The Abraham Accords: Where do we go from here?

6 years since the Abraham Accords, since the Middle East change in ways thought unimaginable, the US brokered normalization packs between Israel and Gulf neighbors sent the region into unchartered territory. And while it certainly hasn't stood still since then, there are questions about whether the accords can be advanced or if the Iran war has cost the Americans the juice necessary to entice more allies to sign on. We'll speak with Senator James Langford, co-founder and co-chair of the bipartisan Senate Abraham Accords Caucus to examine the Accords and where we go from here as we get the American view. Senator James Langford of Oklahoma, thank you so much for taking the time to join us. This week marks six years since the Abraham Accords. You've been there pretty much from the start looking at this, analyzing it, trying to figure out ways to move it forward into more unchartered territory. What does it feel like six years on here? What what what kind of sense do you get of the the current legacy of the Accords? Well, it's remarkable to be able to see uh the Accords. When I think of the Accords, as funny as it sounds, I think about six years ago sitting on the south lawn of the White House uh during the signing of the Accords, which as is everything starts a little bit late and my redheaded self ended up just as sunburned as can be. So, that's six years from a really good sunburn that day. But it's also I think about the signing on UAE and Bahrain and Morocco and now recently Kazakhstan to be able to join in and to be able to see the the growth that continues to be there. I think about the the terrible atrocities since October the 7th and everyone said the Abraham Accords won't hold won't make a difference during that time period and that has proved to be absolutely not true that it did make a difference during that time period. And then I see Iran now attacking its neighbors and to be able to see what the importance of the Abraham Accords then. So six years ago, we could never have expected what has happened since then. But we've seen the strength of that economic engagement, the engagement on humanitarian issues, on technology, and all that's happened and how that engagement has really made a difference in the last six years. You know, it's interesting because the the it seems like the original intent like many things of the Trump administration, economics is behind it, trade uh and development, regional development, but there's so much more as you mentioned some of the other sectors that have fallen into these particular courts when we comes to technology intelligence sharing. We just learned this week there was a recent meeting uh between Sentcom, US Central Command, and the defense chiefs of Israel and many of its Gulf allies. So this has gone beyond the typical Trump administration focus on economics and the art of the deal into so many different areas. Did did you anticipate it going in in this direction from the start? >> As as crazy as it sounds, yes, I did actually. Uh because when you start economic engagement, you start person-toperson engagement outside of government. Uh then you start developing that relationship back and forth that then expands into then government leaders. government drags behind uh business leaders most of the time in most issues. Uh so it it is a formula that we think works over and over again to say if we'll have normalization with Israel, it opens up opportunities for economic engagement, for medical research, for technology research, for uh intelligence sharing, for defense uh protection, not only in this region, but we anticipate in countries around the world. Uh so yes, that that's something that was anticipated at the very beginning. Quite frankly, I still think that's a significant formula of economic engagement, Judea and Samaria and that engagement all across that region to say how can we actually have more businessto business engagement because then government lags behind that? Did did we get our hopes up too much? Everything seemed to come together so quickly and we know there were behind the-scenes talks that had gone on for years and cooperation on certain levels for years, but publicly this just came in a rush in 2020 and it it definitively changed the region. But the the feeling was okay this is going to begin a domino effect. One country after another is going to join. The Saudis of course were going to come on board. October 7th happened. It's unclear if Saudi ever really committed, but there was this expectation that this thing was just going to expand throughout the Middle East. Here we are 6 years later. Sure, Kazakhstan has joined. Sudan joined shortly after in 2020, but for the most part, we haven't really seen progress on that front. Were our expectations too high to begin with or do you feel this this thing is kind of stalled out a little bit? >> Yeah, a couple things I'd say on that. I think the expectation was Saudi Arabia joining in right away was too high of an expectation on it. uh the issue with Sudan and them joining in immediately. Then of course all the challenges in Sudan and trying to figure out the complexities of their government was just a reminder again of how complex the region really is. Uh but I think one of the biggest stalling points of this is in the nations that are already a member Morocco, UAE, Bahrain uh they they've asked the question several times what does America bring to the table to say if you join this club then you get exclusive access to this and America's not been able to define that yet. So that that incentive to be able to put out to say we'll make sure that you're a part of this conversation or the part of this tariff agreement or a part of this trade agreement or or this intelligence sharing agreement. You'll only get access to that if you're a part of the Abraham Accords. I I think America still owes the rest of the region that and owes quite frankly those nations that have already joined in so they can tell their neighbors, hey, if you want this benefit, you got to join this club. >> You and and others have kind of alluded to this. There's one way of looking at it where okay, so it it didn't completely expand throughout the the region. The flip side of it is this thing could have fallen apart really quickly and especially with the Israel kamas war and the way that Israel absorbed criticism from many of its Gulf allies. I mean, this thing could have crumbled months into the war and yet here we stand uh with a ceasefire in place and God willing some progress coming in Gaza and the accords have stood at least in the medium term the test of time. There is that way of looking at it. What do you feel was the key or the keys to this thing being held together because it's still so fresh. It's only six years old and yet it it it held together seemingly like a rock. Although I'm sure there were frictions behind the scenes. >> There were tons of frictions behind the scenes on that. I would say I was privy to several of those. But it it held together because people already knew each other. They had their phone numbers. They had already engaged. They had already talked about what they were planning to do and those plans had already started on that. Tourism had already begun. Business deals had already begun. So once those connections come between countries, they find a mutual benefit to it. Friends can disagree. We we disagree. Yeah. I have disagreements in my own household at times. Uh but that doesn't mean we're not committed to each other. And so I think that initial commitment to each other to say we're going to work to be able to make this work. And then the initial swapping of ministers, swapping of engagement on business engagement, water development, technology. Uh once those relationships started, people wanted to be able to maintain those relationships long term even when there's an enormous challenge uh like the war against Hamas. Uh and quite frankly, most everyone in the region was adamantly opposed to Hamas as well and understood what Israel was trying to be able to push back against. They may agree or disagree on the tactics of actually pushing back on Hamas, but they knew Hamas was a threat not only to Israel, but to them as well. >> There [clears throat] isn't much nowadays that gets bipartisan support in Congress. And when the Accords were first signed, I I mean, Democrats, Republicans, independents said this can't be anything but good for the region. Can't really be anything but good for the United States to be involved in in such a monumental event. We're six years on now. Obviously, the Israel kamas war has changed many things in the Middle East and Democrats more and more are peeling away from the US Israel relationship and seeing really any ties at all to Israel in some cases being a a negative. Do you feel that, you know, we worry so much about it standing the test of time from the Middle East perspective. Do you feel like this can stand the test of time based on the changing philosophies and the changing visions within Congress, specifically on the opposite side of the aisle with the Democratic Party, that they can remain firm behind this vision of an Abraham Accord style Middle East? >> I would hope so. We're about to find out on history on this. When I when I first came into Congress a decade ago, this was a nonpartisan issue in relationship with Israel. Everybody knew that was a close ally, has been a close ally, will continue to be a close ally. Was a totally nonpartisan issue. Now, Israel has become more and more partisan. I've seen over a hundred members of the House, for instance, vote against any kind of support for Israel. Uh we've seen multiple members of the Senate vote against support for Israel on this. That was just not so a decade ago. So, that's been very, very frustrating. I would say it was part of the group trying to talk to the Biden administration in the early days of the Biden administration because there was real conversation. Is this the Trump Accords or is this the Abraham Accords? And the Biden administration had to determine are we going to keep trying to advance this? And there was about six or eight months that there was a real dialogue behind the scenes if they were going to just not do anything with Abraham Accords at all because Trump had worked that deal in the final months of his presidency in the first term. Uh now and they wanted to be able to see what they were going to do with it. They did finally make a decision. No, we think this is good for America and for the entire region and for Israel and for Middle East peace long term. We think this is a benefit. And they eventually jumped in and worked to be able to advance more and more cooperation which was a good thing. So I I would say the Abraham Accords has a true Abraham Accords bipartisan caucus in the Senate. We believe that this is a good way to be able to resolve this. This is not just all about President Trump. This is about the entire world in the entire region and we think that this should be something to advance. How that will prove out in the days ahead, I would only tell you many of us still have conversations with other countries uh in the region and quite frankly outside the region as well and to say this is a benefit. You should actually join into it. We just need to clearly define all the details of that benefit so we can continue to make that package clear. >> You know, the the Iran war could have sent the Abraham Accords in in one of two directions. >> If this went well, well, then we could have seen likely countries say, "Okay, I get it. We're under the American protectorate umbrella here defense-wise. We're seeing the regional integration. We're seeing the teamwork uh visav defeating the Iranians and and and at least in my mind possibly some of these countries that have could have been on the fence for a while now could have said okay I I I understand it now I I get the value even if we have to you know beat back popular sentiment on the street in our particular nations or our particular kingdoms you know visav Israel the other scenario is okay this does not go well and now we have countries questioning America's commitment to the Middle East, questioning their ability not just as a broker but a backer of of these sort of deals. And it seems like we've gone to the latter side of that where the Saudis and others are questioning how much will America really have our backs in this when push comes to shove. Do you feel that this the way the Iran war has been going so far is is a detriment to the advancement of the accords and maybe the the the thinking of some of these countries that have been on the fence and saying, you know what, we're we're not quite ready for this unless we get firmer commitments that the US will have our backs in the uh the case of Iranian attacks. >> I I actually don't I I think this has been a reminder of how close our relationship is with Bahrain and with the UAE in particular. They have taken a tremendous amount uh from the Iranians as well as the Jordanians. Uh and what the Jordanians, the Bahinis, and the Emiratis have seen is we are there. We're going to continue to be able to work for your defense. We're going to continue to be able to push back against Iran, knowing that Iran is first a threat to them as well as they are to Israel and to the United States. But they understand they're looking right across the water uh from Iran and they understand full well what the threats really are coming at them. I think the Saudis and the Immiradis and others clearly see the rise of the Houthis that they want to be able to attack Israel obviously, but they also want to be able to attack the Saudis and be able to find ways to be able to shut off shipping in that entire region and have seen the Americans have been engaged to be able to provide them intelligence support insight uh as well as uh training and troops on the ground uh in places. uh the interceptor missiles and all that we have done to be able to help protect our allies and continue to be able to stand with our friends. We're going to continue to be able to do that. So, no, I think it's actually been the opposite. And when I speak to the Emiratis, they've been very clear, hey, we understand the threat against Iran, but we also understand the United States is standing with us. >> Something I want to return to that we spoke of earlier, and that is the the the democratic view right now of Israel. We've got elections coming up in Israel in a few short weeks. Now, from the Israeli perspective, a lot of it is domestic politics and a lot of it is about internal matters and and the differences between Prime Minister Netanyahu and his opponents in the election. much of foreign policy outside of actual messaging seems it's going to be very much the same because most Israelis at least leadership wise agree on the the course taken during the u the Israel kamas conflict on the course taken on beating back uh anti-semitism and and boycott of Israel and things of that nature within the halls of the capital do you get a sense that they're from the other side of the aisle from from your folks you deal with on the other side of the aisle that they would be more amendable to backing the Abraham Accords in Israel in general if there's a change in leadership. And from the Republican side, is there a sense that if there is a change in leadership and a more moderate or even center-left government that there might be some issues with Republican support of Israel dealing with with possible centrist or left of center government there uh after election time? >> Uh let me let me first start with this. Our relationship with the United States and Israel is not based around who's elected this week. Whether it is Trump or Biden, whether it's Netanyahu or someone else, that relationship should continue to remain strong between the United States and Israel. We have too much in common with functioning democracies and our relationships and our values uh to try to separate based on a different election. Uh the people of Israel will choose their leadership. the people of the United States will choose their leadership, but those two countries should remain solid, committed friends and continue to be able to work through that. So, let me let me begin that way on it. As far as the future of the Abraham Accords, I don't think an elected leader uh would actually make a difference on that. I think there is still an interest in negotiating in the region. I I do think right now many countries in the area are waiting to negotiate anything with Israel or Abraham Accords based on the direction and knowing who they're going to negotiate with in the days ahead. If they engage now or even the last couple of months as I've had conversations with some leaders in the area, they've kind of said we're going to wait and see till after the Israeli elections to make sure who we're negotiating with is still who we're negotiating at the end. That's understandable for them to to wait that out on it. But I think once the elections are resolved in Israel, uh, which isn't always fast as we all know that sometimes it takes a while to be able to work out the details. Once that's resolved, I think that reopens the conversation again saying this is the person that's actually the leader. This is the group that's actually leading. It's time to be able to negotiate what's the next step in relationship. >> Yeah, we've heard some of the names that have been floated, but obviously the Saudis have been there forever. I'm talking about candidates to expand their courts. Now with Israel deep in talks with Lebanon, that's been floated as a possibility. Syria as well, although there's still obviously deep distrust between the Israelis and the Syrians, though the Americans seem to uh have the Syrians um back when push comes to shove. We hear fairly regularly from the the Trump administration itself, hey, we're right around the corner here. We've got names. It's going to happen again. Here we are. Is it realistic to expect that there's going to be a name dropped in the next month, in the next year? Will it, you know, what what's kind of the sense? Is it hyperbole right now from the White House or do you feel there are really in-depth active discussions about potential new members? >> You're talking about new members of the Abraham Accords there. Yes, there are active conversations with new members. The timing is always going to be interesting. uh quite frankly these are relationships you cultivate over years and then there becomes a moment to say this is the right moment. Now obviously several folks uh several different countries are saying hey we will join an Abraham accords when there's a two-state uh when there's a Palestinian state or when there's some other resolution on Palestinian issues on that. I understand that that they want to be able to see some of that that actually pacifies their street uh in the conversation on it. But the challenge is always going to be who is it Israel is actually negotiating with in the Palestinian leadership. Do they speak for the Palestinian people and what does that look like long term? Obviously the whole world changed after October the 7th. Uh when you realize, okay, we we've got to figure out how we're going to actually manage our security and what this looks like long term. Um, in terms of uh the the kind of longer term uh vision of the accords here, you know, the good thing I guess about being a a dictator or monarchy, you don't have to worry about elections and you can kind of uh plan longer term when you're in a democracy like we are. It's there's going to be elections and you've got to kind of worry about your legacy a little bit more when you're when you're planning these sort of big visions and big uh initiatives. another administration comes in, whether it's JD Vance, whether it's Marco Rubio, whether it's AOC, who knows what comes down the line here. At what point are you and folks on the Abraham Accords caucus comfortable that this has been set foundationally and can kind of survive and kind of roll forward on its own valition on its own own momentum without having to have the constant push that we've seen from the Trump administration to to to continue um advancing it. When when does this kind of move on its own? >> Never. No. it it's always going to need a push. The the State Department will have the priorities coming from the president and the push from Congress as well. The State Department is easily distracted with a lot of issues globally on that. And if we don't continue to be able to put focused attention and to say this is one of the priorities is to be able to expand the Abraham Accords, it will drift off into a list of a hundred other priorities, which means none of them are a priority. Uh so this whoever the next president is, whoever is leading the next State Department will continue to need a push from Congress and a push from their own leadership to be able to make sure that this remains a priority. >> In terms of the other members of the Abraham Accords caucus that you you mentioned um you deal with regularly. I mean what are the the concerns within the caucus itself? Where does where does Congress see opportunities for advancement? How much political capital do you actually use as opposed to just doing things kind of behind the scen? I mean, where does a caucus sit in all of this and and trying to move the ball forward rather than having it come from the White House, the State Department? What what is kind of Congress's role in this? >> Well, let me give you a couple ideas. One of them I mentioned when the Biden administration came on, there was a push among several of us to be able to go to them and to say, "Hey, these are not the Trump Accords. These are the Abraham Accords. this is important for our national security and for security of the entire globe and certainly the Middle East peace. Uh so they finally made the decision but that was something we could do to be able to push that and to continue to grow that when I speak to ambassadors when I speak to heads of state as I travel around the world and get a chance to be able to interact with folks representing my state in the United States. This is something I can bring up to folks and say would you consider have you considered this is what it means to be able to be there. We we're partnering with the Emiratis in a different way because of their relationship uh in the Abraham Accords and we think this is a good formula to be able to join into. So those conversations have got to just continue on otherwise again it it drifts away. Uh so for me it's continuing to maintain the conversations the relationships establishing new relationships with countries and regions and to say hey have you considered this? Uh again long term uh people see that there will need to be a resolution and normalization across the entire region. Uh to to have that occur is not going to happen accidentally. It's going to happen with a constant push. >> The accords the the way they're structured. It's interesting because they're they're bilateral relationships, >> right? >> And yet we see the kind of multilateral way in which they're employed. So from your perspective here, I mean, what are we looking at in terms of how America manages this relationship? Because we're looking at Israel, Israel, Bahrain, Israel, UAE, but it's also coming from the American side and then we have this regional infrastructure. It's a complicated thing to manage. I mean, h how does America, at least from your perspective, view the accords within, you know, kind of the the American vision here? Is it just advancing the Israeli cause? Is it advancing the Middle East cause? Is it just saying, "Okay, we want to set up the Middle East for success so you guys can handle your own affairs so we can finally get the heck out of there." I mean, h how is this viewed within your your office, within the caucus, within Congress? >> Yeah. Let me let me clarify a couple things. there there's not a turning away from the Middle East. And and some folks misheard even President Obama when he was talking about that we're going to make a turn towards the Pacific and towards China and our focus. That's not a turning away from the Middle East by any means. Those are long-standing friendships and relationships uh that are there. So those need to be able to be maintained. I really see America's role as twofold. One is a convenor uh to be able to pull the Abraham Accords countries together to be able to talk about what are we doing about water, what are we doing on technology, how can we cooperate together on defense agreements, on intelligence sharing. Uh when the United States actually pulls people together and say let's meet, they're more often to be able to meet together. Uh we're going to be at the table. Don't necessarily have to lead the conversation, but as a lead convener, I think that's very important. That happened a lot more uh before the war with Hamas. uh I think we that needs to be re-engaged more often now to say how are we actually convening that particular group of countries together to plan on specific areas tourism like I said water infrastructure things that we can actually work on cooperation and sharing together on that uh the third thing is the United States has a role to be able to say if relationships are broken how can we pull two people together we have a relationship with this country and with Israel but they don't have a relationship with each other so introducing friends becomes a priority for us to be able to make sure that they actually establish that relationships and connection. Some of those happen behind the scenes out of the public eye, which quite frankly is more often than not how those international relationships are happening. I know of multiple conversations that are happening with Israeli officials and leaders from other countries that very few people actually know about, but it's that's actually a good way for them to be able to get started to establish that initial trust and then to be able to take it to the next step. So those things are things that the United States can do just based on our position in the world, but also also our ability to be able to convene people together. >> We have about a minute left. I I need to ask you this because when the accords were first signed, we were looking at some folks involved in the negotiations who everybody said had no business being there. the Jared Kushner, the Jason Irene Blats, the David Freeman's, the attorneys, the real estate developers, and yet they were able to to to capture magic in a bottle seemingly and to get this pushed through. H some of these same folks are still aboard now. Kushner is still there. Now, Steve Wickoff has come. How do they recapture that magic and and and get these deals done and advance peace on behalf of America? >> Well, the challenge we have with Wickoff and Kushner is they're all over the world. there's not the only spot they're not at is at their house uh right now and so they're they're everywhere and it's it's harder for them because Kushner was able to develop more relationships and to be more focused on that. So we've got to have more folks from the State Department that are actually committed developing that. But it's got to be as it started businessto business relationships. Business people are more interested in establishing relationships and then passing that on to government leaders. That was the magic in the bottle as you described it before. When business folks actually get together and say, "Let's figure out how we can actually have economic development," that helps everybody in both countries. >> Senator James Langford of Oklahoma, thank you so much for taking the time to join us here on the sixth anniversary of the Abraham Accords. We really do appreciate it. >> Yeah, glad to do it. It's a big celebration. >> We will talk to you again next time on the American View.