Video summary
In his interview on the Human Action Podcast, author Patrick Newman explores the historical evolution of the corporatist state in his book *Cronyism: Rise of the Corporate Estate, 1849 to 1929*, clarifying that libertarians oppose cronyism rather than big business itself. He defines cronyism as a system where government policies, such as subsidies and restrictive regulations, favor special interests at the public's expense, effectively replacing free-market competition with state-sponsored cartels and monopolies. Newman challenges several common misconceptions about American economic history, noting that the Republican Party was historically aligned with mercantilist policies like protective tariffs and central banking, while early Democratic leaders like Andrew Jackson championed limited government and debt repayment. He also argues that the "American System" promoted by figures like Alexander Hamilton is often misunderstood today, as America's industrial revolution actually flourished under low-tariff regimes like the Walker Tariff of 1846, contrary to modern narratives that ignore this historical context.
The discussion further examines the Federal Reserve, described by Newman as a "creature from Jekyll Island" established through a secret meeting in 1910 to create a government-backed cartel for Wall Street. Rather than weakening financial power, the Fed strengthened the influence of the "money trust," a dynamic illustrated by the conflicting interests within major investment banks during World War I. Newman highlights the split between J.P. Morgan & Company, which supported U.S. entry into the war to protect loans to Britain and France, and Kuhn, Loeb & Company, a German-Jewish bank that opposed the war due to anti-semitism regarding the Tsar. Although Federal Reserve founder Paul Warberg attempted to prevent excessive money printing and keep the nation out of the conflict, J.P. Morgan prevailed, leading to U.S. involvement in the war and increased monetary expansion after the fighting ceased.
Newman also addresses how regulatory reforms during the Progressive Era often backfired by aiding large corporations rather than protecting the public. He cites Upton Sinclair's *The Jungle*, which intended to inspire socialism but instead resulted in regulations that raised barriers to entry for smaller competitors while helping major meatpackers like Swift and Armour. Similarly, he points out how the American Medical Association used defensive lobbying to restrict competition from patent medicines and alternative practitioners, creating a cartel that reduced access to care in rural areas while boosting doctor salaries. These examples illustrate the concept of regulatory capture, where large businesses shape legislation through high compliance costs that crush small rivals and by hiring intellectuals to craft public-interest justifications for their special privileges.
The interview concludes with Newman sharing anecdotes about railroad lobbyists employing "seductive female lobbyesses" and the surprising historical role of accountants in facilitating cronyism, emphasizing that these stories are essential for understanding the true nature of past economic policies. He notes that traditional narratives often overlook these nuances, particularly regarding the complex roles of different financial institutions in shaping U.S. involvement in World War I and the subsequent development of the income tax. Ultimately, Newman argues that recognizing the historical roots of the corporatist state is crucial for Austrians and libertarians to distinguish between genuine free-market advocacy and policies that merely benefit entrenched special interests, a theme he further promotes through his book available at the Mises Bookstore.
Read the full video transcript
[music]
This is the Human Action podcast where
we debunk the economic, political, and
even cultural myths of the days. Here's
[music] your host, Dr. Bob Murphy.
Patrick, welcome to Human Action
Podcast. Thanks for having me on. Well,
we've we're covering here, folks, uh his
new book, Cronyism, Rise of the
Corporate Estate, 1849 to 1929, in case
you weren't sure which years he was
referring to. And so, I guess the the
first thing is as we always ask in
something like this is, you know, what
what made you do this project,
>> right? Um so, this is this is a um the
second installment in a series. Back in
2019, Hunter Lewis asked if I would be
interested in writing a book on the
history of crony capitalism in the
United States. And originally, I was
going to go from like the founding of of
of uh of Jamestown, right? So, the
colonial era, all the way up through say
2019 or the present. And as I was
working on it, I thought, well, sort of
in classic Rothbart fashion, there was a
lot to cover and it would actually be
better suited to have multiple books.
And the first book, Cronyism, Liberty
Versus Power in Early America, 1607 to
1849,
that that um that was released in 2021.
And then this new book, Cronism, Rise of
the Corporate Estate, 1849 to 1929, that
was just released. And so basically
moving progressing our way through
history and getting up to the present.
>> Okay. And I should also mention here
you've got a forward by Thomas Sergeant
Nobel Laurate and uh I didn't know he
was a friend of the Austrians. So can
you explain how that came to be?
>> Yeah. So that was it was it was very
interesting. He's he's been nothing but
nice and helpful uh and very kind during
this entire uh process really of of
writing the book. He reached out to me
uh I want to say it was the fall of 2022
around around then and he he reached out
to me about the fifth volume of
Conceived in Liberty and he had just got
he said he had just gotten a copy and he
was really interested. I had known he
had cited Rothbart's the progressive era
in a couple of publications. I know he
liked Rothbart's analysis of World War I
and he was sending this email about uh
Conceived in Liberty, the the fifth
volume that had come out in 2019 and he
had mentioned that he had uh always
found some of Rothbart's history very
interesting and they had briefly
corresponded in the 1980s and I had told
him about the first Coroniism. He said
he would pick up a copy. Then he he
reached back out a couple months later,
said he really liked it and he was
really interested in the second book.
And I was I was thrilled by this. He's
like, "Oh, is it how's it going? And do
you have a draft I could look at?" And
it was re really nice. Really um very
very kind and I I mustered up the
courage to ask if he'd be interested in
writing a forward and he said he'd be
delighted to. And so yeah, that's how
that's how it it it turned out. So um
very very very thrilled about that.
Yeah. Yeah. That's a pleasant surprise.
Okay. It's like, you know, I was
thinking you were going to say, "Oh,
yeah, he's my uncle or something." But
no, that's not what it was. [laughter]
>> Yeah.
>> Okay. Well, before we get because So, I
think Patrick probably, as we chatted
beforehand, I think probably I'll just
go through and list some of the more uh
provocative section headers and just
have you give folks a taste of what's in
this book. But before we dive into some
of the particulars, just big picture,
this might be unnecessary for most of
our listeners, but in case other people
come across this interview or whatever,
uh, isn't it the case that libertarians
are just big fans of big business? And
that, you know, didn't Einran say big
business is the most persecuted minority
in America? And so I thought, you know,
especially right-wing libertarian types,
that whatever big business wants to do
goes and government just should get out
of the way. Isn't that Isn't that what
we're for?
Yeah. So, that's that's a I'm glad you
brought that up because there's there's
a lot of misconceptions with that.
Whenever people hear you're like you're
pro- free market or pro limited
government, you say, "Oh, you just want
big business to control everything." And
and yeah, you bring up people bring up
the old Randian analysis. And there's
there's of course an element of truth to
that in that as I discussed in the book
there's lots of good things that big
business does or that they bring to the
table economies of scale uh so on and so
forth. Uh but a lot of times big
business they might preach the free
market but in reality they support
cronyism right which I define as
basically policies that benefit special
interests at the public's expense. So, a
b big business will support subsidies.
They'll support barriers to entry for
smaller competitors. Uh they'll support
uh regulations that benefit them but
that stifle innovation, so on and so
forth. And this is this is really more
accurate. So, what we favor is we favor
open competition, right? The free
market. Uh we don't favor uh big
business just like we don't favor small
business and so on. We favor those uh
entities that can actually survive and
produce the goods and services that
consumers value on the open market.
>> Okay, great. Um and I probably goes
without saying, but what do you mean by
the term corporatist state?
>> Yeah, so the the term corporatist state
refers to the system of government
sponsored cartels and monopolies, right?
It's really you can think of it as
protofascism.
Fascism understood in the original term,
right? But so under corporatism, the the
government will say cartilize the steel
industry, right? The government will
cartilize the steel workers. The
government's going to cartilize the
railroad industry, the railroad workers.
Uh the government's going to have, you
know, intellectuals are going to band
together. Basically, all these trade
associations and so on are all going to
be given various government privileges.
And instead of them all interacting
freely as they would on the free market,
right, open pricing, competition, and so
on, you instead have this entirely
regulated and cartilized environment. So
corporatism was always advocated as kind
of being in the middle between the free
market, the quote dog eat dog less afair
and then the um the the the uh conf
confiscatory or revolutionary socialism.
Right? So that's the corporatist state.
It was created in the early 1900s and of
course there's still large elements of
that in the world today.
Okay. Um perhaps one more clarification
or you know common misconception as we
go through here. It's funny that
especially like you know in terms of
this history in the the mid to late
1800s. It's not the case that oh yeah
the party of free markets and limited
government intervention in business are
the Republicans and it's those darn
Democrats that are always you know
trying to meddle and getting and you
know and tinker with the money and
whatnot.
>> Yeah, exactly. That is a a common
misconception. I'm glad you brought that
up. One of the things I discussed in the
first book was that really when it comes
to say a pro- free market or pro-
libertarian party, the closest that we'd
get we got to sort of a mass movement
party I would say was the Jonian
Democrats when you actually look at the
policies they passed.
>> And then there were elements of that
that continued throughout the post civil
war era particularly like the Bourban
Democrats, people like Grover Cleveland
and and so on. Um, but the Republicans
were really kind of the mercantalist
pro-American system uh party. They could
be pro big business, but they were pro-
protective tariffs, pro- subsidies, pro
beneficial regulations to Wall Street
and so on. They were not the party of of
the free market as what's often kind of
um imagined in sort of their lore,
right? It's just not true.
>> Yeah. And Jackson in particular, of
course, folks, not only, you know, he
famously killed the Second Bank of the
United States, but also literally paid
off the federal debt.
>> It gets to be clear, not just not just
balanced the budget, but actually paid
off the debt. So, yeah, there you go.
>> Exactly. The Jonians, they they got rid
of the bank, they got rid of protective
tariffs, they decreased government
spending, they paid off the debt, they
deregulated on the state level. There's
lots of interesting things uh to to to
to look at. So, of course, there are
some good Republicans in in American
history, but by and large, when we say
that the Republican party was the party
of big business. It was not free
markets. It was it was the party of
cronyism.
>> Mhm. Okay. So, you you use the phrase
here that was one of the things I want
to ask you as we go through the you know
the contents here. You say um during
this period of 1849 to 1861, one of the
section titles is return of the American
system. So, and and I people have been
talking about that. I I don't know if
it's on your radar, Patrick, but like a
lot of Trump officials are referring,
you know, to the the Hamiltonian
economics and stuff like that. So, can
you explain what what is this American
system? What does that mean?
>> Yeah. So, there's there's a lot of
relevance to this now. I I never thought
you'd have a president talk about the
federal budget in the 1880s anymore. You
know, I know Trump was talking about
this when he was running for office, and
I was just thinking, "Oh, wow. I I know
about that." Uh so the the American
system uh there there's a common thread
in in basically in in the um in early
American history that runs from
Alexander Hamilton, our first secretary
of the treasury to Henry Clay, a
prominent senator from Kentucky to
Abraham Lincoln, of course the first
Republican president uh and president
during the Civil War. And there were of
course differences between them, but
they all basically advocated this uh the
these policies at the federal level that
one increase the power of the federal
government, but they um uh they they
they would basically in inject the
federal government into the economy. So
common thread was you have tariffs,
right? Henry Clay and Abraham Lincoln
were especially big fans of protective
tariffs to stimulate domestic
manufacturing, protect workers and so
on. You have some sort of federal uh
involvement in in the um in in the
sphere of money whether through a bank a
central bank or through a quasi central
banking system. Uh and then you have
some sort of what was known as internal
improvements which is the the federal
government would try to stimulate um the
construction of transportation
uh you know networks and so on whether
through originally roads and canals up
through railroads in the Lincoln
administration. And we do hear about
this more and more in in modern uh
parliament as Republicans sort of even
drop the free market rhetoric and they
say, "Well, we need we need protective
tariffs uh because this is what led to
America's industrialization
in um in the 1800s and this is how we
bring back manufacturing." Never mind
that the beginning of America's
industrial revolution in the 1850s
occurred during an era of low tariffs,
the Walker uh tariff of 1846, which got
rid of protection uh protectionism
basically. Um and then they say, well,
you know, the federal government's got
to get involved in promoting
infrastructure and so on. Again, never
mind that the railroads uh that the
Lincoln administration subsidized were
very inefficient and they did not
actually stimulate growth. The
industrial revolution uh occurred before
and after the civil war largely due to
market forces and so on. So basically
myths, old myths die hard. uh and it's I
think it's no surprise that we're we're
hearing some of these policies being
advocated again uh simply just due to
not really understanding the history but
then also there are of course various
special interests that want these types
of policies both past and present. Yeah.
And on that narrow point about, you
know, people who are nowadays supporting
tariffs and pointing to, you know, like
look at last time we relied on tariffs
and one of my points was, well, right,
but back then look at federal spending
and you could get by with just funding
the federal government largely through
tariffs. They, you know, for large, you
know, except for the Civil War, then not
till later, they didn't have a federal
income tax. And so yeah, if you if it's
on the table, we'll cut federal spending
and just get rid of the income tax now
and just fund everything through across
the board tariffs and stick it to the
Chinese or okay, I would take that deal.
But it's not because taxing Americans on
imports makes us wealthier. It's because
the income tax is awful and federal
spending at this level is awful. So
anyway, that's my take on that stuff.
>> Yeah. Yeah. Exactly. I mean if look I
would support protect I would support
tariffs for revenue if government was 5%
of GDP right you know mass massive drop
and of course I think you know I had
high hopes for Doge but that turned out
to be a doge and pony show [laughter]
and of course the federal government
continues to spend and yeah we've raised
money through tariffs but just you know
the government just continues to spend
and so it's we we we we're looking back
at history thinking that we can get some
sort of magic panacea we have for of
course some of our very serious uh
budget problems right now.
>> Can you um again just I'm going through
here. So you've got Wall Street central.
So part three is the corporist era 1897
to 1929. Chapter 6 is Wall Street
central bank and you've got the creature
from Jackal Island. Can you speak a bit
you know what's your coverage of that
scenario or episode? Yeah. So, um I
think the so when it comes to the
corporate estate, um basically business
and other interest groups were lobbying
for the creation of cartels and
monopolies, right? Restrictions on
competitors or to, you know, so they
could increase their own market share
and they were you could get you could
get a government sponsored cartel or
monopoly through a variety of means. Um
the the [clears throat] main way that
these uh interest groups were lobbying
for the creation of these cartels and
monopolies was through a regulatory
commission, right? Something that would
the that would um be created at the
federal level and it would regulate
prices, product control, entry,
something like this, right? It depended
on the specific industry and and and
this was both for business and for
workers, right? Workers, you know,
wanted government sponsored unions and
so on. So throughout the progressive
era, what was called the progressive
era, we see like an enhanced interstate
commerce commission, uh we see the
federal trade commission, uh we see
regulation of food and drugs, uh we also
see the creation of the Federal Reserve
system. And I think out of all the
regulatory commissions that were created
during this period and out of all of the
quote cronyism or regulatory capture to
use a specific term, I think the primary
example of corporatism and the most
successful example was the creation of
the Federal Reserve system, right? uh
which was basically uh an an attempt by
Wall Street to create a government
sponsored cartel that would uh enhance
certain aspects of their business. We
could get into this uh known as banker's
balances, but also to help Wall Street
finance internationally to make the
dollar a world reserve currency, which
was something a lot of Wall Street uh uh
uh bankers wanted. And so the creature
from Jackal Island, uh that's a uh
that's that's of course taken from G.
Edward Griffin's book, right, which is
something a book I read very long time
ago. And it's it's a great title and
it's a classic sort of in in this um in
this field. And I think it's I think
it's true that yeah, the Federal Reserve
was a creature from uh Jackal Island,
right? This small uh island off the
coast of of of Georgia. You saw a lot of
uh Wall Street bankers. They they had a
little pow-wow. Actually, not really a
lot, just like a select few uh in the
fall of 20 uh excuse me, the fall of
1910. And they basically ironed out a
plan to create uh a central banking
system that in most respects basically
became the Federal Reserve system. And
basically then I analyzed the history of
the Fed through World War I and the
1920s and the the the evidence is very
clear that Wall Street kind of
controlled the Fed during this time
period.
>> Mhm. So ironically if I mean because
ostensibly one of the reasons of course
you know was the panic of 1907 and oh
look at JP Morgan's rescuing everybody.
can't have our financial system
dependent on, you know, the the good
pleasure of one guy in the private
sector. And so why don't we go ahead and
get a public institution and yet it was
co-opted and controlled by those private
bankers anyway. So it's it's not like
you're getting around in a sense giving
them more power than they would have had
in a free and open market.
>> Yeah. Yeah, definitely. Um people people
assume that before the Fed there was
something known as the money trust,
right? Now the term trust refers to a
specific type of of business
organization but people were just using
the tr the term trust uh as like a
synonymous with big business. So you had
the beef trust, you had the steel trust,
you had uh the money trust, right? And
you had these big businessmen and doing
something nefarious, right? Of course
exploiting the public and they're able
to uh monopolize markets, right? Become
the, you know, the dominant player. And
when you actually look at the evidence,
and this is something that originally
came from the historian Gabriel Koko in
the triumph of conservatism, it's that
these companies
um their market shares were actually
declining before the uh the progressive
era, right? Before the the corporatist
era, as I call it. And this is true for
the money trust. Uh, you look at Wall
Street's share of deposits relative to
what were known as other central reserve
cities, which at the time was Chicago
and St. Louis. Wall Street share of
bankers balances, which were deposit
accounts kept in Wall Street that
actually belonged not to individual
depositors, but to other commercial
banks. And those market shares were
declining. They were they were going
down before the Federal Reserve. And
actually they went up after the Federal
Reserve.
>> So the Federal Reserve didn't weaken the
money trust. The Federal Reserve
strengthened the money trust. That's
just that's just the honest evidence
when you when when you look at the
historical record.
>> Yeah. And also one of the you know to be
a lender of last resort is one of the
standard functions of a central bank.
And it's like well who is that helping?
It's private banks that got caught with
their pants down you know and they oh
yeah they were acting too recklessly.
That's why they need a lender of last
resort. So, it's not obvious why if you
know you're trying to discipline those
bankers and keep them honest, why you
want to create a lender of last resort
to, you know, be waiting in the wings to
rescue them when they
>> uh like, oh, you guys getting caught in
another liquidity crunch. Um, okay.
Well, you you've been talking about the
trust and I did want to ask you that.
So, I'm sure everybody that grew up in
the United States and is my age or
within 10 years, one way or the other,
received some version of this in grade
school or or high school perhaps that
Yeah. It used to be, you get a little
this folks, it used to be that the
government let big business do whatever
the heck they wanted. There were these
massive trusts that just controlled
everything. So like a few rich people
just bought out all these different
companies and just integrated into one
entity. And uh thank goodness guys like
Teddy Roosevelt came along and and you
know smashed that stuff up and you know
broke things down so that at least the
government was the the biggest force you
know the big the biggest kid on the
block and you know could could have some
regulation and things because otherwise
you know we can't have a democracy with
such concentrated power and so thank
goodness you know and and maybe in more
recent times things have gone too far
but I mean back then there definitely
was a a rationale for that and and hey
this is always the Trump card they play
if everything was fine
Then why did the public clamor for it?
Right? In other words, the progressive
era, the reason they pushed through all
those reforms is because people wanted
them. And so there must have been
abuses. Otherwise, why would people ask
for something that they didn't need? So
Trump card, what do you say, Mr.
Libertarian?
>> Yeah. Yeah. It is a classic um
like one of the classic lessons, right,
you learn in an American history class
is that okay, before the progressive
era, big business, they were exploiting
the public. They were exploiting workers
through unsafe, you know, working
conditions. They were causing business
cycles. They were leading, you know,
causing pollution. They were basically
doing everything bad, you know, that you
could possibly imagine. And then you
needed the the government to clean
things up and these these these
earthwile reformers and so on. Um the
the [clears throat] reality is
different, right? and in that of course
there were reformers who were against
big business but as I try to show in the
book they were really allied with other
interest groups um but a lot of times
business big business advocated for
these policies and the reason why the
public ended up supporting them and this
is something that's very important it
has a lot of relevance to today is that
business allied with intellectuals right
big business worked with intellectuals
to craft public interest justifications
for their various policies. Right? So in
the case of the Federal Reserve, Wall
Street said we needed we need a central
bank to prevent you know the business
cycle from reoccurring such as the panic
of 1907 like you mentioned. Never mind
that that panic was in a sense caused by
the problems in the national banking
system as were all of the other panics
in uh you know the past you know couple
of decades before that. And it's the
it's the propaganda game, right? So, a
special interest group basically hires
intellectuals and the intellectuals will
say, "Oh, this policy uh is is is going
to benefit the public." And in return,
the special interest group, you know,
pays the intellectuals, they get a nice
job somewhere, they get funding for
research, uh so on and so forth. And
this is really a more accurate
um understanding of of what actually
occurred uh back in the day. And this
type of history isn't understood. And
it's unfortunate because the the common
narrative is still pre prevalent. And
even though people might not learn about
it or read history as much, they still
have this basic understanding that, oh
yeah, well, we need an FDA because
without an FDA, you know, people were
putting poison in medicine or we need a
central bank because, yeah, didn't I
learn one time that, you know, before
the Federal Reserve, we had all these
panics and these really long depressions
and so on and so forth. And so, it's
once again, old myths die hard. And
that's why it's important to actually
talk about the real story of what
happened. Mhm. So, another one just to
keep, you know, piggyback on that train
of thought is, uh, I think many of us,
again, at least people close to my age,
uh, we had to read The Jungle by Upton
Sinclair and you're reading it and it's
just, wow, they used to just, you know,
the meat packing industry just used to
be disgusting and they would just throw
rats and human fingers and all kinds of
stuff into the ground beef back then.
And how could anyone possibly be against
the federal government coming in and
just setting some basic decent
standards? The kind of thing where if
private business hadn't been living, you
know, isn't going to live up to those
standards, then they should be
regulated. And if you're saying, oh,
they would do it anyway through market
forces and competition. Okay. Well, it
doesn't hurt then to just lay on just in
case, you know, some bare minimum
standard. You know, the government's not
saying they're not allowed to be safer
than what we're talking about. There's
basic minimum standards. How how could
anybody be against something like that,
>> right? Yeah, that's another classic uh
that's another classic one in in the the
jungle uh which is really a turgid book.
It's it's it's very bloated. It's hard
to it's hard to work through, but if I
guess we we had to suffer suffer through
it from an older
>> generation. Sorry to interrupt you, but
what's funny about that is the author
was like a a socialist, right? And and I
think there's some famous quote to about
I might not be getting it verbatim but
like something he was hoping it was
going to inspire you know a socialist
revolution or whatever and it did it
just inspired regulations and he said
something like I was hoping to change
their hearts and said I turned their
stomachs or something like I aim for the
heart but I hit the stomach, right?
because he wanted to he wanted to really
talk more about the working conditions
and like you know the struggle for the
proletariat so you know of of the
proletariat so to speak but in reality
what people cared about was oh my god
there's something wrong with our food
right and he had said that he visited
the the the meat packing facilities in
in Chicago and all this stuff and he had
found all these abuses and in reality he
he lied he he visited like one time on a
guided tour and then he spoke to, you
know, two people who talk to two other
people, right? You know, one of those
things. And and yeah, the the the the
beef trust is is this is fascinating
because people always say, "Oh, well,
big business isn't doesn't do anything
good." Um, but at least on the free
market, I would say they can do lots of
good things. So, the Chicago Meat
Packers, guys like Armor and Company,
Swift and Company, really, those were
the two major uh companies, they
actually improved uh health uh
standards, right? Because before, back
in the day, you would kill a a cow in a
in a in like a small butchering facility
and then you'd only use half the carcass
and then the carcass would be rotting
out in the forest or you'd dump it in
the river and that wasn't good. And what
the beef trust did is that they totally
revolutionized how meat is processed.
And they used what was known as a dis a
disassembly line. So instead of having
one butcher just chop up bunch of cows,
you have one guy, his job, he was the
knocker, right? He had to take a
sledgehammer, hit the cow, and the other
guy, you know, slit the cow open and so
on. And Henry Ford, the apocryphal story
is Henry Ford actually visited a
meatacking facility and he said, "Oh,
wow. They're doing this for meat.
They're taking apart a cow. What if I
What if I do this in reverse, right? I
build a car through an assembly line
instead of taking apart something
through a uh a disassembly line. And the
beef trust, they created all sorts of
byproducts. Uh they innovated with
canning and refrigerated beef. And this
really improved uh the quality of meat.
Of course, was it perfect to today's
standards? No, of course not. just like
what people are going to be eating in
the year 2300 is they're going to look
back at what we did and think that it
was nauseating or something. Uh but the
beef trust really did improve uh uh
safety standards uh and health
standards. Now did they want a monopoly
or they wanted a you know to control the
entire market share for for beef and
pork? Absolutely. But they couldn't get
it because there was always competition
and they also had a lot of enemies.
smaller slaughter house facilities,
butcher facilities, foreign governments,
lots of reformers who just didn't like
how the beef trust was uh really trying
to sort of squeeze out a penny out of
every, you know, every uh animal they
they they they chopped up like uh Philip
Armor said, "We use everything but the
squeal in a pig." And they thought that
was just capitalist and so on. And so um
along comes Upton Sinclair who was
trying
>> Can I stop you just for a second? Oh
yeah, sure. Don't lose your train of
thought. But what's funny on that point
is I also have heard like people saying,
"Oh, and the reason the Native Americans
are so much more noble than the white
man who comes is cuz when they would
kill a buffalo, they would use every
last little piece of it for all kinds
of, you know, they would make, you know,
skins and blah blah blah and jewel
jewelry and and so it's Yeah. But yeah,
when it's in the context of the meat
packing plants using every last little
thing, it's just like, oh yeah, that's
capitalism for you, you know, to
[laughter] squeeze everything they can
out of the poor animal. So,
>> exactly. And what's funny is that story
about the Native Americans isn't
actually really true. There's a book
called the myth the myth of the
ecological Indian and goes through this
and talks about how actually they
weren't really that big of
conservationists. That was something
that really came about, I think, through
like Earth Day in the 1970s. And they uh
there was a big predominant belief that
of reincarnation, like you kill a you
you shoot a deer and like seven of them
are going to pop up, you know, you re
respawn, so to speak. Uh but yeah, we
think, oh yeah, well, the conservation
that they practiced, which they really
didn't, well, that was good. But of
course, big business when they do that
or the meatackers, that's exploitative.
But long make a long story short, we
could talk about this more, but Upton
Sinclair thought he was writing this
like anti- capitalist manifesto and
instead the Beef Trust was able to do
what I call defensively lobby, which was
they they they got rid of the harmful uh
features of the meat packing uh
legislation that was going through
Congress. Instead, they got this bill,
this law, the Meat Inspection Act of
1906 that actually cartilized their
markets and it made it a lot harder for
smaller slaughter houses to compete. So,
they went out of business and the next
decade was really profitable for the
beef trust, right? So, this just one of
those revisionist
>> uh narratives that the average person
doesn't know anything about.
>> Yeah. And maybe it's worth just I think
you kind of touched on it earlier, but
just to really spell it out for people
in case they've never heard this concept
before, but there is this uh notion that
larger businesses, especially if they
think regulation is coming, can kind of
get in and steer it and make it such
that at least it, you know, helps them
relative to smaller upstarts. So an
example would be like the Sarbain Oxley
legislation that you know imposed all
these extra accounting standards and
things after there was some accounting
scandals and you know behind the scenes
you might think oh gez business wouldn't
want more more ownorous regulations laid
on them but actually like the big firms
that were dominant in their respective
industries
other things equal that that would
actually help them because they already
have teams of accountants and whatnot
and whole divisions that so it's not
that it's easier for them to weather a
burden ra as opposed to um you know,
partnership or something. Two guys just
working out of their living rooms that
had this new company. If they all of a
sudden get a bunch of new compliance
standards laid on them, they have to
outsource it to a CPA or like that
that's going to be extra burdensome to
them. So anyway, that's just in general
this notion that oh, you know who really
hates regulatory bills when they're
going through Congress or big
businesses. Like that's actually not the
case. Often it's the big businesses
lobbyists who are literally writing the
legislation that's going to then
regulate them.
>> Yeah. Exactly. And and this happened in
the past and in the present and and that
the the idea of of compliance costs as
as you were talking about is really
important because it is on average
easier for a big business to comply with
regulations. They already have the
facilities. They can hire a couple extra
people. You know, one extra accountant.
If you have a payroll of 200, you know,
people or something, it's not a big
deal. Um they can handle that better
than a small company, right? one extra
accountant for, you know, like five
people, a five person company, that that
can be a really big uh cost. And this is
why it's it's it's easier for big
business to get what they want uh
because they can afford to have
lobbyists or even a lobbying office in
DC or in a state capital, right? Small
company can't do that. They have to band
together, but it's not it's not the same
thing. and and and sometimes big
business will use this rhetoric that
they're pro- free market, but the truth
is very often it's it's different. Now,
of course, there's types of regulations
they don't want, but they can always
defensively lobby to sort of to
intercept the football, so to speak, and
to shape the bill so that it provides
special privileges to them at the
expense of their competitors and the
public.
>> Yeah. Maybe we just do one more uh
excerpt here, Patrick, and then I'll
just kind of pull back and let you give
some concluding thoughts. But this what
I'm going to be talking about is the
American Medical Association. But the
thing I want to highlight here, folks,
is it it always struck me as ironic
where if you ask the average person, you
know, what what is it about like, you
know, trusts or, you know, the the
robber barons and stuff like that and
vertical integration if they know that
term, like what was what's the problem?
and they say, "Oh, you know, these these
big businesses, they just take over
everything and they they outlaw or they
uh you know, do cutthroat competition or
put their rivals out of business and
then they have a captive market and they
restrict output and raise prices, you
know, that and that's the ostensible
problem. That's why we got to come in
and regulate them and we want to make
sure that there's concentrate or
competition. We don't want too much
industry concentration and so on. But
then there the things that are supposed
to be good like labor unions and like
the American Medical Association are
literally cartel organizations that
restrict output. And so here, let me
just read this is from Patrick's book
here. In the early 1900s, the American
Medical Association entered the drive
for pure food and drugs to reduce
competition from patent medicines. It
was no coincidence that the trade
organization launched concurrent
campaigns to hamper rival doctors and to
capture research subsidies from the
government. Of course, the AMA professed
that its corporatist proposals, which
reduced access to medical care and
boosted doctor salaries, promoted the
public wheel. As St. Louis doctor WG
Moore boasted, quote, "If the American
Medical Association be a trust, it is a
good trust." End quote. So there, I
mean, I I hadn't seen that quote before,
but that was a great one where Wait a
minute. I thought trusts were bad. Oh,
no, no. If it's if the reason they're
restrict, you know, if if the reason
they can give, if the rational they can
give for restricting output and making
things more expensive is because we want
to, you know, maintain minimum standards
of quality for the public, well, then
then they're the good guys.
>> Yeah. Exactly. And and the the story of
the doctors is is fascinating because
they really don't come off they they
they don't come off good when you
actually look at the at the evidence.
They were explicitly like we want to
restrict competition. Uh we want to make
it harder to get a license. We want to
make it harder to set up a medical
school. Uh we want to make it harder to
graduate from medical school and so on.
And and basically we only want the
public to buy uh the you know the
services of AMA doctors, right? Or what
a lot of heterodox doctors called
alipathic uh medicine. basically you
have a problem, you go to a doctor,
they're going to prescribe you a drug or
some sort of painkilling
um you know medicine, right? As opposed
to uh homeopaths
um which prescribe remedies or they
would advocate you use certain types of
things called remedies. Eclectics which
is like herbal supplements. What's funny
is even the doctors, even the AMA were
against chiropractors and optometrists.
That's another thing I found out like
they didn't they didn't trust eye
doctors or chiropractors. And that's
just fascinating. And and and this is
this is really important. I'm glad you
mentioned that quote because
a lot of times people will when
confronted with well the government
created a monopoly or they created a
central bank that you know benefited a
lot of insiders like Hamilton's Bank of
the United States or you know or or
railroad subsidies that went to you know
the the ruling elites of the Union
Pacific or the Central Pacific or so on
they'll say yeah but it benefited the
public
>> right so you you had to have a big
business that had all these privileges
is because only they could do it. They
were a natural monopoly, which is a
technical econ term. It's like they they
they benefited the public, right? Um and
that's why when you're doing this type
of research, this type of let's just say
cronyism work,
you have to show not only that a special
interest benefited, but that also the
public was hurt, right? and that the
public wasn't benefited or didn't
benefit, excuse me, despite all of the
uh that's for lack of a better term,
propaganda to the contrary. And and then
in the case of the doctors, it's that
yeah, it deprived lots of areas of of of
doctors. And you look at the evidence
and the amount of doctors specifically
in rural areas really fell in medical
care became increasingly out of reach.
And it was because of the AMA's
restrictionist drive that really in the
1910s and 1920s and so on, you saw all
these calls for socialized health
insurance, right? Or socialized
medicine. Say, well, it's too expensive.
We need to have just the government uh,
you know, provide this. And the AMA was
very against this unless they were
adequately compensated. That's the long
and short of, you know, the battle with
with o over um uh government provided
health insurance and and stuff like
that. Uh but yeah, it's just another
instance of you're always going to hear
like at the end of the day for any
government intervention, you're going to
hear public interest, public interest,
public interest. But the good historian
or the good detective is, you know,
shows it's cronyism, cronyism, cronyism.
>> Yep. Uh and just on that folks, we'll
I'll try to remember to put a link in
the show notes page of this episode, but
recently I was part of a panel from the
Mises Institute. We went and presented
at this event in New Hampshire talking
all about Patrick the you know medical
care and and what went wrong and is it
gez free market doesn't work when it
comes to healthcare and no that's not
the issue. It just you know standard
things like how come health insurance is
tied to my job? You know, so I was
making the point, you never say to
someone, "Hey, we're going to go to
this, you know, party over the weekend.
You want to go?" Say, "No, I'm in
between jobs right now. I don't have car
insurance." Like, no one ever says that.
But they can say, you know, "Oh, yeah,
there was this elective surgery I was
going to get, but I'm in between jobs
right now, so I can't cuz I don't have
health insurance." Like that's so and
and lo and behold it's not lazy fair
capitalism to explain you know what the
heck happened with healthcare in the
United States and why is it so screwy
that it's you know strings of government
interventions and then oh that caused
this problem and then they came in and
did more intervention that caused this
problem and blah blah blah blah blah. So
and then everyone says oh that's why you
can't have market provided healthcare.
>> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. It's the only it's the
only industry you go to a doctor's
office and you don't ask about the
price. Yeah.
>> You just say yeah all right. Yeah. Just
let me know my shirt. you know, just Oh,
yeah.
>> or or and if you do ask about the price,
they won't tell you. And they'll say,
"We'll tell you once you've already
bought it, then we'll tell you how much
it is."
>> And that's not even hyperbole. That's
literally what they what the deal is,
>> right? Right. It's ridiculous. It's
ridiculous. But yeah, and and but we
always hear, oh, well, and again, health
insurance or the the the medical field,
this is really big. I mean, this is what
the government like this is what all of
our entitlements are are geared around
basically. And this is uh this is huge.
But we hear in especially in the modern
era, oh well, you know, you got to have
Medicare, you got to have Medicaid, you
got to have these licensing standards
for doctors, so on and so forth. It's
public interest. Public interest. But as
you as as as you just discussed, it's
just not true.
>> Okay. Well, we got time here for one
more question for me to give to you,
I'll I'll keep it pretty open-ended
here. Is there as you did the research
for this and we're writing it, what's
the one thing that either like surprised
you or that you think, you know what,
even Austro libertarians don't know
about this and and they need to they
need to know about?
>> It's a good question. I I guess I'd have
to I have to think about that. I mean to
go through some of the more colorful
anecdotes. Um I found I discovered that
I guess a lot of railroad lobbyists
um or rather a lot of railroad companies
they would use seductive female
lobbyesses as they were known to sort of
persuade politicians which I just think
is interesting. Mhm.
>> Um uh tax account or accountants were
very were a very important interest
group behind the income tax in the
development of the income tax which is
really surprise surprise right. Um and I
guess what probably the most interesting
thing I would say is the end of the book
talks about um uh World War I and how
Wall Street was very big in getting the
uh the the the the United States in the
World War I. But what's quite
interesting is that out of the two major
financial investment banks or investment
banks in the country that were behind
the Federal Reserve system, JP Morgan
and Company and Lo and Company,
there's actually a bit of a split
between them uh with with regards to um
uh getting into World War I. JP Morgan
was very interested in getting the
United States in the World War I because
they were lending tremendous amounts of
money to the British in into the French
governments and of course if they
couldn't pay uh JP Morgan and company
then they'd be ruined. So they wanted
the United States to get involved into
basically pick up the tab. Uh but Kun
Loen company was a very prominent German
Jewish investment bank and they were
actually very pro-Germany
>> and Paul Warberg who was one of the
founders behind the Federal Reserve and
he currently sat on the Federal Reserve
board. He was actually trying to
keep the Federal Reserve from printing
money during World War I a little bit or
or trying to tried to get the United
States to stay out of the war. And that
was because Kun loben company was very
pro pro-German, right? They were all
German uh immigrants and they were also
against uh Russia because of the thesar
and some of his uh he was seen as
anti-semitic and it's just interesting
because JP Morgan and company of course
won out. But that's just a side story
that people don't really know about that
I discuss in the book and it's a
provides a bit more nuance to the
traditional uh story I guess you could
say of of Wall Street in World War I.
Yeah. I guess if his two goals, Kunan
Lo's two goals were had the stay out of
the World War and had the Fed not print
too much that he failed on both after
that.
>> Yeah. Yeah. Ex. Exactly. And then he,
you know, he left. He he was very pro
having the Fed basically print money
before World War I and after World War
I. Paul Warberg, right? So in in after
World War I, he sets up his own accept
what's known as an acceptance bank so
the Federal Reserve could buy those. But
it's just it's an interesting story,
right?
He tried but in World War I, but he
lost, right?
>> Yeah.
>> Okay. Well, that's Well, thanks. That's
a good anecdote. So, folks, we've been
talking with Patrick Newman about his
new book, Cronyism: Rise of the
Corporate Estate, 1849 to 1929
specifically. Uh, you can get that, of
course, at the Mises Bookstore. We'll
put a link in the show notes page, but
it's it's available. Uh, Patrick, thanks
so much for writing the book and coming
on here to talk about it.
>> Yeah, thanks so much for for having me
and for this great discussion, and I
hope it people find it helpful. So,
[music] uh, it was a pleasure to be on.
Thanks. Thanks everybody for tuning in.
See you next time.
Check back next [music] week for a new
episode of the Human Action podcast. In
the meantime, you can find more content
like this on mises.org.
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