Taking Stock of U.S. Strategy in Asia

Welcome to the Asia Chessboard, the podcast that examines geopolitical dynamics in Asia and takes an inside look at the making of grand strategy. I'm Mike Green of the United States Studies Center in Sydney and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Welcome back to the Asia Chess Board. I'm Mike Green. joined for a tour of the horizon of the geopolitics of the Indo Pacific with one of the very best in the field Randy Shrivever. We've worked together on and off over it just occurred to me Randy over three decades. >> Yeah. >> And you've been there for a a lot of history. I think you were 12, I was 10, but uh you've been there for a lot of American state craft in different parts of the US government think tank community in the middle of a lot of important decisions. So, lots to get to. Randy is currently the chair of the board of the Institute for Indo-Pacific Security. He served as assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs in the first Trump administration from January 2018 to December 2019. He founded the Project 2049 Institute, which a lot of listeners will know for its work on East Asian security, especially around Taiwan. He was president and CEO. He was deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific Affairs in the Bush administration from 2001 2003. He served as chief of staff and senior policy adviser to the then deputy secretary of state, a big mentor for me as well, Rich Armmitage. And we first met when Randy was working in the Pentagon for Kurt Campbell and Joe Nye and Bill Perry and others. He was in the Pentagon in the Clinton administration 94 to98 in the office of the Secretary of Defense. was the senior official responsible for day-to-day management of US bilateral defense relations with the People's Liberation Army and bilateral security military relationships with Taiwan. So, I was brought in in the middle of that just in case Randy messed up things with the PLA to make sure that the US Japan Alliance was ready and waiting. So, lots of history, lots of insights. Really excited to have you and and Ry's coming out to Sydney for our Sydney International Strategy Forum in September and that'll be great fun. So, thanks Randy. >> Great. Well, thanks for having me, Mike, and I look forward to the conversation tonight and seeing you soon in Sydney. >> So, we always begin with the how did you get here part and why don't you tell us you're from the west coast, so you probably had a little bit of Asia on your mind, but what pointed you in the direction of security of Asia, of China, Taiwan. >> Yeah. So, really my uh China origin story goes back to college when I was failing out as a premed student. There was a mutual agreement between the faculty and myself that I was not going to become a physician. and actually had to take summer courses to make up credit between my freshman and sophomore year. And by luck or by providence, my father was on sobatical in Washington DC. So, I took a summer course at Georgetown University, a place you're very familiar with, an IR course. And I returned to uh Williams College, now in good academic standing, and I sought out this professor who couldn't pick me out of a crowd of two. And I said, "Hey, this IR stuff is kind of interesting to me. What, you know, do you have any advice?" And he said, "Take Chinese language." And if he had said take Swahili, I'm sure I would have done that. But this was 1986. So Mike, you'll both appreciate this and probably be saddened by this a little bit. My Chinese 101 class was four students. The Japanese 101 was 40. It was literally 10 times. You, we remember the mid 80s, the trajectory that Japan was on or thought to be on and China was still pretty backwater. But I got recruited into the Navy, Navy intelligence because I, you know, spoke a little Chinese, which three years of undergraduate Chinese language, you know, is not really sufficient to be translating documents, but it was such an unusual thing and a a distinguishing thing at that time. So I got recruited in the Navy intelligence and of course the first thing they did was send me to the Middle East for uh Desert Shield, Desert Storm. But after my active duty time, I did get into the reserve system working on China. did some recall duty to Embassy Beijing and then I ended up after graduate school working for Kurt Campbell and another guy you know well Carl Iikenberry on the China Taiwan desk. So that sort of married the Chinese language, Chinese interests and security issues for the first time fully together. >> My son wants to do the same trajectory that you did actually >> if he could cut out the premed part. >> He's given premed. I cannot tell you how many people have been on this program, Americans, and said, "Yeah, I was in premed." And I decided it'd be easier to learn Chinese or Korean or Japanese. >> That's [laughter] right. >> But my son's on this trajectory. He's got one problem, though. He's fluent in Latin. So, I keep telling him like, "The Navy needs to be counting those Roman tri." But it's a really cool track. When you went into the Pentagon, you weren't detailed from the Navy, right? That was a civilian belllet. >> That's right. I I had a uh an interesting Navy experience. I I deployed Desert Shield, Desert Storm. But you will also recall 199091, we were still sort of in the peace dividend even though we went to war. And I was asked after I returned from Desert Storm if I wanted to take an early out and and join the active reserves, cut the active duty time. I was advised by a mentor of mine, I don't know if you know this, Mike, my my first boss in the Navy when I was an enson and he was a lieutenant commander04 was Harry Harris. And so Harry said, "Take it." And uh I'll write you a recommendation to go to the Kennedy School. >> So I went to the Kennedy School and I joined the Office of Secretary of Defense after that as what was called a presidential management intern, PMI, later PMF, presidential management fellow. >> Currently more bound thanks to the Trump administration, but I joined as a fellow and then converted into the civil service. >> My wife was a PMI and I got into the program, but I was on a fullbrite. When I came back, the only job left was to be in the Defense Logistics Agency counting how much toilet paper the army had. So, I never did it. It's a great program. People who have worked with the US government, with the State Department, Pentagon, Energy will find some of the top civilian, not foreign service, not military officers, but top civilian officials you meet were out of that program. So, I'm sure it will come back. It's just a >> I look at my cohort group. Kathleen Hicks was was in my cohort group. She became Deputy Secretary of Defense. Christine Warmuth was in my cohort group. she became secretary of the army. So, it was a pretty good pipeline. Sharon Burke became an assistant secretary. So, I hope so, Mike. I really do. Yeah, >> I can't imagine it wouldn't. It's just such self harm to cut off the pipeline of talent to the top levels of the US government. You mentioned a couple of people worth flagging there. Harry Harris, Georgetown, a really influential figure in East Asia. He had the Japan, I think, desk at the joint staff when I met him. That maybe that's when you'd worked for him. But he ended up becoming, of course, the paycom commander. Um, and probably the first one, I think the first one in the postcold war era, >> tell me if you disagree, but the first one in the postcold war era to really focus on the war fight >> with the PLA. And I don't think I'm exaggerating when I say that, to like really take it seriously. not just see the role as maintaining alliances and stability and reassurance but actually really taking seriously the way US forces Korea would the possibility of real combat like real danger. He had to sell that to a Trump administration as you know where there were Chinese representations saying he was dangerous and he held his ground and I think really set the trajectory that we now see with Indopaccom as it's been renamed or back to PCOM. So pretty important guy and and wonderful Georgetownrad naval officer. I work for him in the operational forces. So we were deployed together in a P3 squadron. So it was literally my first deployment in the Navy and we were in Msira Oman but was really a formative period for me professionally and then having him as a mentor was fantastic. I agree with your assessment. I mean, it was probably somewhat evolutionary as the Chinese started misbehaving more and more, but I think he in many ways did reorient things to a real greater sense of purpose about the war fight and more serious preparations. I actually don't think he was having to push too hard on people like Jim Mattis and some of the others that served in the first term of the Trump administration, Matt Potinger at the NSC, but certainly his visionary leadership and his sort of brute force personality certainly helped drive things in that direction >> for sure. And he had no problem with the policy or military side. It was a bit more of the political people who in the end came on side. Well, like most administrations, you won't be shocked to hear we had people on the economic side of the house and, you know, a lot of mixed equities, mixed interests, but I think, you know, we got a lot of help from the Chinese in that period as they really started intensifying the coercion and it wasn't limited to just Taiwan. It was really along the first island chain and it was becoming a global phenomena if it if it wasn't already. And so, you know, that first NDS that was released in the Trump administration, which our mutual friend bridge KBY had a big hand in was really, I think, the first to put a fine point on China as the pacing element and as our, you know, Pacific priority theater, China is the priority challenge. One could argue with very compelling evidence that we say it on paper, but we don't always live up to it in actions and resources. But I think the 2018 NDS was really a seminal piece of work that for our department certainly was a valuable strategic guidance document. You know, sometimes NSS NDS's seemed somewhat disconnected from the policy, but for us it was a very powerful instrument and really at the core of that was this idea of long-term strategic competition with China. I want to come back to the national defense strategy and of course the national security strategy HR McMasters and others worked on that set the predicate for it but let's talk a little bit more about people you worked with leading up to that because when you and I worked in the Pentagon there were real debates about what American strategy should be in Asia and this is a little bit of a simplification but there was basically a school that believed that a kind of reassurance institution building confidence building economic interdependence with China should get the lion share of our efforts. We should be willing to take risk on the security side to invest in that. And then there was another view that didn't disagree with investing in stability and interdependence but wanted to be much more prepared for it failing. That latter group you were in, I was in Kurt Campbell who we worked for a lot of the people we've been talking about especially Rich Armmitage. How did you come into Rich's orbit? I mean for my part I met him through not introduced by but because of the work I was doing on the alliance for Kurt and Jonai because there was such a bipartisan consensus growing around the importance of alliances and readiness and deterrence. But did you meet him when you were working for Kurt in a Democratic administration? Was that the first introduction? >> I did. And it's funny you put it that way because that's one of the reasons Kurt introduced me. I was looking through my soda straw. I can't claim to have this great vision of how we should have strategically been realigning or I was looking at China's growth and increasingly malign activities around including another country in my portfolio Taiwan but Kurt sent me over to see Rich cuz he knew I was a Republican and he said you're going to have to wash this Democrat stuff off he used a different word wash this Democrat stuff off him someday when he makes a bid for a political appointment and so that was an introduction but then I actually worked a bit with him when Secretary Cohen was getting ready to make his first visit to China as Secretary of Defense and he asked the Defense Policy Board to do some preparatory work for that and Rich was on the Defense Policy Board but clearly the person with the most Asia background and so Rich sort of led that effort for the Defense Policy Board. I was sort of the liazison. So I was traveling back and forth to Roslin. You remember the old Armadage Associates office in Rosland on Wilson Boulevard and I got to know him then. And then when I left the department to become an academic, another conversation that resulted in the faculty and my being in mutual agreement that I wasn't going to be an academic, I did leave to go to Stanford. Rich invited me to join some projects and initiatives he was working on. So I had this very weird poor PhD student by day traveling for trilateral meetings with the Japanese and the Taiwanese at the Okora by weekend and [laughter] then back to ramen in my dorm room the next Monday. But Rich was very kind and very generous to include me in all those efforts and that sort of led to us developing a relationship that led to his invitation for me to work on the campaign and then ultimately the transition in the Bush administration. >> Yeah, it takes a particular I don't know if it's discipline or pathological disorder to stay focused on your PhD when you're actually doing all those kinds of cool things with the countries you're supposed to be researching and writing about. It is interesting and I've written about this myself but there's a very strong maritime service Navy imprint the people who really drove what became the strategy in the 2018 national defense strategy rich obviously Navy yourself Kurt was a Navy reserveist you had people like Carl I can army it wasn't exclusively maritime services but a very heavy dose of people who had served at sea or had thought about maritime problems >> tol Jim Kelly you could have >> Jim Kelly took Patterson that's right and my theory is it's because they're at what the Australians would call the coalace. You're thinking about the first island chain sea lanes and that's where the lights start turning from green to yellow, yellow to red first. It's a bit less so in other sectors of relationships. That's where the problem's most acute and where the thinking begins, I find. >> Yeah. I mean, it makes a lot of sense to me. I haven't done the deep thinking necessarily than you have and you've written on it. But I think the other thing Mike is that as a um forward deployed and float force you're also immediately aware of the time distance issues the tyranny of time and distance and therefore in the western Pacific the extraordinary importance of alliances I mean whether that's for protocols or coordinated joint activities whatever it may be when you're dealing with that kind of time distance problem when you're dealing with that vastness of contested areas you know it's not going to feel too crowded. on your side of the battle line if you're joined by partners and allies and all the things that naval forces afloat ultimately need. So I think you're sort of born into that world too. It's not part of the naval service and the orientation to think about sea lanes and all that, but you naturally go right away to the importance of friends and allies. >> Yep. The 2018 national defense strategy built on the national security strategy the year before. US national security strategies coming out of the White House from the end of the cold war until Trump always premised the possibility if not the expectation that US China or US Russia relations could be stabilized by something exogenous to the relationship. So for George Walker Bush it was kind of the new world order. For Clinton it was enlargement and engagement. for our administration, for Bush, it became the war on terror. >> Yeah. >> And for Obama, it was climate change. And so, every administration, for as long as you and I have been doing this, had a national security strategy that at least publicly was premised on the idea, no, we're going to get along. We'll have to have allies. I mean, I was brought into the Bush administration because of my alliance expertise, you know, going to have to have allies. But 2017 and then with much clearer lines of effort, the 2018 national defense strategy said, "No, the defining characteristic of our new era is strategic competition, particularly with China." It was really clear. It was really clear. Yeah. >> And for a Trump administration that was not, you know, or let me put it this way, for a president who was not famous for being disciplined, it was a strategy that was incredibly disciplined, at least on the national security side. And of course, I'm sure there were people I know there were people often on the economic side or the political side who and there were in the Bush administration who found competition inconvenient. Without going into details, you will recall the two of us getting in trouble with our bosses, Colon Pal and Kandi Rice because we kept nudging them to approve arm sales to Taiwan that were not diplomatically convenient. And that happens in every administration. And I'm sure it happened in Trump one, but it was pretty disciplined. I guess the question for you is, was it that disciplined? and how much of that is left in Trump 2. I think a lot of the elements continued through Biden >> with Jake and Kurt and Tony. But in Trump 2, it's just a very very different policy process. It's much more chaotic. It's much more as Habberman and Swan Wright, the president deciding in the moment. How much continuity do you see and how much of the strategic competition discipline I guess do you see surviving today from what you worked on? Big question, but you know, go at it. >> So, I'd say a couple things. First of all, I do want to say what I did say when I was in office is Trump won was more evolutionary than revolutionary. That I mean, I'm sure people were in office, maybe even myself talking about how groundbreaking the NDS was and everything, but if you look at previous administrations, they were definitely a combination or a mix of engagement and hedging. There's always the hedging piece and then I think by the time you get to the pivot to Asia which Kurt would say it's not about China which led us all to understand okay this is about China and really the if you unpack that what they were talking about 60% of our naval forces in the Indoacific and the rebalance within the rebalance to put greater emphasis on engagement with Southeast Asia. All of this, I think, were the building blocks for the Trump administration to be able to come in and say, "China is the organizing principle, and we're going to have our executive branch agencies build out policies in accordance with that." I think the Biden administration, there was not only continuity, but I would say in certain instances a hardening of some of the key positions, particularly on export controls, but also on posture initiatives in the Indoacific. Eli, I think, did a terrific job and a lot of the work in the Philippines and and the um other alliance of Southwest Island chain of Japan and the opportunities that started to open up there, the Second Island chain, all of that I think was not only continuity, but really kind of hardening. You get to the Trump too and it's a little hard for me to comment on because well, on the discipline part, it's not hard to comment on. It's not discipline. But in order to sort of evaluate the policy, I'd have to better understand what it is. And I keep getting sort of mixed messages. Shanklaw speech number one from Secretary Hagsth versus number two. It looks like two different administrations, right? And then you have this discussion about deterrence by denial. And then we're sending our aircraft carrier, the only one in the Indoacific, to the Middle East. And you know, you talk about Taiwan needing to spend 10% of its GDP on defense, which is an absurd number, but made all the more when you don't sell them arms when you put 14 billion worth of arms on freeze. So, the point I can agree with you on, or I don't know if you said it explicitly, but that I would underscore is yes, it does appear to lack discipline and be a bit chaotic. I think what the Trump people would say is it's the sort of outward public-f facing activities, statements, strategic documents, and then there's the real work, what we're doing dayto-day. And they would point to certain things on diversification of supply chain, the critical minerals, critical inputs as being an effort that gets very little attention, that's very consequential. They might point to joint training in Taiwan. We're not selling the big arms packages since December 2025. We've got this unprecedented growth in training. And so this this notion of what did Hick says quiet but strong and clear. I'm not sure we got the strong part with all the resources being amunitions being depleted and attention being diverted to the Middle East. But I think there's an element of truth there that there are things going on outside the public eye that are meant to strengthen our competitive posture visa v China. And so I want to give him a little credit for that. But we talk about Korea being a model ally in a very public speech and then a couple weeks later we're talking about reducing exercises and criticizing them for not supporting us on Iran. So it's doesn't quite have that discipline >> as those exercises are beginning and hundreds thousands of people are being deployed and leaving their families and money being spent. I think you'd agree with this but I kind of from the beginning have rejected this effort to define a grand strategy for the second term. You know, it's Western Hemisphere really than what are we doing in Iran. >> Okay. It's a G2 with China really. It I think it's more of a roulette wheel every day or every week and and whatever the strategy is coming out of the Oval Office or the latest thing is what it is and then it goes away. Living out in the Western Pacific or sort of the hanging off the bottom of the Western Pacific and interacting a lot with defense forces and diplomats and US officials and military officers. If you just peel a few layers back, it's the operating system, if you will, that is in the 2018 NDS or in the Biden administration strategy is still the operating system. There is no new grand strategy. But you probably pay a pretty big price when you don't have a clearly articulated grand strategy from the top in terms of things like munitions or attention or what you can say about China. like you will not hear senior officials criticize China strategically very much right now because the president has a summit coming up. So this I mean you and I have both worked at senior levels of state defense. I was in the NCS. I like to believe that the message and the strategy coming from the top matters to actual successful implementation and it is very hard to read right now and I'm sure we're paying a price for that at some level. But the operating system has not changed that I see. >> That's a great way to put it. I I agree with that. It's gonna sound like I'm picking on my friend Bridge. I I don't mean to, but you know, he gave this speech in Manila, very public, and it's all splashed out of DoD press releases and and the like. And he gives a speech in Manila, doesn't mention China, doesn't mention South China Sea, doesn't mention the war in Iran. I mean, it's interesting at a minimum, right? So I guess that's protecting the president's decision space when it comes to negotiating with CJ Pang and its implementation of this quiet but strong and clear strategy. But I got to believe at some level also that countries are a bit confused by this and trying to understand what our priorities really are and how reliable we really are if we're not even going to talk about the South China Sea in Manila which is you know that's the number one security challenge right now for sure. And you know you were always an excellent leader on this when you were at NSC in the White House keeping us all knit up on public messaging and talking points across agencies because I think you know our allies depend on that. They want to know what the message is and they want to be able to see if there's a say do gap and measure us by our words. And I just don't see that coming out of this administration. Now, a big part of it is who's the China desk officer right now? It's Donald J. Trump. Who's the Iran desk officer right now? It's Donald J. Trump. And either for self-preservation reasons or just adaption to how decisions are made and things get done in this administration, he gets all the space he needs to make decisions. And that sometimes that space is uncomfortably empty until we await the president's words or decisions, but that's the way it is and I don't see that changing for the rest of this administration. >> No, I agree. In fact, it may get even more, what's the word? Dramatic, hyperactive as politics inevitably turn against, you know, the incumbent president. There are two things that I think probably will not happen in 2029 after the next president comes into office. Obviously, a lot depends on the election. But one thing that's not going to happen, I think a new administration is not going to have to come in and call together the foreign service and the joint staff and the CIA and say, "Guys, look, China is our main competitor." I mean, there's a bit of that in the 2018 NDS. That's not going to have to happen. The system knows. I don't worry about that. And the other thing I don't think is going to happen is I don't think our main allies are going to hold what Trump did against the next administration. A lot of commentators write, "Oh, this is it. we're done. But when a new administration comes in, I don't think the foreign ministers of Japan or Australia or Korea are going to say, "Nope, no, no, no. What you did to us, we didn't like, so we're not going to work. What the previous guy did, we do not like, so we're not going to work with you." And you can see it in the polling already. Trust in the US in polls, including a poll we just put out today, is the lowest on record right now in Japan, Australia, not Korea, but that now probably will change. Support for the alliance is in most of these countries the highest ever. 97% in Korea, 93% in Japan. Pretty steady in Australia. So structurally, I don't think see a plan B. I don't see decoupling. But we've not actually been in an administration like this. So we'll just have to see. >> The other interesting thing to me is you see a lot of hedging. I would say minor hedging, but to date most of this are things we would have encouraged. >> Exactly. Either way, now if it becomes a fuller hedge, and that becomes the defining quality of what our allies are doing, that's a problem. But more on defense spending, more miniateral work that doesn't necessarily have the US as the convenor. You know, all the great work Japan's doing with the Philippines and Australia, these are things that we would have long encouraged and are happy to see, even if it's the result of a hedge, fine for now, I would say. Do you agree with that? The US ally that's probably hedging the most in terms of trying to fight alternates to the US right now is Canada. And I would say first of all they are by far the most dependent on the US. So in a way you can't blame them. And number two other countries aren't really buying it. They like the vibe. They like the Mark Carney Davo speech but they're not the Japanese and Australians aren't canceling F-35s. And to your point about allies working together. Last week there's a big Japan Australia conference here in Sydney hosted by Nikke and there was an impressive list of Japan Australia cooperation from the Moam class destroyer to critical minerals and I said to the group this is really good and it's really good for the US and if you had the most reassuring president imaginable John McCain or Jeb Bush this would still be happening and it's primarily happening not because of the US because of China. >> Yeah. So, I think it's hard to keep perspective, but I think there's a lot of reason to think we don't have to put a fork in it yet. We got some room, >> nor is the administration done yet. >> No, that's true. >> You're out in the region, but I've traveled through a few times recently and the conversations on the Iran war are different than what diplomats are saying to US interlocators here in Washington. >> There's a lot of frustration and there's a lot of concern about no endgame, no no strategy to end the conflict. You know, that's just one, it's a big piece, but that's just one piece. You know, where are we going on tariffs? We we seem to get this decision from the Supreme Court and he pivots to another somewhat obscure section of trade policy to strike 50% tariffs against Canada, our largest trading partner. So, you know, that challenging that in the court system would take a while and and it seems like we're on sort of this gerbo wheel of the president's not going to give up use of tariffs as a tool and you know better than I do for for friends and allies who want some privilege with alliance and partnership with history behind it. They're they're not going to get it. Administration is going to continue to reach for this. So, I think your fundamental point is right. I like the way you put it. We still got time to go here. >> You're right. I mean, the thing that drains my glass half full to glass half empty is that we have two more years. And most presidents, as you know, because you worked for most of them in the last 25, 30 years, if they lose the midterm election, they become more internationalists. They move to the center. They emphasize allies more. Clinton did it. Bush did it. Obama did it after losing the midterms. If President Trump and the Republicans lose the House and maybe the Senate, I don't think that's what will happen. I think that Trump's particular style is when you're under duress, show you have power even more dramatically. So, it could be an even wilder ride. And so, really, we have to temper the cautious optimism with that fact because we just haven't been in this kind of sustained pattern of presidential decision-m that's so just not trusted. You can see it in the polls around the world. Let me ask you a little bit. When you were in the Pentagon and in the State Department, you would comment and it really caught people's attention. And you would say early in your career when you were involved in projections about PLA military capabilities, you were accused at the time always of being too hawkish and you always underestimated how serious the problem would be. So I haven't heard you say that in a while. >> Yeah. >> Let me ask you about it. So looking at the PLA now and the capability set and looking back on the work you did in the Trump administration 1.0 or in project 2049 say in the Biden years were you were on the you know the edge of saying look how dangerous it is. Are you surprised? Are you surprised at how dramatic it is or is the trajectory what you expected? >> I think the pace I mean if you go back to the 1990s I would like to think I was you know sort of an early hawk and part of that is just when are your formative years what are your formative experiences? I came into the Pentagon in '9495 and Carl Iikenberry said I want to do big China you do the little stuff. you do Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mongolia. And so I took up the Taiwan portfolio literally the month lead on the way went to Cornell University and gave the commencement address and all hell broke loose with exercises. And you know, I'm scratching my head saying they're becoming a democracy and they're getting missiles lobbed at them for that. That just doesn't seem right to me. And then, you know, even the other portfolios, I worked the Hong Kong revision. You know, we used to do 60 to 80 ship visits a year there. US Navy ship visits, we do none now. But kind of seeing all that unfold really made an impression on me. But I think yeah, I was surprised at the pace what you're referring to, Mike. I was commenting on a study we actually did. We had the intel community do something that they're normally loathed to do, which was grade themselves, do a study of studies and say how well we did in predicting China's trajectory. And as you said, at every juncture, in virtually every category, they were underestimating the progress. >> And when when you say we, you mean in the second Trump administration, so like 2019 or so? >> Oh, 20. So I think we got more sophisticated and and have a much more realistic understanding of the trajectory. I think what's at play now though is this evolving nature of warfare harvesting all these lessons learned from Ukraine and and even Iran for that matter. Not only the foundational research and the development of certain technologies with military application but actually fielding them and incorporating them into doctrine and operational concepts. I think we would be really ill advised to underestimate the PLA's capability of doing that though it's certainly a challenge right I think even in the beginning of the Trump administration there was still this idea that China's innovation cycle was uh fast follower that they'll steal the IP and the technology they'll duplicate it they'll build it to scale but they're fast follower they can't innovate the way our country does and that includes technology with military applications innovations with military applications I think what we're seeing and I'm drawing on work I do with the US China Commission for the Congress. What we're seeing is pretty impressive innovation in AI and quantum and biotech. And we're starting to see some things reach the military, at least things we can observe when we look at exercises and media portrayal that the Chinese are letting out. You know, the uh use of autonomous systems, the use of even advanced robotics. And I do kind of wonder with these dog robots actually, you know, if they hit the beach, how well they're going to do. But, you know, they're showing them off in these exercises. I mean, there's some impressive stuff going on. But to use the Rumsfeldian lexicon, the big known unknown is how does all this come together for a military that hasn't seen combat since 1979 and doesn't train in highly complex environments. They're better, but they're not to our level of complexity and difficulty. And that's just hard to know. >> Yeah. And where are you on the so-called Davidson window? the idea that when Phil Davidson was into Paycon commander, he gave that speech in 2022 citing Xiinping's call on the PLA to be ready to fight and win by 2027. Are we in a dangerous window or what are you thinking? >> I've talked to Phil a lot about this actually. He would hasten to add that that was a be ready by date, not a go date and a lot of people treated it as a potential go date. I think there are a number of things to suggest that if it's a be ready by date, they might not be ready by then and that there are things that would surely give them pause if they're studying the battle space of Ukraine and Russia right now and again, frankly, even Iran and what Iran's been able to do against the United States and what they've been able to do to take advantage of their asymmetric capabilities and and their geography and so on and so forth. You got the massive purging of the PLA that continues. There are a lot of things that would suggest they don't look like a military that's sort of on the verge of a major operation of that nature. And it's still a hard target. 80 nautical miles of water, mountainous, inhospitable terrain, unfavorable sea conditions for most of the year, very few ports for imbarcation that are favorable. So, I don't think we're looking at the most dangerous window. There's a huge caveat I would add to that which is they're watching what's happening to the United States military very closely. They're seeing the depletion of munitions. They're seeing our inability to replenish at sufficient rates. They're seeing our resources which were meant for posture initiatives and building our logistics and maintenance capabilities for a contestant environment in the indust. They're seeing all that diverted and one would think they're calculating maybe this is a better window than we thought despite our own shortcomings and our own uncertainties. Would the United States and would this president take on another major conflict right now? Taiwan is doing all this work on national resilience. Do we really want to wait till that all comes online? So, there is risk. I don't think, you know, this is a stretch where I'm going to wake up one morning and be wrong. It's a big thing to be wrong about, but I I think deterrence can hold longer at this juncture. >> I'm going to butcher it, but you know, Admiral Paparo, the current PCOM commander, sort of describes the big sweeping epical changes in warfare and describes World War I as advantaging defense to the surprise of the cult of the offense that came out of the 19th century, World War II, favoring offense with the Blitzkrieg and US island hopping to the surprise of those who came out of World War I and and fixed defenses. And he he said it could be we're entering an era where defense again has the advantage that autonomy actually helps defense more than offense. A do you think that sounds right? And B do you how do you think the PLA looks at that? Because theirs is no longer really a defense doctrine. They're moving to my interpretation of the PLA campaign plan is it's a theaterwide campaign p plan very much like Japan in 194142. So the burden of offense is on the PLA in many ways. So so what's your take? Yeah, it you know all these things China hands love to talk about things with Chinese characteristics, right? So it is more of an offensive oriented plan and doctrine and operational concepts being developed for that. But there are Chinese characteristics to this, right? Which is the lawfare political warfare piece and what you're seeing around Taiwan right now. For example, a new coast guard patrol that's supposed to be a persistent control east of Taiwan. You know, really interesting development. So, I think, you know, the win without fighting thing is still very important and if not the PLA, the CCP's mindset. I'm not smart enough to give you a good answer on the defense versus offense. I do know this that even if that were to be true, you have to make the right investments in the joint force in order to leverage that new reality. Right? defense may have the advantage, but if you're shooting patriots and thads to knock down very cheap and tradable drones, that's not a good that's not a cost-effective way to do defense. Now, there are ways that you can match cheap tradable things to shoot down cheap tradable things, but I think there probably is some some truth in that, but we we got to make the right kind of investments. When Admiral Paparo talks about hellscape as part of the defense of Taiwan, I think it well I know because we read what the Chinese write about it. It's something they're very concerned about, but it's still highly aspirational. We have to build that and we have to work that into operational concepts and ultimately into the war plan for that to really be a deterrent. Right now it's a oh shoot, the United States may be on to something, but it's aspirational. >> Yeah. You spent a lot of time obviously with Taiwan, but also Japan, Australia, other US allies. What's your take on our alignment on the Taiwan problem and China's take on our alignment? Do you think that the PLAC seems that they can exploit and neutralize key countries or do you think they're assuming that, you know, all the key allies, particularly Japan, Australia, Philippines are in? >> Yeah, you know, Mike, it's a great question and you're more expert in more than one of those countries you just rattle off, but particularly Japan. My read is they're very upset at Takiichi for the Taiwan statement, but not just because she said it's a survival threatening situation, but because Japan is doubling its defense spending, it's introducing counter strike capability, which to the untrained eye looks a lot like strike capability. That they're doing a lot of things to strengthen their position for their own defense, but also to contribute to regional security or as we used to say around the 95 96 areas situations in the area surrounding Japan. Is that the >> That's it. [laughter] >> Yeah. So, I think Japan to me looks more serious and that draws on my recent time in government, but also recent travels. And I think the Chinese understand them to be more serious, which is why they've really taken a turn to pressure the Japanese. I think the reports from the cross party diet delegation that was just in Beijing, they were basically lectured on Taiwan and nothing's going to change from China's perspective unless Japan changes its Taiwan policy. You know, I think the Philippines under Marcos is certainly more inclined to support US initiatives. You know, they get a little squeezy when you start to specify what some of this stuff might be meaningful for. If you get into deeper conversations about a Taiwan contingency, you're going to make a lot of people pretty uncomfortable quickly. Australia, I think they take a again, you're far more expert than I, but they do think of the regional picture sort of what they can contribute and what they can be enablers to. And they're worried about, you know, not just Taiwan. It's not the situation that Amble Paparo has where he's got to think about honoring domestic law and having a plan that could work and being able to say we have the capacity to resist force. I think they'd look at broader Chinese power projection and what they've seen in the areas in the South China Sea and beyond Chinese patrols and they're thinking about delivering a force that is capable enough to secure its own interests which increasingly include broader regional activities and I think they've given serious thought to being a stronger partner and enabler to the United States and all of that is coming online. I've never had the impression that anyone in Australia is looking for a fight over Taiwan. >> Three people are. I know them all personally. [laughter] >> Yeah, you're right. And it's interesting. Our poll that just came out showed younger Australians, Australians in their 20s now think that China and the US are equally unhelpful in Asia. >> Equally unhelpful. >> Equally unhelpful. So that's a big problem. That's not where the government is. What the government is seeing is missile tests, circumnavigation by PLA, Navy task forces. And just this week, a big diplomatic effort by Australia to get the Pacific Island leaders to agree in effect that there should be no Chinese bases is in real peril because Beijing has successfully reached under the hood in some of these countries and convince leaders not to go. So, it's a knife fight and it's across all domains and some of the most intense ones are actually not physical or kinetic. They're diplomacy and influence campaigns and information. So I think for that reason there's going to be a tolerance for American let's just charitably say lack of discipline for a bit longer but we'll see. >> That's encouraging. That's oddly encouraging. Thank you. >> Look the best friend we have right now is Xinping until he's not. >> Yeah. Well, if you watch the region over a stretch of time, as you certainly have more than even the strongest Asia, I mean, you'll see these little indicators that aren't so little like Fiji and Australia entering into an alliance. This is Fiji's first military alliance, first security alliance ever. And for Australia, it's only what US New Zealand leanes treaty and they reach an agreement with BNG recently. I mean, this is new stuff >> and it's not because somebody cracked open a textbook and said, "Hey, alliances, that sounds interesting. We need that." >> No, it's, you know, the Chinese are really overplaying their hand and making a lot of folks nervous and we need to leverage that. And I it looks to me like folks in Cber are and and doing so in very smart ways. >> I think that's right. They definitely didn't crack open my textbooks. Hey, last quick question because your institute and before that project 2049 were drawing some of the best and brightest Asia hands in as RAS and interns and stuff. I'd be interested in your take on you know where the if you will future Randy Shrivers are coming from how they're doing. Are you are you going around to premed programs and liberal arts colleges saying don't do anatomy do Mandarin? I mean, presumably you're getting people out of Georgetown, GW, A&U, places like that, Japanese and Taiwan and Korean universities, but what's your take when you work with Americans, but also Australians, Japanese, Taiwanese, Koreans and stuff in their 20s, it gives me great hope because I find they're very, if you will, mission focused, they realize how high the stakes are and how important is they really master the subject. You know, let's let's face it, this is less than 1% of the population, but it does seem like there's a pipeline of real talent. That's my impression, but I've been in Australia for four years. What are you finding? I >> agree 100%. When we have intern applications come in, it's an embarrassment of riches and incredible choices, and 95% of the time it more than pans out. We've just been so blessed with spectacular talent. And there are things that really stand out, language capability and international experience. I often tell young people like, you're asking about my career path. My career path today would not work. you know, three years of Mandarin undergraduate language, which made me an interesting candidate for a bunch of jobs that required Chinese language. We get people that started studying Chinese language as an elementary school student and lived in China and that's not a distinguishing feature anymore. So, that's really impressive. I could say there are some things that maybe aren't as strong as they used to be. It's you tell me is do you find young people write as well as they used to? >> No. >> Yeah. >> But maybe they won't have to someday. I don't know. But well, that's fair enough. too too much texting and and social media, but I I'm very encouraged and I'm going to take the opportunity to do a little plug here. We are creating a fellowship in honor of Rich Armmitic who, as you said earlier, also was a person who mentored a lot of young professionals, myself included, you included. We're creating the Richard El Armadage Fellowship at the Institute for Indopacific Security. His family's very involved, Lauren. The kids are very supportive. It's going to be focused on the US Japan Alliance. We're going to have a cohort group of two fellows every year, one Japanese, one American. They're going to do six months at our institute in Washington area and six months in Tokyo. And we're launching that this fall as a pilot program. We're sending an American young professional to Tokyo. And our plan is to launch the full program April 1st for reasons Mike you will understand, April 1st, but I don't know that all your listeners will. But we'll have a full cohort group April 1st, 2027. So in our small way, we're trying to not only honor Mr. Eridge, but to your point, try to mentor and and nurture young professionals who are coming into the field who want to have their time making contributions and and we'll try to help them do that, build the skills and the tools, capabilities to do that. >> That is fantastic. Not April Fool's Day, but the beginning of the Japanese fiscal year, just so people know, that is fantastic and exactly what Rich would have wanted. So well done, Randy Shrivever, is the Japanese say national treasure. >> Yeah. So, um, thanks Mike. Thanks. And a lot in there and I hope people enjoy the discussion. >> Great. I always come out of a discussion like this and I think, God, I every question Mike asked me, I would have rather heard his answer than my own, but we'll have time to chew the fat a little more in Sydney, maybe. >> Excellent. Thank you. >> For more on strategy and the Asia programs work, visit the CSIS website at csis.org and click on the Asia program page. And for more on the US studies center in Sydney, please visit ussc.edu.a. AU.