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The State of U.S.-China Relations Ahead of the Trump-Xi Summit: A Conversation with Demetri Sevas...

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The upcoming summit between President Trump and President Xi Jinping in Washington DC marks a significant shift in diplomatic optics, highlighted by Trump's unprecedented decision to travel to Andrews Air Force Base to personally greet the Chinese leader. This gesture represents a dramatic departure from long-standing US protocol and signals a desire from the Trump administration to cultivate a respectful, peer-like relationship with Beijing, contrasting sharply with the more distant interactions of previous administrations. While this high-profile meeting suggests a personal rapport between the two leaders, experts caution that it does not necessarily indicate a resolution of deep-seated tensions regarding issues like artificial intelligence, technology controls, or the South China Sea. Instead, it reflects a strategic recalibration where Trump seeks to manage these difficult topics directly with Xi, separating his personal diplomatic style from the broader, often hawkish stance of other US officials. Despite the ceremonial warmth, the substantive agenda remains fraught with challenges, particularly concerning the extension of the trade truce and the establishment of new dialogue mechanisms. The United States has proposed an AI incident notification hotline to manage national security concerns, while negotiations on extending the one-year trade pause are stalled by disagreements over China's rare earth export commitments; Beijing aims for a long-term extension until the end of Trump's term, whereas Washington is hesitant due to perceived non-compliance and a desire to maintain leverage. Furthermore, while there is progress in defining a "Board of Trade" to reduce tariffs on specific non-sensitive products like agriculture, expectations for a functional "Board of Investment" are low given the current political climate and US skepticism toward Chinese capital inflows. The most volatile element remains Taiwan, where Trump's history of approving massive arms sales creates uncertainty, as Beijing views these shipments as a critical leverage point that could derail any summit outcomes. Beyond bilateral issues, the geopolitical landscape is heavily influenced by the ongoing war in Iran and China's domestic political cycle leading up to its 2027 leadership transition. Analysts suggest that while China has significant influence over Iran through energy ties and financial channels, Beijing may be reluctant to intervene without a "grand bargain" that addresses core US concerns like Taiwan or security guarantees for allies. The potential withdrawal of US troops from Japan and South Korea looms as a major risk, with experts warning that such a move could trigger a rapid nuclear proliferation cascade in Asia, fundamentally altering the regional security architecture. Consequently, China's strategy involves balancing its role as a champion of the Global South through BRICS and SCO summits with a pragmatic need for US cooperation to maintain stability in East Asia, acknowledging that neither side can afford a full-scale economic or military collision. Looking ahead to future engagements like APEC in Shenzhen and the G20 in Miami, the success of these events will largely depend on how Trump navigates the Taiwan arms sales issue and whether he follows through on promises to visit China twice in a single year—a historic first if realized. The atmosphere is currently characterized by a "strategic stalemate," where both nations possess sufficient leverage to prevent a crash but lack the trust for deep cooperation, resulting in a cautious game of economic chicken. While there are hopes that the AI dialogue and trade discussions will yield concrete agreements, the ultimate test lies in whether the leaders can manage their respective domestic pressures without escalating rhetoric into actions that undermine regional stability. The coming months will be critical in determining if this unique dynamic between Trump and Xi can evolve from a temporary truce into a more durable framework for managing US-China relations amidst global instability.
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Welcome to China Power. I'm Bonnie [music] Lynn, your host. And in this podcast, we dissect critical issues underpinning China as a global power. [music] Today I'm joined by Dimmitri Seistoppelo and Shane Wong. Dimmitri is a US China correspondent at Financial Times. And Shiawei is a senior visiting scholar at Harvard and former editor and chief of the South China Morning Post. In this episode, we will discuss this current state of US China relations and what to watch as presidents Trump and she meet in Washington DC. I will note that Dimmitri was the only reporter that interviewed Secretary Bessant after his meeting with his Chinese counterparts in New York City this weekend. Uh please note that we are recording this episode on the 22nd of September. Demetri Shane, thank you for joining me. >> Thank you. Thank you for having me, Bonnie. >> Likewise. Thank you, Bonnie. And nice to see you, Shane, as well. >> Yeah, thank you. >> So, I'd like to start with a teaser question of what has surprised or fascinated you um leading up to the second meeting between President Trump and she this year? I think Demetri, I see you're you're actor. Maybe I'll go to you first and then Shane. >> Sure. I I think in in terms of the kind of the the show or the optics, u one of the most interesting things is President Trump will personally go to Andrews Air Force Base outside Washington DC to greet uh President Xi Jinping. And as far as I can tell, the last time an American president went to join B Andrews to welcome a visiting leader who was not the pope uh was actually in 1962 when President John F. Kennedy welcomed British Prime Minister Harold McMillan. So we're talking 63 64 years. Um so to me that's an that's an amazing uh piece of kind of history. Tell me what has surprised you? uh you know as someone uh who have writing and and reporting on US China relations you know I thought nothing really surprised me but you know I echo what Dimmitri said the fact that the Donald Trump made this extra effort of meeting Xiinping uh at the uh Andrews airport which is came a bit of a surprise to me and it and that is something very interesting interesting. And the second part is that sort of despite all the pessimism about uh uh whether China and the US will cooperate on AI, the fact that uh uh you know according to Dimmitri who reported this uh uh as well that you know China and US uh agreed to a dialogue. Uh to me it is also something very interesting >> and and just um building on this really fascinating development of President Trump meeting um she in person on the tarmac like what does that mean in terms of the state of USChina relations? Is does that signal a desire from President Trump to have a very good relationship with China? Like how do you see this as fitting within the larger USChina relationship? I think one interesting thing as a comparison with the last time Xi Jinping came to the US and met Donald Trump was in 2017 and he came to Florida to and he met Donald Trump at at the president's uh Mara Lago resort. On that occasion, President Trump did not go to the Palm Beach International Airport. It was Rex Tillerson who was then the Secretary of State who greeted uh Xi Jinping and his and his wife. So I think you see kind of an interesting shift there. My sense is that it represents two things. The first thing is that you know the gap between the US and China in terms of being kind of peers has dramatically shrunk over the past decade since Trump was first president. And second of all, it's clear that even us, the US and China have many difficult issues to work through. Whether it's AI, South China Sea, technology controls, rare earth controls from China. There's a whole host of difficult issues and tensions that remain in the relationship. But above all of that, it's very clear that Donald Trump wants to have a certain kind of relationship with Xi Jinping. And so he affords him a lot of respect. And so going to the airport to meet him, going to join base Andrews underscores that. But it doesn't mean that relations between the US and China are in a fantastic place. It just you have to slightly separate, I think, where Donald Trump sees the relationship, what he thinks about how you deal with foreign leaders and what the rest of his administration thinks about USChina relations. To me, they're they're two separate things that sometimes overlap, but often are quite different. You know to me what make very interesting you know as someone who has been watching this over the past 10 years is that how quickly that Mr. Trump has transformed from the China hawk to China do in in a very relatively short period of time. you know during his first term that he launched the trade war in 2018 after he met Shigin Ping as Dish said in 2017 and then from 2017 to uh October last year that you know he he was very tough on China and then you know over the past few days I have been reading reports on some of the commentaries by the China analysts in DC, you know, saying that uh uh Mr. Trump sort of did not get Shiin Ping and and and uh suggesting that uh you know, he was uh he's being taken advantage by Xiinping. I I don't really agree with that sentiment. And also there are lots of report most of the reports in the US suggest you know there is little subsidance which will come out of this summit. I think you have to put this whole thing into context. you know, just back on April the 2nd last year that uh Trump launched this tariff war which basically stopped paused the US China trades uh for several months and and and the two two sides just basically came a sort of a truce in October last year when they met in Busousan in South Korea. So you know if you take into consideration of that context I think what's uh uh has happened you know over the past let you know one year is truly uh is truly significant. >> So Sha just to follow up you you said that you believe um that President Trump's actions signal that he understands Xi Jinping. Can you elaborate a little bit more like what what exactly are you seeing or how are Chinese experts viewing President Trump as really understanding Xiinping? >> Yeah, just about one thing about the Mitch who said that Trump broke with this long decades of protocol that the US presidents uh sort of did not go to the airport to meet with visiting heads of state. The fact that the Trump will go to the Andrews and meet Xiinping is something that it seemed to me even though the matter is very trivial but it seemed to me he really gets Shiin Ping. I mean because you know the optics, the grand ceremony, the fact that the president of the United States, the world's most powerful leader will make the extra effort of meeting Xiinping at the airport. I mean that is something that what she really wants and you know you know this image will be well received back home in China. I I think it's important to note that when Donald Trump went to Beijing for his state visit in May Xi Jinping did not come to the airport to welcome Donald Trump. So Donald Trump is going a step further than Xi Jinping went several months ago. Yeah. I mean, you see that's very interesting. You know, she sent his vice president Hanjung to meet and now Trump sort of step it up. He knows, you know, this is kind of a pump that Shiin Ping really likes and then and it will be well received, I can tell you. So in addition to the I guess the pump and what we might see in terms of the optics, I do want to look at what we might see below that and the extent to which you know 2 days before the meeting we know what might be going on. So so far in the past week or so we've seen a um phone call between um Secretary Rubio and Wangi and we've also seen Secretary Basant in New York City meeting with his counterparts. Um what are you seeing from these meetings? Maybe Shane, over to you first. What are some of the signals that you're seeing from Beijing in terms of what are China's priorities and what they want from the summit? >> I think what China wants from where uh I can see is sort of first of all, China wants this overall stability uh that was first uh you know the two leaders discussed sort of back in October uh in Busan, South Korea. You know, China wants this stability, overall stability to continue. As Xiinping said himself in May when when he met with Trump in Beijing is that he wants this overall stability to continue in the next two or three years. Again I want to uh go back to the you know all the commentary made by uh the so-called China analysts in DC you know like saying that Trump is at a disadvantage you know at the summit uh where that Trump is sort of please shining without sort of getting much in return. I think you have to see from China's perspective that this trip is also very important for Xiinping to make sure the summit will be a success. I mean because as you know China will soon go into its own political cycle that you know next year one year later is going to uh uh seek the fourth term. So a successful summit in DC will reflect very well in in mainland China. And second part it it will also pave the way for the both leaders to meet later again uh at the uh on the fringes of Apex summits in November and also on the uh fringes of G20 in December. So all in all, you know, my belief is that at the upcoming summit, I think Xiinping will continue to press sort of Donald Trump on the uh Taiwan issue. I think there has been reports that Trump will delay the sale of 14 billion uh US dollar worth of weapons to Taiwan after the uh G20 meeting, maybe early next year. I think the Taiwan issue is very much top of agenda from China and in terms of trade and investments. I think China will be more accommodating. I think you know it's very interesting maybe we can talk about this later is that at in May uh uh at the summit in Beijing you know the US side maybe Dimmitri can share some insights the US side suggested that uh two balls of would be set up one is uh on trade the other one is on investments and other than that I haven't really heard of anything I you know I hope uh this summit that certain agreements will be made uh so to flesh out uh uh how the board of investment and the board of trade will work. >> Really quickly before we um turn over to Dimmitri to hear what he's hearing and seeing, I do want to ask you a little bit about China's own political cycle. You mentioned the uh 24th sorry the 21st party congress in 2027 but right before China confirmed that Xiinping was coming which was yesterday we also saw the announcement in China of the fifth plenum of the 20th party congress to be held in Beijing um in late October and the theme seems to be um I guess strengthening party um discipline right I found it very curious that all of those that was announced right the same the same day of uh President Xi's trip to the United States. So to your point to me that signaled that maybe even for she domestic politics may come first. >> Yes absolutely. I you see the thing is if you look at the priorities of the communist party and Xiinping for him the very first priority is to ensure his control over the communist party will remain tight. you know that's why you know ever since he came to power late 2012 uh uh he has launched this ongoing anti-corruption campaign and sort of despite of 10 years of efforts you know this polar bureau meeting you just mentioned uh showed that Xiinping is still not not very happy about the party discipline about the corruption so he wants to uh continue this campaign to strengthen his control of the party in the runup to uh the 21st party congress which is probably going to be held in fall next year. So in the international contest for Shiinpin to do that and secondly his most important priority the other important priority is for him to focus on growing the Chinese economy. And for Shiin to do that to do those two things he also he needs a international stable a stable international environment. So that's why the meeting with Trump to ensure that in the next one or two years there will not be major problems between China and the United States will really help him uh in terms of domestic politics. >> Thank you Shane. Dmitri, over to you. What did you learn in terms of the prep? How are you viewing um the leadup to the September meeting? Well, I I think there's several things that are in the mix. So, on Sunday when I sat down with Secretary Bessant and also US Trade Representative Jameson Greer was in the room too and and separately I talked to uh several senior US officials. Um so, a few things. Um we know that the two sides are going to set up this AI dialogue which they talked about in Beijing, but now they're going to formalize it. The Americans have also proposed setting up a kind of a a hotline incident notification mechanism so that if there's some AI thing that is sparking national security concerns in either the US or China, they have a mechanism to actually talk about this. So that's something the US has proposed. Um and I think Donald Trump and Xi Jinping will talk about that and we may or may not get agreement on the truce in Busousan. the one-year trade war truce that the two presidents agreed uh in October of last year, which expires on November 10, I believe. My understanding from talking to US officials was that as of Sunday, they had not reached agreement. The Chinese want to extend the truce until the end of Donald Trump's term. The Americans want to extend it for 6 months because for two reasons. they think that will keep giving them leverage but also because the US uh believes that China is not fulfilling its commitments on exporting rare earths that they reached in Busousan. Um and one one of the officials said to me that China is only fulfilling 2/3 of the commitments it made on rare earth. So there's definitely a difference of opinion there. The question is will that difference shrink between Sunday and when the two leaders meet on on Thursday? Uh we'll have to see. My my suspicion is that probably not and that any extension will probably come after the summit uh but before November 10. But and then I think um on the board of trade which uh they also announced in Beijing that seems to be moving ahead more quickly. They're going to identify a list of products that are nonsensitive areas. So it could be agriculture and other things where they will then try and reduce the tariffs on those products to a much lower level than currently applies. So I think there's progress there. The board of investment I think really is something that's in name only. I haven't detected any evidence that anything serious is really happening on that front. So I'm not expecting anything there. And then finally, as Shangi alluded to, the kind of wild card will be Taiwan. You know, after the Beijing summit, a lot of analysts in Washington were initially relieved that they felt Donald Trump hadn't given any ground on Taiwan. But then after the summit, he gave an interview to Fox News where he said, you know, Taiwan was far away. Why would the US send troops there? Arm sales for Taiwan was a very good negotiating chip. And that sparked a lot of concern in Washington. But I think the the difficult thing with Donald Trump as always is if you look at his record on Taiwan, the truth is he has the best record on approving arm sales for Taiwan of any American president. And in December 2025 alone, he approved 11.1 billion record package, which was more than the $8 billion that Joe Biden approved over four years. Now the 14 billion which will be a new record package that was planned he has paused that I think to for two reasons to avoid derailing his meetings with Xi Jinping this year not just this summit but further meetings later in the year [gasps] and also because of this rare earths question the US is knows that China has this lever it can pull that could make huge problems for US industry so that is constraining the US ability to respond in certain cases so Taiwan. There's there's kind of evidence on both sides. And the key question as always is will Donald Trump say something that's not planned either in private to Xi Jinping or on Truth Social after the summit that will get everyone or get one side or another side upset and you know watch this space. One final thing I'd like to note and Shane mentioned this as well. You know, Scott Besson said to me that um the AI dialogue team, and we don't know who's going to be involved yet, would likely meet again in a couple of months in Shenzhen, which is where APEC is being hosted this year. And we think there's a decent chance Donald Trump will go. If Trump goes to APEC, that will be the first time in history an American president has gone to China twice in one year. And I believe, and Shane, correct me if this is wrong, if Xi Jinping then comes back to Miami for the G20, I think it's the first time a Chinese president will have come to the US twice in one year. >> That's also historically, I think, quite significant. >> Yeah. I mean if you look at that you know that's if you look for any sign of stability what the said about the the Chinese president US presidents visits each other's country twice in a year I mean that's unheard of if that happens >> and Demetri if I could follow up on the board of trade so I think earlier this week after the Sunday meeting we also saw Greer talking to Fox News is saying that they would announce the board of trade this week and then there would be uh more details of that. How concrete do you think that will will we see the um in terms of the board of trade this week cuz you mentioned it was already mentioned in May. It's taken 4 months. I think we have more details now but like when will it actually be put into practice? >> So I I think they they are saying now that it has been operationalized. The question I have is will they on Thursday put out a I I don't think we're expecting a joint statement, but will both sides put out a statement saying uh this is what the board of trade actually is. Here are some of the specifics. Here are the products we're talking about. Um you know, so Bessant and and Greer met Holifung on Sunday in New York, but their teams are continuing to meet and they were planning on meeting up until the summit on Thursday. So, I really think it depends on how those negotiations go and at this point I don't know where they are to to be candid, but I think we'll get some kind of a more concrete announcement than we had in Beijing. But whether it's a full complete here's the suite of products that we're going to um reduce tariffs on, it may not be complete. It may be they announce some things and say others are coming down the pipeline. >> Uh Bonnie, can I just add uh uh one comment on what Demetri said? You see uh you know I agree with Dimmitri that there will be uh there are likely to be new developments on the board of trade uh trades. I mean because you know uh you know that's one thing that Trump is very concerned about and I do hope you know I don't have any insights on this but I do hope they're also going to make some progress on the board of investments which is going to be a huge potential win for both countries. Uh you know there has been reports that Xiinping is probably going to bring a large business delegation of Chinese entrepreneurs uh including those who are the CEOs of EVs and uh uh uh in China. You see that's the thing I think there is a point for USI to propose a board of investments. I mean because right now no matter how many soybeans and Boeing airplanes uh uh and u energy China buys uh from US every year is not going to reduce the trade deficit very much. So uh you know it can't be made up by allowing Chinese investments into the United States. That's the thing you know right now because of the uh sort of political sentiments against China and against Chinese investments. Before I joined Harvard, I taught uh at the uh one of the universities in Hong Kong and me and my students we often discussed this what kind of investments the US would welcome from China. Uh you know you know it's very difficult to think of any. I mean because considering the uh sort of political climate I remembered a couple of years ago that even a US senator deemed uh the Chinese made garlic as a national security threat. So, but I really hope that uh this is something that if we talk about a potential area of cooperation uh on top of AI, you know, that very hot topic, whether the US will allow the Chinese investments into the United States, you know, should be something that both countries should work on. I mean because it's it's going to create a lot of jobs in the United States if nothing else. >> Yeah. I I would just say that a couple of things. I'm not expecting a lot on investment at at this point. Um the reason being is that most of the US officials who are working on all of these topics ahead of the summit. In general, they're quite hawkish and they actually don't really want a lot of Chinese investment in the US. on the other hand, they have to look over their shoulder because they know at any point in time Donald Trump could say, "Hey boys and girls, where's my big China investment deal?" And that could happen at any time. And one of the things that's uh kind of a live issue right now is uh and US car makers, most US car makers are nervous about with one exception maybe is Donald Trump has said he'd be okay with Chinese automakers building factories in the US to create jobs and to sell Chinese cars in the US. Um most US automakers with the exception possibly of Ford um are really nervous about that. They've actually written letters to the administration saying please don't do this. [gasps] uh when I sat down uh not with Scott Bessant and Jameson Greer but when I talked to the other senior officials on Sunday after the meeting with Holly I said do you expect any kind of an announcement on Chinese automakers investing in the US and they said listen there's there are natural obstacles to doing that there are rules and regulations on the US books um that would make that difficult there's legislation working its way through Congress that would actually make it even more difficult And so they suggested was unlikely, but when I pushed them and said, "So, are you telling me it's impossible, they wouldn't say that, they basically said, "Listen, at the end of the day, the president hasn't made any determinations yet," which I view as a kind of a get out of jail card. They they're not talking to the Chinese about it. They don't expect it, but they know that Donald Trump could turn around at any point and say, "Actually, this is a great idea." So, I think that's another another wild card. And in terms of the CEOs, there was definitely talk about a a reasonably large delegation of Chinese CEOs coming with Xi Jinping, which is quite unusual because unlike a lot of other countries, the Chinese president generally does not travel to the US with with uh business leaders. I think those expectations have diminished a little bit. I don't think uh any visas have been issued and my understanding is that it will be actually a much smaller delegation of CEOs if one comes at all. it may just be a handful of uh state-owned enterprises uh who CEOs come and that the the kind of BYD auto manufacturers uh some of the big you know technology companies will will not be coming um as of Tuesday 2 days before the summit um that's my understanding so I I think the investment side of things at least in in Washington at this summit are going to be fairly limited >> and one topic we haven't discussed is the Iran war and how that will feed future in in in the discussions. Um maybe Shane to you first. Obviously, China has been trying to play um a key role in positioning itself as helping to promote peace and ending the Iran war. What what do you see President Ni as coming to DC prepared to share with President Trump in terms of what China can do or has already done? >> That's a very good question, Bonnie. I you see that's the thing that from my end I think China and the US can truly work together. Of course China has a huge influence over Iran just sort of simply being you know one of Iran's biggest customers. And then China, there has been reports in the United States about China supporting Iran with satellite imageries and all that. I have no idea whether that's true or not but I do believe that there are you know on top of Iran and there are also many other hot spots particularly concerning Middle East that China and and US can work together and that's the part that China will probably need a bigger incentive to work with the United States on those issues. I mean because you know the United States rightly wrongly sort of started all of this uh by us itself and then this come back to the question that we discussed earlier you know again I don't have any insights into this but I think if you know if I was Xinping and and if Donald Trump sort of asked me to help on Iran and I will say what about Taiwan. I'll help you on Iran. You see, right now, the thing that you have to understand, you know, there were a lot of things in terms of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and sort of Iran on all those troubled issues. China can really work together with the United States. And then what's the benefit for China? And I so you have to understand from China's geopolitical view that the longer the Russia's war again in Ukraine continue and longer the Iran issue continue from a geopolitical point of view. It is better for China because the US will be Trump and the US administration will be spending mo much of its time on those issues and without enough time to get tough on China. >> Bonnie, could I could I ask Shangi a question that kind of gets to that point? >> Sure. you know, when when when the US first attacked Iran, um a lot of people said China would be in a relatively stronger position than a lot of countries um including in Asia because it had a good stockpile strategic oil reserves and I I think estimates were at least 8 months. I'm curious where how how big are those stockpiles now? Is there more pressure on Xi Jinping to do something to help end the war because the Chinese economy could start to suffer? And I'm just the answer. I' I'd love to know what you think. >> Yeah, I I you know, I don't have the exact numbers, you know. I mean, it's you know, for Shiin for both, you know, like Trump, he has he has lots of variables to to consider, right? I think I mean no matter uh what you think of Shiin Ping you know as a leader but you know he had this vision so he sort of started to stockpile all the energy and and oil and gas so that really helped China to tide over but you know I also agree with you you know what you hinted you know the longer the war uh continues the bigger impact uh uh that the Chinese economy is going to recede. Uh I mean it is also in in Beijing's interest to see the war to end soon. But then you know if if you were a Chinese leader weighing all those variables you know I think right now you just say you know without you know to put this thing just simply on the issue simply looking at this issue as a see whether Beijing and Washington can work together on Iran is not enough. That's what I'm trying to say is that if if there has to be something of a grand bargain being discussed, you know, that is always something that is being said uh uh privously among certain people that, you know, the Trump administration has presented a opportunity for Beijing and Washington to have some kind of a grand bargain. I have no idea what that grand bargain is, but I'm just sort of suggesting just merely that sort of Beijing and Washington can work together to resolve the Iran war, uh it's not going to happen. But if you put this into a bigger context, you know, I'll say why not. So, I think some people in Washington are actually worried uh about exactly what Shanei just described, which is would Donald Trump do a deal that would involve trading something on Taiwan in exchange for help on Iran because the Iran war has created a host of problems from inflation, increased gas prices that are going to impact Republicans in the midterm elections in November. So, that's definitely something people are focused on. You know, when I sat down with some of the American officials on Sunday, I asked them about Iran and what they wanted from China. They were a little bit hesitant, but the one thing they said to me was they had been talking to Chinese financial institutions and they felt that talks were moving in the right direction. That was a nice way to frame it. I think what they meant was we're putting pressure on Chinese financial institutions telling them that if you facilitate transactions uh that help the Iranians whether that's payments for uh crude energy imports or other things that the US still maintains the ability to threaten Chinese banks with secondary sanctions um or what someone described as the damocle sword and that that is still out there. The difficulty for the US is that China has a damocally sword too and that's its uh dominance in the rarest industry which is why I think even though there are a lot of tensions in the relationship the reason we've got to this strategic stability or what some people call strategic stalemate is that actually what we have in the background is a huge game of economic chicken where both sides have realized they can't kind of drive the car down the road at each other and then one swerve of the last moment moment they actually have to both slow down to make sure there's no crash and no accident. And so I think we're in a I think strategic stalemate is actually a very way good way to explain the relationship right now. >> And Dimmitri on the um strategic stalemate that you just laid out. Where do US allies and partners fit? Obviously uh President Trump is meeting with a number of them right now in New York City today, but you mentioned some of the concerns from Taiwan's and what are you hearing from our allies and partners? So, there's several things and and I think as with everything to do with Donald Trump, you have to separate the rhetoric from the reality. Um, because sometimes they're different. Sometimes they're the same, but sometimes they're different. So, uh, as we're recording, as we're speaking right now, Trump is expected to be sitting down with Japanese Prime Minister Sai Taki. You know, last year when she said that Japan would get involved in a Taiwan conflict if China attacked Taiwan, it sparked a furious response from Beijing. And even though Trump had gone to Tokyo in October and had a fantastic visit and she did a phenomenal job, I would say charming Donald Trump and and managing Donald Trump, masterful, uh he didn't come to her defense after those comments and the Japanese were really frustrated that that happened. So I think 2 days before Donald Trump meets Xi Jinping, Prime Minister Takai will be trying to get assurances from him that he's not going to throw allies under the bus rhetorically um when he meets the Chinese leader. I think one thing that's worth noting is despite the rhetoric that comes from Trump um which the allies generally don't like whether it's the threat of removing troops from the region or putting a lot of pressure on them to increase their defense spending and other things that when you talk to militaries in the region they will tell you that US Indo-Pacific command which oversees American military activity in in the Pacific that they are doing as much if not more now with allies as they were doing during the Biden administration. So even though Trump says things that freaks the allies out to to use a casual term, [sighs] the militaries are actually still doing a lot and you know, China is aware of that and whether it's US cooperation with the Philippines, uh allies working more with each other in Asia. Um, these are important developments, but I think ultimately, [sighs and gasps] you know, if Trump sits down with Xi Jinping and says something that undermines Taiwan or undermines the US Japan alliance, that will make people extremely nervous. So, I think everyone's watching very closely to see that. in Shane. I want to also bring you into the conversation, but looking at the Chinese side, we've obviously seen President Xi make a number of trips abroad uh including his first trip abroad and later half this year to North Korea and then of course um attending the BRICS and SEO summits. H how do you see China shoring up its position prior to um she coming to Washington DC? >> Thank you Bonnie. Uh that's a excellent question. I think uh in terms of China's international diplomacy right on top of what the Chinese leaders have been saying sort of trying to cultivate the great power relations with the United States I think the other plank of uh flank of China's diplomacy is to show up uh China's status as the champion of the global mouth you know the trips uh to uh break to India um break and SEO and others have shown have really put China in a in a good light and you know that is something that you know China will continue to do. However, that does not mean that having said that, China uh uh is also uh from from my point of view is also trying to work with the United States over the regional issues which is something that is less talk about you see uh just take the example that the Mitch mentioned about uh you know in the aftermath of the Japanese prime minister's public statements that s the Japanese will intervene uh if Chinese mainlands invades Taiwan and then curiously uh Mr. Trump made a very interesting comment saying that he could become a mediator to mediate uh uh you know just in case of any conflict uh uh between China and the United States uh sorry between China and Japan you know that is something that you know certain people do not understand. You see right now uh you know Trump has said a few times that the US would like the uh let's take Asia for example. The Trump has said many times he wanted Japan, South Korea and other the American allies to step up to show up uh their own sort of defenses. But the thing is you know the Asia I mean right now the rise of China uh has caused sort of discomforts among sort of many of the Chinese neighbors and I think even though China wants to be the leader of the global south uh wants to be the dominant power in Asia but in the immediate future I think China still needs the United states whether China will say this publicly or not to maintain the stability in Asia. Let's just sort of give me one let me just give you one example you know right now is because of US presence the presence of US troops in South Korea and Japan and neither South Korea nor Japan has developed nuclear weapons even though you know the Kim Jong-un of North Korea has been sort of flexing uh the muscles of the nuclear muscles I mean can you imagine If US withdraws its troops from South Korea and Japan the next day, you know, both Japan and South Korea will announce the they are, you know, they're going to develop nuclear weapons. I mean, because both countries have possessed knowhow, the people and and the facilities to do it. I think there is a generally uh uh misconception that uh uh uh uh China wants the US to leave Asia. Uh you know that's not true at all. >> Bonnie C, could I just add something there just to unders underscore part of what Shane just said? I mean I I lived for most of the 1990s uh in Japan. So I, you know, I spent a lot of time talking to people in Tokyo and I think one of the really interesting things that happens is when when President Trump says things that makes the allies concerned, and I'll focus just on Japan for a moment. Often people will say in Japan, "We don't like it, but we don't have a plan B." But the truth is there is a potential plan B. And as Shangi said, it's nuclear weapons. Now, if Donald Trump withdrew American troops from South Korea and Japan, I agree. I think South Korea, where there's already a fairly strong debate about whether South Korea should have nuclear weapons, I think would move very quickly. I think among the Japanese public, there's still a lot more resistance. But if the US withdrew troops and if South Korea announced that it was going to get a nuclear weapon, then I think the debate in Japan would shift very very quickly and within several years the potential to have three nuclear powers in Asia and well if you count North Korea four nuclear powers in Asia I think is a distinct possibility. So you know as a journalist we tend to kind of look at today, tomorrow, next week, maybe next month. But actually the thing that I'm thinking an awful lot about is what is the future for nuclear weapons in Asia and how does that how does that materialize and I think a lot of that will depend on the next two and a half years and how Donald Trump deals with allies. So I think Shane is right it's it's a critical issue that people should pay more attention to. >> Absolutely. And like don't forget we also have India and Pakistan. >> That's actually sorry. Yeah I was thinking east. No you're correct. Absolutely. So we have So we could have six. >> Yeah. >> So I don't mean to cut this conversation short, but I do want to sort of wrap this up and ask each of you to look a little bit forward. So we've talked a lot about September summit, what we might expect, what um what are each side's intentions going in. Um what is your biggest prediction if you have any for APEC? Is it going to happen? Are both presidents going to be there? And what would be the key theme that we could see in APEC given all the things that we've discussed might be coming from the September meeting? >> Uh I think uh uh uh Deitri uh partly uh you know hinted this. I think uh I'm you know if this summit next week uh you know a couple of days later goes well I'm sure Trump uh will is very likely to go to Shenzhen and sort of given the fact that uh the US and China uh has started has agreed to start a dialogue on AI and I think by the time in November uh uh at at April It could be a very good venue to talk about this. I mean because China wants uh uh this AP pack in Shenzhun to focus on high-tech sort of technological developments. I'm sure AI will be a very much a a interesting topic. And secondly, as has been reported uh that there could be a possibility that Putin, the Russian president will go to Shenzhen and there could be a possibility of a trilateral summit among the uh three leaders. Uh uh uh if that happens that's also could be a very interesting development. >> Thank you. Last words. >> Yeah. I'm picturing the three of them and Shenzhen. I'm wondering what if Kim Jong-un dropped in and and made it uh four leaders for tea. Uh I I think at the moment it's more likely than not that that Trump will go to Shenzhen and Xi Jinping will come to Miami for the G20. I think the million-doll question though is what does Donald Trump do on Taiwan arm sales? If over the next uh few months he goes ahead and approves a 14 billion dollar new record package, then I think Shenzhen and Miami are off. U if he does not, it's more likely they go ahead. And one of the interesting questions is if Trump split the Taiwan arms package into smaller packages, you know, maybe four packages, whatever, and just announced one or two, would that be enough to um cause the Chinese to rethink, you know, the G20? How would that play into relations? I think that's unclear. I think a 14 a record number would be a big problem for for Beijing. a smaller number might be more tolerable. But I think that's one of the things that I'm going to be watching very closely over over the next few months. And and Bonnie, any of your listeners who are listening who have any information on any of this, Dmitrift.com is where you should come. [laughter] >> Awesome. Thank you, Demitri, for that plug. But I think many many of my listeners are probably actually already actively reading your articles as well as Shane's articles. Thank you both so much for joining me today for this fantastic discussion. >> Thank you, Bonnie. It was fun. Thank you. Bye. Bye. >> [music]