Russians are tired of the war and they are not protesting; voluntary recruitment is slowing
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Russia has endured approximately 1.4 million battlefield casualties since launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with analysts projecting that monthly losses could average around 30,000 troops by 2026. Despite these staggering human costs and significant attrition in military equipment, particularly within the Black Sea Fleet, Moscow has yet to secure major operational victories during its recent spring and summer offensives. The disparity between Russian and Ukrainian personnel losses is estimated at roughly eight to one, yet this numerical advantage has not translated into decisive territorial gains or strategic breakthroughs, especially in the Donbas region where advances remain painfully slow and costly.
Amidst rising casualties and a slowdown in voluntary recruitment, which had previously been bolstered by high pay and tax incentives, Russian authorities are reportedly considering a new wave of mobilization following the State Duma elections. While Vladimir Putin's last partial mobilization in September 2022 aimed to call up 300,000 reservists, the current strategy has increasingly relied on volunteers to fill manpower gaps. However, Western media reports indicate that voluntary enlistment is declining as war fatigue sets in across Russian society. Although polls suggest that a majority of Russians desire peace talks rather than continued hostilities, experts caution that this exhaustion does not necessarily equate to a willingness to protest the Kremlin or accept peace under any conditions.
The potential for a new mobilization stems from the leadership's repeated insistence on seizing full control over the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, a goal pursued through what analysts describe as a "meat grinder" tactic of throwing massive numbers of men into battle. Experts like Andrew D'Anieri suggest that the Kremlin may view mobilization as a necessary advantage to increase troop levels and finally achieve these stated objectives, despite evidence indicating that sheer numbers alone are unlikely to guarantee a breakthrough on the front lines. This approach reflects a desperate attempt to overcome years of slow progress and high casualties, yet it raises questions about whether such measures can alter the fundamental trajectory of the conflict without addressing deeper strategic and logistical challenges.
Ultimately, even if a new mobilization wave occurs, many analysts believe it is unlikely to significantly change the course of the war or lead to a rapid resolution. The combination of enormous losses, economic pressure from strikes on oil infrastructure, and the diminishing pool of willing volunteers creates a precarious situation for Moscow. While the Russian leadership continues to push forward with its territorial ambitions, the reality of sustained high casualties and slowing recruitment suggests that the conflict may become increasingly protracted and costly. The situation highlights a stark contrast between official goals of total regional control and the grim battlefield realities that suggest such objectives are becoming harder to achieve through attrition alone.
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Russia has suffered approximately 1.4
million battlefield casualties since the
start of its full-scale invasion of
Ukraine, and by 2026, Russian losses
will average approximately 30,000 troops
per month. Against this backdrop, Moscow
may be preparing a new wave of
mobilization after the fall State Duma
elections, Forbes reports. According to
the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, as of July 1st,
Russia's total battlefield losses
amounted to approximately 1.4 million
service members. In 2026 alone, analysts
estimate that the Russian army will lose
approximately 30,000 troops monthly.
Moreover, the ratio of losses between
Russian and Ukrainian military
personnel, according to the center's
estimates, is approximately 8 to 1. At
the same time, the Institute for the
Study of War notes that despite enormous
losses, Russia failed to achieve
significant operational successes during
the spring and summer offensive
campaigns of 2026.
The losses are not limited to personnel.
Russia also lost a significant amount of
military equipment and ships from the
Black Sea Fleet, and Ukrainian strikes
on oil refining infrastructure have
created additional pressure on the
Russian economy. Amid rising losses and
problems with military recruitment,
Russian authorities may consider a new
wave of mobilization. Meduza previously
reported that Russian officials are
discussing the possibility of holding
such a mobilization after the State Duma
elections in the fall. The Institute for
the Study of War also reported that the
Kremlin is considering various options
for supporting a potential mobilization.
Vladimir Putin last announced a partial
mobilization in September 2022.
At that time, 300,000 reservists were
planned to be called up. Since then,
Moscow has primarily sought to fill its
military needs with volunteers,
>> [music]
>> offering them high pay, salaries, and
tax breaks. However, according to
Western media reports, voluntary
recruitment in Russia has slowed down
recently. Experts note that Russian
society is increasingly tired of the
war, but this does not necessarily mean
a readiness to protest against the
Kremlin. A March poll by the Levada
Center showed that 67% of Russians
believe peace talks with Ukraine are
necessary, while only 24% favored
continuing hostilities. At the same
time, experts say war fatigue does not
automatically mean Russians are ready to
demand [music] its end under any
conditions. "Russians are generally
war-weary and want it to end," said Dr.
Brian Taylor, director of the Moynihan
Institute of Global Affairs at Syracuse
University. "They are well aware that a
full-scale war against Ukraine,
beginning in 2022, has already lasted
longer than the Great Patriotic War
against Nazi [music] Germany. However,
this war weariness does not mean that
Russians want peace at any price [music]
or that they will protest the war."
Analysts suggest that additional troops
may be deployed primarily to continue
the offensive in Donbas. The Russian
leadership has repeatedly stated its
intention to establish full control over
the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
However, the Russian army's advance in
this direction remains slow and has
resulted in significant losses.
According to Andrew D'Anieri, deputy
director of the Atlantic Council's
Eurasia Center, "The Kremlin may be
counting on mobilization to increase
troop levels and ultimately achieve its
stated goals." The expert says, "If
Putin decides to mobilize, he will do so
because he sees it as an advantage on
the battlefield.
>> [music]
>> He has repeatedly stated that Moscow
wants to seize the entire Donetsk and
Luhansk regions. Russian progress in
these areas has been extremely slow and
extremely costly for several years. So
far, they have used a meat grinder
tactic, [music]
throwing as many men into battle as
necessary to try to achieve these goals.
Perhaps the Kremlin believes that
mobilization will finally help them
seize these territories, although
evidence from the battlefield suggests
this is unlikely. At the same time,
experts believe that even a new wave of
mobilization is unlikely to
significantly change the course of the
war, since an increase in the number of
troops alone does not guarantee Russia a
breakthrough on the front.