Train Unexpectedly Crashes into Suburban Garden | Plainly Difficult

Train crashes, train crashes never change. It seems the more things change, the more they stay the same. When I tell you that our story today has many similarities to another crash, one train that has crashed into the rear of another due to drive not reacting appropriately to the signals in front of them, you might be thinking about the more recent Bedford tragedy, which happened this year, 2026. This is the similar event I'm thinking of, but our story today actually took place 37 years before, just outside the humble South London suburb of Purley. The event shows that the railway is still reliant on the one consistent safety device aboard a train, the driver. It would highlight the need for train protection, a need that many are still arguing for today. So, what am I going on about then? Well, today it is a story that ended up with an electric multiple unit train being lifted out of someone's 1930s suburban house garden. My name is John, and welcome to Plainly Difficult. This video today wouldn't have been possible if it wasn't for my YouTube patron and coffee members. If you want to get access to the channel's videos, you can from just £1 per month. As always, the links will be in the pinned comment below. Purley, Purley, Purley. So, this is Purley. It is a town just south of the major South London town of the Croinks, aka Croydon. The borough is the fourth largest in London by size. It is a cultural center of sorts, being famed for the home of dubstep and for having all of its bus stop shelters being stolen by a scammer. Yes, that actually did happen. Anyhows, if you want to escape Croydon for Brighton, you have a high likelihood of needing to go through our disaster location, Purley. Today, the area is known for its massive Tesco's. But our story took place 2 years before the creation of this landmark, in the year 1989. Interestingly, it was the year I was born. But less info on me. Let's get to the track layout and the signaling arrangements in 1989 around Purley station. And geek warning, you will hear the terms automatic semi-automatic control signals a few times here, so you have been warned. The station has a whopping six platforms with six tracks running through it. Named the up fast towards Croydon and ultimately London, the down fast away from Croydon, and the up and down slow, again towards Croydon and away from Croydon respectively. In addition to this, there is an up and down loop line which takes trains to the magical worlds of Caterham and Tattenham Corner. The down slow and up loop platforms are bidirectional, allowing trains to come from said amazing places to be able to be routed onto the fast line and into and out of a siding to the north of the station. Now, the signals in the area were fairly recent, having been upgraded in 1986. This allowed the signaler to operate a routing via push button entry and exit routing, where the signaler pushes a button on their controller to route and set the signals for said route. This is great for routing trains across the slow line onto the fast line, where the computer logic of the signal box takes the stress out of setting each signal away from the signaler. It's all interlocked, so no conflicting movements can be set without signal protection. Now, we could talk for hours about the signaling arrangements for this area, but for not wanting to waste air and hard drive space on my Zoom H4N, I'm going to talk mainly about one signal. This is Tango 168. It is controlled by the Free Bridges signal box a few miles to the south. This signal is placed at the end of the up fast line and it protects Purley Junction as trains come across from the slow line to the fast line. It is a semi-automatic signal. This means it can be set to auto mode when movements across the junction aren't taking place. Meaning the signal will act like an automatic signal being activated by the passage of trains. When a train is clear the section, 168 protects it and it can automatically clear without any input from the signal. When in controlled mode, the signal has to be cleared by the signal. This is used when say a train moves from across the slow line onto the fast line and Tango 168 will be held at danger. Now, this would not be a surprise for a driver as the preceding signals would check the train down with Tango 182 showing double yellows, Tango 178 showing single yellow and Tango 168 being at danger. The line speed throughout the area was 90 mph with a 25 mph speed restriction across the point work when crossing over. The trains in the area run on the South London tried and tested 750 volts DC third rail system via the brown trouser conductor rail. Now, with all that background done and dusted, it's time to move on to how commuter train ended up in someone's back garden. The disaster. It is just a bit past half past 1:00 in the afternoon on the 4th of March 1989 and a four-carriage class 423 London Victoria-bound train is just pulling into Purley platform three on the up slow line. The train had started off at Horsham further south at 12:50. The driver canceled the AWS warning for Tango 170. As the train approached the stopping position, the signal cleared with a junction one indicator showing the route was set for the train to go over onto the up fast line. This would mean that the signal at the end of platform one, Tango 168 would be at danger to protect the movement of the ex-Horsham train onto the fast line. The guard for the train checked the platform and rang the two bells to the driver telling him it was ready to depart. The driver brought their train up to the speed of 25 mph to navigate the points onto the fast line. Meanwhile, a 12:17 Littlehampton to London Victoria service was approaching Purley on the up fast line. This was made up of two four-car Class 421 trains making a formation of eight carriages. The train passed Tango 182 showing double yellows followed by Tango 178 showing a single yellow yellow. Both of these signals the driver acknowledged the AWS warnings. The train was traveling at roughly 60 mph when it reached the end of platform 1 at Purley. Tango 168 was at danger. The train went through the red signal and collided with the fourth carriage of the ex-Horsham train. As the two trains collided, the first six coaches of the ex-Littlehampton train derailed and began tumbling down the steep embankment into the houses' gardens that backed onto the railway. Multiple carriages flipped over sliding down onto their roof. Being Mark 1 derived rolling stock, their crash protection was pretty lackluster. Thus, many inside the trains were thrown around causing multiple injuries. A light running locomotive on the down slow stopped just outside Purley station and made a call to the signal by the signal post telephone telling them what they had just witnessed. The first 999 calls came in from nearby residents that had found an electric multiple units train in their garden. Soon enough, emergency workers would arrive on the scene and begin assisting the injured and survivors at the crash. Emergency workers would work until 5:00 p.m. searching the wreckage with the last survivor being removed about quarter past 3:00 in the afternoon. In total, over 80 people were injured but sadly five would lose their lives in the crash. The line was closed until the 6th of March where repairs to the track and signaling was made. The damaged vehicles that lay on the embankment were strewn around people's gardens and they would have to be craned out progressively until the 9th of March when they were fully clear. The crossover point work point work was replaced and the speed restriction was in place until normal operations were allowed to resume on the 27th of March 1989. The driver of the ex-Little Hampton train would be charged with manslaughter. They would plead guilty and receive 12 months imprisonment reduced to 4 months on appeal. Which leads us on to the cause. The investigation. The Ministry of Transport's railway inspector would delve into the crash and release a report in October 1989 placing the blame clearly at the feet of the Little Hampton train driver. The train and signaling had no issues and were found to be in correct working condition. And testimony of drivers of other trains through the area earlier had shown the signaling was working as it should have done. The main cause was the lapse of judgment where the driver passed Tango 168 at danger. That was a pretty easy conclusion to come to and this was reflected at the time with the driver's guilty plea and conviction. But as time went on the 12 months would get reduced to 4 months and in the mid-2000s his conviction was completely reversed because there was a lot more going on with that signal. The lord who oversaw the overturning of the conviction said something about the infrastructure of this particular junction was causing mistakes to be made. You see Tango 168 was what is considered a multi-spade signal. It would turn out that there were multiple trains over the years had passed it at danger which would logically point at one thing that the way the [clears throat] signal set up was meant it was conductive to an accident. Looking at the diagram there's potential for read across where driver could misread a signal on the adjacent line. For example, reading across at Tango 178 to Tango 180 or read through where the driver saw a signal beyond and thought it was theirs. For example, from Tango 168 to Tango 166. Now, I'm not saying that's what happened on the day, as those aspects were shown to be a danger after the crash. But, I couldn't find out any information on what they were showing before. Small infrastructure issues can create multi-SPAD signals. There's notorious signal on the Watford DC, Whiskey Sierra 35, which has multiple SPADs. Many theories exist for this, as there are many distractions along the line, especially at Wembley Sidings, where weird and wonderful trains pass by. There's also another notorious signal, actually just a couple of miles away from Purley, Tango 22, which is notorious for reading across and long sighting, where a signal is viewed from such a distance that drivers switch off and forget it's at danger. The ultimate failure was caused by the driver not reacting to the restrictive signals before 168, but British trains at the time had one massive flaw, that there was no real train protection system beyond the driver and the automatic warning system. The crash was a decade away from the implementation of TPWS, which would mean multiple more train crashes would occur during what I call the bloody years of early post-railway privatization. I find it so frustrating that this period had nothing to stop a train passing a signal at danger, especially when the London Underground had a very reliable system of tripcock train stop protection since the early 1900s. As was then, as we still see today, the meat sack at the controls is the first and last defense of safety. So, that's my video on the Purley train crash. It's going to be a three on my scale, and this is what I've got with my root cause analysis card. Do you agree? Let me know in the comments below. This is a Plain Dealing Productions audio on the channel Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. Plain Dealing videos produced by me, John, in a currently very hot corner of South London, UK. It is the 12th of August today and it is near 30°. Anyway, thank you very much for watching. And all we have to say is thanks for watching. And Mr. Music, can you play us out, please?