everybody would
have been squeezed together and
everybody would have agreed on um
culturally agreed on when this is
supposed to happen overall. So as you
shift the average age to the right
because people have got things to do
with their lives, women are in
education, employment, socioeconomic
uplift, all the rest of this stuff,
independence, which we can get into.
That's pushed it to the right. That uh
hits a hard biological wall. That brings
the height down. You also lose height
because it's flatter generally because
you have this greater variance, which
means that for every one person that you
meet, there are only 0.1 people who are
at the same stage as you. Also, if you
shift it further to the right, you have
this uh Luis Par Perry calls it the lamp
effect, which is if you are moving into
an apartment and there's nothing in the
apartment, you need to buy a lamp, it's
really easy to find a lamp that fits the
apartment. But if you've spent 10 years
building the perfect interior design,
finding the lamp that fits that very
carefully crafted interior design is
super tough. This is the same as
somebody who's ready to build a life
with someone versus somebody who's
already built a life and tries to find
someone who slots into it. That second
version is much more difficult because
well I'm not compromising on my career
so much. I know where I want to live.
I've got a preference about no I know
what I want for a diet. You you have
these preferences and they begin to get
locked in and oified as a part of
yourself or this is a part of me. This
is who I am. And it's a a big predictor
of where I take my self worth from as
opposed to I take my selfworth from my
partner and from us being together in
this way. We have built a life together
as opposed to I have built a life and do
you slot into it perfectly? And as you
push that later, that preference uh
challenge becomes a a higher wall for
people to get over, which again makes it
less likely. So not only do you need to
be at the right stage, the same as me,
but I now have uh an even greater number
of criteria that you need to be able to
take off in order for this thing to
work. What am I missing? No, that's it.
I mean, to be honest, you've done a
really succinct job of describing
exactly it. I've actually got a name for
this overall process. Fatality curve is
the curve, but the process I'm calling
reproductive synchrony. Okay. Yep.
That's the nice a nice term for it. As a
man who likes giving unnecessary names
to things, it's got my seal of approval.
>> So I I you know I think this re and to
to share more broadly part of my
research right now has extended into
other species. This is not humanentric
at all. M
>> if you look at prairie vos, if you look
at wolves, if you look at seahorses,
other animals that pair bond, you also
have gaussian curves, these bell curves.
Now, they have not been researched and
we can't say they're necessarily the
same thing, but it may well be that this
is evolutionary trait. Mhm.
>> The evolution itself has determined that
those species or those cultures or
societies
>> that get it right early on are the ones
that evolution chooses to
>> That's interesting. That's interesting.
So you need this this suggests
reproductive synchronicity. Yes.
>> Yes. Reproductive synchrony is
>> synchrony. Sorry. reproductive synchrony
suggests that cohesion like uh cultural
cohesion is a big part of this. So I
guess the obvious next question uh
assuming that everybody's keeping up.
I'm holding on for dear life but I this
is [ __ ] fascinating. Um
what are the driving factors behind the
vitality curve moving
>> in terms of height in terms of uh left
to right and in terms of distribution?
>> Yeah. So this goes back to uh our
conversation on the last podcast and the
first part of my documentary where we
see sudden shifts in this average age of
parenthood. It's very clear in the data.
Um and it in simple terms is linked to
moments of financial crisis.
So you can go back to 1973,774
in much of Europe and Japan, 71 in the
US, mid '90s in Korea and more recently
after the mortgage crisis shock in the
US and many other countries 0708. And
what do you see? Well, mothers, parents
who already have one child, really no
change at all in their progression to
have two, three, four or more children
as before. You would barely notice that
there's been a crisis. But you see that
those who have not had a child suddenly
delaying parenthood because there's a
sudden drop in first-time births.
>> How sudden do I mean? Well, the paper
just published has a section describing
Japan. in 1974,
the last quarter of 1974,
every single prefecture in Japan, 47 I
believe, um
they all whether were they were
metropolitan, whether they were rural or
the tropical beaches of Okanawa, every
single one of those saw an identical
trend, a drop in first-time births in
that quarter. Well, that's kind of
confusing because there's no financial
shock in 1974 until you really what
happened 9 months earlier. Uh, well,
actually 12 months earlier, which is
interesting. You had the oil shock.
Japan, the biggest oil importer in the
world. I show in the documentary the
reels of the shelves, all it was like
COVID, you know, times 10. It was just
everything sold out in those days. Mass
panic buying. and a nation that had gone
through this period postwar of rapid
growth suddenly realizing without oil
they have a problem what happened
naturally parents across all of Japan
every prefecture decided sorry
non-parents wait a minute not this year
maybe next maybe next same after the
lean mortgage crisis we say yep so after
the financial crisis in the US uh we can
see in the data that this measure
that demographers unfortunately still
use. I feel sorry for so many
demographers, the total fertility rate,
uh which measures this thing called the
average woman that doesn't exist. Um but
still it's a measure that we tend to use
mostly. The average woman started having
fewer children and that decline is known
to be mapped back to that period of
time. But the measures I introduced in
in my recent paper show that the average
mother the TMR the total maternal rate
didn't change at all
>> changed explain the difference between
TFR and TMR.
>> So this has just come out in my my
recent paper and uh it tries it
separates the average woman into two
women which is a step forwards
mothers and non-mothers.
So the average mother the total
fertility rate really to me has been the
reason demography has missed many of
these trends in recent decades
there is no average mother simply
because you can't be a mother and a
nonmother at the same time
if you look at the TMR the proportion of
women who are becoming mothers
>> that number descended sharply after 0809
it was around 08 8 uh point five even
women in the US were becoming mothers
prior to that. Now it's heading down
close to 0.6. So
>> so it's gone from most to nearly half.
>> Yes. And it's left the US today. Uh so
we know from CDC national family growth
surveys which are are the most reliable
thing we have for the US. We know that
90% or more of women either have or want
children during their fertile years.
6,000 interviews. It used to be all inh
home interviews which are highly
accurate. Now it's a hybrid which has
made it a little bit more blurry but
it's given us a very good sense
>> 90%
>> have or want children around the age 30
right
>> and
when you compare that to the TMR which
to the US is now heading towards 60% it
means that for every 10 women in America
today if fertility patterns stay the
same as they are now
one out of 10 would choose not to have
children,
but only six will have children. Another
three will be women who are I use the
term unplanned childlessness.
>> Involuntary childlessness.
>> Well, this is another term and I
appreciate the chance to just clarify.
Um, voluntary childlessness is easy.
Choosing not to have children.
Involuntary is well defined as people
who have medical issues. So either Oh,
>> now that can be you had a disease,
there's something just not medically the
way it should be. Or it can be you've
tried IVF and it's failed.
>> Mhm. Mhm.
>> The other side,
the bigger side is this circumstantial
childlessness I call unplanned
childlessness, which is now let's so
let's link all this together.
>> Japan going back all these waves of
delaying parenthood. people, they
weren't saying, "I don't want kids now
because of the shock. I've changed my
mind." They were saying, "Not yet. Not
yet."
And that's what's happened. We've slid
into this world of delay parenthood
through people saying not yet.
>> And of course, when people were saying
not yet, they were doing something else.
They were pursuing their careers
>> or education.
Sure, good thing. But there's a
consequence to that. If people are
pursuing their careers longer, it
becomes a societal norm to pursue your
careers longer. In fact, it becomes a
risk of vulnerability particularly to
women to have children younger. So
suddenly you've pulled the needle later
and later and later
and the fear of fears I have in this
time moves forwards.
It's easy to stretch the age of
parenthood as a society.
It's easy to say, well, not this year,
not 25, 27, 29, next year, next year.
>> How, as a society, even if people want
to, and I think a lot do, as a society,
how do we kind of go back in time?
Because we have to go through a
turbulent period where people, let's say
over 27 are still having the kids they
want to have,
>> but we have a new bubble of younger
people at the same time coexisting. We
need a new and that's where
to me the only hope lies that we do have
a group of younger people saying wait a
minute I I don't like what I'm hearing
>> that doesn't work unless you can do it
in a coordinated manner because you
can't be one person at 22 want the
equivalent of a population bubble of a
small number of people at 22 you need a
large social movement overall okay so
one thing that's been in my head as
we've been talking like the obvious
question and this is what happens when I
speak to anybody about this stuff,
whether it's Lyman Stone or Brad Wilcox
or the the uh Luis Perry, no matter who
it is that I speak to about this, Simona
Malcolm Collins,
uh one of the coolest questions that
people love to ask is why are birth
rates declining? And
what you're suggesting here is that
there's actually sort of two buckets of
answers. One is uh social, cultural,
expectational, psychological, financial,
educational, you know, all of these
things that are occurring to people that
make them feel like something's going
on, but that is feeding into
this dynamic and the dynamic is
reproductive synchrony
uh or vitality curve stuff. Is that a
way to look at it? Because it seems like
the vitality curve is shifted.
>> Mhm. And there's when people say why
what you could give an answer
justifiable answer based on today is
well the vitality curve has moved and
flattened
>> that that that is why but it's also not
why does that make sense?
>> Yeah. But it changes the question. The
question then becomes why is the
fatality curve shifted which is the
right question to ask rather than why
are birth rates falling. So suddenly we
can start to ask the right question and
I think that moves us forward a lot
>> because it's a much more direct
intervention to say what we need to do
is shift this curve back. It's a more
accurate question, more precise
question. Okay. So I guess
I mean can I just add in I mean with
greatest respect to everyone else
researching in this field um there are
multiple interesting factors. Um I mean
for example
falling sperm counts keeps coming up and
I I
just to explain
if there were falling sperm counts we
would not get a vitality curve of this
shape. We just wouldn't um
>> because it would be
>> it would be skewed in some wayed.
>> Yeah. And you would see over time this
impact it would have
>> this curve exists and it's shifted
rightwards but at different times in
different countries. So you'd be saying
kind of well yeah the the spurb count
suddenly affected people of all age in
Japan 20 years before the US. It just
doesn't make sense. Now those issues
like that may still be a major problem
to increasing the fatality curve.
>> Mhm.
>> Uh but they're operating at a level
that's not as powerful as the curve
itself which is effectively defining
governing the number of people who
become parents.
>> Okay. And to put it in some context
heristically,
90% of birth rate decline
is related to the average age and
vitality. 10% is everything else.
>> How do you know that?
>> Because if you um because there's a
formula if you look at I went if we go
back to what I said earlier. You've got
the average age of parenthood. You've
got the stretch. Those are important
factors, but you also got some little
ripples. They do exist some
imperfections
and you can clearly see that okay those
imperfections
um are kind of defy
this kind of
>> lawike law of nature
>> and you realize oh actually we can do
something through policies and
incentives you look at Hungary and there
was a bubble of people
>> or else there wouldn't be ripples
>> there wouldn't be ripples
>> so we can do something
>> right interventions that are available
>> but they're so minor compared to the
overall part of the curve itself
>> understood Right. Okay. Yeah, that makes
that makes sense. Um, I asked the
question, "What causes the vitality
curve to shift?" The first thing that
you said was financial crisis. Um, a lot
of the time when you ask people, uh,
what are your, uh, what's your desire
for children? Do you want to have
children? Why have you not yet have
children? Why do you not plan yet to
have children, etc. Uh, at least if you
look at social media, one of the first
places people will go to is
just don't have the money, cost of
living crisis, etc. This to me you
saying financial crisis would just play
straight into that. So okay it is how
much money people feel like they have
and that they need to have kids and if
they have this threat this looming
spectre of uh economic uncertainty or a
real felt uh sense of economic scarcity
uh in their own lives and lives the
people around them don't want to have
kids. Is that true? Why did you go first
to financial why is that the predictive
uh driver?
>> Yeah. Um, so one really noticeable fact
here is that after these crises, the
average usage of parenthood doesn't go
back. The curve doesn't go up. It
becomes locked in even when times become
more prosperous.
>> So if it were simply correlated to
finance alone, you would see a curve
shifting later and then shifting back or
or shifting up again in some context. It
simply
>> it would be related to environmental
security in that way.
>> Yeah. Well, you you find that um
vulnerability
rationally causes people to delay.
>> But you equally find that because it's a
societal synchrony getting everybody to
synchronize suddenly to take um the risk
particularly for women to have a child
earlier.
>> Why does it ratchet only later and not
earlier?
>> I don't know how. So I I like to use
Japanese terminology for it. It's it's
very clear. In Japan, Japan's employment
system is very hierarchical based on the
year you started working for a company.
In fact, right the way through rather
than by performance. So you have um
senpai is your boss, Kohai is your
junior.
And particularly if you're a woman, if
you have a child before your boss,
before senpai, Kohai will probably get
your job.
>> Okay?
>> If you wait till senpai has her child,
you will probably get her job.
>> So there is this kind of everyone's
frozen in the headlights thinking, well,
when is the right time to take the step
out the career ladder? when I get to
that certain point and you're looking at
those people who
entered employment a little bit before
you mostly and looking at the societal
norm. Now, how do you go back? How do
you then say, "Okay, Kohai, you can go
first now. You know, we're going to go
back to your age."
>> It feels much more risky. Um, yeah,
that's that's fascinating. That's and
that that would explain the ratchet
thing. you don't have a god's eye
coordination issue to be able to drag
people back because the tendency of I'll
just wait and it is you know it
fundamentally is from a financial
perspective safer to wait financially it
is safer to wait right the single
biggest predictor of wealth is age you
get more wealthy as you get older if the
thing that you are optimizing for is
wealth uh which is security right this
will uh it's a prophylactic against the
financial crisis that just happened Oh,
[ __ ] hell. Like, I'm going to stick
about. What if things don't go well
again in the future? I'll be all right.
I'll I'll I'll keep pushing forward. Uh
it doesn't surprise me that then
shifting that back is something that
wouldn't happen. Um
>> yeah. And I, you know, this this may be
the great gotcha that nature has planted
for us that there's no going back.
>> It only pushes us later and later. what
um I I I just want to sink into sort of
what's happening with uh women's culture
uh their interpretation of having
children. This is something that we
talked about a lot on the last episode.
People got really pissed. Let's do it
again. Um what is happening with women's
desire for children? The culture around
um becoming mothers, child rearing. Uh
there was a number last time that we
spoke about which was 80% of women who
reach menopause without children didn't
intend to not have children. Does that
still hold up?
>> Yeah. Um there is a caveat and it's only
a temporary one. So it does hold up. Uh
when you look at nations that have gone
through this transition to low birth
rates, high childlessness, it holds up.
Um so if you go back 30 40 years and
you're looking at the 1960s when
childlessness in the US many countries
might have been 5%.
>> Um
>> it was much lower which suggests that
the people who did it were doing it
through valition.
>> Exactly.
>> But we're talking about the modern
world. [ __ ] that. [ __ ] the 60s.
>> Well you say that but you know the
number of researchers. My gosh.
>> Oh well if we go back to the 60s you'll
actually find that
Chris
cohort studies. It's just a [ __ ]
selection effect. Are these people are
these people actually stupid? Like it's
just a select. It's the same as saying,
"Well, look, the divorce rate's going
down." It's like, "Yeah, because the
marriage rate's going down because the
only people getting married are the ones
who are really certain that they want to
get married." Well, this is just a a
kind of plea to the world of demography
and researchers for a second. Stop being
so [ __ ]
>> Stop using cohort for your predictions
of the future compared to period based
risk of what's happening right now. And
it it you know, we see it all over the
place. And I get accused even recently
by senior professors saying, "No, we saw
some data for a cohort study." Yeah, it
was women born in the 1960s compared to
the 1940s. Of course, family size went
down back that far ago because cohort uh
studies take decades to to
>> All right, bring us into the 21st
century. What do women think about
having kids?
>> Yeah, I see no evidence of change. The
CDC numbers um have fallen a little bit.
It used to be uh 95% of women have or
want children around that that age of of
30. Uh now it's it's closer to 90%. Um
so there is a shift downwards but
there's also been other shifts that have
gone on at the same time of delayed uh
parenting and you know all washed out.
you know, I have talked to I mean the
documentary 24 countries uh 230 people
interviewed mostly women uh often you
know sitting in their homes talking
about their dreams and aspirations and
since then hundreds if not thousands of
personal conversations um and clearly
not everyone wants children and we have
to respect and I want to say this
because otherwise there'll be comments
against me and and certainly you get
gripped in with it too. I'm sure I don't
believe we should be coarse at all. We
should be entirely respectful that some
people genuinely do not want children
and that's fine because those people
have other things that they can do to
support society. Um I don't think it
benefits anyone by trying to guilt them
in in any way. Um I wouldn't want to
live in a society where we were trying
to guilt people into having children.
>> You're also not going to make
particularly good mothers if you force
somebody who doesn't want to be a mother
into being a mother.
>> Right.
>> Yeah. I mean, look, I I I can see
exactly where you're going with this. At
no point in any of the conversations
that me and you have had we said we
should be forcing women who don't want
to be mothers into being mothers. That's
not where you improve birth rates from.
We're talking about the huge
overwhelming percentage that 80% of
women who pass reproductive window and
do not have kids didn't intend to not
have kids. Right. Right. this uh uh
unplanned childlessness and these women
have support groups to grieve over
families that they never had. Like of
the of the two groups of people, the one
who's on the outside saying, "Look at
these two white men getting women out of
the boardroom and back into the kitchen,
making them domestic prostitutes, conned
by the patriarchy into just churning out
women. This is just a handmaid's tail
all over again."
Where's your compassion for the 80% of
women? The overwhelming majority and the
20% me and you were saying awesome. Like
you made your life choice. That's
totally great. Congratulations. Enjoy
your future in however you want to do
that. Like how is this not the
compassionate perspective when you've
got women who literally have [ __ ]
support group? Who is that lady that's
got the
>> Judy Day?
>> Judy Day. [ __ ] fantastic. and and and
they have support groups to grieve it's
that sentence grieve over the family
that they never had.
>> Yes. Like I mean it's it's
>> if you've ever been around a woman who
is getting toward and because I'm 37
some of my friends and friends friends
are doing this these women who are
feeling the ticking clock of biology uh
like not just
conceptually
they're coming into contact with it in
reality and it is a type of like terror
it's like a fear it's like rabbit beyond
rabbit in headlights you know I I you
know I just give an example of a woman I
had lunch with because she wanted to
talk to me u knowing I made the
documentary in Japan. 35 years old,
um, just gone through another breakup
and distraught, she said, "I don't want
flowers. I don't want vacations. I don't
even want romance. I just want family."
>> And, you know, you realize that this is
a woman getting that point of
realization that the likelihood she'll
become a mother
is becoming more fleeting and fleeting.
>> Have you got the number? So, you said a
woman reaching 30 without kids has a 50%
chance of ever becoming a mother.
>> At most.
>> What about 35?
>> Oh, I mean it's it's it does vary by
country. I'm not going to cite it here,
but I had a guess. I'm going to say it's
15%. I'll be pretty sure
>> woman without children at 35 has a 15%
chance of ever becoming a mother. Okay.
I'm just going to because we haven't
fully delved into this and I do think
it's an important um qualifier to
explain what this means.
A lot of women that are listening and
guys that are listening would be like
what do you mean 50% like I could have
sex with a woman who's 31 today once
over and over it's easily get pregnant.
That's not what we mean. It's not that
there is a 50% chance of you getting
pregnant. What we mean is of all of the
women who as yet haven't had children by
age 30. This includes single women. This
includes women who are coupled but not
married. This includes married women
that haven't yet tried. But a big cohort
of that is people who are as yet not in
the situation that is ready for them to
be able to start a family. And that
bundles all of this in.
If you reach that age, the likelihood is
that you probably haven't been trying
because most people who try to get
pregnant do get pregnant who want to.
It is a How do you come to describe how
do you come to explain it in this sort
of way that I'm doing it here? Well, the
number of people I've met who were in a
stable relationship at some point in
their 20s, maybe into their 30s,
thinking, "This is it." You know,
everything's good now,
and then suddenly go through a breakup.
>> And very often for the woman, the
breakup comes from the man.
>> And within a year, he's got a child with
a 25-year-old.
>> He's traded down.
And now you've got a 33y old woman who
has to find someone else and has to
start trying to think of having a child
maybe age 35 or 38 if they don't meet
the same person again. So it's it all
and this comes back to the vitality
curve. It's finding that match and
>> committing quickly.
>> Committing quickly.
>> Yeah. Because if you wait, this is the
thing, dude. So many people uh that I I
I've talked about this a lot uh since we
had our first conversation and a lot of
the time I bring up a theory from
evolutionary psychology that is maybe
more a notion than a theory, but at
least it it's postulated to be true. Um
if two people that are in a committed
relationship, pair bonded together, are
together for a good chunk of time, we're
talking, you know, 3 to seven years,
something like that, and no children
have come along.
Sometimes they break up and you would
think, well, I've broken up because
we're just fall out of love. We don't
have the same sort of spark anymore. The
energy, the chemistry, we argue all the
time. Yeah. What would be the adaptive
reason for that? The adaptive reason
would be ancestrally there was no
reliable birth control, which meant that
and and who was in a relationship and
not having sex? An unbelievably small
like, you know, the the asexuals of the
uh past era, there probably weren't
many, and it certainly wasn't a meme
that stuck about to survive. Um, most
people ancestrally that were together
and pair bonded had sex. Most people
that had sex got pregnant because they
couldn't do contraception. That means
that most couples who were together for
a long time and didn't have kids, it was
due to a fertility issue. Now, I don't
know if it's me. I don't know if it's
you. What I do know is if we break up,
there is a 50% chance or something like
that. 50% chance that the next partner
that I get with is going to be able to
have kids with me in case it's a you
problem. And if it's a me problem, I'm
just going to keep cycling through that
until that goes. Now, this is just this
underlying dynamic that sounds like a a
restrictive uh horrible judgment on
people that choose to not have kids
immediately when they're in a committed
relationship. It's like, what do you
mean? I got got with it when I was 25.
We're 29 or 30 or 31 or whatever. Like,
we're going to start when we're ready to
start. And we love each other. We love
each other just as much as we ever did.
You're like, "Yeah, I I I get that. But
I do think that you should treat
whatever we want to call this like
infertility paradox
with caution. I think that it's a
dynamic that comes in and just causes
people. The way that she used to sip her
tea that I thought was so cute now
[ __ ] drives me up the wall. Like
these little things creep in. And how
much of that is due to this dynamic? How
much of that is due to this ancient
programming of there's something wrong
here? We've been together a long time.
No kids have arrived. Something's wrong
with one of us. I think that we should
move on
>> that there's um an effect and this is
also a theory but I think it plays into
this what I term little sister syndrome.
So if you go back a few decades when
most people were marrying settling down
early 20s and starting a family for the
man there weren't that many younger
sisters in the dating market yet. You
were probably going to marry someone
closer to your age 18 plus. But as the
dating window, that fatality curve has
shifted more and more left.
Of course, I don't necessarily literally
mean the sister of your the one that
you're with right now, but that
generation is suddenly interesting to
you. There's a distraction there.
>> There's more options which itself may
induce part of the delay.
>> Oh, right. Okay. So, the reason that
guys, women that are saying, you know,
I'm ready to commit or I'm ready to
start a family and he just keeps put
next year. We go we go next year. we'll
go next year. Well, if he knows uh
subliminally or consciously that he's
35, dating 32, but he's seen quite a lot
of 27 and 25 and they look pretty
[ __ ] fertile and hot to trot. You're
like, maybe he'll just hold off just a
little bit and then the tradeout
happens. So, this this is really
interesting because it because women are
the ones mostly, not just that men's
fertility drops with age as well. That's
why I froze my sperm this year. Um
because women are more
uh restricted uh in terms of their
ability to to reproduce uh they have a
much harder and faster line.
Men who do this uh like
holding pattern dynamic thing where guy
of 30 gets into a relationship with girl
of 27. They stay together for 5 years.
then he trades down for a younger woman.
That still allows younger woman to have
a child with older man, but that kicks
older partner out potentially out the
top of the mating pool. And means that
it's unfortunately
desiraability for women is at least
slightly correlated with age. And that
means that the dating market is going to
be tough for her to step into. Uh and
that means that the likelihood of them
now falling off the end of this uh
reproductive window is greater.
>> Yep. But there's another impact to this
as well.
>> Brilliant.
>> Which is that that one woman who now is
reaching the end of her likely uh
fertility window. For every woman,
there's also a man who is also in effect
also checking out. Now men can have
children with more than one woman, which
is a slight blur of this, but that's not
that many overall. So again it comes
back. So if you look at this the
vitality curve for men and women
>> um you know men have the same shape
curve but not quite a peak and more
stretch but you can see that these
curves are linked together.
>> So what's whatever is happening to women
ultimately is happening to men too. Now
but c can I just
>> come back to
this waiting game that's going on in
people's 20s.
>> Mhm. So, if you take
a 20-year-old today, let's say 20-y old
man for a second, and maybe he's got his
first girlfriend, we're thinking about
it. He's probably not thinking she's the
girl I'm going to have kids with
because that's 10 years later, or maybe
more.
>> Where does that come from? Where does
that's 10 years later? Because the
vitality curve looking at the average
age of parenthood in a society, the
societal norm or people this
cohesiveness around the central age
>> on average there are exceptions but it's
all in this curve. Mostly young men are
not thinking she's the one for life,
she's the one to have kids with and
she's also not thinking the same thing.
Mhm.
>> So then you get to a point of I imagine
and this might be more your expertise
than mine that you know men in early 20s
are thinking well what's the point of
dating at all?
>> You know really why make any commitment
of any kind?
>> In fact
what's the point of even being in the
dating game at all compared to becoming
in Japan at Otu someone stays at home
and plays gaming machines. Um a and you
have neats here, you have so many other
social things these days, you know,
infidels, fam cells, all of these
things.
>> I believe those are downstream of the
fertility crisis of delay parenthood
because nature didn't design it for
people to sit idly in their 20s.
>> I mean, we can't assume that shifting
this period of having family 10 years
out would be without some social impact.
>> Yeah. I I think it's an interesting one,
at least where that comes into land.
For me, the the tall girl problem, as
I've come to call it, raising
socioeconomic standards that women have
got and hypergamy, those two together
means that there's an everinccreasing
cohort of high performing women
competing forever decreasing cohort of
ultra high performing men above and
across from them. Uh the research
doesn't seem to be great at kind of
reducing hypergamy down. Hey women, if
you're outperforming men
socioeconomically, maybe you should be
looking to date a little bit lower. Uh
it's even difficult to try and ex um
separate out education from employment
that uh a woman with a degree or a
mast's dating a blue collar worker who
earns more than her but is less
educated. There's some complications in
that too. So men can't even compensate
for undereducation with overemployment
in that regard. So the whole um it
doesn't matter dude, go and get your
apprenticeship. you're going to earn
more money as a coach or whatever.
Sometimes that doesn't work because
people tend to mate within their
education band. Yeah. Like um that to me
at least seems to be one of the big
drivers of this imbalance in early age.
It's one of the reasons that you're
getting older guys dating younger women
because by that you're able to
compensate so much more
socioeconomically that it does um uh
flip that imbalance. But given that
people date assortatively within their
education band and two women for every
one man uh uh completing a US college
degree like that that that's just raw
data again on this that that isn't great
for mating when it comes to sort of the
relational aspect of this. The thing
just to kind of round out the the women
point that we came into earlier on I saw
a really interesting reaction to Taylor
Swift getting engaged. Taylor Swift got
engaged to Travis Kelce. uh she has been
I think for a lot of women a kind of
permanent breakup artist for a very long
time you know sort of over a decade now
she's been singing about the minations
and challenges of a woman going through
the world of makeup and breakup and
heartbreak and I saw a bunch of
different threads and forums talking
about how it's such a shame that Taylor
had got engaged because she was going to
be such a wonderful role model for
child-free in. Now, that makes sense if
she wanted to be child-free, and she
still may. Her and Travis may decide to
not have kids. Something tells me that
that's not going to be what happens. Uh,
first question. First off, I think that
there is going to be a bump in your
vitality curve if Taylor Swift gets
pregnant. Um, just because of that
mimemetic like you see mothers around
you, that means that you get more
mothers thing. Like, I just think that's
going to be uh, you know, I'm sure that
some group of women lost weight when
Adele lost weight. uh and Lizo, right?
You know, like people that are in the
public eye that do a thing, you end up
doing that thing, too. Um but the other
side of this is
I think a lot of the conversation or the
question I have is why is the
conversation uh that is so pro or so
antiatalist specifically for women that
you don't need to have kids, you're
being forced into a family. If it's the
case that four out of five women
that fall off their reproductive window
and didn't intend to not have kids,
how can it be the case that the talking
point online encouraging women to not
have kid? Why is that not being pushed
back against four in five women that
aren't that are childless didn't intend
to be?
>> Yeah. So, I I've come to see
um a huge divide, a lack of empathy, uh
understanding
between those people who want kids and
those people who simply don't to a point
I think often they can't understand each
other. If you don't want kids, it's hard
to understand why anybody would want to
get up three times during the night for
the first three years of your kids'
life. and you know have to transport
them to every after school activity for
a couple of decades and on the other
side if you do have that strong desire
to children it's really quite hard I
think to understand completely why
someone just doesn't have that desire
>> so I think part of this is fueled by
this lack of empathy and and
understanding but it goes deeper than
that
um I mean anti-natalism
is alive and Well, and you know, it's
one of those things hiding in plain
sight, but you it certainly touches me,
you know, when I get heckled by a
professor in Japan, as I was recently,
you know, a British professor of
strategic thinking, I believe it was,
uh, came into a class of Japanese young
students while I was uh talking about uh
the subject and started uh hurling uh
questions at me without letting me
respond
>> or been canceled at Cambridge
controversially because uh yet that
happened I think just after a podcast
>> that um you know it it was too
controversial a topic. Well, where is
that coming from? Why is it that people
want to make it their business
>> Mhm.
>> to tell other people not to have
children? Um and I believe it has come
from sources sources that had good
funding back in the 60s and 70s. uh the
the person you referred to earlier who
was telling people that they should be
locked up if they have more than two
children in America, that was uh Paul
Erlic who wrote the book Population Bomb
and clips of him saying that are in the
documentary. Um but the funding for that
came from some very substantive
foundations and those organizations are
still there. I show in the documentary
the the latest part how in the US uh
Paul Erlick's
nonprofit organization is still alive
and well
>> a population connection okay
>> of DC and they boast that they teach
provide materials to 3 million high
school children per year based on
>> what's their justification why do they
want fewer people to exist
>> well I think they're locked in time you
know talking to them they they are
aphable people, they will, you know,
tell you how wonderful kind of it can be
of a child, but then tell tell you 20
reasons why why you might not want to.
Um, and then they have a very, I would
say, clever tactic of pointing to stats
of people in Africa and showing pictures
of here's an Afghan man marrying his
10-year-old bride and and then suddenly
telling you can do what you want. So,
there's this undertone. Now they are
part of a group and I am happy to state
it because the CEO told me that they do
not inform people about birth rate
decline. I would say to anybody
listening to this who who themselves or
knows a volunteer working for
organizations like that,
>> stop
because you are telling halftruths to
young people. find an organization
that's telling the full truth about
exactly what's happening and
particularly when it comes to uh sex
education. We're very good at telling
young people how to avoid pregnancy and
that's a good thing. What we're not good
at all is telling people there's a
fertility window and by the way you've a
lot to cram into your 20s and by the way
here's the real data on the likelihood
of becoming a parent at age 30 or 35.
>> 15% at 35 is [ __ ] insane. That's so
wild.
>> That's optimistic. Um,
what do you make of people who celebrate
women having fewer children?
I don't understand it. I mean, I really
it it evil.
If people don't want children,
they shouldn't have them. If people are
having fewer children because they
themselves have decided to have well,
fewer than what? Fewer. There is an
organization in the UK
um who come out with this mantra people
should have fewer children than they
want.
So I asked the question online well what
happens if you only want one childh
>> if you have fewer children than they
want
>> and they repeated how people should have
fewer children than they want.
Well, whatever the math is, let's say
you wanted four children. Okay, you
know, I'm indoctrinated now from this
message. As a teenager, I'll have three.
I'm hearing it again, so I have two. You
know, you can see the direction. I mean,
this I mean, nihilism is out there and
it's real. Some people
do state. I think uh after the
documentary came out, there was one uh
nihilist uh channel on YouTube who
reviewed my documentary and they sat
through and watched it all together and
it was just interesting seeing these
people who genuinely believe that
humanity should become extinct.
>> That's a very different perspective. It
right. Yeah. So I I had a conversation
with Alex Okconor recently and he
explained there's a bunch of different
brands of antiatalism.
Um there are some that are so extreme,
very few. There's some that are so
extreme that uh once you're alive, you
should kill yourself. Like that's a very
particular I guess that's like
anti-humanism in some sort of a way.
That's a a real So if you're that
antiatalist, if you were super super
antiatalist, you'd be like, well, even
though I'm alive, I should no longer be
alive because you are impacting the
planet by that. So, you know, you can
put your money where your mouth is if
you don't want that many people on the
planet. Um, no. And then you sort of
move forward to um people like David
Benitar if you're familiar with him. It'
be fascinating for you to look at. So
his philosophical position is basically
that uh suffering is uh more painful
than pleasure is enjoyable and most of
human life is some suffering which
outweighs the uh pleasure. And he's got
some other sort of squirrely ideas and
it's a he's a a philosopher like an
anti-latist philosopher. Um little tough
to wrap your head around at times. So
again, like impact is going to be at
least moderated. Uh but then there's
places like stopids.org
who hold rallies here in Austin, Texas.
Um
yeah, I I think when you ask the
question like uh what are the impacts of
people not having kids or people having
fewer children, uh there's two buckets
as far as I can see. One is the
personal. So what does this do for men
and women who reach later age and don't
have a family uh who reach the end of
their life and haven't gone through the
process of having a family like that's
one and then the other is the macro it's
like what does this do to the human race
what does this do to economics politics
culture so on and so forth is that how
you come to think about the the impact
yes yes I think it's a very good way and
often we only think about the macro you
know and I think those people who are um
you know I guess protesting about other
people having children. I think they
have been fed information that these
macro problems are so vast that they
they obscure any sense that there is a
micro problem in in personal people's
lives. People don't yet understand the
level of desire there is to have
children
>> and especially given that the people who
are child-free by choice are uh very
vehement about it and they knew. So I
think you have the it's such a there is
an asymmetry in the sexiness of the
argument right but even Chris I have to
say um
I hate that term
>> childareree by choice
>> child-free the idea you put the word we
don't say pet free you know I don't have
a dog I'm not pet free that's just not
the term we would even think of using
>> you know if I don't go on vacation this
year I'm not vacation free because you
had the hassle of booking the flights
and you packing whatever
The term free was attached to the word
child by ideologists. You know, certain
ways of feminism going back many years.
>> The burden and you have relinquished
yourself from it.
>> Right. And the reason I don't like Oh,
there's many reasons I don't like it to
to be honest with you. The term free we
use for disease free, you know, debtree,
stress free, universal negatives. We
don't put free
after something that actually most of us
want.
But it goes further than that. There
there people who do not have children by
choice, childless by choice, I call
them,
>> who also don't like that that term. You
know, two of them are are school
teachers I know
>> who said to me, I would never use that
term. It's a horrible term. I could
never tell my my my class that I'm
child-free.
>> So, I don't know. I think with it's
another example how this um ideological
antiatalism in whatever flavor has been
allowed to to seep into the psyche.
>> Yeah. I like I say, I think that there's
a real im it's a little bit of a messy
argument to try and get across and it's
not the sort of thing that you can say
instantly. Um because you've got the
macro and the personal occurring
separately. So someone will say, well,
you should stop having kids because of
the environment, right? There's too many
people on the planet or because of
carbon emissions or something like that.
And one of the costs of that, let's say
that that is true. I actually don't
think it is. I think it's like 0.04% 04%
over the next 200 years if you you know
if population
stays the same versus decreases.
>> Um let's say that you do say that and
you're like okay well what are the what
are the costs to that person
individually like well relationally
they're uh the the 80% of women don't
have kids didn't want to not have kids
grieving families they never had etc.
But then you can go the other way too
and you can say uh the girl with a list
on Tik Tok. Did you ever see that girl
who wrote 350 reasons about you know
everything from can't go to brunch with
the girls to can't wear cute heels to
literally a parasite growing inside of
you. It's like every bad thing and then
it was you know eight pages of reasons
not to and then half a sheet of A4 of
why you could why you should and that's
somebody who is talking about the
personal but not thinking about the
macro that's not thinking about the
impact economically politically so on
and so forth and and other impact that
people often don't think about is I mean
we're we're talking I remember we had
this in the last podcast this analogy of
like people imagine you can glide down
to some better optimal population
number. There's too many people here
today. How many? Oh, maybe a 1 billion.
We're just going to glide down. It
doesn't work that way. It's a collapsing
spiral of ever decreasing births. So,
births half over a certain period to
time time depending on the birth rate.
>> South Korea, it's every 18 years. In the
UK right now, it's 55 years. In US, it's
probably similar. So, we're talking
halfing of births in decades.
>> I'm 37. So potentially in my lifetime
I'm going to see 150 million people in
the US
>> births. Births. So yeah there'll be a
ton of older people but those old you
know but if you look at the birth
numbers they will be you know instead of
4 million right now they're yeah on
current patterns it's going to be closer
to 2 million in the US. But it doesn't
stop there. That's the point. Then it
huffs again and again and again. So even
if you're one of the people who think no
I still am happy for us to not glide but
this kind of roller coaster downward
that's a good thing I think you should
really be thinking about okay maybe
>> just how vertical is this line
>> yes and how would we stop it if we
wanted to you know because we're in this
kind of it's not a glider we're
spiraling down the engines are off and
there's no pilot and there's no manual
as to how how to revert
>> can you give me
a overview of what the macro impacts of
declining population size over the next
couple of centuries is going to be over
the next few decades.
>> Well, I can because you know, eight
years now in Japan, you know, I'm living
it and if you're in the center of Tokyo,
uh mostly you won't see it. You'll
probably notice relatively few children
around. Um but you go into the suburbs
of Tokyo, never mind going into the
rural decaying towns. Um, let's just
take uh a a suburb of Tokyo that going
back to the 70s was burgeoning.
Apartments were built there, luxury
apartments for 10,000 people.
Now, those apartments are still fully
occupied, 98% occupied. They show this
in the documentary. But now it's old
people,
many of whom are old women living alone,
no children around.
The playgrounds are kind of grassed
over, you know, long grass.
And the most moving moment in making my
entire documentary, and there were many,
was going there to film and being told
by some locals that the week before a
90-year-old woman had jumped off the
roof because she was lonely.
And then going to talk to a pharmacy and
the local groceryer
to be told, "Oh, yeah, this happens
every week."
So you realize that the impact is not
the total number of people.
The impact to me is the loneliness
and I think the mental disorders that
come through that loneliness for people
who don't have family
>> and even those who do have family who
where we lose as a community we're in
shrinking worlds if children move away
and they most they will they want to
find somewhere more vibrant um where
we're going to have these decaying
worlds. Now, I've worked on projects in
Japan
and
talked to mayors,
municipalities,
and the heartbreak in their faces, the
the gloom because
they know that
their future I came up with a term
actually this morning. I just wrote an
article for for the spectator and um I
came up with the term futurehood.
I think you know I've been spending a
little bit of time in Hanoi, Vietnam and
um I I've really enjoyed just spending a
little bit of time in a vibrant nation
with energy and youth. It was crazy the
first time I was there and it was like
no this is this has got something Japan
is missing. Europe smithing and it's
that youth energy.
>> People in Vietnam don't worry about
their future. They know they have a
future. They can see it around them
through the construction, through the
building work. You go to Japan and that
futurehood, that sense there is a
future, you know, which I think is
underlines nationhood is gone. And these
mayors and these municipalities are
making tough decisions as to what
services do I cut next, how am I going
to keep that bus service to that town.
5,000 schools have closed in Japan in
the last 15 years on average two per
day. You take a school away, communities
disappear.
>> So looking at total headcount is another
distraction. I think that has been um
you know everything's stacked against us
actually because it's too easy to you
know play with numbers if you're an
anti-natalist just focusing on oh look
at the total headcount of the planet or
look at the total headcount of the US
we'll be fine without realizing as you
peel away the layers the economic
infrastructure is one of decay and then
behind all of that
>> what I worry about have you seen the
movie or read the book Children of Men.
>> Yep.
>> Um, so when we were making the
documentary, one of the film crew kept
telling me, "Wow, you should watch
Children of Men." And the title didn't
really stand out to me as something like
Why of Men?
>> Um, because what I was talking about to
the crew was, "Oh, it's going to become
this really gloomy world that went a
world without children."
>> You know, that's not a positive thing
when you literally
see your world in decay and there seems
to be no way out of it. and children of
the man just just shows that I think
perfectly. Different storyline perhaps
but um not not not that far off. Um so I
worry about dispondency
>> and I think it comes back um so why am I
even sitting here? Why am I not not kind
of closing up research saying we're done
and and that's it. Well, there is hope
and that hope lies with the youth. It
lies in new bubbles of people in their
20s saying you know what I'm just going
to resequence life. I'm gonna figure out
a way to do this to have family at the
same time.
And the power that younger people are
going to have given they're a shrinking
number in many nations I think will mean
that employers will have to follow them
and say you know what I will give you
that sbatical
>> to have children and the real
I think game changer in all of this
comes back to education.
I would love to take a year out of high
school and a year out of college. I
think people should be in the workforce
by 21
>> and let's have people start their lives
and get established at a younger age.
>> Well, less education, that's not a good
thing. No, no. I mean, switch the
education model to lifelong learning.
You I go back to college. I still do.
Haven't for a couple of years, but I
just love going back. I used to, you
know, come to the US summer schools
>> for three or four years, studying
psychology and game theory and all sorts
of other things that were of interest. I
think switching our education pathways
and why would universities, colleges,
education boards want to do this? Well,
the reality is that universities around
the world are faced with an ever
shrinking number of potential students.
Switching to lifelong learning is
actually a pretty smart move. If I were
a college, let's have someone, you know,
go through some form of
>> um associate degree, certification,
community college system, you know,
something similar to this. but then be
able to come back later in life. And for
some people it might be after they
become parents.
>> Even if you do enable that, even if you
get people into the workforce early, you
still have this huge cultural swing,
this sort of, you know, massive
narrative that specifically for women.
Um, well, you you just got access to
higher education. You just allowed the
gender pay gap is still a thing. We
haven't even reached par yet. So what
you you're saying that you're going to
give up this thing that you just got
access to? It certainly seems at least
with regards to Korea, that's one of the
reasons the birth rate did decline that
they got access to education but not
employment. And then when they got
through the higher education arrived
into employment and weren't selected or
promoted by what was still a pretty sort
of misogynistic culture that didn't see
women as in the same sort of equal way
perhaps to be able to get them access
into these uh uh higher paying jobs that
they said, well, [ __ ] this. like I'm not
even going to bother. So I understand
and it would be great to start people
off early. They don't need to stay in
education as long. I mean the American
education system what is it some 50% of
people that are leaving high school
don't have like an eighth grade reading
level and all this stuff. I I I don't
think that you need to be in education
this long to not get the results that
you're supposed to be getting. We can
definitely make changes there. But
that's like this is a huge multivariate
problem. Uh, I have to guess that the
countries that take this seriously
earlier are going to be the ones that
are going to benefit and the ones that
don't are going to be very
self-defeating.
>> Yeah. And that's part of my frustration
with Japan. I I you know, I'm I'm losing
confidence in many countries. Um I I
I've been um able to talk to
a lot of people who are in a position to
do something about this. Government
ministers, several prime ministers,
presidents. I'm I collaborate with the
former president of Hungary and a
nonprofit to increase awareness uh of
this uh worldwide. But yet no one really
yet is doing anything. But it's
changing. So
um
your point about education I want to
come back to that if I can. U women's
education I mean you already give the
example that two out of three under
college undergraduate students in the US
are female and I think men have a higher
dropout rate as well. Well you take
Thailand what percentage of women in
Thailand get college degrees 55%. Men
30%. you know, Thailand. So, the idea
that women have something to uh catch up
on in terms of education is is it looks
like no longer the case.
>> Mhm.
>> Um, so I don't think it's a very good
argument for people to say we're going
to take education away from women
necessarily if everyone shifts to
lifelong learning. I'm talking about men
and women
>> shifting to lifelong learning. And
again, why am I doing this? Um
the comments I have from young people in
particular I talk to colleges,
universities, speeches,
the shock that they have such a low
likelihood of becoming a parent in their
30s is so intense.
>> I can see in their eyes they're going to
make the right decision for themselves.
And very often that's going to be, do
you know what? I don't really want to go
to the office and report to a boss for
30 years and not have a child. I'm
making sure I do that first.
>> And
you know, I call myself a panatalist
because I don't like being called
pro-atalist and I'm certainly not
antiatalist. Pan natalist meaning I
support those who want to have children
to have the children they want to have
and those people who don't want children
not to have the children they don't want
to have. So ultimately, you know, I'm on
the fence in terms of what people
actually choose. It's not my uh role to
tell someone anything, but I think
giving young people the information so
they can sequence their lives, what is
right for them is part of what part of
the answer here.
>> What happens to GDP of countries and the
world if this continues? What happens to
quality of life?
Yeah,
>> I want to get like some big macro [ __ ]
out there.
>> Yeah, you know, GDP, you can talk about
GDP. Well, that's going to shrink if
there's fewer people. Then someone will
say, well, it's GDP per person. Uh, that
matters. You know, number of people
glide down. You know, you say, what does
it matter? Because there's going to be
fewer and fewer of us anyway. But no,
you see, the services that we provide
through taxes are locked in at a much
higher level. they cannot scale down
because older people need more health
care and need pensions and in most
nations the pensions are paid in whilst
people work go into the government um
kitty um and are paid out to current
retirees. So the idea that economically
this will not hurt
is simply wrong. And in in terms of um
my my biggest concern
and I don't know how we're going to
figure this one out is investment.
Investment drives growth.
Give a concrete example.
>> Well, you know, I I I 30 years ago I
studied an MBA
and the entire MBA was about growth
markets.
How to find a product that would grow.
How to create a company that would grow.
The importance of growth
and why does someone invest?
Why does an individual invest? Why do
pension funds invest?
>> It's going to go up.
>> It's going to go up. They don't invest
because it's going to go down.
>> So, the appetite for investment in
anything is well perhaps old people's
products like diapers for, you know, for
the elderly for a time. Mhm.
>> Um so the appetite for investment by
definition for me will reduce
and what can be called this degrowth
model or I like to call it retronomics.
You know retrofitting economies
continually for an evershrinking size
for diminishing returns. I don't know
how that's going to work. And if you
take away investment what does that do
to jobs? So people will say well sure we
haven't talked much about AI.
AI. Thank goodness AI is around right
and robotics.
>> Thank goodness we have some way of
increasing productivity because you know
one thing that isn't going to shrink
with GDP is our national debts.
Those are locked in.
>> Mhm.
>> And by definition I I did the numbers
for the US very recently.
It might be thou no it's thousands of
dollars per worker
>> Mhm.
>> per year are paid in interest on the
national debt.
>> Mhm. And that number is only going up
because the national debt's going up in
the US like effectively every country.
>> Now if there's a shrinking number of
workers to pay that off, what what
happens to our next generation? So
effectively what we've been doing as
nations and I don't think people have
been doing this willingly. So I don't
blame the boomers. I don't blame it's
just the reality where we are. We were
borrowing money against our future.
>> Mhm.
>> For the present.
>> Yep.
And it's the next generations who are
going to have to burden that.
>> Yeah, there's an an embedded growth
obligation. If you have an increasing
debt, the assumption is at some point
we'll outgrow our own debt. So growth
has to occur in the future. This is the
mad thing about the economics especially
given that uh a lot of the push back I
think against talking about birth rate
decline comes from progressive leaning
individuals who are very concerned with
quality of life especially for people
toward the bottom rung of society and
inequality two things that they really
care about or are supposed to really
care about. Um, well, if you have a
decreasing GDP, if you have a worsening
economic model,
what do you think that does to quality
of life? And who do you think it is
that's going to be I'm going to be fine.
You're going to be fine. All of the
people that are educated and have wealth
are largely going to be fine. Lots of
problems as well, but they're going to
be more fine than the people who were
relying very heavily on a social safety
net that was paid into by taxes from an
ever dwindling workforce that's now
being pulled up more by pensions and
healthcare that needs to support old
people. And if you say, "Well, [ __ ]
hell. At least we've got AI and
robotics." Well, what about the second
thing that you're worried about, which
is inequality? Who do you think is going
to capture all of the economic gains
from that? It's the 10 companies that
own all of the chips and all of the
compute and all of the AI systems and
all of the robotics. Yeah, [ __ ] Jason
from an Nvidia is going to be fine. Sam
from OpenAI is going to be swimming. But
this uh decrease, it's the two things
that progressive people are supposed to
care about the most that as far as I can
see, and I'm totally open to being
wrong. I am an idiot, but economically,
those seem to be the two things that are
going to be impacted the most. People at
the bottom rung of society are going to
be cared for less because there's fewer
resources and more are taken by people
who are older. And if you do rely on the
one technology that could be a bit of an
escape velocity to pull us out of this
thing, where do you think those gains
are going to be captured? They're not
going to be redistributed down by these
amazing company that this company
contributes 10% of all productivity in
the United States, this one robotics
company or this one AI company. Okay,
you now have the most powerful company
in American history that's running this
thing. And this this is something that I
want you to get on to. Why do you think
that talking about birth rate decline is
right-wing coded?
>> To me, it's not from where I come come
from. Um,
>> well, you guys accusations I do, right?
>> Yeah, for sure. Um so I think on one
level there are people on the right
uh who are aligned with the idea of
family
>> and you know I often their perspectives
come from a good place often it's uh
some religious perspective
um
so you do get this weight from the right
I think where family is in some way
prioritized not just for religious
reasons
But I think on the left
you have multiple ideologies that were
linked in some way to the idea of
exploding populations, too many people
on the earth, etc. So, you know, um, you
know, on record saying, you have a a
daughter and two sons, and I will do
everything for my daughters as much as
my boys in terms of whatever I'm I'm
capable of. Um but there so in that
sense yeah I'm maybe a first wave
feminist you know maybe second wave of
it depending how it's defined uh
education is wonderful for a woman uh
opportunities are wonderful but there
are waves of feminism out there that
really um I think are anti-motherhood
>> at their core they don't understand or
don't want to understand motherhood and
they will use things like the patriarchy
you know women are only having children
because men are forcing them to I've
literally had that stated in a bit in a
debate
>> despite the fact that four out of five
women who fall off their reproductive
window didn't intend to not be
childless,
>> right? And then they start uh getting uh
you know accusational about oh you're
using the wrong survey and they kind of
have have all this fuzzy data to try and
support that. But there are these
ideologies therefore that are threatened
by the idea that actually 90% of people
want women. That's just people on the
right. That's the right, the middle, and
the left.
>> And then you have environmentalists
which may be, I don't know, maybe more
left- centered often who have been, you
know, indoctrinated in some cases. I
think it is that that we need less
people in the planet because we can't
possibly sustain the idea of,
you know, of of of people having
families and simply polluting the earth
less. M
>> um so you you have the left I think
that's going through this exercise of
trying to remap its prior views on many
things like you know gender pay gap uh
the environment and many other things
but
um it's changing and it has to change
because the left will be left behind.
>> Well let's not let's not forget the
Democratic National Convention had free
vasectomies happening outside of it.
>> I didn't know that. free vasectomies in
a van like a a bus like a vasectomy bus
open to being told that this was right.
I mean this was reported [ __ ]
everywhere. So I'm downstream of a lot
of people reporting incorrectly if
that's the case. Um
I know what you're about to say. Anyone
that's taken the behavioral genetics red
pill understands that your political
ideology is at least partly heritable.
That means that the children of
left-leaning parents are more likely to
be left-leaning themselves because they
have a personality inherited from their
parents which is independent from the
environment that they were brought up in
which predisposes them also to
left-leaning beliefs. This means if you
are anti-Natalist but also progressive,
you are self-defeating. That is uh
ideological [ __ ] Sepuku, right?
Because you have to assume that in the
future the pro-natalist ideologies,
subcultures, groups of people, the
religious, the conservative, the [ __ ]
Amish, they're fine. Look at Israel,
right? Like, you know, there are small
pockets that are fine, I imagine. But
they're in a overall decreasing vitality
curve. Who do you think inherits the
future? Who do you think inherits the
future culturally, ideologically,
religiously, politically? If you really
care, I mean, it's a difficult argument
to be made. Like, if you really care
about progressivism, you should turn
against all the people that are
progressive that say you shouldn't have
kids and you should start having kids.
But
>> the future, the future will be inherited
by the children of the people who have
children. Shock, horror, and they will
be predisposed to a particular type of
ideology based on this. And I'm like, am
I am I [ __ ] high here? Like, does
nobody else see this? You are saying we
care about democratic
uh ideals. The DNC is here to help uh
move America forward in the right
direction. But this denial of the fact
that heritability is something that even
exists in behavioral genetics is like
[ __ ] pseudocience.
Sure. Uh I can see how long that gets
you moving through the future.
you're encouraging your supporters
to cease themselves from being able to
have kids.
So, in terms of who inherits the earth,
um it's interesting you mentioned the
Amish. It's interesting uh you mention
Israel. Israel I know a bit about. Um, I
imagine that Amish are have very low
child rates, probably larger families,
but also I imagine that their vitality
curve, I imagine they have their own and
it's way left shifted because people are
starting families younger.
>> Yeah, you've got cultural cohesion,
>> right? Israel doesn't have cultural
cohesion. Um, and I haven't been to
Israel. I certainly would like to go at
some point. Um, but you can see in the
data there's more than one Israel
because 15% of mothers there are having
six or more children but you also have
20% childlessness.
>> So you can see okay there's multiple
vitality curves inside Israel.
>> So who will inherit the earth? It's
going to be those groups of people who
have a vitality curve that is less left
shifted towards probably the average
Asian motherhood being
>> 25 or less.
>> Mhm. And the challenge therefore I think
if if we are if the conservatives are to
get a little bit smug saying well we
will inherit the earth that's only true
if conservatives start having children
younger.
If you're saying we're going to have
more children but you're still keeping
your vitality curve at age 30. This is
effectively a law of nature. You're not
going to match with the person you
wanted to match for all the reasons
we've already talked about. So it comes
down to you know you talked about a
movement earlier and you know it's not
individuals cannot change this.
>> Yeah. Yeah. Be coordinated.
>> It has to be coordinated.
>> Yeah.
>> And I don't mean coordinated someone's
going to twist this that we want some
coordinated you know parenting.
>> It's the same as the unfortunate term
enforced monogamy. We're talking about
encouraged monogamy not coerced
monogamy. We're talking about encouraged
vitality curve not enforced vitality
curve.
>> Yes. And and I think again it can happen
because I I I get sent photographs of
babies quite a lot of people watch the
the documentary. It's heartwarming. Um
you know I I was at the Ark event in
London uh speaking there this year and
this lady came with a pram ran up to me
and said you know I wanted to show you
my baby. Want to show you my baby. It it
tells me that once people are aware of
the risks of delayed parenthood, I mean
that's another way of expressing it, a
risk of delayed parenthood,
>> that this movement
will naturally happen. It has to be
natural that people and then the left
has a challenge of what do they do?
>> And we're already seeing it. One of the
most heartening moments to me was
earlier this year in Porto
um at there's an organization called the
OCE organization for security and
cooperation in Europe 57 nations they
have a parliamentary assemble assembly
350 members includes the US Canada every
European nation north African nations
and east as far as Mongolia
and a demographic resolution was um
added to the overall declaration. I was
able to give a speech and and meet some
of these politicians the day before. It
passed unanimously,
left, center, and right.
>> What was the demographic resolution?
>> It was that we need to take seriously
what you and I are talking about accept
that we have got a demographic
challenge. Support people who want to
have children better than we're doing
now. Increase awareness amongst younger
people in terms of education of the
fertility curve, um etc., etc. And to
see that resolution pass unanimously. I
I you know I I was speechless and and
heartened that actually no.
>> Well, yeah, but that's at the macro
level. That's at the level of that's at
the level of countries that are able to
stare down the barrel of economic
shrinkage in the face of climbing debt
that are going to be looking at
infrastructure being increasingly relied
upon by an old population. fewer young
people, towns that just completely
abandoned. This was the craziest thing
that you taught me one of the times that
we spoke. It might have even been in
Qatar when we did that. Me and you were
there having breakfast over the top of
this big courtyard. And I was like,
well, what happens to a country if the
population decreases, but do you just
end up with half the number of people in
each town? You said, "No, no, no, no.
You end up with the same number of
people. Manhattan's going to have 8
million people."
>> Yeah.
>> But there's going to be towns everywhere
that have no one.
>> Yeah. because the infrastructure has to
it's more economically uh efficient to
do it that way. Um just on the
environment point that you made before,
a new paper argues that reducing the
size of the human population would have
close to zero effect on climate change.
A baby born today will have a similar
carbon footprint to one born a decade or
two ago and that kids carbon footprints
will be even smaller. As a result of
population momentum, population numbers
won't decline for several generations
and by the time they do, people's carbon
footprints may be negligible anyway. The
authors estimate that population
reduction would lower global
temperatures by 0.05%
Celsius. 0.05°
C compared to population stabilization.
Yeah. There's another factor as well
which is if you decide today as a young
person you're not going to have a child
because of the environment. Well, your
child actually doesn't start
contributing to emissions at all until I
think it's mid-20s is really when there
they start to become economically
productive.
>> We're already living in a planet that is
past peak child, we're already on the
way down. So for for me it is just a
fool's game to try and think that not
having children given that the vast
majority of people want them and often
desperately want them. I think it's a
fool's game to bring the environment
into this unless you're an anti-natalist
and decide to spin this in some way.
>> Yeah. You're using a lie about the
impact on climate that population
reduction would be 0.05 or 5° C. Unless
you're using lying about those stats and
then saying that we shouldn't have kids
because of the environment because
people believe that and then that is the
way to sneak your antiatalist uh policy
in under the guise of being caring about
the climate.
>> So on this exact topic um the worst ever
chart I have seen in science. Okay. You
know, in future, I'm into data as you
may have guessed and in future I'd love
to see a museum of data science and I've
said before that, you know, in the
basement there would be the naughty
room, you know, the the the
>> bad data
>> seller for bad data. And then the center
would be this one chart and on the chart
you've got these small circles, the
impact of one flight a year, the impact
of you know driving 100 kilometers. All
these things are all little circles.
let's say grape size and then you have
this giant grapefruit in the center. You
know the effect of having one child and
then you read the footnote notes and
it's from some study and you go to that
study and it's based on another study
>> and what they did was work out the cost
of a child's emissions over their entire
lifetime plus the fact that they were
assumed to have two children.
So that their children's emissions and
their children's children and their
children's children's children's
children and they lump them all
together. So it's one flight or the
entirety of your future, your dynasty
for the next couple of hundred years.
>> And this was published in the Guardian
and many many other.
>> Can you do I you you evaded it earlier
on and I have to assume that was because
of something that was diplomatic. You
have to know the numbers based on
current fertility rates and your
predicted decline.
What do the next few decades and the
next couple of centuries look like in
terms of total global population?
>> Yeah, I did a video because I I try and
stay away from total headcounts.
>> Yeah. Sorry, I'm I'm going to keep my
foot on you here.
>> Sure. Um,
so I
>> without interventions, without changes.
>> Yeah, I think we're going to peak 10
billionish.
>> When is that about 2100? No, but I think
sooner than I think60 is is is rel I
think that the rate of decline when you
see what's happening in India, when you
see what's happening in subsaharan
Africa is much faster than expected
>> and we're then going to go through a
period of not rapid decline at all
because there will there will be more
people living longer that will continue.
>> Flat flat flat flat flat flat flat flat.
There we go. And when does that start to
happen? Oh, you you mean if you're if
you're interested and I'm not sure why
anybody would necessarily be focused on
total headcount in the year 2100, but
it's going to be that far out. And I say
that because at that time so many people
are going to be old re retirees unless
we have some, you know, technology to we
may well do you know reinvigorate 100
year olds might be having kids but then
we might be in a whole new world but
we're really into a world of science
fiction there that we can't imagine. So
for me, you know, so there's a number I
I I like to share and it's it's in my
paper. It's the societal half-life, SHL,
and I think it should be stated every
time a birth rate is quoted. So South
Korea, I mentioned it earlier, South
Korea's birth rate of around.75
now I believe means a societal half-life
of 20 years. So births are going to half
every 20 years. But then eventually
everything will have the economy will
have the number of consumers will have
the number eventually of old people will
have but by that time the number of
children will have h haved again
probably several times you know most of
the developed world including US are
going to be halfing in terms of births
every 50 to 60 years uh China it's
probably 40 years right now that to me
when I talk to to mayors and governments
around the world I think is more
meaningful that you know what you're
planning now for infrastructure for tax
base for whatever it is
>> is going to half in this and of course
it's not like you you wait 50 years and
suddenly it has
>> that path is is starting now and of
course immigration comes into it and uh
I just to cover that you know I'm a
migrant myself so are you in a sense
>> I'm certainly not against migration um I
think each country's got its own entire
right to decide the level of immigration
that's right for them and what context
in chap in Japan it's very low that's
changing quite rapidly uh other nations
like the US historically it's been
relatively high but the idea that you
can patch over birth rate decline with
immigration is another fool's game so
you take a nation right now that becomes
dependent on fresh workers because its
birth rate is so low
>> um like Germany Italy for many decades
now you get to a situation
eventually where those retirees or those
immigrants will retire of course and you
need to look after them of course they
need taken care of like everybody else.
So what do you need what do you need
with falling birth rates? More
immigrants who then get older. So the
number of old people will never
decrease. The one thing you might say is
a benefit to Japan the number of old
people will eventually decrease.
>> Mhm. M
>> so maybe you accept okay we need
perpetual migration from where
>> you know another
>> coming from Brazil
>> well India is going to need its own
immigrants very soon
I mean we're already at a point where
there are ghost towns in India
>> of people living alone and the
competition for migrants especially
perhaps the ones that most countries
would best like to have the more the
younger the more able and more educated.
You know, countries will be offering
free housing. Maybe they are already in
some cases, you would argue, uh for
people to come to simply support their
decaying societies.
Two things that we haven't spoken about.
Uh IVF, can that not fix this problem?
>> And the second one, adoption. You're
saying people good. Yeah. Yeah.
>> I've never had a drink like this before.
>> That's a element. So, it's um
>> it is good.
>> It's like electrolytes, sodium,
potassium, magnesium. It's salty, which
is
>> Yeah, it is. It's a weird, you know,
this is the inverse of uh birth rate
decline. Um because it's so salty and
nice and sweet, you want to drink more
of it, but as you drink more of it, you
want to drink more of it. So, it's this
very strange Yeah. It's good. It's
really good for you. Natural uh
sweetener. It's It's fantastic.
>> Total carbs 1%.
>> Yeah. Yeah. Very good. Um IVF adoption.
>> Well, adoption, we could maybe cover
that first because it's an easy one. um
you know in the US as you seen the this
episode of the documentary I'm releasing
I say I'm releasing a full feature
length version of documentary simply
called birth gap it's covering part one
and the whole thing through
>> and um in it you see adoption experts
you know say that in the US for every
adoptable infant there are 30 parents
wanting to adopt 30 to one you have
situations
>> that's pairs of parents 30 families
Yeah, 30 families. So the chance of
adopting an infant and the quote from
the expert was that you know people
giving away an infant for adoption these
days is a very rare thing.
>> Most people are having the children they
want to have which was not the case
decades ago. Then you have other
regulations
certainly I imagine for good reason um
where in some states in the US that
children are not allowed to be formally
adopted until for example 8 years old.
Why? Because reconciliation is is
promoted. The the parents who are
perhaps drug addicts or divorced and
have no money or whatever it is may
change their minds or so might family
members. So, they're put into foster
homes until that age. So, now you're
adopting an 8-year-old. And, you know, I
guess most people would prefer to adopt
a younger child. Um, then you look at
international adoption. Uh,
international adoption is down over 80%.
In recent years, many countries in
Africa, Latin America have closed their
borders to international adoption. Why?
>> What you mean by that is poor countries
exporting children, doing the Angelina
Jolie thing.
>> Yeah. And and it all happened when there
were some horrendous cases where I I
think it might have been um if I recall
you know Russian babies were being
brought to the US and in one or maybe
two cases horrendous things happened to
those babies.
>> Uh Russia shut its borders first I
believe and then many countries decide
you know we can look after our own
infants because countries uh you know
including Latin America now have a birth
rate crisis.
Don't export your kids if you've got few
young people.
>> Right.
>> Right. And if you've got parents who are
unable to IVF, unable to have children
because they've tried IVF and it's not
working. So the the idea of
international adoption, the idea of now
if you want to adopt, I didn't include
this in the current documentary, but I
have a lot of footage and I may release
it at some point. If you want to adopt
in the US, there are children who are
adoptable. uh
>> 13
>> probably um but even infants but
probably they're black and I know white
parents have adopted black kids but
probably their parent was a drug addict
>> living under a bridge and I'm not just
saying that from gosh if anybody wants
to call me a racist I'm the wrong person
to to to do that so please don't go
there um this is from adoption experts
and from families who have adopted
>> because black kids tend to be poorer
there is a higher incidence I believe of
of drug abuse and unfortunately there's
you know a a higher likelihood of a
black child being given up for adoption
whose mother may have been a drug
addict. So the idea of adoption and so
many people in in the documentary
saying, "Oh, I'll just adopt or if I can
have a child later in life, I'll just
adopt." That that's fantasy.
>> They're not available. They're not
anywhere. No.
>> Yeah. And they're going to be
decreasingly anywhere as well.
>> Yes. Absolutely.
>> Uh IVF,
>> you know, this is, you know, I know
people including close to me who have um
had children, wonderful children through
IVF. So you have to say it's wonderful.
But
there's a sad story and I shared a
little bit of it earlier which is when
you look at the vitality curve there's
no uptick in people having children
later. So there's more people having
children in their 40s but overall the
likelihood of having a child at some
point in life has gone down. So, what
we're not seeing, and I've heard it from
multiple fertility doctors, again, the
documentary, the horrendous
reality of having to tell parents who've
gone through the challenges of IVF is
not easy. You get pumped full of
hormones
>> and you, you know,
>> sometimes in multiple rounds
>> in multiple rounds. It's expensive.
>> Absolutely. with no guarantee of success
for doctors having to tell people who've
gone through that that has failed and
people having to make the decision to
give up
>> um is harrowing. But there's another
group of people as well which is those
people who
get to age 38 40 45
and don't have a partner who who now
feel tired. It's just things didn't line
up.
>> I've got I've got eggs but not sperm.
And then if I do want to do this with a
sperm donor into my eggs, I'm going to
be on my own. This wasn't the vision
that I had for my family. In any case,
didn't my my intention wasn't just to
have kids. My intention was to have a
family.
>> Yeah, that's right. And you know, very
often, again, coming from fertility
experts, women later in life into their
40s are quite probably using donor eggs.
>> [ __ ] hell. and donor sperm.
>> So, this was at least a couple of
interventions that I thought I I I I
wrote a newsletter post a couple of
weeks ago about the Cassandra complex
about being right but early. The pain of
being right but early. Um, and I think
that Birthright is one of the things
that me and you were right but early on.
Um, not being right but early on that
much stuff, but this is one of the ones
that I'd bet a pretty good amount of
money on. And interestingly, like most
things that you're right but early on,
first off, you don't actually know.
Except for with demography, you do. We
know how many one-year-olds there are.
So, I'm, you know, I'm prepared to bet a
good bit of the house on this thing
being a good I don't understand how a
shrinking population can't be a big
deal. I don't understand how it can't be
bad economically, culturally,
politically, socially, in terms of
mental health for individuals, in terms
of social cohesion, in terms of war and
peace across the world. uh all of these
things whether you're from the right or
from the left progressive all of this
like whatever it is that you care about
declining birth rates are probably going
to impact it
>> I wrote this thing about um stuff that
I'm right but early on and uh I you know
wrote about uh the difference between
Capernicus and Galileo do you know this
story no
>> brilliant so uh Capernicus realizes that
maybe the earth isn't the center of the
sun but he uh holds off from publishing
his sort of groundbreaking work until
basically his deathbed and he sort of
whispers it out essentially. 100 years
later, 100 years later, Galileo has the
same insight, realizes that maybe the
idea that everything circles around us
isn't true and he publishes it straight
away. What happens? It's castigated by
the church. He's forced to recant. He
lives the rest of his life basically
under house arrest. So, what you see is
the pain of somebody who's right but
early. And the difference between
Capernicus and Galileo is Capernicus was
able to foresee the problem of being a
Cassandra. He was like, I I shouldn't
talk about this. I shouldn't. And the
the crazy thing is
the people who are enforcing
the
restriction, the judgment, the
castigation of anybody who decides to
talk about this stuff are just straight
up limiting. they they are causing and
inflicting
future suffering on
all of the different dynamics that I've
mentioned that. So I decided to after
I've gone through all of these examples
from history, germ theory of disease,
the guy died in an asylum. Uh the lady
who discovered DDT was mocked. Um I was
like I better put some skin in the game.
like what are the things that I think
that I'm I'm right but early on and uh
one of the things that I thought would
be a positive social norm would be
encouraging women at 21 to freeze their
eggs and it's expensive it's difficult
it's all of those things and it does not
fix the problem entirely it only fixes
one small dynamic of it but I think the
more that you know because this is going
to be richer goals I mean actually it
currently it's 15 grand. So like you
know you got to have a pretty rich
family to be getting a 15 grand 21 year
old birthday present. But some people
get cars and all the rest of it and
stuff like that. It's like okay maybe
you pull 18 19 20 21 together and you do
this thing. Um
I think that the more that there are
movements like that, the more that they
are lynchpin moments that people hook
into and think more seriously about
fertility overall that start to think
about it earlier. Why am I freezing my
eggs? I'm pumping. Oh, [ __ ] That's why.
Because it's a big deal and because if
it goes wrong, it goes wrong in a big
way.
>> I um
I'm not sure I exactly agree with that
about egg freezing at 21 anymore. I did
think that. Um but I worry that in doing
so
>> it encourages people to wait.
>> Encourage and then they don't the
partner we're back into.
>> Oh yeah, I did foresee that. I thought
you would say that. I frankly I just
don't have an answer. I just I'm you
know not all of my ideas are going to be
winners here Stephen. Um
>> but the thing you know and again going
back to you know why
um being early
was important to me and maybe also to
you in this context. It starts people
talking about the topic.
>> You when we did the first podcast people
weren't talking about this in their
classrooms in their homes with their
friend groups at all. No,
>> I I was at a an event in Europe, EU
event, and I we're being bust uh to to
an evening dinner. It was linked to this
OCE event in Porto. And I hadn't this
sit close to this 21-year-old uh young
woman who, you know, wanted to know a
little bit about what I did and I wasn't
a politician that interested her because
almost everybody was. I mentioned the
documentary. I said, you know, I'd love
to come along sometime if you have a
political event and I'll show. So we
talk about this all the time. This isn't
new anymore. We're talking about birth
rates constantly.
>> And I think what you know starting to
talk whether it's about egg freezing or
IVF or the GDP or we've given people in
a sense
an open door to actually start talking
about a problem that otherwise I think
was a very private thing.
>> Yeah. Well, it is right talking about
your your choices for starting a family.
It feels like a very individual
decision. It feels like something that
you have a lot of agency over. It feels
like this is my choice. But based on the
fact that the vitality curve has shifted
and there hasn't been a staunch group of
21-year-olds that have just kept this
peak in there. Well, it shows that it's
actually not you don't have as much
valition over this as you said and
you're right like you choose if you are
going to not have children. That is
something that you choose.
>> But you can't it's going to be much more
difficult to choose to have children
especially as a man. you're gonna get an
egg donor for your sperm and a surrogate
from and I'm gonna raise this child on
my own as a solo father like that. You
know the crazy world. So uh I guess a
couple of other things IVG
>> in vitro
>> gamtogenesis.
>> Okay. So this is um taking cells from
anywhere on the body
>> that you can then turn into pur potent
stem cells that you can then turn into
eggs
>> that you can then fertilize. So what you
do there is it permits you if you also
uh move in artificial wombs you can
basically from like I I'm not sure if
it's quite skin cells but basically any
sc any cell on the body go through a
sequence turn that into an egg cell then
fertilize that with the uh surplus of
sperm that's floating around uh and then
if you have the artificial womb too away
you go you basically have like you know
the matrix where it was just banks and
banks and banks of humans uh you do that
I
We're really getting into sci-fi
territory here. But
>> yet, yes. But I I can already answer
that statistically
given the data set of 300 million
mothers
um going back decades where IVF and
technology started to creep in and
there's no dent on the vitality curve.
So, it tells me there's something more
powerful. And the only thing that
explains this curve is pair bonding.
being in a stable relationship where two
people are on the same page at the same
time. So no matter what you've got in
terms of IVG or surrogate
>> opportunities, I think surrogate parent
uh parent, not surrogate, I beg you
pardon, artificial incubation,
this idea that we can kind of soon, it
won't be soon,
>> test your baby our way through.
>> Yeah.
I have yet to meet a mother
who has told me that she would consider
remotely being pregnant. I think is
something with it challenges
that is important to women
>> and the idea well I'll just you know
Louise has this wonderful line where she
says pregnancy doesn't just make a child
it makes a mother
>> right right and and probably in many
ways psychologically as well as
biologically
>> correct yeah um so when it comes to
interventions what are the ones that
don't work
>> everything not quite true um but you
know give me the give me the the top
things that people throw at you. What
about what about what about what about
what are the things that just No.
>> Yeah. I this is um
you know I I talk in different countries
and the thing that is evident to me is
that people are convinced that their own
local grievance is the reason people are
having fewer children. So I I was at a
technology conference in in Japan. uh
unusual to speak at a technology
conference, but industries are now
starting to worry about low birth rates
and this was uh you know a topic they
wanted to hear about. I thought it did a
really good job of explaining to this
Japanese audience that uh work life
balance or having men rather do more in
the home would not change Japan's birth
rates. Because if you look at
Scandinavia where men already do a lot
lot more in the home, birth rates are
pretty much as low as Japan.
And um you know to me that's evidence.
It's it's like you cannot just say okay
this local solution is based on this if
it's not working somewhere else in the
world. But it kind of broke my heart
afterwards. This lady came up to me and
said yes but Steven really if men did
more here we'd be fine with birth rates.
So I think there is this tendency for
people to focus on what so in the UK
right now uh where I've just come from
it's house prices but that's a that's a
regional thing in the UK. You go to the
areas of the UK with the lowest birth
rates like Scotland and you don't have
the same house price issue that you have
in London. So people I think have got
this tendency to blame
I I I was calling it the the local
grievance razor like an extension to
Okam's re razor where the simplest
explanation is usually the correct one
for me it's it's a case of well the
local grievance is probably not the
explanation to a global or widespread
phenomenon. So you you can go through
all of those
>> because this wouldn't explain if it was
based on the UK saying it's because of
housing and Japan saying it's because of
men helping around the home and
Scandinavia saying it's because of cost
of living and the US saying it's because
of gun control or whatever it is. Um in
if that's the case why is every country
so reliably decreasing at the same rate
in the same sort of way at the same kind
of time
>> and now with a fatality curve that can
be predicted without knowing any of
those things. So for me that's proof
positive. But the fatality curve does
reveal
what for me is more than a glimmer of
hope. Um and it comes back to to
Hungary, a country I've got to know
pretty well. It's cited a lot because of
its um
increased birth rates, but it's now
criticized because birth rates in recent
uh year or two have been falling. Again,
I don't care. This this idea this total
fertility rate this average woman really
masks so much relevant information. If
you look at births by age in Hungary the
policies from around 2010
um right the way through the LA for
about 12 14 years did one remarkable
thing.
There was a bubble of young people
starting to become parents. So you had
like a biodal vitality curve. And that
is a real outlier for me. So you then
look at Hungary and what might they have
been doing? Well, Hungary has dozens of
policies. Um, some are interesting.
A woman under 30 having a child will
have her college tuition canled. No, no,
no college fees.
uh a family who wants to or a couple who
wants to have a family can get a
effectively a deposit for an apartment
or a house
and that deposit increases whether
you're going to have one two three or
four children. There's also this famous
thing perhaps in the media where a woman
having it was four children I believe
it's now two will pay no income tax for
life.
>> But the one that I think is most
interesting in all of that is helping
young people get housing in Hungary.
I think that caused enough young people
who were in a stable relationship at a
younger age to think,
>> "Let's do it.
>> Why not, you know, in a way that in many
other nations that that just isn't part
of the psyche." So Hungary certainly
hasn't solved its crisis at all. But
it's a signal of hope. But the irony of
this, and people are going to hate me
saying this,
>> but from the data, so I'm going to blame
the data. What we have to do is put all
our efforts on the young. We almost have
to take all the incentives away from the
over 30s having children
>> and put everything into
well, you know, I I I've cited 25 year
old is the optimal age and people look
at me as if that's impossible, but I'm
looking at data here.
>> The more we can do to help younger
people have stabilities. So back to
economic vulnerability, having some
framework
>> that gives them security to know that
well I am I've got a good employer I am
allowed to take this you know extended
period off
>> you know I love the idea of young people
having a career
that's more and more the gig economy of
course so it's not for everybody
necessarily but let's say joining an
employer and you take your 3 five years
off most like a mother that could be a
father, I guess. Um, but you're still an
employee. You still have the business
card. You still have the email. You
still go to the Christmas parties or
whatever party the company throws. You
still do training. You might still work
on and off. You still feel part of that
company. And you come back age 32. And
with retirement become being pushed out,
you still can work for 40 years.
>> 570. Yeah. Exactly.
>> Yeah. I have
I wonder about the
sort of personal social choices that
people are making. I saw I want to say
GSS data maybe or some other survey that
looked at um why is it that you don't
want to have kids yet? And a lot of
people were talking about just working
on myself at the moment. Uh don't feel
ready. So it was a personal choice. So
what we have at least when it comes to
people's uh trying to nudge this
vitality curve when you ask people
they're like I don't want to have kids
yet. I don't want to have kids yet. And
what you're trying to do is get people
to work out what them in a decade would
have wanted them at 25 to have done. Now
if that was easy to do, nobody would
ever cheat on their diet. Like you eat
the cookie now because it tastes good
now. Even if in even if in future
retrospectively you wish that you
hadn't. Tomorrow I wish I hadn't had
that fast food. Today I do want the fast
food. I do what I want now. Like we
hyperbolically discount. We can't win
the marshmallow test every single day.
The uh challenges and issues of the
restrictions of having kids in a world
that has got more opportunity than ever
before, more distractions than ever
before. We've got Netflix and Tik Tok
and porn and video games and travel. Got
interconnected world. I can go and, you
know, backpack around Bali in Thailand.
I can't do that with a kid. So, you
telling me I'm going to stop doing all
of these things
now that I want to do now to do
something that I don't want to do now. I
genuinely do not want to have a kid at
age 23 because the world is different to
how it used to be. The world is
different to how it was a few decades
ago where there were fewer things to do.
Maybe the most fun, most engaging, best
thing that I could have done was have a
kid, but there's other things for me to
do now. And you're telling me that I'm
not going to do the thing that I want to
do now to do the thing that me in the
future might want to do, probably will
want to do, but I don't know that now.
So, I give up the thing that I know for
the thing that is uncertain or the thing
that I don't know I will want. Give up
the thing I do want for the thing I
don't know I will want.
I I love this. There's so many different
points uh to make. One I'll make so I
don't forget is that, you know, there
are so many younger parents I meet.
maybe my age whose kids are all grown up
who are now touring the world doing all
the amazing things when they're, you
know, able to do things that they
wouldn't have able to do in the 20s. The
idea that everything has to be crammed
in to our younger years, I think has has
to be questioned and maybe people my
generation should be sharing more of
that. But to me, it go, you know,
everything you've just said makes sense
in two contexts.
one those people who really don't have
the desire for kids
>> you know they just and it is pretty I
believe it's binary and people are going
to challenge that so maybe it's not
perfectly binary but it does seem and
the people have met you either do or you
want them one day now so you look at the
the category then who are saying like
you're suggesting in many cases well not
now I want this vacation now I want this
you know new iPhone now career yeah
absolutely
>> you
um
better inform people. I'm going to say
that because it's based on data. You
tell that person that you've got a 15%
chance of you. So, I'm going to launch
an app. I wasn't going to announce this
here because it's not ready yet and I
don't want someone to beat me to it, but
if they do, that's fine.
Imagine an app where you tell the app
where you're located.
Austin, London, Tokyo. What age are you?
What age would you ideally want to start
a family? 35. I say, okay, for Tokyo,
the probability of having a child at 35
is 7%.
>> For men and women,
we have this data now. We can tell
people
>> going to be a very popular app.
>> I've registered data.com because I think
it is a race.
>> Daterra.com.
>> Yeah, it doesn't exist. Date
>> is one letter away from a really, really
delicate word.
Okay. Your mind works a different way. I
>> I worked in nightife for a long time.
>> Okay. All right. Well, maybe I'll
rethink that. Yeah, you can maybe cut
that.
>> I'll do some No, no, no, no. Keep it.
But I I I just I I caution I caution you
that date.com. Also,
>> perilously close to date.com and
daterra.com.
I'm like, uh, date what race?
>> All right. Just come to birthcap.org and
we'll
>> Yes. birth birthcap.org. Um, yes. But
but the point really is though that
again I've seen it with my own eyes
so many times once you tell those people
the likelihood of becoming apparent
especially as a woman you you can see
the shift.
>> What's the Actually that's a good point.
Let's say that you know we've done
nearly three hours on this which added
on to the other thing in the
documentary. People got a lot to watch
right they got to go watch the Bgap
documentary which will be out by the
time that this comes out. Just search
birth gap on YouTube. go and watch the
first conversations that we've had. A
lot for people to take in. Let's say
that someone has been compelled by this
threehour treaties.
What if they're going to try and
convince a friend to take it seriously
beyond listen to the podcast, watch the
documentary, and obviously you're trying
to do this a lot. You're trying to
convince people to take seriously their
personal choice when it comes to maybe
thinking about having kids sooner,
right? I would guess that's a way to
summate what it is that you're trying to
achieve.
>> Yeah. without coercion just to think
about it.
>> Think about this thing more seriously.
>> Yes.
>> What are the most compelling oneliners,
few oneliners? What is the uh
Thanksgiving table uh pitch that people
should be giving to their friends and
family?
>> I think we've covered quite a few facts
here that are would be perfect for
Thanksgiving. Uh you know the 80% of
people without children had planned to
become parents one day. that you know by
by age 30 at most a woman have a 50%
chance of ever becoming a mother. I mean
those are really topical things and are
quite shocking to to to a lot of people
but I I think there's an opportunity
beyond this
for
younger people
men actually
my experience on multiple corners around
this globe is that there are multiple
women who really want to become mothers
enough to consider consider it much
earlier than would otherwise happen.
>> Mhm.
>> And they're waiting for Mr. Kind of
quite right. Maybe not perfect.
Nothing's perfect.
>> Mr. Quite right.
>> Yeah. Yeah. Quite right. And to young
men who may even have checked out or
been embarrassed at being rejected
multiple times,
>> I would be dropping that line in
whatever you can. you know, just asking
someone do they want
>> God. Wow. Did you know that 80% of
>> Yeah.
>> Well, maybe that's a little bit direct
and crew, but the point is I would
persist because the more and more people
who
start to understand
um the there's a thing uh that today
young people are learning more and more
called life design. Have you heard of
life design? Came out of Stanford in the
'9s. basically is telling young people
you can have whatever you want to design
your life.
>> Okay.
>> And interestingly, there's a a branch of
evolutionary biology um or some form of
biology called life history. Strange
word life history is looking at a
species and saying typically what
actually happens in terms of when
species reproduce, you know, when they
age, what they do in terms of, you know,
do chimpanzees look after their
grandchildren? Yes or no? How does that
all work?
>> And for me, I want to put life design
and life history together for humans.
Look at the reality of what tends to
happen to young people in terms of that
curve, the probability of having a child
at a certain age against your
aspirations. And I think the more young
people figure out that you can't have it
all. It's a lie that you can have
certainty about having it all. You might
be very lucky and get it all but the
>> your sister might have managed to get it
all
>> right and the more they have it all the
you the the greater the likelihood that
others won't. You know
the idea of things lining up is is
mostly a education, travel, career,
fulfillment,
family on time before it's too late with
the right person at the right time. It
it it's it's it's mostly a it's a myth
to suggest that there's a high
likelihood of that for anyone. And once
I think people start to
from data again understand what these
realities are, I think the psyche will
change. And my point young man is don't
give up. I know there are women out
there.
>> This this comes back to why I was just
saying before that it is about
tradeoffs. It is about well I know what
I want and I know what I can get right
now. I can get I have much more agency
over my own career over my own
education. One of the reasons I think
that people prioritize careers over
relationships is that a career can never
leave you. You can only choose to leave
it. A partner is not quite the same.
There's a level of um existential
investment of romantic investment that
is not within your control in a world
where people are dealing with more
anxiety and uncertainty, depression than
ever before. I think that it tends us to
go for things that are safer and it's
just a sexier talking point. Like there
is really easily a way to look at every
single thing if you take a very very low
resolution view. There is a super easy
way for somebody to look at the entire
conversation that we've had today and
say this is just men telling you to not
embrace your freedom in the modern
world. And
it takes much longer than that one
sentence to rebut that one sentence.
What that means is there's an asymmetry
sort of with the battle of ideas that
we've got going on here.
>> Yeah. But ultimately
we've started a conversation
and I think people will make up their
own mind that person lecturing telling
someone they can have it all when we
start challenging that and that's never
really happened before challenging that
saying look at all these childless women
grieving in tears about their lost
dreams men too and here's the actual raw
data that shows right now in the US a
woman who wants to have children has
basically got a 25% % chance of um sorry
a 60% chance of becoming a mother in the
US only six out of 10 people will do so
I think I no longer care about I've only
been cancelled once but it was enough to
see that you know the views in the
documentary went up 100 thousand
from the media coverage that got
>> so I don't mind at all about the the
naysayers the challengers they actually
you know so the asymmetry I think comes
the way.
>> Well, ultimately, you know, unless
you're going to misrepresent either
stats or intentions, the power lies with
what's true. And again, with demography,
this is one of the things even with
regards to climate change, um, we
understand where the climate is now, but
we're only using prediction models to
work out how that's going to affect
things in future. Demography may be the
most accurate
in terms of we don't know what the
financial market's going to do in the
future. We don't understand what's going
to happen to cloud formation. We don't
understand what's going to happen to sea
levels. We know how many one-year-olds
we've got. We know how many
one-year-olds we've got, which means
yeah, you don't know how long people are
going to live, but you can't make any
more one-year-olds or 2-year-olds or
three-y olds or 15 year olds.
>> So, we know how many 75 year olds will
be maximum any limit.
>> Yeah. Because they're all they're being
born this year.
>> There can't be anymore.
>> That's right. Yes.
>> Um and yet it surprises me greatly uh is
that organizations, publications
are in some form of denial. So the UN
came up with some projections. It's been
on X quite a lot this past week about
you know likely scenarios of future
population levels of the planet based on
birth rates
>> and they've got these different
scenarios best case, midcase, worst case
in terms of birth rates. But every
single one of them assumes that birth
rates will go back up to 2.0. Well, when
>> well they just over the century. Oh,
there is no there's no rationale for it.
It's just Well, they must do.
>> Oh, that this is
>> so the worst case scenario still assumes
a best case scenario
>> way better than anybody that's actually
looking at the data or understanding the
mechanisms of this would think.
>> Yes. So, and you know, and part of it
part of it I get, you know, the
economist came out with an article this
week saying basically don't panic about
low birth rates.
Sure,
we shouldn't be panicking, but we got to
be realist about it. Things will change.
And
>> I disagree. I disagree entirely. I think
it I think it's perfectly right to panic
about low birth rates. I am. But I
don't, you know, I'm a pretty even kill
guy. I haven't got involved in many sort
of big social movements. I've largely
been a only child energy adult infant
until pretty much now. You know, I cared
about some stuff to do with mating
because I was worried about loneliness
and people not coupling up. Um, I got
worried about AI safety and the
alignment problem. I got worried about
that u about 8 years ago or so and
that's still something that's a big part
of my concern. I'm worried about
existential risks more generally,
pandemics, boweapons, including climate
change, although it's on a longer more
protracted timeline. But this is the
first one that really has like huge
global implications. Uh, and I'm sure
that I'm sure that everybody, even the
people from [ __ ] Heaven's Gate,
right, that were sure this asteroid was
coming over and we're going to, you
know, this is going to destroy the earth
or, you know, people that thought that
in 2021 or whenever it was that the the
earth was going to be destroyed. All of
this stuff like everybody from the
inside of some uh inaccurate cult
believes that they're telling the truth,
but none of them have got the level of
certainty and data that demographers do.
So, it kind of comes back to raw stats.
And that's why, you know, uh, I would
love to get you to sit down with Luis
Perry. I'd love to get you to sit down
with Brad Wilcox and and and, you know,
the the Collinses and and have a a
conversation where we thrash this sort
of stuff out because I think they've got
important um, uh, elements to contribute
to this, what are the mechanisms that
are going on? What we seeing with
regards to relating and culture? What
was the change with regards to the pill,
with the sexual revolution, with, you
know, all of these sorts of things,
hypergamy, changes in socioeconomic
status? But first and foremost,
demography is about maths and that's
where you come from. And I think that
that's why you're an important voice
with this.
>> I think though to be fair, there's many
branches of demography. Um, and perhaps
the biggest part is like social dem.
It's a branch of sociology
>> looking at societies and why things
happen. And you I've been at events
speaking where I've been pulled aside by
other speakers from a world more aligned
with sociology saying, "Stephen, what
are you doing? Why are you telling
people this? We Why are you panicking
people? Because it's in the data and
it's our future and I care about young
people and it's true." Yeah, but we
shouldn't be panicking people. So I
think not all clearly but uh many voices
in academia
have
a level of responsibility. I mean we've
known this you're right demography is
about numbers. Those numbers have been
on the books. Birth rates fell in 1970.
You only need to look to to look at the
the justifications for this.
Just compare Galileo and Capernacus,
right? Like very few people especially
you're in academia. This is very
unpopular. The advantage and the reason
that I can talk about this even more
than you is that most of my friends,
they don't hold particularly staunch
beliefs that I'm going to be ostracized
for going against with regards to me
saying that I think population is going
to go down and it's maybe not a good
thing for pretty much everybody. No one
I'm I'm not going to be kicked out of
the hallowed holes of the canteen for
doing that, but people inside of
academia are. People inside of
government are. you know, the the the
repercussions if you're inside of an
institution like that are much bigger.
And the advantage that you and I have is
that we're on the outside of the tent
pissing in.
>> Yeah.
>> And
>> Yeah, that's right.
>> I it like I say, you can I'm I'm fired
up about this thing. I think it's I
think it's super important. Uh the first
conversation that we had sort of red
pill me. This one's given me enough to
think about for another [ __ ] three
years. Um
what should people do? What what do you
think that people should do if they want
to educate themselves further on this
thing?
>> I mean, there is good news here. When I
started making the documentary, my first
assumption
was that people just didn't want kids.
And I was expecting to conclude that,
you know what, we just got to prepare
for the wind down. you know,
understanding that for some decades, a
century or so, we're going to go through
this painful phase and but contraction,
>> but yeah. Yes. Contraction, but not an
elegant contraction at all.
>> Contraction.
>> Yeah. Yeah. Compression, collapse. I
mean, it's collapse. It's it's what it
is on many levels.
>> And
that's not the case. I mean, what I
learned consistently, surprisingly, is
that mothers are having the same kids as
decades ago in Japan and parts of
Europe, young women are having the same
number of kids, if they have the first
one, as their grandmother's generation.
So, it's nothing to do with parenthood
or motherhood. It's these waves of
childlessness that kicked in and then
this unplanned childlessness's element.
So
the reality is there's an easy fix if we
can just solve the unplanned child's
crisis. And how do we do that? Well, we
know how now. We just got to enable
people. We we got to increase the
vitality curve. And the only way to do
that, it's pretty clear from the data is
for the average age of parenting to be
younger. So then all we have to do is
reinvent education, reinvent careers,
and a whole bunch of other things. But
it but it's possible. It's at least
possible.
>> Okay. Cuz previously you thought we're
just locked in.
>> Yeah. And uh but I'd also say to policy
makers um or anyone influencing them or
and voters, the idea that a
magic policy is going to be pulled out
of the hat to solve this.
Um I would save your money. I I I would
focus on the unless it's focused on the
young
>> where should where should uh resources
be focused mostly
>> providing support for young parents in
their 20s.
>> What does that look like?
>> If you're a young woman today,
you have a vulnerability career-wise and
you have a vulnerability therefore
financially, but you've also
vulnerability in terms of divorce is
still a common thing.
>> Mhm.
And I I you know it's not an easy
solution but providing better assurance
to young women that whatever happens
we've got you.
>> We've got you.
>> Yeah. I mean look we two things that we
haven't spoken about much here. It's
probably too culture war. I'm actually
it obviously leads open to people saying
well what about the pill? What about the
sexual revolution? What about increasing
divorce rates and a secular society and
stuff like that. It's actually a bit
culture. Maybe we can come back and and
do a a group conversation with some of
the other people I spoke about where
it's their wheelhouse. But I will say
this just the pill comes up a lot. The
pill was legalized in Japan in 1990.
Birth rates fell in the early '7s. The
pill was legalized in the 70s or 60s
maybe elsewhere. So the idea it's all
because of the pill. You just look at
Japan and it's not as simple as that. uh
the point that I was about to make there
you said sort of um women's level felt
level of security is a part of the the
driver of this um it's really difficult
to hear that and look at the um
increased acceptance of divorce and not
think about those two things being
correlated because and and look
increased acceptance of divorce does
that that in the past many women stayed
in relationships with men that weren't
right for them, weren't good for them
because they were financial prisoners
because they were socially uh going to
be um uh ostracized if they did do that.
There was so much pain that was going to
be associated. Yeah, I completely I get
that. But if we can't hold a couple of
thoughts in our mind at one time, right?
I'm not saying that that was good. I'm
not saying that women should have stayed
in relationships with men that weren't
great fathers that that were were
abusive or uncaring or neglectful or
whatever, right? Yes. But we can also
see okay what what can we take from that
that a pro-marriage culture that one
that encourages uh couples to not be
confluent that I'll stay with you for as
long as you can provide something to me
but one that really genuinely commits
one that does look at a breakup not as a
moral failing on either person's side
but as something that is to be avoided
at all costs because the more of those
that happen the less confident young
women are and women in general and men
are about committing to this thing.
>> Sure. I think there's another dimension.
Again, it's it's it's
not easy to talk about, but but it's
there. You know, I meet
women who are divorced, older in life,
who have no kids.
I've also met women older in life who
are divorced, who do have kids. What
would you rather be if the marriage
doesn't work out? Would
you? And it's personal choice again, but
maybe in many cases
>> that risk of divorce
should be weighed up against
having a family in that context
>> and again this is down to personal
choices but it is part of the the
equation calculus. Yeah. So it's not a
simple I mean there are a lot of people
who you know one of the things that
I think I irritate some people well a
lot of people
>> we both mate
>> um you know people who promote you know
marriage but for me it's the other side
of the same coin you know simply saying
well people married more that have kids
more
>> I think often people are are getting
married simply because they want kids
you can't separate those in my view
there's nothing wrong to promote
marriage of course but I I think
focusing on that alone
>> yeah what is it in western cultures only
onethird of babies are born outside of
marriage
>> yeah well I I I think it's a little bit
more than that and some I think in
France it might be as low as that but
you know in Japan and South Korea 95% or
more of babies are born inside marriage
but what happens there is that you know
in a relationship um if it's going well
and maybe there's a pregnancy often
planned now it's time to get married
because socially you got to do that in
Japan. There's a history uh and certain
reasons for it. So you know you there's
a lot of complexities here and you you
know for for me I I sleep better
because I to me now my second paper
fatality curve is not yet peer reviewed.
It's going into pre-print very soon. It
will be out there to be analyzed and
it'll have to go through that scrutiny.
But three years ago when I talked to you
about unplanned childlessness that
wasn't peer reviewed. I put it out there
because the data was clear and now that
has passed through peer review. So we'll
see. At least for me I am sleeping
better at night that I know what the
problem is. It's just the scale of the
solutions reinventing of our 20s
basically that frightens me.
>> Steven Shaw, ladies and gentlemen.
Stephen, you're great. I appreciate you
man. Uh, I commend the fact that you are
continuing to be obsessive about this
one problem. And uh, yeah, people should
just go and watch Birthgap. Search
Birthgap on YouTube. That's all you need
to do. Um,
birthcap.ap.ap.ap.ap.ap.ap.ap.ap.ap.ap.org
to to keep up to date with this stuff.
I'm glad that I'm on this ride with you,
man. I really am. I think that we are
talking about something that's really,
really important that's going to
hopefully make people's lives and the
future of the world a little bit better.
So,
>> well, I appreciate your interest in this
topic to be honest with you. You've been
a big factor in getting this story out
there. So, thank you.
>> Let's keep doing it. Thank you very much
for tuning in. If you enjoyed that
episode, you will love this one with Mr.
Naval Ravakan. It's first episode in six
years. Go on.