Podcast: A conversation with Radmila Shekerinska, Deputy Secretary General of NATO

This podcast is brought to you by the IIEA, sharing ideas, shaping policy. The purpose of today for us is to have a discussion. We're going to have a fireside chat. Um following which I will open up questions. Can I also particularly welcome all of our guests online? Um and I didn't start by introducing myself. So, just to start there, please. Um I'm Orla Quinn. I'm the uh interim director general here of the institute. It's a great honor to be that. Um I'm the former secretary general of the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment here in Ireland. So, obviously questions of uh policy are very much in my uh arena. And and this institute provides such a wealth of information and such a wealth of speakers. So, those of you who are online, if you have questions, you can already start to put them in even though we haven't heard a word yet from our honored guest. But, those of you who are here, please hold and we will come to questions at the end. So, without further ado, can I introduce, please, our honored guest? So, Radmila Shekerinska is, as you know, the Deputy Secretary General of NATO. She's had an extremely distinguished political career. She has served two terms as Minister of Defense of North Macedonia. Um and indeed we had our your Minister of for Foreign Affairs here in June. So, again, a topic of great interest to us. She was also the first woman in that post and indeed the longest-serving since her country's independence in 1991. It was in that role that she brought forward North Macedonia to become a member of NATO. And indeed, they became member the 30th member um in 2020. So, we are delighted to have you with us. Um and we're going to have a fireside chat, as I said, but I will just open up first to you and thank you, Radmila. >> Thank you so much for the invitation and good afternoon. Welcome. Uh it's an interesting format to actually have a debate like this before some of the official meetings. Uh but let me let me start by saying why I am first and foremost in in in Dublin. Uh on behalf of NATO, I will join uh defense ministers of the European Union uh that meet here under the the Irish presidency in order to discuss a number of issues, but the reason why I'm joining them is that one of them one of those issues will be supporting Ukraine. And this is definitely one of the areas where NATO and EU cooperate very well, and our cooperation has really been to a certain extent the only game-changer at Ukraine's disposal to help them in their justified fight for independence and for sovereignty and the territorial integrity. And this was very high on our agenda when uh leaders of the 32 allies met just uh more than a month ago in Ankara. Uh in the last 2 years, we have had two summits. And as some people say, with every summit we claim that the summit is historical. Uh I do believe that both summits were very important for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and for the alliance because the Hague summit last year uh really allowed all 32 leaders to agree that we need to reinvest in our security. You know, I have been I I I have not been only a defense minister, so I know how money is scarce in every budget, with every discussion, and I would always prefer to say, "Oh, we would be able to to increase spending in other areas." But, you know, I also come from the Balkans and I have seen the price of undermining security. And this is what we discussed last year when we met in The Hague. War is back in Europe. We see a not only a revisionist, but very aggressive Russia. And the only way a defensive alliance can really deter aggression is to invest in its own security. Uh if someone would have said few years ago that 32 democracies can agree to such an ambitious target to increase defense investment to 3.5% for core defense and additional 1.5 percentage points of GDP for defense-related, a broader sense resilience, cyber, infrastructure elements, uh many people would have said no way. But, this is why The Hague Summit was so important. It allowed us to reach this decision. And in Ankara, just 1 year afterwards, we were able to to say we have committed, but we are also delivering. And in Ankara, it was clear that there is a a real change, especially in Europe and Canada. European allies and Canada have increased their in defense investments initially by 20%, which was 139 billion US dollars just for 1 year, and for 2025-2026, an additional 250. And this is an investment especially in countries that have been underinvesting in security because we were all enjoying the peace dividend. Uh but, what Europe has shown is that when confronted with with a challenge of a completely changed security environment, we do what is rational. And this is we rise up to the challenge. And what we have seen is not only a focus to increase our security, to increase our capabilities, but also to continue and sustain our support to Ukraine. Uh and I can I can go more in details if there is interest on these issues, but generally it was uh a big sign that it's not just words that uh Europe is becoming more serious about its security, and that's in today's world, that's good news. Thank you. >> Thank you for those opening comments, and it leads very much, I think, into the first question that I had, which was about the war in Ukraine. Um and in particular, I suppose, the the growth in hybrid activity. Um and maybe just to to kick off on that question, what does NATO Where would you see the biggest threat, then, to European security today? And maybe just to add to that, is Europe adequately prepared? And you've touched on on some of that already. >> Well, the discussions uh even before uh Ankara, but very much the discussions on The Hague were very clear. We have a shared threat assessment, and we have seen that the biggest threat to European uh security, Euro-Atlantic security, actually comes uh from this revanchist and aggressive Russia. Uh the the forms of this threat can be different. Uh I mean, the most visible part is, of course, what we see in Ukraine. Uh I repeat this because sometimes it takes me also it is difficult for me to assess that five years. >> Yeah. >> We have war in Europe, a a traditional territorial conquest, which we thought belonged to the past. And at the same time, uh we see uh Russia challenging also European security in different ways. Some people call it hybrid threats. Uh I I remember some colleagues said, "These are no longer hybrid threats. These are hybrid actions." Uh their reckless behavior is very very visible on throughout the eastern flank. You see it in a number of airspace violations, be it drones, be it jets. But then we see the number of uh arson attempts, uh the the the sabotage attempts, not to mention the intelligence and even even assassination attempts. So, uh what we see is really a behavior uh that that shows a very increased appetite for risk, uh a lot of aggression, and definitely this is something that uh we sense as a changed security environment in Europe. Uh I have no doubts no doubts that uh the alliance and within it European allies and Canada is definitely stepping up. Uh I have mentioned some numbers in total, uh but I will mention that a number of allies have already invested more or around 5% in its of GDP into their security. And of course, the picture depends on geography. Unfortunately, we uh the the the threat assessments, of course, it's is very visible uh and very clear as as you move closer to the to the eastern our eastern borders. And you can see all the Baltic states, uh Poland, uh but also the Nordic states, uh some of them actually reaching 5% for core military core defense, uh not 3.5 plus 1.5, but 5% solely dedicated to this defense capabilities. And uh if they can do it, others can do it. Of course, there is a different pattern in the defense spending, but just in the course of 1 year, let me go back a bit to the so-called Hague pledge. In the Hague, we have agreed that we will reach the 5% of GDP pledge in the course of 10 years. So, because we know that it's it's not an on-off switch. You you It's very difficult to go from lower traditionally historically lower spending suddenly to to 5%. So, there is a curve. But even 1 year afterwards, in total, we are very close to 4%. So, it This shows commitment, and I have no doubts that when we put our mind to it, when we when we see the challenge, we we rise to the challenge. And I think this was very visible in some of the pledges of support to Ukraine. We we agreed in Ankara that we will match a certain amount of aid both for this year and next year that will allow them to negotiate from a position of strength, but also survive. >> Yes. >> You're all witnessing the the the the the the terrible death toll that every night and every day Russian aggression is causing in Ukraine. And this is why we especially focus on air defenses in Ukraine because we we really know that the the the the challenge of this winter will be A, the severe humanitarian losses. Now, the the the recent attacks have been really terrible in terms of civilian losses, but also the losses to critical infrastructure, especially energy. So, so this these are all things that I think will require our focus. >> Okay. And and you touched there on the role of the EU and clearly they have been stepping up to the mark through the rearm Europe and other initiatives safe instrument etc. Where would you see from the NATO perspective complementarity? And and is there also a risk of duplication? Just maybe touch on that if you would please. >> If you ask me what how is the cooperation generally between NATO and EU? I would say that it's a very good partnership. And it is growing. And that's because we see each other's roles not as competing but as complementary. And when Secretary General Stoltenberg was elected in his position his let's say managerial vision was let's not try to do everything in in you know that can be security related but focus on really the things that we know the best. And this is how he approached also cooperation with the EU. On certain issues we count on EU leadership. You know, how do you increase the the the the financial instruments at disposal? How do you support defense industry base? How do you work on issues such as increasing our resilience? All these things we believe that the EU has a lot of expertise and then we support their their their decisions but we focus on what we do the best. Standards, how to be interoperable, how do to to to create the capability targets, how to do the traditional deterrence and defense. And when approaching support to Ukraine we were equally pragmatic and complementary. This is why at all of our meetings in the North Atlantic Council focused on supporting Ukraine, we we have a special NATO-Ukraine Council. We always have uh EU very high-level representative, usually Kaja Kallas. Whenever there is a meeting of EU foreign or defense ministers, it's always one of us supporting. We have focused on the military, let's say, equipment, supporting also Ukraine with advice, supporting them with necessary logistics. We have a whole center in Stuttgart focusing on on on supporting Ukraine since day one. And then we have our teams in Kyiv, but we also have created a special center in Poland that works it it's it's practically the only entity of that kind between NATO and a partner country where we don't believe that we are giving something to Ukraine, but we are actually working together on lessons learned from the war in in Ukraine, a very clear partnership. And we focus on these things. So, for example, 99% of all the military equipment support going to Ukraine comes from NATO allies. Not NATO as it but NATO allies. We focused especially in the last year on providing the necessary air defenses. 90% of all the Patriot interceptors come through a program that we have envisaged, the so-called Pearl program, prioritized Ukraine requirement list. Uh it is allies that finance it. It's predominantly equipment that is only available in US stockpiles. We have called European allies to use interceptors also from their stockpiles. Uh but interestingly enough, we also have worked on a model in which part of the Ukrainian support loan funds can be used to finance part of these packages. So, I think when you're confronted with a with a tragedy and uh a war uh of of this magnitude, uh you have to learn to be really very practical and come up with solutions that save lives. And this is how we have worked together with the EU on supporting Ukraine. >> Okay. Thank you. Thank you for that. Can I touch then on in terms of Ireland and Ireland's relationship as you as people in this room will know, we have a very long-standing policy of military neutrality, but also maintaining an established relationship with NATO. How does the alliance view that relationship and again, how might it develop in the light of the changing circumstances in Europe? >> If I'm not mistaken, uh this partnership started back in 1999, uh when Ireland joined partnership uh for peace uh as a partner country. And we have valued very much our partnership, fully respecting your your policy and your choices sovereign choices that you have made on uh military neutrality. And this is how partnerships with NATO work. We respect each other and we agree whether there are areas in which our cooperation can benefit uh both sides. Uh I uh know that lately one of the areas in which there is more of an even interest and raison d'être for the cooperate is of course maritime security and especially the threats that we have witnessed with regards to our undersea cable infrastructure. Uh 75% of all the transatlantic cables pass through Ireland. So, there is an interest for you. There is also an interest in us to protect this. And what we have seen especially in the Baltic Sea, but what happens there can happen elsewhere, is that Russia's actions, the so-called hybrid actions, are not just with military capabilities, but they can harm us even more by stopping energy transfer, by stopping data transfer, by undermining critical infrastructure. So, this was very much a challenge for us at the beginning of of last year, when we saw a number of ships from the Russian shadow fleet, with the aim of breaking sanctions, but probably even also causing damage, breaking many of these cables, using false flag ships, which are not only challenge for our infrastructure, they can also be a huge environmental threat. And what we have seen is that our decision in the Baltic Sea to start, we call it a vigilance activity, Baltic sentry, with more of a presence there, did change Russia's calculus. The initiative of the French President Macron to tackle the Russian shadow fleet, for a number of reasons, among other these kinds of also changed their calculus. And it did allow us to protect our critical infrastructure better. So, the element that element is something that all countries who are worried about maritime security have in common. We have appreciated the fact that Ireland has supported KFOR presence in in Kosovo, which has been really instrumental in maintaining peace in the Balkans. And I remember that we have also been profiting from trainings by by Irish Defence Forces on dealing with explosive devices, etc., etc. Every year we discuss with Irish counterparts what are the interests of Ireland. We discuss our interest and we formulate the plan for this partnership. So, it's very much a two-way street. Uh I come from a country that until 2020 was a partner country. So, I know how interesting, challenging, uh but for us very useful this partnership can be. And I do hope that we play the same role in our relationship with Ireland. >> Very good. Thank you. And indeed here in the institute we have done some work on cybersecurity and undersea cables and I've had a most recent seminar on that. And for those of you who have a particular interest in that, there's a very good report on our website that you might like to to to access after this session. Maybe just before I turn over to the the audience for for questions, do you think NATO and its allies are acting fast enough to counter the new threats? >> We always we always talk about acting with the speed of relevance. And of course, if you translate this nice two word three words, it means you know, if yesterday's feasible, it's better than today. But actually, we we have to be very clear about this. We are a defensive alliance. We were created to to to preserve peace and to protect the members and and citizens. Uh this is why sometimes our behavior is seen as reactive because the only thing we want to do is to protect. And this is why some people might might challenge are we are we uh quick enough? Uh uh of course, we have to do everything. This this huge ramp-up, increase of investment, increase of production, it has to happen much quicker. But, I'm really impressed by a number of allies that have made practical U-turns in their policies. Not because they desired, but because they were confronted with a very bleak reality. Uh probably an area where we need to be faster is of course uh production, defense production. Uh after uh decades of peace uh and uh well, enjoying peace dividend, our the defense industries uh have become really weak and their production capacity very low. And this is why it was really um uh staggering to see uh that there is a significant uh increase in their potential, in their capacity. We saw it in Ankara. In parallel to the summit, we did a defense industry forum, and we have seen that allies have invested, uh increased their defense industrial production by 38 billion uh US dollars. Some of it just extending old production line, and some of them in creating new production lines. But, especially on these issues, air defense, we have to produce more. And uh especially as we we are confronted with too many theaters, too many crises uh globally, uh this is probably the big uh urgency that that everyone senses. >> Okay. Thank you so much for that, uh Radmila. >> This podcast is brought to you by the IIEA, sharing ideas, shaping policy.