Video summary
Lyman Stone argues that declining fertility rates in America and globally are often misunderstood due to a failure to distinguish between total births and surviving children. Historically, high reported fertility numbers were an optical illusion caused by massive child mortality; women might have six biological children, but only two or three survived to adulthood. In modern industrialized societies where nearly all children survive, families implicitly target a specific number of *surviving* offspring rather than total births. Stone emphasizes that this targeting behavior is deeply ingrained in human psychology, evidenced historically by parents repeatedly naming deceased infants after surviving ones to maintain their desired family size. Consequently, the dramatic drop in fertility since 1950 cannot be attributed solely to rising wealth or standards of living; empirical data shows that when individuals suddenly become richer—such as lottery winners—they tend to have more children unless cultural norms shift toward lower expectations for what a child's life entails. The podcast identifies two primary drivers behind the current low fertility crisis: structural economic factors and widespread mental health issues, specifically depression and anxiety. Stone notes that while income inequality has worsened for young men in their 20s—the traditional demographic for marriage—this is only part of the story; a significant portion of the decline comes from people who do not want children at all or are avoiding them due to fear about the future. He critiques the "apocalyptic" tone often used by demographers and politicians, arguing that framing low fertility as an existential crisis creates a self-fulfilling prophecy where potential parents feel discouraged from having families because they anticipate raising their children in a bleak world. Instead of focusing on GDP or population numbers for instrumental reasons, Stone advocates for addressing the psychological barriers to parenthood, suggesting that if people were convinced the future would not be awful, fertility rates could recover naturally without coercive policies like Universal Basic Income (UBI), which he argues fails to alleviate long-term poverty effectively compared to targeted interventions. Political polarization in the United States has also become a significant factor in demographic trends, with Stone highlighting a stark contrast between Republican and Democratic officials regarding family size; federal-level Republicans average 2.6 children per woman, while Democrats average only 1.4. This disparity suggests that political affiliation correlates strongly with fertility preferences, yet Stone cautions against assuming this will lead to the extinction of one party through genetic drift. He explains that social values are not highly heritable traits and that conversion rates between parties remain high enough to maintain electoral competition for generations. Furthermore, he points out a cultural divergence where Republican norms often prioritize work over family life, whereas Democratic platforms sometimes inadvertently promote anti-natalist sentiments by framing children as burdens or emphasizing anxiety about the future. Stone believes these political cultures reflect underlying differences in mental health and personality dispositions that are partially heritable but not deterministic enough to cause one ideology's total disappearance. Looking toward the future, Stone predicts that Western fertility rates will likely continue declining for some time before potentially bottoming out between 0.4 and 1.3 children per woman, a scenario he describes as unpleasant rather than catastrophic. A low-fertility society would face reduced entrepreneurship, slower technological innovation, greater wealth concentration among fewer heirs, and increased intergenerational sadness or disconnection. However, he maintains that human life has always been worth living despite harsh conditions, noting that the main obstacles to reproduction are psychological burdens like social comparison and financial insecurity rather than a lack of biological capacity. To counteract these trends, Stone directs attention toward housing affordability as a critical policy lever, arguing that stable homeownership is essential for young people's long-term planning and family formation. Ultimately, he concludes that while we may face significant demographic challenges in the coming decades, they are manageable through cultural shifts rather than panic or extreme measures like vasectomies intended to alter political demographics.
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what is the story of fertility rates in
America over the last few
years uh they're going
down uh as
in every country essentially um so yeah
I mean in 2007 the average woman had 2.1
kids per woman uh today it's closer to
1.6 so half a child missing per woman
though uh it's always a weird thing to
say which half of the child is missing
um no really Bally that means every
other woman um is missing a child that
she would have had if birth rates were
stable at 2007 approximate levels what
happens if we go much further back what
was happening with fertility rates in
America in like the 1800s and the early
1900s so pretty much everywhere um it
used to be that women had lots more
babies um I say pretty much everywhere
because there are exception cases
um they're sort of unusual ones to
Kagawa ER Japan had pretty low fertility
there was low fertility in some parts of
the Roman Empire in the first and second
centuries um but pretty much everywhere
I mean the US had I think six children
per woman um in uh
1800 um with the exception of like
Massachusetts in Connecticut that were
lower maybe around four
um but um that number's kind of an
optical illusion we say oh they had six
children per woman but the first thing
you have to keep in mind is most women
didn't survive to the end of their
reproductive years right so if life
expectancy is 30 and we calculate a
total fertility rate up to age
50 well half of women never even make it
to the end of their reproductive years
oh so that was a projected right not an
actual number right well it might be
true for the women who actually
survive but a lot of women don't
survive um I I don't know why I'm
laughing that's not funny that's
horrible um but it's a statistical
problem right that the actual the actual
number of of children born um per
woman uh is going to be much lower
because many of them are not going to
survive long enough to have six kids and
then secondly a lot of those children
didn't
survive um so surviving fertility per
woman um in the US was was quite High
still um
probably you know 2.7 to to 4ish in that
range depending on the place and the
time
um uh but in many Societies in Europe it
was much lower uh in some places below
two um because uh death rates for
children and for women were so high that
the average woman hitting puberty really
could only couldn't expect to have um
that many kids it's wild to think that
you could get between 2 and a half and
four with all of the hurdles that that
you need to get over uh risk of uh
mother dying during child birth risk of
child not making it to maturity risk of
mother just dying outside of child birth
and still you get close to two and a
half or four yeah it's uh um I mean
humans have overcome extraordinary
adversity um just uh before you uh
before I got on this podcast I was
writing about um uh the massive
population oscillations in like the
Yucatan Peninsula over the last several
Millennia um
and I mean the result is I mean
literally the stories are embedded in
our genes right like you've got
subpopulations that they have
meaningfully different genes related to
how they digest certain foods um or how
they interact with certain viruses and
bacteria um because of horrible things
that have happened um in their past um
and the survivors come out of it
fundamentally changed um and so we as a
species um uh have um a variety of
adaptations that that help us uh
continue to have children despite all
these things um the most important one
is that we have very low variation in
our reproductive systems that is to say
pretty much any human can be fertile
with almost any other human um is that
common in other animals we have a lot of
genetic variation um that we are still
fertile across that in some animals
um uh would be more challenging what do
you mean be be can you be more
specific uh yes so I mean in some
species um you've got groups that are
isolated for thousands of years and when
you bring them back to other other um
branches of the species they basically
can no longer produce um fertile
offspring whereas human populations that
were separated for tens of thousands of
years um uh when they get back together
still make babies um what's going on is
we have very so to speak harmonized
reproductive systems um we have very low
variation in genetically what's going on
with reproduction we we pretty much all
do it the same way um there's there's
variation in some of our hormones and um
and a lot of uh there's some variation
in human body size but even then humans
have le less variation in body size than
most animals I mean if you look at um
other species that have wide
distributions they just have more
variation than we do
um so uh the the upshot of all this uh
is um you can survive a lot more things
uh if you're working with a very
standardized or rather your genes can
survive a lot more things if you're all
working with a very standardized toolkit
and whoever the survivors are uh they
can they can make babies looking at the
1900s the must be some interesting
oscillations and lessons in terms of
fertility rate in terms of Desire number
of children versus actualized etc etc as
you have people dying different economic
situations fast crashes and then
rebounds and and uh sex ratio imbalances
and stuff like that what are some of the
lessons to take from the
1900s so definitely one of the lessons
we've learned is uh when people um when
people are less likely to die they are
in less of a hurry to start having
kids um and so they start later and
furthermore when people believe more of
their children are going to survive they
have fewer children um which is to say
people are implicitly targeting
surviving fertility and that explains
most of the fertility decline up through
like 1950 around the world and even
today a lot of the fertility decline in
developing countries is essentially
explained by assuming if you just assume
that women are targeting or families are
targeting a stable surviving number of
children that explains most fertility
decline uh it is the case that
um uh surviving fertility rates are
actually rising in some African
countries for example even as overall
fertility rates are declining um but in
general surviving fertility is a lot
more stable um particularly in that
period where you're coming off like
early 1900s and things like that um or
today for for some African countries um
but that doesn't explain what's happened
in like industrialized countries over
the last 40 50 years because almost all
children Sur survive to puberty it's
like you know 99 something per um in in
our societies so there's not really any
leverage there and yet fertility keeps
falling so that's not going to be
about uh child survival um uh we also
know it's not about Rising standards of
living um I have some articles about
this coming the they might be out before
this podcast so then people can look
them up but um but essentially we can
see what happens when people suddenly
become a lot wealthier but without
cultural change and we can see what
happens when whole countries suddenly
become much wealthier but without
dramatic cultural change so like for
countries we're often looking at like
natural resource discoveries right like
they find oil and suddenly they're no
longer in destitute poverty they're like
wildly wealthy for individuals we look
at things like lottery winnings um or
money transfers and we can see that when
you make people richer uh they have they
don't have fewer babies and in fact
typically they have more babies
um so what happens uh is not that
societies became richer we know now that
um fertility began to fall in many
countries long before they were
industrialized and in many earli indust
early industrializing countries like the
UK fertility did not fall for a very
very long time and it didn't fall until
other conditions were met so basically
one of the key takeaways that we learn
from particularly the last century um uh
is that that um fertility decline is not
about just becoming a high income
Society we know a lot um about fertility
enough now to know that uh that
fertility declines largely in response
in the long run to cultural factors um
not to uh just becoming a wealthy
Society there was an interesting study I
saw you tweet I actually looked at it
off the back of your Twitter about
fertility rates from lottery winners
and uh Swedish people when they win the
lottery yeah we have several studies uh
that leverage lottery
winnings um the findings are not all in
Perfect Harmony um as studies never are
um but in general um when men win the
lottery uh they definitely have more
kids that's true across many different
contexts
um when women win the lottery there's a
little bit more variety um but even then
it does generally seem like um there's a
there's a sort of a Pro-Am effect um in
the Swedish case the it was one of the
bigger gaps that is there was definitely
a positive effect for men um and I
forget if it was a neutral or slightly
negative effect for I think women women
women get divorced a little bit more
likely yeah there was there was
definitely a divorce effect I forget
what the fertility effect was for women
um I will say in Africa for example we
have a collection studies recently that
showed that when African women have
higher incomes they have more children
and we also know that from from studies
of American women um and American men um
so there's definitely some cultural
contextualization there um but just in
general I mean think about any product
like if you have more money will you
consume more hamburgers very likely um
if you have more money will you consume
more airplane tickets very likely most
goods are kind of you know consumption
of them is going to be approximately
related to income so kids are not
different in that regard if you give
people more money it does tend to be the
case that that they have a bit more yeah
I think it's a interesting or difficult
Circle for me to square with modern
living standards at the moment compared
with how they would have been in 1900 or
in 1800 or whatever um the fact that
people a lot of the time feel or say
anecdotally I can't for to have a kid
even though they're living in the
richest Society in the world so and they
feel like it's true yeah right they feel
like they do not have the money to be
able to raise a child how could I raise
a child I can barely pay for myself I
can't get on the property ladder and uh
cost of living's going up as ever before
and the cost of fuel and the cost of
housing and the cost of groceries
inflations through the roof and
unemployment and all the rest of it um
so that is genuinely how they feel yeah
even if that isn't perhaps um accurate
quantitatively when you compare it with
our ancestors so where's
that either estimation of the cost of
having children or estimation of the
cost of how much uh life is is going to
come in as an expense what's going on
here so one thing to keep in mind is
what I said about mortality that when
you actually look at surviving fertility
rates um modern people have more kids
than people in the past I mean human
populations in the past were largely
stable for a very long time now there
was a lot of oscillation for hundreds of
years at time but like there were long
periods where for centuries humans had
below replacement rate fertility okay in
the past not below 2.1 they were having
six kids but five of them were dying um
so um uh for certain periods so it's
important to keep in mind that like the
the ancestral primordial human
environment that sort of structures the
hard where we're working within our
brain um was an environment where human
population was not
growing um it was not a growth
environment for human population um so
um the 20th century saw massive human
population growth that's unusual in
human history um not quite not totally
unique but it's not the the dominant
experience rapid population growth is
not the most common human experience and
what that should tell us is that like
three or more surviving children is not
the usual Human Experience through most
of human history um so right off the bat
we just have to get out of our head that
people in poor societies were having
tons of kids right they were having tons
of babies but rather few of them became
kids okay um so we just have to keep in
mind that like humans are targeting the
number of children they're going to
raise and so on that sense yeah actually
the number of children people were
raising did rise over the course of the
20th century as um particularly the the
early 20th century AS Global income
started to rise right and that's child
mortality improved so we just I really
want to dig you get things like the baby
boom right like the baby boom there's
this massive increase in standards of
living with rapid technological
innovation in the mid century that led
to dramatic increases in wealth
particularly housing wealth and that's
both size of hous and quality of housing
people were living in way better houses
I mean you look at the things people
lived in I don't mean rich people I mean
like normal people like in the late
1800s and
like compare that to what they were
living in in you know 1948 and it's just
seismic Improvement and they had way
more kids um so just to like I say I've
never heard of this before but it makes
it makes complete sense are you saying
that there is somewhere sort of
internally inside of either men and
women or just women men and women alike
you are tarting surviving fertility so
for example we know in modern and
ancient societies if a kid dies the odds
of having another kid
rise okay demographers sort of maab in a
maab way call this replacement fertility
not replacement rate um mortality
replacement fertility um so basically
the idea is that humans are shooting for
surviving family size we don't think
about it much in our society because
almost all of our kids
live um
but this was very very very present in
the past and you see this in the past in
societies where people had six or seven
kids you routinely there's a problem in
genealogical data you find a kid their
name is JN they die when they're a month
old the next kid also gets named John
when he dies at two the next kid is also
named
John um they just keep reusing names
because they're just shooting for a John
you know why they want a JN because
Dad's name is Jon and there needs to be
a JN after the JN okay um so like name
repetition is like a really strong
indicator psychologically of what's
going on here oh wow that's such an
interesting way you've got this census
data or whatever type of dat data you
get tax record data all kinds of things
you've got genealogical data going back
along way and you've got four kids all
named the same there's no way that you
would name four kids that survived into
adulthood the same name it would be
absolutely this is yeah and again the
names that get repeated are likely to be
family names particularly right because
you really want inheritor for the name
um so that's the first thing to keep in
mind okay is that it really is the case
that like modern people are actually
raising bigger families often than
people of the past it's not they're
bearing more children but they're
raising more of them often the second
thing that's going on is we have to
distinguish
between um standard of living and
standard of living
okay there's the standard of living in
the sense of what you earn and like we
have a better standard of living we are
more productive we earn more we are
richer and then there's the standard of
living that is the standard that if you
don't meet it you feel bad about your
position in life okay
so if you raise that first one you can
think of it as like income level
fertility doesn't tend to fall and it
often
Rises but if you raise that other one
that is your
expectations about what you should have
or what a child should have have
fertility tends to
fall what's happening in modern society
is yet income has gone up but
particularly over the last you know 60 I
would say especially the last 40 years
expectations have also dramatically
risen particularly in terms of what
you'll provide to Children um there's a
bit of an arbitrary example of this but
I love it um if you look up the
frequency of the word parenting in
English language texts over time it's
like nonex it's it it really is quite
rare before like
1975 and if you look up like other
substitute terms like child rearing and
things like that they're also uncommon
but after 1980 the share of English
language texts and this is true in
English English American English English
Fiction it's true across all textual
categories legal it's true in in in um
uh legal cases like corpuses of of legal
texts um frequency of parenting vocab
just explodes in the 80s 90s and 2000s
um we became way more
preoccupied with parenting this this
idea of parenting this notion of like
all the things you have to provide your
kids um now I think this actually
arguably may have begun a bit earlier
than the linguistic shift um but it is
the case that there has never been an
era as preoccupied
with parenting
strategies and the things you have to do
to raise your children as a current one
um we are what's that an indication
of I think it's an indication um I think
it's two things one it's just kind of
it's just a cultural meme you know there
are some societies that did human
sacrifice there are some societies that
tattoo their whole bodies and there are
some societies that are obsessed with
parenting um so on some level just
societies just do things for reasons
that are hard to explain um on the other
hand I I do think there's a sense in
which as children became
rare um or as childbearing became rare
and as it became as we all developed the
expectation that all children survive to
maturity it kind of raised the question
of like so what should parents do like
what are we supposed to do um and I
think like the baby boomer generation
the answer was like
nothing like I mean we'll put you in a
school put you in front of a TV when you
need to be distracted but like parents
didn't have to do much and a nice little
indicator of this you look at like the
share of mothers who breastfed their
children it reaches like Rock Bottom
lows in like the 40s okay 40s and 50s
and then it's been rising since then so
in like the 40s and 50s I think it's
something like 25% of American moms were
breastfeeding their children and the
vast majority of kids were formula fed
um and it's not that that's bad like
full disclosure I'm a bought and paid
for consultant for the formula industry
like I'm not saying formula is bad but I
think this testifies to people's views
of like of parenting as an Endeavor
right that in the middle of the century
it was very outsourced right outsourc
the feeding outsourc the education just
trust whatever the school is offering
for your kid I'm sure it's fine um
whatever's on TV I'm sure it's fine just
put the kid in front of the TV um well
you know whatever's a church I'm sure
it's fine they'll do religion parent
doesn't need to handle religion that's
Church's job Outsource everything right
so you get this very outsourced model of
parenting in the mid 20th century um as
people just sort of assumed that like if
you keep the kid alive everything's fine
because that's the goal because they
could remember a time when kids didn't
all live right um and they could see
that they were entering a period where
if you really try you could keep your
kid alive so that that they entered a
period where it was really possible to
keep almost all the kids alive and they
hadn't thought about all the new
difficulties that might create and I
think the generation the baby boomer
generation that grew up that way and
then also the kind of the genx
Generation
Um kind of experienced this very
hands-off parenting and it didn't
actually go very well for them that is
they saw that culture started
intergenerational cultural transmission
was breaking down right that gaps
between between generations and social
values attitudes and behaviors got much
bigger um this is empirically true um
that this did happen so we see um a much
faster pace of social change that caused
a lot of people to be like
whoa whoa maybe we don't want to do that
um and also you get things like Rising
discourse about
fatherlessness um single
parents um you know obviously you get
things with drug abuse whatever um what
was the what was the birth rate during
uh baby boomer generation it's a bit
over three per woman I believe in the US
maybe even almost four at one point I
wonder whether just adding in uh another
element here I wonder whether because
living standards were Rising so much
intergenerational competition Theory
they were just so much further ahead so
that discussion we had before about
expectations versus reality living
standards versus living expectations
the kids are doing great we don't need
to do any parenting like look how much
farther ahead they are than us we went
on holiday twice this year I didn't even
get to go on holiday at all when my
parents growing up because they were
growing up during World War II yeah
exactly so I mean that's exactly what's
going on um is that that generation
actually the metrics that they were used
to measuring against were met okay um
and then you get in the 80s you get the
kids who came out of this looking around
being like okay um that didn't actually
go great like we we broke pieces of
society we didn't mean to and also just
feeling like their childhood maybe
wasn't actually quite what they wanted
it to be um or that they didn't have a
close attachment to their parents or
like like or also as the outsourc things
got more and more expensive like wow it
costs a lot to put your kid in child
care all the time um and also what
happened as a result of this is because
children became in some sense less
similar to the parent generation on
average it meant that there was more
heterogeneity in society like basically
more diversity and I don't just mean
like racial ethnic I just mean like more
diversity in how you think you should
fold your
laundry okay like just like it's just
more likely that like children and their
parents or their grandparents just
didn't share a view on you know what
kind of yard maintenance you you should
do um just these little things like
within a family are a little bit irksome
um and as a result you get a generation
coming up that's more aware wow the
world is really
diverse I can't just trust that
whatever's on TV is good right it might
not replicate my values I can't just
trust that whatever is in the schools is
correct it might not replicate my values
right and so you get the rise of
parenting right the idea that like
actually we have to protect our children
from becoming abusers you're talking
about uh parenting is kind of stepping
into the natural flow of children just
finding it out on their own right
exactly you're stepping in you're saying
okay I can't Outsource everything I have
to do it I can't just put my kid in
school I have to make sure they get a
good education now initially that means
choosing more carefully about
Outsourcing okay I'm not just going to
put my kid in whatever school I'm gonna
make sure they get a good school I'm G
to make sure they get good child care
I'm gonna make sure they get you know
good formula for them or whatever you
know it's this quality idea but I think
what we're seeing now is even more that
branded parenting things like free range
parenting helicopter parenting gentle
parenting all these like types of
parenting that people do okay um uh it
um I think what's going on is as people
realize how diverse Society actually is
and how they really do want to see
certain of their values replicated in
their
children they are looking
for um parenting strategies that they
never learned as a child right because
they just kind of were put in child care
and that was it um uh they're looking
for strategies to replicate their values
in the Next Generation and the result is
that they have a very costly vision of
parenting right their vision of
parenting involves doing all these
things exactly right these strategies
these disciplinary modes like whatever
it is it's like a very long to-do list
how to be a good
parent okay so I think basically what's
going on here
is um yes Rising expectations of what
your kid is going to have and then also
as Society became more heterogenous in
in various ways um more and more parents
realize oh to make sure to get what I
want out of raising a child that is
Raising someone who's like me in certain
valuable ways I have to do a lot of
effort so cost as yes so that therefore
means even if living standards are
higher even if real world money is more
available even if all of the things that
economists look at and say why is it the
people think that having children is so
much more expensive they were poorer in
the past and they had more children
there is this degree of investment this
sort of expectation investment
expectation going back to um what you
said before to do with this like
pivoting in in uh living standards it
was a fascinating study about Ubi that
just came out recently what for the
people that didn't get to see that can
you just give a a 30,000 foot
view yeah there's um there's a growing
interest in Universal basic income
basically just giving people a monthly
check for nothing um and some of the big
donors interested in it um put some
money into a pilot project okay
basically they got a bunch of people
gave them bucks a month and survey and
kind of did collected follow-up data on
them and what they found is um for every
dollar you gave them um their earnings
declined I think it was like 25 cents so
to speak um their spending
Rose like 30 or 40
cents um 45 cents maybe and it Rose kind
of across categories it wasn't like it
all went to one thing it Rose it Rose in
like necessaries like food and it also
Rose in like luxury categories like
vacations actually the biggest growth
was in gifts people gave more gifts to
other people um when they had a Ubi um
and all the Ubi recipients by the way
were poor they were all low income to
begin with um so there was if you think
about it for every dollar you give there
was a reduction in income an increase in
spending but
not enough to count for that whole
dollar so you would
expect that net worth should have gone
up like people should have had more
savings then by you know 25 cents per
dollar 20 cents per
dollar in
fact uh their net worth declined by
about six cents per uh um uh you can
think of this like by by six cents per
dollar kind of net worth is a little
more complicated because not it's a
stock not a flow
um so for every you know $1,000 of
monthly income they they ended up with
about 60 bucks less of net worth at the
end um so there's two problems here one
is just like that seems
bad we got success we got people to work
less spend more and also like not have
any wealth building despite higher
income so that's unfortunate but two it
really raised a question
about even The credibility of some of
these results right because you add up
you know 25 cents less of earnings 40
cents more of income a bit less of net
worth and there's a huge resid there's
like a 35 Cent residual of
like where did that money
go like did they just like did they just
light it on fire like did they buy
something they didn't want to report
like something illegal um did they cut
their work by more than they reported
did they increase spending on some other
category more um so it not only s uh and
they also found like there there was not
a big Improvement in housing conditions
um there was not um there really were
not improvements in in there were not
big improvements in in almost any
category uh that would that would be
some like obviously if you give people
one they'll spend more that's not an
improvement that's just like a thing
that happens um so um uh we didn't see
improvements in we didn't see big
improvements in like
objective things that we might all agree
are a good thing
um and so that should really concern us
about
Ubi um that it that it's probably not
going
to um result in great Liberation for
people
um it might just result in like more
gambling well a place that people might
go to is they might say well you know
you that's right perhaps they haven't
got that much to show for it financially
at the end of the day but what happened
with regards to an alleviation of stress
and they also looked at that as well the
cash transfer resulted in large but
short-lived improvements in stress and
food security greater use of hospital
and emergency department care and
increased medical spending of about $20
per month in the treatment relative to
the control group suggested that the use
of other office-based care Dental Care
blah blah blah however we found no
effect of to transfer across several
measures of physical health as captured
by multiple well validated survey
measures and biomarkers we drive from
blood drawers can rule out even very
small improvements in physical health
and the effect that would be implied by
cross-sectional correlation between
income and health Li well outside of our
confidence inter so people weren't
happier they weren't less stressed they
didn't have uh improvements again on any
of these measures that are like things
we would all universally want like if we
found a Trans for that just made
everyone happier and healthier it'd be
like great cool like on these measures
that are like
clearly like good outcomes yeah they
found nothing it did it didn't help
people at all there's there was another
study a different study that looked
specifically at home that gave a Ubi
specifically to homeless people and the
goal was we will give them thousand
bucks a month to find housing and they
found in the long run there was no
across I think it was threee followup
after three years years there was no
difference in the homelessness rate of
people who got like 0 or $1,000 a
month um simple reality was that giving
homeless people money did absolutely
nothing to get them in house and a lot
of Mone a thousand bucks a month you can
pay rent for that for one person is that
not something to do with the culture or
the lifestyle or the substance
dependency that these people have kind
of being a lingering overhead that
doesn't allow them to get the exit
velocity to get out of the bottom of
homelessness yeah there's it would be
easy to look at these Ubi studies and
say what these tell us is that nothing
helps the the poor are permanently poor
that is in fact not what they show
because we actually have a lot of
interventions we do know work focused
substance AB substance abuse
interventions like getting people in
rehab getting them support stuff like
that um does cause people to be less
poor uh high quality therapeutic
interventions like based on cognitive
behavior therapy um not lowquality
random talk therapy things but like high
quality therapeutic interventions can
actually boost people's like long run
income and health um certain religious
interventions are actually known to
boost longrun income and health um there
are a lot of things that we can do that
do lift people out of poverty I mean
education obviously um handing them cash
turns out not to be
one just it just isn't um so yeah it is
the case that like if you are a donor
and you have like $20 million that you
want to spend on helping poor
people in the US let's say you would be
way better off investing that in like
focused substance abuse
treatments okay
um than a
Ubi okay giving
cash doesn't do a thing for longer
outcomes it actually briefly it does
right A change in income is a better
predictor of happiness than absolute
income like eventually everything
normalizes until you dis dise equilibri
it again yeah so but I mean the point is
like if you actually want to alleviate
poverty not just for the next six months
but you know actually lift people out of
poverty
like Ubi is just not the way to do it it
just isn't and at this point we have
Decades of experiments and pilot studies
and all these things looking at this we
know that this doesn't work for
long-term poverty alleviation now there
are things that are somewhat similar to
ubii that do work so conditional cash
transfers um so for example uh child
allowances sometimes um when people
really want to argue against child
allowances they will sometimes call them
uis they are not ubis not everybody gets
them you don't get them for forever you
get them conditional on something that
is having custody of a child and it's
important to mention having custody okay
like people who are the genetic parent
of a child but not actually like in the
same tax unit as them don't get a child
allowance right um so when we give
people a child allowance that rewards
them for actually raising their child
co-
residentially that's good okay it
generates slightly more children and it
generates slightly less divorce and it
generates um slightly more uh spousal or
um uh co-residents of Partners um we
know this we have Decades of studies
showing this so Ubi where you give
people money for nothing not a good
policy conditional transfers where you
give people money for something can be a
decent policy depending on what outcome
you're targeting and um and what trying
to do um it's still expensive but um
it's important to distinguish
between Ubi which now I think we really
should be able to put this to bed that
it's not a good idea um and conditional
cash transfers which um May in fact be
very
worthwhile so when we get back to the
fertility rates and where we're at at
the moment what are people saying modern
people right now about the number of
kids that they do or don't want and
their reasons for wanting or not wanting
children
um in surveys like in the US for example
uh people report that their ideal number
of
children is uh
2.3 If instead of Ideal you ask them to
rate how happy they would be with
different family outcomes like 0 1 2 3 4
5 6 whatever
ever people's sort of weighted sort of
weighted average
happiness tends to be
about uh
2.3 if you ask people what the ideal
family size for a family is their
average tends to be
2.3 um any way you ask that's getting it
desires wants ideals for the US it's
2.3 um
um if you ask about intentions how many
kids you intend to have that's a very
different
question that's not asking what people
want it's asking okay down to Brass tax
thinking about your life as it really is
how it's almost like asking people how
many kids do you think you can afford to
have okay all of us would recognize how
many kids can you afford to have is not
the same thing as how many kids do you
want okay but how many kids do you
intend to have depending on the
population subgroup and the exact survey
and all it ranges from like 1.85 to
2.1 in the
US actual fertility in the US is
1.6 so people are way short they're
about s kits short of what they
want and they are about 02 to point4
kids2 to 0.5 kids short of even what
they think they're really realistically
going to have they are they are um
they're not even meet meeting what they
think of as like their realistic goals
and just presumably the number of when
you look at actual fertility rates
that's people who've had kids so far
when you ask people what they intend to
that's future focused and given do it
different ways yeah but given given that
we're on a decline in terms of fertility
we can assume that the number of actual
children is going to continue to move
away from that number of intended
children so I I get that but that Pew
research that came out recently like 10
percentage Point increase in the number
of people under 50 saying that they
didn't want to have kids 37% to 47%
between 2018 and 2023 what what do you
make of that that's nearly 50% of people
under the age of 50 saying that they
don't want to have kids unlikely to ever
have
kids
so the
actual prevalence of young people who
say they don't want to have
kids was 20 something percent um the
50-some was like the share of the share
of childless young people who say the
reason for being childless is because
they just don't want kids so you say
Okay among childless people what share
just don't want kids the actual share
who say they don't want kids is like
maybe 20ish 20
25%
um that sounds
High um it's similar what I find in my
surveys that say we do inhabit a society
where the average person wants 2.3 kids
and also where you know 15 to 25% of
people say they want zero
kids um we are inhabiting a society of
increasingly polarized desires where
there's people more and more clustering
at
zero and at you know three or four um
not a lot of people saying like
six um so um yeah it it is what it is
um long run for
fertility um you know you can have a
society where everybody has two you can
have a society where half the people
have zero and half the people have four
they both have a fertility rate of two
on average
um so what we're seeing is yeah there is
some rise in intended
childlessness um it's largely offset by
Rising desires for big
families um on average desires haven't
changed a lot um and what we can see is
that the fertility decline we've had
over the last 15 years um it's bigger
for un unintended births that is
unintended births have fallen
um like I think it's like 40% what's
unintended births births people were not
trying to have so like they were not
planning to have a kid and they
did um whereas intended births have
fallen like I think a bit less than
20% um so yeah there's been a bigger
decline in unintended births meaning
that um uh meaning you can think of that
as
like uh you know people avoiding having
kids that they didn't want to have that
would be consistent with the idea that
there's more people wanting to avoid
have kids and successfully avoiding um
but we've also seen a decline in
intended births that is people who do
intend to have kids but are having fewer
of them um so I don't worry too much
about like a growing share that say they
want zero um because okay that's fine
you can want zero other people want four
other people want two on average it
doesn't seem to be changing a whole lot
you seem uh
surprisingly uh positive or at least
non- apocalyptic uh given most of the
demographers and the people sort of in
this world that I'm speaking to have
this like cataclysmic uh perspective it
doesn't seem to the alarm Bells don't
seem to be going off quite as
aggressively or maybe you're just
holding it together
well you know
um falling fertility is a very serious
problem
it is uh it's a problem to me my view
the biggest problem of falling fertility
is I want people to have the lives they
want to have I want to live in a free
Society where people are free to achieve
reasonable normal and acceptable life
goals two kids that's a totally
reasonable life goal people should be
able to achieve that if they can't
achieve it that's a serious problem in
society in my
view it also happens that low fertility
has really bad economic effects in the
long run has bad political effects um it
has all sorts of bad effects in the long
run those are less of a concern to me um
because first of all I think it's kind
of gross to use babies as like your
instrumental solution to GDP like have a
baby for the GDP is like not a great
pitch or like have a baby so we can
recruit them into the army like not a
great pitch
um um so to me the biggest issue is just
people not getting what they want um so
if people genuinely want zero
like that's not my problem I don't want
zero I want five so I want to be able to
hit five I want Society to not put
obstacles in front of that because we
are below desires on average I'm very
very strongly in support of pronatal
policy I think we should be doing a lot
more to help families hit their goals um
and offset some of that standard of
living issue but and this is what I
think is really important you're right
there are a lot of people who like me
are PR natalists that is they want to
see more kids born and they do adopt
this really apocalyptic tone it's a
fertility crisis demographic winter um
Koreans are going
extinct and I
think that that that
tone is just a massive
mistake um the best predictor
of people not wanting
kids is depression and
anxiety okay if you want to know if
someone wants to have kids ask them to
rate 1 to 10 how happy they are the
number they give you is going to be
wildly correlated with the number of
kids they want to
have the strongest predictors of low
birth rates at the individual level are
fertility preferences and measures of
mental
health people who are
depressed anxious uncertain sad worried
about the future they don't have kids
why because the reason you have kids is
to raise them and watch them become
fruitful adults and if you think that
the future is scary and bad and
awful then you're not anticipating the
joy of children you're anticipating
watching your children suffer in a bad
World okay so my view is that if you
actually want people to have kids shut
up about a
crisis okay the only way to get more
kids is to convince people that the
future isn't awful
that the the birth rate decline is
Downstream from a mental health crisis
it's definitely related to it so I mean
yeah this is you know there's there's
these like broad structural things about
like the standard of living people
expect the standard of care they expect
for kids all these things but there is
also very concretely yes A Mental Health
crisis um I mean pick your condition I
mean depression anxiety um autism
schizophrenia I mean these are very
different conditions um or just like
survey reports of sadness survey reports
of uncertainty um survey reports of
beliefs about if the future is going to
get better or worse
um negative AFF effect across all of
these indicators is associated with
lower fertility preferences and lower
fertility
behaviors um so so like categorically my
concern is that some very
well-intentioned people talk a lot about
the fertility crisis and they are
sabotaging efforts to address the
problem of low fertility and the problem
of people's fertility not meeting what
they want because by talking Crisis
crisis Crisis crisis we're telling
people look if if there aren't more
babies the the future will be very bad
okay but think about what that says
somebody says
okay so then I shouldn't have a baby you
should bring your children into this
world that's reliably think and also
there's no way I can guarantee other
people will have babies I can't change
the social fertility rate I can only
change my own fertility rate so if I see
that other people aren't having babies
I'm not GNA have babies because a world
of low fertility is a world of bad
outcomes and I don't want to bring my
baby it's like it's this like vicious
cycle where like because people are so
convinced that like of dumer ism they
don't have kids and then the pronatal
people come out and tell even more doery
stories when what we should say is like
look if you individually have kids like
desired children this isn't as true for
like unintended children okay but people
who want kids when they have kids is
associated with very positive outcomes
they have higher happiness in the short
run they have higher happiness in the
long run 10 years out they're happier
than otherwise similar people who want
to to kids and didn't have them people
who want kids and don't have them have
higher rates of prescription of anticho
anti-anxiety
anti-depressants um they are more likely
to have adverse quite adverse mental
health outcomes um people who want kids
and have them um report just a whole
range of better life outcomes and people
who want kids and don't have them report
considerably worse subjective well-being
in the long run now for people who don't
want kids it's thing okay not I'm not
you know I'm not trying to bully anybody
to having kids they don't want to have
um but there are so many people that
want kids and they're not having them
because they're worried about this that
and the other and we just need to say
look first of all the we know in
longitudinal surveys that when people
have kids they increase the number of
kids they think is ideal so think about
what that says once you have the
experience of having kids you decide you
want more of them on average okay so
like my my encouragement to people is
like kids are going to be way more fun
than you think like they're going to be
way more interesting than you think
they're going to be full of way more
value than you think um and once you
have them you're way more likely to be
like I'd kind of like to have more of
these than being like dang I would have
preferred fewer that latter response it
does happen people do say that in
surveys there are people who say you
know I love my kids but if I had it to
do over you know I might have one less
there are people who say that it's not
it's not never I'm not going to say that
never happens it does but on average
people who say you know what I had these
kids and wow yeah I'm totally raising my
number now way more numerous have you
had a look at retrospective regret of
childless
people what is there to learn from that
how common is it so actually the the
survey you mentioned has some surveys on
has some stuff about this they didn't
ask it exactly um but yeah I mean
childless people um do report various
difficulties arising arising from
childlessness um
crucially the Pew survey asked young
people do you expect such and such a
thing to be a a challenge with
childlessness and then they asked older
childless people was such and such thing
a challenge and they found it across
numerous
categories the challenges were more
common than the young people expected
what what sort of challenges um you know
feeling disconnected from the Next
Generation feeling like you lost friends
because you didn't keep up you didn't
have kids um feeling like um you were
lonely feeling like um uh I forget the
list they had they had a bunch they had
a bunch of these different things um and
across the vast majority of
them current people who don't want kids
were underestimating
just how big the difficulties challenges
and regrets can be that doesn't mean
that childless people all regretted it
many of them didn't um but
um but it is the case that young people
are greatly
overestimating the uh the benefits of
childlessness so to speak um or the
costs of having children um or maybe
they're underestimating the benefits of
having children however you want to put
it
um it is the case that when people get
to retirement it's
not that free solo life is just not
going to be as good as they think it
is what is the relationship that you see
between marriage rates desire to get
married mating crisis uh desire to get
into a relationship and desire for
children and and and stuff does does
this piece together in a nice neat
fashion does it make a cohesive
narrative or is it individual things
going on so fertility of married people
has not declined nearly as much as the
fertility of unmarried
people um and
crucially the main thing that's
happening in fertility is just that
people are not getting married as much
okay they're getting married later or
not at all but are people not getting
married because they don't want kids
before they get into a relationship
um no cuz we know that desire for
children is approximately stable right
so we know that we know desire for
children is approximately stable we also
know desire for marriage is
approximately stable about 90% of people
say they want to get married um most of
them in their mid to late 20s that's the
typical age which is a bit younger than
actual marriage ages right now
um so um uh we know that that's what
people want and yet marriage ages are
rising and Rising and a growing share of
people will never marry so we're
actually seeing a shortfall in marriage
versus desires okay people who get
married their fertility rates are not
declining that much um not declining as
much and if everyone got married at the
same rates they did in 2007 fertility
would not have declined nearly as much
most of the decline is just because of
less marriage okay so yeah a mating
problem is a huge part of the story
um uh and there are so many reasons
people are not marrying as much as they
used to um I mean the one of the biggest
ones is just an economic change um uh it
is the case that if you look at like
data from dating
apps women swipe on men's incomes at the
same rate that men swipe on women's
conventional physical
attractiveness um I'm not sure you can
say that says something bad about us as
a species if you like um it's facts um
it hasn't changed in you
know 2,000 years um actually let me take
that back it hasn't changed
in 600,000 years um so uh status will
always men's status has always been
fertility correlated it's just always
has been it's always been the case
there's virtually no exceptions um that
high status men High in come men in
money societies have more kids than low
status men um that being the case you
have to ask what not what has happened
to men's income generally you have to
ask what happened to men's income at the
marriage ages that if you get married in
those ages it's easy to have two or
three
kids so that's going to be marriages in
your 20s if you're not married in your
20s odds of getting to two and
especially three kids
decline
um so what has happened to the income of
men in their 20s in the US at least it
has actually declined um over the last
20 years 30 years um men in their 20s
are actually getting poorer in inflation
adjusted terms um this is not true for
men generally this is not true for older
men this is not true for the population
generally people are getting richer
incomes are going up but for men in
their 20s and that's the group for for
whom income is sort of setting the bar
for marriage because I'm assuming that
women in their 20s are like not getting
less attractive or something okay um uh
and again these are not the only things
that that like guide marriage obviously
what really guides individual marriages
like love and like shared values and
shared life orientation but funny enough
uh people tend to fall in love with
people who are within a certain
socioeconomic band of their expectations
and within a certain range
of um of
[Music]
um it sounds so callous to say but like
physical attractiveness um uh yes
individually people marry for love
collectively
humans uh don't they marry for other
things um so um
uh it is the case that men's
marriageability
in the key marriage ages for supporting
fertility has declined really really
sharply um that is their incomes have
fallen particularly compared to women
um that being the case there's less
marriage and in fact marriage rates and
particularly fertility rates have
declined at exactly the ages where men's
incomes are declining so early and mid
20s and at the ages where men's income
is rising in the 30s and 40s fertility
rates have actually risen
um there actually has been an increase
in fertility at those ages not enough to
offset the decline at earlier ages but a
little bit um so basically what's going
on with the marriage Market on a deep
level is that
um young men are poor um they cannot
support a family um particularly a
family whose consumption expectations
are set by um by like the joint incomes
of two single people with no
kids um so if you spend your whole 20s
setting your consumption expectations
based on zero care responsibilities your
parents are still young enough that
you're not having to take care of them
in old age you don't have kids you don't
have a you know a spouse or something
like that and then you come into
marriage and that's how your consumption
expectations have been
set well it's really hard to have
kids you mentioned before about this
decline in unintended kids
I know that you've looked recently and
I've been doing quite a bit of research
into this too about the attitudes toward
contraception in the US I think if I was
to put a couple of bets on a roulette
table for upcoming Public
Health fur rals uh things that people
are going to be really really concerned
about I think we're already sort of
starting to see a lot of women talk
about the
psychological uh challenges that come
from hormonal birth control phys
physiological changes things that you
can lock in for the rest of your life if
you take it during uh puberty and and
and periods where the brain is in
development I also think microplastics
in water I think toxic uh environments
molds Etc is also going to be another
one um but it it's surprising to me that
it seems to be
this it seems to be two things at the
same time it seems to be both a very Pro
contraception and a very
anti-contraception culture I don't know
whether that's just two different
cohorts and I get to like hear the most
vicious of one and the most vicious of
the other but do you know what I mean
there's this sort of super position I'm
in yeah everything natural except
reproduction right that's that's the
vibe right all natural except
reproduction um so uh I think that's a
real thing um on the fertility
front um you know you sometimes hear
things about falling sperm counts or
falling testosterone counts
um this is
basically fake um sperm counts are not
falling in scientifically studied
cohorts um and anyways the actual effect
of the kinds of variation in sperm
counts we observe the implication would
just be you need to have sex for an
extra two or three months to have a
child not that you would become
infertile um testosterone changes are a
bit more complicated because there's
just measurement of testosterone is
extremely problematic um it problematic
since like it's very difficult and it
changes over the course of the day and
it changes in different parts different
types of tissue samples U or cell
samples um but either either the way
either way these kinds of things don't
appear to be affecting fertility um
microplastics there's some BPA there are
some Plastics that could impact
fundability
um so far a couple Studies have gone
looking and have not found anything um
or at least not anything significant um
but could be I mean these things last a
long time so it could be that takes us a
few generations for them to build up in
sufficient levels to do damage
um
uh in general and then on contraception
um the best evidence suggests that
hormonal contraception can increase time
to pregnancy after cessation um by a few
months that is it can take a few months
longer to become pregnant um and for
some methods it can be a lot longer I
think long acting reverse contraceptions
like implants can increase time to
conception by by quite a few months um
uh there doesn't appear to be
long-term identifiable damage to
fundability the problem with all these
studies is that people who choose to use
more intense contraception are also
people who want fewer children so even
when they go off contraception they have
fewer children because the reason they
were using contraception is because
they're people who want fewer children
have you have you have you found any
research looking at how
uh women's desire for children desired
number of children intended children
changes when they're on or off birth
control I haven't I know that there's
some stuff that's I don't know the state
of the research on this but I've seen
headlines saying that like when women
are on certain forms of hormonal birth
control that like the type of like body
type that they will swipe on on dating
apps is different or something um I
don't know how credible that is in
general um I'm skeptical of most of
these types of findings for a variety of
reasons one um we have really good
controlled studies that look at time to
pregnancy um and we can see that for
couples who are not using contraception
of a given age and actively trying to
conceive time to pregnancy hasn't
changed in decades um as far back as we
can study it just isn't the case the
time to pregnancy has changed people's
ability to conceive hasn't changed a bit
um uh so um and time to life birth
hasn't either that is implied
miscarriage rate has not has not changed
um so um that tells me that whatever is
going on under the surface it's it's not
dramatically altering fertility it could
there could be things on mate selection
I would totally believe that the rise in
but honestly contraception wouldn't be
the main thing I'd point to I would
point to the rise of like
ssris um and other um um you know
anti-depressants anti anti- anti-anxiety
antis psychotics um they more directly
impact the brain the share of the
population or I mean frankly also just
drugs um like pot and opioids like there
are so many other substances that would
be like my go-to on like if something is
messing with mate preferences what could
it be maybe the really like quite
powerful drugs that are designed to
alter your neurochemistry
um let's not say those things are bad
like I don't know if anyone's ever
studied what they do to make preference
um they do alter libido obviously um but
I don't know what they do to mate
preference and things like that or views
of commitment um uh and also like I I
said earlier that like depression is
itself um sort of
anti-natal um so like you could find
that like anti-depressants are
anti-natal but they're less anti-natal
than the depression oh my God that's so
funny right so like you could get these
kinds of really interesting challenges
um yeah and so I just um in general my
view is
like we live in a chemical soup we just
do we always have um in ancient times
they weren't chemical soup it was just
that humans were so hungry they were
just I mean you look at old cookbooks
and they were eating stuff that today
you know 20% of the population is
allergic to and it smells like death and
like it's awful but they were eating it
like twice a month or like uh I mean you
look at the it's there's something
called the Eastern agricultural complex
which is um pre corn agriculture among
um Native American tribes in the eastern
US um and like you can look it up
there's like all these crops that you're
like what is this crop and I kept
telling my wife like I really wish I
really wish there was like a restaurant
that would like like a hipster
restaurant that would like use only
pre-columbia crops and animals like have
a whole menu on it I was like this would
be a cool idea and then I looked up the
crops and I was like okay so like this
one has like an aroma that can be
smelled down the street when it's cooked
like this one has great proteins it's
like better than kenoa also like
everybody's allergic to it like so many
people are allergic to it um like
they're they're awful plants like like
there's a reason that as soon as Native
Americans got corn they were like yeah I
want corn Corn's amazing um so like one
of the things we don't talk about with
like the great diversity of crops that
people used to eat is that like so many
of them were really bad and like bad for
you and unpleasant or maybe they were
good for you but they were unpleasant or
they were pleasant but they're bad for
you um that's not to say declining crop
diversity isn't a bad thing it is like
we should preserve rare varietals but
that stink the street out though yeah
yeah yeah exactly like I would be okay
if dur do you know about duri are you
familiar with durian
yes yeah that stinky fruit yeah I'd be
okay if it went extinct like I know like
all of Asia cries out in horror at what
I just said but like that one I wouldn't
mourn um but uh but by and large um like
humans have always been putting just
weird stuff into their bodies
um uh and so I think we are less fragile
than we think we are and we talked at
the beginning about how humans lived in
environments where so many people were
dying and yet they still carried on and
I think less fragile than we think we
are um and to be honest this is actually
part of what I think is part of the
cultural change we need to promote
fertility is like kids are not as
fragile as you think they are that
standard you think they have to
have they might not need that standard
they might be tougher than you think
they are they might can just be okay
playing outside some um you might not
need to intensively do every little
thing um and beyond that you are less
fragile Than You Think You Are
children are not going to break you
you're going to be okay some people
won't be most people will be like you
are gonna be okay um you are less
fragile than you think you are you can
do it you can raise kids you can parent
you will pull it
off does political polarization play a
role here you know we recently came out
of the DNC where they were offering free
vasectomies and abortions outside I
think
uh but you know what about the role of
yeah polarization in political uh
beliefs parents wanting their kids to
date somebody from within their own
political class the increasing
importance of politics in mate selection
and in people's lives than perhaps it
used to
previously um yeah so politics plays a
role in a couple ways one
um political cultures are sets of ideas
and values and memes and norms and
behaviors and social ties
um the fact
that one side of politics in the US at
least um has adopted particularly
anti-natal social values um that is uh I
mean if you you a great example of this
is like the the average fertility rate
of Republican elected
officials at the federal level is
something like 2.6 kids and the average
fertility rate of democratic ones is
like
1.4 um uh so like there's like microcosm
right there right um uh interestingly
that means that Democrats are closer to
the societal
average um so Republicans are the
weirdos um but they're like the weirdos
continuing Humanity um but um so I do
think this is unfortunate that we kind
of have this perpetuating political
culture
on one side that promotes Norms of of
anxiety fear and uncertainty about
children um and presents children as
burdens primarily um that's not say
Republicans are innocent there's a lot
of ideas and values on the Republican
side that I think are anti-natal in a
little bit more of an oblique way um
particularly Norms around work for
Republicans everything is about jobs
like if it makes jobs it's good but I'm
like if you employed a
mom earning minimum
wage like in her alternative was staying
home with kids or a dad it could be a
dad as well though in practice
statistically it's usually usually mom
um like and she has two kids it's
probably more socially valuable for her
to like invest in her kids than flip
Burgers so like I'm actually not
interested in creating make workor jobs
um just to pull people away from their
families because I want to buff labor
force participation like I that's just
not what I value um in general just the
super work Focus that Republicans tend
to have um I think is a cultural mistake
um work is rivalis with family um on
some level um so
um at the same time I do think it's
worth remembering that political culture
comes from somewhere right um we know
that uh depression is not equally
distributed across the
parties um we know that um certain types
of fears about the future are not
equally distributed across parties um
and as a
result I don't know how much we can
blame
partisanship for what might actually be
a difference
in religiosity or um Family background
or uh mental health or a million other
variables right is partisanship causing
this or is partisanship just reflecting
that this is the kind of divided Society
we live in wow yeah I mean increasingly
fewer people are are disbelieving about
the heritability of sort of
psychological dispositions whether that
be introversion or extroversion or
conscientiousness or willpower or
[ __ ] hunger or political ideology
some things that are more complex which
are an entire sort of Suite of
dispositions that all come together but
this is the every time that I see it
every single time that I see an
anti-natalist movement that intends on
continuing it blows my mind it's like
what you this is mating seppuku do you
know how things work I just it dude the
the thing outside of the DNC for the I'm
just going to make this plan for the
people that haven't seen the previous
episodes your political affiliation is
heritable that means that if you are a
card carrying died in the
wool Democrat it is more likely that
your children will be Democrats as well
because there is a particular Suite of
traits personality types and
dispositions that have led you toward
that you can take personality tests for
both Republicans and for Democrats left
leaning right leaning labor conservative
whatever it is and people will Veer in
that kind of a direction given that your
children are made up of the raw genetic
material that you're about to give to
them if you are someone who wants your
particular political ideology to keep
moving forward and you do not have
children that is you basically seeding
ground to decide that decides to have
children and and it just every single
time that I see this I'm like I is it do
they not know that this is the case are
they do they know and not care are they
so short shortterm minded that they
think yeah but we're going to you know
buff kamala's votes by 0.1% in in a key
Battleground state by doing the
vasectomy outside of the DN SE truck I
don't know I think there's a couple
things going on one is they're they're
betting on the power of conversion right
um uh because most
people um you think about the dynamic
here because more socially conservative
people have more
children
um a disproportionate share of children
are raised in conservative environments
and yet we end up with relatively even
politics how because conversion favors
Dem Democrats okay um so the Democratic
party is disproportionately made up of
converts so to speak people raised
Republican and became Democrat um and as
a result it's going to be people who
selectively believe in the cultural
power of conversion right um and I would
say they're not actually entirely wrong
so I've done a fair amount of writing
about this recently that
um heritability of fertility turns out
to be very complicated
um it's true if you have a norm that uh
leads to zero fertility okay that weeds
itself out relatively quickly
um unless it has a reason for people to
select it for Fitness in the time being
right so if there's a norm that um you
know gives you zero fertility but also
it just hacks the part of your brain
that handles dopamine you'll choose it
every time and eventually the species
will just go
extinct like species can just go extinct
like it's not inevitable that like
fertility is 2.1 we could just stop
having babies and go extinct um and
there are pieces of your brain that can
be hacked through you know drugs through
medicine
through um you know congenital defects
through whatever like yes dopamine
receptors can get fried um people can
become addicted to things that kill them
um people can it is possible uh that we
could just stop breeding there's no
reason that fertility has to return to
two and I've actually run a lot of
simulation models on this that like
let's say you have like the Amish okay
are the Amish ever going to become a
majority of the population the answer is
absolutely not they never will um if all
you do is you take actual real world
Amish fertility over the last 50
years and Trend it forward and use real
world rates of conversion in and out of
the Amish you find that the Amish are
going to Peak at a maximum a maximum of
like 7% of American population and
they're never actually going to get
there um the simple reality is
conversion is really powerful and
assimilation is really powerful there is
not um for simple monogenetic traits
that do that have certain types of
Fitness
profiles um genetic drift can be really
powerful
but most traits aren't like that
particularly if they're polygenic for
example politics I mean height is quite
heritable okay like Height's very
heritable like it's like 80%
heritability um and some behavioral
traits are quite heritable um there's
debate about schizophrenia but it
appears to be relatively heritable okay
um and it has behavioral implications
and stuff like that so social values as
a family set which includes both
politics and religion is like one of the
least heritable trait sets that we know
of um along with reproduction
ironically
um uh I mean religion is high is
actually highly environmental
environmentally sensitive right the
reason kids born in Saudi Arabia become
Muslim is not because they have a Muslim
Gene right it's because they're in a
context that encourages Islam okay um
and we know this because kids get a
adopted across countries and they're
astronomically more likely to end up in
their adoptive parents religion than
their birth countries religion like
Korean kids adopted in America don't
become Buddhist by and large they become
like you know Presbyterian although
there's a lot of Korean Presbyterians
too um so um in general social values
they they do have a her I'm not g to say
they don't have a heritable component
they absolutely do depending on kind of
how you define heredity because that's
complicated and um and what social value
talking about ranges from like 3%
heritable to like 40% heritable that's
kind of the range you're talking about
there aren't a lot of social values that
are over 40% heritable um or is there's
a lot of physical traits that are
considerably over 40% heritable and then
you get like traits that are kind of
like like a a medley of the two so you
think about things like
sexuality the super controversial one
intelligence um there's huge debates
about heritability of these sexuality is
highly non-heritable for example there's
some genes that do relate to it um but
probably through Gene environment
interactions not directly Gene um the
upshot of all this I'm kind of
Meandering the upshot of all of this is
that like conservative fertility
Advantage does Drive some electoral
Advantage but way less than you would
think way less than you would think from
just like a naive sort of breeders
equation type of population genetic
model
um it really is the case that
um the heritability rates are
sufficiently low and conversion rat
sufficiently high that they're um that
conservatives don't get nearly as much
electoral bang as you would expect from
their fertility buck and their fertility
Buck is large it's a very large
fertility gap between Republicans and
Democrats and in a pure hereditarian
environment like this would be the last
generation of Democrats to have an
electoral shot yeah but we all know
that's not what's going to happen we all
know that politics are going to remain
highly competitive for and Democrats
have the same thing where they're like
look at how conservative young people
are or look how liberal young people are
this is the last time conservatives will
have a shot and yet here we are they
think that every
generation and it's still the case that
politics are competitive on the same
issues that they always have been so
um I would strongly caution against
trusting to fertility to give your
cultural group uh a long-term majority
you really do need to persuade other
people you meaning that you can't shag
your way out of some ideological
culdesac probably not you you actually
need to make persuasive arguments so so
you know I think you know
vasectomized into the
DNC whatever its net social benefits or
costs uh probably doesn't have a huge
effect on Long Run political
equilibriums okay um what are your
predictions
for the the sort of future of Western
fertility rates and stuff at the moment
like down just it's going to continue I
mean does it bottom out it has to
presumably at some point it's going to
be carried by certain small subgroups
that would maintain a higher it could
bottom out at
zero um like I mean if you think like
let's let's imagine okay let's just do
like Doomsday scenario and it turns out
that like microplastics totally
sterilize people okay microplastics are
also totally inescapable they're like
literally in the air okay like unless
you are wearing like a hazmat suit you
are getting microplastics in
considerable volumes um so if
microplastics cause sterility then
Western fertility will bottom out at
zero okay um on the other
hand um if low fertility is caused by if
falling fertility is being
caused primarily by
um um I don't know pick your pick your
pet Theory um if it's caused by like um
uh particular parenting
Norms parenting Norms are something that
probably could weed out fairly quickly
in just a few Generations okay they're
going to be highly volatile they're not
we know that they can be broken across
Generations because that's what has
happened recently um and we know that
people with parenting specifically
parenting Norms that encourage more
children that seems of values that seems
more likely to have high heritability
like. three or something than low like
0.1 okay so like if parenting Norms are
what's driving low fertility then maybe
in 150 years we're like back up to
two people's expectations about the
amount of in
yeah and people who are raised in like
lower expectation environments will will
will be will make up a larger share of
the generation and I don't think there's
a compelling reason to think that like
super high expectations parenting is
necessarily always can to be super
persuasive as a conversion Prospect um
so um uh on the other hand you can get
things like if it's really just that
like young men's incomes are crack
that's not likely to go away because
skills bias technical change in the
economy is what it is you need skills it
takes a while to get them it is what it
is um so that might not necessarily go
away but that also wouldn't cause us to
Flatline at
zero that might cause us to Flatline at
one or 1. two or something um so you
know I tend to think that stuff like
skills bias technical change
is a decent explanation for those types
of kind of structural economic factors
and also things like parenting or decent
explanations for what's going on with
fertility and I and I don't think the
more apocalyptic explanations are
reasonable um and so I think that we're
likely to see continuing decline for
quite a while I think we'll bottom out
somewhere between
0.4 and 1.3
um and
then maybe there will be social
subgroups that find ways to achieve
higher
fertility whether that will be heritable
will remain to be seen um fertility
heredity requires stable transmission of
the same traits across lots of
generations to do the work there's only
one gene that's known to have long run
positive
selection um across a long time span um
so I'm I'm a little I'm just
skeptical that we're gonna suddenly find
a new Gene that like drives super strong
positive
selection maybe we will um right now we
can see that positive selection for
fertility across cultures is happening
across 50 or so Gene Gene genetic loky
but it's not the same ones in different
cultures it's not like all Western and
this is just among just among European
societies among Western like European
and American societies there's 50 or so
genetic loai that are among active
selection but there's only one genetic
lokai that's under active selection
among like all
groups um and it's been under active
selection for 30,000 years and it's
still only 66% of the population so
like give it another 500 years it's
still going to be like 66% of the
population so um other than that like
there is genetic there is selection on
fertility happening in different
societies but like Dutch people are
breeding for are like selecting on
different genes than American people and
different than Estonian people and
different than Swedish people like it's
just it's different um we're not
gravitating towards like it's not like
we're finding a gene that across
populations it's like predicting higher
fertility so I'm skeptical we're GNA
find a new
one what is
a medium-term future with an upside down
demographic table look like what what
will it be like to exist over the next
going from wherever we're at now 1.6 to
somewhere between 0.4 and
1.3 yeah it's going to be a lot of
disappointment and a whole lot of cope
so disappointment there's going to be a
lot of people not having the families
they wanted to
have um that will lead to various coping
mechanisms um encourage trying to
encourage the younger generation not to
make the same
mistakes um which might be an endogenous
method of of fertility increase um or
just being angry at the Next Generation
because you feel no attach attachment to
them which could be an endogenous
mechanism for continued fertility
decrease um uh disconnection between
Generations
sadness insisting that you're not
actually sad you never really wanted
those kids
anyway um people have different coping
strategies but it's going to be a sadder
and more disappointed
Society there will be reduced
entrepreneurship reduced pace of
technological innovation there will be
reduced economic growth
rates
um I mean we've lived in societies with
zero population growth before they were
called
feudalism so we will see more inequality
greater concentration of wealth across
Generations um because Estates will be
divided among fewer
people
um quite I mean it's it it's
unpleasant um this is why people talk
about a fertility crisis as we've
already discussed I I I really dislike
that language and I think humans survive
have survived unpleasant environments
before life in a low fertility
future will be worth living it will be
so worth living as human life has been
for hundreds of thousands of years um so
and crucially the main obstacles to
having kids are likely to be
psychological that is if you can get
over the burden of like being like
married younger than your friends not
going on quite as many International
trips as your friends and you know
adopting strategies conducive for mental
well-being
you'll probably have plenty of
kids it's going to be an interesting
period i the cope thing I think is going
to occur on an individual level but it's
also going to occur on a macro level as
well you know it is
so I don't know because I live in this
weird like degenerate internet
subculture niche as opposed to sort of
Normy world uh but you know people still
talk about an overpopulation problem
they talk about population boom about
limited resources about us running out
of space about us running out of energy
about all of this stuff and there are
going to be all of these things that
come along for the ride that you
population decrease is going to result
unless we have some unbelievable
Automation in AI robotics stuff that
comes in to save the economy you're
going to have to have a a reduction in
economic growth okay so what's that
going to cause it's going to be a lot of
people that are very unhappy and start
pointing fingers all over the place and
you go well the policies that you were
putting in place only not so long ago
are the these are the fruits of those
exact suggestions and now it's something
else something else is going on for you
to complain about so yeah I uh I'm I'm
concerned quietly concerned I'm not as
equanimous as you are although I'm uh
I'm actually feeling a little bit better
after today's conversation what's next
or when it comes to sort of studies
where is your focus going to be over the
next uh Eur
so right now um I'm the director of the
pronatalism initiative at The Institute
for family studies and what we're
focusing on right now is
housing um housing is a major milestone
for young people it's one of those um
one of those things that people tend to
think like you shouldn't have kids until
your housing situation is kind of sorted
out um and young people are getting less
and less likely they're living in
smaller and smaller houses and they're
less L like less and less likely to own
their houses um
and so we are exploring um what can be
done about that how can we make housing
more affordable how can we make it a
more useful um method of of of uh
long-term planning for young people how
can we make it more accessible to them
um and what types of housing uh are most
supportive of transition to family life
um so we're doing a lot of original
research there and hoping to release
some of that over the next next few
months dud that's cool that's cool I'm
very I'm a big fan of the institute for
family studies Brad's a a fascinating
writer and so you where should people go
they want to keep up to date with all of
the work that you're doing uh so ifs is
a great place to look for a lot of the
uh um the population work um if you want
all my truly unfiltered opinions on this
stuff um uh you can follow me on Twitter
at lionstone KY um and uh and you can
you can get all my opinions there on on
all the sorts of topics that uh that
that sometimes I should actually shut up
about
but hell yeah Lyman I appreciate you
thank you man good talking you if you
enjoyed that episode you will love a
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