Video summary
The TG ZKP Task Force meeting began with a recap of the previous Berkeley session, where the group validated ADR00001 as their first actionable proof-of-concept for solving the offline voucher problem using blind signatures. The discussion highlighted that while Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) are flexible and can be swapped out later, the underlying signature scheme is a critical, load-bearing component that must be post-quantum secure from the start. Changing this foundational element later would require reissuing credentials, making the choice of signature scheme a permanent architectural decision. Consequently, the team emphasized that the specific use case dictates the necessary security level; simple, one-off disclosures do not require heavy post-quantum signatures, whereas securing delegated authority or verifiable trust agents does, directly impacting computational time and user experience on devices like smartphones.
A significant portion of the meeting focused on the development of the "ZKP Cookbook," a specification draft designed to standardize construction records for various proof families. Mitchell presented the current state of this document, which includes an audit system and a lifecycle for proofs ranging from initial requests to final publication. The spec defines key terminology such as "gadgets"—reusable circuit fragments that handle specific relations like membership or uniqueness—and explains how these combine into larger constructions. The group discussed the trade-offs between different proof families, noting that public proofs can rely on battle-tested systems like those donated to Linux, while private pairwise interactions might require more specialized frameworks like Noir or PLONK. The document also addresses security concerns, such as the recent Zcash Sapling gadget flaw, reinforcing the need for crypto-agility and rigorous verification loops before any proof is published.
The conversation concluded with a strategic look at how the task force will engage with the broader Trust Over IP ecosystem. The group agreed on an asynchronous workflow where external projects can submit specifications for review without blocking adjacent work, allowing for iterative feedback and refinement. This approach ensures that the ZKP Task Force provides governance and clarity rather than rigid prescriptions, enabling diverse implementations to flourish while maintaining security standards. Looking ahead, the team announced plans to host Leif from the Cirrus Foundation on September 29th, who will share performance test results across major ZKP families. The meeting ended with a commitment to continue integrating developer insights and research into the cookbook, ensuring that the specification remains practical, secure, and adaptable for future trust graph applications.
Read the full video transcript
Hello. Hello.
How are you doing?
>> I'm doing good. How have all of you
been?
>> I am great. Where are you located? I um
I don't think I've ever captured that.
>> I am located in the eastern part of
India at a city called Kolkata.
>> Oh, got it. Awesome.
9 and a half hours difference something
like that
>> from GMT we are 5 and a half off so it's
around 8:30 in the evening.
>> Yep.
>> Hello. How we doing?
>> Hi.
Howdy.
So I heard Dennis will not be able to
make it and Drummond will not be able to
make it.
>> Okay.
>> This might be those who can make it.
>> So it's just us.
>> Yeah. Potentially.
>> Although this is full of surprises. You
never know.
>> Yeah.
Shall I kick it off or anyone feeling
intuition to wait a minute?
>> Thank go ahead.
>> Cool. Well, welcome everyone.
I will point to the antirust notice so
we're all aware
and digging into the recap.
Uh last week was the Berkeley session.
They validated ADR00001
as our first proof to build.
Uh the offline voucher problem, proving
your voucher is a is a community member
while they are offline uh is solvable
and practical with blind signatures.
And the loadbearing choice is the
signature scheme, not the ZKP.
uh it has to be postquantum and the hard
part and it is the hard part to change
later because it means reissuing
credentials whereas the ZKP can be
swapped. Um those were kind of
encapsulating the the big talking points
from from that call last week.
So the the um
the signature scheme does that have a um
an impact on which ZK P family
>> is is possible.
>> Yeah.
>> Okay.
>> Yeah. The schemes based on lises have a
particular set of proofs and then the
schemes based on hashes.
They both can kind of um
fall within some of the more general
CKPS but there are limitations and
boundaries on either side.
So just to understand the um because I
think this is an interesting you know
point the
what would be the process of saying
what's our use case based on this use
case
we need this sign signature scheme and
because we need this signature scheme
we've got these this family of zks
available.
Yeah, I think that's a fair process. And
then the at each step there's um like a
gated decision and one of the key
decisions around the signatures is the
the size and um the timeline
uh of or like the importance I think
>> like the the size of the proof or the
>> well the the purpose of the signature
like there's
like not all signatures
um need to be equal, right? Like if if
one signature is just like a oneoff use
kind of burner style disclosure of a
particular face that you want to show.
Um we don't necessarily need the bigger
postquantum
signatures. Um,
>> but if this is something that is like
securing the verifiable trust agents
delegated authority or something,
probably talking about a bigger
signature, which means that that then
changes the um
the like time it takes to compute the
signature in the proof or the multiple
signatures in the proof
>> and that timing is then the UX
conversation.
Sorry.
>> Because it's like, yeah, can this happen
on my phone when we meet in person or
versus um is this something that I want
to like run for half an hour in my
family home in order to secure our um
documents that are important.
>> So, yeah, it's good that they're
focusing on that question, too. And I
think it's that I see this group has
passed the creation of the spec um
being
sort of wisdom on that workflow when
people start using trust graphs.
Cool.
Uh the first item we don't have Dennis
but
>> um any other sorry any other reflections
on the Berkeley call. Um,
>> yeah, I guess for me because and sorry
because I I haven't been able to join
the earlier calls and so I'm a little
bit out of not up to date with what
what's all happening, but they're
working on a specific proof
out, you know, independently that they
think can be applicable for some of the
stuff that that we're doing in the trust
graph.
>> Yeah.
>> Or did they say we think we could do
something that that you guys need?
I think they are building something that
we need.
Um, however, yeah, that's what I was
trying to get from they call it sounds
like it's not in an academic sense
anymore. It's more of like a deployable
framework for um
or there's kind of like two layers to
it. there's the thing that runs the
proofs and the like software that does
it. Um, and I don't think they're doing
that. I think they're working on like
the types of constructions and the code
that goes into how to run the proofs and
they've identified that the ones for
that are required for kernel at least as
I was aware from the conversation is
what they're working on. Um, so I assume
it will be sort of folded into um that
project and then become available, which
was kind of why my action item I was
hoping they would try and bring that
into the spec document as soon as
possible.
>> Mhm.
>> But yeah, thanks. I I think that does
need clarity. That was one of my
takeaways as well from the Berkeley call
just like working out where it's a
independent project and where it's uh
contribution to trust over IP.
>> There there was also a discussion on
that call last week about I mean it
should have some
I mean I the reason I joined this call
is because I want to learn more about
ZKPs. So, I don't know anything about
them or very little. And so, uh, but I
did hear somebody say that, yeah, the
are they going to adopt, you know, I
know it's all math, but, um, are they
going to adopt something that is new and
hasn't been stress tested or battle
tested or is it in a family that's well
known and therefore this is just a
little bit of a variation that that
solves a specific issue and therefore
there's confidence in that or is this a
complete new, you know, new family of
ZKPs?
It's not a new family. Um, that's EKPS
at least. I I don't think so. I think it
a lot of the existing
um techniques and proofs
um
are kind of well defined and that's not
yeah that's not an area that
>> I think we can play. Um
>> so
yeah um
I think what we'll find is that these
three categories that we've formed
around like the house with no names or
the just pairwise versus public
um categories. is
will be like um gravity to particular
types of zero knowledge proof families
and groups. So like the public ones we
can use the battle tested in um long
fellow um CKP that was donated to Linux
whereas the um
private pairwise ones we may have to use
um like a combination of like the noir
family and plunk CKPS or snarks um the
sort of growth 16.
But yeah, then um
that's kind of that leads really well
into the cookbook conversation or the ZK
book conversation being a root of
>> where I think this task force's
contribution to bringing it all together
and then
>> allowing people like the Berkeley folks
to have like specialized proof that then
gets folded into the book. Um and when
some when interested in trust graphs
arrive uh and start adopting the
credentials and discover that CKP's
become a given for their use case. Um
hopefully they have options but not
prescriptions.
Um at least
Yeah. Thanks.
>> Uh, hey there Vicas. How are you?
>> Oh, good morning.
>> Cool.
>> Oh, go ahead.
>> No, no, nothing. U, it seems like an
interesting discussion going on. Thank
you.
I had to refresh my memory. You last
joined about a month ago, I believe, in
August.
>> That's right, Scott.
>> Cool. I mean, it didn't come from my
memory. I cheated. I looked at an old
page, but
>> I wish I wish I had that in my brain.
Uh, great to have you back.
>> Yeah, thanks.
>> So, um, if we're ready, teeing up the
the cookbook and construction records
conversation. Uh, in the past couple
weeks, Mitchell has taken the cookbook
from an idea to something real. Um, it's
now a set of construction records in the
ZKP spec draft. One board for one board
uh row each and 12 so far and the ADR
001 is the first one composed. Uh, so
Mitchell, I'll hand it over to you if
you'd like to take the screen or
otherwise.
Yeah, there.
Thanks.
Okay, here's a familiar spec up T. Um
this has had three
sort of iterations so far
and it has also like a audit
system built within it where I kind of
check the discussions on um credentials
human trust
um and a few of the other active repos
is
um so
the
this one um so this is still sitting in
a pull request.
Um,
actually let's let's just populate some
chat stuff right now.
And the branch is
oops
book branch.
So you can build this um using the CK
book.
And I guess this is kind of me showing
what the initial um spec
has looked like and where it's come
from. So then we can get this to like an
initial pull stage or at least cut down
a bunch of stuff that's not needed or we
find unnecessary for the first CKP spec.
Um okay I need to go here.
So high level um the abstract describes
the purpose of the ZKP task force.
It's a specification
to implement the ZKPS
and create these construction records
and it's kind of the
book framing.
So we can scroll down here. Um but here
are the records that I think
originate in the liveless root document
and also appear in the DTG credentials.
So we have like
>> which um sorry which um did you share
the link of this document?
>> Yeah. So this
>> the first one has to be um so because
this is a spec up it has to be built
>> through the um
>> branch here
>> the zk book branch.
>> Okay.
>> Um
>> okay that's fine.
Yeah,
but once we
pull it in, I think
it can um it will live here.
>> Mhm.
So maybe the rendered spec
is on
cable.
>> Let me see is the one plus.
Yeah, I'm not on that.
>> Let's see if that work. Yeah, sorry.
Yeah. Okay, it's fine.
>> I think
>> Yeah, I
can um
>> No, I've I think I've got
>> That's fine.
>> Give me a second. So, these are the sort
of different areas of the spec that it
cares about in relation to knowledge.
So we need statements, witnesses. The
method is the different what they call
gadgets. Um in circuits,
uh the public inputs tend to be the
credentials. Um a disclosure set is like
what parts of the credentials are being
um shown to the verifier
um or the prover.
Uh this is kind of like the the uh
justification of the boundary around
what the proof is or is not. Um there's
an adversary connection as well which we
included in our original drafting notes
and um time is also one adversary in the
postquantum sense um which then is why
horizon is included as another term.
Uh this is answers that question Erica
around the different families and what
they do um include unlinkability which
is a big question around the personhood
version construction options.
>> Yeah.
>> On that gadget is gadget is that a term
that's that's well defined in this
space?
>> Yeah.
>> Okay. And a gadget is often so just to
provide like an example, it's in the
implementation,
not in the math of the proof. And a
gadget
>> is so earlier this year um there was a
flaw that was found in one of the
um Zcash
shielded pools called Sapling.
>> Mhm. And that wasn't a flaw in the zero
knowledge proof, but it was a flaw in
the gadget that was checking information
about the proof and providing a um
statement saying that this is a unique
um
like this is a unique ZEC in the pool.
So it didn't and that flaw had to be
patched very quickly and then they
migrated away from that pool because it
was kind of like an infinite mint bug.
And the reason that that is possible is
because in zero knowledge you don't know
like all of the checks and receipts
within the pool but you have like a
encrypted note that you can redeem in
and out of the pool. But if a gadget is
not recording those correctly in zero
knowledge then we have that problem
which requires crypto agility. So that's
probably one of the most recent
>> AI based well was it was a security
researcher that used AI so required
specific knowledge but sort of
vulnerabilities um in uh one of the like
most tried and tested zero knowledge um
systems that is Ccash
and it was a vulnerability in the gadget
um which yeah is that term. So
um issuance requirements and then the
provenence records which I think
guys understand
um here has
sort of the different states of within
the repo of these like constructions.
So, we have this request list um which I
think will eventually live in the git
discussions but then hopefully like fold
in here. Um I haven't put this in yet
but we have the a double1 is a request
right and then there'll be another one
which is a request. Um
the carded is the term that I came up
with for um
these are the constructions that are a
draft for answering that request. Um
then the constructions is the actual
runtime of the proof um before it runs
and then you have the run. And then the
vetted is if you guys remember the
um ZK mage verification loop where you
can run it on your own computer and then
provide like a proof that you did the um
circuit
uh in our group. Um and then we get to
published
>> and this is the registry. That part up
there was the registry that can be
uh sort of the auditable registry just
to to go back and see that the proofs
did their job and there's no problems
there.
Um so is that on the so here is
uh this
>> this section is the the registry of kind
of like the timeline of the request
creation um
run and then
almost like audit of the the ZK book um
within the trust IP ecosystem and kind
of like a proposal for how we identify
the states of where these proofs are at
in the process of us um vetting and then
publishing them within this spec.
>> Okay. And so a construction record
construction record carries a record
state. So construction record is how the
how the proofs are constructed and
>> so what's what's in it
>> and this and the record state is for um
that's for internal to to okay
>> so it's kind of like the governance of
this document
>> so then this document can create like a
timeline of
>> um we had this request from uh this
project and this was the um construction
that we came up with carded is just the
draft and constructed is the after we've
decided that's cool then we run it then
it's vetted um and that creates like a
verification loop and then we publish it
to this spec and then sort of point the
um request from the other trust over IP
um like the e ecosystem input
>> okay
>> in that ction
that kind of follows into
um nicely to the relationship with other
specifications. And this is the comment
I made earlier, Eric, around like this
pair wise directed and public um sort of
trilma or uh like trinity of options
that we've come to um in the credentials
core spec uh all have specific
relationships with the CKP spec.
And remind me directed. So pair wise is
between two. Directed is one.
Um
>> yeah so it's kind of um
the
>> the prover the approver.
>> So it's like that mix between where you
you can choose to disclose more connect
like we would happily we would all have
pair wise.
>> Yeah. But we would then also disclose
this like connection between all of us
in the ZKP task force meeting right now.
Um
but we may not want to disclose that
we're in another task force meeting. So
it's like that in between the two,
>> right? So it is a a um sort of very
specific disclosure
whereas public there's no you have no
choice on who gets to see it. It's just
public.
>> Yeah. So these are like the community
governance decisions of the
um credential.
>> Yeah.
>> Like the shape of the graph,
>> right?
and that the shape of the graph if a ZKB
is what lives on the the edge. So then
information doesn't need to um the shape
of the graph matters because that
defines how many edges we're working
with
um and how strong the edge needs to be
whereas like public the edge doesn't
need to be as strong as pair-wise um
because there's many more edges um we
can't cover everything as public anyway
um but we may want to have specific uh
relationships
that are private initially and then go
public which is that sort of directed
directionality.
>> Okay.
>> But everything starts with pairwise in
the house with no names. So it's just
like you and I, which means that it has
to be um like a ZKP on the edge.
Otherwise, everyone can see everything.
If you and I um if they saw that you and
I connected, they could see like the
Yeah.
>> They would be able to see my did. And if
my did also connected with Scott and
then my did also connected with Vicas
and Sanka Shan and it's that problem. Um
yeah.
Uh so then this gets into the
terminology point which I think is
actually the most um productive part of
this spec to review and and check and um
its definitions. So it's going to help
um
quite a lot.
Uh so this like chain resolve gadget is
a gadget that
chains like the information
of the connection between the verifier
and the proverment
open gadget. This app for proving a
public commitment
can post construction is a record.
>> So again, these gadgets run within a
circuit or are they are they the things
that run the circuits?
So they're the things that run the
circuit or are the thing is the software
that either the verifier or the prover
>> okay
>> needs to um
>> okay
>> have
I think this is alphabetical so there
isn't any sort of
I'm just going to keep scrolling. If you
guys can see, we can stop on one if it
needs clarity.
Here's our gadget,
a reusable circuit fragment.
That proves the relation.
That's that distinctness that
distinctness gadget seems like it would
be carrying a lot of weight depending on
um if I'm understanding how that would
be used. I probably don't. So how would
that be used?
>> Yeah. So this is useful for the
membership VR. Um
yeah PMC
where you can choose like it's
I'm not already in this registry
like it's like a uniqueness.
>> Um,
do you have the inspector gadget?
>> Yeah, I I almost said that.
>> Sorry.
or or a deeper reference have a guy
named Penny and Brain or something.
>> Maybe we can if we have examples
um instead of Alice and Bob.
>> Yeah,
>> play with that.
>> I have not seen that show in like 40
years, but I still know the name of the
characters. It's crazy.
I only know one
>> sun's important too.
>> Key binding gadget
public key. So these are like little
microervices
of micro little.
So like a construction is
like a bicycle and a gadget is like the
wheel and the pedals.
>> Yeah. Oh, so you have multiple you can
have multiple gadgets within a single
construction.
>> Mhm. But then that's kind of where the
families diverge where you then have to
do like a if you want to have this
unique combination of key binding plus
um like a membership proof
>> and accommodate different signatures and
and different proofs like if you have if
you have a construction that has
different cat gadgets that rely that
need different proofs then you then it
starts getting complicated and
>> yeah and also not possible. All right.
Why not?
>> Um, so like some combinations
that
>> some combinations like the
like you have to have a tradeoff um in
the information between the verifier and
the prover. So you can't just like put
all the gadgets into one proof and it
works, you know.
nullifiers are also widely used.
They often sit in most proofs.
So this is like I hold the secret but
you you can't know the secret.
So the nullifier sits on the
um
prover.
So prove that you have this secret
without knowing.
So the primitive construction is the
only the one only gadget
instructions.
This one's also probably going to get
used a lot. Um, this is a range proof.
This is the whole like um it can prove
I'm over 18 conversation.
>> Mhm.
long fellows that
mostly.
>> Yeah, they use that a lot in um
improving your your um income
>> when you're looking to rent
like I can just prove you you make over
10k or whatever.
>> Yeah.
Yeah, that's actually quite a I guess
point in that one. Um especially if
yeah we get um
like trust graphs that accept taxation
records and those sorts of things.
This one's unique to Aspec because it
relates to that registry system that I
established where there's like a
an acceptance
uh
that you don't necessarily need to like
review the circuit but as a member of
this group by running the circuit
um you your computer says that it's okay
in I
um set up an infrastructure, it's going
to work.
So, it's just a registry verifier. And I
think that that role that actually is a
trust task in of itself um that kind of
connects the trust task um spec to the
ZKP um governance.
we spoke about, but this is that um
people outside of the ZKP task force can
request cards to be created.
There's another gadget which is the set
membership.
So this is relevant to um if I want to
prove that I'm part of the Linux kernel
maintainers
but not which one I am.
Um another term that's important is
transcripts.
So transcripts are um
like when you lay all the math out,
that's the transcript that then the
verifier reads.
So the prover creates a transcript that
this proof is
done all of these gadgets and followed
these instructions and it solves.
And that transcript is then given to the
verifier and the verifier says, "Yep,
awkward. Now the proof is
um
made."
>> So right this this is what the verifier
gets. Is the transcript. Is it the only
thing they get or one of the things they
get? Yeah,
practically the only thing they get
other than the like um API call or the
connection between the nodes that
information.
So then you get this presentation
and the verifier challenges the the
transcript and if it solves
then it's proof.
Okay. So that has like a bunch of the
terms. I think that this is something
that when we have like a new term
introduced, we should do as like just a
practice in this group. If you guys
enjoyed it, um it's quite helpful
from my side. Um
>> yeah. And how I'm
so not a GitHub expert. How would I
generate this on my own to be able to
review it?
>> Yeah. So once we
once it's pulled in
um it should just live Oh, wrong one. It
should just live on this domain.
But if you go to the branch
the um you can do some AI magic here and
say go to the zkbook branch and build
the um spec up t locally of this branch
>> and then it will build it locally like
what mus
um I think there's also I think sangan
might know a little bit more about this
um than I do cuz I'm still getting used
to how spec opt work works but um it may
already be
deployed just at a different branch as a
renderer. Um
>> so what do you do after you go to the zk
book? Um
>> so yeah the the zk book branch um
>> yeah
and then you do what and then
This one.
>> Oh, okay.
>> Yeah.
But if you just grab this link and ask
cororpt to build the spec upt locally
for you, it should be able to do that
fairly easily.
>> Okay. Um,
cool. And what is um
what would be what would to to whatever
word you use to fold it into the right
place. So it is just part of this what
needs to be done.
>> Uh so it's a pull request.
>> Yeah.
on the
here. It's been mentioned in a couple of
the conversations
um
>> already and I
referenced it
um in a few task force things
and I also updated it cuz this was first
pushed a week ago and then I have made
some edits over the weekend to this um
specific pool.
But yeah, once we get that, but I I
yeah, I didn't want to just be like this
arbitrator that um pulls its own um spec
into the root repo. So that's why I did
the branch.
Um, let me just double check where is
there any Scott is there anything that I
am going to miss if we continue this
path for the next 10 minutes.
Um the one thing that I had was calling
out um that cross spec linkage
and
just confir I believe we just want to
confirm as a task force that we would
own
007
as the construction. Um,
there was just a bunch of chatter around
that and it felt like we want to decide
if we want to own that in this task
force.
>> Okay. And it's in great spec issue nine.
Yes,
I think we do own the
It's this one.
Yes.
Yeah. So, I think
this is actually solved.
Let me find
uh SH has a question
ADR1 and the specification with the
impacted
>> I think it's it's kind of linked to what
we are discussing right now in terms of
how the work of that is in this group
is it do we see that as blocking uh the
adjacent work or do we see that that
they are going to fit some of
uh in some sort of a synchronous manner.
>> Um
>> I'll give you an example.
>> Yeah, I think asynchronous is where I'm
leaning. Yeah.
>> All right. Then I I kind of had the same
feeling that the synchronous of what
probably is going to happen at this
point.
Yeah, which is kind of why this spec
does have that language littered
throughout it which is like this is my
proposal for the verification flow of
information. This is like how I think we
should do the registry system and how we
had that thing above. Um this is also
another kind of expression of that where
the other groups can asynchronously go
to this spec and kind of like form their
document
to the ZKP language and then we can go
through in the task force meetings
reviewing it and asynchronously um reply
and
build.
Yeah, I think there are two
parts that emerge. One is uh the ZKP
group is going to get tagged in various
implementation or specification details
to review or provide input or give shape
to things which has been happening since
the past 2 3 weeks I guess. The other
thing is that the group goes out and
looks at what out there in terms of a
composite set of specs flows and is able
to provide a very considered opinion in
terms of where it is sufficient or not
sufficient and how it has to be
addressed the gaps are going to be
addressed. So that's the second part and
and I think that's the more involved
part where the where things start to get
a bit more uh in project management
terms into the go no-go zones. So that
that's why I just wanted to have the
clarification in terms of how the group
sees the engagement and the involvement.
>> Yeah, I understand. It's a good
question. Um so just uh I have started
doing that second
um part where it's then you sort of
observe the whole trust rover IP stack
and make inputs rather than just accept
at requests. Um and I have this like ZKP
board book reader where it kind of gives
me ideas of things that I should look
at. um some replies that are like
requiring things like that to happen.
And I actually made a push today in the
ZAB task force repo um with this
document and then I wasn't sure that was
appropriate. So I went back on it um
after second thoughts. But I think
having a document like this in a
standard format could also be um a a
good methodology
where I can then do some sort of
ceremony. So the way that I do the
ceremony is um
for the different comments and inputs is
there's this like link to the open
destination. This is a comment on credec
9. Um, this one like I read and I was
like, we don't need to make this
comment. It's actually solved somewhere
else. But just to show you the flow, I
say one hand proves two names. Two hands
prove one name is the same. And the
second is not the first. And that's kind
of like a proverbial reading of what
this post means. So that's like me doing
a mental check. Um, I then copy the
approved text, open the destination, and
like as I mentioned, I thought that this
one is kind of already been solved. Um,
and we've had a few comments and back
and forth. So, I don't need to post this
long thing was my opinion after reading
the agentic sort of read of the
situation. Um, but if I was to post, I
would then post and then I would export
this view receipt. Um, and I've been
doing these view receipts because I I
think that's also like an interesting
experiment of trust asks that we can um
start giving to over a viable trust
agents.
So yeah, that's kind of how I've been
trying to manage what I think Sangishan
you're getting to with your your
question of like there's
this like this balance um that we're
going to need to create um both for us
as CKP task force people but also the
agents that help us manage this.
But yeah, if this is useful, I think I
made a post in
um
the task force
discussions.
Yeah. This
Yeah, Sangashan, if if you want, I can
literally just post it. Um,
I think the problem that I have with it
is
like it it struggles with time and it
also struggles with um like it obviously
doesn't have the specific knowledge of
what I know Sanka to be working on or
what I know um Jeff is working on. So,
it kind of like starts
just cherrypicking
um stuff that I'm like, "Oh, he already
knows the the answer to that." But it
just wasn't addressed in that git
discussion. Um or something like that.
So,
I need some refinement around that. But
I think that's um yeah,
I will stop talking about my little my
little agent reader now. Um,
back to the agenda.
>> Cool.
>> Oh, yeah. Okay. So, uh, where I was at
was this record seven. Let's just go
straight there.
Cool. Just need to move your guys faces.
See the
the index.
Okay,
it's too fixed
this one.
No, it's further down. Here we go.
So, this would be an example of
construction 7, which is that answer to
nine, which is common control across
identifiers, which is that like I have
all these credentials that mean that I'm
a part of the kernel.
So again, we've got this like key
binding gadget being bound by the
primitive
construction.
And the statement for this one is the
verify checks. The two identities
appearing with credentials
um as a subject and issuer
are pairwise.
So we need a witness
We accept two sort of pairways inputs
and then we get that
transcript.
Identifier A's public key or commitment
opens to
A and identifier B is open to B.
Both are equal same issuer.
So that sort of pairwise key binding
proving common control.
So one controller is the disclosure set
um the transcript gets disclosed
um and the identifiers only as far as
the card already discloses them which is
not
it's just the
request.
Then we follow that flow of information
where it's like does not establish
other constructions.
We have that adversary
on the horizon.
Then we have some of our options
cross one option running a circuit a
circum gadget
and then the other option here includes
the one that was in the proof of person
paper
against
This is kind of like the
recipe. What are the ingredients?
>> Yeah, I was going to say it felt like
you were going through the cookbook and
saying
>> this is this is one of the
>> here's the ingredients we would take.
>> Yeah.
>> Yep.
And this part here is what gets
hopefully it gets hashed away but um it
kind of
>> Are you intending to share right now?
>> Huh?
>> Are you sharing are you meaning to share
your screen?
>> I am sharing my screen on it.
>> I don't think No.
>> Really?
>> Are you I'm on the wrong How did I do
that? You are. How did I do?
>> Okay. Okay. There's there's multiple
tabs in Zoom.
>> I freaked out.
>> Freaked out.
>> Can we Can we erase that from the
transcript so I don't sound so dumb?
Sorry. Continue.
>> Oh, that was um so yeah, this this
Providence graph uh early days
um it lives here. Hopefully we then just
hash this stuff and create this sort of
chain of of governance that resolves to
the trust graph
um
in terms of yeah who is responsible and
what and I also think that this is
helpful when showing people like the
Berkeley folks that they um if they
contribute their work there's providence
written in um to the spec.
This was the initial
on Friday.
So yeah, that was one construction
answering 07. Um,
and now this is one that you requested,
Scott, actually the blinded binder.
So I think in the next
week if possible um have
maybe like a specific like there's two
things that I think we need comments on.
One is like the structure of this
because if we're going to follow this
structure it then creates a template. um
of like the cards that becomes really
this is the recipe statement to people
when they come in
um format. So, I'd like that to be
um scrutinized if possible
and
then um there's a lot more I guess
general education in this spec
around. So, right now we're at the
constructions part of it.
But in the book of ZKPs who jump down
here to the bottom,
this is actually pulling from
both the
mapping the paper but also some like
independent research.
uh that I've been doing.
So, it's kind of like the more messy
context and research at the bottom that
will eventually get removed from the
spec, but is useful when we have agents
working on it.
Um, so it just gives some
like a place for
me to put those sort of run times
because there was a new proof that was
actually introduced last week. Um, which
is really quite cool. Um but it's for
it's mostly for ZK EVM the virtual
machines relevant later but um yeah I I
want to make sure that we like have that
in here even though we're going for the
stronger ones we have some research area
um
and then the cryptographic background is
like your one zk brought into the spec
as well where it's like what is a zk AP,
these are the things that matter. These
are the trade-offs that we're always
going to be um thinking about or trying
to achieve.
Um the different types of setups. So
you've got the you've got the un uh the
universal trusted setup. So this is the
the blockchain uh and then the
transparent
CKS
got the non-interactive ones
field curves and this is where we start
getting some
mathematical
um definitions into the spec.
which is where it all starts getting a
little bit too confusing.
But I think it's
>> Sorry, did you say that's where it
starts getting too confusing?
>> Speaking for myself.
>> Yeah,
that's that's
so
this one's actually fairly okay. Um
we're at the end of the timing for the
call. Yeah, I this was awesome. Thank
you. The one thing I the the one item I
just wanted to call out was we will be
having um Leif from Ciros Foundation and
the WW wallet joining us on the 29th.
Um, and we'll be looking to see if we
can get some uh developers on the call
too just to get at the intersection of
some of the they've been running Leif
and Cyrus have been running performance
tests across major ZKP families and they
have some interesting intelligence to
share and I I think we'll have good
contributions to the the cookbook and
these conversations we're having. Um, so
that's in motion. Just wanted to call
that out.
Sweet. That sounds good.
>> Yeah.
>> Do you think the um
prover
or guys would attend as well at one
point?
>> Proverb. What is that?
>> That's the the world ZK kit.
>> Oh, the prove. Got it. Um
>> no,
>> I mean I met I met the engineer. He's
very kind. I can ask him. Yeah.
>> Okay.
>> Well, let's start with that one on the
29th and then we can continue to
>> Cool.
>> have developers in.
>> Awesome.
>> Great.
>> Well, thank you everyone.
>> Thanks.
>> Thank you. Thanks, Mitchell.
>> See you.
>> See you later.
>> All right. Have a good day.