SURGE US-China Symposium 2022: David Rawson Memorial Keynote Lecture w/ Brian Wong

empty chairs and golden tables all right um welcome everyone um this is our 14th annual symposium and we are serge um tufts sinai u.s international relations group and we focus on covering the relationship between china and u.s and it covers all facets ranging from security environmental policy economics and culture and yeah so we've spent uh the past eight months preparing for this symposium and um even though we regret not being able to host you on tufts beautiful medford campus um we're sort of having a hybrid uh model where our speakers will be virtual while our attendees could come in either in person or attend virtually um so again thank you for everyone who has made this symposium possible including the students professors and members of the tufts administration um and without further ado here is our keynote speaker brian wong thank you very much thank you very much anthony just double checking two things firstly is the audio all right yep it's good on my end great and secondly uh is there any introduction or can i just delve straight into it unless haitong wants to weigh in here um hi tong do you have any um intro or whatever you'd like to give if not um i think you can just yep you're unfortunately muted taitong which means i can't hear your lovely voice i am i am i am unfortunately muted i am terribly sorry so uh first of all a very important point of clarification brian wong anthony wong are not related and uh uh i'm going to pull it out right here so uh geez i'm terribly sorry my phone is very much and hi tong um while you do that we can give like i can give a quick um overview of like who i am and then who is please go on so yeah so i'm anthony wong not related to brian wong i'm the president of surge and i'm an applied math major junior at tufts university and overall just really interested in learning more about sort of the macroeconomic implications of the china and u.s relationship um and hi tong and uh brian brian is a lovely friend of mine um we were when i was studying abroad at oxford last year i had heard of brian's name and brian is the founding editor-in-chief of the oxford political review a publication that aspires to bridge the theory and practice gap and uh also a founding pat partner to the oxford political advisory group as a columnist for the hong kong economic journal and time and the editor at large for thrive global they write regularly for publications such as foreign policy aeon financial times the diplomat fortune scmp nikhil asia sub china u.s china perception monitor natan the hindu and having also presented and written on issues for public philosophy for the journal of practical ethics the american philosophical association and the royal institute of philosophy brian's comments have been featured on the atlantic and politicos china watch they have also served as the asia lead for polamax and uh without further ado brian please uh thank you very much haitong thank you anthony and tufts at large for having me it's a real pleasure i'd like to just essentially you know i've been invited to address the the current state of sign american relations and obviously these are rather peculiar times we live in so like just to start with the the and the figuring that's you know what diplomacy is and what diplomacy isn't because fundamentally when we look at the bilateral relationship we often delve into a lot of nitty-gritty we talk about geopolitical realities we talk about leadership structures a turnover of cabinets and changes and leaderships and also transformations to partisan politics factionless policies what have you but undergirding not just you know what we're talking about today but also the association and the incredible work that you're doing all of us are doing is the central concept called diplomacy and at risk of sounding a tad grandiose i'd like to think diplomacy is not just an art or craft or an occupation wonderful things that we see diplomats opting into representing and standing for the countries at multilateral associations organizations uh engaging in very heated dialogue in conversations some more heater than others but diplomacy is also an ethos it's an attitude that we espouse when we speak with folks that we would categorize okay superficially as belonging to the other country or belonging to another country per se it is a practice that we associate with essentially deepening our understanding at times when international relations is very much fraught but ultimately it is tolerance and compassion that makes for the art of diplomacy and makes it terrible and sustainable an age where peace the decade long peace that we've had over the past few decades really especially since the aftermath of the cold war may well be coming to an end diplomacy is important it is important not just as an antidote to fragmentation to war to hatred and grievance politics but also as a means of supporting a modus of ending between competing clashing and conflicting cultures and ideals so that's essentially the overarching book and thesis i want to employ as i delve into my topic concerning track 2 diplomacy and a royal citizens activists political thinkers and intellectuals and academics can think and play when it comes to mediating between america and china in this bilateral relationship there are five components to my sort of broad speech today the first concerns some structural realities on the ground as we see unfolding before our eyes the second concerns the existing sort of manifestations the core principles and tenets as well as the shortcomings of state-to-state diplomacy i.e the backdrop against which much of the critique i'm going to be delving into would indeed take place against the third part then revolves around track two diplomacy so this is what i would just oppose in contrast to track one diplomacy and hopefully highlight the prospects for our understanding of more in-depth citizen decision or citizen to government modes of diplomacy that often overlooked in existing discussions concerning international statecraft with some concrete examples of course as how china and america really can build better relations via tractor diplomacy the fourth part of this lecture seeks to put theory into practice then where instead of just discussing this in an abstract level and on very abstract terms we get to grips with the nitty gritty of tractor diplomacy how can we as students as scholars as writers participate in and conduct track to diplomacy our sales and then finally i want to close on a more personal note with some forewarning caveats and reflections at large on how this journey i guess has affected me and shaped me as a person but also why i think this is a journey that ultimately many of us can undertake in our own forms and tread and what exactly is this journey you may ask well that goes back to the crux of today's discussion eg mediating as individuals as agents you know agents not of influence but agents of change between two governments that seemingly are helming you know both the world's largest two national economies as well as increasingly you know two counterparts in this quasi-polarized relationship that don't necessarily see eye to eye on many issues if not most issues so with a roadmap laid out let us start with this this question of what exactly are the structural realities on the ground here and i'd like to encapsulate this using broadly four main points of contention the first is the economic and financial interdependence we see underpinning washington and beijing's interactions the second revolves around a mutual mistrust and grievances over geopolitical and domestic political affairs uh controversially labelled or contested the extent to which these affairs are indeed domestic if at all the third is the rise of external proxy conflicts and tensions and there we're going to touch upon inevitably some of the the crowds favorites including the ongoing atrocities okay carried out by russia and its invasion of ukraine and then fourthly and finally an observation concerning political incentives and also why exactly we might find this indeed an economical moment to paraphrase the parallax and linguo of the cpc per se so these are the four main tenets i want to just highlight in my presentation firstly then on economic and financial interdependence for all the talk of a new cold war of tensions mistrust and antagonism brewing between washington and beijing for all of that talk right very vociferous and sells well and make some nice headlines the reality is that they exist fundamental disanalogizability okay and then congruence between the cyano-american relations that we see today and the uh ussr usa relationship that characterized or constituted a bulk of the latter half of the 21st 20th century and the difference here predominantly revolves around how interconnected really both sides are and such interconnectivity doesn't just occur in a form of trade export imports you name it right where both countries despite the best attempts of donald trump and his i don't like china approach to global diplomacy despite his best attempts the bilateral trade between china and us is still going strong sure it is not the case that china and u.s are now each other's largest trading partners that role has since been supplanted by neighboring countries and also more prolific economies in the case of the us and the eu when it comes to china but still you know both countries value each other as a source of trade not just on a first order level in terms of employment jobs and all the revenue and taxes that you cruise through tariffs but also the second order level in terms of balancing the trade books and balancing the currency accounts right looking here of course at the recent and excellent work to publish such as trade wars and class wars and also james fox uh book and offering concerning sign a us financial cold war and he said to which that's indeed the case i think both books make incredibly salient observations as to why china needs the us and trade in the us as to comprise a bulk of his exports which in turn belies or undergirds a an investment and also export driven growth strategy in lieu of consumption that despite the best attempts of the chinese government and switch and pivot towards purely domestic consumption and inward-facing inward circulation-centred investment just ain't gonna cut it as of now and similarly i think the us also benefits from uh greater connections with china not just in terms of the market of consumers that exist in china but also with respect to the capital liquidity the prospect of indeed right setting up shop within china drawing together and consolidating uh mixed joint ventures and the loosening of restrictions and regulations concerning joint ventures over recent years attest to the fact that beijing is open to to a certain limited extent to more economic collaboration and synergy with the us these are all trends that we're seeing despite the vitriolic rhetoric that constitutes the media and popular narratives about beijing and washington and yes there have been concerns raised with respect to financial security to the transparency and accountability especially of chinese adr stocks right offshore stocks that we see and hence the recent de-listings and threats of further investigations by the us regulatory authorities but at the end of the day the interconnectivity between both parties both sides is unlikely to go away under either republican or democratic establishment in the u.s nor is it going to transpire at a very least undercurrent leadership trajectory in china so i think the base rock and the cornerstone really of this relationship cannot be you know fundamentally neglected right and overstated with respect to the outsized importance but of course how much of this can spill over into non-economic and non-financial spheres that's one question how tenable and sustainable will such arrangements be especially in light of the arising of alternative export markets for china or what china may see as alternative export markets to america yes these are all contingent variables that render the story more complicated more complex and straightforward narrative i was portraying just that but at the end of the day we must start from the recognition that the ties and reliance between two parties is going strong it is not as strong as it was perhaps eight to ten years ago but it remains fundamentally integral to the economies of both sides of the pacific that this is indeed what we see right now as a broadly tenable arrangement okay but with that said it's not all rose and pigeon that's for sure and that ties me on to the second observation side american relations are also increasingly characterized by mistrust and grievances i would say bear three core characteristics the first is the ideological and totalistic undertones or overtones now that permeate throughout the accusations the allegations the attacks and arguments launched by beijing and washington and the political solutions on both sides of the house we see that not just in the form of this traditional sort of attack centered around china's domestic governance model a human rights record and a way china has dealt with a public health crisis so these all criticisms coming from washington and more broadly speaking the american side of things and i'm not going to cast any moral dispersions or normative judgments as of yet i just want to state this as a fact and yet similarly this is reciprocated through a very trenchant assertion of structural confidence or institutional confidence right in chinese as well as the belief that the global dynamics at large is moving in the direction that favors the rise of the east and declining the west in chinese is called the the claims therefore that we see emanating from both parties are not just ones that seek to for perhaps again in a way that's reminiscent of the dynamics that we saw during the cold war now between soviet union and the usa this sort of totalistic negation and rebuking of the other side's governance model it's also infused with this historicist confidence that maybe just maybe the model of governance epitomized by one one end of the spectrum is going to prevail and chinese especially the diplomats and the the foreign facing sort of bureaucrats as we see these days emphasize the fact that a western model in their eyes doesn't quite work and similarly washington uh even on a more bipartisan level you know we're seeing this framing of the sino-american contest as one centered around autocracy versus democracy so i think the first observation i'll make on this point is that these grievances these accusations are increasingly couched in all or nothing binary terms and the reasoning for that in turn stems from the political philosophical roots and origins of the criticisms and of the vitriol that's directed and is it harness is it manufactured sure but much of this is also i'd say organically felt both in america and in china it's organically felt insofar as more and more generations of politically alert and involved american citizens are questioning the extent to which engagement and contact-centered approaches to china had worked the the the rising sense or the the precipitate the incipient sense here is that maybe engagement hasn't worked out and isn't changing china for the bitter in accordance with the eyes from washington and similarly coming from china right we see genuinely rooted deeply embedded nationalistic sentiments that say we're fed up with the lecturing and the pedantry we're hearing from the west that it's time to do away with the west once and for all these are discourses that aren't particularly useful when it comes to bridging the gap or the differences and yet of course we see them and they are also bolstered and reinforced in term in turn by social media by state media and conventional media the second observation by the way on this is interpersonal mistrust right so whilst interpersonal ties and relations under i guess they carter administration and then the bush administration uh which corresponding roughly onto sort of the the early to mid sort of mid to later periods of the reform and opening up era in china interpersonal relations between deputies bureaucrats academics businesses had blossomed during those administrations during that era which then paved the way for genuine okay academic institutional exchanges and visits and deepening of partnerships in the late 90s and the early 2000s subsequent to the era talked about just then but we're seeing a roll back to that we're seeing this heightening skepticism towards foreign individuals and persons whether it be in america the china initiatives thankfully recently wrapped up yet nevertheless from my humble point of view um controversially enshrouded by to some extent a degree of cynicism and repudiation of chinese individuals ethnic chinese individuals i find quite alarming and similarly in china right the the lockdown or the repulsion and the expulsion of foreign journalists of academic steam to be involved in allegedly seditious activities these are signs that interpersonal trust between citizens journalists intellectuals business persons those who are most likely to travel between china and america this trust is rapidly dwindling and arguably it's dwindling at a rate that's outpacing okay the broader geopolitical decoupling and the ideological disalignment we're seeing i'm about to get on to in just a second this is alarming in turn for two reasons firstly the absence of communication and genuine bilateral exchanges means that it's harder and harder for both political researchers to get a good grip on what exactly the other side is thinking and yet secondly on a more humane level on a more microcosmic level it also makes lives like us people who are quite literally trying to straddle the divide to make you know to facilitate better empathy and mutual understanding it makes lies for us very difficult because we're not trusted we're seen as outcasts by both sides right and yet to quote one of my favorite china watchers and a very good friend of mine right if both sides see that we are fundamentally alien and hostile chances are we are doing something right in order to bridge that golf and also to make the impossible possible anyhow i digress the third point of structural reality then concerns proxy conflicts and tensions and what's indisputable here is that whether it be the korean peninsula the sino-indian conflicts over the goldwan valley the concerns to do with china's belt and road initiative or biden's build back bitter and attempts to reconsolidate or re-establish american presence abroad or indeed the elephant in the room the ukraine war the russian invasion of ukraine these are all conflicts that may not directly involve sure china and america clashing with one another and yet have certainly deepened have certainly bolstered and amplified right the negativity the the repudiation and appropriate that had previously been swept under the carpet and brushed away as china and america sought to deepen trade ties economic relations kumbaya and all of that but now the skeleton closet comes running out some might say this has happened because of the shifts in the political assumptions attitudes the elites changing and souring and the diagnosis and judgments of china which in turn stems from again ideological pivot and turn under the second point i discussed just then whereas others would say you know what's what's missing still here is you know an acknowledgement of genuinely how perceptions and attitudes of ordinary citizens do matter and i'm more inclined to believe in a mixed picture that there's both an elite driven element and also mass driven component to these absolute shifts and conflicts over these proxy battlefields so take ukraine as an example from the chinese point of view and perspective they believe that they've made the position very clear it's time for neutrality they stand for not intervening any ukrainian crisis neither backing ukraine nor russia and using the crisis as a means of basically criticizing what they see as the inflammatory and instigatory gestures of nato whereas in washington's point of view right much of the restrict of beijing seemed to be deflectionary as opposed to genuinely engaging with you know the philistic center which china could play a role and arguably has played a role in terms of respectively mediating resolving or addressing the crisis so from washington's point of view and also the rhetoric that's spurred and provided by many a prominent media outlet in the west china is framed as an accomplice as a better whereas from the point of view and perspective of beijing much of this stems and turn from the reluctance to distance themselves a way to pull themselves apart away from a partner that only a few months back the the leader of china the president of china had dobbed to be you know an incredibly integral partner in this new multipolar order so there is this tension and there's also this reluctance on the heart of china to take sides where under pressure from both eu and america like and these are separate entities by the way to very large extent have insisted that china ought to take aside and take a stand again the irreconcilability of this is not necessarily necessary it's not something that can't be resolved or overcome i remain convinced that if there were more pragmatic diplomacy at work here if there was more massaging and also i guess paving over the cracks in a fundamental reorientation which may take some time but nevertheless is very important in the mindsets and mentalities of both sides there could well be a cognizance of the limits of what china genuinely can't do and can do and similarly what america should do and what america could do and what america will inevitably do out of geopolitical constraints and considerations but our level of understanding calls for empathy of course will meta-empathy you know that's just lacking in the status quo discourse whether it be because of how polarizing discussions about china and the west's policy towards china has become how polarizing that is now or indeed with respect to the emotively you know sentimental and and very very strong and vigorous spirit concerning the ukraine crisis one thing is clear it is very hard for chinese and american diplomats alike to genuinely rebuild that sense of trust and rebuild that sense that commonality and common ground can be forged in the eyes of the public any audiences written respectively america and china so i hope what i've highlighted so far just the realities that most accurately ideally reflect what's going on today in in as we speak right in april 2022 and a final point of note is political incentives as we all know this is in a very important year of paramount significance for the chinese authorities uh we've got a national congress coming up we've got essentially a potential uh well not no potential but it's almost certain that president she would see a third term in office and yet in america uh the midterms are coming up next year and then down the line we see the upcoming presidential elections the time is running out with respect to uh the stability or the fragile stability that characterizes the status quo and increasingly there will be political incentives on both sides to make a very strong and firm statement on sino-american relations the question is what will this statement look like and what is it likely to be and to be frank with everyone i'm not particularly optimistic at this juncture from the perspective of the chinese government with respect to consolidating domestic control as well as answering to the pleas and heightening nationalistic sentiments of the younger generations a recent survey uh conducted i believe by the riwi and jointly with the kind of center reveal the confidence and also the assertiveness with which many amongst the younger generations in china view china's image abroad and also its global standing all of that suggests that there's little wiggle room at least officially for the government okay in beijing for doing high and beyond to say we're going to take a softer stance on america because this doesn't conform with the overarching story that america is weak and america's vulnerable and america is a system that's falling apart and that china is uniquely the superior model of governance these incentives to appear strong but also to appear defiantly transient are reciprocated and mirrored by what's going on as we see in washington where there's an increasing bipartisan consensus no less you know accelerated by the difficulty of doing underground research in china and the reliance right of china watches upon a select few sources for information as to what's happening in china right now you know these are uh sort of compounding variables and factors but but ultimately what we're seeing here is that by paradigm consensus that's forming that says you know was previously china had been viewed as a cooperative partner as some some entity with which they could be joined global governance g2 and what have you increasingly the viewers warned that china is arriving is a threat is something that needed to be contained and addressed and the republic and republicans and democrats diverge here not in terms of the verdicts okay and conception over china but in my humble opinion it diverged merely on issues of means so whilst democrats are very keen on employing multilateral international institutions and working with allies reviving nato uh the quad a new entity the the partnership between eu and america in containing china republicans on the other hand are more content with employing a going at it alone sort of isolationist or neo gold approach to to essentially right how america or to to lead or take up the banner of democracy once again so there's no disagreement over how china is viewed or should be viewed at the very least amongst those in active political office right the third in their 30s their 40s and 50s and beyond but secondly the divergence is predominantly over what needs to be done and i suspect therefore that when it comes to the electoral debates and also the discussions and run up to the presidential race a vast majority of the chat and talk wouldn't be so much around or centered around you know how bad china is and all that would instead be a carefully and delicately trotted out debate you know that's artificially constructed and reinforced over how china ought to be engaged with the presumptions underpinning that is that china is indeed somewhat at a very sort of structural ideological level incompatible with america whilst i previously thought that this consensus could go away and is not necessarily likely to last i must confess i'm increasingly less optimistic and it falls upon me to lay bear the facts as i see it and put it to you that does not mean though that we give up nor does it suggest that all the precursory preliminaries i outlined just saying concerning diplomacy and the vitality of diplomacy and how it instrumentally brings us together amidst these predicaments it doesn't mean that any of those things i said is either untrue or unimportant if anything that makes it all the more important that we practice and engage in genuine diplomacy and before i delve into this sort of juxtaposition and comparison between tracks 2 and track 1 diplomacy i just like to make one broad comment here we can accept that china and america govern internally and domestically and do things differently on the ground we can accept that we also grant that there are certain spheres in which they never see eyes eye eg over the korean peninsula over arguably afghanistan to lesser extent myanmar and to a very large extent uh although certainly not from the point of view of beijing who believes that it's in fact more proximity to the eu position than the eu sees it to be but at the very least from the eyes of washington or on ukraine so given these percep perceived or actual issues of divergence what exactly should diplomacy be centered around is it to continually prop up differences to cast aspersions on the other side to castigate them to ostracize using inflammatory nationalistic rhetoric that we're hearing from you know certain actors and speakers i i personally don't think that's the advisable move if not for the fact that this is not what diplomacy at its core is about then for the fact that this is not going to serve the interests of either party this is not going to advance the economic and occupational interests of uh middle class and working-class citizens including those that donald trump promised would benefit from his trade war on china or indeed the consumers the burgeoning middle class in china that very much would adv would get in from the country to you know opening up reforming further and deepening its ties with the world at large nor indeed to these changes benefits the bureaucrats the those who govern those who seek stability in china and those who seek democratic accountability in america these changes or the reduction and depletion of diplomacy exclusively in my opinion only advantage two groups of people firstly those who have a stake in a skin in the game in relation to escalating tensions military tensions geopolitical rivalry and also flawed economic relations with respect to you know potential partners that can now come into the fray to substitute for respectively america and china in each other's economic characters and a second group of folks are those who ultimately want to see okay and would indeed seek a weakening of the political economic establishments of middle class of wealthy folks that have historically benefited off this bilateral relationship and yet for which comeuppance i guess and also the repercussions of the inequality that has been precipitated is now in a pipeline so these are the two groups of folks without signing reductionists i think you know would almost certainly have to gain and finally of course there's the the half group i suppose of those who are whose causes and interests are inevitably intertwined with isolationism so when it comes to china these look like folks who are cultural entrepreneurs or what i call nationalism entrepreneurs that manufacture outrage and anger and antagonism for the sake of driving up clips and views of the videos on social media or the content they produce and when it comes to america those who would quite literally benefit from narrow protectionist measures that have been introduced as america seeks to cut itself off from not just china because you could have yourself from china but not from other countries you're not going to see of returning the jobs into the hands of american workers but quite literally from the rest of the world and other supply chains as well so these are the folks i think have every stake to see a continued worsening of bilateral relations whereas for many others living in a society as consumers as workers as investors as students as entrepreneurs ideally this relationship ought to be produced sure so that's the aspirational side of things covered how can we do it though how can we put this into practice you know the reality is the track one diplomacy side of things doesn't look so good so if i track one diplomacy i'll just lay out a few definitions but it's diplomacy that's ultimately state to state oriented around governments around official representatives at un in but multilateral institutions world bank either what have you uh characterized and constituted by conversations summits exchanges between state leaders political figures bureaucrats rodney show it is also interestingly probably the the increasingly the mode of diplomacy that is more public and internal pub oriented than it used to be in the past where historically diplomacy say centuries ago or about at least up until half a century ago had occurred primarily through close room talks ping pong diplomacy the secret conversation the the line between you know moscow and washington during the cold war these are all secretive talks they are then to be followed by the communiques comedy case sorry the agreements the public disclosures and declarations sure but the seed and the bulk and a bullet of diplomacy would previously happen behind closed doors now you might say surely that's still the case with alaska with encourage right with you know the meeting between uh she and biden and the telephone readout surely the readout is cursory and supplementary it isn't talking that matters yes and no it is still true that there remains some degree of confidentiality and privacy to these conversations but increasingly track one diplomacy is publicly oriented it is conducted and carried out with the respect of domestic publics in mind and it is my submission that when both sides of the pacific are talking these days at least as government to government exchanges not only must they cater to the concerns and entries on the other side of the talking table but also those who would be viewing the readout viewing the summaries of events viewing the reporting and commentary analysis and ultimately select footages of the dialogue back at home and that is also why track one diplomacy is increasingly performative there's the expectation that diplomats formal representatives okay as the official designates of their respective countries must perform must perform a sign of strength of determination of resoluteness and ultimately panda to the crowd per se this is not to say that the the diplomats engaging in close room conversations and discrete dialogue aren't doing important work they still are and many of these conversations are still happening but at the top end when it comes to the side of american relations with israelis i'd submit that there's a heightening sense of performativity and theatrics and addressing one's own populace in lieu of seeking common ground and fermenting a viable and tenable set of agreements partial agreements concessions what have you on areas and domains of mutual interest and this ties me onto the final comment on the present stage of track one diplomacy that particular demographics and audiences are served but these demographics and audiences may not necessarily reflect the economic majorities or indeed the demographic majorities at large when we look at the nature of chinese diplomacy over the past few years some have dubbed this this nascent newfound sense of zeal and confidence wolf warrior diplomacy others have labeled it essentially china's pandemic policy and there are loads of very interesting pieces and books and articles on this i think peter martin for instance wrote a book that i i'd recommend and there's also uh the the chatham house coverage and reporting on the shifts in china's diplomacy and finally uh for for chinese source uh the excellent work by the center for china and globalization also explains okay in part what's been going on in terms of the rationale of chinese diplomacy and so is one gc's run dc's recent dialogue um at the csis and the only american side of things right where i feel know existing discussions often don't necessarily delve into a critical examination or we also see a symmetric escalation okay in retrograde perhaps not to the same degree not to the same extent of anger and rage and also performed rage but it's there whereas previously china had been framed as a potential collaboration on issues like climate change public health crises a potential pillar okay of co-governance under obama's imagination of that relationship much of that talk has now been issued and ditched in favor of discussions of china's models of governance models of diplomacy and also its track records on particular points of ignominy okay or ignominy in the eyes of those in a western engaging in the conversations here where it's always the labor rights and human rights and also china's that were pandemic that's brought up predominantly at the forefront of conversations this is all to say by the way that these issues aren't important i'm just noting that as a tactic they've been amplified they've been blown up and that areas of potential convergence like climate change like to some extent education and academic exchanges have been sidelined not trying to cast blame or the to frame either of the parties involved here as responsible but this is empirically right a noticeable trend where increasingly diplomacy at least between governments it's just not amicable between beijing and washington it's gotten to a point where you would expect okay as a basis this this confrontation this verbal sparring between not just a different about himself but it commentators the official rundowns and characterizations of readouts etc and a subsequent press briefs right you would expect antagonism to be norm to be the default this doesn't necessarily have to be the case and i can point out you know that here are a few possible scenarios where we can see the amelioration and the softening of the rhetoric the first is if america views china as a sturdy and reliable partner in combating crises of even more existential proportions than arguably a threat that feels that's governing governance logic so eg would respect climate change to the pandemic or indeed to what america does a rising russian threat that's one possibility that would indeed motivate a softening at least in language if not in substance of how america deals with china or alternatively there could be this this brokering of you know begrudging respect and an acceptance of areas of necessary disagreements okay and they're parked aside through compartmentalization by both beijing and washington where they choose to only focus on areas where concrete improvements and action points can be delivered eg financial regulation and harmonization of these regulations and we are seeing that right we saw that with the recent u-turn and also announcement from beijing that it's willing to accept any and all scrutiny right over the the overseas stocks are being listed in wall street as well as the the willingness to compromise and bargain on more generally speaking labor rights and trade rights regulations and we've seen that to a lesser extent with sino-european relations as well these are all possible scenarios okay and i'm not saying that they're not ruling them out entirely and they could both contribute towards an improvement in g2g relations government to government exchanges between beijing and washington and yet they remain unlikely in my view in a short to medium term for two other reasons the first being that ultimately domestic politics in both america and china render this sort of conferral and consensus-driven and i guess more pragmatic push towards active collaboration hard to sell and hard to pitch to domestic audiences and also the political supporters and selectors of those in power secondly it's unlikely because of the ongoing crisis in ukraine we're only going to see as i would suggest increasing escalation in force deployed by russia and even greater resolve on a part of the eu nato and america and of course the most important actor of all ukraine to not capitulate and to not give in so until these two roadblocks these two elephants in the room are dealt with track one diplomacy gtg diplomacy interesting in principle necessary in practice but ultimately it's not going to yield the kind of constructive pro pro-consensus formation uh ideal right that we're looking for here so what gives what do we do if that's indeed the case do we just sit tight and look free do we just see oh you know what that that's that's the promise out of the window let's go to war let's fight you know let's let's just say uh let's flip it and gung-ho yeah dismiss all the progress we've made over the past years when it comes to great interconnectivity and ignore all that and say we're going to go for the cupping i mean it's easy to say that it's tempting to believe and subscribe to that but from my point of view i'd like to think we deserve better for all the reasons outlined above but i'm also going to outline a few more before taking a brief pause as we reach the halfway mark the first reason is when it comes to handling global crisis climate change pandemics dangers of big tech as evidenced by uh of course uh or best epitomized perhaps by the recent takeover or attempt to take over twitter and and fourthly mechanization of labor and the challenges in form of social economic inequalities and unrest these are all crises where china and america would benefit from more tech knowledge and ultimately political cooperation in multilateral organizations and institutions you know i'm not saying that both governments must engage in heart-to-heart dialogue and treat each other as allies that's nonsense nor am i advancing that china and the us can't compete or shouldn't compete of course they must right they must compete in areas where consensus it cannot be formed because the interests involved here are necessarily an innately zero sum what i'm merely suggesting is a humble hypothesis is not all of these areas are necessarily zero sum or negative some there could be positive sum where one plus one is larger than two the second reason though is on the most humanistic level students journalists citizens individuals that are struggling have historically struggled and benefited all the exchanges the extensive tourism uh collaboration exploration of joint ventures human to human interactions knowledge transfers willing knowledge transfers okay organic ones not not illegal ones these are all folks who have found themselves increasingly sidelined and would only be further sidelined if indeed both economies we're heading towards decoupling why because individuals are the most fragile individuals are the most vulnerable and the easiest to pick up on stakeholder group when it comes to great power politics and that's also a tragedy of great power politics is most likely to merge so these reasons coupled with everything i've said just then suggests to me that we need to fix the problem existing solutions of government to government diplomacy really can't suffice and the the entire situation is looking rather dire and discrimination is only likely to continue if not worse okay so what gives what gives that's a very good question i could only be answered in a fall if we are to think of track 2 diplomacy slash track 1.5 diplomacy slash what i would like to term as a neologism citizen driven diplomacy what's isn't driven diplomacy here really it's it's a good question right because you know usually we would expect diplomacy to be just anchored around polished privileged powerful appointees of the state that stand to speak in favor of the government to adhere to official lines to take surely those are the typical maps you know i'm not a diplomat you're not what okay maybe some of you have become different but it's unlikely that i would ever become a diplomat uh at least as of now in relation to my country in relation to china or for all sorts of restrictions and contingencies that bar the participation of hong kongers in the officials of diplomatic uh foreign affairs ministry of china this is i'm not complaining about this i'm just saying this is an empirical fact but it's not likely that in my lifetime i'd become an official diplomat okay but the reality here is we don't have to be pushed we don't have to be officially in charge and given a profile and a brief and a suitcase and all that in order to act as diplomats i'd like to suggest that citizen-centered diplomacy would have broadly four main characteristics okay the first is it is far more moderately flexible than the formal diplomacy that we see occurring in the hallways of power citizen diplomacy can occur by in person meetings summits gatherings workshops seminars lectures or online conversations and dialogue like the ones we're hosting right now salon study group reading sessions indeed syndicate doesn't even have to be interactive it could also just be a series of back and forth op-eds and exchanges a twitter thread here a facebook commentary war on the other but of course you know on a more formal basis liaison in conversations and exchanges between non-profit organizations and groups and collectors it's moderately flexible and it need not take place only by the most rigorous and carefully defined and stipulated of means secondly though citizen diplomacy often treats diplomacy for the sake of diplomacy as a side objective in a sense that they're arguably more important primary goals and orientations that's uh that around which right the activities we're talking about here are centered so for instance if we're looking at climate change ngo initiated and undertaken diplomacy but it's really you know the employment of diplomacy as a tool and as an instrument of achieving concrete gains in mutual agreements over how we ought to tackle climate change or if we talk about cultural diplomacy then through the hosting and convening of forums and associative gatherings where we try to talk about and talk through you know the cultural differences and seek to understand each other's cultures more beyond the stereotypes the essentialist troops we see in popular media portrayals these conversations have cultural understanding and deepening ties between people as the primary prerogative and diplomacy is a side benefit it is an incidental upside we don't engage in diplomacy here because we're diplomats because it's a jaw indeed it comes as a side benefit a positive externality of the citizens decision organization to organization society society exchanges in collaboration at large thirdly citizen-centered diplomacy respects a citizen it puts at the forefront the voices of the public the voices of the people the voices of those whose interests are most pertinently and directly affected by great power consciousness and yet really you know really do we see people in democracies non-democracies authoritarian states or non-authoritarian states having a direct say in what the diplomats say sure there might be that feedback mechanism reflect you stand concerning the popular pressures okay acting as an indirect chicken balance but ultimately we don't see civilians and ordinary citizens participating in g2g diplomacy they might be trotted out as witnesses or testimonial givers but not ultimately those who proactively undertake such forms of diplomacy and fourthly and finally and this is also a response to the unique circumstances of the cyto-american relations and how afraid they are right now in order for there to be constructive dialogue and genuine understanding there must be an emphasis upon good faith and trust and a presumption of trust and good faith on the other side what does that transpire is right how does that transpire well that transpires as you know if you're engaging with citizens um representatives of china academics from china you don't view them automatically as assets of the state because that's a very trivializing and dehumanizing narrative right the argument that any and all academics that may not agree with the consensus in the in america right now must therefore be part of this co-op united front that's a reduction is thinking you might think is absurd but i'm hearing increasingly uh uh prolifically and proliferating the most most in the most vociferous and voiceless man i'm hearing these restaurants i'm hearing these claims it's outrageous and similarly right we're engaging with in china our folks coming from america it shouldn't be the case that we always presume that they're funded to stare confident right i look at the the extremist narratives that claim or portray all foreigners and incoming visitors as brainwashed spies coming from america and i i look at this sort of level of of anger and resentment embodied in these characterizations and i would say this is just not true i know many an american china watcher or an american academic a professional eye banker whatever media professional look i might have disagreements with it i might disagree over lockdowns public health policies what's going on in respect of cities domestically in china i might fundamentally not see eye to eye with it but i wouldn't see them as automatically and by default a spark what i hope to see here is that when it comes to citizen diplomacy more of this information more of this appreciation that maybe the other side is indeed engaging in good faith and even if you don't think they are you're not convinced based on your presumptions and priorities you give them that chance you offer them that benefit of the damage because that sort of initial trust is essential in order for real conversations that matter to them take place if you always walk into the room with a presumption that the other side here is to trip you to trick you then how could you ever possibly manage to see the other side as a human being as an ordinary citizen as a as a fellow with you know their own interests but not necessarily a state-centered agenda now acidic would say ah okay maybe brian you're you're approaching applies very nicely onto american citizens right but what about china where everything in order is an extension of the state well this is again a misconception that's i'd i'd just like to push back against yes the chinese state exerts compared with the american government certainly more influence over the civil society in china but i've written about this elsewhere and many a time i don't think china is homogenous entity the chinese civil society has many different voices demographic groups interest groups the educators the intelligentsia the middle class in china do not always think alike and nor are they brainwashed to characterize them operating under you know an environment of environment of certainly restricted regulated information as thereby brainwashed and agency-less actors is is misinformed at best and dangerous at worst because that means that we always presume from the outside that there's no point in trying to engage and talk to people on the inside of china whatsoever that strikes me as a deeply deeply fallacious thought right you're looking at 1.4 billion people here do they all think the same can they all think the same i i'd like to think not and if the whole point of engaging with china is to try and figure out a sustainable model of compatible coexistence with china and the chinese government as it is then presumably unnecessary for a step in doing so is to talk is to here is to say look i see where you're coming from here you know which is your focus in china but i disagree with you on x y and z and seeing me get striking a conversation there because the alternative to that and that's something i'm also seeing increasingly ubiquitously is when we go in and say you're all brainwashed we know better you you're exposed to censorship okay censorship is bad way we don't have a sense of media we're free that kind of holier than that attitude is not just off-putting and patronizing it also does not bode well okay for attempts to win the hearts and minds of people from the ground so as much as i'm critical of the ultra nationalism that i'm seeing right now right this sort of presumption that all that why all foreigners i must therefore be bad people right i i must equally repudiate and push back against the road chinese are brainwashed uh pomposity and preposterous language and stories that we're hearing from certain segments of the media short their difficulties in accessing information yes there is censorship yes there's regulation but let's engage each other on a human footing we may not see eye to eye but at least if your eyes and my eyes lock into each other the prospects of us seeking and reaching an agreement are slightly higher than not doing so and by the way i'm not encouraging that we break or contravene any laws in carrying out citizen diplomacy what i am suggesting here though is that cis and diplomacy operates as a supplementary force as a supplement to mainstream gtg diplomacy and if i could add three opposite asians here these observations will then proport to show why ultimately i think citizen diplomacy is going to become the primary modus operandi and the mode of interaction between countries including china and america over the upcoming decades the first is the fragmentation and individualization of communicative mediums from social media platforms to uh i guess non-social media but communicative technologies between personnel and telegram whatsapp what have you to the the the shortening or compression of distances right this this collapse of geographical gifts to paraphrase uh david harvey right these are all seismic transformations that render especially once uh you know things start reopening in the aftermath of the pandemic that read a human to human contact and exposure incredibly easy it's a low cost and potentially high reward you know activity to speak with see to meet travel and whatnot and the caveat of course is that we don't see massive inward looking restrictions upon travel and human movement and capital flow right in the aftermath of the pandemic i'm not ruling that out entirely there's a possibility of that nevertheless that indeed leads me on to the second point but the first point here is that mobility is going to be heightened and the easiness of human to human contact cannot be you know understated or cannot be overstated sorry the second way i'd note is even if partial decoupling in political and also institutional senses is indeed occurring this makes non-gtg contact all the more important to say we grant right that the worst case scenario for multilateralists and internationalists is unfolding we're seeing this this decoupling and the segwaying of the world into segmented spheres even then there needs to be some source some gel that holds as a coagulant together of these fragmented and isolated spheres and what goes on there it is not the government or the leaders of governments that would have the incentive or indeed the day-to-day capacity to let it interact right because if all governments or all countries are equally inward-looking or at least increasingly we're looking at it's not likely that outward facing diplomacy is going to be the mainstay that's where citizens come in that's where non-profit and non-governmental organizations must come in and swoop into the rescue to engage and to pick up on the conversations i've been left out and neglected by governments on both sides of the equation and a final comment here is this i've a lot of faith and hope in a gen z in the next generation so even if indeed in the present we see you know antagonism skepticism and negativity between those in positions of power and also those who are most likely to influence and hold the greatest sway over politics and respectively america and china i remain convinced that the very least if we look at the chicago council surveys of the american public millennials and younger generations are more forthcoming and sanguine about the prospect of working with china and similarly in china whilst i have indeed also noted my concerns about the ultra nationalism that we see among segments of the us the remains the possibility that the quality of ties and discussions and empathy seeking incentive communication that we see right now uh in institutions like yours would be able to drive forward would be able to push forward the kind of internet and agreement that's needed in order to advance and further interpersonal exchanges all of this is just a roundabout way of saying i do not think my proposal is untenable i think it is at the very least in theoretical and also to certain extent pragmatic terms uh something that we could indeed put into practice and on that note then it helps me to talk about how we can indeed put theory into practice and here i would like to cite some hypothetical some actual examples and then some there are at least four primary means through which we can put theory into practice with concrete deliverables and outcomes in the mediums long term the first is to produce and engage in genuine activism and research in challenging and taking on cross-country international challenges not just climate change not just public health but also automation ai the dangers of privacy violations right and i know the cynics in a room would say ah you know what can we talk about in terms of privacy this is not something that the chinese care about allegedly but that statement itself overlooks the fact that china has as much incentive as a government as a society to regulate surveillance capitalism as america does because surveillance capitalism does not transform or translate the dividends and doesn't transfer the dividends at all that they don't calculate through to the people and this is something that's a political no-go therefore for both china and usa life so i think groups and non-profits are centered around empowering individual citizens digital literacy bio-scientific literacy understanding of climate change and environmental issues they must and should comprise the bulk of society or civil society-centered exchanges and another challenge here of course is the difficulties of registering foreign ngos in both america and china especially in china the recent passage of the ingo laws i think in 2017. that's a valid concern but that's also why the upshot of this is i think governments need to make space for non-governmental exchanges as opposed to just framing and centering the collaborative space in room around exclusively official parties that's something that i think both beijing and washington would benefit from noting secondly open debates and dialogues and exchanges and discussions to be held on campuses to be held in forums in civil society groups in salons and whatnot and this applies to both beijing and washington where increasingly for political ideological reasons we're seeing this tightening of the space for discussions for deliberation on both sides of the civic the chilling effect we see in here in america alternatively in china of course official uh redlining okay and base lines and sending what you can discuss it is on my humble opinion that a healthy confident and rising country should be more open to constructive criticisms and debates over important issues that matter not just to the world at large but also to the people inside the country now i'm not advancing at all the concept that we must support activities that pose a danger or threat to national stability or security that of course is some of that is a political culture relative and specific judgment that only the irrelevant authorities can make i can't make what i am saying though is the more room there is for rational and well-informed debates to take place within academic spaces where there's fact checking where there's rigorous counterbalancing and scrutiny views the likelihood is that misinformation and stereotypes and misportrayals of people of actors of political incentives and structures the less likely is that they will take hold and that holds as a rule of thumb across both sides of the pacific but that also means by the way across specific dialogues through festivals of ideas through summits where politically divergent views are platformed it's all the more important that these events occur and in turn act as a springboard as an incubator for projects okay of mutual alignment and also converges so that's what i would say in terms of what we can do host more conversations like these like search engage with more professionals with academics that can speak not trot out orthodoxy and just the consensus that we're seeing and hearing in the media echo chambers but actually folks who know what they're talking about you know with professor celix song being uh someone who or alternatively the the many other academics at large have written on a debt track diplomacy and the dangers of pigeonholing and characterizing you know certain forms of international diplomacy and aid as debt track full stop or on the other hand academics that say you know maybe within china right people who say we shouldn't see east rising and west declining as inevitable these are the views and voices that i think should be better and more frequently platformed because they push back against the the evolving and increasingly trenchant dogma that we hear and that we see and i am personally quite alarmed by on both sides of the house here and the spectrum per se the third mechanism then is to to build and build into i guess the the interaction between citizens and governments better communicative devices and platforms and channels through which citizens can relay information to their own governments to be very clear this is not okay at all intelligence gathering i'm instead advancing the viewer that we need clear unfettered communication of uncoercive exchanges of information where in lieu all the half-informed and ill-informed judgments concerning the other side's intentions we get a more robust picture from simply folks who have overseas experience who have engaged with governments abroad and who can confidently speak to and attest to their own experiences as scholars and academics and students and individuals living in america in relation to china and china in relation to america to speak to the lived realities and empirics on the ground because i'm sure many in america do not view china with skepticism and suspicion because they are racist that's not the case it's because they do not necessarily hear what's happening on the ground in fault in china and maybe their elements of what's unfolding in china they're horrified and maybe their elements are not but at the very least i think the audience in america deserves a fair say and a balanced understanding likewise in china right when i speak with many of you know my friends who are highly educated and incredibly informed as to what's happening in the west in britain in eu in america there's this overwhelming consensus that you know it's not looking good yes it isn't looking good but there might also be pockets of hope and pockets of positivity that we should cherish and value in america in europe and the uk and we all we are induced to think and believe about the other side is that we're winning they're losing that's not going to confidently offer us a voracious picture which in turn undermines our ability to make rational and beneficial geopolitical decisions even from a pure self-interest point of view so we need better communicative devices and exchange mechanisms we need a more inclusive okay and also expansionary net of information that's unfiltered that's uncensored and that gets into the hands of those who are calling the shorts because i genuinely think that many of the grievances and conflicts in international relations stems not okay from this fundamental irreconcilability but from misunderstanding but from this unju amping up and highlighting or discarding of tenets of facts of empirics that ultimately will not do anyone any justice or good because it leads to lose-lose situations say the the ill information or the erroneous assumptions concerning the incentives of certain government leads to the other government presuming that a war over this region is imminent we all know what we're talking about here or what could be talked about here in the context of cyber american relations that is a dangerous scenario yeah that is also a scenario that has rendered all the more likely if all we see in washington in beijing and beijing in washington is signs of escalation signs of impunity signs of unwillingness to indeed take stock of geopolitical constraints if both sides leaders think that the other side is going to fight it would make very little sense of course from a game theoretical point of view for one to back down and i'm not worried about actual escalation and spirals of that i'm worried about perceived willingness and resolve to escalate and lack of knowledge and certainty and clarity over how far the escalation goes and of course citizens may not be privy to all of the information here educated academics and journalists are not privy and that's why a lot of misinformation is spewed as such by the very least what folks you speak the parlance and understand the idiosyncrasies on both sides can do the least they could do is explain very clearly and to deliver as comprehensively and un you know instructor and snared by propagandistic and ideological elements a truthful rendition of the other side's intentions and motives and also capacities that is an obligation that i think ought to bind all of us really and that ties me on to the final point well you might think that you're a student you might think you're young you might think you're powerless you might think we might think okay that we're nobodies and maybe we are indeed no bodies maybe we are indeed folks that don't have the money don't have the capital and as a senior once reminded me i don't even have any political official or officially political or formal uh capital whatsoever to influence institutional decision making i don't there's no you know these are all channels as of today are not available to us okay we don't have wherewithal or resources but if there's one thing i know we have uniquely it's the ability to undertake conversations to talk to hear to listen to engage to sympathize and empathize and develop okay the space that we need for discussions that matter so don't underestimate your prowess don't say i'm a student i'm young i don't know what to do i probably should just go with the flow i want to get a job i'm going to repeat and trust out the orthodoxy and the mainstream consensus i'm going to rise and claim the hierarchy we're pumping out you know very much ideologically skewed and partisan hackery but i know that gets me jobs i'm gonna do it don't do that because you could be doing so much more than that right the fact that we're here you know the fact that we're alive is a miracle to quote hamilton one of my fav favorite musicals and the fact that this conversation is flowing uh hopefully not not just in a new direction or manner but i also want to take some questions of course it's a miracle but it also attests to the depth and breadth of human to human exchanges and ties that truly matter and are ought to matter only with increasing volume and magnitude in years to come and here i'm going to close with as promised a forewarning and a word of personal reflection the warning here is simple you know respect and understand and adhere to the laws of the land there are certain boundaries that are formal the certain boundaries that whether it be in terms of information sharing confidentiality tech transfers i firmly believe that the jurisdiction rests with the courts and the country that's engaging in the determination of the contents and substances of the law the letter of the law must be followed and this applies you know both ways and yet much of that constraint that hard constraint that we're operating by should not deter us from engaging with what's possible with their nose constraints to push to strive to drive forward mutual agreement and respect and dignity and this is where i want to say this it's tough you and i we can't go at it alone to transform the way populations view each other especially this these two huge economies populations is a good game to enter and there will be traps there will be naysayers there'll be those that accuse you of being you know too sympathetic towards the other side or alternatively a representative a sneaky suspicious extension okay or shill for one side or the other and that's all right because peace is not something that we win or secure through garden parties you don't throw a garden party you know grab a pint with your mates and say i want to get peace greenpeace whatever peace that's not peace nor is peace something that comes in vain where our achieved peace let's boast about it let's forget about it peace's heart fought over it's something that our ancestors gave their lives to secure during the two world wars it is something that millions took to the street to fight for as the cold war ended they demanded okay they demanded dignity and peace in how they were treated by their own governments to have a say and a stick and a game piece the secret formula or not so secret that propelled china's astronomical rise as an economic superpower peace a moral metric and regulatory standard by which the actions of countries like china and america and beyond ought to be judged peace someone that's falling apart before our eyes in eastern europe as a war in ukraine rages on and drags on peace some that you and i deserve and we can and must defend at all cost at any cost if necessary to death if necessary alone thank you very much thank you thank you very much brian i just want to jump in i have a question that's been burning i'm just sorry i'm just checking my flow here um you have mentioned that look around look around how lucky we are to be alive right now as someone who literally has a billy in hamilton merch and posters in my room the next phrase eliza says just stay alive that will be enough and the question is as so many chinese students in other in america or alternatively american students in china have gone into just self-preservation mode we have gone to a mode that in a in a in a a in a attempt of not getting canceled by various activist groups for example we have refrained from even talking about track 2 diplomacy because such attempts for example in the united states could be potentially framed as uh being as for example being a communist to party mouthpiece attempts of of promoting sino-us relations have been seen by many actors uh including but just not limited to the two actors that you have talked about the military-industrial complex and the people who write nationalistic fear-mongering propaganda um have been have been viewed as even a endorsement of of of for example various uh uh policies that the chinese communist party have been pushing out that are somewhat morally questionable and in china likewise uh people who want to promote even american culture american songs taylor swift friends these at the most basic level are being framed as the so-called half a million the so-called people that have allegedly received a half a million dollars from national endowment of democracy my question for you is how do we even overcome the most fundamental fear of getting canceled getting visas cancelled getting um being being even more culturally marginalized than we already are thank you for that and that's a very poignant and also relevant question i'm going to repeat what i said in my presentation just then respect the law of the land okay so i don't think any and all i genuinely think okay if it will talk about unlawful and illicit activity that contravenes boundaries uh as established by the law then it's a very clear no-go but fortunately you know i genuinely think that 90 or the diplomatic efforts and conversations including hopefully the one we're having right now do not violate any laws okay because because i'm not you're not none of us we're not operating as extensive agents of i don't know the american government or the chinese government that's not what we're doing right now we're talking about literally human to human interactions and frank and forthcoming manner so if i could use a chinese phrase the which is it's hard to translate but i would call it this is self-accentuated confidence self-confidence okay if you will that the ichira if we're doing nothing wrong then there's nothing to fear guys this is a saying in cantonese okay that basically translates to if you've done nothing wrong there's nothing to hide i think nothing i think it might but yeah that's the first thing i would note uh the second thing i don't know the third thing i would note is this you know legal structures are are not static political structures are dynamic and discursive structures are fluid and it falls upon individuals too even if indeed the political environments look hostile within the confinement of legal constraints we can and should always seek mutual interest and overlap in in what we works best for us right i don't think it's fair to say that's you know or it is indeed fair to perhaps to say that tragically the activities you talked about on both sides in both countries are increasingly viewed with suspicion but honestly if we want to challenge stereotypes and challenge suspicions the first step is to do it ourselves is to say i'm chinese but i listen to taylor swift i listen to hamilton and i don't think america is structurally and always evil or i'm american but i want to just say you know why don't we just try to understand china in a more multi-dimensional as opposed to monolithic manner we lead by example we lead by embodying that that resistance towards that mind-numbing mind-numbing ignorance okay that has come to filled the innate mainstream discussions that we see in both countries so it's hard and there's no easy answer the road ahead is treacherous but if it's not treacherous then it's not a cause worth fighting for right so that's what i would say thank you so much and and even with what's going on between russia and ukraine right now um what we're seeing is that uh russia affiliated scholars um our ties with russian institutions have been cut to a degree so even even when track when diplomacy fails such catastrophically um do you think there are still hopes for track 2 diplomacy to proceed or is it still even worth fighting for if for example with regards to sino-us relations um some some some the sovereignty of some territories are being challenged and had gone into or escalated into a degree of war and armed conflict to what extent can even track two diplomacies facilitate let's say russo-american relations or russo-european relations when when when the us has been trying to inflict the maximum pressure upon the russian population and when universities cannot sanction putin's families they decide to sanction russian citizens that are on campus that's a great question i must say i'm not an expert in american roster relations so i can't possibly comment to the the main bullock of my talk today is about sign american tires i i certainly hope that with you know the despite the current russian invasion of ukraine we must be fair and judicious in a way that we engage with citizens of russia as well as scholars and intellectuals and writers from russia if they're not actively inadvertently in favor of the government if they indeed have spoken out against the government's position on the war i genuinely don't think it's fair to say because you're a russian citizen we must therefore alienate and ostracize you but that's just my two sense of worth as a political theorist and putting on a political theorist less of a you know of an ir person per se but go back to the question if i were to transpose your logic concerning the difficulties and the dwindling room for tractor diplomacy that allegedly arises from tightening track to attract one engagement or the dwindling room there look there certainly is going to be an element of mirroring right which is why i also said you know tractor diplomacy is it's not all roses and picnic it's not going to be as direct and and straightforward as it were during peace time between the two governments but what i will note is this firstly both governments benefit from having some degree of tractor and honest conversations right even just as an epistemic tool of keeping their own insights in check and also ensuring that you know the insiders are making decisions can actually have an accurate pulse on the ground in the field yeah for the other side so to speak and secondly on areas like climate change and public health i don't see any reasons to why track one diplomats want to just squint okay quench sorry and destroy the route for perspective collaboration and convergence the reasoning for that is just what they care about is geopolitical security it's national security that does not however prevent okay it doesn't prevent the prospect and a possibility of to an extent right the the agreement and the entente in non-politically touchy or non-tier one red red alert issues or baseline issues so to speak so i remain relatively optimistic genuinely even though it's hard and even though there is indeed going to be some degree of pessimism and skepticism so to speak there right thank you so much brian um we we we really hope that we will uh we've been able to kept you here for longer but um we have a econ panel that is coming in pretty soon um and oh i'm sorry a cultural panel that's coming in pretty soon my apologies and for cultural panel i think we're going to talk about chinese digital media um anthony if you have the link for the cultural panel feel free to drop it into the chat and uh thank you again brian for joining us today um we really really enjoy your talk and uh um and we look forward to well in our case i i look forward to seeing you in person at some point soon and um yeah and for anyone who's interested in the cultural panel the link will be dropped pretty soon and uh anthony it's my absolute pleasure and thank you for having me thank you thank you very much yep thank you brian thank you brian