The View From America’s Partners (Future Security Forum 2026)

our moderator um Hila Rasul Aub who is um she ran uh global engagement at the National Security Council and is now doing similar work as a director of uh her program here at New America and she will um talk about the view from America's partners with our all-star panel here. Thank you. Oh, by the way, I'm >> fascinating. >> Thank you very much. >> Yeah, you got him from Iraq last night and very impressive. >> Well, thank you, Peter. And um I'll exercise a bit of moderator's prerogative and start with a personal reflection as many of our other moderators and panelists have done. So, on September 10th, 2001, Amacha Massud was assassinated in Afghanistan. And I remember at the time thinking, "This feels oddly ominous. It feels weirdly larger than what a murder of a singular freedom fighter, warlord, whatever your thoughts are on him, what it should be." And then the next day, 9/11 happened. And as an Afghan-American, I was absorbing the horror of what just happened in my home country, the fear of aftershocks, the fear of what was to come for my community living here in the US, and also holding the knowledge of what um the response from the US could hold for a country and the people that I was still very deeply connected to. And now 25 years later, we have some sense of uh those consequences. Um according to Brown University's cost of war estimates, um the post 911 wars resulted in 4.5 to 4.7 million deaths in Afghanistan, Iraq, and some of the other countries um in the war zone and displaced more than 38 million people. these numbers continue to reverberate and have repercussions. So today uh what I want to do with our panel is to look at that history from the perspective of those countries and the people who lived and experienced these wars and the partners who fought alongside the United States. Um uh I am joined by Brigadier Ian Langford who spent more than three decades in the Australian Army including commanding Australian special operations forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. We are joined by Matin Beck who served at the highest levels of Afran government including as chief of staff to President Ashrafani and as part of Afghanistan's negotiating team with the Taliban. And we are also joined by Ambassador Fared Yasin who served as Iraq's ambassador to the United States and France and was involved in negotiating the agreements between um US and Iraq uh after 2003. So what I want to do is take a bit of a historical perspective and start before 911 because both Afghanistan and Iraq's relationship with the US started long before then. So I I will start with um Matine and Ambassador Yasine to give us a sense of what did previous US engagement in those countries leave behind by the time the post 911 wars began. So Matina, we'll start with you and then we'll move to Ambassador Yasine. >> Uh thank you Hila. Well before 911 I don't remember I was Maj K. uh because when it was interesting let me start from a personal story. I was born in the 1986 and my father was already fighting against the Soviet. So I hadn't seen my father for two years after two years I met him. So I don't remember much of that than I remember the civil war when the commerce regime collapsed and then more I connect relate in a way when the Taliban emerged. So you know what happened all the changes in Afghanistan. Uh but that time it was the Afghans who were suffering from the terrorism from the Taliban and al-Qaeda and others. Afghanistan was a lost cause as you mentioned Amash Shamasu that time he used to lead the northern alliance of resistance and he came to Europe and he gave the warning but there was not much of a attention but when 9/11 happened uh I was in nine gray for me it was hard to grasp what is the consequence of this to Afghanistan and I didn't know I mean everyone was saying this was unfortunate but African was saying now things will change then I didn't of course immediately Afghanistan became the headline and so but now when in the prospect when you look back of course the Taliban and the civil war and the American support to the Mujai in 1979 the whole thing after the collap collapse of the communists and the complete abandon of Afghanistan. So all this I think our history, our modern history is very interconnected with America's four decade of policy in the cold war and then afterwards the war on terror. >> Thank you Matine and Ambassador Yasin. I know you had been part of these conversations long before 911. >> Um well thank you for the invitation. Um, I was in the United States when uh 9/11 happened and uh living in Boston and uh was concerned uh for the fate of friends who lived in New York, particularly downtown. And uh what I remember very vividly was that I the relief that I got when I heard from them via email, not by phone. You can get through by phone at all. Um, but thank you for starting this issue before 9/11 because for Iraq, it started way before 9/11. Um, I'm an exiled Iraqi. We left Iraq in ' 74 and I could not return to Iraq until 2003 because my father was not liked by by Saddam. And so if I were to go back, I wasn't sure I was sure that I would be able uh to leave. And so uh for a long time I lived in the west in opposition to Saddam, but very quiet about it because uh Iraq as very aptly said uh by Kanan Makia in his 1989 book Republic of Fear was a republic of fear. And to prove the point when he published a book he published it anonymously under a pseudonym uh because precisely he was concerned about his family and it was really awkward because when you come to the United States and you talk to officials about Saddam Hussein so what are you talking about this guy's a modernist I I remember a session at Tus University with a former ambassador to Iraq American ambassador to Iraq who you know gave the most ludicrous description of Iraq under under the bath. Um, and this prevailed and it prevailed even beyond the gassing of halabja, the committing of a crime that in sheer numbers actually outweighs 9/11 and in a way that was horrible. I mean, uh, I I lived through this vicariously through essentially ABC News. I was a nightline junkie. Um, so for us it started way before then. And if there's one element that I want to single out in our history that actually set us on a trajectory is the way in which uh the war in 91 came about and the way it ended because for a long time Saddam and his regime were coddled by the West by the Gulf countries uh precisely the countries that he attacked precisely the countries that he, you know, criticized and railed against. Um, and by the way, the war ended, and to me, this is really personal because this is when I started becoming politically active. We I used to live in Boston. There was a community of Iraqi intellectuals there uh tied to the universities in the Boston area. And we were concerned that if uh the war would end and Saddam would be left uh and an uprising would happen as called for by President Bush, then uh the cost would be horrible. And it was and it proved to be. And in fact, I I know this firsthand because I was part of the first team that met with people at the State Department. Remember the date? 3rd of April 1991. Uh we met with an assistant secretary of state who said uh no way you know uh we're we're we're there. We're uh we've done what we were tasked to do which was remove Saddam from Kuwait and we've done our mission. We're leaving. Uh and uh you know the rest is history. Uh and it's unfortunate because they did receive the Americans did receive advice to do otherwise. I remember a dis discussion with uh Prince Turk Feso who was for a long time Saudi Arabia's chief of intelligence who told me that at a meeting with James Baker uh as the war was evolving or um at meeting in Riad attended by the foreign ministers of um Egypt and Syria both of them members of the coalition. Um, Prince Turkey said, "We don't mind if you would to to remove Saddam. We're not concerned about the consequences to the Shia of Iraq. We know that their nationalists, they proved that over the Iran Iraq war." And he said that uh, Prince Saw Alfeso, his older brother and foreign minister at the time, backed him. And James Baker said, "Uh um, I'll get back to you on that." And then Prince Turkey added that many years later, probably during the time of the Baker Hamilton report, they met again at an event and uh James Baker said to Prince Turkey, remember the discussion we had many years ago in Riyad, he said, "We should have listened to you." And I think what made him realize that is that he actually had gone he was sent by George Bush to northern Iraq to Kurdistan to see what was happening and then went back and then did what he could to salvage the situation. And that's how the no-fly zone was set up. That's how Kurdistan was able to uh you know separate itself from Saddam for Saddam's regime for 10 years. So to us, it all started there. And I think had the United States gone beyond and gotten rid of Saddam in 1991, uh I think the history of Iraq and the region would have been a lot better. I heard earlier uh one of the speakers talk about the impact of the of the of the sanctions on the Iranian population. Well, I Iraq had 10 years of sanctions and especially the early years were awful. you could see that in the average size of babies and and and children. Um so whatever you do um think of the history and things did not start on 911. >> And I I I think it's very important to remember that history because you know it is prologue for the future. Brigadier Lingford, I I I want to turn to you uh you know, first off also just 911 from the Australian perspective, from your personal perspective, but also post 911 as uh the US was making the case for the war. Um how did Australia understand the strategic case that was being made after September 11th? And then what were the assumptions that were questionable at the time that maybe as a as an ally you weren't as comfortable um or difficult for allies to challenge? >> Yeah. Well, thank you very much. It's great to be on this panel. Shout out to the crowd who are still here. Um your perseverance is admirable and we appreciate that, but it's very humbling to be here. Um many of you may not know that uh our prime minister was in Blair House on 911. So John how was over there and he had a visceral experience in terms of the emotion and the urgency of the day. He addressed uh the congress the day after I think it was to a standing ovation and he on advice from his foreign minister invoked ANZIS which is our now 75year-old defense treaty with the US and with New Zealand first time in its history and it was on the context of collective self-defense. So that was invoked at Australia's initiative really in an act of solidarity but was an expression based on our history but also our common interests as it relates to uh defense and collective security. So there was no question at all uh in Australia that we would support the Americans in those initial uh response options, those actions to address the security gap that was discovered straight after 9/11, but then also the commitment to some sort of enduring proposition that uh common security interests meant that we would be with the US throughout this campaign. Now there's a little bit of a romantic notion to this in Australia. We fought with the US throughout the 20th centuries in all of its major wars. World War I obviously World War II most particularly after the fall of Singapore where we pivoted from the British to the Americans as it relates especially to the Pacific. We were the second nation to contribute troops to Korea after the Americans under the opaces of the United Nations in relation to that emergency in 1950. Our prime minister committed us to the war in Vietnam in 1965 before he even asked the parliament. Said that we were going to do it. Uh and we were there from 65 to 72. And obviously in the context of the cold war, Australia was a reliable ally uh in the sense of what it did throughout that conflict but also in establishing things like five eyes intelligence. You know, and I say this respectfully to those nations who aren't in Five Eyes, but they wish they were. Uh it is a valuable and enduring framework for cooperation around collective security that regardless of uh whose administration uh in what frame of mind has provided stability to common interests since it's been sort of in inception. And so there's all this evidence that stands as testament uh to our levels of commitment. I was in East Teour patrolling the east or Indonesian border on 911. I was told by a village tribesman that the White House had been hit by an aircraft and I wasn't quite sure what that meant. We went back to our patrol base. Within 2 weeks, we were out of uh East Teeour. We'd been replaced and we were preparing for operations which would lead to that first SOTG going into FOB Rhino when the Rangers went in and then obviously in that reoccurring theme around Afghanistan and then into Iraq. the issue around WND was as pervasive and as divisive in Australia as it was in the UK around evidence um and the government was committed to supporting again US-led intervention in the broader belief that it was uh of the common good and we did that and we live with the consequences and I don't think frankly even in the current environment should an envir should a a contingency like that develop that the result would be any different. So the relationship between Australia and the US uh is uh is there in evidence for all to see throughout the 20th century. The reaction after 9/11 was genuinely felt. It sets the context for what then happened. And just briefly thinking about the future and we haven't really talked about China today for obvious reasons. But China will shape very much the security environment for the rest of our lives. I mean we talk about wars of choice and then we talk about wars of existential survival. The contestation between the US and China is probably the single dominant security dimension to the rest of our lives. Um that will be existential one way or another. And so Australia does this not sheerely out of you know benevolence and some sort of romantic historical narrative. It's also doing out of its own self-interests. And there is obviously you know some element of quid proquo when it comes to collective security. And my sense is that you know part of us think about our recent past as an investment into guaranteeing our future. >> Well we can get into that later in the conversation but um you know let's then move into like 911 and this is a lot to hold in a conversation in 30 minutes and two very different contexts. Um the Afghan reception and the Iraqi reception uh to the US war, US occupation initially was very different, but during the course of each individual war, there are some similarities and some differences. And so I know I've spoken with both of you about the impacts of the surge in both contexts, but I I would love to hear from all three panelists. You know, if you could name three strategic challenges, things that the US could have done very differently, what would those three have been? I'll turn to you first, Ambassador Yasi. Um, so on Iraq, um, I I think the United States went there not knowing much about the country. >> Mhm. um and uh not having a plan that was agreed to with Iraqi partners. Many of the people who were on the side of the Americans and their allies in the country were actually quite disappointed when after the fall of Saddam, Iraq was put under a status of occupation. uh the scenario that people had in mind was what happened in France after World War II. Uh recall that at the time there were two schools of thought. Uh one American school of thought thought that France should be occupied and in fact if memory serves they even printed money that would serve under with labels under you know American administration. Uh but the other point of view prevailed and Iraq was put under uh occupation. Um that was one mistake. The other I think um pretty egregious mistake was the disbanding of the army in the way that it was done. I mean you don't kick out tens of millions of people on the street, people who have been trained to fight. And you know the the really interesting thing that it this had consequences on on on life in Iraq whenever there is there was a large-scale demobilization uh many criminals turned to uh many former serial soldiers for whatever reasons turned to criminality. I mean most of the outlaws in the west were former rebel soldiers. In France, you know, there's the famous Bond Bono that were former soldiers in the in World War I. Well, u right after the fall of the regime, you had in Baghdad a wave of kidnappings of wealthy doctors and wealthy individuals and the uh description given by those who survived were those of military style operations. So the criminals who actually came out because Saddam had announced an amnesty just before um he fell uh came led to a sort of a co cooperation between uh those criminals and and the and disbanded military. And the third mistake I think was the way in which uh debathification was implemented. Granted, uh, you know, the Bath party was, uh, an instrument of of of terror, but given the situation in Iraq, you could not hold a teacher's position or a journalist's position or any position for that matter without being a member of the party. And so, uh, I think a lot more discretion should have gone into implementing these these measures. >> Thank you. >> There's actually one more thing. Um the way the governing council was set up uh had consequences for the for for for for the rest of Iraq's you know recent history. The uh Americans had a good initial reaction which was to make sure that the uh representation on the governing council reflected all of Iraq's diversity. But in some sense this turned into some sort of partitioning of the government rather than uh just uh happening the people that you have a natural um people join and and through technical competency things like that and you'd have a a representative group of people running the country. It was actually instituted in in a way uh not like Lebanon of course there's nothing in the Iraqi constitution that says that the president or the prime minister or the ambassador should be of this or that sect but the practice has emerged and I think it'll take us a long time to go beyond that. Well, and I think that's very interesting, especially your point on debathification because in Afghanistan, we had a very different uh situation with Iraq. There was a very established civil service and infrastructure and architecture to the government. And with a dismantling of that, you know, u came uh a lot of other challenges. But with Afghanistan having already faced you know 20 30 years of war that infrastructure was already depleted. And so Matin from your perspective what were three of the kind of things that could have been done very differently um but were not. Well, first um sometime I would say like in the negotiation in the DHA I would say to the Americans I wish that 9/11 had not happened then Americans had not intervened in Afghanistan because the reason why I'm saying unlike Iraq people in Afghanistan were already exhausted by Taliban they were already fighting so if you see there was no American troops on the ground it was the Afghan only there was your support so it's like the Taliban collapsed like a house of cards. Not only in the north, in the south, in the east, in the center, all part of the country. So I wish we had finished that phenomenon on our own, not with an American intervention first. I think that was second after that what happened the Taliban surrender. There's enough document now. Karai have spoken on that. there's historical document and they were officially surrendering and giving but then that time I think the policy was mainly with secretary of defense Ramsfell and he objected to that surrender they chased them and third another reason I think when but with all things happening with Afghanistan constitution transition election things was Afghanistan was becoming a model then at the same time things were going wrong in Iraq. So attention shifted towards Iraq. Uh that was another probably you I won't call it mistake but a lack of attention but not much strategic. I think the another more strategic thing uh the when you look to the surge uh when you have the counterinsurgency in the when President Obama comes to office so he talks about the war of necessity war of the choice he focus a lot on Afghanistan but I think that the time was too much of resources we couldn't observe that resources too much of building of on militarization later on when I was in transition team I travel all the bases there's so many military airport and the way the intention was here but it was misread in Afghanistan in the region Afghan thought particularly president Karz thought we are the most important land on the earth so the United States need us geopolitics need And the Russians start seeing the American prisons with a self suspension. The Iranians start seeing the same way. the the Chinese because there was a lot of base building in Helman in Paktia in Pakika every around the country and at the same time the withdrawal and with that I think I remember because I come from the north until search we didn't had much of a security problem in the north with the surge with the going all the night rates so then the Taliban started expanding in the north the northeast as well. So to wrap, I know we're running out of time. I think the surge was one of the critical thing which has emboldened the Taliban the way it was done and the withdrawal the and also of course our the Afghan partners. I think that time the peace should have been pursued that time which kar objected because of the dual office so it didn't work. I think we were in a good ground if we had done and afterwards of course when the second administration come Ghani's administration came then here things changed President Trump came then Saudi Assia strategy all the thing beside that uh then the peace process started I would say 2018 I was the head of local governance uh we announced the ceasefire For the first time I realized how much Afghans both side of the war exhausted. We had a mutually hurting stalemate. The first time both the parties to the war had come to conclusion no one can win the war. But unfortunately that opportunity was uh hijacked by the policy which was set up in Washington a policy of withdrawal which was framed in peace. And I think here we lost and the African government was excluded completely delegitimized. Um I think these are the initial part of not putting Taliban in the process of state building and accepting the surrender and the search exclusion of African government from the peace process. So I would say these are in my view the most three strategic mistakes >> and Brigadier uh Langford from your perspective as an ally on the ground both in Iraq and Afghanistan. So I'm asking you to cover a bit of ground um where did you see some of the most strategic uh mistakes that were made? >> Yeah. So my comments might be specific to the US but it'll be more reflective of the West. So um most would remember when General Shinsseeki was effectively sacked by announcing you need 100 plus thousand to run a successful counterinsurgency early on during the occupation of Afghanistan and was sort of corrected by then Secretary Rumsfeld. I think that strategic hubris dimension to the western way of war was probably at its apex at that point and uh that comment sort of reflected the broader zeitgeist that somehow technology and some sense of superiority could prevail over human factors and the pure physics of what was being undertaken. Um so hubris on the part of the west was a big part of it. Uh the other is ignoring our own history. So many of you would know Fox Connor who was the mentor to guys like Eisenhower. You know, the US does well when it fights big, when it only fights when it has to, and when it never fights alone. And so, you know, putting the Afghans and the Iraqis in the center of that paradigm, I think, is pretty significant when you think about the ways and approaches that might be undertaken for what effectively amounts to an intergenerational um counterinsurgency. you know the most two successful counterinsurgencies in the 20th century was the reconstruction of Germany and Japan and that's the benefits of unconditional surrender but that's the kind of approach you need to take I think if you take an informed view that acknowledges history but also you know strategic hubris in going forward and then just more broadly the recognition that um uh you know this since the revolution of military affairs as it was declared at the end of the first Gulf War this idea that technology replaces is the human factors, the fog and the friction dimensions to conflict and the idea that we can, you know, design our own war termination and war aims without recognizing all of the confusion and all of the uncertainty and all the risks that plays into uh misadventures and undertakings such as these. So hubris and ignorance of history and you know a failure to sort of recognize the limits of technology. putting soldiers inside FOBS, not having them relate to civilians, burying them behind armor under the opice of force protection, which is honorable enough, but then losing and creating dissonance between you and the constituency you're trying to help. And then when faced with the alternative um of course Iraqis and Afghanistan and its people having to choose the best alternative as it relates to their own self-interest as opposed as opposed to war aims which should have been consistent with that. >> And now let's move on to where we are today and looking forward to the future. Uh Ambassador Yasin um where is Iraq right now? I mean, you know, we've there have been decades of war, but these countries in addition to geopolitics are facing other challenges as well. >> Baghdad is fun to come. >> I'm serious. You know, um and um we all know what happened to Mosul. Mosul is fun and I really urge you to visit. Unfortunately, most of the diplomats who still live in Iraq, who worked in in Iraq, are operating under rules uh that are overrestrictive. Uh I I think they should be relaxed for them to have a um an experience that is worth relating to their governments. Um so I I urge you come visit, you know, and I'll anybody who wants my contacts, ask her. I'll show you around. Um so things are um problematic for us not because of things that are intrinsically Iraqi but rather because of the geography of Iraq and its inter international relations. I mean we're caught between you know Iran and and the and and the United States. And to me um and here I'm sort of betraying my my sort of Swiss links. Uh to me the only situation that Iraq can live through in the region is to be like Switzerland in Europe. If you ask uh me what characterizes Switzerland is a neutral country. Relevant question is why is it neutral? Well simply because in the 17th and 18th centuries all the wars in Europe were either sectarian or ethnic and Switzerland is a mixed ethnic and sectarian country. And there's a map which I found of Swiss canton that showed you know Protestant canton and Catholic canton and mixed canton. And it looks exactly like a map of Baghdad that the coalition came up with that showed you know Sunni neighborhoods and Shia neighborhoods and mixed neighborhoods. And so uh in a situation where the conflicts between neighboring countries when you have a populations that extend into these neighboring countries the only poss possible policy for you is that of a proactive neutrality which has its certain implications. You have a strong state you have a state that is committed to its population and we're working on that. And one of the things that I'll I'm very proud of is that, you know, the last 20 years, we've had nine elections. None of our prime ministers has been executed. In fact, they're getting pretty plump salaries and and retirement. Um there is a lively press. Okay. Um but like I said, we're caught up in this uh in this situation between Iran and Iraq. And we are an oil producing country and uh uh we export exclusively through uh the homo trade. So we're kind of strapped for the time being. But the real issues that we have to confront are completely different. And I think we're not the only ones. Uh Iraq is a young population, has a young population. We have a very high u population growth. We are plagued by water scarcity and we're subject to climate change and these are issues that are really existential for us and so we have to find solutions and the wonderful thing is that there are a lot of countries that are in the same situation and there are solutions one of them is you know Australia Australia is one of the world's leaders in terms of agriculture and arid environments and there are u you're talking about what kind of relationships we need that we would like to have with the United States. Well, there are states in the United States that are living in similar circumstances to ours. You know, water scarcity, hot, arid, and we could learn from each other. And so, the one new thing in the um bilateral relationship between Iraq and the United States is that there is now a sizable Iraqi diaspora. And so maybe we could uh take advantage of that to find, you know, similar solutions. >> Thank you, uh, ambassador. And and Matine, turning to you, I think with Afghanistan, it's a very different story. Um, we're almost seeing a bit of a a thawing of relations with the Taliban, with some European countries, and others. Um, what do you make of this and and what does this pretend for the future? Well, unfortunately, I don't have any good thing like ambassador to report on Afghanistan. I mean, you know, like everyone knows schools are closed for girls. Instead of that, there's more jihadi madresses are popping up. Recently, a video of us son was popped up from there with a kandari turban. That's interesting. And after like 25 years hund thousands of Afghan die plus thousands of American and unfortunately with as I mentioned with more irresponsible policies here and also back in Afghanistan something was just surrender to Taliban the country and that five years have passed you don't see a prospect in the future. and they have taken over but they have more anti-people policies still they act uh as if they're insurgent but they should have people friendly policies but they they more act like an occupier in certain part of the country they don't mingle with the people um there's a lot of celebration here I hear from the people oh Afghanistan good that that happened that should have happened long time ago there's no civil war nothing but I would say that's a pause at the moment the country is unfortunately entering to another round phase of civil war it's a misery maybe in coming years there will be more headline and it was an opportunity if Taliban would had leave the process of reconciliation which they didn't so I don't they only relying still if a country is in peace they don't have to spend three to four billion only in their own security apparatus. So uh unfortunately Afghanistan is not in a good shape and probably right now is a pause but in the future there will be more more bad newses coming up from there. >> Thank you and I apologize to the audience because we did not leave time for audience questions but hopefully you can catch some of our panelists afterwards. I thank you all for being here and um thank you to Peter and others for hosting us.