Video summary
The panel discussion critically examines China's development across three distinct historical periods, challenging the tendency to overlook the achievements of the revolutionary era while questioning the excesses of the reform and opening-up period. The speakers argue that while the initial revolutionary phase fostered social solidarity and significant advances in agriculture, industry, and education, it was eventually followed by a shift toward market mechanisms that exacerbated inequality and eroded public welfare systems. The current phase is characterized as a "rebalancing" effort where the state is actively regulating capitalism to address issues such as corruption, labor exploitation, and cultural emptiness, aiming to use capitalist tools to build socialism rather than simply adopting state capitalism. This period involves a massive experiment in redefining the relationship between market forces and socialist values, with the state maintaining control over strategic sectors like land ownership and commanding heights of production to prevent the complete commodification of essential services.
A central theme of the conversation is the nature of cooperation between China and the West, moving beyond the simple question of whether it is possible to ask under what terms such collaboration is desirable or feasible. The speakers highlight deep divergences in worldviews regarding global governance, particularly concerning the role of international law and the legitimacy of unilateral coercive measures like sanctions. From an English School perspective on international relations, the discussion distinguishes between the "political West," described as a US-dominated alliance system that functions partly as a hierarchical empire de-sovereignizing its members, and a nascent alternative model emerging from the "global East." This new framework, represented by entities like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS+, is built on principles of anti-hegemonism, anti-colonialism, and strict adherence to the United Nations Charter, rejecting what it views as the abuse of international law by Western powers.
The dialogue concludes by framing the current global conjuncture not merely as a clash of ideologies but as a contest between competing models of world order within the existing UN-based system. While China officially claims to be at a primary stage of socialism and does not explicitly claim dominance, its actions and rhetoric suggest a vision that challenges the hegemony of the US-led political West. The speakers note that while there is hope for a more advanced form of socialism in China, the immediate reality involves navigating the tension between utilizing market dynamics for development and preserving socialist values against the pressures of global capitalism. Ultimately, the panel suggests that the future of the global order depends on whether these divergent models can coexist or if they represent fundamentally incompatible worldviews that will reshape international politics in ways unseen in a century.
Read the full video transcript
Uh, okay. So, now, uh, we'll have this,
um,
uh, you know, the the question and I I'm
afraid this time we may only have time
for one. So, I'll say I'll ask the
question, but also, uh, because I've cut
off, uh, comments, feel free to just
say, "Uh, the hell with Nathan's
question. I'll say what I was planning
to say." So, uh, what are your
observations about the obstacles and
opportunities that China faces today and
how could it maneuver best in the
current global conjuncture?
>> Well,
um,
I want to say something about that that
second question cuz I didn't get a
chance to say what I was going to say
on the first cuz, um, this this thing I
wanted like to
contest certain things about the
dominant historiography of China both in
China and outside China. And one of them
is this tendency to see the the, um, the
success of China in terms of four
decades. Uh, like Harry, and I'm going
to insist on talking about three, uh,
periods and I'll which I'll do as fast
as I can. But, I think there's a
historiographical issue. tendency to
downplay the achievements of the
revolutionary period, uh, to articulate
a non-critical position, uh, on the
reform period,
um, and to mischaracterize the current
period, which I would consider a
rebalancing period,
uh, and I believe to have a proper sense
of China right now, it's important to
have, um, this story of how we've got to
right now, uh, a lot clearer than it
tends to be. So, I'm going to rush
through my sense of, uh, of of these,
uh, periods. So, the revolutionary
period, um, and I'm glad that, uh, that
Richard evoked this feeling, uh, in the
1960s of of a revolution in the sense
that, you know, something else was
possible at this stage of history. And,
uh, we did feel it, uh, in those times
even in the West.
Uh, so, in this revolutionary period,
there was this fervor of building a new
social order. There was like
expropriation of the expropriators.
There was radical
redistribution. There was a sense of the
oppressed of the earth could become its
masters. There was a sense of social
solidarity. There was the challenge of
facing monumental tasks, but doing it
collectively. And this did in fact bring
great advances in agricultural and
industrial production as well as
advances in health, culture, and
education. And in education from basic
literacy on a mass scale to really
advanced ideas in the universities in
the area of knowledge production. And
this ought not to be forgotten. But
there were also ill-conceived
ultra-leftist initiatives, demands for
100% adherence to based on ill-defined
criteria. There was a Sino-Soviet split,
and there was an atmosphere of force,
violence, and fear, which I think are
are not conducive to building a real
socialist society. So there needed to be
a a change. There needed to be some kind
of reform. And there needed to be
opening up.
So and and even I would concede there
was it was necessary to give some scope
to capitalist production and and
investment. And this has as everybody
can see brought great advances in
industrial development, in scientific
and technological progress, in poverty
reduction, and international
interaction. But I ask
did it go too far in the direction of
capitalism? Not only in economics, but
in intellect intellectual and the
cultural sphere.
Did agriculture have to be
decollectivized?
Did public enterprises have to be
privatized and to shed their obligations
in education,
housing, health, and welfare, which have
become to a
became to a considerable extent
commodified in a way that they weren't
before?
Um
and to allow
late and to allow the wealth that was
built up in collective labor
um, to be channeled in such a way as to
allow some to live in luxury while large
sections of the population
were impoverished. Um, and you know, I
know it's supposed to be a great success
story of forward movement, but I was
just in Northeast China the last a week
of July and people really feel that
their lives were This was a great area
of industrial high industrial
development in China and they feel that
they flourished during the revolutionary
period and and uh, in a way they were
disadvantaged during the reform and
opening up period. They don't have the
same story to tell about the difference
between the revolutionary period and the
reform period. And about Foxconn, by the
way, I mean exploitation of labor
was a
a feature of this. We know about the
suicides in in in Foxconn.
Um, so the
the issue about this period is how to
deal with the staggering inequalities,
the fracturing of social solidarity,
the widespread individualism, the
cognitive dissonance, the existential
alienation, the involution, the
rejection of grand narratives,
you know, this loss of a sense of of
progress
in anything except material development
narrow narrowly defined material
development. And a
a sense of a lack of meaning that is
widespread in the rest of the world.
There is a crisis of meaning globally
and it's it is there in China as well,
but there's still there's it's different
China. There's still a the hope for
socialism. So I would consider the one
minute, but I think then you still have
time for your
Yeah, but I still I want to say this.
Yeah, about I call this period
rebalancing.
Um, it's a period of increased
regulation of capitalism which a lot of
people think is woeful. I think the
opposite. Um, an anti-corruption
campaign. There was a lot of corruption
that came in the interface
between private enterprise and and the
party state, which had to be tackled.
There's been a revival of Marxism both
from above and from below. My students
are you know, and and a lot of young
people in China are actually very
serious about Marxism.
Um,
and um,
so there's
um,
um, there's in my way here. So,
I think that
that there's an addressing
of the cultural there's been discussion
about historical nihilism
and the current cultural imitation of
Hollywood and the rest of Western
culture and and the psychological
emptiness that the reform and opening up
has left
in in terms of large section of
population, especially migrant workers
who are just cast adrift. Um, you know,
with with very few rights. Uh, and a lot
of this is is being addressed now. And
so I think that China is engaging in a
massive world historical experiment. Um,
in a new relationship between capitalism
and socialism. I would have said during
the reform and opening up period I was
tempted to call it state capitalism and
I I resist that now. Um,
uh, about the current period. Um, I
think that they they have and it's very
vague sometimes about somehow using
capitalism to build socialism. Now I
think aspects of this dynamic have
existed for example in the Soviet Union
and the NEP in in the 20s and the
perestroika period in the 1980s, but the
scale of this in China is is quite
unique. Uh, and I think that the role of
the state in controlling the commanding
heights of production and investment in
ownership of land, um, I think is is
extremely important for the success of
China. Um, I I do worry about the extent
and power of capital
and exploiting labor and undermining
socialist values
and wanting to push China more, you
know, back more in the direction of a
more and less regulated capitalism. Now,
China does not claim to be socialism.
>> Okay, one more sentence.
>> Um, but to be at a primary stage of
socialism and to be embarked on this
protracted path, very protracted path
to a more advanced form of socialism and
I choose
not to believe absolutely that will
happen but to hope for it.
>> All right.
So, 5 minutes.
>> Yeah, thanks Ed. Just two things. I'll
just throw in a couple more isms. I
don't want to say anything about them
They're not all isms but they could be
just because we've heard about
communism, socialism, [clears throat]
reform communism and and other the the
those those debates which have gone on
over many decades. So, just to throw
into that pot social democracy which
isn't an ism but might be defined as
another
as an as an ism and then also the debate
on varieties of capitalism. So, I
suppose if we're thinking about
different isms to put those in the pot.
The second thing I think Ed is to just
um
take the bit about kind of
issues for China and the current global
conjecture and just frame that I think
one of
of this kind of an obvious point but one
of the
meta questions at the global level is,
you know, to what extent can China and
the West, the US, Europe, you can add,
you know, Japan, Australia and other
broadly Western countries
cooperate with one another. And almost
all people I think would agree that it
would be
better if we were able to cooperate in
terms of managing the global economy,
addressing climate change, conflicts,
nuclear proliferation, AI, etc., etc. I
think the real issue or the the real
question for me is cooperation on what
terms.
And I think you can see that kind of
question on the overcapacity
debate. So, I mean that there's not time
for me to get much more into that, but I
think the question isn't, you know,
okay, can China and the West cooperate?
The question is on what terms is
cooperation either possible
uh or
uh desirable. Um
and
maybe two other points. One to to to to
take on one phrase which Helena used,
which I think was it you spoke about
people's mature world views, I think was
the phrase you used. And maybe, you
know, one
question sort of around the issue I've
just raised there is are there
ultimately
divergent
world views which are perhaps
incompatible?
Discuss, I guess.
>> [snorts]
>> Um and then I
I would just raise finally,
I think for China,
there is a question,
you know, China, Chinese leadership,
Chinese Communist Party, what kind of
world order, global order does China
envisage? Um and is that ultimately, you
know, one in which China would be the
dominant power and, you know,
I think you know, serious um
Western China watchers I would So, I'm
just named Elizabeth Economy who is a
respected kind of
analyst of of
US analysts of China for many decades
argue that China does in a sense have
have have a vision of itself as as as as
as the dominant power in the world.
Finally then just to end with this
phrase
from
Xi Jinping a few times now Xi Jinping
has used this phrase
that we're currently the world is
currently witnessing changes the like we
the like we have not seen in a century.
And you know it's also part of the logic
of that phrase is that put it like this
the wind is with China and maybe also
it's Russian ally because one of the
first times I think that she used that
phrase was with this kind of famous
flash influence summit with
with President Putin in in February
2022.
Interpret that quote as as as well as
one will and I
I'll leave it leave it on that I think.
>> Uh all right. So
Richard
>> Yeah.
Okay.
I'll cut out learning that just want to
make one quick comment on Marxism.
You know there's absolutely right there
has been a revival quite clearly in
of of Marxism but clearly in the debates
over Marxism as but above all as a
Marxism as an analytical method
and over and over again the creative use
of Marxism
and indeed how you can use the question
what should put how can you use the
market to build socialism but on the
other hand it's more specific it seems
to me the market is one thing capital
and capitalism is another
and what we have in China is this unique
experiment and
use of the state. You have in other
words you have capitalism, but and the
power of capital in the Marxist sense,
and you have a
a developmental state, which is using
that and controlling it. And of course,
Alibaba and so on
uh try
my What was his name? Has has learned
the power of the state intervention. But
the key point I want to say is the fact
that you know, I mean, what Andrew has
just said about ultimately, are there
elements of incompatibility?
Now,
the big the way we have to conceptualize
it, and maybe a few more isms just to
keep party going.
And that is, how do we conceptualize
You've mentioned in and Andrew in his
opening comments, you mentioned the word
the notion of world order, global order.
I have no idea what this means. But I'll
tell you what I think it may mean and
how I would look at the world. And this
is I derive from English school
thinking.
And of course, not exactly the way that
Hedley Bull and Martin Wight and others
would use it. But the English school
looks at the world very differently from
the way they do in the United States.
And too many Chinese scholars, in my
view, have imbued Cold War thinking
through studying American IR
and international relations, but that's
another issue. So, if an English school
perspective,
we we have an international system now.
The one established in 1945 is the
United Nations based charter
international system. It has learned a
lot from the failures of Versailles
1919-20.
It has learned from the Congress of
Vienna, the other European world system
from 1815 and all the way back to
Westphalia. So, but this charter system,
the UN-based charter system, is is
Westphalia plus. And this is what people
like John Ikenberry and so many
Americans completely fail to understand.
It isn't just about sovereignty. It's
about sovereign internationalism.
It's about sovereignty balanced by
multilateralism and so on. And that is
in all the documents which are signed it
was on that joint statement of February
2022. It was a joint statement which I
could quote at length now on the of
China and Russia on international law.
And all these joint statements are
again, you know, this it's couched in
language of anti-hegemonism and so on.
But as Xi Jinping has mentioned over and
over again, China was a founder member
of the United Nations. It did at the
United Nations Declaration of January
1942 all the way on. So in other words,
the charter UN based international
system is
decides what is legitimate today and
it's a framework for international law.
Within that international system you
have competing models of world order.
On the one side you have what I call the
political West. So what is the West? The
West is the US dominated alliance system
established in 1945. This is a unique
social formation.
And this is the huge elephant in the
room which everybody looks at its tail
or its tusk or its trunk. But to put it
and its legs, but this is the beast that
we're dealing with. And this is a beast
which has a Commonwealth aspect and it
has an imperialist aspect. It has these
two sides. The Commonwealth delivers the
public goods, free trade, all that good
things which we talk about which China's
accused of failing to live up to. But it
also has it's a system of power. It's a
system of hierarchy. It's transforms the
nature of the member states just like
European Union does ala Bickerton and
Phil Cunliffe and so on. It
de-sovereignizes
its members. And this political West,
the United Kingdom of France or Germany
today are legacy powers. We do not act
as sovereign powers. Even after Brexit
we're still we've jumped out from that
particular frying pan, that is European
Union,
and we've jumped into the fire of NATO
and that huge security thing and doubled
down and turned up the heat on that
particular fire. But that's because this
is the political West. It's a constantly
mutating beast of power and
>> minute. One minute. One minute. Yeah.
>> And but we have now a nascent
alternative model of global order. I
don't know what to call it. Let's call
it the global East. This week the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization was
meeting in Bishkek. Look at its the
final summit. The BRICS plus now. Iran
and President Xi was there in Bishkek
talking to Modi, to Xi Jinping, to
Putin, to Modi,
Turkey is a partner member and so on. So
this is this is with more than half of
the global population is in Shanghai
Cooperation Organization. BRICS plus
even more. So this is an alternative
model. What is it based on? It is based
precisely on anti-hegemonism,
anti-colonialism in its neo-colonial
forms today, and of course commitment to
the United Nations Charter, and above
all condemnation of the political West's
usurpation
and abuse of international law through
sanctions, where
unilateral economic coercion coercive
measures with no legitimacy and no
legality. Totally illegitimate and
illegal behavior. And China is accused
of misbehaving in this thing, which of
course these technical issues are
important. A lot of debates and
discussions going on about it, not to be
gainsaid, but we need a larger
conceptual framework to understand where
we are. I think in other words, bottom
line, China is a conservative status quo
state vis-a-vis the international
system, but China, Russia, etc. are
revisionists at the level of
international politics because it's
challenging the hegemony and power of
the US-led political West.
>> All right. I'm afraid that's all we have
time for.