Where Crises Converge: Russia's Role in the Middle East

[music] Welcome back. I'm Max Bergman, director of the Stewart Center and Europe Russia Eurasia program at CSIS. >> And I'm Maria Niggoava, senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia. >> And you're listening to Russian Roulette, a podcast discussing all things Russia and Eurasia from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Hello everyone and welcome back to Russian Roulette. I'm Max Bergman. I'm recording solo today and I'm thrilled to be joined by longtime friends of the show, Hanote and Natasha Hall. We're very excited to have you both back uh to talk about the increasingly interconnected nature of the wars in Ukraine and Iran and what that means for Russia's foreign policy in the Middle East and the potential risks of a wider global conflict. Hanote of course is the director of the Eurasia non-prololiferation program at the James Martin Center for Non-prololiferation studies in Monterey, California and is a non-resident senior associate here in the Europe Russia Eurasia program at CSIS. She is an expert on Russian foreign policy especially uh Russia's role in the Middle East and on Russia's nuclear posture and most importantly she is the author of the brand new book We Shall Outlast Them: Putin's Global Campaign to Defeat the West. Her brand new book is out now. Uh we've got a link in our show notes for those interested. Go buy a copy of uh Hana's book. Talk about it. Hype it up. Uh tell your friends. Uh it's fantastic. And we're also going to be talking with Hana later on uh about her book, not on today's episode, but in in a future episode. So stay tuned for that. And also joining us today is Natasha Hall. Natasha is the senior advocate for the Middle East at Refugees International and an associate fellow with the Middle East and North Africa program at Chattam House. Previously, Natasha was a colleague of mine, a senior fellow with the CSIS Middle East program where she continues to collaborate as a non-resident senior associate. She spent years on the ground across the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, working on everything from crisis management to water security with a variety of organizations internationally, including with the White Helmets, the volunteer organization during the Syrian Civil War. Uh she will also soon be releasing her new book titled Assad Shadow: What Syria Taught the World Strongmen. And congratulations, Natasha, on that. hope you you finish that as soon as possible and can get that out um and then probably join maybe not our show but others uh others in the CSIS family. We will throw all the links uh to these books in the show notes. So, please make sure to keep an eye out um for the new exciting work by both our guests. Natasha Hana, thank you so much for joining us today. Maybe just to start, we can sort of take a step back. We had both of you on the show early last year to talk about the fall of the Assad regime. Uh we were well over a year away from the current US and Israeli war with Iran and its global implications. Maybe Hana starting with you and then Natasha you could give us a lay of the land. Hana about Russia's current posture in the Middle East. Where does it stand now? How have things evolved over the last year or two years since we really uh drilled into what was happening in Syria? How is Iran sort of uh impact things? Maybe an overview overall lay of the land. >> Sure. Um happy to Max. So when we last spoke in early 2025, you know, this was 3 years into the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. uh Assad had just fallen in Syria and we were in a situation where Russia's influence in the Middle East broadly speaking had suffered the loss of a major ally in Syria. Iran and the Iranled axis of resistance had been weakened since October 7th and of course Iran is a strategic partner of Russia. So overall the Russians were still present but you know in in comparison to the peak of their power projection into the Middle East you know thinking of the years after the intervention in the Syrian civil war Russia's influence was reduced I would say over the last year and a half 2025 and now 2026 uh fortunes for Russia have continued to be mixed in the Middle East so the big developments have been two wars with Iran now we had the 12-day war last summer and now the ongoing war with Iran. You know, the the 12-day war last summer really threatened to further erode Russia's position in the Middle East. I think it came as a shock to Moscow. The Iranians looked rather weak. Though it was a short war, Russia didn't do very much. It didn't get involved in the conflict. It tried to support Iran diplomatically and politically after the war, but also couldn't deter the United States and Israel from going at it again. And I think there was a great anxiety in Moscow when the current war started what this could mean for Iran. Now Iran has proven relatively resilient in this war and that is very much welcomed by Russia. We could talk about this more but I think there's a sense now that they that Russia was right to bet on a strategic partnership with Iran. Looking at Syria here, the Russians have hung on to some influence. They hustled quite hard last year to preserve ties with the new Syrian government to some extent defying expectations. Al-Shara has visited Moscow twice. But here again, Russia is not a major player. They have some role to play. They have retained access to their bases, though that is in flux as well. So, a mixed picture with Israel. I think there's been some relaxation in the Russian-Israeli relationship in 2025 after the Gaza war. That has also had to do, I think, with the Trump administration coming back into office and um that opening some room also for Israeli Russian normalization. But then there have been recent irritations in that relationship as well because of Russia's backing for Iran. Russia has not been very successful in terms of being a major diplomatic player in all of these uh dossas that we're discussing. They've tried to insert themselves also into Iran related diplomacy both last summer and then amid the current war putting offers on the table but pretty much being rebuffed by the Trump administration. And the last point I want to make, Max, is that another irritant from Russia's point of view is that Ukraine has been making some foray into the Middle East, visits to Syria, forging partnerships with Gulf Arab states, um, defense partnerships, sharing Ukraine's anti- drone expertise and technology. There's a question mark for me over the extent how far these relationships and these new partnerships can go, but it is certainly something that the Russians have not liked to see. So bottom line here is Russian influence has come down from its peak uh a decade ago but Russia retains a role and it also retains some assets and and the basis potentially for for future power projection. >> Thank you Hana that's a fantastic overview. Natasha I want to turn uh over to you. Any any thoughts you have on what Hana said but also maybe you know this has been sort of a transformative period for the Middle East. I mean there's uh lots of changes and I'm curious how maybe you could give us a lean on how things are evolving and is is Russia a player at all still is it still you know considered a factor how does the region see Russia? Yeah, it's an overwhelming question, right? What a difference a couple of years makes from the last time we spoke together. Hannah, you know, I think Russia has removed itself from being sort of this indispensable, you know, power player in the Middle East with its position uh in Syria. You know, it used the Estana negotiations as kind of like an alternative to Geneva. It was really becoming a power that all of the regional players had to deal with because of Syria and because of other issues as well. Now it's more of a foothold than a fortress is is how I would put it more plainly. And we saw that with the negotiated agreement with the Syrian government whereby you know its presence with Tartus and Himamine and the you know the air base in Syria has been downgraded significantly and Russia has tried to move its assets and you know personnel to Libya but this isn't a clean uh you know sort of a clean substitution. There was a lot of things to Tartus that were indispensable to Russia in terms of repairs facilities in a warm water port. That said, I think that this speaks to a couple of different things. One that and and Hannah could speak much more uh to this is that it's clear that Ukraine is the priority here. And so I think you know in terms of what Russia has always been trying to do, that hasn't changed as much. It wants to distribute its footprint. It is not like the United States where it's sort of a committed married partner to its allies. It's a very transactional relationship. As soon as Russia saw that Assad was a losing hand, it pulled out and it switched alliances very quickly. It quickly tried to establish a relationship with the transitional government, which is actually pretty breathtaking given the Russian air power that we saw on on those very forces on the ground for for over a decade. And you know it it continued to for example export grains that were very needed uh for Syria. It somewhat took the place of Iranian oil uh imports for for Syria as well. It immediately almost immediately exported you know Syrian currency to prevent uh economic collapse there. So, you know, it very quickly just switched gears in in a sense as much as it possibly could, which I think shows that Russia is more interested in who is in power in the capital so it can maintain influence rather than the individual position. And I would say the same goes for its relationship with Iran. I mean hopefully we'll talk more about this but it's been really fascinating to see how Iran really invested in this relationship provided the shahed drones that were instrumental in the Ukraine conflict but then Russia pretty quickly developed the domestic capacity for that and Russia really felt that isolation when it was being attacked by the most powerful militaries in the world in the past year or so. uh and Russia provided some support but not not a significant amount right and so I think you know everyone is seeing that Russia is not necessarily a committed ally that's going to be there to the very end but it's unclear if anyone ever really thought that in the first place I think we're very much in a transactional era alto together and I think you know Ukraine sees that and reads the room and knows that it needs to help out Gulf allies for example with some of its counter drone technology Y um everyone is trying to become more indispensable so that they can survive these very very uncertain times especially in the past couple of years. >> I think that's a great segue to talk about the Russia Iran uh relationship. How has it evolved since this war has begun? What has what what has Russia provided Iran? How are the Iranians seeing Russia as a as a as a partner? So maybe Natasha, maybe you could extend on on that and maybe dive in a bit more. >> Yeah, I mean I I got into it a bit, but I I think I would point to probably, you know, and I'm excited to hear what Hannah has to say about this, but I think that the three ways in which these conflicts are becoming linked. Some of them are extremely tangibly like geographically, militarily, economically. But I think I would say underneath all of those three is sort of the question of bandwidth and how much attention and capacity does the Iran war pull away from Ukraine and vice versa. So I think you know there's been recent you know activity on the Caspian. So, this is a good example of geographically how they're linked. And I think Max, you and your team have been doing a lot of work on this, but Ukraine just struck vessels there in July after Israel already hit uh Iran's Caspian port. And the Caspian had functioned as as CSIS has written many times as kind of a sanctuary lane because it's important for Russia Iran sanctions of Asia and the logistics corridor there. And that sanctuary is now being breached. Um, and so, you know, I think, you know, there's a practical reason that the Caspian matters. Uh, Iran is using it for for grain imports, for, you know, military imports, etc., etc. And it's also a big blind spot, I would say, for the United States. Um, which I think the US is trying to fill right now, but it's strategically, geographically very messy for the US. The five countries bordering the Caspian fall along different US military and bureaucratic jurisdictions. Um and you know Azerban and Russia are under European command. Iran, Turk men, Kazakhstan fall along central command and so you know I mean even the state department has you know various bureaus covering these countries. So that's another I think piece of this that the United States needs to be and is become becoming more aware of. You know obviously the second link linkage is intelligence. There's been reports that Russia has provided satellite imagery to Iran. we just saw this Ratcliffe CIA director uh visit to Moscow. So I think that that was kind of uh an acknowledgment uh that Russia is going to be instrumental in really sort of putting the pressure on on Iran. And you know, I think that I I guess you know, we've also talked about this drones issue, but as I mentioned, you know, I think what what basically ended up happening was that Iran made itself indispensable and Russia quickly took that away and now is, you know, producing probably 90% of Iranian designed drones uh within Russia. Um so, you know, I I think that that link has been somewhat severed and now Russia can essentially do what it wants. And so I think you know there's those aspects of it. So like the geographic, you know, the military. I think um and we can talk more about the economic costs and because I do think that this drone aspect is really fascinating both because Iranian drones were so instrumental in the Ukraine war, but also because now Ukraine is trying to use its expertise to make itself more indispensable to the Gulf because it just simply knows that the more Patriot interceptors are used in, you know, the Iran conflict, the less is available for for Ukraine. you know, to put it very concretely. And then again, I think that one of the biggest aspects of this is that I don't know if Russia wants this war to end, right, between the US and Iran. I think for its purposes, it just wants to add just enough fuel to the fire to kind of keep it going, keep people distracted, keep US personnel and assets, you know, being used um in an unsustainable fashion, I would say. Um all of these things benefit benefit Russia. In addition to the fact that the war is extremely unpopular, I would say globally and even domestically in the United States and Russia capitalizes on those kinds of divisions. Thank you, Natasha. And I have to thank you for for the plug of uh the report that came from uh Maria uh and my colleagues uh Tina Debay and Nick Fenton. It it's about the the North South transport corridor between Russia uh and Iran. It's called Resilience Through Linkage. It's also available at csis.org and we'll put it in the show notes. Um, and and I think, you know, the point about drones is is quite important in the sense that, you know, he the Iranians seem to have sort of made a mistake in just sort of allowing, you know, giving essentially the IP to Russia, allowing Russia to just build its variant of its own variance of of the Shahed drone. and that that sort of you know there was a real linkage at the beginning of the war but Russia's not really dependent not dependent on Iran for for its drone technology. Um Hana maybe back to you. How do you see the the Russia Iran relationship? What has Russia provided Iran? What hasn't it provided Iran? I you mentioned the 12-day war and I think that was in some ways sort of an example of the limitations of Russian air defense uh uh support. you know, Russia has provided uh air defense or sold air defense to Iran that didn't seem to be that impactful and and so how do you assess the Russia Iran collaboration? >> Yeah, look, I think Russia and Iran have a strategic partnership uh which does not oblige either side really to pro provide military assistance. I mean come directly to aid in the event of war and both sides wanted the agreement to be negotiated that way. both the Russian side and the Iranian side. Now having said that there has been support that Russia has given to Iran amid the current war. I think it's very true that the the relationship dynamic has be has become again more of a patron client dynamic where the Russians don't need the Iranians at this time in the war. I think Russia is more dependent on North Korea and China in order to be able to prosecute the war than it is reliant on Iran today. But there's things that Russia has given to Iran in the current war. We've had the reports about the sharing of targeting data with Iran to enable Iran to better conduct strikes against targets in the Gulf. Uh we've had uh reports of components potentially ammunition TNT being delivered to Iran. Perhaps also the sharing of some of that upgraded Shah technology with the Iranians. So sort of knowledge diffusion back towards Iran. though I think we still need to wait you know to learn more from from the debris of systems to learn what exactly has trans transpired there but there has been some support I agree max that it you know it hasn't gone above and beyond there's items that the Iranians have wanted from Russia for years such as SU35 which I I have not seen any real indication that those have been delivered but also other kinds of assistance and you know for the Russians this this has always has been a delicate balancing act because they do want to support Iran but at the same time they have partnerships in the Middle East with Israel with the Gulf Arab states. So they need to tread carefully and of course the Gulf states have not been happy at all with the kind of support that Russia has given to Iran. And so this comes at a cost for Russia uh as well and so this is why I think they will not overdo the support that they're giving to Iran. I just want to add a few more points to Natasha's great analysis on the ways in which these wars intersect. I think for me at the moment the the most important point is the in terms of a link between the two theaters is in the depletion of resources and how that affect affects the other theater. And here I'm talking about the Iran war being a tipping point for shrinking inventories of patriot interceptors. Right? We have the numbers in terms of the pressure that that has put on Patriot interceptors and we know that Ukraine desperately needs those systems that they are struggling to defend themselves against Russian ballistic missile strikes and we are moving into the fall and winter I think with great anxiety over how that might manifest in the Ukraine war. So that's I think quite a concrete sort of spill over from one theater to another. Now, I do agree with Natasha's basic contention that at this time it's not clear, therefore that Russia wants the Iran war to end soon because there are some benefits that Russia is extracting with the continued pressure on Patriot stockpiles and also an elevated oil price. Though I guess it hasn't gone through the roof as much as some analysts expected, but still an elevated oil price is is good for Russia on balance. But I don't think that this was the sentiment throughout this war. I would actually pose the argument that in the spring there there was there was a sort of mixed assessment in Moscow as to whether a protracted war with Iran in the Persian Gulf would actually be to Russia's benefit. And the key reason here is that Russia wanted to engage the Trump administration over Ukraine. Let's recall the Anchorage summit last year in Alaska. Russian claims in terms of what was promised. Um, you know, the Trump administration delivering Ukrainian concessions in negotiations, you know, deliver a deal on Ukraine. I think by and large that was the big hope that the Russians had through 2025 and still into 2026, you know, for a negotiated outcome in Ukraine, one that is compliant with Russian expectations and demands, they needed the Trump administration to deliver pressure on Ukraine. Suddenly with Trump starting a war in the Middle East and being distracted, the focus on Ukraine completely went away. And so that was sort of then a mixed blessing from a Russian point of view. You had people in the Russian expert community saying in the spring, well the Americans need to be done with this in the Middle East so that they can refocus their attention to Ukraine and finally put that pressure on Zalinski. Now I think now there has there's a realization that has sunk in in Moscow that this is just not going to happen. That the anchorage spirit is no more that there's not going to be a serious heavy lift by the Trump administration on Ukraine. Certainly not before the midterm elections and so the alternative the only alternative now is therefore to fight on uh to escalate the war. And so at this time I think they truly benefit from continued low-level conflict in the Middle East. But I'm not sure that that was true throughout the whole duration of the conflict is is my point. Um, one final point I want to make about these two theaters. It's been quite interesting to have a look at how the Russians have read the war with Iran and also the negotiations towards what came to be known as the Islamabad memorandum which has since fallen apart and sort of what lessons they have drawn for themselves um from this war. I think one big takeaway of course is that these kinds of agreements that the Trump administration forges, they are brittle. They don't solve underlying conflict issues, they very much kick the can down the road when it comes to fundamental issues. So such agreements are not to be trusted and therefore Russia shouldn't go for something so superficial either. But there have been a few other lessons that the Russians have drawn. One is they say this war showed that the United States is no longer willing to incur significant material or human losses and costs in order to actually win a war that it started and Russia is taking note of that for itself. And the second point is that they have taken note of Iranian resilience. It's been quite interesting to compare how Russia has looked at Iran during the 12-day war last summer when you had some Russian military experts come forward and call Iran a paper tiger and this current war where the Russians have been actually surprised by the degree of Iranian resilience and the way in which Iran, you know, instrumentalized the straight of Hormoose and weaponized it, you know, to to gain leverage visa v the United States. So you've had a lot of Russian commentators saying Iran is the model of resilience and what it shows is that in order to withstand and outlast the other side you know in the current geopolitical environment a stronger adversary and of course for Russia the adversary in Ukraine is not Ukraine it is the collective west that is who Russia sees itself in conflict with in order to outlast that other side the key is domestic resilience. The key is the regime keeping control through times of turmoil and pressure. Look how the Iranians did it. That's the model. And I think that also forbods certain domestic developments inside Russia ahead of the Duma elections. And so the Kremlin keeping control of the situation as a growing portion of Russian society is growing tired of this war and wants this to end. >> There's a lot on the table. Um, I I think I want to go back to something Natasha mentioned about John Radcliffe's uh the CIA director's trip to Moscow. There's been a lot of and I don't know about conflicting reporting, but just a lot of reporting that sort of points at different reasons why he might have gone to Moscow. And this would be this was the first time a CIA director has gone to Moscow since Bill Burns, who was then CIA director under the Biden administration, went to uh Moscow, I believe in in December of 2021 to warn uh the Russians not to invade Ukraine. No, there's speculation that perhaps this was about Russian hybrid attacks or threats in in Europe, uh about perhaps Russia contemplating an attack on the Baltics. There's another theory that perhaps this really had to do with Iran with the administration wanting Russia to perhaps use some of its leverage to uh put pressure on Iran or to not do certain provide certain support to Iran. Um Hana maybe what do you what do you make of this? Is there an Iran link here? and Sam Green, our our colleague uh in in the UK, just did a a Twitter thread where I think he was quite uh concerned that perhaps this was, you know, Russia, if you put pressure on Iran, perhaps the US dials down its support for Ukraine. I'm curious uh how Hana how you see this and maybe then Natasha over to you. >> Yeah, look, I mean, I don't know for sure, of course, whether this was was on the agenda. I think it's conceivable that it was one item on the agenda. I think it probably was not the main item. I think that there was the main purpose was a conversation about the Ukraine war and escalation scenarios here. You know, if Iran was on the agenda, the first thing I want to say is that this would be a curious reversal because whenever the Trump administration and various officials and Trump himself were prompted over Russian support to Iran in recent months, they brushed it aside as inconsequential. They said it wasn't so significant and it wasn't a big deal. So, you know, to then make a trip to Moscow um to raise the issue, that would be quite a reversal. You know, unless the United States has intelligence that there's more support coming from Russia to Iran that we're not seeing in the open source, which is of course always a possibility. But you know what I find curious about the this whole Iran speculation or hypothesis is that the Trump administration just announced its D-Day visa v Iran and so it is ratcheting up its economic pressure on Iran and here the Russians are really not the main player. I mean if the Trump administration wants this to work the player they truly have to get on board is the Chinese right who are buying enormous amounts of Iranian oil. Um, from my understanding, Russian Iranian bilateral trade has not grown significantly in recent years. It stands at at a rather modest figure. The Russians are investors in the Iranian economy, but a lot of those projects have also stalled. So, this is not as such a significant economic relationship. And the final point I want to make, Max, and I'd be curious to hear Natasha's thoughts on this as well. If this is about getting the Russians to put pressure on Iran to reopen the Straight of Hormuz, my big question is, do the Russians have that kind of leverage over Iran? And I really have my doubts. Of course, they are strategic partners. Of course, there's a relationship, but the Iranians are fighting what they consider an existential fight. And so, how are the Russians going to put pressure on the Iranians? Again, what they are providing Iran with, I think, is not that existential, that they have good cards to put that kind of pressure on the on the Iranians, which of course, none of this is to say that the US administration might not might not try, but uh you know, I think there's a few pieces here that don't really add up. >> Hana, you stole my question. You should be co-host of the podcast. Natasha, over to you. uh uh what leverage does Russia have any leverage over the Iranians on when it you know when it comes to this war? >> Yeah. So I would pull back a little bit and answer your previous question uh really quickly just kind of zooming out the optics of this more generally, right? Because Russia and Trump are very interested in optics. And I think just the fact that the CIA director went to Moscow to ask for something we don't know what or to discuss something we don't know what again reenters Russia in some way as some kind of power player it has something that the United States wants. We don't know what that thing is right we can speculate about what it is but again I think that that positions Russia in a certain way. You know the second new thing as as Hannah alluded to is this econ economic pressure campaign. So it seems that the Trump administration is trying to move to the more traditional forms of diplomacy after this sort of shock and awe campaign has not worked with Iran. So we've saw seen the UAE step up and you know say that it will uh put the kaibos on Iran. It's odd that that didn't happen earlier given how hawkish the UAE has been. Um and as Hannah alluded to, you know, China is the big player in this, not necessarily Russia. The thing about China though is that I don't think that they're going to succumb to any kind of pressure from the United States and they've said as much. But Russia, I mean, at least the United States has something that Russia wants and that is support to Ukraine. And so I think that you know the speculation about this being somehow related to an Iran Ukraine thing you know we can't know for sure but given the sort of transactional era that I just described I wouldn't be entirely shocked whether or not that's the straight of Hormuz or that's you know support to Iran. I don't know maybe both. I do think that's significant because it also shows that the United States might be prioritizing an end to this war in the Middle East or at least uh reopening of all trade lanes to Ukraine and that that's probably concerning to Ukrainians I would say um and and Europeans more generally and you know just given you know here in DC in the United States we're about to have elections gas is still you know a dollar over you know at the pumps I could see how they would at least temporarily prioritize ending this this you know US Iran war and you know I think that uh the Trump administration frequently pivots all over the place as we've especially seen in the past few months so I don't think that's outside the realm of possibility >> maybe we could shift to the Gulf uh Hana you mentioned the Russia needing to balance uh its relationship with Iran with the Gulf states you know I think when Russia intervened in Syria, at least when I was in the State Department, could see it sort of firsthand. Suddenly, the Gulf States, Israelis began to sort of see Russia as a real player in the region and needing to interact with Russia. Russia was then, I think, expanded its its clout, its influence, its interactions with with Gulf States. This war see the war in Iran seems to have scrambled out um and has really demonstrated to the Gulf States that that Russia may not be on their side. uh and also created an opening for Ukraine, particularly Ukraine's really remarkable ability to deal with just a daily uh onslaught of missiles and drones, which then it would became quite apparent that the Gulf States were not as wellprepared. Neither was the United States and was using really high-end weaponry, expanding Patriot missiles like they, you know, uh like there were leaves growing on trees. I mean, now that we're six months uh into this into this war, uh how how have things evolved? How has Ukraine's relationship with these states, Gulf States, evolved? Have we seen Gulf money pouring back into Ukraine? Uh Hana, maybe you could could kick us off here. >> Sure, happy to. Um so so the first thing I want to say is and I think it's it's important to take note of this. If you look at official reactions from the Gulf States or from Israel for that matter I think it's quite remarkable that there has been no highlevel criticism of Russian support for Iran through this war. They have all been quite tight lipped. They have not come out and criticized Moscow publicly. uh behind closed doors, people will, you know, make their dissatisfaction known with the Russian support for Iran and, you know, say there's no reason why we shouldn't expand our defense cooperation w with Ukraine. But there's clearly a reluctance to break with Russia at the highest level. And you know, based on closed door conversations that I've had in the early summer with some experts from from the UAE and from Saudi Arabia, there's still this sense that at the end of the day, Russia is a great power. We have a multifaceted relationship with Russia. We still have to deal with them in OPEC plus at least when it comes to the Saudis. You know, the UAE regularly mediates prisoner exchanges between Russia and Ukraine. That is important to them. Russia is a permanent member on the UN Security Council. Uh we don't know how this war in Ukraine is going to end. So, you do not want to antagonize Russia or sort of go allin with Ukraine. Now, you know, I I think countries in the region are not going to do that. But they will quietly expand their cooperation wi-i with Ukraine. But again, as I I said earlier in the conversation, how far that can go, you know, beyond just discrete deals uh that focus on the anti- drone expertise and technology, I I genuinely don't know. And yeah, I don't know how much Gulf investment has flown into Ukraine in return yet. I think we're still waiting to see, you know, some of those numbers. >> Natasha, your your thoughts on on sort of Russia's role in the Gulf and and and whether, you know, how how does the Gulf see Russia? How does the Gulf see Ukraine? Uh has that been evolving? Where where where do we stand? >> Yeah, I mean I would agree with Hannah's points on this. Uh you know, Russia is seen as a great power. It's permanent member on the security council. It's um you know, instead of being too big to fail necessarily, it's too big to ignore just in terms of energy security, food security, etc. uh and it and it makes it hard to be ignored by you know sort of like lighting fires all over the world as well in a certain way. So it kind of punches above its weight in terms of GDP I would say and has for some time. Um I think it's also a convenient hedge for not just Gulf states but regional players and many other players in in the global south. how important Russia actually is to their economies or their militaries is one thing, but it can always sort of at least during the Cold War use kind of the boogeyman of Russia um as you know a way to get more US support for example, right? So we've seen that as well. We actually just saw that kind of with the Syrian government where the Syrian government promised to cut its its oil imports from Russia and now we see this state sponsor uh of of terrorism designation lifted lifted in Syria. Right. So, you know, I think that there's ways to use those relationships in very strategic ways. I mean, in terms of Ukraine, I think Hannah, you know, better answered this, but you you did see hundreds of, you know, counter drone experts, you know, going to the Gulf and um, you know, I think there was a lot of a lot of publicity around that, right? Because I think especially for those that want to defend Ukraine, they really wanted to point out that Ukraine is showing concretely how it can assist how the battlefield in Ukraine can actually uh assist the United States and the West more broadly because you know I think since the Biden administration with the Trump administration and I think with the American public in general, the idea that Ukraine is the defender of like liberal democracy or NATO or Europe kind of falls on deaf ears or they don't it doesn't really translate in a sense and you know this is a concrete thing that they can say that they're providing the issue I would say you know just stepping back and back to my whole transactional era piece of this I think a Gulf official was actually the one that put it to me this way that you know relationships are either you know marriages or they're mistresses right and we're kind of like in a mistress era at this point the Gulf doesn't really feel like the United States might be there until, you know, their deathbed. It's it's much more transactional. They feel like they therefore can be more transactional with China, with Russia, etc. And they're going to make, you know, different bets based on that. They're not just going to simply say ideologically with ideological purity, we're going to stand with Ukraine or anyone else, right? Because everyone's a hypocrite at the end of the day when it comes to many of these wars that we're talking about. And so, I think everyone sees that. And um so I think you know moving forward we're just going to see much more of that. And I think I think Ukraine understands that. I think everyone sees what happened to Assad. Um and you know they understand that this isn't an era of quagmires where you're going to fully invest in something until you know for 20 years. This is uh this is a much more transa transactional situation. Maybe one final question to to both of you to sort of project forward and maybe Natasha we'll start with you because sort of starts with the where the Middle East is headed sort of what opportunities or challenges are there for Russia? I mean I mean it sort of seems like to me the period from Russia's intervention in the Syrian war in 2015 to the fall of Assad was sort of an an era perhaps a high watermark for Russia involvement in the Middle East at least in this century. Uh and so are we just kind of in a period where Russia is just going to be somewhat of of a peripheral player or is the fact that there's a lot of transition happening? There's a lot of talk about the America basically needing to pull a lot of its forces out of the Middle East. These bases that it has in the Gulf may not be operable uh going forward that that we're going to be an era of of real churn in transition. Maybe that creates opportunities for Russia. How how do you see this going forward? You know, how do you see Russia as a player in the Middle East? Uh go, you know, going forward if we project out next year, 5 years, 10 years. Uh and the same question to you, Han. >> Yeah. So, a lot's changed as you noted. I mean, back to 2015, you know, King Abdullah of Jordan was warning the United States of the expanding role of Russia in the region and, you know, how are we going to deal with it? And the US kind of dismissed it at the end of the day. And then, you know, years later, as Russia is this instrumental player in in Syria through its military intervention, Jordan, a US ally extremely dependent on the United States, called Russia a very stable partner. And I think that speaks to the overall narrative that Russia wants to portray, which is that it itself is not a revisionist or rogue power, but it's really the United States that is, and it's just trying to keep everything, you know, it's it's it's it's trying to protect sovereignty of countries. OB except for obviously Ukraine, but outside of its near or abroad, it's it's trying to keep the status quo, whereas the United States is sort of, you know, supporting the Arab Spring, lighting fires, um, fueling civil wars. Um, and I I don't think that the United States did itself any favors through this US Iran war or its sort of cart blanch support to Israel over the past few years um, in in really um, sort of rebutting that that argument. Right. That said, I mean, Russia is obviously a very diminished player in reality. Um, you know, it it lost its keystone, which was Syria. The US is going to withdraw its 10,000 troops from northeast Syria, you know, I mean, but Russia has as well. So, I think that that kind of points to, you know, a different sort of calculation as to which areas are important. There's even discussions about US moving troops kind of more away from Iran, westward. Um, and I'm sure that that really creates a lot of fear amongst the Gulf countries, right? Um, it's especially certain ones that are particularly close to Iran geographically speaking. Um, and so I think a lot of Russia's positioning, much like it was in 2015, is what the United States is allows Russia to grab up, right? Um, so you know, if it if it decides to withdraw, if it decides to be more of a rogue power and sort of inflaming these conflicts and tensions, Russia can then come in to be a player that's, you know, making itself seem like a more stable partner, right? Or at least one that isn't going to sort of inflame conflicts. Um, and so that's I think where the problem lies. It's less, you know, about Russia's um, you know, actual power and it's more about US positioning. Um, and that is no longer as clear as it was in decades past. >> Thank you, Hana. Over to you. Closing thoughts. >> Yeah, I think I agree with much of what Natasha said. I I I'll take the question sort of through a slightly different prism. When I think about the future of Russian power projection, especially military power projection in the Middle East, I think it's helpful to differentiate between intent, capability, and opportunity. And I think intent is the easiest, Max, because I think beyond the war in Ukraine, Russia will definitely have an aspiration to be a player in the Middle East, to have that kind of more global power projection. The Middle East is a natural arena for Russia to do so because of the historical role that the Soviet Union played, because of the legacy presence um in in Syria. You know, I think there's a sense in Moscow now that yes, we understand that we have to lay low for a while, that we can't be a major player because we have our hands full with Ukraine, but then at some point after the end of this war, we can make a comeback of sorts also in the Middle East. So, I think the intent and ambition will be there. the capability will probably also be there because Russia will probably retain you know the capabilities for an expeditionary force to conduct limited kinds of interventions or operations in the Middle East. I think the big question will be over the bases in Syria and the extent to which Russia could dispose of those bases for expeditionary warfare. you know there's there is this recent deal to convert the the bases in menartus into training uh and qualification centers but I think the language in that deal is sufficiently unclear that we don't actually know yet for sure to what extent Russia could still use the bases um in in the future or not and this might be purposefully done so both to allow Russia to save some face but also to to sort of keep this slightly ambivalent and certainly having looked at how the Russian strategic community has reacted to this deal and this announcement there there's no consensus really on what that means for Russia's future ability to use the bases. So I think this is something to watch. The biggest question uh and this comes back to Natasha's point about the future of the US role in the region will be whether there's going to be any opportunity for Russia to return to the region. Where could Russia conceivably intervene or project military power in the Gulf? I have big question marks over this. There's also a lot of regional countries that will never, I think, ex accept a Russian military presence on their soil. You know, I think it's very interesting to discuss whether we could ever foresee a Russian military presence in Iran in the scenario in which Iran post war descends into internal turmoil or even a civil war, which is not currently on the cards, but you know, thinking down conceivable trajectories five or 10 years down the line, you know, um is that something that we could see? I would not totally discount that. But I think the greater opportunity for Russian military power projection will be in a different theater and that is in Africa where the Africa corps has already established a foothold. I think with the ambition also to expand more aggressively after the war in Ukraine and it is my sense yes there might be opportunities for Russia to do something in the Middle East but the opportunities will be limited and that is less a function of Russia's capabilities and more a function of the regional landscape powers who themselves have leverage and who might not afford Russia that kind of space. >> Thank you both. Unfortunately, we're going to have to end it there. Uh Hana Natasha, it's been a fantastic conversation and always a big thanks to all of our listeners for tuning in. Uh be sure to check out the link to Hana's book. We will outlast them, Putin's global campaign to defeat the West uh in our episode show notes and you can buy that book wherever you buy your books. And we will see you next time on Russian Roulette. [music] You've been listening to Russian Roulette. We hope you've enjoyed this episode and tune in again soon. >> Russian Roulette releases new episodes every two weeks and is available wherever you get your podcast. [music] So, please subscribe to our show, share our episodes online, and give us a five-star rating. Also, be sure to check out our sister podcast, The Euroile, [music] where we talk Europe through a Washington lens. This show is made possible by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Also, don't forget to subscribe to the CSIS channel on YouTube for live and recorded video events featuring leading experts. [music] Finally, you can read all the latest analysis by the Europe, Russia, Eurasia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies website css.org. >> [applause]