Senate Farm Bill, Currency Markets, and Forced Labor
Watch on YouTubeVideo summary
The episode opens with a detailed update on ongoing legal battles regarding US tariffs and trade remedies, highlighting how litigation has surged alongside the imposition of new duties. Several lawsuits are currently pending against Section 301 tariffs, involving small businesses like Collective Horology and Burlap and Barrel, as well as a coalition of attorneys general from Democratic states. A significant procedural development involves efforts by aggrieved importers to be certified as a class action to secure refunds for unliquidated entries, bypassing the Justice Department's requirement that each importer sue individually. While the government has made it difficult to obtain these refunds through universal injunctions, plaintiffs are pursuing both court appeals and class certification hearings, with decisions expected soon from the Court of International Trade.
The discussion then shifts to the Senate Farm Bill, which is currently stalled despite being in its third or fourth year under one-year renewals instead of a full five-year authorization. A major point of contention preventing passage is not trade policy itself but rather SNAP benefits for food stamps; urban representatives who previously supported farm bills have now rejected cuts proposed by both Republicans and the administration. Additionally, there are debates over geographical indications (GIs), where Europe seeks absolute protection for names like "Champagne" or "Parmesan," even when products made elsewhere with identical ingredients use those terms generically in the US. The bill also includes a significant increase in funding for agricultural export promotion programs, though its fate remains uncertain until it reaches the Senate floor for further amendments and votes on issues ranging from dairy quotas to pesticide liability lawsuits.
In international currency markets, the United States and Japan coordinated an intervention to prop up the yen after it fell to roughly 40-year lows due to sustained weakness and interest rate disparities between the two nations. This move aims to stabilize pricing, encourage domestic investment in Japan, and counteract the "carry trade," where investors borrow low-interest currencies like the yen to invest in higher-yielding assets elsewhere. The hosts note that while such interventions are standard among allies, there is also a broader signal of stress within the global financial system exacerbated by interest rate differentials. They further discuss China's currency situation, noting that unlike Japan or Europe, the Chinese yuan does not float freely and remains undervalued according to some estimates, contributing significantly to China's trade surplus; however, direct intervention against China is limited because its currency is controlled domestically rather than traded in deep global liquidity pools like the dollar.
Finally, the podcast addresses enforcement actions under the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), where the Trump administration added 43 companies to an entity list banning their goods from entering the US for the first time since January 2025. This action counters criticism that the previous Biden administration was hypocritical by condemning forced labor abroad while failing to update its own lists of prohibited entities in a timely manner. The hosts explain that being on this list is particularly damaging because companies are effectively presumed guilty until they can prove their innocence, making it difficult and costly for businesses to clear their names. Despite some controversy regarding the selectivity of enforcement efforts compared to international standards, the addition of these 43 firms represents a notable step in expanding transparency around supply chains linked to forced labor issues originating primarily from China's Xinjiang region.
Read the full video transcript
I'm Scott.
>> I'm [music] Bill.
>> And we're the Trade Guys.
>> You're listening to the Trade Guys, a
podcast produced by CSIS, where we talk
about trade in terms that everyone can
understand. I'm Alex Kissling, [music]
and I'm here with Scott Miller and Bill
Reinsch, the CSIS Trade Guys.
>> Thanks for listening to the Trade Guys.
On today's episode, we break down the
trade provisions in the Senate Farm
Bill, the US-Japan intervention in
currency markets, and the Trump
administration's latest enforcement
actions targeting goods linked to forced
labor. All that and more on this episode
of the Trade Guys.
>> [music]
>> Welcome back to the Trade Guys,
everybody. We have a few great topics to
cover today, but before we dive in, I
want to go back to Bill at the newsdesk.
It's been a few weeks since we've done
this, Bill, but you have a number of
updates on refunds and legal issues that
we have covered over the past couple of
months. So, what are we looking at
today?
>> Well, yes, there's a bit of a litigation
update. Their lawsuits are multiplying
like rabbits as the tariffs have
multiplied initially like rabbits, and
now they're all being followed by
lawsuits. The 301 case now has three
lawsuits pending against the 301
tariffs. The plaintiffs are small watch
company in California called Collective
Horology. That's horology with an H.
Burlap and Barrel, which is in New York,
imports spices.
And a separate group of companies,
including our old friend Rick Woldenberg
from Learning Resources and others we
had on this program in the past.
And then the third set of plaintiffs are
the usual collection of 25 attorneys
general and governors, all from
Democratic states. So, what's going on
there is that there seems to be some
agreement on timing and scheduling.
Meaning that it looks like there's an
agreement that the Burlap and Barrel
plaintiffs will be the master case, and
they set up a schedule that culminates
with I think all briefings and
presumably the hearing to be held by
October 2nd. The three-judge panel has
been announced, so you know, all wheels
are turning on that one, although
there's not going to be any kind of a a
decision anytime soon. In addition, in
the Section 122 cases, that's on appeal
to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, and that's expected to be
decided sometime in the fall, and I've
got no further news on that. On the AEPA
front, there are two things going on
that are kind of interesting because
they're complementary. They're designed
to achieve the same problem. I think the
refunds for the unliquidated entries
continue to proceed
normally and as planned.
The controversy has been over refunds
for tariffs that were finally liquidated
by CBP,
where the Justice Department uh
and CBP, for that matter, has argued
that refunds cannot be made in those
cases
except pursuant to court orders that are
specific to each case. In other words,
each importer has to go and sue and win
in order to get their money back.
An incredibly inefficient process.
>> [laughter]
>> You'll recall when we began all this in
the spring, Scott and I both predicted
that the government could make it hard
or easy, and it's apparent in this case
the government's making it hard, but
apparently on the assumption that a lot
of people won't bother, and they'll save
some money. That's being fought on two
fronts. The Justice Department
has appealed Judge Eaton's order that
the tariffs be refunded on the grounds
that it was a universal injunction. In
other words, it was granting universal
relief
to all the people that were affected,
even those that were not parties to the
actual litigation. The Supreme Court
issued a decision last summer
in Trump v. Casa, c i s a,
that basically shut the door on most
universal injunctions by ruling that the
Judiciary Act of 1789 didn't give the
judiciary authority to do that, but they
left one door open, which was the class
action door, that if you can organize
and get certified as a class,
then you can sue as a class that covers
everybody that's a member of the class,
whether they filed lawsuits themselves
or not.
So, what's happening right now is
literally right now, today,
one track of this has been the
plaintiffs, with the meaning the
aggrieved importers, are trying to get
certified as a class, so they could get
around the Justice Department's protest
and appeal, and stay within the ambit of
last year's Supreme Court decision. CIT
is sure it has a hearing today, today is
August 6th, on precisely that question,
whether they could be certified as a
class.
So, we'll see how that works out.
Meanwhile, the appeal of the Justice
Department decision continues as well,
and so the plaintiffs really are
fighting this issue on two fronts.
They're fighting the Justice
Department's position in court and
arguing that there should be a universal
injunction issued in this case, and that
it's at a minimum inefficient not to do
that.
But, that one doesn't succeed, they're
also pursuing the class action front,
and there, since the hearing was today,
and the CIT tends to work fairly
efficiently, we can expect a decision
about that fairly quickly. Now, that, of
course, isn't going to settle the issue,
because the issue on the table is simply
can't we get certified as a class? If
the answer to that ends up being yes,
then of course the the Justice
Department may appeal that, but if the
answer ultimately gets settled as being
yes, then they have to file a class
action suit in order to get the money
back. So, this is on a slow track either
way. But, wheels are turning and lawyers
are making piles of money and we will
continue to report on it.
>> The three of us went into the wrong
field for our careers. I know that.
>> You can have a happy life and not be a
lawyer, but there does appear to be some
money in it.
>> [laughter]
>> We're doing the people's work, sort of.
>> That's right.
>> [laughter]
>> At a lower pay, to be sure, but
that's right.
>> Well, Bill, thanks for all the updates
and I want to dive into our first topic
here today and that is the farm bill.
Arkansas Senator John Boozman, chairman
of the Senate Ag Committee, is working
to pass the first five-year
reauthorization of the farm bill since
2018
with a Senate Committee's markup
happening as we are recording this
episode. So, Scott, there are a few
angles here to unpack, but let's just
take a step back for our listeners and
tell us what's in the bill and why it's
important for our trade watchers out
there.
>> Oh, look, the farm bill is one of these
tasks in Washington that is no longer
what it once was. When I was back in the
last century, when I first started in
this business,
the best example of coalition building,
lobbying, and influence was watching the
Agriculture Committee or the members of
Congress who cared about agriculture
make things happen. The ags were amazing
at the what they could get done and they
designed bills to pass. They looked for
ways to incorporate and add other
constituents to their programs. It was
very impressive and very impressive
operation. It appears now that while
there are many impressive members of
Congress who are part of the Ag
Committee, don't get me wrong about
that, what we have is the farm bill has
fallen into one of the category of
issues in Washington that seem to be
designed not to get things done. So, the
budget's the classic example. We haven't
had a appropriations bills passed since
1996. And what we have is a budget
process that just kicks the can. It
doesn't leads to continuing resolutions.
It doesn't lead to solving problems. And
now with the farm bill being in its
third or fourth year of one-year
renewals instead of their full five-year
renewal, it appears to be just one more
casualty of function Washington. But be
that as it may, there are important
issues to be worked out.
The trade title per se is manifestly
different than in past years. But one
issue to keep an eye on and one that
will continue to cause tension with
Europe is the so-called geographical
indication or the naming of common
agricultural products. Now, in the last
two round of the World Trade
Organization, the Uruguay Round, in the
intellectual property section of the
agreements, there was an attempt to deal
with geographic indications. In fact,
there are two kinds of them in that
agreement. One is an absolute protection
for geographical indications on wines
and spirits. So, as an example, only
bourbon
processed in Kentucky can be called
Kentucky bourbon. It is an absolute
protection. Doesn't matter whether the
consumer's confused or not. Good example
is the company that markets Moët &
Chandon champagne
has vineyards in Napa Valley,
California. The grape plants are from
the Champagne region of France. They
planted the same and use the same
cuttings. So, they have a grape orchard
that produces the same grapes. And they
have a product that is, at least in my
poor judgment, is is indistinguishable
from the stuff that comes out of the
Champagne region. But because Champagne
is a place name and it is a spirit or
wine, it has absolute protection. So,
Moët & Chandon's White Star, for
instance, is a champagne. Whereas when
Napa Chandon or Chandon Napa, from the
same cuttings with the same ownership,
is a sparkling wine.
Okay? Now, there was a lot of heartburn
when this was first implemented because
many places that followed the
conventional naming, and uh there wasn't
a lot of consumer confusion in things
like wines grown in the Napa Valley or
grown in Australia or anywhere else.
But, there was real cost associated with
changing. There's been a stubborn demand
from Europeans to expand the list of
absolute protections to things like
hams, cheeses, and you name it. If it's
grown in Europe, they want special
protection. Keep in mind that geographic
names are already protected from
consumer confusion. So, this is this
lower standard does work. So, if I were
to market, you know, Scott's number one
Parma ham and fail to mention that it's
from ham it's from processing in North
Carolina instead of the Parma region of
Italy, that would be something that
would violate the rules as they are
today. But, the Europeans would like to
go further. So, this is one of those
tripwires that that is affecting more
and more varieties of agriculture, and
with more and more challenges as the
people who originated these products and
special things seek protection, and uh
the rest of us are are left. The The
funny thing is uh Idaho potatoes, which
is good enough for a license plate,
famous potatoes in the uh Iowa state
plates, but Idaho potatoes does not
qualify in Europe as a geographic
indication.
>> Interesting.
>> Someday I'll understand this or be dead.
>> [laughter]
>> The US argument here, right, is that
their some food names are so generic.
And I think the examples I've seen are
Parmesan and Gorgonzola that it's kind
of absurd to try to say that there's no
middle ground to be reached here. But, I
guess the question is in this within the
the farm bill is is I understand it, and
Bill or jump in here, is that it kind of
directs the USTR to make this a priority
in trade discussions, although it
doesn't bind them to do anything. Is
that right?
>> It doesn't bind them. It directs them to
try to negotiate resolution on these
issues. This is not a new problem. I
mean, multiple administrations going
back years have fought the EU and before
that the European Community on this
issue. The American position has been
bipartisan
and clear. This is not a Trump thing. It
is particularly a thing that is that
applies in agriculture. It's a sore
point, particularly in cheese,
because there's, you know, a lot of
American production of cheese that is
called Parmesan, even though it's not
from Parma, or cheddar, even though it's
not from There actually is a place
called cheddar in England, or Stilton,
well, I guess they can't do Stilton in
the United States.
But, it's a sore point for Americans,
and one of the things, to the credit of
the Trump administration, that they did
was they built into a number of last
year's reciprocal trade agreements
a provision in which the other party
agrees not to recognize those particular
GIs.
That's what we call them. It's not
gastrointestinal disease, it's
geographical indications, not to
recognize those GIs if they conflict
with their obligations in the US
agreement. That's kind of untested yet,
and it's awkward for the countries if
they also have an agreement with the EU,
because what the EU likes to put in its
agreements is commitments by the other
party to accept EU GIs, to acknowledge
them, and to, you know, regulate
consistently with that. So, this is an
issue that's going to get worse, I
think, rather than better. It is I've
never had much sympathy for. I think
it's an effort primarily in Europe
simply to protect regional agriculture
products, but people get very excited
about it and in the Doha round trade
negotiations, the conclusion of that
ministerial in 2001 was held up for a
day over an argument about feta cheese
and whether countries outside of Greece,
namely in that case Bulgaria,
could be allowed to call their cheese
feta.
Well, you know, the Bulgarian argument I
think is we're next door. We border the
country. It's the same cheese. So,
people take this very seriously. I'd
also just comment that another element
of the ag bill this year is a
significant, I mean doubling really,
increase in funding for export promotion
and market access programs in
agriculture. This is something that the
farm community has wanted for years and
it's purely, you know, it's a budget
issue at one level. It's an expenditure
of money of several hundred million
dollars.
>> Can you just explain what we're talking
about here?
>> The government has several different
programs designed to help farmers export
more agriculture products and some of it
is agriculture promotion, some of it is
just is marketing assistance, you know,
helping them figure out find customers
basically. That's not novel and it's not
actually restricted to agriculture. The
XM Bank does something similar. The
Commerce Department does something
similar, but of course it's if it's
agriculture program, it's in the farm
bill. It's not in other legislation. And
finally they've got a significant
budgetary increase in both farm bills.
So, it looks like it may get through.
Today, however, the Senate Agriculture
Committee met to consider all this and
failed to approve the bill
by a 10 to 11 vote, which I thought was
kind of interesting. The issue there and
this goes back to Scott's comment about
agriculture strategy. The issue was not
over any of the stuff we're talking
about. The issue was over SNAP benefits.
SNAP is the current term for food stamps
for those of you that are as old as I
am.
And one of the reasons why the ag folks
were so successful
in the '70s, '80s, and '90s, and even
aughts,
as Scott was talking about, is that
basically they formed a coalition with
urban members of Congress who cared
about nutrition programs and food
benefits.
Cared about food stamps. And the deal
was that the urban representatives would
support the farm bill if it had
appropriate levels of snap benefits and
nutrition assistance, and they go along
with, you know, whatever the farm the
Republicans wanted to put in the bill
for to help the farmers. And it was a
convenient coalition that produced, you
know, 300-plus votes. The current
problem they have now is the both the
administration and the Republicans want
to cut back on the benefits,
and that's unacceptable to the
representatives of urban communities,
and been a difficult point of contention
not just this year, but it's one of the
reasons why
the farm bill keeps getting extended
from year to year because they can't
reach agreement on this. The other thing
that happened that I thought was
interesting that does have some
relevance to trade was that there's this
other issue about whether or not people
can sue for immediate health harm that
was caused to them by pesticides or
other chemicals that were not properly
labeled. And courts have generally made
that difficult.
And for a variety of reasons. And uh
Senator Booker, who is a really more or
less an urban senator, he represents New
Jersey, but sits on the agriculture
committee, had an amendment that would
have allowed more individuals lawsuits
on the pesticide issue. And that was
rejected
on a party line vote, as I recall.
So, there's a lot of issues here that
have delayed the farm bill
because the coalition has crumbled,
really.
But they're probably large not trade
issues, but we'll keep track of it
because one of the things that happens
when this bill comes on the floor, at
least in the Senate, the House has
already passed the farm bill by the way,
so the action is in the Senate in the
for the time being. One of the things
that always happens when the bill comes
to the Senate floor is there will be
amendments and there will probably be
trade amendments. You can expect, I know
speculating, maybe Canada dairy
amendments, maybe GI amendments, who
knows what and probably China amendments
as well to the extent that we bring in
Chinese agriculture imports, which we do
to
not the most significant thing we
import, but it's there. So, stay tuned.
>> I think this is a fascinating debate.
Let's move on here and I want to turn
next to some really big news over the
past week with the US joining together
with Japan to prop up the yen.
The move came after months of sustained
weakness in the yen, which has increased
the cost of imports for Japan and raised
concerns about financial stability.
Scott, I'm going to turn back to you.
This was an unusual step, so what
prompted the move and why does it
matter?
>> Yes, it is an important issue, but it's
also it's very important given Japan's
position in the world economy and there
are alliance structure that we get along
with Japan, particularly when it comes
to financing. Japan remains, has long
been and remains the largest holder of
US debt outside the United States. So,
they're pretty good customer for what we
have to sell, which is Treasury bills,
but more importantly, there's been close
coordination with the Treasury
Department of the United States and the
Japan Finance Ministry to try to keep
the yen from falling further in a in
efforts to improve the level of domestic
investment, the yen fell to a roughly
40-year low. So, it got down as far as
164 yen to the dollar, which is quite
low and so the intervention was
something that big economies often do,
their central banks do, and their
treasury departments do, to try to
stabilize or make somewhat more
predictable the ongoing pricing of the
currencies underneath. Now, currency can
be prices can be affected by a couple of
things. Mostly, it's buying and selling
a counter instrument. So, if you want
the yen to rise, you buy yen and sell
dollars. And so, the coordination with
dollars, given it's the it is the
largest and deepest liquidity of any
currency is dollars, and you can trade a
lot of dollars without any effect on the
price. So, it's it's the it's the ideal
instrument to use. Doing it in
coordination with the Treasury is a
smart thing to do.
Uh the last time this happened between
the United States and Japan, by the way,
was 2011.
During that period of time was the Obama
administration, and I believe that that
was Tim Geithner was the Treasury
Secretary, but it was a different
condition. In that case, the yen was too
strong after the Fukushima reactor crash
and the earthquakes and tsunamis that
they were facing. So, it was a weather
condition that provoked the difficulty,
but uh we do these stabilizing things.
In fact, the original G7 was a group
called the Library Group that met in the
White House library, and it was only
finance ministers for this very kind of
thing. So, it's not a bad thing. It's a
reasonably wise move on the part of
Japan and the United States, given that
that there's a lot of dollars held by
Japan, and Japan has some fiscal policy
goals they're trying to achieve. And one
of the issues that continues to come up
is Japan has very low interest rates,
which leaves room for something called
the carry trade. The carry trade is a
very interesting way to leverage higher
interest rate currencies versus lower.
And so, we have a zero interest rate or
near-zero interest rate currency like
the yen, it becomes the funding
currency, and then you pair that with a
higher interest rate currency or assets
that are denominated in a target or the
carry currency and you profit off the
difference in rate which you can
leverage. In stable currency
relationship that happens a lot. So, the
Japanese carry trade is one of the
reasons that
there's a slight decline and that's also
pressure on uh Japanese interest rates.
But, overall this is a good example of
financial coordination among allies that
is clear. It's been They've been
transparent about it and they're
stabilizing Japan for good investment
reasons.
>> Yeah. Bill, I've seen a lot of
commentary this week arguing that the
intervention was perhaps less about the
yen itself and more of a signal about
growing stress in the global financial
system. Is that right or is it just
really about the yen here?
>> I mean, everything I agree with
everything that Scott said. There are
macroeconomic factors at stake here that
that actually I think have more impact
over the long term.
There's a long history of currency
intervention in particular to stop to
normalize markets and to stop people
from panicking and things getting out of
hand. But, when you've got a disparity
in particular for example Scott cited,
disparity in interest rates where in
Japan it's hovering I think around 1%
and here it's, you know, up above three,
you know, up above three and a half,
there's really an incentive there for
people to sell yen and buy dollars or to
invest their yen in US Treasuries
because they can get a higher return.
And that's a good difference in
macroeconomic policy between the two
countries. One of the things that set
Secretary Yellen has been also doing in
addition to the intervention issue has
been encouraging the Japanese to raise
their interest rates.
And they've done that because it's gone
from near zero now to I think one or
maybe a little bit more than 1%. That
has other consequences in the economy,
of course. If you start raising interest
rates, then in theory anyway you may
start yourself into more of an
inflationary cycle. I mean, Japan
doesn't really have to worry about that
because uh they've been in a
deflationary cycle for the better part
20 years and you know right now and a 1%
interest rate isn't going to make that
much difference and if they jack it up a
little bit more it's still not going to
make much difference.
But this is a question of you know the
the Fed deals with this in the United
States all the time which is the the
inevitable dilemma between you know
raising rate or lowering rates to
control inflation and at the same time
thinking about the macroeconomic impact
that will have on employment, wages and
things like that.
So you know I think that the current
situation is less of a problem than we
had in the
80s for example when we ended up having
the the so-called Plaza Accord where
basically the G7 got together and
pushed Japan to make some adjustments
into allow its a currency to appreciate
and at that time
actually the currency at that time was
not that different from where it is now.
Come to think of it it's fluctuated over
the years and I used to chuckle about
this because our old friend Fred
Bergsten who for years ran the Peterson
Institute of International Economics and
was a Treasury Department alumnus
would frequently talk about exchange
rates and particularly about Japan
because that was the problem of the 70s,
80s and
well 1990 anyway and when it was 200 to
the dollar he would say well when it's
150 all of our troubles would go away.
Well it actually went down to 150 and
nothing changed. We still had an
enormous deficit with Japan.
So then he said well if it goes down to
100
all our problems will be solved. Well it
actually did go down to 100. In fact at
one point it reached around 80 and the
deficit still didn't change very much.
So there's a lot of other issues that
are involved here as well. I'd also say
just a word about China.
>> Yes yes please.
>> Where we have the same problem.
The S current estimates are that the
Chinese uh the RMB, or the yuan, is
undervalued by, you know, people say 20
to 30%. This is not a new argument.
There was a huge debate about this in
the Congress in the teens. In, uh, in
Obama's late first term and early second
term, there was an amendment that was
designed to impose, basically, sanctions
on China if it didn't allow its currency
to appreciate. It didn't become law, but
it was a huge debate at the time. We may
be heading back into that. Now, there's
a difference, of course, because the
Chinese currency doesn't float freely.
It floats within a very narrow range
that's set daily by the Chinese
government. So, it has, in fact,
appreciated a little bit. It's been, in
the worst case, more than seven to the
dollar.
And now it's down into the six range,
but from the estimate of a number of
observers, probably needs to come down
closer to five in order for it to
reflect actual value. And, of course,
there's an edge to that particular
debate, too, because to the extent it's
undervalued, that it contributes
significantly to China's
trillion-dollar-plus trade surplus.
>> Sure. Exports competitive here.
>> Because it makes their exports cheaper.
>> Mhm.
>> It definitely has clear macroeconomic
consequences for practically everybody.
So, that's another one of these issues
that's lurking out there. It's harder to
deal with through currency intervention
since it's not a convertible currency,
and the rate is set by the Chinese
government. The United States can't go
in and start buying RMB in order to get
the currency to appreciate. It really
depends on persuading the Chinese
government to do something that you
certainly would be in our interest, but
would probably be in their long-term
interest, as well.
>> Yeah, Scott, do you have anything on the
China angle here?
>> Well, China's a controlled currency, and
because of that, there is not
particularly deep liquidity on that
currency outside of China. So,
settlements really don't happen in the
RMB. For practical all
a domestic currency that is used in
trades and in settlements for Chinese
goods. And as a result, it has fewer
spillover effects. It's not part of the
global trade and payments economy system
to the extent that, say, that the euro
or the yen would be. So, but it's a
sensitive one.
>> China's doing its best to change that.
They're trying to internationalize their
currency. They're setting up alternative
payment procedures that allow for
settling accounts outside the dollar and
in RMB. They're making small progress
there, but I think the number of
international transactions that are
settled in RMB is still well less than
10%.
>> Yes, you got to find traders who want to
settle in RMB and who trust the Chinese.
Good luck with that.
>> Well, or you find people like the
Russians who don't have a lot of choice.
>> Yeah, a good point.
>> And that bumps up the data.
>> Yes.
>> Because, you know, there's a lot of
trade between Russia and China right
now, particularly Russia's exports of
oil and gas, and to the extent those end
up being settled in yuan
or RMB, that makes it look like more is
going on than actually is going on, I
think.
>> True. Interesting.
>> All right, good point. So, I want to
turn finally today to some news from the
Department of Homeland Security, which
has added 43 companies to the Uyghur
Forced Labor Prevention Act entity list,
which bans these entities from shipping
goods to the United States. This is
notable because this is the first time
the Trump administration has made
additions to the list. So, Bill, I'm
going to turn to you here first. How
notable do you view this move to be?
>> There's not a lot to say about it. I
mean, the administration has begun to
come under some criticism for hypocrisy
on the forced labor issue. They have,
you know, determined that 60 other
countries are guilty of either not
having a forced labor law or not
adequately enforcing the one they do
have, and at the same time, this is an
administration that has made no changes
in the list of entities that fall under
the US forced labor statute, which we've
talked about ad nauseam in previous
years.
This is famous UFLPA, but the Uyghur
Forced Labor Prevention Act.
And as near as I can tell, you know,
enforcement there has been proceeding
all right. There have not been any
dramatic developments that I'm aware of
recently, but one of the promises of the
act was that the administration
whoever it was, this was enacted in the
Biden administration, was that the
administration would be diligent in
searching out companies that in fact
engage in forced labor and to identify
those companies for the public so the
people would know
who they were and could avoid buying
from them.
And it's now been, well, 18 months. The
last update of that list was in January
2025 before President Biden left office.
And so this is the first one in 18
months, which suggests that, you know,
probably their resources have been
focused on other things. This is not a
USDR issue. This is administered by the
Treasury Department, I think, isn't it,
Scott?
>> Yes, with the Department of Labor
providing input, yes.
>> Okay. Yeah. So, you know, welcome
development, I think, from the
standpoint of UFLPA enforcement. I don't
know the merits of the individual
entities that have been put on them put
on the list. I think they're mostly, if
not all, Chinese, but it does counter
one argument that has been cropping up
lately that, you know, the
administration has been selective in its
in its handling of this issue and has
been very quick to criticize everybody
else, but has not done much to expand
its own efforts.
>> You know, it would be an an awful shame
to lose hypocrisy in matters like this
because we'd have to rewrite half the
jokes of this program.
>> [laughter]
>> So, it
we can't rely only on irony.
>> [laughter]
>> We just got to have hypocrisy. This is
one of these examples.
>> Well, we've have said hundreds of times
that there is no trade rule against
hypocrisy.
>> That's right.
>> And this is one more example.
>> Yeah.
>> We utilize them well. And of course this
is an entity's list that you really
don't want to be on.
>> No.
>> Because the standard in this particular
enforcement operation are basically
guilty till proven innocent. You have to
work to get off the list and the US
government's wrong about a little less
than half the time about what they've
described and what penalties they've
been acted on you. So it's a list you
don't really like to be on. So it always
contains some pushback but there is at
least some addition to the list. What
we'll have to survive with for the
moment.
>> Yep. At least the tune of 43 entities.
So we're going to leave it there for
today. Thanks as always to our listeners
for joining us. We'll be back next week
with a special guest episode. So we look
forward to you joining us then. Take
care everyone.
>> Thank you.
>> Thanks.
>> You've been listening to the Trade Guys,
a CSIS podcast. For more audio content,
visit csis.org/podcasts.
Thanks for tuning in.
>> [music]