The State of U.S.-China Relations Ahead of the Trump-Xi Summit: A Conversation with Demetri Sevas...
Watch on YouTubeVideo summary
The upcoming summit between President Trump and President Xi Jinping in Washington DC marks a significant shift in diplomatic optics, highlighted by Trump's unprecedented decision to travel to Andrews Air Force Base to personally greet the Chinese leader. This gesture represents a dramatic departure from long-standing US protocol and signals a desire from the Trump administration to cultivate a respectful, peer-like relationship with Beijing, contrasting sharply with the more distant interactions of previous administrations. While this high-profile meeting suggests a personal rapport between the two leaders, experts caution that it does not necessarily indicate a resolution of deep-seated tensions regarding issues like artificial intelligence, technology controls, or the South China Sea. Instead, it reflects a strategic recalibration where Trump seeks to manage these difficult topics directly with Xi, separating his personal diplomatic style from the broader, often hawkish stance of other US officials.
Despite the ceremonial warmth, the substantive agenda remains fraught with challenges, particularly concerning the extension of the trade truce and the establishment of new dialogue mechanisms. The United States has proposed an AI incident notification hotline to manage national security concerns, while negotiations on extending the one-year trade pause are stalled by disagreements over China's rare earth export commitments; Beijing aims for a long-term extension until the end of Trump's term, whereas Washington is hesitant due to perceived non-compliance and a desire to maintain leverage. Furthermore, while there is progress in defining a "Board of Trade" to reduce tariffs on specific non-sensitive products like agriculture, expectations for a functional "Board of Investment" are low given the current political climate and US skepticism toward Chinese capital inflows. The most volatile element remains Taiwan, where Trump's history of approving massive arms sales creates uncertainty, as Beijing views these shipments as a critical leverage point that could derail any summit outcomes.
Beyond bilateral issues, the geopolitical landscape is heavily influenced by the ongoing war in Iran and China's domestic political cycle leading up to its 2027 leadership transition. Analysts suggest that while China has significant influence over Iran through energy ties and financial channels, Beijing may be reluctant to intervene without a "grand bargain" that addresses core US concerns like Taiwan or security guarantees for allies. The potential withdrawal of US troops from Japan and South Korea looms as a major risk, with experts warning that such a move could trigger a rapid nuclear proliferation cascade in Asia, fundamentally altering the regional security architecture. Consequently, China's strategy involves balancing its role as a champion of the Global South through BRICS and SCO summits with a pragmatic need for US cooperation to maintain stability in East Asia, acknowledging that neither side can afford a full-scale economic or military collision.
Looking ahead to future engagements like APEC in Shenzhen and the G20 in Miami, the success of these events will largely depend on how Trump navigates the Taiwan arms sales issue and whether he follows through on promises to visit China twice in a single year—a historic first if realized. The atmosphere is currently characterized by a "strategic stalemate," where both nations possess sufficient leverage to prevent a crash but lack the trust for deep cooperation, resulting in a cautious game of economic chicken. While there are hopes that the AI dialogue and trade discussions will yield concrete agreements, the ultimate test lies in whether the leaders can manage their respective domestic pressures without escalating rhetoric into actions that undermine regional stability. The coming months will be critical in determining if this unique dynamic between Trump and Xi can evolve from a temporary truce into a more durable framework for managing US-China relations amidst global instability.
Read the full video transcript
Welcome to China Power. I'm Bonnie
[music] Lynn, your host. And in this
podcast, we dissect critical issues
underpinning China as a global power.
[music]
Today I'm joined by Dimmitri Seistoppelo
and Shane Wong. Dimmitri is a US China
correspondent at Financial Times. And
Shiawei is a senior visiting scholar at
Harvard and former editor and chief of
the South China Morning Post. In this
episode, we will discuss this current
state of US China relations and what to
watch as presidents Trump and she meet
in Washington DC. I will note that
Dimmitri was the only reporter that
interviewed Secretary Bessant after his
meeting with his Chinese counterparts in
New York City this weekend. Uh please
note that we are recording this episode
on the 22nd of September. Demetri Shane,
thank you for joining me.
>> Thank you. Thank you for having me,
Bonnie.
>> Likewise. Thank you, Bonnie. And nice to
see you, Shane, as well.
>> Yeah, thank you.
>> So, I'd like to start with a teaser
question of what has surprised or
fascinated you um leading up to the
second meeting between President Trump
and she this year? I think Demetri, I
see you're you're actor. Maybe I'll go
to you first and then Shane.
>> Sure. I I think in in terms of the kind
of the the show or the optics, u one of
the most interesting things is President
Trump will personally go to Andrews Air
Force Base outside Washington DC to
greet uh President Xi Jinping. And as
far as I can tell, the last time an
American president went to join B
Andrews to welcome a visiting leader who
was not the pope uh was actually in 1962
when President John F. Kennedy welcomed
British Prime Minister Harold McMillan.
So we're talking 63 64 years. Um so to
me that's an that's an amazing uh piece
of kind of history. Tell me what has
surprised you? uh you know as someone uh
who have writing and and reporting on US
China relations you know I thought
nothing really surprised me but you know
I echo what Dimmitri said the fact that
the Donald Trump made this extra effort
of meeting Xiinping uh at the uh Andrews
airport which is came a bit of a
surprise to me and it and that is
something very interesting interesting.
And the second part is that sort of
despite all the pessimism about
uh uh whether China and the US will
cooperate on AI, the fact that uh uh you
know according to Dimmitri who reported
this uh uh as well that you know China
and US uh agreed to a dialogue. Uh to me
it is also something very interesting
>> and and just um building on this really
fascinating development of President
Trump meeting um she in person on the
tarmac like what does that mean in terms
of the state of USChina relations? Is
does that signal a desire from President
Trump to have a very good relationship
with China? Like how do you see this as
fitting within the larger USChina
relationship? I think one interesting
thing as a comparison with the last time
Xi Jinping came to the US and met Donald
Trump was in 2017 and he came to Florida
to and he met Donald Trump at at the
president's uh Mara Lago resort. On that
occasion, President Trump did not go to
the Palm Beach International Airport. It
was Rex Tillerson who was then the
Secretary of State who greeted uh Xi
Jinping and his and his wife. So I think
you see kind of an interesting shift
there. My sense is that it represents
two things. The first thing is that you
know the gap between the US and China in
terms of being kind of peers has
dramatically shrunk over the past decade
since Trump was first president. And
second of all, it's clear that even us,
the US and China have many difficult
issues to work through. Whether it's AI,
South China Sea, technology controls,
rare earth controls from China. There's
a whole host of difficult issues and
tensions that remain in the
relationship. But above all of that,
it's very clear that Donald Trump wants
to have a certain kind of relationship
with Xi Jinping. And so he affords him a
lot of respect. And so going to the
airport to meet him, going to join base
Andrews underscores that. But it doesn't
mean that relations between the US and
China are in a fantastic place. It just
you have to slightly separate, I think,
where Donald Trump sees the
relationship, what he thinks about how
you deal with foreign leaders and what
the rest of his administration thinks
about USChina relations. To me, they're
they're two separate things that
sometimes overlap, but often are quite
different. You know to me what make very
interesting you know as someone who has
been watching this over the past 10
years is that how quickly that Mr. Trump
has transformed from the China hawk to
China do in in a very relatively short
period of time. you know during his
first term that he launched the trade
war in 2018 after he met Shigin Ping as
Dish said in 2017 and then from 2017 to
uh October last year that you know he he
was very tough on China and then you
know over the past few days I have been
reading reports
on some of the commentaries by the China
analysts in DC, you know, saying that uh
uh Mr. Trump sort of did not get Shiin
Ping and and and
uh suggesting that uh you know, he was
uh he's being taken advantage by
Xiinping. I I don't really agree with
that sentiment. And also there are lots
of report most of the reports in the US
suggest you know there is little
subsidance which will come out of this
summit. I think you have to put this
whole thing into context. you know, just
back on April the 2nd last year that uh
Trump launched this tariff war which
basically stopped paused the US China
trades uh for several months and and and
the two two sides just basically came a
sort of a truce in October last year
when they met in Busousan in South
Korea. So you know if you take into
consideration of that context I think
what's uh uh has happened you know over
the past let you know one year is truly
uh is truly significant.
>> So Sha just to follow up you you said
that you believe um that President
Trump's actions signal that he
understands Xi Jinping. Can you
elaborate a little bit more like what
what exactly are you seeing or how are
Chinese experts viewing President Trump
as really understanding Xiinping?
>> Yeah, just about one thing about the
Mitch who said that Trump broke with
this long decades of protocol that the
US presidents uh sort of did not go to
the airport to meet with visiting heads
of state. The fact that the Trump will
go to the Andrews and meet Xiinping is
something that it seemed to me even
though the matter is very trivial but it
seemed to me he really gets Shiin Ping.
I mean because you know the optics, the
grand ceremony, the fact that the
president of the United States, the
world's most powerful leader will make
the extra effort of meeting Xiinping at
the airport. I mean that is something
that what she really wants and you know
you know this image
will be well received back home in
China. I I think it's important to note
that when Donald Trump went to Beijing
for his state visit in May Xi Jinping
did not come to the airport to welcome
Donald Trump. So Donald Trump is going a
step further than Xi Jinping went
several months ago. Yeah. I mean, you
see that's very interesting. You know,
she sent his vice president Hanjung to
meet and now Trump sort of step it up.
He knows, you know, this is kind of a
pump that Shiin Ping really likes and
then and it will be well received, I can
tell you. So in addition to the I guess
the pump and what we might see in terms
of the optics, I do want to look at what
we might see below that and the extent
to which you know 2 days before the
meeting we know what might be going on.
So so far in the past week or so we've
seen a um phone call between um
Secretary Rubio and Wangi and we've also
seen Secretary Basant in New York City
meeting with his counterparts. Um what
are you seeing from these meetings?
Maybe Shane, over to you first. What are
some of the signals that you're seeing
from Beijing in terms of what are
China's priorities and what they want
from the summit?
>> I think what China wants from where uh I
can see is sort of first of all, China
wants this overall stability
uh that was first uh you know the two
leaders discussed sort of back in
October uh in Busan, South Korea. You
know, China wants this stability,
overall stability to continue. As
Xiinping said himself in May when when
he met with Trump in Beijing is that he
wants this overall stability to continue
in the next two or three years. Again I
want to uh go back to the you know all
the commentary made by uh the so-called
China analysts in DC you know like
saying that Trump is at a disadvantage
you know at the summit uh where that
Trump is sort of please shining
without sort of getting much in return.
I think you have to see from China's
perspective that this trip is also very
important for Xiinping to make sure the
summit will be a success. I mean because
as you know China will soon go into its
own political cycle that you know next
year one year later is going to uh uh
seek the fourth term. So a successful
summit in DC will reflect very well in
in mainland China. And second part it it
will also pave the way for the both
leaders to meet later again uh at the uh
on the fringes of Apex summits in
November and also on the uh fringes of
G20 in December. So all in all, you
know, my belief is that at the upcoming
summit, I think Xiinping will continue
to press sort of Donald Trump on the uh
Taiwan issue. I think there has been
reports that Trump will delay the sale
of 14 billion uh US dollar worth of
weapons to Taiwan after the uh G20
meeting, maybe early next year. I think
the Taiwan issue is very much top of
agenda from China and in terms of trade
and investments. I think China will be
more accommodating. I think you know
it's very interesting maybe we can talk
about this later is that at in May uh uh
at the summit in Beijing you know the US
side maybe Dimmitri can share some
insights the US side suggested that uh
two balls of would be set up one is uh
on trade the other one is on investments
and other than that I haven't really
heard of anything I you know I hope uh
this summit that certain agreements will
be made uh so to flesh out uh uh how the
board of investment and the board of
trade will work.
>> Really quickly before we um turn over to
Dimmitri to hear what he's hearing and
seeing, I do want to ask you a little
bit about China's own political cycle.
You mentioned the uh 24th sorry the 21st
party congress in 2027 but right before
China confirmed that Xiinping was coming
which was yesterday we also saw the
announcement in China of the fifth
plenum of the 20th party congress to be
held in Beijing um in late October and
the theme seems to be um I guess
strengthening party um discipline right
I found it very curious that all of
those that was announced right the same
the same day of uh President Xi's trip
to the United States. So to your point
to me that signaled that maybe even for
she domestic politics may come first.
>> Yes absolutely. I you see the thing is
if you look at the priorities of the
communist party and Xiinping for him the
very first priority is to ensure his
control over the communist party will
remain tight. you know that's why you
know ever since he came to power late
2012 uh uh he has launched this ongoing
anti-corruption campaign and sort of
despite of 10 years of efforts you know
this polar bureau meeting you just
mentioned uh showed that Xiinping is
still not not very happy about the party
discipline about the corruption so he
wants to uh continue this campaign to
strengthen his control of the party in
the runup to uh the 21st party congress
which is probably going to be held in
fall next year. So in the international
contest for Shiinpin to do that and
secondly his most important priority the
other important priority is for him to
focus on growing the Chinese economy.
And for Shiin to do that to do those two
things he also he needs a international
stable a stable international
environment. So that's why the meeting
with Trump to ensure that in the next
one or two years there will not be major
problems between China and the United
States will really help him uh in terms
of domestic politics.
>> Thank you Shane. Dmitri, over to you.
What did you learn in terms of the prep?
How are you viewing um the leadup to the
September meeting?
Well, I I think there's several things
that are in the mix. So, on Sunday when
I sat down with Secretary Bessant and
also US Trade Representative Jameson
Greer was in the room too and and
separately I talked to uh several senior
US officials. Um so, a few things. Um we
know that the two sides are going to set
up this AI dialogue which they talked
about in Beijing, but now they're going
to formalize it. The Americans have also
proposed setting up a kind of a a
hotline incident notification mechanism
so that if there's some AI thing that is
sparking national security concerns in
either the US or China, they have a
mechanism to actually talk about this.
So that's something the US has proposed.
Um and I think Donald Trump and Xi
Jinping will talk about that and we may
or may not get agreement
on the truce in Busousan. the one-year
trade war truce that the two presidents
agreed uh in October of last year, which
expires on November 10, I believe. My
understanding from talking to US
officials was that as of Sunday, they
had not reached agreement. The Chinese
want to extend the truce until the end
of Donald Trump's term. The Americans
want to extend it for 6 months because
for two reasons. they think that will
keep giving them leverage but also
because the US uh believes that China is
not fulfilling its commitments on
exporting rare earths that they reached
in Busousan. Um and one one of the
officials said to me that China is only
fulfilling 2/3 of the commitments it
made on rare earth. So there's
definitely a difference of opinion
there. The question is will that
difference shrink between Sunday and
when the two leaders meet on on
Thursday? Uh we'll have to see. My my
suspicion is that probably not and that
any extension will probably come after
the summit uh but before November 10.
But and then I think um on the board of
trade which uh they also announced in
Beijing that seems to be moving ahead
more quickly. They're going to identify
a list of products that are nonsensitive
areas. So it could be agriculture and
other things
where they will then try and reduce the
tariffs on those products to a much
lower level than currently applies. So I
think there's progress there. The board
of investment I think really is
something that's in name only. I haven't
detected any evidence that anything
serious is really happening on that
front. So I'm not expecting anything
there. And then finally, as Shangi
alluded to, the kind of wild card will
be Taiwan. You know, after the Beijing
summit, a lot of analysts in Washington
were initially relieved that they felt
Donald Trump hadn't given any ground on
Taiwan. But then after the summit, he
gave an interview to Fox News where he
said, you know, Taiwan was far away. Why
would the US send troops there? Arm
sales for Taiwan was a very good
negotiating chip. And that sparked a lot
of concern in Washington. But I think
the the difficult thing with Donald
Trump as always is if you look at his
record on Taiwan, the truth is he has
the best record on approving arm sales
for Taiwan of any American president.
And in December 2025 alone, he approved
11.1 billion record package, which was
more than the $8 billion that Joe Biden
approved over four years. Now the 14
billion which will be a new record
package that was planned he has paused
that I think to for two reasons to avoid
derailing his meetings with Xi Jinping
this year not just this summit but
further meetings later in the year
[gasps]
and also because of this rare earths
question the US is knows that China has
this lever it can pull that could make
huge problems for US industry so that is
constraining the US ability to respond
in certain cases so Taiwan. There's
there's kind of evidence on both sides.
And the key question as always is will
Donald Trump say something that's not
planned either in private to Xi Jinping
or on Truth Social after the summit that
will get everyone or get one side or
another side upset and you know watch
this space. One final thing I'd like to
note and Shane mentioned this as well.
You know, Scott Besson said to me that
um the AI dialogue team, and we don't
know who's going to be involved yet,
would likely meet again in a couple of
months in Shenzhen, which is where APEC
is being hosted this year. And we think
there's a decent chance Donald Trump
will go. If Trump goes to APEC, that
will be the first time in history an
American president has gone to China
twice in one year. And I believe, and
Shane, correct me if this is wrong, if
Xi Jinping then comes back to Miami for
the G20, I think it's the first time a
Chinese president will have come to the
US twice in one year.
>> That's also historically, I think, quite
significant.
>> Yeah. I mean if you look at that you
know that's if you look for any sign of
stability
what the said about the the Chinese
president US presidents visits each
other's country twice in a year I mean
that's unheard of if that happens
>> and Demetri if I could follow up on the
board of trade so I think earlier this
week after the Sunday meeting we also
saw Greer talking to Fox News is saying
that they would announce the board of
trade this week and then there would be
uh more details of that. How concrete do
you think that will will we see the um
in terms of the board of trade this week
cuz you mentioned it was already
mentioned in May. It's taken 4 months. I
think we have more details now but like
when will it actually be put into
practice?
>> So I I think they they are saying now
that it has been operationalized.
The question I have is will they on
Thursday put out a I I don't think we're
expecting a joint statement, but will
both sides put out a statement saying uh
this is what the board of trade actually
is. Here are some of the specifics. Here
are the products we're talking about. Um
you know, so Bessant and and Greer met
Holifung on Sunday in New York, but
their teams are continuing to meet and
they were planning on meeting up until
the summit on Thursday. So, I really
think it depends on how those
negotiations go and at this point I
don't know where they are to to be
candid, but I think we'll get some kind
of a more concrete announcement than we
had in Beijing. But whether it's a full
complete here's the suite of products
that we're going to um reduce tariffs
on, it may not be complete. It may be
they announce some things and say others
are coming down the pipeline.
>> Uh Bonnie, can I just add uh uh one
comment on what Demetri said? You see uh
you know I agree with Dimmitri that
there will be uh there are likely to be
new developments on the board of trade
uh trades. I mean because you know uh
you know that's one thing that Trump is
very concerned about and I do hope you
know I don't have any insights on this
but I do hope they're also going to make
some progress on the board of
investments which is going to be a huge
potential win for both countries. Uh you
know there has been reports that
Xiinping is probably going to bring a
large business delegation of Chinese
entrepreneurs
uh including those who are the CEOs of
EVs and uh uh uh in China. You see
that's the thing I think there is a
point for USI to propose a board of
investments. I mean because right now no
matter how many soybeans and Boeing
airplanes uh uh and u energy China buys
uh from US every year is not going to
reduce the trade deficit very much. So
uh you know it can't be made up by
allowing Chinese investments into the
United States. That's the thing you know
right now because of the uh sort of
political sentiments against China and
against Chinese investments. Before I
joined Harvard, I taught uh at the uh
one of the universities in Hong Kong and
me and my students we often discussed
this what kind of investments the US
would welcome from China. Uh you know
you know it's very difficult to think of
any. I mean because considering the uh
sort of political climate I remembered a
couple of years ago that even a US
senator deemed uh the Chinese made
garlic as a national security threat.
So, but I really hope that uh this is
something that if we talk about a
potential area of cooperation uh on top
of AI, you know, that very hot topic,
whether the US will allow the Chinese
investments into the United States, you
know, should be something that both
countries should work on. I mean because
it's it's going to create a lot of jobs
in the United States if nothing else.
>> Yeah. I I would just say that a couple
of things. I'm not expecting a lot on
investment at at this point. Um the
reason being is that most of the US
officials who are working on all of
these topics ahead of the summit. In
general, they're quite hawkish and they
actually don't really want a lot of
Chinese investment in the US. on the
other hand, they have to look over their
shoulder because they know at any point
in time Donald Trump could say, "Hey
boys and girls, where's my big China
investment deal?" And that could happen
at any time. And one of the things
that's uh kind of a live issue right now
is uh and US car makers, most US car
makers are nervous about with one
exception maybe is Donald Trump has said
he'd be okay with Chinese automakers
building factories in the US to create
jobs and to sell Chinese cars in the US.
Um most US automakers with the exception
possibly of Ford um are really nervous
about that. They've actually written
letters to the administration saying
please don't do this. [gasps]
uh when I sat down uh not with Scott
Bessant and Jameson Greer but when I
talked to the other senior officials on
Sunday after the meeting with Holly
I said do you expect any kind of an
announcement on Chinese automakers
investing in the US and they said listen
there's there are natural obstacles to
doing that there are rules and
regulations on the US books um that
would make that difficult there's
legislation working its way through
Congress that would actually make it
even more difficult
And so they suggested was unlikely, but
when I pushed them and said, "So, are
you telling me it's impossible, they
wouldn't say that, they basically said,
"Listen, at the end of the day, the
president hasn't made any determinations
yet," which I view as a kind of a get
out of jail card. They they're not
talking to the Chinese about it. They
don't expect it, but they know that
Donald Trump could turn around at any
point and say, "Actually, this is a
great idea." So, I think that's another
another wild card. And in terms of the
CEOs, there was definitely talk about a
a reasonably large delegation of Chinese
CEOs coming with Xi Jinping, which is
quite unusual because unlike a lot of
other countries, the Chinese president
generally does not travel to the US with
with uh business leaders. I think those
expectations have diminished a little
bit. I don't think uh any visas have
been issued and my understanding is that
it will be actually a much smaller
delegation of CEOs if one comes at all.
it may just be a handful of uh
state-owned enterprises uh who CEOs come
and that the the kind of BYD auto
manufacturers uh some of the big you
know technology companies will will not
be coming um as of Tuesday 2 days before
the summit um that's my understanding so
I I think the investment side of things
at least in in Washington at this summit
are going to be fairly limited
>> and one topic we haven't discussed is
the Iran war and how that will feed
future in in in the discussions. Um
maybe Shane to you first. Obviously,
China has been trying to play um a key
role in positioning itself as helping to
promote peace and ending the Iran war.
What what do you see President Ni as
coming to DC prepared to share with
President Trump in terms of what China
can do or has already done?
>> That's a very good question, Bonnie. I
you see that's the thing that from my
end I think China and the US can truly
work together. Of course China has a
huge influence over Iran just sort of
simply being you know one of Iran's
biggest customers. And then China, there
has been reports in the United States
about China supporting Iran with
satellite imageries and all that. I have
no idea whether that's true or not but I
do believe that there are you know on
top of Iran and there are also many
other hot spots particularly concerning
Middle East that China and and US can
work together and that's the part that
China will probably need a bigger
incentive to work with the United States
on those issues. I mean because you know
the United States rightly wrongly sort
of started all of this uh by us itself
and then this come back to the question
that we discussed earlier you know again
I don't have any insights into this but
I think if you know if I was Xinping and
and if Donald Trump sort of asked me to
help on Iran and I will say what about
Taiwan. I'll help you on Iran. You see,
right now, the thing that you have to
understand, you know, there were a lot
of things in terms of Russia's invasion
of Ukraine and sort of Iran on all those
troubled issues. China can really work
together with the United States. And
then what's the benefit for China? And I
so you have to understand from China's
geopolitical
view that the longer the Russia's war
again in Ukraine continue and longer the
Iran issue continue from a geopolitical
point of view. It is better for China
because the US will be Trump and the US
administration will be spending mo much
of its time on those issues and without
enough time to get tough on China.
>> Bonnie, could I could I ask Shangi a
question that kind of gets to that
point?
>> Sure. you know, when when when the US
first attacked Iran, um a lot of people
said China would be in a relatively
stronger position than a lot of
countries um including in Asia because
it had a good stockpile strategic oil
reserves and I I think estimates were at
least 8 months. I'm curious where how
how big are those stockpiles now? Is
there more pressure on Xi Jinping to do
something to help end the war because
the Chinese economy could start to
suffer? And I'm just the answer. I' I'd
love to know what you think.
>> Yeah, I I you know, I don't have the
exact numbers, you know. I mean, it's
you know, for Shiin for both, you know,
like Trump, he has he has lots of
variables to to consider, right? I think
I mean no matter uh what you think of
Shiin Ping you know as a leader but you
know he had this vision so he sort of
started to stockpile all the energy and
and oil and gas so that really helped
China to tide over but you know I also
agree with you you know what you hinted
you know the longer the war uh continues
the bigger impact uh uh that the Chinese
economy is going to recede. Uh
I mean it is also in in Beijing's
interest to see the war to end soon. But
then you know if if you were a Chinese
leader weighing all those variables you
know I think right now you just say you
know without you know to put this thing
just simply on the issue simply looking
at this issue as a see whether Beijing
and Washington can work together on Iran
is not enough. That's what I'm trying to
say is that if if there has to be
something of a grand bargain being
discussed, you know, that is always
something that is being said uh uh
privously among certain people that, you
know, the Trump administration has
presented a opportunity for Beijing and
Washington to have some kind of a grand
bargain. I have no idea what that grand
bargain is, but I'm just sort of
suggesting just merely that sort of
Beijing and Washington can work together
to resolve the Iran war, uh it's not
going to happen. But if you put this
into a bigger context,
you know, I'll say why not. So, I think
some people in Washington are actually
worried uh about exactly what Shanei
just described, which is would Donald
Trump do a deal that would involve
trading something on Taiwan in exchange
for help on Iran because the Iran war
has created a host of problems from
inflation, increased gas prices that are
going to impact Republicans in the
midterm elections in November. So,
that's definitely something people are
focused on. You know, when I sat down
with some of the American officials on
Sunday, I asked them about Iran and what
they wanted from China. They were a
little bit hesitant, but the one thing
they said to me was they had been
talking to Chinese financial
institutions
and they felt that talks were moving in
the right direction.
That was a nice way to frame it. I think
what they meant was we're putting
pressure on Chinese financial
institutions telling them that if you
facilitate transactions uh that help the
Iranians whether that's payments for uh
crude energy imports or other things
that the US still maintains the ability
to threaten Chinese banks with secondary
sanctions um or what someone described
as the damocle sword and that that is
still out there. The difficulty for the
US is that China has a damocally sword
too and that's its uh dominance in the
rarest industry which is why I think
even though there are a lot of tensions
in the relationship the reason we've got
to this strategic stability or what some
people call strategic stalemate is that
actually what we have in the background
is a huge game of economic chicken where
both sides have realized they can't kind
of drive the car down the road at each
other and then one swerve of the last
moment moment they actually have to both
slow down to make sure there's no crash
and no accident. And so I think we're in
a I think strategic stalemate is
actually a very way good way to explain
the relationship right now.
>> And Dimmitri on the um strategic
stalemate that you just laid out. Where
do US allies and partners fit? Obviously
uh President Trump is meeting with a
number of them right now in New York
City today, but you mentioned some of
the concerns from Taiwan's and what are
you hearing from our allies and
partners? So, there's several things and
and I think as with everything to do
with Donald Trump, you have to separate
the rhetoric from the reality. Um,
because sometimes they're different.
Sometimes they're the same, but
sometimes they're different. So, uh, as
we're recording, as we're speaking right
now, Trump is expected to be sitting
down with Japanese Prime Minister Sai
Taki. You know, last year when she said
that Japan would get involved in a
Taiwan conflict if China attacked
Taiwan, it sparked a furious response
from Beijing. And even though Trump had
gone to Tokyo in October and had a
fantastic visit and she did a phenomenal
job, I would say charming Donald Trump
and and managing Donald Trump,
masterful, uh he didn't come to her
defense after those comments and the
Japanese were really frustrated that
that happened. So I think 2 days before
Donald Trump meets Xi Jinping, Prime
Minister Takai will be trying to get
assurances from him that he's not going
to throw allies under the bus
rhetorically um when he meets the
Chinese leader. I think one thing that's
worth noting is despite the rhetoric
that comes from Trump um which the
allies generally don't like whether it's
the threat of removing troops from the
region or putting a lot of pressure on
them to increase their defense spending
and other things that when you talk to
militaries in the region they will tell
you that US Indo-Pacific command which
oversees American military activity in
in the Pacific that they are doing as
much if not more now with allies as they
were doing during the Biden
administration. So even though Trump
says things that freaks the allies out
to to use a casual term, [sighs]
the militaries are actually still doing
a lot and you know, China is aware of
that and whether it's US cooperation
with the Philippines, uh allies working
more with each other in Asia. Um, these
are important developments, but I think
ultimately, [sighs and gasps] you know,
if Trump sits down with Xi Jinping and
says something that undermines Taiwan or
undermines the US Japan alliance, that
will make people extremely nervous. So,
I think everyone's watching very closely
to see that.
in Shane. I want to also bring you into
the conversation, but looking at the
Chinese side, we've obviously seen
President Xi make a number of trips
abroad uh including his first trip
abroad and later half this year to North
Korea and then of course um attending
the BRICS and SEO summits. H how do you
see China shoring up its position prior
to um she coming to Washington DC?
>> Thank you Bonnie. Uh that's a excellent
question. I think uh in terms of China's
international diplomacy right on top of
what the Chinese leaders have been
saying sort of trying to cultivate the
great power relations with the United
States I think the other plank of uh
flank of China's diplomacy is to show up
uh China's status as the champion of the
global mouth you know the trips uh to uh
break to India um break and SEO and
others have shown have really put China
in a in a good light and you know that
is something that you know China will
continue to do. However, that does not
mean that having said that, China uh uh
is also uh from from my point of view is
also trying to work with the United
States over the regional issues which is
something that is less talk about you
see uh just take the example that the
Mitch mentioned
about uh you know in the aftermath of
the Japanese prime minister's public
statements that s the Japanese will
intervene
uh if Chinese mainlands invades Taiwan
and then curiously uh Mr. Trump made a
very interesting comment saying that he
could become a mediator to mediate uh uh
you know just in case of any conflict uh
uh between China and the United States
uh sorry between China and Japan you
know that is something that you know
certain people do not understand. You
see right now uh you know Trump has said
a few times that the US would like the
uh let's take Asia for example. The
Trump has said many times he wanted
Japan, South Korea and other the
American allies to step up to show up uh
their own sort of defenses. But the
thing is you know the Asia I mean right
now the rise of China uh has caused sort
of discomforts among sort of many of the
Chinese neighbors and I think even
though China wants to be the leader of
the global south uh wants to be the
dominant power in Asia but in the
immediate future I think China still
needs the United states whether China
will say this publicly or not to
maintain the stability in Asia. Let's
just sort of give me one let me just
give you one example you know right now
is because of US presence the presence
of US troops in South Korea and Japan
and neither South Korea nor Japan has
developed nuclear weapons even though
you know the Kim Jong-un of North Korea
has been sort of flexing uh the muscles
of the nuclear muscles I mean can you
imagine
If US withdraws its troops from South
Korea and Japan the next day, you know,
both Japan and South Korea will announce
the they are, you know, they're going to
develop nuclear weapons. I mean, because
both countries have possessed
knowhow, the people and and the
facilities to do it. I think there is a
generally uh uh misconception that uh uh
uh uh China wants the US to leave Asia.
Uh you know that's not true at all.
>> Bonnie C, could I just add something
there just to unders underscore part of
what Shane just said? I mean I I lived
for most of the 1990s uh in Japan. So I,
you know, I spent a lot of time talking
to people in Tokyo and I think one of
the really interesting things that
happens is when when President Trump
says things that makes the allies
concerned, and I'll focus just on Japan
for a moment. Often people will say in
Japan, "We don't like it, but we don't
have a plan B." But the truth is there
is a potential plan B. And as Shangi
said, it's nuclear weapons. Now, if
Donald Trump withdrew American troops
from South Korea and Japan, I agree. I
think South Korea, where there's already
a fairly strong debate about whether
South Korea should have nuclear weapons,
I think would move very quickly. I think
among the Japanese public, there's still
a lot more resistance. But if the US
withdrew troops and if South Korea
announced that it was going to get a
nuclear weapon, then I think the debate
in Japan would shift very very quickly
and within several years the potential
to have three nuclear powers in Asia and
well if you count North Korea four
nuclear powers in Asia I think is a
distinct possibility. So you know as a
journalist we tend to kind of look at
today, tomorrow, next week, maybe next
month. But actually the thing that I'm
thinking an awful lot about is what is
the future for nuclear weapons in Asia
and how does that how does that
materialize and I think a lot of that
will depend on the next two and a half
years and how Donald Trump deals with
allies. So I think Shane is right it's
it's a critical issue that people should
pay more attention to.
>> Absolutely. And like don't forget we
also have India and Pakistan.
>> That's actually sorry. Yeah I was
thinking east. No you're correct.
Absolutely. So we have So we could have
six.
>> Yeah.
>> So I don't mean to cut this conversation
short, but I do want to sort of wrap
this up and ask each of you to look a
little bit forward. So we've talked a
lot about September summit, what we
might expect, what um what are each
side's intentions going in. Um what is
your biggest prediction if you have any
for APEC? Is it going to happen? Are
both presidents going to be there? And
what would be the key theme that we
could see in APEC given all the things
that we've discussed might be coming
from the September meeting?
>> Uh I think uh uh uh Deitri
uh partly uh you know hinted this. I
think uh I'm you know if this summit
next week uh you know a couple of days
later goes well I'm sure Trump uh will
is very likely to go to Shenzhen and
sort of given the fact that uh the US
and China uh has started has agreed to
start a dialogue on AI and I think by
the time in November uh uh at at April
It could be a very good venue to talk
about this. I mean because China wants
uh uh this AP pack in Shenzhun to focus
on high-tech sort of technological
developments. I'm sure AI will be a very
much a a interesting topic. And
secondly, as has been reported uh that
there could be a possibility
that Putin, the Russian president will
go to Shenzhen and there could be a
possibility of a trilateral summit among
the uh three leaders. Uh uh uh if that
happens that's also could be a very
interesting development.
>> Thank you. Last words.
>> Yeah. I'm picturing the three of them
and Shenzhen. I'm wondering what if Kim
Jong-un dropped in and and made it uh
four leaders for tea. Uh I I think at
the moment it's more likely than not
that that Trump will go to Shenzhen and
Xi Jinping will come to Miami for the
G20. I think the million-doll question
though is what does Donald Trump do on
Taiwan arm sales? If over the next uh
few months he goes ahead and approves a
14 billion dollar new record package,
then I think Shenzhen and Miami are off.
U if he does not, it's more likely they
go ahead. And one of the interesting
questions is if Trump split the Taiwan
arms package into smaller packages, you
know, maybe four packages, whatever, and
just announced one or two, would that be
enough to um cause the Chinese to
rethink, you know, the G20? How would
that play into relations? I think that's
unclear. I think a 14 a record number
would be a big problem for for Beijing.
a smaller number might be more
tolerable. But I think that's one of the
things that I'm going to be watching
very closely over over the next few
months. And and Bonnie, any of your
listeners who are listening who have any
information on any of this, Dmitrift.com
is where you should come.
[laughter]
>> Awesome. Thank you, Demitri, for that
plug. But I think many many of my
listeners are probably actually already
actively reading your articles as well
as Shane's articles. Thank you both so
much for joining me today for this
fantastic discussion.
>> Thank you, Bonnie. It was fun. Thank
you. Bye. Bye.
>> [music]