Video summary
The recent intervention by the United States to support the Japanese yen is framed not as a benevolent act, but rather a strategic move driven by self-preservation aimed at preventing Japan from offloading massive amounts of US Treasury debt. If such sales were to occur, they would drive up yields and significantly increase borrowing costs for an already heavily indebted American government. This reality stands in stark contrast to official narratives that claim a weak dollar benefits exports; instead, these arguments are dismissed as debunked mercantilist myths that overlook the detrimental effects on importers and domestic consumers while ignoring the contradictions within Federal Reserve policy, where high interest rates persist despite rhetoric about normalizing balance sheets amidst inflation figures hovering around 3.3%.
The core of the economic instability is identified not merely in market mechanics but in a fundamental lack of political will to implement spending cuts, leaving deficits swollen to approximately $2.1 trillion and debt service costs exceeding $1.2 trillion under the current administration. This excessive federal spending forces investors to demand higher yields on US Treasuries as they anticipate further flooding of markets with new debt, creating a volatile environment that short-term measures like Scott Bessent's efforts or other band-aid interventions cannot effectively address. The speakers emphasize that these immediate fixes are insufficient against the root cause: unsustainable government expenditure, echoing Murray Rothbard's view that high debt is merely a symptom of this deeper underlying issue rather than the primary problem itself.
Compounding domestic fiscal concerns are fears regarding global interconnectedness, specifically the potential for Japan to simultaneously dump older bonds, which could destabilize both US and global economies given how central banks rely on one another. The situation is further exacerbated by political friction within Congress, where Republicans have failed to codify pro-Trump policies like "Doge," and disappointment over a supportive congressman being ousted following an alleged $10+ million campaign donation from an Israeli-influenced billionaire suggests shifting allegiances that may not align with fiscal restraint. As the US debt clock approaches the staggering milestone of $40 trillion, these factors combine to create expectations of continued economic volatility leading up to the upcoming election, highlighting a growing public frustration where inflation consistently outpaces wage growth without clear solutions in sight.
Read the full video transcript
[music]
Welcome back to the Power Market
podcast. I'm Ryan McMaken,
editor-inchief at the Mises Institute.
And with me today is our contributing
editor, Tho Bishop. And also helping us
out today is of course our Henry Hlett
research fellow Jonathan Newman who we
love to have on one of our best
economics teachers here at the Mises
Institute. and I think he's a good fit
for this week's topic because I want to
talk a little bit about some recent
economic data uh as well as what's going
on with currency and bond markets right
now because just a few days ago, it was
about nine days ago I suppose uh the US
intervened uh and entered into a joint
intervention with Japan to essentially
prop up the yen. And why did that
happen? And what does that mean for the
US's economy, for treasuries? There's a
lot of different pieces to this that I
think we'll discuss a little bit today.
And I think Jonathan can speak to that
uh more completely than I can, but I'll
just give you kind of the basic rundown
on what the story is. So about nine days
ago, we start getting uh news from Scott
Bessant that the US is intervening to
help prop up the yen. And it's very
interesting, I think, in terms of the uh
the BS version you're getting of things
from uh the the media and the regime on
this because if you just kind of
casually Google US, Japan, yen
intervention using those sorts of words,
you'll get a lot of articles back. But
what most of the articles state is that
basically this was just a nice thing the
United States was doing for Japan. Uh
they asked uh Trump about a little bit.
Hey, why is the US intervening to prop
up the yen? And Trump says, 'Well,
because we're just helping out the
Japanese. We like to help them out. With
the he said this literally, they've been
good friends with the exception, of
course, of Pearl Harbor. [laughter] Uh
so, okay, fine. So, this was just a nice
thing the US was doing was propping up
the yen. And uh then he also said and we
just do it because it's good for the
global economy. It's just good. So we're
just going to print dollars and spend a
bunch of taxpayer money essentially
either uh either in the form of
inflation tax or whatever dollars we got
and we're going to help prop up the yen,
but it's just cuz we're nice people. Uh
there were a number of articles that
that covered that and had those sorts of
quotations in them. the the one article
I did come across that seemed to get a
little hit a little closer to home was
through CNBC
and that noted that well actually
there's a lot of self-preservation from
the US regime in this sort of thing
because what they were noting was that
as the yen was declining in value
um the the US decided that maybe this
would be a problem because in order to
defend the yen, the Japanese regime was
selling treasuries.
And that's not good for the United
States because that puts upward pressure
then on yields. And uh so CNBC went in
and this is this is what they say. Uh
Louise Louu, head of Asia economics at
Oxford Economics said that uh that that
is the intervention was quote possibly
one of the key reasons that is the the
declining uh need to or the the rising
need to uh dump uh treasuries to finance
unilateral intervention
that this was pos this was possibly one
of the key reasons behind US
participation and she says quote there
is a self-preservation element here
volatile markets driven by potentially
fiscally aggressive policies from Japan
could extend to the US Treasury markets,
destabilizing the dollar. So, yeah, it's
this isn't about Trump being a nice guy
and helping out the Japanese because he
has fond feelings toward them outside
Pearl Harbor. Uh this is this is about
worries in terms of the value and the
demand for US treasuries.
And I saw some good commentary on this
in financial Twitter, which is basically
the only Twitter I bother reading
anymore with the saying that okay, so
now if you sell US treasuries, you get
you get a call from Washington saying
don't do that. So we hear constantly
from the regime, the US regime about how
treasuries are great, everybody loves
treasuries, everybody wants them, the US
economy is airtight, everything's great.
But then the second another central bank
that holds a lot of treasury starts to
sell them even in fairly moderate
amounts as the Japanese state has been
doing so far, well then it this
immediately requires a US intervention
to create more dollars and intervene to
prevent them from selling treasuries,
prop up foreign uh currencies. That
seems to be what's going on right now.
Uh but I wanted to get your take on it,
Jonathan. I wanted to Right. What is
your view really of of the yen, of the
dollar, of treasuries right now? What
should our takeaway be from all of this?
Or is this just a minor issue that it
doesn't really matter? Uh, and this is
no harbinger of of anything to come, no
big deal. I don't know. What do you
think?
>> No, I think you hit the nail on the
head. The the US is not intervening in
the yin market uh because we're friends
with Japan or because they're an ally.
It's it's because they are sitting on a
mountain of US government debt and they
they Japan wants to uh resurrect their
own currency which is falling for for
various reasons namely because of the
the yin carry trade. There's low
interest rates in Japan, higher interest
rates in US and elsewhere. And so a lot
of people are borrowing in Japan then
selling their yen uh and then they're
investing that elsewhere. And so that's
that's what's causing trouble for the
yen. Japan is trying to to undo that and
one option that they have is to sell off
a bunch of their US treasuries. And so
the Bessant especially, but the the uh
US government doesn't want that to
happen. They don't want uh Japan to sell
a bunch of treasuries because interest
rates are already too high in their u in
their view. Um, and so any any further
increase in in uh Treasury yields uh
would just make it more expensive for
the US government to borrow. And as we
were talking about before uh we started
the recording, uh the US government is
is just spending out the wazoo. Just
tons and tons of deficit spending. It's
having to borrow a ton and so interest
expenses are huge. I think it's um it's
it's still the second largest expense uh
from the Treasury. Um and so they so the
reason why Bessant especially wants to
help prop up the yen is because uh he's
trying to discourage Japan from having
to sell their treasuries and cause
further increases in US treasury yields.
Now what was interesting uh there was
this tweet from Bessant uh and I I love
this sort of like this sort of fighting
political drama. Well, [clears throat] I
guess it's a politician or bureaucrat on
journalist drama. He said one of the
highlights of the wars Fed has been
watching stenographers posing as
journalists like the Wall Street
Journal's Nick Timmerouse reduced to
reporting Fed backroom gossip because
they're incapable of performing real
economic or monetary policy analysis
without being spoonfed.
And so I mean I'm I'm not one to come to
the defense of a journalist but uh this
journalist was basically reporting the
same sorts of things that you were
talking about that this uh Louise Louu I
think was her names like just pointing
out like there there are reasons why the
government wants to do this and and what
Tim Rouse was reporting on was uh
Besson's pressure on the Fed led by Wars
now uh to try to get the Fed to
participate in this propping up of the
yen. So, uh, the the Treasury has the
exchange stabilization fund, but the Fed
has this other ability to give, uh, uh,
dollars to or lend dollars to other
governments and and foreign central
banks, but there's a cap on it at $60
billion. So, Bessant was trying to get
the Fed to increase that that limit so
that so basically to um to do anything
that they can to prevent Japan from
selling treasuries. And so this brought
up I mean this has been a common story
over the past few years is like how
independent is the Fed uh in reality and
here we have a Treasury Secretary
pressuring the Fed uh uh to to do
something in line with the
administration's goals. And so it it
brought up all this independent stuff.
Uh it it's it's all funny to me because
I've I've long thought that Fed
independence is a myth. Um, I've been
working on this article where I go
through it's like the Fed is not
independent and uh and a lot of this
fighting that you see this this time
between the Treasury Secretary and
journalists, but whenever you see the
Treasury pressuring the Fed or the Fed
uh Fed chair saying something like the
uh US government spending, the debt is
on an unsustainable path, all of this is
just u it's it's public feuding, but
it's all fake. They're really all
working together um at the end of the
day. And so if a crisis does come in the
Treasury market, uh you can bet that the
Fed will be there to to do whatever it
can to to push interest rates back down.
>> Yeah. And I should note that um
specifically the fund that uh Timaros
was talking about was the foreign and
international monetary authorities repo
facility. The other FEMA I suppose
[laughter]
which is is right that the Fed doesn't
just like print money and hand over the
money usually isn't what they do.
>> I wonder if they have barbed wire around
their facilities like you have
[laughter]
>> fewer prison camps. That's a different
type of FEMA camp.
and they give you cheap loans is what
they're going to do, right? Subsidized
loans. These are special loans that
normal people could never have access
to. Uh this is special money for the
special people, that is central bankers
and powerful politicians and so on. So
they're just talking about blowing the
lid off of this and just making it like
this endless fund would I mean I've been
around long enough to know that this is
how it always happens, right? Ever since
2009 or so, these sorts of funds that
originally had caps, they were supposed
to be very limited, rarely used, they
always end up morphing into just these
limitless funds where endless money
comes through them to prop up and bail
out whatever enterprise it is that the
Fed wants to and or the Treasury wants
to bail out uh and prop up. And by the
way, this is just the latest evidence
that there isn't really any sort of
separation between the Treasury and the
Fed anymore. This is just I mean one
more way that we can see that the Fed
exists to serve the Treasury to make
sure it has plenty of liquidity to make
sure it has cheap borrowing at hand and
this is that and people have been really
kind of raising the alarm about the yen
situation for many months from what I've
seen the carry trade. Our own senior
fellow Brendan Brown has talked about
the carry trade quite a bit and and and
I think it's predicted even that that
might be where you start to see serious
problems with the yen carry trade and he
may then be proven very very right that
that's where the the the next repo
crisis comes out of but I think you
start to see a lot of the weakness as
you say here in things like treasuries
in things like the dollar. And another
explanation that was forwarded for that
was, well, we got to devalue the dollar
also because that's good for America.
But as you note, Jonathan, right, isn't
it isn't it remarkable how all of these
currencies seem to devalue together? Why
is it that no currency is allowed to
just become significantly more devalued
or to conversely become significantly
more valuable? And this is something
that Brendan Brown has pointed out is
that after in uh the early 1980s, right,
the dollar became much more valuable
after the Vulkar intervention where of
course interest rates were allowed to go
up significantly. It looks like the US
was doing something uh meaningful about
its debt and dealing with its inflation
situation. The value of the dollar went
up significantly. But then lo and
behold, by the mid 1980s, you get the
plaza accords. So that the US dollar is
now being purposely devalued again with
Vulkar's approval. Vulkar however was
acting uh in I don't know in a joint
venture I suppose of the treasury at
that point and with probably the bank of
England and other central banks because
there is always this coordination among
these national central banks to ensure
that no dollar or no currency becomes
too valuable.
Now Jonathan, maybe you can explain a
little bit what what the rationale that
they give us is behind this, right?
They're always saying, well, we can't
let the US dollar become too valuable in
relation to the yen or in relation to
the euro or relation to the to pound
sterling or whatever because that would
be bad for business. Is that true?
Right. Is it true that we never want a a
very valuable and stable dollar because
it should go down if other currencies go
down or else the American economy will
implode? That's that's what I hear every
time from central bankers, from people
in Washington that we want a weaker
currency for reasons. Can you tell us a
little bit more about that? Yeah, the
the reasons that are given are old,
thoroughly discredited, thoroughly
debunked uh mercantalist and
protectionist myths. It's the idea that
exports are the greatest thing ever that
in order for uh for our domestic
economy, I can speak from the
perspective of the US. In order for the
US to be successful, we just need to to
export a bunch of our stuff. And that
will be great for US businesses because
uh now it's cheaper for foreigners to
buy our stuff and so they'll buy more of
our stuff and that's that's great for
business. Now of course what that misses
out on is like the complete other side
of the story. It's there's actually two
two ways to to
uh to think about this and and see the
reality. First you can think about from
the individual business perspective. Of
course there are going to be some
businesses who benefit as a result.
that's going to be the exporttheavy
businesses. Uh the ones that uh that
that's their main thing is exporting.
Yeah, they'll see at least a short-term
boost to their business. This goes back
to what Bosat talked about with the seen
and the unseen. So, it's really easy to
point to those sorts of businesses uh
either in prospect or in hindsight and
say look like they benefit from this
currency devaluation. Look at all of the
look at how well these businesses are
doing. But what it it ignores is all the
businesses who rely on imported goods,
raw materials, um inputs to their
various production processes. Uh and so
it actually so when you do that, of
course, you're making exports cheaper,
but you're making imports more expensive
whenever you devalue your own currency.
So it makes it harder for for those
businesses uh uh to do well. And in the
end, it just it distorts the economy. It
means that we're not producing what our
comparative advantage is. And so there's
that's why that's why this sort of thing
only works in in the short run anyway.
But the other the other flip side to to
the whole cheaper export thing is that
the the the domestic economic benefit of
exports is imports generally. So like
like we don't we can't eat money, right?
We can't we can't eat the money that
we're receiving when we're when we're
selling exports. And so how do we
benefit as a result of selling things to
other countries, people in other
countries? And the answer is well now we
have a greater ability to buy stuff
that's produced from that country or
other other countries. And so if you're
using currency devaluation, yes, there's
this seen benefit. some exporters
um do well as a result of that, but US
consumers, many US businesses uh are are
made worse off in the short run and
everybody is made worse off in the long
run. And and I said at the beginning
that like this is th this has been
debunked for hundreds of years literally
like the the economics itself was born
out of refuting these arguments. And so
it's it's uh it's a little bit
disheartening to [laughter] to have to
continue to address these things that
have been talked about um so thoroughly.
>> It is interesting to note though that if
other currencies start to go down
significantly uh those central banks
could end up sinking the
uh the US uh debt situation by dumping
their treasuries.
And of course that seems to be in the
end that is the ultimate motivation,
right? I'm clearly they do want to
devalue the dollar to some extent. Uh
but it seems to me that just as with
interest rates being set by the central
bank overall, especially in our current
debt environment, it seems that the
overall
issue, the overall priority is keeping
interest rates as low as they possibly
can, which is by which I mean yields on
US treasuries. And you can look at this
and you can uh just check out the latest
numbers on debt nationwide.
And there were there was a spate of new
headlines just coming out in recent days
as new Treasury data became available.
Trump's deficit for the year swells to
2.1 trillion according to Fortune. These
are bonkers numbers. These are like
COVID era. These are Biden at his worst
unsustainable sort of deficit numbers.
It looked like there might have been a
decline at hand for overall debt, but
that swiftly turned around thanks to the
ongoing war uh increased spending. We've
got, of course, uh on top of that, we've
got uh the the uh secretary of war um
Heg Seth out there saying we we need a $
1.5 trillion defense budget to all on
top of already massively inflated
amounts of spending. So when you look at
that, how they're going to need massive
new deficits in the near future, of
course they're going to be obsessed then
with keeping yields as low as they can.
And it doesn't even seem to be working.
A recent headline from Bloomberg here
from 17 hours ago, US sells 10-year debt
at highest yields since financial
crisis.
So that's not good news for the regime.
>> The 2007 financial crisis, not the not
the 2020,
>> right? Yes. No. No. We're not talking
about Yeah. We're talking about the old
global financial crisis, the GFC as some
people say it, uh, in the days preceding
the Great Recession. Yeah. What years
ago, 18 years ago is what we're talking
about here. And that, uh, that doesn't
sound so great.
And that also shows, I think, if that
continues, it demonstrates the fact that
the wheels are kind of coming off the
administration, right? because Bessant
is everywhere intervening here and there
to try and keep a cap on the situation.
We don't want them selling off
treasuries cuz that would that would
increase yields and yet yields go up
anyway. And in fact, it seems that
whatever gains had been made, that is by
yields going down in the days after the
intervention, that's already gone.
That's already been completely erased.
So yields are now back to where they
were before the intervention. So what
what now? Do you just keep intervening
more and more to prop up the yen or do
you let yield markets actually do their
thing? Uh bond markets do their thing,
which clearly this administration
doesn't want to do. But looking at these
huge debts and looking at where yields
are headed, it seems to me that the bond
markets are sending a strong signal. And
I don't know how much the
uh administration has left in terms of
its bag of tricks for getting the bond
markets to feel that everything is going
to turn out okay. I mean, what what's
your take on on with yields heading up?
I mean, the 10-year is connected, of
course, to the 30-year mortgage, so
you're not seeing any significant
decline there. 30 years are inching up
as well. Why do you think that is?
Well, I think uh I think you hit the
nail on the head. The at the bottom of
all of this is the problem of of
government spending. So, it's it's the
enormous amount of government spending
and of course taxes are politically
unpopular and so the treasuries of the
US government or the Japanese government
as well. They have the same problem. Uh
they they just have to issue so much so
much debt to do this. Now, in terms of
like like what tools are they going to
have to deal with this in the future, I
don't know. I I saw um a Wall Street
Journal headline this morning uh using
the sword stagflation. Uh I mean you
could make the case that we're already
in that sort of situation. We don't have
negative GDP numbers uh right now, but I
mean that's that's where we have to go
in this sort of situation because
like the the only button that the Fed
knows how to press and the federal
government knows what to do is to
increase the money supply. It's like if
if we have any sort of problem, if
there's if there's a problem with
government debt, if there's a if we're
in a recession, what do we do? Boost
aggreate demand. We got to print more
money, stimulate demand that way. Um and
and so but we're already in a situation
now where price inflation is is
extremely politically unpopular and like
getting like really getting out of hand
um um economically speaking. I mean the
um I I also just recently because I was
preparing for this uh this podcast I
watched uh Wars's recent uh press
conference and it I was just laughing
because he was you know was very sternly
saying it's like we are resolutely
committed to getting back to our price
stability. He he likes to use the word
remitt a bunch. Our our remitt of 2%
price inflation. And this is, you know,
broadly held across the FOMC.
And it's like we've been hearing this
for for five years now. It's like it's
like multiple times a year whenever they
have these press conferences, whether
it's Powell or Al Wor, they're they're
saying it's like we are committed to
getting back to price, but we're we're
still north of 3%, right? So, it's like
it's like they they know
they know that it's politically
unpopular. They know that the American
people are are sick and tired of of
prices increasing. Last week, you guys
talked about the burrito gate, $20
burritos. [clears throat] So, so people
are are sick of it. Uh but like they
like what are they going to do? They're
they're between a rock and a hard place
because the only alternative is to, you
know, suffer the consequences when it
comes to government finance and allowing
yields to rise, allowing interest rates
to go up, which is extremely difficult
for for the government to do.
>> Well, I think some of this can be seen
as well. Like I you're going back to
the, you know, the big Bessant uh
discussion over raising the um the repo
cap. One of the things that Worsh has
tried to you know, you has talked about
long before he was Fed chair was trying
to normalize the balance sheet.
Well, if if that is the goal, but you
also want to massively expun expand the
foreign repo market. Like there's those
are two contradictory aims being
presented out in public, right? So these
are behind the scenes discussions. I
mean these are the public inherent
contradiction into what Worsh is trying
to signal what Besset wants the Fed to
do playing out in public right now,
which I think goes to just how their
lack of uh you the the the the lack of
obvious solutions that they have within
their their toolkit. I think it's also
interesting that a lot of um you know
the post uh great recession era has been
so dependent upon international
cooperation between central banks and
obviously you the yen you know the Fed
intervening the yen being an obvious
example that direction but part of you
know just this this growing differences
in in political cultures um that the
fact that the ECB was not informed of
the Fed's decision to backs stop the yen
using euro
caught them completely off guard, which
goes to one of our running themes, which
is the complete breakdown of of norms,
getting these ungo these unwritten
governing rules. And so, for some
reason, Bessant felt the need not to
inform the ECB doing this trade.
Afterwards, like, oh, they were offended
that the ECB would complain about it.
It's like, well, I mean, you're doing
something that hasn't been done in a way
that that is probably not good for your
relationship with the ECB when the
central bank cartel is part of propping
this entire thing up. like that's some
of this stuff, you know, you can see the
potentials for some uh snowballs coming
down the pike there that get really
really interesting when even the central
bankers can agree on on what to do in
collaboration.
>> Yeah. The I mean, speaking of the Worsh
speech from last from I guess last
Wednesday um for their most recent press
conference where they held the the
interest rate steady. We didn't really
talk about on the last part, Margaret.
We're too busy talking about burritos.
Uh we we we did touch on a little bit in
terms of inflation and how they weren't
going to reduce the interest rate at the
latest FOMC meeting precisely because
inflation is yet again well above that
2% target. Uh the data came out the
other day, yesterday or the day before,
and that was at 3.3% well above the 2%
target, which I think now makes it 65
months in a row of being above target.
Some of those months way above target,
up over 3%.
And well, and and that's not even
counting the 2022 stuff, right? Where it
was hitting like 40-year highs in terms
of year-over-year inflation. never been
fixed. Even though you've got MAGA
people out there saying, "Oh, the price
of eggs went down. The inflation went
away. Inflation's gone in reverse. This
this shows the importance of education
folks." Because what you had were were
MAGA people posting a decline in the
rate of increase. So they showed that
the rate of increase had decreased from
say 7% down to 3% and they said, "Look,
inflation's been reversed." No, that's
not what that means. Just means the your
constant decline in dollar value has
slowed somewhat uh because everything
continues to get more expensive. And I
should note, by the way, that if you
look at the most recent job data and you
pull out the average earnings, the
weekly average earnings, that's not as
high as inflation. That was about 3.1%.
>> And the inflation number is 3.3%. This
is I think now the third month in a row
uh that you have declining wages by that
measure and that that comes after just a
brief reprieve. You had a period of some
small growth in average wages
year-over-year but that followed a
24month period of falling wages. So you
get these economists out there saying oh
yeah prices are up but thank goodness uh
wages are up too. Well, that depends a
whole lot on when you're measuring that
as to how exactly you're framing that
because there are, as the numbers show,
even these official government numbers,
there are a whole lot of people out
there, especially over the last three
years, who have experienced real
declines in wages, even just going off
averages. Uh, but the economists want us
to believe that everything's great. So,
they're they're not going to admit that.
So looking at the the inflation data,
looking at the jobs data, by the way,
there were 23,000 jobs lost net uh
according to the most recent numbers for
July. That was in both the and we saw
declines in both the household and in
the establishment survey. So the job
situation is I don't know it's it's
looking increasingly bleak, especially
when you look at it over several months.
Huge downward revisions in the previous
month for that. It's the old Biden
trick. The initial number looks good and
then we do a big downward revision. Uh
so that's the the administration simply
adopting uh the the oldfashioned
Democrat uh slight of hand sort of
economic data stuff. So looking at that,
we're looking at people are now trying
to dump treasuries to uh to defend their
own declining currencies.
We But meanwhile, we've got Warsaw. are
saying we're we're on top of it. We're
committed to doing everything right. How
long can this mismatch I think that's
when you start to get real political
problems is when there's a huge mismatch
between what the people in power are
saying about how they have everything
under control and what the actual
situation is in real life. And I I just
wonder what this is going to look like a
few months from now because I don't I I
have a hard time imagining something
that's going to happen in the economy
that's suddenly going to make
everybody's productivity skyrocket.
Everyone's going to start hiring. Uh
everyone's going to suddenly be
demanding yen. It's uh it's just hard to
see what scenario uh causes a major
turnaround here.
>> Yeah. Uh I during uh burrito gate I I
posted this uh quote from my favorite
quote from Ludv Misus uh where he's he's
putting down the the the way that the
statistical bureaus as he calls them uh
measure price inflation and he said a
judicious housewife knows much more
about how uh prices affect her
household's budget uh much better than
the statistical averages can tell. I
think that's pretty close to verbatim.
might have rearranged a few words there.
Uh, but that's what I was thinking about
when uh when there was all of this
kurfuffle about people saying uh you
know, don't you realize that uh you
[clears throat] can eat ramen?
Don't don't you realize you can you know
you can get a a really really cheap meal
with the chicken and rice from Aldi,
which of course you can. Um but that
ignores the fact that like people
actually like you're you're ignoring the
real data. you're ignoring what people
are actually saying and feeling about
their their own household budgets and
their own ability to to to buy a house
and start a family, their own ability to
to climb a ladder at work and to to earn
higher wages. Uh and so ignoring all of
that and relying on these statistical
averages. Um and so that's what I was
thinking. Another thing I was thinking
about with the Worsh press conference uh
related to what Tho mentioned about the
balance sheet normalization is that they
so they've been talking about getting
back to the 2% u price inflation target
uh for for many months now. How many
months did you say?
>> I think it's 65 now.
>> Yeah, 65 months. Uh but they've been
talking about balance sheet
normalization since like 2012 or
something. It's like that's never going
to happen. Um, so they and there was a
great uh question from uh Mike McKe at
that press conference where uh he he
basically said uh Wars, you're what do
you say to all these Americans that are
thinking it's like you keep talking like
you have all this talk about uh
stabilizing inflation, but when when are
you actually going to act on it because
they they didn't they didn't do anything
with interest rates uh this this time
around with the FOMC meeting. Uh and of
course Worsh had this like political
non-answer. Uh that's one thing that
that Worsh is very good at is uh it's
like using a lot of words to say
absolutely nothing which I mean Fed
chairs have been doing that a long time.
But I guess I think it's more obvious
with with Wars. And so like even even
the reporters in the room, even these
journalists who are who are tied up in
this world, it's like they're they're
actually
they're turning the the page. They're
they're they're saying, "Hey, uh the the
Fed has has has said that they're going
to solve this problem. The Fed has said
that they're going to do something about
price inflation. Uh but they're they're
not doing anything about it." It's like,
how how long can this go on? Going back
to what you were saying, Ryan, it's like
how long can this actually go on? When
are people when is there going to be
like some sort of like triggering event
where there's uh u like people are fed
up with this and so like there's some
sort of big, you know, political change.
>> I don't about it, Jonathan.
>> Yeah, that's right. There's a maybe we
need a a political revolution task
force.
>> Oh, that's right. I forgot. Yeah, Wars
has uh created like seven new task
forces to figure out everything. Um
because of course the Fed, what what are
they employing all those economists for
now anyway? Oh, we need a new task force
to study the economy because I guess the
existing Fed economists aren't studying
the economy. It's uh and they they get
well paid. Maybe that just betrays the
uselessness of Fed economists right now.
But it all just rings so untrue, right?
Worsh getting up there and saying he's
in control of the inflation situation is
about as true as Trump saying that the
reason they bailed out the yen is
because he just likes the Japanese and
they're nice people. I mean, it's just
it's just
>> Except for Except for that. That was the
one bad thing they did. Which, by the
way, you know, is uh is not true because
I lived I'm old enough to remember the
age of uh Japan bashing where everyone
was horribly afraid that Japan was going
to take over the United States. This was
in the very late uh 80s and early 90s.
There was a movie that that embodied it
called, I think, Rising Sun uh that came
out. Uh, I think it was a based on a
Michael Kiteon book. And man, it made it
made the Japanese look like basically a
master race that were going to take over
the United States anytime soon. And they
had they they had like secret the whole
way they conducted their their society
was like a giant Masonic temple where
everything was secret and membership was
closely watched and they had strange
rituals and all of this sort of thing.
And people kind of believe that about
Japan back then. there was this kind of
existential fear about them and then
they went into recession and nobody ever
thought about Japan ever again.
>> Yeah. But back back in 1988 when Trump
was kind of previewing a presidential
run back then I mean like when he was on
Oprah Winfrey like he he was using the
same exact rhetoric directed towards
Japan that he was using in 2016 against
China. It's like this this is why we
need tariffs of course is because this
dang Japanese car manufacturers back in
88 but neither are there
>> right. Yeah. Of course, that the fact
that Japan just went away without the US
uh engaging in a trade war against them
was uh inconvenient for the Trump
narrative.
Uh but I mean just why can't the central
bank and the US government well I know
why they can't but because of politics
but they've got so many excuses for why
they need to do this why they need to do
that and the solution of course is less
government spending that's it if they
just send the signal that we're going to
engage in less government spending I'm
not I'm not saying they even have to
actually reduce it significantly.
If they just send some signals saying,
well, government spending is going to be
flat next year. It's just going to be
the same next year as this year, you
would probably see yields plummet on US
treasuries. You would see this huge wave
of confidence probably in the US because
of course that would really
differentiate the US from the Japanese,
from the Europeans and so on because
they would all just continue spending
crazily.
And just I remember when
Ron Paul was running for president I
believe the second time. So it was 2012
and their big thing for the budget was
of course not to cut all spending,
right? I mean the these were people
making serious political
uh suggestions, right? This was a
presidential campaign, a serious
campaign that was putting out real
policies that they thought were
attainable. And they said we're going to
reduce spending to 2009 levels. And this
was in 2012, which was a totally
reasonable, normal thing to do because
prices, everything, all spending had
just skyrocketed into crazy town
territory after 2009. And they said,
"We're just going to go back to when
thing wasn't crazy town. It was still
irresponsible. It was still
unsustainable, but we're just going to
go back to 2009." And of course, that
was treated as utter insanity and
unattainable by the Washington elite.
But you can imagine if they had done
that, how would that would have changed
things? The US would have become this
economic powerhouse seen as the safe
place to put your money uh the the
sound, the sane people globally. They
could do something similar now, but
they're not going to.
>> Yeah. Unfortunately, what what it takes
to get that sort of rhetoric from
politicians is something like a a
Democrat in the White House and a
sizable number of vocal Republicans in
the House. um maybe in the Senate as
well. That that's the only time you get
that that sort of rhetoric at least at
least from uh the conservative wing.
>> Yeah. Well, now now again like getting
pre-COVID would be like the the the
equivalent of 09 now and you can't do
that. It's interesting. I mean, you not
as exciting as as Ron, but um remember,
you know, for years, you know, Rand
Paul, you know, his big radical pitch
was what he called the penny plan to go
we're just going to take a penny out of
every dollar the government spends and
that will get us on to, you know, uh a
balanced budget over x amount of time.
And like now he's now he's campaigning
on the six penny plan because like
that's how much you need to kind of
achieve the same sort of gains from back
then, which kind of tells you uh
everything you need to know. Um, you
know, it's just
>> inflation everywhere.
>> It's so disappointing though because I I
guess I got I got hoodwinkedked. I got
tricked. I I actually had a little bit
of optimism at the beginning of the
second Trump administration because
there was there was Doge and uh Elon
Musk was like slashing all this stuff
and there was lots of great rhetoric
about getting rid of whole departments.
Um, I I I I admit I was I was optimistic
about that, but then it just all went
down the tubes and and it's it's it's
such a disappointment now. I mean,
there's also all of the campaign
promises about no new wars. Um, and it's
it's just it's been sad and
disappointing. U maybe I I shouldn't
have gotten my hopes up at the
beginning. Isn't it great, guys, that uh
tariff revenue replaced the income tax
and they abolished the income tax. I'm
really loving that. That was that was a
great thing the Trump administration
did. There were people who actually
believed that was going to happen. I
mean, just astounding. I mean,
obviously, these people can't do math.
if they just looked at even the most
optimistic revenue
uh projections for tariffs versus the
actual revenue that comes in through the
income tax. Obviously, that was the pipe
dream, but a lot of people believe that
was going to happen. And boy, I just I
need to start compiling a list of all of
the cockamame schemes that we were told
were going to happen and none of it ever
happened.
But like you, Jonathan, I had some
optimism. I thought he's going to
appoint some of these people. And in
fact, he did appoint some of those
people. It's just it all came to
nothing, right? I liked that he was
going to appoint Kennedy to Healthy
Human Services. I thought maybe that'll
make some some difference. I like that
he appointed um Tulsi Gabbard, right?
But boy, she was just so completely
sidelineed, right? Evidence, by the way,
that personnel is not necessarily
policy. Uh because what really matters
are that that core group that runs
things. But so much of that just turned
out to not matter at all. And so that
the question is which TDS do you have? I
can't remember who came up with this,
but there's three different TDS's.
There's Trump derangement syndrome,
which we're accused of having anytime we
point out anything that the
administration has done wrong. But the
reality is I think most of us have Trump
disappointment syndrome,
>> which is we were we really wanted him to
succeed in doing these things he said he
was going to do. And obviously he was a
better uh candidate than Kamla, right?
None of I didn't think it just didn't
matter. Vote for Ka, whatever. I mean,
yeah, an economic policy. Now, knowing
what we know, there probably was going
to be no difference, but there was a lot
of other policies to worry about in that
case. But we we do not have Trump
deification syndrome which is what many
of the core MAGA people still have
although that's that number gets smaller
and smaller
>> and and I think the biggest thing too
like the failure of Doge I think is the
single most important failure of the I
mean the war situation is is horrible as
well like I'm not trying to I'm not
trying to mitigate that um but in terms
of the long-term realities and going
just through lack of answers here
because you know there's two different
proh problems with with the budget. For
one, there's there's no political will
to do it at a at a legislative level. I
mean, you know, no one wants to actively
vote for even the most minor reforms to
let's say, you know, social safety net
pro programs because you're immediately,
you know, sold as, you know, throwing
granny off the cliff. It's also funny.
It also works in local government. Like
we had someone talk about like uh making
some minor changes to the library and
all of a sudden you had a B. Don't you
dare take one Danielle Steel book at the
library. like this is this is this is a
war on on you like it's just it's it's
across all levels. Um but uh u but you
doge was the opportunity of bypassing or
sold as the opportunity of bypassing a
lot of the standard budgetary process
that the legislature refused to do. We
don't have a we haven't had a you know
real budget in what almost 30 years now.
um and that the inability for with all
the capital baked in that particular
promise that was supposed to be an easy
button in this issue and it's it's it's
absolute failure in terms of practice
outside of you know some minor things
can glad USA ID is less money great
fantastic but in terms of these broad
structural things and I I think it's you
know just looking at going back to you
know one of the original points like if
you look at uh uh the 10-year Treasury
yields I mean there there was
significant there there was about a8%
cut in US Treasury yields between
January till about April and that's
about as long as any hopes Doge lasted
and I fear it immediately goes back up.
I think those two might be might have a
little bit more uh more late than than
some might want to see.
>> But it's it's als it's not just Trump
that I'm disappointed in. It's also the
Republicans in Congress who were like
all for Trump on on the on the campaign.
And so like they were like they they
were echoing the same rhetoric about
Doge and cutting things. And then when
they had a chance to codify actually,
you know, like make it longerl lasting
as opposed to something that the next
president uh can can just reverse uh
they they fumbled the ball. I I don't
know what happened, but they did. And of
course, the the one congressman who was
good on this stuff, uh was pushed out
with billions of dollars, millions of
dollars, maybe not billions, millions of
dollars from some Israeli influenced uh
billionaire. It's it's just sad.
>> Yeah, it was it was double digit
millions, I do believe, which is a lot
for a single house race.
>> A Senate race can run a billion dollars
now.
>> Uh but yeah, for a single congressional,
that's just Apac really just pulled out
all the stops to just throw money at uh
the Thomas Massie problem, quote
unquote, which of course wasn't a
problem for any normal American
anywhere. Uh so I I say just keep an eye
out on yields. I if we continue to see
these sorts of numbers in terms of
federal spending, I don't see how you're
going to see the 10-year head down again
in terms of the yield. People are just
going to expect so much
uh debt, US debt to flood the market now
with these $2 trillion deficits coming
out of the Trump administration.
Why would you be uh why would you be
paying higher prices for any of this
stuff? Because you're just going to
expect more to be coming right
immediately afterward. There's going to
be dumping more and more debt in the
market. So, of course, you're going to
want you're going to demand higher
yields on that. And now
because they're fearing not only on top
of all this new debt being added to the
marketplace, they're fearing the
Japanese dumping what they got. That's
the that's the key is you get so much
new fresh debt coming onto the market
and then you got the Japanese
simultaneously dumping the older stuff
that that could just really destroy
Treasury markets from the government's
perspective in terms of now they're
having to uh to pay so much more. And
that was the other statistic on these
huge debt numbers coming out of uh the
Trump administration. I think I I think
I saw that it was 1.2 trillion. It could
have even been higher paying that's
that's just what they're paying on the
debt. That's just the debt service so
far. That's these are astounding bonkers
numbers. So when you look at that, of
course, yields are going up and that's
going to really I think destabilize
uh a a lot of both the US and the global
economy even because right as you note
Jonathan all of these central banks are
interconnected. The global economy is
all interconnected and I think we're
just going to start to see a lot more of
intervention from all of these banks and
not just the Fed. But it'll be
interesting to see going forward just
how this perhaps the pace of this steps
up. But then every every six weeks we're
going to get Worsh out there telling us
that everything's under control and he's
his task force is is going to solve that
problem any day now. Then we'll get up
>> they're resolutely committed,
>> right? And then it'll be 70 months of
inflation [snorts] above 2% then maybe
75 unless of course the economy crashes
and then you'll have your official
inflation go down significantly. Uh but
stay tuned I guess. But I do think
keeping an eye on the 10-year yield,
30-year, all of that, I think, is going
to give us an idea of what the mood is
out there for investors and how much
people actually believe this rhetoric
about getting inflation and spending
under control.
>> Yeah. In case people think that like
this this conversation got sort of
derailed when we were talking about
Trump and Doge and Massie and all these
things, it's because the the central
problem, as you said, Ryan, the central
problem is government spending. That's
that's the problem. It's it's extremely
high levels of government spending
that's causing all of these problems uh
with you know higher yields and and
people are are are becoming increasingly
um or maybe I should say decreasingly
willing to hold on to to treasury debt.
It's all because of the size of
government spending. This is something
that Murray Rothbart was was great on.
He in a man state there's a section
where he's talking about uh uh debt
hawkery. It's like people um are worried
about the size of of government debt.
But Rothbart pointed out that the the
debt is is a uh it's a symptom. It's
it's like a it's a side issue. It's a
consequence of all of the excessive
government spending. And the government
spending is where all the distortions
happen. And so the solution to all of
this is reducing government spending.
It's it's it's not some weird new policy
trick, some weird new intervention that
the Japanese central bank, Japanese
government or US government can do to to
shortterm fix problems with foreign
exchange markets or fix problems in the
Treasury market. Like they of course
they they have tools that can like do
things in the short run, but as as we've
seen what they did with the yen has
already corrected itself. Like there was
like this little blip in the yen. So all
the stuff that Besson did last week and
earlier this week to to try to prop up
the yen that all of that has already
evaporated. So like all of all the stuff
that they can do to to put band-aids on
these problems are are just band-aids
just like short-term almost like like
super short almost like immediate run uh
things that they can do. Uh but the
underlying problem is government
spending.
>> Well, with that we'll go ahead and wrap
up this episode of the Power Market
podcast. I suspect there well we'll have
many new trends along these lines to
return to in a few weeks. Uh and then
we've got that that election coming up.
So it's going to be an interesting year.
>> Speaking of speaking of the future, I I
I pulled up the US debt clock and we're
inching closer to $40 trillion. So
that's [laughter] coming
>> 40.
>> Well, thank you everyone out there for
listening. I do appreciate it. We will
be back uh next week with a bit more. Uh
perhaps Connor may be able to rejoin us
uh next week. So, thank you very much,
Jonathan, for filling in today. And uh
yeah, it was great that we were able to
cover this topic because I do think it's
one of those things that just it doesn't
break into the mainstream news is it
news is just in the business media for
the most part, but I think it's the sort
of thing that proves to be pretty
important later on. So, thanks all out
there for listening. We'll be back next
time with more. We'll see you then.