Stephen Kotkin: Stalin, Putin, and the Nature of Power | Lex Fridman Podcast #63
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In this episode of the Lex Fridman Podcast, historian Stephen Kotkin explores the nature of power through a comparative analysis of Joseph Stalin and Vladimir Putin, arguing that while all humans crave security, love, and adventure, some possess an extraordinary drive for unconstrained authority. Kotkin explains that absolute power corrupts because it removes external checks on decision-making, leading leaders to make mistakes without challenge or input. He contrasts the American system of institutional constraints—such as separation of powers—that prevent tyranny with circumstantial limitations like distance in Russia's vast geography. While acknowledging a segment of the Russian population desires an "iron hand" due to frustrations from economic transitions and geopolitical pressures, Kotkin notes that Putin has successfully appealed to both the losers who lost pensions during privatization and the winners through strategic political maneuvers, including his temporary stepping aside for Dmitry Medvedev before regaining power following urban disillusionment. Kotkin delves into Stalin's rise to power as a product of historical contingency rather than inevitable evil, detailing how Lenin created the position of General Secretary specifically for Stalin after suffering strokes, allowing him to build an organizational machine that eventually became a personal dictatorship. Unlike many contemporaries who were true believers in communism or statist ideals without such ruthlessness, Stalin combined genuine ideological conviction with cunning manipulation and violence to eliminate rivals. Kotkin emphasizes that history is full of surprises; just as Hitler's rise was not inevitable but contingent on conservative support, Stalin's ascent depended on Lenin's health issues and the specific organizational skills he possessed. The discussion highlights how both leaders conflated their personal power with national well-being, creating a psychological dependency where stepping away from authority feels impossible, akin to an addiction that distorts one's perception of reality and self-worth. The conversation shifts to the path forward for Russia under Putin, rejecting violent revolution or reliance on individual saviors like Garry Kasparov as viable solutions. Instead, Kotkin argues that sustainable change requires building strong institutions, including a functioning judiciary, an impartial civil service, open markets, and meritocratic systems within the state apparatus. He warns against relying on miracles or upheaval, noting that societal transformation takes time to consolidate into durable structures rather than fleeting protests seen in other regions. While acknowledging deep patriotism among Russian officials who recognize the country's decline under current corruption and lack of investment, Kotkin suggests that a coalition of patriotic leaders within the regime could eventually unseat an aging autocrat through peaceful evolution toward power-sharing arrangements, mirroring how George Washington prioritized institutional strength over personal rule to ensure long-term national stability. Finally, addressing broader political philosophy, Kotkin critiques the extremes on both the far left and far right that seek to eliminate capitalism or democratic institutions entirely, advocating instead for "normal politics" where diverse viewpoints compete within a framework of equality before the law and respect for constraints on executive power. He draws parallels between historical struggles over socialism—between those seeking to abolish markets and those wishing to regulate them—and modern debates about inequality, asserting that eliminating capitalism often leads to worse outcomes than regulating it. The episode concludes with reflections on the inevitability of conflict due to conflicting human interests but stresses that humanity's goal must be managing these conflicts peacefully through strong institutions rather than resorting to zero-sum violence or global catastrophes like World War III, urging listeners to study history to avoid repeating past mistakes and preserving future generations from planetary-scale destruction.
Read the full video transcript
the following is a conversation with
Steven Kotkin a professor of history at
Princeton University and one of the
great historians of our time
specializing in Russian and Soviet
history he has written many books on
Stalin in the Soviet Union including the
first to of a three-volume work on
Stalin and he's currently working on
volume three he may have noticed that
I've been speaking with not just
computer scientists but physicists
engineers historians neuroscientists and
soon much more to me artificial
intelligence is much bigger than deep
learning bigger than computing it is our
civilizations journey into understanding
the human mind and creating echoes of it
in the machine to me that journey must
include a deep historical and
psychological understanding of power
technology puts some of the greatest
power in the history of our civilization
into the hands of engineers and computer
scientists this power must not be abused
and the best way to understand how such
abuse can be avoided is to not be blind
to the lessons of history as Steven
kotkin brilliantly articulates Stalin
was arguably one of the most powerful
humans in history I've read many books
on Joseph Stalin Vladimir Putin and the
wars the 20th century I hope you
understand the value of such knowledge
to all of us especially to engineers and
scientists who build the tools of power
in the 21st century this is the
artificial intelligence podcast if you
enjoy it subscribe on YouTube give it
five stars an Apple podcast follow on
Spotify support on patreon or simply
connect with me on Twitter at lex
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here's my conversation stephen Kotkin
do all human beings crave power no human
beings crave security they crave love
they crave adventure they crave power
but not equally some human beings
nevertheless do crave power for sure
what words is that deeply in the
psychology of people is it something
you're born with
is it something you develop some people
crave a position of leadership or of
standing out of being recognized and
that could be starting out in the school
years on the schoolyard it could be
within their own family not just in
their peer group those kind of people we
often see craving leadership positions
from a young age often end up in
positions of power but they can be
varied positions of power you can have
power in an institution where your power
is purposefully limited for example
there's a board or a consultative body
or a separation of powers not everyone
craves power whereby they're the sole
power or there they're unconstrained
power that's a little bit less usual we
may think that everybody does but not
everybody does those people who do crave
that kind of power unconstrained the
ability to decide as much as life or
death of other people most people are
not everyday people they're not the
people you encounter in your daily life
for the most part those are
extraordinary people most of them don't
have the opportunity to live that dream
very few of them in fact end up with the
opportunity to live that dream so
percentage-wise in your sense if we
think of George Washington for example
most would most people given the choice
of absolute power over a country versus
maybe the capped power that the United
States president
presidential role at least at the
founding of the country represented what
do you think most people would choose
well Washington was in a position to
exercise far greater power than he did
and in fact he didn't take that option
he was more interested in seeing
institutionalization of seeing the
country develop strong institutions
rather than an individual leader like
himself have excess power so that's very
important so like I said not everyone
craves unconstrained power even if
they're very ambitious and of course
Washington was very ambitious he was a
successful general before he was a
president so that clearly comes from the
influences on your life where you grow
up how you grow up how you raised what
kind of values are imparted to you along
the way you can understand power as the
ability to share or you can understand
or the ability to advance something for
the collective in a collective process
not an individual process so power comes
in many different varieties and ambition
doesn't always equate to despotic power
the spotted power is something different
from ordinary institutional power that
we see right the president of MIT does
not have unconstrained power the
president of MIT rightly must consult
with other members of the administration
with the faculty members to a certain
extent with the student body and
certainly with the trustees of MIT those
constraints are make the institution
strong and enduring and make the
decisions better than they would be if
he had unconstrained power but you can't
say that the president is not ambitious
of course the president is ambitious we
worry about unconstrained power we worry
about executive authority that's not
limited that's the definition of
authoritarianism or tyranny
unlimited or barely limited executive
authority executive authority is
necessary to carry out many functions we
all understand that that's why MIT has
an executive has a president but
unlimited or largely unconstrained
executive power is detrimental to even
the person who exercises that power so
what do you think it's an interesting
notion we kind of take it for granted
that constraints on executive power is a
good thing but why is that necessarily
true so what is it about absolute power
that does something bad to the human
mind
so you know the popular saying of
absolute power corrupts absolutely is
that the case that the power in itself
is the thing that corrupts the mind in
some kind of way where it leads to a bad
leadership over time people make more
mistakes when they're not challenged
when they don't have to explain things
and get others to vote and go along with
it when they can make a decision without
anybody being able to block their
decision or to have input necessarily on
their decision you're more prone to
mistakes you're more prone to extremism
there's a temptation there for example
we have separation of powers in the
United States the Congress right has
Authority that the president doesn't
have as for example in budgeting the
so-called power of the purse this can be
very frustrating people want to see
things happen and they complained that
there's a do-nothing Congress or that
the situation is stalemated but actually
that's potentially a good thing in fact
that's how our system was designed our
system was designed to prevent things
happening in government and there's
frustration with that but ultimately
that's the strength of the institutions
we have and so when you see
unconstrained
executive authority there can be a lot
of dynamism a lot of things can get done
quickly but those things can be like for
example what happened in China under Mao
or what happened in the Soviet Union
under Stalin or what happened in Haiti
on the Papa Doc and then baby doc or
fill in the blank right what happens
sometimes in corporations where a
corporate leader is not constrained by
the shareholders by the board or by
anything and they can seem to be a
genius for a while but eventually it
catches up to them and so the idea of
constraints on executive power is
absolutely fundamental to the American
system American way of thinking and not
only America obviously large other parts
of the world that have a similar system
not an identical system but a similar
system of checks and balances on
executive power and so the the the case
that I study the only checks and
balances on executive power are
circumstantial so for example distances
in the country it's hard to do something
over 5,000 miles or the amount of time
in a day it's hard for a leader to get
to every single thing the leader wants
to get to because there are only 24
hours in a day
those are circumstantial constraints on
executive power they're not
institutional constraints on executive
power one of the constraints on
executive power the United States has
versus Russia maybe something you've
implied and actually spoke directly to
is there's something in the Russian
people in the Soviet people they're
attracted to authoritarian power
psychologically speaking or at least the
kind of leaders at that sought authority
and power throughout its history and
that desire for that kind of human is a
lack of a constraint in America it seems
as people we desire somebody not like
Stalin somebody more like George
Washington so that's another constraint
of the belief the people would
they admire in a leader what they seek
in a leader so maybe you can speak to
well first of all can you speak briefly
to that psychology of is there a
difference between the Russian people
and the American people in terms of just
what we find attractive in a leader not
as great a difference as it might seem
there are unfortunately many Americans
who would be happy with an authoritarian
leader in the country is by no means a
majority it's not even a plurality but
nonetheless it's a real sentiment in the
population sometimes because they feel
frustrated because things are not
getting done sometimes because they're
against something that's happening in
the political realm and they feel it has
to be corrected and corrected quickly
it's a kind of impulse people can regret
the impulse later on the impulse is
motivated by reaction to their
environment in the Russian case we have
also people who crave sometimes known as
a strong hand and iron hand and
authoritarian leader because they want
things to be done and be done more
quickly that align with their desires
what I'm not sure it's a majority in the
country today certainly in Stalin's time
this was a widespread sentiment and
people had few alternatives that they
understood or could appeal to nowadays
in the globalized world the citizens of
Russia can see how other systems have
constraints on executive power in the
life isn't so bad there in fact a life
might even be better
so the impatience the impulsive quality
the frustration does sometimes in people
reinforce their craving for the
unconstrained executive to quote get
things done or shake things up or yes
that's true
but in the Russian case I'm not sure
it's cultural today I think it might be
more having to do with the failures the
functional failures of the kind of
political system that they tried to
institute after the Soviet collapse and
so it may be frustration with the
version of constraints on executive
power they got and how it didn't work
the way it was imagined which has led to
a sense in which non constrained
executive power could fix things what
like like I'm not sure that that's the
majority sentiment in the Russian case
although it's hard to measure because
under authoritarian regimes
public opinion is shaped by the
environments in which people live which
is very constrained in terms of public
opinion but on that point why at least
from a distance desert seem to
nevertheless be support for the current
Russian President Vladimir Putin is that
have to do with the fact that measuring
getting good metrics and statistics on
support is difficult know that Aryan
governments or is there still something
appealing to that kind of power to the
people I think we have to give credit to
President Putin for understanding the
psychology of the Russians who to whom
he appeals many of them were the losers
in the transition from communism they
were the ones whose pensions were
destroyed by inflation or whose salaries
didn't go up or whose regions were
abandoned they were not the winners for
the most part and so I think there's an
understanding on his part of their
psychology Putin has grown in the
position he was not a public politician
when he first started out he was quite
poor in public settings he didn't have
the kind of political instincts that he
has now he didn't have the appeal to
traditional values in the Orthodox
Church and some of the other dimensions
of his rule today so yes we have to give
some credit to Putin himself for this
in addition to the frustrations and the
mass of the people but let's think about
it this way
in addition without taking away the fact
that he's become a better politician
over time and that sentiment has shifted
because of the disappointments with the
transition with the population when I
asked my kids am I a good dad
my kids don't have any other dad to
measure me against I'm the only dad they
know and I'm the only dad they can
choose or not choose they think if they
don't choose me they still get me as dad
right
so with Putin today he's the only dad
that the Russian people have now if my
kids were introduced to alternative
fathers they might be better than me
they might be more loving more giving
funnier richer whatever it might be they
might be more appealing there are some
blood ties there for sure with that I
have with my kids
but they would at least be able to
choose alternatives and then I would
have to win their favor in that
constellation of alternatives if
President Putin were up against real
alternatives if the population had real
choice and that choice could express
itself and have resources and have media
and everything else the way he does
maybe he would be very popular and maybe
his popularity would not be as great as
it currently is so the absence of
alternatives is another factor that
reinforces his authority and his
popularity having said that there are
many authoritarian leaders who deny any
alternatives to the population and are
not very popular so denial of
alternatives doesn't guarantee you the
popularity you still have to figure out
the mass psychology and be able to
appeal to it so with with the in the
Russian case the winners
from the transition live primarily in
the big cities and our self employed or
intrapreneurial even if they're not self
employed there they're able to change
careers they have tremendous skills and
talent and education and knowledge as
well as these entrepreneurial or dynamic
personalities Putin also appealed to
them he did that with Medvedev and it
was a very clever ruse he himself
appealed to the losers from the
transition the small towns the rural the
people who were not well-off and he had
them for the most part not all we don't
want to generalize to say that he had
every one of them because those people
have views of their own sometimes in
contradiction with the President of
Russia and then he appealed to the
opposite people the successful urban
base through the so-called reformer with
the idea of the new generation the
technically literate prime minister who
for a time was president and so that
worked very successfully for Putin he
was able to bridge a big divide in the
society and gain a greater mass support
than he would otherwise have had by
himself that ruse only worked through
the time that Medvedev was temporarily
president for a few years because of the
Constitution Putin couldn't do three
consecutive terms and stepped aside in
what they call castling in chess this
when this was over Putin had difficulty
with his popularity there were mass
protests in the urban areas precisely
that group of the population that he had
been able to win in part because of the
Medvedev castling and now had had their
delusions exposed and were disillusioned
and there were these mass protests in
the urban areas not just in the cap
by the way and Putin had to as it were
come up with a new way to fix his
popularity which happened to be the
annexation of Crimea from which he got a
very significant bump
however he the trend is back in the
other direction it's diminishing again
although it's still high relative to
other leaders around the world so I
wouldn't say that he's unpopular with
mass in Russia he there is some
popularity there there is some success
but I would say it's tough for us to
gauge because of the lack of
alternatives and Putin is unpopular
inside the State Administration at every
level deeper accuracy of because no
simple are well informed and they
understand that the country is declining
that the human capital is declining the
infrastructure is declining the economy
is not really growing it's not really
diversifying Russia's not investing in
its future the state officials
understand all of that and then they see
that the Putin cleek is stealing
everything in sight so between the
failure to invest in a future and the
corruption of a narrow group around the
president there's disillusionment in the
state apparatus because they see this
more clearly or more closely than the
mass of the population they can't
necessarily yet oppose this in public
because there are people they have
families they have careers they have
children who want to go to school or
want a job and so there are constraints
on their ability to oppose the regime
based upon what we might call cowardice
or other people might call realism
I don't know how courageous people can
be when their family children career are
on the line so it's very interesting
dynamic to see the disillusionment
inside the government with the president
which is not yet fully public for the
but could become public and once again
if there's an alternative if an
alternative appears things could shift
quickly and that alternative could come
from inside the regime from inside the
regime but the leadership the the party
the people that are now as you're saying
opposed to Putin they're nevertheless
maybe you can correct me but it feels
like there's structural he's deeply
corrupt so each of each of the people
we're talking about our and don't feel
like a George Washington once again the
circumstances don't permit them to act
that way necessarily right George
Washington did great things but in
certain circumstances a lot of the state
officials in Russia for certain are
corrupt there's no question many of them
however are patriotic and many of them
feel badly about where the country has
been going they would prefer that the
country was less corrupt they would
prefer that there were greater
investment in all sorts of areas of
Russia they might even themselves steal
less if they could be guaranteed that
everybody else would steal less there's
a deep and abiding patriotism inside
Russia as well as inside the Russian
regime so they understand that Putin in
many ways rescued the Russian state from
the chaos of the 1990s they understand
that Russia was in very bad shape as an
incoherent failing state almost when
Putin took over and that he did some
important things for Russia's stability
and consolidation there's also some
appreciation that Putin stood up to the
West and stood up to more powerful
countries and regained a sense of pride
and maneuverability for Russia in the
international system people appreciate
that and it's real it's not imagined
that Putin accomplished that the problem
is the methods that he accomplished it
with he used the kind of methods that is
the same taking other people's property
putting other people in jail for
political reasons he used the kind of
methods that are not conducive to
long-term growth and stability so he
fixed the problem but he fixed the
problem and then created even bigger
long-term problems potentially and
moreover all authoritarian regimes that
use those methods are tempted to keep
using them and using them and using them
until they're the only ones who are the
beneficiaries and the group narrows and
narrows the elite gets smaller and
narrower the interest groups get
excluded from power and their ability to
continue enjoying the fruits of the
system and the resentment grows and so
that's the situation we have in Russia
is a place that is stuck it was to a
certain extent rescued it was rescued
with methods that were not conducive to
long-term success and stability the
rescue referring to is this of the
economic growth when Putin first tests
took office they had 10 years they had a
full decade of an average of 7% growth a
year which was phenomenal and is not
attributable predominantly to oil prices
during president Putin's first term as
president the average price of oil was
$35 a barrel during his second term as
president the average price was $70 a
barrel so during those two terms when
Russia was growing at about 7% a year
oil prices were averaging somewhere
around $50 a barrel which is fine
but is not the reason because later on
when oil prices were over $100 a barrel
Russia stagnated so the initial growth
do you think Putin deserves some credit
for that yes he does because he
introduced some important liberalizing
measures
he lowered taxes he allowed land to be
bought and sold he deregulated many
areas of the economy and so there was a
kind of intrapreneurial burst that were
that was partly attributable partly
attributable to government policy during
his first term but also he was
consolidating political power and as I
said the methods he used overall for the
long term were not able to continue
sustain that success in addition we have
to remember that China played a really
big role in the success of Russia in the
first two terms of Putin's presidency
because China's phenomenal growth
created insatiable demand for just about
everything that the Soviet Union used to
produce so fertilizers cement
fill-in-the-blank
chemicals metals China had insatiable
demand for everything the Soviet Union
once produced and so China's global
raising of global demand overall brought
soviet-era industry back from the dead
and so there was something that happened
Soviet era industry fell off a cliff in
the 1990s there was a decline in
manufacturing and industrial production
greater than in the great depression in
the US but a lot of that came back
online in the 2000s and that had to do
with China's phenomenal growth the trade
between China and Russia was not always
direct so this was an indirect effect
but raising global prices for the
commodities and the products the kind of
lower and lower value products in
manufacturing not high-end stuff but
lower and stuff like steel or iron or
cement or fertilizer where the
value-added is not
but nonetheless which had been destroyed
by the 1990s and after the Soviet
collapse this was brought back to life
now you can do that once you can bring
Soviet era industry back to life once
and that happened during Putin's first
two terms in addition to the
liberalizing policies which spurred
intrapreneurial ISM and some small and
medium business the crash of the ruble
in 1998 which made Russian products much
cheaper abroad and made imports much
more expensive also facilitated the
resuscitation the revival of domestic
manufacturing so all of this came
together for that spectacular 10-year
seven percent on average economic growth
and moreover people's wages after
inflation their disposable income grew
more even than GDP grew so disposable
income after inflation that is a real
income was growing greater than seven
percent in some cases ten percent a year
so there was a boom and the Russian
people felt it and it happened during
Putin's first two terms and people were
grateful rightly so for that and those
who don't want to give Putin credit give
oil prices all the credits but I don't
think that oil prices can explain this
having said that that doesn't mean that
this was sustainable over the long term
so you've briefly mentioned sort of
implying the possibility Stalin held
power for let's say thirty years you
briefly mentioned that as a question
will Putin be able to beat that record
to beat that so can you talk about your
sense of is it possible that Putin holds
power for that kind of duration let's
hope not let's hope not for Russia's
sake the primary victims of president
Putin's power are Russians
they're not Ukrainians although to a
certain extent Ukraine has suffered
because of Putin's actions and they're
not Americans they're Russians moreover
Russia has lost a great deal of human
talent yes millions and millions of
people have left Russia since 1991
overall somewhere between five and ten
million people have left the country and
are beyond the borders of the former
Soviet Union so they left the Soviets
base entirely moreover the people who
left are not the poor people they're not
the uneducated they're not the losers
the people who've left are the more
dynamic parts of the population the
better educated the more entrepreneurial
so that human capital lost that Russia
has suffered is phenomenal and in fact
right here we were sitting at MIT we
have examples of people who are
qualified good enough for MIT and have
left Russia to come to MIT you're
looking at one of them and the other
aspect just to quickly comment is those
same people like me I'm not welcome back
no you're not under the current regime
it was a big loss for Russia if you're
patriotic but not from the point of view
of the Putin regime that has to do also
factors into popularity if the people
who don't like you leave they're not
there to complain to protest to vote
against you and so your your opposition
declines when you let them leave however
it's very costly in human capital terms
hemorrhaging that much human capital is
damaging its self damaging and we've
seen it accelerate it was already high
but we've seen it accelerate in the last
oh seven eight years of President
Putin's rule and those people are not
going back of their own volition but
even if they wanted to go back as you
just said they'd be unwelcome that's a
big cost to pay for this regime
and so whatever benefits this regime
might or might not have given to the
country the disadvantage is the downside
the costs are also really high so we
don't want Putin lasting in power as
long as Stalin it would be better if
Russia were able to choose among options
to choose a new leader among options
many people speculate that President
Putin will name a successor the way
Yeltsin named Putin as his successor
Boris president Boris Yeltsin and then
Putin will leave the stage and allow the
successor to take over that might seem
like a good solution but once again we
don't need a system where you hang on
for as long as possible then nominate
who's gonna take over we need a system
that has the kind of corrective
mechanisms that democracies and markets
have along with rule of law a corrective
mechanism is really important because
all leaders make mistakes but when you
can't correct for the mistakes then the
mistakes get compounded a Putin could
well he seems to be healthy he could
well last as many years of Stalin it's
hard to predict because events intercede
sometimes and create circumstances that
are unforeseen and leaders get
overthrown or have a heart attack or
whatever there's a palace insurrection
we're ambitious leaders on the inside
for both personal power and patriotic
reasons try to push aside an aging
leader there are many scenarios in which
Putin could not last that long but
unfortunately right now you could also
imagine potentially him lasting that
long which as I said is not an outcome
if you're patriotic about Russia is not
an outcome you would wish up to the
country is that I guess a very difficult
question but what
what practically do you feel is a way
out of the Putin regime as a way out of
the corruption that's deeply underlies
the the state is a if you look from a
history perspective as a revolution
required is some his violence required
is in you know from a violence within or
external to the country do you see or
origin as a powerful is a inspiring
leader enough to step in and bring
democracy and kind of the free world to
Russia so Russia is not a failed country
it's a middle-income country with the
tremendous potential and has proven many
times in the past that when it gets in a
bad way it can reverse its trajectory
moreover violence is rarely ever a
solution violence rarely it may break an
existing trend but it's rare that
violence produces a non-violent
sustainable positive outcome it happens
but it doesn't happen frequently
societal upheaval is not a way always to
institutionalize a better path forward
because you need institutions people can
protest as they did throughout the
Middle East and the protests didn't
necessarily lead to better systems
because the step from protests to new
strong consolidated institutions is a
colossal leap not a small step what we
need and what we see from history and
situations like this is a group within
the power structures which is a
patriotic that sees things going down
and that is to say that sees things not
be developing relative to neighbors
relative to richer countries relative to
more successful countries and they want
to change the trajectory of Russia
and if they can in a coalition fashion
unseat the current regime for a new
power sharing arrangement which once
again can be frustrating because you
can't do changes immediately you can't
do things overnight but that's the point
constraints on your ability to change
everything immediately and to force
change overnight is what leads to
long-term success potentially right
that's the sustainability of change so
Russia needs stronger institutions
it needs court system as well as
democratic institutions it needs
functioning open dynamic markets rather
than monopolies it needs meritocracy and
banks to award loans on the basis of
business plans not on the basis of
political criteria or corrupt bribery or
whatever it might be right so Russia
needs those kind of functioning
institutions that take time are
sometimes slow don't lead to
revolutionary transformation but lead to
potentially long term sustainable growth
without upheaval without violence
without getting into a situation where
all of a sudden you need a miracle again
every time Russia seems to need a
miracle and that's the problem the the
solution would be not needing a miracle
now having said that the potential is
there the civilization that we call
Russia's amazingly impressive
it has delivered world-class culture
world-class science it's a great power
it's not a great power with a strong
base right now but nonetheless it is a
great power is a tax in the world so I
wouldn't underestimate Russia's
abilities here and I wouldn't write-off
Russia I don't see it under the current
regime a renewal of the country but if
we can have from within the regime and
evolution rather than a revolution
in a positive direction and maybe get a
George Washington figure who is strong
enough to push through
institutionalization rather than
personalism so if I could ask about one
particular individual maybe just
interesting to get your comment but also
as a representative of potential leaders
I just on the spot has talked to Gary
Kasparov who I'm not sure if you're
familiar with his his ongoings so
besides being a world-class chess player
he's also a very outspoken activist sort
of seeing Putin truly seeing Putin as an
enemy of the free world of democracy of
balanced government in Russia what do
you think of people like him
specifically or just people like him
trying as leaders to step in to run for
president to to symbolize a new chapter
in Russia's future so we don't need
individuals some individuals are very
impressive and they have courage and
they protest and they criticize and they
organize we need institutions we need a
Duma or a parliament that functions we
need a court system that functions that
is to say where there are a separation
of powers impartial professional civil
service impartial professional judiciary
those are the things Russia needs it's
rare that you get that from an
individual no matter how impressive
right
we had Andrei Sakharov who was an
extraordinary individual who developed
the hydrogen bomb under Soviet regime
was a world-class physicist was then
upset about how his scientific knowledge
and scientific achievements were being
put to use and rebelled to try to put
limits constraints civilizing you main
limits and constrained
on some of the implications of his
extraordinary science but Sakharov even
if he had become the leader of the
country which he did not become he was
more of a moral or spiritual leader it
still wouldn't have given you a
judiciary it still wouldn't have given
you a civil service it still wouldn't
have given you a Duma or functioning
Parliament you need a leader in
coalition with other leaders you need a
bunch of leaders a whole group and they
have to be divided a little bit so that
not one of them can destroy all the
others and they have to be interested in
creating institutions not just or not
solely or predominantly in their
personal power and so I have no
objection to outstanding individuals and
to the work that they do but I think in
institutional terms and they need to
think that way too in order to be
successful so if we go back to the
echoes of that after the Russian
Revolution was Stalin or Lenin Stalin
maybe you can correct me but there was a
group of people there in that same kind
of way looking to establish institutions
that were built in a you know in a
beautifully built around an ideology
that they believed is good for the world
so sort of echoing that idea of what
we're talking about what Russia needs
now can you first of all you've
described a fascinating thought which is
Stalin as having amassed arguably more
power than any man in history she's
interesting thing to think about but can
you tell about his journey to getting
that power after the Russian Revolution
how does that perhaps echo to the our
current discussion about institutions
and so on and just in general the story
I think is fascinating of how one man is
able to get more power than any other
man in history
it is a great story not necessarily from
a moral point of view but if you're
interested in power for sure it's an
incredible story so we have to remember
that Stalin is also a product of
circumstances not solely his own
individual Drive which is very strong
but for example World War one breaks the
Czarist regime the Czarist order
Imperial Russia in the state Stalin has
no participation whatsoever in World War
one he spends World War one in exile in
Siberia until the downfall of the
Czarist autocracy in February 1917
Stalin is in eastern Siberian exile he's
only able to leave eastern Siberia when
that regime Falls he never fights in the
war he's called up briefly towards the
end of the war and is disqualified on
physical grounds because of physical
deformities from being drafted the war
continues after the Czar's regime has
been toppled in the capital and there's
been a revolution the war continues and
that war is very radicalizing the
peasants begin to seize the land after
the Tsar Falls essentially destroying
much of the gentry class Stalin has
nothing to do with that the peasants
have their own revolution seizing the
land not in law but in fact de facto not
desert land ownership so there are these
really large processes underway that
Stalin is alive during but not a driver
of the most improbable thing happens
which is a very small group of people
around the the figure of Vladimir Lenin
announces that had in a seized power now
by this time in October 1917 the
government that has replaced the Tsar
the soap
visional government has failed and so
there's not so much power to seize from
the provisional government
what Lenin does is he does a coup on the
left that is to say Soviets or councils
as we would call them in English which
represent people's power or the masses
participating in politics a kind of
radical grassroots democracy are
extremely popular all over the country
and not dominated by any one group but
predominantly socialist or predominantly
leftist Russia has an election during
the war a free and fair election for the
most part despite the war at the end of
1917 in December 1917 and 3/4 plus of
the country votes socialist in some form
or another so the battle was over the
definition of socialism and who had the
right to participate in defining
socialism not only what it would be but
who had the right to decide so there's a
coup by Lenin's group known as the
Bolsheviks against all the other
socialists and so Lenin declares a
seizure of power whereby the old
government has failed people's power the
council's known as the Soviets are gonna
take their place and Lenin seizes power
in the name of the Soviet so it's a coup
against the left against the rest of the
left not against the provisional
government that has replaced the Tsar
which has already failed and so Stalin
is able to come to power along with
Lenin in this crazy seizure of power on
the left against the rest of the left in
October 1917 which we know is the
October Revolution and I call the
October coup as many other historians
call the October Revolution happened
after the seizure of power what's
interesting about this episode is that
the leftists who seize power in the name
of the Soviets in the name of the masses
in the name of people's power they
retain their hold many times in history
there's a seizure of power by the left
and they fail they collapse they're
cleaned out by an army or what we call
forces of order by counter revolutionary
forces
Lenin's Revolution Lenin's coup is
successful it is able to hold power and
not just seize power they win a civil
war and they're entrenched in the heart
of the country already by 1921 Stalin is
part of that group
Lenin needs somebody to run this new
regime in the kind of nitty-gritty way
Lenin is the leader the undisputed
leader in the Bolshevik Party which
changes their name to communists in 1918
he makes Stalin the General Secretary of
the Communist Party he creates a new
position which hadn't existed before a
kind of day-to-day political manager a
right-hand man
not because Lenin is looking to replace
himself he's looking to institutionalize
a helpmate a right-hand man he does this
in the spring of 1920 to stall and his
name to this position which Lenin has
created expressly for Stalin so there
has been a coup on the Left where by the
Bolsheviks who become communists have
seized power against the rest of the
socialists and anarchists and the entire
left and then there's an
institutionalization of a position known
as General Secretary of the Communist
Party right-hand man of Lenin less than
six weeks after Lenin has created this
position and installed Stalin Lenin has
a stroke and a major stroke
really returns as a full actor to power
before he dies of a fourth stroke in
January 1924 so a position is created
for Stalin to run things on Lenin's
behalf and then Lenin has a stroke and
so Stalin now has this new position
general secretary but he's the right
hand of a person who's no longer
exercising day-to-day control over
affairs Stalin then uses this new
position to create a personal
dictatorship inside the Bolshevik
dictatorship which is the remarkable
story I tried to tell so is there
anything nefarious about any of what you
just described
so it seems conveniently that the
positions created just for Stalin there
was a few other brilliant people
arguably more brilliant than Stalin in
the vicinity of Lenin why was Stalin
chosen why did Lenin all of a sudden
fall ill as perhaps a conspiratorial
question but is there anything nefarious
about any of this historical trajectory
to power that Stalin took in creating
the personal dictatorship so history is
full of contingency and surprise after
something happens we all think it's
inevitable it had to happen that way
everything was leading up to it so
Hitler seizes power in Germany in 1933
and the Nazi regime gets
institutionalized by several of his
moves after being named Chancellor and
so all German history becomes a story of
the Nazi rise to power Hitler's rise to
power every trend tendency is bent into
that outcome things which don't seem
related to that outcome all of a sudden
get bent in that direction and all the
trends that were going on are no longer
examined because they didn't lead to
that outcome but Hitler's becoming
Chancellor of Germany in 1933 was not
inevitable it was contingent
he was offered the position by the
traditional conservatives he's part of
the radical right and the traditional
right named him Chancellor the Nazi
Party never outright won an election
that was free and fair before Hitler
came to power and in fact it's votes on
the eve of Hitler becoming Chancellor
declined relative to the previous
election
so there's contingency in history and so
Lenin's illness his stroke the
neurological and blood problems that he
had were not a structure in history in
other words if Lenin had been a
healthier figure Stalin might never have
become the Stalin that we know that's
not to say that all history is
accidental just that we need to relate
the structural the larger structural
factors to the contingent factors why
did Lenin pick Stalin Stalin was a very
effective organizer and the position was
an organizational position Stalin could
get things done he would carry out
assignments no matter how difficult he
wouldn't complain that it was hard work
or too much work he wouldn't go off
womanizing and drinking and ignore his
responsibilities Lenin chose Stalin
among other options because he thought
Stalin was the better option once again
he wasn't choosing his successor because
he didn't know he was gonna have this
stroke Lenin had some serious illnesses
but he had never had a major stroke
before so the choice was made based upon
Stalin's organizational skills and
promise against the others who are in
the regime now they can see more
brilliant than Stalin but he was more
effective and I'm not sure they were
very brilliant well he was exceptionally
competent actually at the tasks for
running a governor of the executive
branch rate of a dictator yes he turned
out to be very adept at being a dictator
and so if he had been chosen by Lenin
and had not been very good he would have
been pushed aside by others you can get
a position by accident you can be named
because you're someone's friend or
someone's relative but to hold that
position to hold that position in
difficult circumstances and then to
build effectively a superpower on all
that bloodshed right you have to be
skilled in some way it can't be just the
accident that brings you to power
because if accident brings you to power
it won't last
just like we discovered with Putin he
had some qualities that we didn't
foresee at the beginning and he's been
able to hold power not just be named and
now Putin and Stalin are very different
people these are very different regimes
I wouldn't put them in the same sentence
my point is not that one resembles the
other my point is that when people come
to power for contingent reasons they
don't stay in power unless they're able
to manage it and Stalin was able to
build a personal dictatorship inside
that dictatorship he was cunning he was
ruthless and he was a workaholic he was
very diligent he had a phenomenal memory
and so he could remember people's names
and faces and events and this was very
advantageous for him as he built the
machine that became the Soviet state and
bureaucracy one of the things maybe you
can correct me if I'm wrong with you've
made me realize is this wasn't some kind
of manipulative personality trying to
gain more power solely like kind of an
evil picture of a person but he truly
believed in communism the the you know
as far as I can understand again you can
correct me if I'm wrong but he wanted to
build a better world by build by having
infusing communism into into into the
country and perhaps into the the
the whole world so maybe my question is
what role does communism as an idea as
an ideology playing all of this in his
rise to power in the people of the time
in the Russian people actually just the
whole 20th century you're right
Stalin was a true believer and this is
very important
he was also hungry for power and for
personal power but just as you said not
for powers sake not only for power he
was interested in enacting communism in
reality and also in building a powerful
state he was a statist a traditional
Russian statist in the Imperial sense
and this won him a lot of followers the
fact that they knew he was a hardcore
true believing communist won him a lot
of followers among the communists and
the fact that he was a hardcore defender
of Russian state interests now in the
Soviet guys also won him a lot of
followers
sometimes those groups overlapped the
Communists and the Russian Patriots and
sometimes they were completely different
groups but both of them shared an
admiration for Stalin's a dedication to
those goals and his abilities to enact
them and so it's very important to
understand that however thirsty he was
for power and he was very thirsty for
power that he was also driven by ideals
now I don't necessarily think that
everyone around Stalin shared those
ideals we have to be careful not to make
everybody into a communist true believer
not to make everybody into a great
statist Russian patriot but they were
widespread and powerful attractions for
a lot of people and so Stalin's ability
to communicate to people those that he
was dedicated to those pursuits and his
ability to drive towards them
were part of his appeal however he also
resorted to manipulation
he also resorted to violence he lied he
spoke out of all sides of his mouth he
slandered other people he sabotaged
potential rivals he used every
underhanded method and then some in
order to build his personal dictatorship
now he justified this as you said by
appeals to communism and to Soviet
father himself as well too to himself
and to others and so he justified it in
his own mind and to others but certainly
any means right were were acceptable to
him to achieve these ends and he
identified his personal power with
communism and with Russian glory in the
world so he felt that he was the only
one who could be trusted who could be
relied upon to build these things now we
put ourselves back in that time period
the Great Depression was a very
difficult time for the capitalist system
there was mass unemployment a lot of
hardship fascism Nazism Japan Imperial
Japan there were a lot of associations
that were negative with the kind of
capitalist system that was not a hundred
percent not a monolith but had a lot of
authoritarian incarnations there was
imperialism colonies that even the
democratic rule of law capitalist states
had non democratic non rule of law
colonies under their rule so the image
and reality of capitalism during that
time period between World War one and
World War two was very different from
how it would become later and so in that
time period in that interwar conjuncture
after World War one before World War two
communism held some appeal inside the
Soviet Union for sure but even outside
the
because the image and reality of
capitalism disappointed many people now
in the end communism was significantly
worse many more victims and the system
of course would eventually implode but
nonetheless there were real problems
that communism tried to address it
didn't solve those problems it was not a
solution but it didn't come out of
nowhere it came out of the context of
that inner war period and so Stalin's
rule some people saw it as potentially a
better option than imperialism fascism
and Great Depression having said that
they were wrong it turned out that
Stalin wasn't a better alternative to
markets and private property and rule of
law and democracy however that didn't
become clearer to people until after
World War two after Nazism had been
defeated Imperial Japan had been
defeated
fascist Italy had been defeated and
decolonization had happened around the
world and there was a middle class
economic boom in the period from the
late 40s through the 70s that created a
kind of mass middle class in many
societies so capitalism rose from the
ashes as it were and this changed the
game for Stalin and communism communism
is about an alternative to capitalism
and if that alternative is not superior
there's no reason for communism to exist
but if capitalism is in foul odor if
people have a bad opinion a strong
critique of capitalism that can be
appealed to alternatives and that's kind
of what happened with Stalin's rule but
after World War two the context changed
a lot capitalism was very different much
more successful not a non-violence
compared to what it was in the interwar
period and the Soviet Union had a tough
time competing against that new context
now today we see similarly that the
image and reality of capitalism is on
the question again which leads some
people to find an answer in socialism as
an alternative so you just kind of
painted a beautiful picture of
comparison this is the way we think
about ideologies because we is what's
working better do you separate in your
mind the ideals of communism to the
Stalinist implementation of communism
and again capitalism and American
implementation of capitalism and as we
look at now the 21st century where yes
this idea you know of socialism being a
potential political system that we would
or economic system would operate under
in the United States rising up again as
an idea so how do we think about that
again in the 21st century about these
ideas fundamental deep ideas of
communism capitalism yeah so in the
Marxist schema there was something
called feudalism which was supposedly
destroyed by the bourgeoisie who created
capitalism and then the working class
was supposed to destroy capitalism and
create socialism but socialism wasn't
the end stage the end stage was going to
be communism so that's why the communist
party in the Soviet Union first built
socialism transcending capitalism the
next stage was socialism and the end
game the final stage was communism so
their version of socialism was derived
from Marx and Marx argued that the
problem was capitalism had been very
beneficial for a while it had produced
greater wealth and greater opportunities
and feudalism had but then it had come
to serve only the narrow interests of
the so called booze huazi or the
capitalists themselves and so for
Humanity's sake the universal class the
working class needed to overthrow
capitalist
in order for greater productivity
greater wealth to be produced for all of
humanity to flourish and on a higher
level so you couldn't have socialism
unless you destroyed capitalism so that
meant no markets no private property no
so-called Parliament's or bourgeois
Parliament's as they were called so you
got socialism in Marxist schema by
transcending by eliminating capitalism
now Marx also called for freedom he said
that this elimination of markets and
private property and bourgeois
Parliament's would produce greater
freedom in addition to greater abundance
however everywhere this was tried it
produced tyranny and mass violence death
and shortages everywhere it was tried
there's no exception in historical terms
and so it's very interesting Marx
insisted that capitalism had to be
eliminated
you couldn't have markets markets were
chaos you needed planning
you couldn't have wait a hiring of wage
labor that was wage slavery now you
couldn't have private property because
that was a form of theft so in the
Marxist scheme somehow you were going to
eliminate capitalism and get to freedom
it turned out you didn't get to freedom
so then people said well you can't blame
Marx because he said we needed freedom
he was Pro freedom so it's kind of like
dropping a nuclear bomb you say you're
gonna drop a nuclear bomb but you want
to minimize civilian casualties
so the dropping of the nuclear bomb is
the elimination of markets private
property in Parliament's but you're
going to bring freedom or you're going
to minimize civilian casualties so you
drop the nuclear bomb you eliminate the
capitalism and you get famine
deportation no constraints on executive
power and not abundance but shortages
and people say well that's not what I
mark said that's not what I said
I said I wanted to minimize civilian
casualties the nuclear bomb goes off and
there's mass civilian casualties and you
keep saying but I said drop the bomb but
minimize civilian casualties so that's
where we are that's history not
philosophy yeah
I'm speaking about historical examples
all the cases that we have Mark's was
not a theorist of inequality Marx was a
theorist of alienation of dehumanization
of fundamental constraints or what he
called fetters on productivity and on
wealth which he all attributed to
capitalism Marx wasn't bothered by
inequality he was bothered by something
deeper something worse right those
socialists who figured this out who
understood that if you drop the nuclear
bomb there was no way to minimize
civilian casualties those socialists who
came to understand that if you
eliminated capitalism markets private
property and Parliament's if you
eliminated that you wouldn't get freedom
those Marxists those socialists became
what we would call Social Democrats or
people who would use the state to
regulate the market not to eliminate the
market they would use the state to
redistribute income not to destroy
private property in markets and so this
in the Marxist schema was apostasy
because they were accepting markets and
private property they were accepting
alienation and wage slavery they were
accepting capitalism in principle what
they wanted to fix it they wanted to
ameliorate they wanted to regulate and
so they became what was denounced as
revision
not true Marxists not real
revolutionaries but parliamentary Road
parliamentarians we know this as normal
politics normal social democratic
politics from the European case are from
the American case but they are not
asking to eliminate capitalism blaming
capitalism blaming markets and private
property so this rift among the
Socialists the ones who are for
elimination of capitalism transcending
capitalism otherwise you could never
ever get to abundance and freedom in the
Marxist schema versus those who accept
capitalism but want to regulate and
redistribute that rift on the left has
been with us almost from the beginning
it's a kind of civil war on the left
between the Leninists and Social
Democrats or the revisionists as they're
known pejoratively by the Leninists we
have the same confusion today in the
world today where people also cite Marx
saying capitalism is a dead end and we
need to drop that nuclear bomb and get
freedom get no civilian casualties
versus those who say yes there are
inequities there's a lack of equality of
opportunity there are many other issues
that we need to deal with and we can fix
those issues we can regulate we can
redistribute I'm not advocating this as
a political position I'm not taking a
political position myself I'm just
saying that there's a confusion on the
left between those who accept capitalism
and want to regulate it versus those who
think capitalism is inherently evil and
if we eliminate it we'll get to a better
world when in fact history shows that if
you eliminate capitalism you get to a
worse world the problems might be real
but the solutions are worse from
history's lessons now we have deep
painful lessons but there's not
many of them you know our history is
relatively short as a human species do
we have a good answer on the left of
Leninist Marxist versus social democrat
versus capitalism versus any anarchy you
know do have sufficient samples from
history to make better decisions about
the future of our politics and economics
for sure we have the American Revolution
which was a revolution not about class
not about workers not about a so-called
universal class of the working class
elimination of capitalism markets and
the bourgeoisie but was about the
category citizen it was about universal
humanity where everyone in theory could
be part of it as a citizen the
revolution fell short of its own ideals
not everyone was a citizen right for
example if you didn't own property you
were a male but didn't own property you
didn't have full rights of a citizen if
you were a female whether you own
property or not you weren't a full
citizen if you were imported from Africa
against your will you were a slave and
not a citizen and so not everyone was
afforded the rights in actuality that
were declared in principle however over
time the category citizen could expand
and slaves could be emancipated and they
could get the right to vote they could
become citizens non-property owning
males could get the right to vote and
become full citizens females could get
the right to vote and become full
citizens in fact eventually my mother
was able to get a credit card in her own
name in the 1970s without my father
having to co-sign the paperwork I took a
long time but nonetheless the category
citizen can expand and it can become a
universal category so we have that
the citizen universal humanity model of
the American Revolution which was deeply
flawed at the time it was introduced but
fixable over time we also had that
separation of powers and constraint on
executive power that we began this
conversation with that was also
institutionalized in the American
Revolution because they were afraid of
tyranny they were afraid of
unconstrained executive power so they
built a system that would contain that
constrain it institutionally not
circumstantially so that's a great gift
within that Universal category of
citizen which has over time come closer
to fulfilling its original promise and
within those institutional constraints
that separation of powers constraint on
executive power within that we've
developed what we might call normal
politics left-right politics people can
be in favor of redistribution and
government action and people can be in
favor of small government hands off
government no redistribution or less
redistribution that's the normal
left-right political spectrum where you
respect the institutions and separation
of powers and you respect the universal
category of citizenship and equality
before the law and everything else I
don't see any problems with that
whatsoever
I see that as a great gift not just to
this country but around the world and
other places besides the United States
have developed this the problems arise
at the extremes the far left and the far
right that don't recognize the
legitimacy either of capitalism or of
democratic rule of law institutions and
they want to eliminate constraints on
executive power they want to control the
public sphere or diminish the
Independence of the media they want to
take away
markets or private property and
redistribution becomes something bigger
than just redistribution it becomes
actually that original Marxist idea of
transcending capitalism so I'm not
bothered by the left or the right I
think they're normal and we should have
that debate where a gigantic diverse
country of many different political
points of view I'm troubled only by the
extremes that are against the system
cost system that want to get rid of it
and supposedly that will be the right
path to the future history tells us that
the far left and the far right are wrong
about that but once again this doesn't
mean that you have to be a social
democrat you could be a libertarian you
could be a conservative you could be a
centrist you could be conservative on
some issues and liberal on other issues
all of that comes under what I would
presume to be normal politics and I see
that as the important corrective
mechanism normal politics and market
economies non monopolistic open free and
dynamic market economies I don't like
concentrations of power politically and
I don't like concentrations of power
economically I like competition in the
political realm I like competition in
the economic realm this is not perfect
it's constantly needs to be protected
and reinvented and there are flaws that
are fundamental and need to be adjusted
and addressed and everything else
especially equality of opportunity
equality of outcome is unreachable and
is a mistake because it produces
perverse and unintended consequences
equality of outcome attempts attempts to
make people equal on the outcome side
what attempts to make them more equal on
the front end on the opportunity side
that's really really important for a
healthy society that's where we've
fallen down
our schools are not providing equality
of opportunity for the majority of
people in all of our school systems and
so I see problems there I see a need to
invest in ourselves invest in
infrastructure invest in human capital
create greater equality of opportunity
but also to make sure that we have good
governance because governance is the
variable that enables you to do all
these other things I've washed quite a
bit returning back to Putin I've watched
quite a few interviews and with Putin in
conversations you know especially
because I speak Russian fluently I can
understand often the translations lose a
lot I am I find the man putting morality
aside very deep and interesting and I
found almost no interview with him to be
to get at that depth I was I was very
hopeful for the Oliver Stone documentary
and with him and to me because I deeply
respect our stone as a filmmaker in
general but it was a complete failure in
my eyes that interview the the lack of
it I mean I suppose you could toss it up
to a language barrier but a complete
lack of diving deep into the person as
what I saw my question is a strange one
but if you were to sit down with Putin
and have a conversation or perhaps if
you're sa-do's Saddam was Stalin and
have a conversation what kind of
questions would you ask well this
wouldn't be televised unless you want it
to be so this is only you so you're
allowed to ask about some of the
questions that are sort of not socially
acceptable meaning putting morality
aside getting into depth of the human
character what would you ask
so once again they're very different
personalities and very different time
periods in very different regimes so
what I would talk to Stalin about and
Putin about her are not in the same
category necessarily so let's take Putin
so I would ask him where he thinks this
is going where he thinks Russia's going
to be in 25 years or 50 years what's the
long-term vision what does he anticipate
the current trends are going to produce
is he under the illusion that Russia is
on the up swing that things are actually
going pretty well
that in 25 years Russia is going to
still be a great power with a tremendous
dynamic economy and a lot of high tech
and a lot of human capital and wonderful
infrastructure and a very high standard
of living and a secure secure borders
and sense of security at home see think
the current path is leading in that
direction and if not if he's if he
understands that the current trajectory
does not provide for those kinds of
circumstances
does it bother him it does he worry
about that does he care about the future
25 or 50 years from now deep down what
do you think is the answer either the
honesty either he thinks he's on that
trajectory already or he doesn't care
about that long-term trajectory so
that's the mystery for me with him he's
clever
he has tremendous sources of information
he has great experience now as a world
leader having served for effectively
longer than laying at Brezhnev's long 18
year reign and so Putin has accumulated
a great deal of experience at the
highest level compared to where he
started and so I'm interested to
understand how he sees this long term
evolution or non evolution of Russia
and and whether he believes he's got
them on the right trajectory or whether
if he doesn't believe that he cares I
have no idea because I've never spoken
to him about this but I would love to
hear the answer sometimes you have to
ask questions not directly like that but
you have to come a little bit sideways
you can elicit answers from people by
making them feel comfortable in coming
sideways with them on just a quick
question so that's talking about Russia
yeah Putin's role in Russia do you think
it's interesting to ask and you could
say the same for Stalin the more
personal question of how do you feel
yourself about this whole thing about
your life about your legacy looking at
the person that's one of the most
powerful and important people in the
history of civilization both Putin and
Stalin you could argue yeah
once you experience power at that level
it becomes something that's almost
necessary for you as a human being it's
a drug it's an aphrodisiac it's a
feeling you know you go to the gym to
exercise and the endorphins the
chemicals get released and even if
you're tired or you're sore you get this
massive chemical change which is has
very dynamic effects on how you feel and
the kind of level of energy you have for
the rest of the day and if you do that
for a long time and then you don't do it
for a while you're like a drug addict
not getting your fix you miss it your
body misses that release of endorphins
to a certain extent that's how power
works for people like Putin that's how
power works for people who run
universities or our secretaries of state
or run corporations fill in the blank in
whatever ways power is exercised it
becomes almost the drug for people it
becomes something that's difficult for
them to give up it becomes a part of who
they are it becomes necessary for their
sense of self and well-being the
greatest people the people I admire the
most are the ones that can step away
from power can give it up can give up
the drug can be satisfied
and be stronger even by walking away
from continued power when they had the
option to continue alright so with a
person like Putin once again I don't
know him personally so I have no basis
to judge this this is a general
statement observable with many people
and in historical terms with a person
like Putin who's exercised this much
power for this long it's something that
becomes a part of who you are and you
have a hard time imagining yourself
without it you begin to conflate your
personal power with the well-being of
the nation you begin to think that the
more power you have the better off the
country is this conflation you begin to
be able to not imagine you can no longer
imagine what it would be like just to be
an ordinary citizen or an ordinary
person running a company even something
much smaller than a country so I
anticipate that without knowing for sure
that he would be in that category of
person but you'd want to explore that
with questions with him about so what's
his day look like from beginning to end
just take me through a typical day of
yours
what are you doing a day how does it
start what are the ups what are the
downs what are the parts of the day you
look forward to the most what are the
parts of the day you don't look forward
to that much what do you consider a good
day
what do you consider a bad day yeah how
do you know that what you're doing is
having the effects that you intend how
do you follow up how do you gather the
information the reaction how do you get
people to tell you to your face things
that they know are uncomfortable or that
you might not want to hear those kind of
questions
through that window through that kind of
question you get a window into a man
with power so let me ask about stalling
because you've done more reason another
amazing interview you've had
the the introduction was that you know
more about Stalin than Stalin himself
you've done incredible amount of
research on Stalin so if you could talk
to him get sort of direct research what
question did you ask of Stalin I have so
many questions I don't even know where I
would begin the thing about studying a
person like Stalin who's an immense
creature right he's exercising the power
of life and death over hundreds of
millions of people he's making decisions
about novels and films and and turbines
and submarines and and pacts with Hitler
or deals with Churchill and Roosevelt
and and occupation of Mongolia or
occupation of North Korea he's making
phenomenally consequential decisions
over all spheres of life all areas of
Endeavour and over much of the globe
much of the land mass of the earth and
so what's that like does he sometimes
reflect on the amount of power and
responsibility he has that he can
exercise does he sometimes think about
what it means that a single person has
that kind of power and does it have an
effect on his relations with others his
sense of self the kinds of things he
values in life does he sometimes think
it's a mistake that he's accumulated
this much power does he sometimes wish
he had a simpler life or is he once
again so drunk so enamored so caught up
with chemically and spiritually with
exercising this kind of power that he
couldn't live without it and then what
were you thinking I would ask him in
certain decisions that he made what were
you thinking on certain dates and
certain circumstances where you made a
decision and could have made a different
decision can you recall your thought
processes can you bring this
Beck was at seat-of-the-pants was it
something you'd been planning did you
just improvise or did you have a
strategy what were you guided by whose
examples did you look to when you picked
up these books that you read and you
read the books and you made pencil marks
in them is it because you absorbed the
lesson there or did it really not become
a permanent lesson and was just
something that you checked and it was
like a reflex so I have many specific
questions about many specific events and
people and circumstances that I have
tried to figure out with the surviving
source materials that we have in
abundance but I would still like to
delve into his mindset and reconstruct
his mind the closer you get to Stalin in
some ways the more elusive he can become
and especially around World War two
you've already illuminated a lot of
interesting aspects about Stalin's role
in the war but it would be interesting
to ask even more questions about how
seat-of-the-pants or deliberate some of
the decisions have been if I could ask
just one quick question one last quick
question and you're constrained in time
and answering it do you think there will
always be evil in the world
do you think there will always be war
unfortunately yes there are conflicting
interests conflicting goals that people
have most of the time those conflicts
can be resolved peacefully that's where
we build strong institutions to resolve
different interests and conflicts
peacefully but the fact the enduring
fact of conflicting interests and
conflicting desires that can never be
changed so the job that we have for
Humanity's sake is to make those
conflicting interests those
conflicting desires to make them to put
them in a context where they can be
resolved peacefully and not in a
zero-sum fashion so we can't get there
on the global scale so there's always
gonna be the kind of conflict that
sometimes gets violent what we don't
want is a conflict among the strongest
powers great power conflict is
unbelievably bad there are no words to
describe at least 55 million people died
in World War two if we have a world war
3 a war between the United States and
China or whatever it might be who knows
what the number could be a hundred and
fifty five million two hundred and fifty
five million five hundred and fifty five
million I don't even want to think about
it and so it's horrible when wars break
out in the humanitarian catastrophes for
example Yemen and Syria and several
other places I could name today it's
just horrible what you see there and the
scale is colossal for those places but
it's not planetary scale and so avoiding
planetary scale destruction is really
important for us and so having those
different interests be somehow managed
in a way that they don't that no one
sees advantage in a violent resolution
and a part of that is remembering
history so they should read your books
Stephen thank you so much it was a huge
honors talking to you today I really
enjoyed it thank you for the opportunity
my pleasure
thanks for listening to this
conversation with Steven Kotkin and
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with me on Twitter and now let me leave
you with words from Joseph Stalin spoken
shortly before the death of Lenin and at
the beginning of Stalin's rise to power
first in Russian
yeah she died Oh recession innovation
act or acog Buddhist party gonna bite
the watchdog Chile China vajna at the
Couture Heacock which is she dies Casa
I consider it completely unimportant who
in the party will vote or how but what
is extraordinarily important is who will
count the votes and how
for listening and hope to see you next
time
you