Center for Strategic & International Studies

The Terrorism Threat from Afghanistan Five Years after the U.S. Withdrawal

Duration: 12:33 2094 transcript words EN summary

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Five years after the United States withdrew its forces from Afghanistan, experts Dan Byman and Trisha Bacon assess that while fears of a large-scale resurgence for Al-Qaeda have largely been unfounded due to devastating leadership decapitation campaigns and global arrests, new complexities have emerged. The primary terrorist threat has shifted significantly toward Islamic State Khorasan (ISK), an extreme group born from former members of the Taliban, Pakistani insurgents, and defectors who rejected both the Afghan government and their former allies. Unlike other regional groups that rely on state sponsors, ISK carved out a unique space by targeting indiscriminately without boundaries, attacking schools, hospitals, and American personnel alike. However, this threat has been mitigated not by US intervention directly in Afghanistan, but through an aggressive counterterrorism partnership with the Taliban government, which now controls all territory and can effectively flush out insurgents that previously operated under a patchwork of competing forces. The relationship between the Afghan Taliban and ISK illustrates both the effectiveness and the inherent costs of this security arrangement. The Taliban has employed brutal repression against ISK leadership while attempting some outreach to lower-level fighters, successfully reducing ISK's territorial control within Afghanistan to near zero. Consequently, ISK has transformed into a clandestine network that operates covertly across borders in Pakistan and Central Asia, focusing on propaganda generation and transnational plotting rather than holding ground locally. This dynamic highlights the reality of "parallel realities" under Taliban rule: while they ferociously suppress groups like TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan) within their own sphere to prevent them from becoming a model for others, they simultaneously provide sanctuary that allows these groups to plot attacks against neighboring nations. As a result, ISK has escalated its international attack profile as its domestic capabilities have diminished, filling the void left by declining regional power with transnational violence. A significant concern regarding US capacity post-withdrawal was whether intelligence networks would degrade too severely for Washington to monitor threats without direct presence on the ground. While it is true that robust intelligence apparatuses designed for combat operations were dismantled, experts argue this represented a necessary "right-sizing" rather than a failure of capability. The United States has maintained targeted intelligence networks specifically focused on ISK and Al-Qaeda, revitalized cooperation with Pakistan after an initial decline, and successfully warned of multiple attacks even when local authorities ignored the alerts. This calibrated approach allowed US officials to identify precise locations for high-value targets like Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul without needing a full-scale military footprint, demonstrating that sufficient intelligence exists to manage current threats despite the loss of broad operational networks inside Afghanistan. Ultimately, the post-withdrawal landscape forces a difficult reckoning on how the United States should engage with partners who are effective counterterrorism allies but problematic from an ideological or human rights perspective. The case studies of Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban reveal that these entities often possess a dual nature: they cooperate against specific enemies like Al-Qaeda while simultaneously sponsoring others, such as TTP in Pakistan's border regions. Experts conclude that US policy must accurately recognize this duality rather than assuming partners are wholly good or bad; working with them requires strict boundaries to prevent slippage into areas where their actions contribute to broader threats. The current security situation underscores a complex reality where the most effective tools for preventing terrorism may come from governments and groups whose values clash fundamentally with those of the United States, requiring a nuanced strategy that balances immediate counterterrorism efficacy against long-term strategic risks.

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I'm Dan Byman. I'm the director of the warfare irregular threats and terrorism program here at CSIS and I'm here with my colleague Trisha Bacon who is a professor at American University and also a non-resident fellow here at CSIS. And we're here to talk about Afghanistan 5 years after the US withdrawal from the country. And in particular we're going to focus on one question which is the terrorist threat from Afghanistan and how it has played out and what has not occurred that um has shaped US thinking. Um Trisha, uh let's start with setting the scene. Uh let's go back in time. Can you tell us 5 years ago, 10 years ago, what were the US concerns regarding terrorism in Afghanistan if US forces withdrew? >> I think the main concern for US forces essentially that we would have a repeat of what happened during the 1990s, that the Taliban would provide a large-scale safe haven that would allow Al-Qaeda to train, prepare, plot, and conduct operations particularly in the United States, but also in the West more broadly. >> Um one concern that came up especially near the end was the Islamic State Khorasan. Right? And that was a more active group. It was one that was seen as more extreme. The United States was fighting the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Um if you don't mind just uh talk everyone through uh the Islamic State Khorasan or ISK as we all call it, um ISK's relationship with the Taliban and with Al-Qaeda. >> So ISK carved out a really unusual place in the region more broadly, actually. It's the only terrorist group operating in the region that does not have a state sponsor. Every other terrorist group in the region has at least one state that they work with, but ISK carved out this full like fully rejectionist space. And when it formed, it had a number of former Taliban members, a number of Pakistani Taliban members, and even some Al-Qaeda members. So, it also had a lot of defectors and was sort of born in opposition not only to the Afghan Republic government and the Pakistani government, but also to the Taliban and to Al-Qaeda. So, it was fighting sort of all the enemies at once. And then as you say, was doing so in a very extreme way. This is a group that would target anything. It It really didn't have any boundaries. It's targeted school children taking tests. It's targeted hospitals. And of course, it's targeted American service members and American targets as well. >> One of the pleasant developments and one doesn't use that word very often when you talk about counterterrorism is that the Taliban has aggressively fought ISK. And it has targeted its leaders, it's arrested them, very high degree of repression. There has been some outreach as well to lower-level ISK fighters. But for the most part, it's been a pretty brute force sort of method. And frankly, this seems to have been effective. The territory of the Islamic State in controls Afghanistan has diminished. Overall influence has declined. Um and a big difference I would stress is the Taliban actually controls the entire country. And the United States and its Afghan government allies did not. So, the Taliban is better able to kind of flush out ISK from different parts of the country. And Sebastian Gorka, the top US counterterrorism official, you know, he has noted that the Taliban is a cooperative counterterrorism partner, which is probably not something many people expected. Um but one thing that you've educated me on is that this success in this successful partnership and the Taliban's counterterrorism, that there's a cost to it. Um, what is that cost? >> So, there is it's a really interesting progression because the Taliban was countering ISK with ferocity even before the US withdrawal. So, it's sort of maintained the position that it had before, but now it's able to execute it much more effectively cuz as you say, it controls all the territory in Afghanistan. Whereas before there was sort of this patchwork of the US, the Afghan Republic, and the Taliban all trying to counter ISK um in their own ways. And so, one of the things that the Afghan Taliban has been able to do is really put pressure on the communities that ISK was emerging from, particularly the Salafi commun- communities in eastern Afghanistan. So, it's gone to sort of the source of a lot of ISK's recruits. And as you say, it's done a lot of repression and it's done a little bit of outreach. But the effectiveness that that's had is it's made ISK an almost entirely covert and clandestine organization. It doesn't control any territory anymore in Afghanistan. So, it has to operate solely in that way. It's spread more and more into Pakistan as well, so it's now this kind of clandestine network that goes across the two countries. And it's really escalated that kind of activity. And it's moved into fill a niche both as a result of its declining power in the region and for the Islamic State more broadly, which is to be this creator of a lot of propaganda that reaches out in particular to Central Asia, to to those in South Asia, and to serve as sort of a plotting function. It's been involved in or responsible for a number of transnational attacks. So, as its attacks in Afghanistan have gone down, what we've seen are more attacks internationally or transnationally that are either conducted by the group itself or that it's playing a pivotal role in the networks that are executing those attacks. >> Now, we've talked a lot about ISK, but when most Americans think of Afghanistan terrorism, they're thinking of Al-Qaeda. >> Yeah. >> And one concern that US officials had was that Afghanistan would again be a haven for Al-Qaeda. And we have seen limited training. Um Ayman al-Zawahiri, uh who headed Al-Qaeda, was was killed in Kabul in 2022. >> Mhm. >> Uh but for the most part, this is a very weak group. And this has been, I would say, a long-term success of US policy that spans multiple administrations. There's been global arrests of group members around the world. >> Yeah. >> Uh but there's also been this targeted assassination campaign that really devastated group leadership. And we have, you know, documents from the group itself talking about how devastating this campaign has been. So, this kind of lasting legacy of US counterterrorism has made the potential haven um less dangerous. Uh but one question I'd kind of love for you to answer is the question of US capacity in Afghanistan. Um as you know, one fear of US officials was once the US packed up stakes, it wouldn't be able to reach out in Afghanistan, and it would really be dependent on the Taliban. Um how accurate is that or was that fear? >> I think it's fair to say that US intelligence networks were degraded when we left Afghanistan, but at the same time we didn't need the same level of intelligence networks. I mean, if you have intelligence networks that are designed to protect US forces in a country and a US embassy in a country, you need a much more robust intelligence apparatus. So, certainly there was a decline in that kind of intelligence, but the US has maintained, I would say, more targeted intelligence networks, particularly as they pertain to ISK, particularly as they pertain to Al-Qaeda. It's revitalized its relationship with Pakistan after a decline in the years after the US withdrawal. So, it's also getting some intelligence cooperation there. So, it has a sufficient intelligence network that it's been able to warn of multiple ISK attacks, even when those warnings weren't heeded. And as you say, identify a very precise location for Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul in a in a house owned by the Haqqanis. Um so, it's shown that kind of capability, which is sufficient for the threat that's emanating from the country at this juncture. Um so, I do think there was a decline, but in in some ways it was a right-sizing that is calibrated more specifically against the kind of threat we're facing in Afghanistan. And of course, is also now has a lot of other intelligence priorities that those resources can go to. >> So, we've talked about ISK, we've talked about al-Qaeda. There's yet a third group that we should probably discuss, and that's um Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP. Um what is the Taliban's relationship with TTP? What kind of threat does it pose? Because, you know, almo- over 15 years ago, there was a plot in the United States linked to TTP. So, how do we think about this concern in a broader counterterrorism context? >> So, it's interesting. The concern about the safe haven in Afghanistan, that it would be a place where a group could plot and can and conduct attacks from elsewhere, or that the Taliban would serve as a model and an inspiration for other groups. We didn't see that on a global scale. We saw it on a regional scale. That is exactly what has happened to the Pakistanis in all of this. TTP, our Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, has emerged as the number one threat for the Pakistani government because it is finding just that kind of sanctuary under the Afghan Taliban. The training, the ability to hide, the the ability to um to to to plot in Afghanistan and conduct attacks in Pakistan. So, in a way, it's not that the Taliban changed its stripes, but in the TTP, there is a a large, sophisticated organization that is willing to operate in the in certain kinds of ways within Afghanistan that are acceptable to the Afghan Taliban, but yet conduct this pretty extensive insurgency campaign against the Pakistani government. So, this is sort of the the parallel realities of the Taliban. They are willing to go after groups that are a threat to them with ferocity, but they are still willing to provide haven and allow for those who have haven underneath its rule to plot and conduct attacks elsewhere. And so, the security situation in Pakistan has gotten significantly worse since 2021. And in fact, its one-time client, the Afghan Taliban, and Pakistan are now in regular conflict with one another over this. >> Your point about the tradeoffs and how difficult um a partnership this is for the United States, I I think really highlights the broader issue, which is you know, how much should the United States be working with these, I'll say, troubling partners? And obviously, the Taliban is one. Another is the uh Al-Shabaab government in Syria, which is working closely with the United States against Hezbollah, against the Islamic State there. Um what are your thoughts on, you know, how to regulate these relationships with partners who are certainly not ideal from a US values point of view, but nevertheless are very effective from a counterterrorism point of view? >> I think the critical piece of these is to accurately recognize the partners that they are and that they aren't. This came up in the post-9/11 era with the Pakistanis, that they were a partner who were cooperating with us against Al-Qaeda while still sponsoring the Taliban and anti-India organizations. And at times, the US sort of convinced itself that Pakistan was a better partner than it was because of its willingness to go um after Al-Qaeda specifically. But the reality is we have a lot of counterterrorism partners that are good counterterrorism partners in very specific ways and problematic partners in a variety of others. And as long as we're accurately assessing that duality, working with them where it makes sense without allowing slippage to to come into these areas where they're not good counterterrorism partners and they may even be contributing to a threat that we can hold this sort of complexity at the same time. It's it's sort of the reality of of this world of counterterrorism that some of your best partners in certain areas are ones that are not comfortable partners in a variety of others. >> I think that's suitably informative and complex point on which to end. Again, I'm Daniel Byman here with the Center for Strategic and International Studies with my CSIS colleague Trisha Bacon who is also a professor at American University. >> [music]