The Critical Minerals Institute Warns That Government Funding Alone Is Not a Strategy
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The Critical Minerals Institute warns that relying solely on government funding is an ineffective strategy for securing critical minerals due to a fundamental lack of strategic planning, transparency, and focus on end-user needs. Experts argue that the United States undermines its allies by using financial leverage to outbid partners like Canada, Japan, and Australia, creating a fragmented "every dog for itself" dynamic that weakens Western coordination against China. This approach ignores the reality that China is industrializing primarily for self-sufficiency rather than direct competition, having already secured internal independence in key industries over the last decade. Consequently, the US must shift from simply acquiring raw materials to building defensible supply chains that begin with specific end-user requirements, acknowledging that nations like South Africa and Australia face complex internal challenges such as energy shortages and political fragmentation that make them difficult partners under current unfriendly administrations.
Beyond the geopolitical landscape, the discussion highlights critical gaps in the US industrial base, including a severe shortage of skilled labor, insufficient processing capacity, and opaque capital allocation processes. Skepticism is directed toward initiatives like Project Vault, which critics say suffers from poor organization and unreasonable terms that fail to address the necessity of transforming ores into finished products rather than merely stockpiling them. Furthermore, tariffs are criticized for merely redistributing manufacturing advantages within the US without rebuilding actual capacity, while raising costs and disrupting long-term production planning. The expiration of China's temporary export halt is also reinterpreted not as a total ban but as a strategic shift toward restricting exports to military applications and prohibiting technology transfers, effectively cutting off Western defense industries from essential Chinese rare earths and equipment.
To survive in this competitive environment, US industries must prioritize essential materials over non-essential ones, such as wind turbines, especially given China's dominance in electric car magnets currently used in American vehicles. There is a pressing concern that massive investments in domestic capacity for the entire supply chain may not be viable if there is insufficient US demand or access to international markets, potentially leading to company failures. This vulnerability extends to Japanese semiconductor manufacturers who fear Chinese economic or military attacks and are actively seeking alternative sources for materials like gallium and rubidium. In response to these challenges, some viewers suggest that a strategic partnership between Australia and South Korea could serve as an ideal solution, combining complementary resources and capabilities to mitigate the risks associated with relying on a single superpower.
Ultimately, the panel concludes that the United States cannot defeat China by simply copying its methods but must innovate differently to secure a competitive future. This requires humility in Washington, visa reforms to acquire global knowledge, and a strategic focus on transforming raw materials into valuable end-user products rather than just securing ore deposits. The conversation underscores that without addressing these structural issues and fostering genuine cooperation rather than unilateral action, the US risks falling further behind in the critical minerals race. As the sector evolves with new technologies, the next steps will likely involve exploring how artificial intelligence impacts the critical mineral landscape, but immediate attention must be paid to building a resilient, transparent, and demand-driven supply chain that serves both national security and economic viability.
Read the full video transcript
[music]
Okay, on behalf of the Critical Minerals
Institute, it's lovely to have our
August uh CMI master class titled
Playing the Trump Card. We have Jack
Lifton in from Detroit and we have
Melissa Sanderson in from Casper,
Wyoming. How are you both today?
I'm doing great. We had rain yesterday,
so I feel refreshed and reinvigorated.
>> I know it rains every day in tropical
Detroit for the last two, literally
every day. Okay. I haven't had to water
flowers all summer.
>> We despise you.
We decided to do this master class
because we do a podcast uh twice a month
with both of you and we were discussing
the Wall Street Journal article about uh
the US is trampling allies in the global
hunt for rare earth and we thought it
would make a great conversation piece.
So as Washington uses its financial
power to outspend and outbid other
nations, a crucial secondord problem is
emerging. Could America's global hunt
for rare earths, undermine its allies,
and weaken the western coordination
needed to compete with China? Do you
guys want to flip a coin to see who's
going first, or who would like to take
that one on first?
Should we do ladies first, Jack?
>> No, I'm a gentleman. I'll let the lady
go first.
>> I I spoke recently to some officials
from the European Union who very
interestingly
expressed exactly concern
that the Oracle expressed to buy
whatever it wants.
And therefore we are trying to figure
out
how we're going to move forward with the
US but also on our own because it
appears increasingly to them as they
articulated it that the message that
they're receiving is it's every dog for
itself and the biggest dog is going to
build the biggest house. So I think it's
a very real concern when a at least
formerly very close ally and trusted
friend in the form of the conglomerate
of the European Union feels rightly or
wrongly that it is being victimized by
the US checkbook. I think it's something
that perhaps hasn't received due
consideration yet in Washington because
at the same time that we are wielding
the checkbook and the sword, we are also
saying that we want our trusted allies
and friends to join us. Look at the
recent G7 meeting in working
cooperatively together to build a
western structure that would be able to
begin to match what China has done in
the global markets. So, I think we need
to think about how we want to reconcile
our currently conflicting messaging and
actions.
>> You know, I I I'm trying I I thought I
have to have a theme for this discussion
and I thought of it. This is what I call
the great condiment crisis. What do I
mean by that? We're playing catchup.
Okay? And we are we are not going to be
successful
here. Here here's here's the problem.
No one in America and including the
government of course pays any attention
whatsoever to history.
And so we keep doing the same thing over
and over again except that all the
ground rules are changing. So this is
1939
and we're watching the great other great
powers of the world great power okay uh
arm themselves
we think we think then we knew now we
think and we have in 1939 the United
States had a standing army of 139,000
men at that point France Germany the
Soviet Union Japan had millions of men
in a standing each standing army. Okay,
we didn't give a damn because we had the
oceans to protect us.
We had the mines to protect us. We had
the processing companies to protect us.
If we wanted to, we were making million
more cars in our country than all the
rest put together. And our leaders then
knew that if they had to switch that
production to tanks and aircraft, we
could do it. And we did it. Okay. The
critical minerals in 1939 were iron,
copper, aluminum. That's it. Coal. We
had a lot of coal, too. Okay. And oil.
We had we had a lot of them. Okay.
Fast forward a century.
I don't really understand what the
competition is here because I don't
believe that the China's competing with
us. I believe that China is
industrializing and taking care of
itself.
it. Here's the real problem.
China does not have to export anything.
They are consuming the 60% of the
world's metals they produce in into in
building their own country. Okay? They
do export. Of course, there's always
more productive capacity in their
country than they need. So, they can run
it up and export. But if they don't
export,
it's I don't think it's going to change
their lifestyle too much. Um, I don't
know what they need to buy with the
dollars and and euros they earn by
export, but I do know that they have
been on a plan for the last 10 or 15
years to develop internally all of the
key industries they need to be
independent of the rest of the world.
They've done a real good job. Okay.
>> Okay. So, let's stay on your theme here
of condiments. And so, Mel, which
partner should we relish? Well, you
know, Canada springs to mind inevitably,
even though the current fad seems to be
more of uh kicking the the cat, so to
speak, in terms of Canada, but it's it's
the obvious choice. If we're talking
about trying to quickly build a secure
uh integrated supply chain end to end in
the critical mineral space, there's no
better choice. We are connected by a
land border. Canada has tremendous
capabilities particularly at mining.
It's a natural marriage,
but at the same time, um, we've just
unilaterally cancelled the US, Mexico,
Canada trade agreement that counting its
predecessor NAFTA, he had had really
done a very fabulous job of integrating
the three economies over the last 30
years, but it appears to be not not
worthy of consideration. So, if we're
not going to consider Canada, I suppose
I would have to say the next most
obvious choice is Japan, but Japan lives
in a bad neighborhood and it's going to
be really, really hard to maintain a
secure supply chain of any sort with
anybody in that neighborhood if China
ever decides that it actually wants to
undertake acts of aggression to defend
itself.
>> Jack, do you agree with Mel on those
partners?
I think that Japan I agree with her on
Japan is the would be the ideal partner
for the United States because
it has always had the deficit of natural
resources. Yet it has built one of the
world's greatest economies and nations
by importing resources and internally
developing total supply chains to take
those resources into enduser products
that actually support and build their
economy. They are very smart people
and they know what they've they faced
this crisis their entire life. the
national life. Okay. And they've solved
it in a sense
every day they're out looking for
natural resources, but they have in
their country the installed capacity to
turn those resources into products to
support their economy. Now, we could
really learn from them. Uh I don't know
that we think that way in Washington.
Mel would know more about that than I
do, but they to me they stand out as the
ideal model for us to to pay strict
attention to.
>> Okay. Well, when we were discussing this
yesterday, there were some concerns of
course that Trump's administration
uh wouldn't be open to partnerships. Do
you want to comment any further on that,
Jack?
Well, I yeah, the the problem is they
Washington, it's not just trumpets
been for a long time. They assume the
rest of the world exists to to supply us
with what we need. Uh they take they
don't take into account much the the
aspirations of of other people's and and
their ability to take care of
themselves.
The nations that have been supplying us
today,
I'm not talking about China, I'm talking
about everybody else, are today thinking
they want to use these resources
as a tool to acquire the technologies
and the education
in order to add as much value into their
country as possible. and they would like
to emulate the the standard of living of
the United States and they see that to
do that they have to recreate the the
total capacities
for consumer goods for example in the
United States and so what we're up
against right now is that our
traditional suppliers are thinking
what's in it for us and I believe this
is the biggest change and I I think
tariffs do not help in this situation.
I
>> I want to get into tariffs, but we were
discussing as well in preparation for
today's master class about Project
Vault. You wrote a story about it this
week on how Project Vault could be
competitive. Jack, do you want to
provide Project Vault administration
with the advice that we discussed?
>> Uh yeah, it's very simple actually. The
people who are promoting project vault
as an inventory management setup run by
the US national government have
forgotten that they need to ask who are
the customers, what are they buying and
can we inventory those materials and
devices or do we just inventory the raw
materials and if we do that do we have
the capability and capacity in the
United states to transform those
inventory raw materials into enduser
products that we can actually use. Okay,
none of this has been talked about. All
they talk about is they're going to buy
a whole lot of rare earths and a whole
lot of BOS phosphates, whatever they're
going to buy. And I don't think they
really know
what inventories are needed and what and
I think what they missed entirely is
it's going to be the end user that
dictates what's in the inventory, not
the USGS telling us that we're dependent
on some other nation for this particular
raw material and so we should we should
get ahead and buy a lot of it. That
doesn't mean anything. Okay? And I don't
put much faith in project uh vault, so I
don't think it's going to happen.
>> Yeah. But didn't you have an excellent I
thought it was an excellent
recommendation that you said we should
use project vault as an insurance agent
agent uh as an insurance policy for our
critical minerals. And then Mel, you
told me you disagreed with [laughter]
that. Would you like to jump in?
Well, I mean, I agree with everything
that Jack said in that regard, but I
think that there's a couple of other
concerns to articulate as well. The
[clears throat] first of which is just
as we were talking about the checkbook
driving our partners out of business.
The US government checkbook wants to uh
purchase a bunch of stuff in a market
where outside China supply is already
scarce. The private sector is already
scrambling to find sources that are
trustworthy and reliable and available
and suddenly the US government is going
to come in and say no we're going to buy
all of the disposium
for what objective so that we can resell
it at a profit to the same company that
was trying to buy it in the private
sector to begin with. So I think that
that's another um obstacle that presents
itself in the form of project fault. But
everything else that Jack said is
absolutely correct. I mean if if all we
want is rocks. Well, there's plenty of
minds that can sell plenty of rocks, but
the rocks are not what's going to keep
us all in business with the lights on
and our cars running. So yeah, I'm I'm a
skeptic as far as Project Walt goes, for
sure. I want to circle back really
quickly on this idea of partnerships as
well because there's an additional point
to what Jack was saying. [clears throat]
The United States, particularly post
World War II,
never had to learn how to be a partner.
We were the leader
by a claim and in some cases by pleading
and begging please lead us because we
were the last man standing so to speak.
So the idea the fundamental idea of
partnerships and cooperation
is fundamentally lacking in US foreign
policy and has been for a long time.
Even multilateral organizations like
NATO that we formed were for our
objectives and we were always the
primary genesis of it. PreWorld War II
isolationist America he had no desire to
partner with anyone because we were fine
and happy all on our own. So I would
argue that America fundamentally has a
problem with the concept of partnership
and that's why we don't implement it
very well.
>> Can I jump in a minute just on the last
topic? I just want to mention something
because I've had direct uh interaction
with project vault with our tungsten
project in California.
And number one, um you know, I can tell
you that they're not very well
organized. That's number one. Um and
I've heard that multiple times from
other people that are very close to the
Trump administration and government,
whatever. Um we had a call with uh one
of the three commodity firms you know
talking about offtakes
and um you know their terms are are
really crazy terms number one um for
offtakes. I mean when I say crazy I mean
they're just so rich.
Um and the one that we spoke with u
actually had a 7% equity interest in
another tungsten company in the US and
obviously we didn't really feel
comfortable about entering an agreement
when it's almost a competitor for us but
um so far it's been a dead end with
project vault for us. Uh I just wanted
to just throw that out there.
>> Okay. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Kevin Ernst, CMI director as well. Okay.
So, Jack, do you want to do you want to
go ahead and start warming up the the
audience here for for the big debate on
the November 10th deadline and what what
we should be expecting, how that's going
to change our life and how that's going
to impact the critical mineral strategy
for the United States?
>> Well, the thing is we have no idea
because we don't know what China's going
to do. the what happens on November 10th
is their temporary
halt on the prohibition of export uh in
general expires. And so now they're
they're going to let us know whether
they're going to enforce the the rules
and laws they've enacted about uh
natural resources and and finished
goods. And the thing that we don't know
is if they're going to do anything at
all. Uh as a uh a free market
capitalist, I have to say that if I were
President Xiinping of China, I would be
thinking, why do I want to stop
making all that convertible currency?
Okay. I mean, what what difference does
it make these the crazy people on the
other end? And forgive me for everybody
out there that's going, "What is the
November 10th deadline?" It will impact
approximately 6 and a half uh trillion
dollars of downstream critical minerals.
Those are the magic numbers they're
throwing out, Jack.
>> No, they're not. That's not This is the
kind of nonsense that keeps people
printing newspapers.
Look, the those materials from China
are critical to the production of
trillions of dollars of enduser
products. Okay? No one's talking about
can we get along without some of that
with the Chinese. Do you really think
the Chinese are going to shoot
themselves in the in the foot in in
order to stop making shoes? I mean, come
on. They're not going to simply
institute a blanket. we you know
prohibition on export they've what
they're telling us is that two can play
the same game. So what they're saying is
all of us all of the nations of the
world have always
not exported weapons okay arbitrarily.
Okay. Okay. We know for example that
that uh the terrorists in the Middle
East buy weapons from Czechoslov
Czech Republic. Okay, great. That's the
business of Czech Republic. But nations
like great nations do not sell weapons
to potential enemies. China says, you
know what that means? If you're going to
use rare earths to make military
production, we will not sell you the
rarest for that because you have told us
we are the target. So we do the same
thing. Okay. Now that's a tiny part of
the rare earth use. Tiny. Okay. They're
not saying they won't sell us material.
They're what they've changed and people
don't understand is this.
They used to sell to anybody like I if I
as a metal trader for example wanted to
buy a rare earth I would contact one of
at the time 29 Chinese export companies
and I'd say I need a ton of this roium.
They would then get back me with the
price. I didn't know where they were
getting it. Okay. I didn't care. I I
just only cared if I could pay the
price. Okay. China changed the rules
now. No more intermediaries.
If you want to buy rare earths, you need
to be an enduser.
Okay? And they have to decide if that
use has a dual purpose, civilian and
military. If it does, no contract. We
you no longer deal with the
intermediaries, neither theirs or ours.
The the government in Beijing
has to review every export order
containing a metal they have prohibited
[clears throat] the ex the free export
of they then decide whether that order
can be filled. No more intermediaries.
This this is a big change. The other
thing is they have now absolutely
prohibited the export of technologies of
any kind related to the production of
rare earths at any level in the supply
chain. They've also made a list of all
the specialists in China in this
particular area and they have said those
people if they want a visa to to visit
Ant Ming in Sacramento they need
permission from Beijing directly. Okay.
And it's and it's very unlikely it'll be
given. Uh so that they have cut us off
from raw materials for military purposes
and they've completely cut us off from
technology and equipment. This is the
biggest problem. The equipment
>> we don't make that in the west. They
>> So can I ask a question? Let me ask a
question, Jack, because I just want to
make sure I understand the implications
of what you're saying. I mean, I think I
do, but I just always like to check. So,
basically what you're saying is if any
of these US OEMs, whether it's Lockheed
or Rathon, want to source materials for
any of their defense products, China is
basically going to say we're not we're
not exporting to you. Is that's like in
a nutshell what we're saying?
>> Absolutely.
>> Okay. Well, that's a problem.
So, let's go back to what's going on
with the spending spree that's happening
right now with the US government. Okay.
So, Mel, with this spending spree, who
who are the decision makers and do you
have some feedback on how this process
is taking place? I know we spent a great
deal of time trying to track who was
giving what to who because it seemed
like various branches of the US
government were providing conflicting
uh investment capital to competitors
just like what Kevin was talking about.
They didn't seem to even know who the
competitors were. Um where do you want
to go with this?
>> Well, it's not
a question that
>> [clears throat]
>> has an answer because [cough]
the so-called process is completely
non-transparent
and therefore evades logical scrutiny.
So as to how decisions are made
that leads to an inevitable conclusion
that they're made capriciously
or they're made on the basis of
relationships
either personal or business
that um will be beneficial at some point
to the decision makers involved.
So it does not appear readily that the
decisions are based on potential.
Whether that potential is the quality of
the deposit of the rocks or whether that
uh potential is the experience of the
metal maker or whether it is the
capability of the magnet maker. And you
know Jack and and I have both talked
about this before. When you don't have a
strategy and you don't even have a plan,
what you have is chaos.
And that's what we're seeing playing out
here.
>> Jack, you wrote a piece called Trump's
tariffs. Have a redistributed American
manufacturing advantage, not rebuilt it.
Do you want to start talking a little
bit about the tariffs and how that's
impacting the American strategy for
critical minerals moving forward? and
tariffs are creating favorite companies.
Favorite companies uh share price goes
up in the marketplace.
A lot of people make a lot of money, but
[clears throat] nobody's making anything
useful.
So that that's the real problem with
tariffs. We we don't know
we don't look at the effect of the
tariff. Okay? For example,
I was mystified to see tariffs put on
key metals like ste steel and aluminum
because because and then you may have
noticed that the utilization of American
industrial capacity for steel rocketed
up one or two percentage points. the the
the utilization of American aluminum
production, productive capacity actually
went from like 35 to 50%. Based on the
fact that our non-competitive companies
could charge higher prices because our
our end users couldn't could no longer
buy foreign goods at lower prices. This
is this is all about capitalism, okay?
And this is manipulated capitalism,
okay? Which is we're supposed to believe
is called is also free market
capitalism. It is not. It in in a there
there's never been a global market
really. You know, it's always been since
the war, the great war of 45, it's
favored the United States. Okay? That's
how it's been manipulated. Now the
world's getting back into business. So,
if I want to make a steel product in
Detroit, let's call a car,
uh, I need a reliable supplier of the
quality of steel and the quantity I need
at the price. Guess what? Chinese steel
makers could do that every day. They
could be the lowest price. Well, we need
a steel industry in America, right? I
mean, everybody agrees with that, okay?
because this is not this is not an ideal
world where everybody loves everybody.
So we need a steel industry
theoretically
uh one to employ a lot of Americans and
two to make sure we can compete in a
war. Okay. So we support our steel
industry with tariffs on foreign steel.
But that makes cars more expensive than
they have to be. Well, then we put a
tariff on the we prohibit the import of
foreign cars or put a tariff on it. And
then the foreigners say, "Well, uh,
okay. We'll build car factories in
Indiana." Is that okay? And we say,
"Yeah, unless you're Chinese." And they
say, "Wow, there's a lot of rules here.
What's it all about?" Well, what it's
all about is keeping us in business. We
have our people have to be employed and
we have to have an economy. Okay. So
these tariffs
are meant to maintain America's
lifestyle. I understand that. Okay. I if
I were the president, I' I'd probably do
the same thing. Okay. If I wanted to get
reelected. Um, I don't understand
if you're going to put a tariff on
something, is it for 15 minutes, an
hour, two weeks, couple of days? That's
the problem. When you're in the
manufacturing economy, you have to plan
for the long term. How the hell do you
plan when you don't know what the cost
of your of your feeds are going to be?
Okay, that's what the problem is. the
tariffs have completely screwed up the
our ability to plan production. That's
the biggest problem.
>> I I want to quote Jack before you
respond to him, okay? Because what he
adds that he hasn't said uh verbally is
Jack says, "My conclusion is that the
Trump tariff program has redistributed
manufacturing advantage within the
United States more than it has enlarged
the American manufacturing base." And
then he adds that the distinction
between tariffs on finished goods and
tariffs on industrial inputs is
essential. So please do respond, but I
want you to take those elements into
consideration.
>> Well, I was going to start with the fact
that you just said something that's
fundamentally incorrect, Jack. Tariffs
are not helping President Trump. Pres
President Trump is being hurt by tariffs
because they are being applied
indiscriminately in nature leading
to pocketbook got to keep its prices low
by bringing in Chinese-made goods and
[clears throat and cough]
they are now not able to keep those low
prices. So people are not um benefiting
from tariffs and Trump is not benefiting
from tariffs either. That's one reason
that his latest um popularity poll is as
low as it is. Um but more importantly,
the tariffs also degrade the capability
on a broader level of improving our
industrial base because the steel
industry in this country does not have
the productive capability to support
simultaneous growth of the mining
industry, the processing industry, the
AI industry and ongoing retail
developments. So a smart country is what
I was saying would find a partner coming
back to one of the earlier themes that
actually produces steel in copious and
reliable quantities and would smooth the
path for the import of that steel if we
actually had an industrial policy that
looked at all the necessary factors that
have to come into play to grow and grow
rapidly a domestic indigenous production
capability.
Okay, you you realize there have been
some very fundamental changes.
Okay, at the excuse me for talking about
history. The at the end of the 19th
century there were there were four great
steel producing nations. Germany, the
United States, France and Great Britain.
Would you please fast forward to that
now? uh something like
more than 50% of the world's steel is
made in China.
Britain basically has no steel industry.
French has France has no steel. Germans
Germany's steel industry is dying
because of the cost of energy. We make
70,000 tons uh 70 million tons of steel
here a year. Okay, which is by Chinese
standards trivial. So, I'm not saying
that. What I'm saying is you're exactly
right. Even if we said no more imported
steel,
would we really run out of steel for
what we need? Okay. I don't know. And
could we increase that production? Yeah.
And increase the cost and then all steel
products would be more expensive. And
this is this is getting us nowhere. That
this tariff game is getting is getting
us nowhere. I believe sincerely, this
where I'm going to be different from all
the rest of you, that the United States
should be competitive on the world
market. I believe we could be
competitive on the world market. That's
the real problem. That's that's not the
goal of our government.
>> Okay. I'm sure Mel would like to add
something here. So, let's roll something
another element in here, Jack. The Trump
administration's announcement last week
of approximately $3 billion in new
investments, loans, and guarantees for
critical mineral projects is the
strongest signal yet that Washington has
finally accepted a truth that those of
us in the industry have been repeating
for decades. Industrial civilization
runs not on ideas, but materials. By the
way, I'm quoting you, Jack. Mel, do you
want to take this? you want to start
talking about uh the critical mineral
supply chain, how it will take time and
how this capital is currently being
prioritized.
>> Well, um I'll start with the last part
first because we we just spoke a little
bit ago about the non-transparency of
how capitals being allocated. So I think
the same is true for quote the new 3
billion unquote as was true for the
previous you know 3 5 10 100 billion. Um
so whether it will be allocated
logically and productively is a guess.
Um because as far as is evident,
we do not yet have in mind any sort of
structured
enduring defensible
supply chain. And I I hope that the
emphasis on the word defensible was
noticed because you recall I said that
Japan lives in a bad neighborhood. So
does Vietnam and Malaysia and South
Korea and all of these others. And we
would like to buy magnets from Japan. We
would like to buy them from South Korea.
And we would like to buy rare earth from
Malaysia and Vietnam.
Um,
you know, China has been very, in my
view,
very patient
with all of the malarkey of the West to
this point,
but at some point, you know, they could
get tired of it.
And in a world where
one
major power is pursuing the PF of
capriccious attack on other countries,
I think that China could begin to see
very little reason why it should not, as
it has begun to do strategically with
its elements, why it should not also
begin to strategically defend its
resources outside of the country or its
so-called sphere of influence.
So I think that we're looking
increasingly at a period of turbulence
and instability a lot of which derives
potentially from Chinese actions and
derives directly from current decisions
but even goes beyond that.
So the capability of the US as I say to
structure and defend a supply chain
is to a certain extent already failing
because we are not making the sorts of
strategic analyses necessary to
determine where those rooted supply
chains should begin. We always want them
to end here but where should they begin?
And without making that decision, I
don't think we can rationally decide how
to allocate our resources, whether it's
three billion or 103 billion.
>> Okay. Here's what I would like Jack and
Mel. I'd like you both to take three
minutes each and explain to our audience
what you would recommend for the US
government with these huge budgets on
how they should proceed. Okay. It's
quite the challenge. And then we're
going to open the uh floor for
questions. Jack, you you want to go
first?
I'd like to put this in perspective.
$3 billion is a lot of money to me. It
is not to the US federal government.
Everybody seems to forget that the
American budget is in the trillions.
That means billions of dollars per
working day. May I I don't want to do
the math, but it it's we're approaching
a billion dollars an hour. You want us
to got to think that $3 billion deployed
it
to 15 or 20 or 80 groups is going to
change anything. Okay. You you yourself
uh Tracy said, "Well, it's going to
impact 6.9 trillion dollars of
production." Well, isn't isn't also the
sale of fly swatters going to affect
that? I mean, there's a there's a point.
Do does anybody understand the impact of
any of this on any else? We keep talking
about it's a crisis because we can't get
ring baloney fruit sandwiches. Why is
that a crisis? Okay. Like there's no
other way to do it.
>> So, how about you take your three
minutes then because and since three
billion isn't a large enough budget for
you and why don't you just talk about
your second law of productive
investment.
Okay.
Installed capacity is not productive
capacity. A plant becomes a productive
asset when it can repeatedly produce
qualified products at commercially
sustainable yields and costs.
>> So take on one critical mineral.
>> Okay.
>> And and and provide some feedback to the
US government.
>> You and I guess I have just stated the
the key problem. What is this $3 billion
for? Because if we're going to have
productive capacity in the United
States, we have to build it. We we do
not have it for these critical
materials. Okay. So, will it cost $3
billion to put us back into the
processing
uh you know ability for let's say rare
earths? Yeah, I guess could be. Okay.
But what does that mean? Because that
doesn't mean we're going to have rare
earths that meet the standards of our
end users, okay, or in the forms they
need. It just what we're trying to do
here, what it we're we're at we're we're
moving the tail of the dog, okay? We're
we're trying to recreate
the the capacity which means we have to
first see do we have the capability to
reproduce the capacity. This is where
the money has to be spent and there's
just one gigantic impediment.
We don't have the people. We have lost
the skills. We abandoned legacy
engineering here. We said, "Let the
Chinese build our magnets." And you guys
that are now building magnets, you, as
one of our former presidents said, learn
how to code. Well, guess what? They
tried. I guess we don't have the people.
So, you can you can spend all the
billions you want. You have to focus on
the capability which means people, the
capacity which means bricks and mortar
and then the raw materials. Don't worry
about the raw materials before you have
something to do with them. I I have been
saying to this industry for the last
several years,
the rare earth oxides have beautiful
pastel colors. Why don't you go into the
face brick business? Because there's no
demand for them. We don't have the
capability or capacity to process them
into the enduser forms we need. That's
where the money has to be focused. Never
mind. We have enough mines. We have the
largest uh primary rare earth mine in
the world, Mountain Pass. We don't have
any heavy merits in America that are be
capable of being produced at this point.
So, we can't make these special magnets.
Let's face it,
all this money, where is it going? What
part of the supply chain is it
supporting? That's what has to be
understood. And it's not going to be
understood by elected officials or
bureaucrats. You have to go to the end
users and say, "What do you need?" Then
you go backwards and find out how those
things are made. That's where you need
the investment.
>> Okay, Mel, I think uh Jack got his three
minutes.
Do you want to do you want to catch up
with uh [laughter]
Jack and add anything to that or would
you like to go in a different direction
for your conclusion?
>> Yeah. Well, I think that, you know, the
first thing that has to happen is some
humility
on the part of the folks in Washington.
Um, so I may be starting from an
absolutely impossible point, but let's
assume that we can achieve some humility
in Washington to recognize that there
are many things that we don't know and
because we don't know them, we can't
cope with them. So I would,
you know, the Department of Defense is
currently running its own study group. I
don't know if a lot of people know that
they they've partnered with the private
sector and with the end users and
they've been doing their own sort of
study group on strategically trying to
think about what the supply chain should
look like.
I would throw the academic sector into
that mix because there's a lot of skill
around the theory of supply chain
development that's available and is not
being heard and I think that we need to
to expand that coordinated talk shop. We
need to get the political backing for it
which it currently does not have. We
need to make sure that the highest
leadership listens to and is willing to
implement the conclusions of that. I
think that there are some concrete steps
that could be taken. Jack's 100% right
in pointing to the problem of human
capital in this country. The current uh
approach to granting or more frequently
refusing visas is a travesty because it
would be very possible for us to do what
many other countries currently are
doing, which is use our checkbook to buy
the knowledge we need.
There is knowledge that is necessary
outside of China. We could buy it. We
could bring it here. we could put it to
productive use
>> to build the skills and the projects
that we need to have built in record
time instead of slamming a door shut and
saying that we don't want anybody from
outside and we don't need anybody from
outside comes back to the concept
startlingly of showing a little
humility.
So if we would be willing to do these
things, we could make better use of even
the relatively small pots of money like
$3 billion. But let's not overlook that
there's much larger pots of money
already out there that are being um I
would say personally frittered away. So
you know we have the Orion fund in
coordination with DoD. We have you know
the the the Morgan Stanley fund out
there. We have pots of money that are a
lot bigger than $3 billion,
but that in my personal opinion, as I've
said earlier, are not being correctly
and uh strategically allocated. So we
start by getting a plan that is backed
politically and correctly funded itself
and we undertake some measures that are
well within our ability to do quickly
and well like visa reform.
And then we put all of that together and
we can make progress in something less
than 50 years. Maybe in 20 instead of 50
we could be where we need to be. Oh, and
one final thought. We're killing
innovation in this country. We need to
re-energize innovation because we're not
going to beat China, quote unquote, by
doing what China already does so well.
We're going to beat China by doing it
differently,
better, smarter.
Okay. Well, a lot of points were hit on
in this last hour. Thank you all to all
the Critical Minerals Institute members
that are here today. Would anyone like
to ask a question or two? We've got some
time.
>> Yes. Uh it's Kevin. I'd like to ask a
question.
And by the way, I'm sorry that I
interrupted with my questions. This is
my first master class, so I didn't
really know the format, so I apologize.
Um anyway
um you know when we were talking about
the ideal uh partners in terms of
countries
um I I know that uh Mel you mentioned
Canada and I think Jack mentioned uh
Japan but I guess I'm wondering where do
you put Australia and where do you put
uh South Korea on that list?
Well, you might remember that I also
said that Japan lives in a bad
neighborhood,
>> right?
>> So does Australia. So does South Korea.
The problem that that we have in terms
of trying to pick the partners is the
new global reality is
gone has gone back to the old zones of
influence or spheres of influence. So,
it's one reason that we see Washington
get really touchy and increasingly
touchy about Chinese quote interference
unquote in Latin America.
So, why would we be surprised to see the
Chinese get agitated about so-called
American interference unquote in their
sphere of influence which includes all
of those yummy countries that you just
mentioned who I don't disagree. I mean,
I mentioned Japan myself. We need those
countries. But
I'm coming back to the concept of a
defensible
supply chain.
The whole thing with the straight of
four moves underscores that your supply
chain has to be defensible.
If you're going to source it nearly
exclusively in China's sphere of
influence, you inherently do not have
defensible supply chain.
>> Go ahead, Darius.
Yes. Uh, thank you Tracy. Good evening
from Johannesburg down here in South
Africa. And I just wanted to ask when
you're just the the recent um $50
million DFC funded project now here and
uh it's a Falabora rare earths project
and looking at the supply chain issues
that Mel has mentioned and totally agree
with some of the comments that uh from
my experience in this part of the world
where I've been for the last 15 years
looking at new partnerships uh to what
extent do you think that these sorts of
relationship ships with South Africa uh
would be harbinger of future
partnerships because if you look at uh
there was a very difficult relationship
if you know with and then South Africa
appointed a new ambassador
to Washington to redefine the
relationship with the US and South
Africa as you know South Africa is a
powerhouse so I'd be interested in
seeing and hearing from the panelists on
their views of on this part of the
Thank you.
>> Actually, Darius, I think we'd all be
intrigued by their responses on South
Africa. Who wants to go first?
>> Jack looks like he's still thinking, so
I'll go ahead and run my mouth first.
[laughter]
Uh Darius, um I don't know you you would
have no reason to know this, but I
actually lived in in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo for eight years.
So I know uh somewhat uh some of the
parameters of doing business on the
continent. um where as you just
indicated, South Africa has long been
one of the shining lights, but even
South Africa has encountered some
substantial difficulties related
specifically to the mining sector and
the energy sectors that have really
decreased both its productivity and its
attractiveness as an investment source.
And in a broader continentwide sense,
those problems epitomize the the rise of
Africa because we've got a a whole host
of issues that interlock and are very
complicated to address and involve
energy but also involve you know uh
former wars and [clears throat] separate
relationships
and therefore impacts on logistics and
transportation.
We've seen the problem of the coming
together of a of a true African trade
zone. Um, countries that haven't made
the political effort yet to begin to
harmonize their standards in order to
ratify the treaty. So I think that
that's why in many ways outsiders
use the phrase Africa as if it was one
country. But it's because they just
don't want to have to deal with all of
those complexities. Um I remember the
[clears throat] great hope for the
African Union that it would be the
European Union analog and it has not
become that. So I think that it's going
to continue to be a country bycountry
um investment strategy whether we're
talking government to government like
the DFC or whether we're talking about
straight private sector investment. So
the continent itself is not in my
opinion in a position to benefit from
the current race to rare earths but some
countries may.
You want to comment on that, Jack, or do
we want to go to the next question?
>> South Africa, what do you think?
>> I think that the current American
administration is extremely unfriendly
to South Africa and that you cannot you
it will not be involved in at least the
next two years.
>> Okay, Al, you have a question. Go ahead.
I think you just need to unmute
yourself. I don't just look.
>> Thanks a lot. always uh fascinated by
the discussions but you know a recurring
theme has been demand the end users what
do they want how do we you know and work
backwards from there is there any
consistent
um visible effort on behalf of demand
and I'm I'm talking about wind turbines
electric car manufacturers that need
permanent magnets robotics and those
kind of demand drivers uh to try and
influence where the investment is going
in rare
I I don't understand the the context of
the question because uh you're you know
the if you look at the uh uh journalist
approach to this of course all they talk
about is is the gigantic demand that'll
be unfilled.
My opinion is quite the opposite. I
think the American economy is mature. I
I don't I think uh EVs are not going to
be a big uh item here. Uh our government
is strictly against it currently against
wind turbant and I don't see any great
demand growth in the United States uh
that couldn't be filled by the current
regime of of international trade. The
pro the real problem here is real
simple. Well, we we import
essentially all of the rare earth
permanent magnets and the raw materials
to make them that we use. The principal
source of those imports is China. It
China controls that.
If if we can't get where permanent
magnets in China, let's say a total uh
then you can forget all about electric
cars. You can forget all about wind
turbines and all of those products. If
they restrict the export, as it looks
like they're planning to do, uh then
we'll our our industries have not our
government, our industries will have to
pick and choose. Uh I don't think wind
turbines are going to are much of a
business here in America right now.
Okay?
>> China dominates that.
electric cars. The truth is we make
between 1 and two million a we sell
between 1 and two million a year in the
US. So we need we need those magnets
right now. We have them. Okay, you can
buy electric car made in the United
States with a Chinese magnet. You may
not think it's a Chinese magnet, but it
is. Okay, that's what they're going to
impact. And to sum this up, it all comes
back to what what the industrialists
always say. Is something necessary or
nice? You decide. Can you live without
this stuff?
I don't know. It's up to you.
>> Yeah. I guess my assumption is that the
the magnitude of the buildout if if all
the um facilities from mine right to
magnets is built in the US with the
amount of investment is there there
won't be enough demand in the US. So if
the US if the US can't learn to sell or
can't get access to markets outside of
the US why would anybody build those
that capacity in the US? Don't don't
tell anybody about this because it'll
it'll it'll you know impact their their
idea how rich they're going to be in the
future. We are we have committed to so
much capacity
that you know will never get built
because there's no demand. So these
companies will fail. But right now all
we want to do is talk about capacity
capacity. Capacity. My question is for
what?
>> Mel, do you want to add anything to that
or do you want to take on Marcy's
question because we have time for one
question left for today.
>> Oh, let's hear Marcy's question.
>> I just was curious what your guys's
thoughts are. Um, in the last few
months, I've had um, two fairly
well-known semiconductor companies out
of Japan who have confidentially asked
about when and if we can get our pilot
plant up and running and produce gallium
and ribidium and what sort of end
product we're going to be having and at
um, what capacity because they are both
in fear that China may cut them off. So,
they're fishing for alternate sources.
>> I think they're right to be worried. I
would add that, you know, Japan's
actions over the last six years at this
point um clearly indicate that Japan
fears a possible attack from China, a
military attack, not just an economic
one. So, you know, I think that they're
right to be worried and I also think
it's why they're looking for good places
to settle their their companies outside
of Japan.
>> You know, something Mel Mel made an very
interesting point. It never dawned on me
and and one of the viewers um I think an
ideal combination would be Australia and
South Korea.
South Korea has what Australia lacks and
Australia has what South Korea lacks.
The two of them could be powerhouse
together.
>> There we go.
>> I agree.
>> Well, that's the benefit of these
wonderful master classes. Our next one,
by the way, will be the impact of
artificial intelligence on uh the
critical mineral sector and as the
evolution of the marriage between
technology and critical minerals rises.
Anyways, again, thank you everybody. If
you have any questions, just reach out
to me. Thank you.