Panel 5: International Crises – From Iran to Venezuela | Manila Strategy Forum 2026

panel here on a slightly scary subject. Uh I'm glad we're not the last panel. Hopefully they'll pick our spirits up after this one. We're going to be talking international crises uh from Iran to Venezuela. And with me today we have Will Toddman, senior bully Middle East program at CSS. We have Henry Zemer uh fellow at the Americas program at CSS. We have Aries uh Aragai, professor at the department of political science at the University of Philippines Dolan. And we have Jean and Cenus Frankill, professor department of political science, college of social sciences, a philosophy also at the University of Philan. With that, I think I'll uh start off by handing over to Will. Thank you so much Harrison. So six months ago, President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu named a extraordinary strategic bet. They believed that using an overwhelming force could do more than just damage to Iran's military capabilities. A thought it could transform the Iran challenge and transform the whole Middle East with it. It worked but not as they intended. Yes, Iran is substantially weaker. It has uh faced enormous destruction to its air deficences, its name, its broader military capabilities and it's also facing severe pressure. But judged by the physical objectives that President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu laid out, the outcome is actually closer to the opposite of what they intended. And today I want to make three points about what I run. First, the strategic assumptions were wrong and the bet failed. Second, conditions are now right for reviewed and potentially far greater escalation. And third, regardless of how the war ends, it ws it represents an infection for the regional order. So starting on the strategic fact, the theory of victory that US and Israel laid out rested on several assumptions and either first was tied to the fight. The assumption was that military force could solve or fundamentally reduce Iran's nuclear program, but in many ways the nuclear question remains unresolved. Iran has restricted IA access to the sites. The location and status alled stock piles of highrania are uncertain. Just yesterday, some of my colleagues at CSIS released new satellite imagery which shows a significant reconstruction and inheritance. So, Kickax is now a key Iranian facility and there's a real lesson that the Iranian has taken from this is that they capabil nuclear capabilities deter the attack and perhaps the nuclear weapons could section. >> And so this is exactly what war was supposed to prevent. The idea that the nuclear program was set out physically, but the nuclear issue itself has become harder to resolve politically. The second assumption was that overwhelming pressure could change Iran's regime behavior or even change. The decapitations, the assassinations, the feeders have certainly changed and weak against the Iranian edition, but so far the Islamic Republic remains. It's even more aggressive in many ways, and it looks like the regime has consolidated under all of the IRGC. We're yet to see many sides of a renewed domestic uprising. And in fact, I think a lesson to be taken is that Iran's asymmetric business allowed it to pose costs on its farm. >> The third assumption that proves wrong is that costs of the war. Now in previous rounds I think even in the 12th day is US joined in June of 2025 did really retaliate and in this time grant Egypt gets nationalized for its vulnerability most famously of course by maritime traffic through this street and although there is more than it's open A third of the hydrocarbon resource is still missing. Yeah. And that's still by overt efforts to try to get oil free. And also just byation strategies and secular Gulf oil exporters have used being using uh alternative ports. Just yesterday uh the grain to grow to above $100 again for the first time in months. But it also has imposed huge pricing. um stability, its risk to Arab state's vision and and to their economic strategy and it has really undermined uh its its global reputation and the fundamentals of those strategies and I just hit off in a summer and there was a pretty sense of trauma that I have to say I did not fully anticipate this idea that they could continue drone and missile attacks. So the paradox then is that Iran is equally the Iranian problem I spot larger. >> Sorry this is not barrel laughs this because you're about to little more depressing because I think the potential for a new and large escalation it's very real at the moment as both sides seems to believe that a new round of escalation actually improve that possession for Iran. Iran is not prepared to just sit back and absorb the crisis and pressure the administration is opposing until they collapse at some stage. They're going to change terms of the conflict and resort to military tactics again um to try to to to shift and transform an just this week in many ways. We've seen uh unprecedentedly large attacks of ballistic missiles against the US base of Jordan. We've also seen BJS getting a lot less attention. Um but you have seen Kufis attacked multiple cities in Saudi Arabia causing dozens of casualties among Saudi civilians. Um they are currently advancing uh by land threatening the port city of Mocha. And we also see reports of uh coordination between Iranbacked militias in Iraq people. And I think in terms of the timing, the Iranians believe that their leverage for President Trump will grow as we get both at US midterm elections at November. They believe that I am posing greater economic pain on President Trump. He will feel more domestic virtual pressure and therefore that their language is is greater. And so as the line is getting eventually weaker, I think its incentive to use asymmetric tools will will grow stronger. On the US side, I think uh President Trump feels that his economic pressure campaign is actually working quite well and that additional pressure may finally compel Teron to concede. It is certainly true that Iran is facing long economic pressure. Um but that may not lead to a breaking point. are effects of Iran's fever relationships with China and Russia, its ability to supplement sanctions. I think that's also something to watch out for after the midter when President Trump will probably be more focused on his legacy and that will probably encourage him to make greater risks when it comes to Iran. So the potential from this application is very high. And then the third or final point I want to make was about how this war no matter how it ends reflects an inflection point for the Middle East. I think it is clear that this is the end of one phase that we've had in the regional order. The security architecture involves this shape. The US has gone from being seen as an indispensable security partner to now a source of like great Brits. Arab states were not consulted or the warrant began and they suffered any of the consequences of it. Although there is not a substitute for Arabic power, there is no other state that wants to take on the world of the first we already see the diversify the diversification security ties of the region. The Mecca joint defense agreement to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey has wind up with this. But we're also seeing gold states turn to other partners around the world, Korea, Japan, crane or missile uh sorry the Germans in particular. So we're seeing the first mind of security ties. Second is that the understanding of security in the region has transformed the interconnection between geoeconomics and poverty. You see this one's clear. Um, but as I said before, this has challenged the very premise of the Gulf's economic uh strategy. The idea that it is a safe and stable hub of the international investment and trade. So going forward, Adolf is going to have to init our Adolf states are going to have to invest much more deeply in Brazil and some of that AI stages have been attacked. I think the also proved to have transformed in its role more broadly the global environment. uh some of the security uh implications are clear for this part of the world. The defian missions and the moving is unpacked. Um on the economic side, I think states around the world are going to have a real incentive to try to reduce their reliance in the Middle East for energy and oil. So that's going to be a real challenge with these four years right to come up with a position to encourage continue to international economic engagement but there going to be opportunities as well um states around the world if they are in a position to reformulate and we imagine their ties with the Gulf there are opportunities to build new kinds of partnerships um and also to benefit from the Gulf's drive to actually resilience or that's the uh food security in alternative logistics uh hubs and and even the mitigation strategies for energy with few offshore facilitating to close 6 months in the premise of the war has so far failed. Iran is definitely deeper but the Middle East is not safe as a result. Now we are entering a more dangerous and more unpredictable phase or and the ore has transformed the region and has widely shaped consequences and I know it was >> thank you well. >> Thank you. >> Great. Thank you Harrison. Thank you my CS colleagues my hello panelists and everyone who's made this this conference possible. Um my task today is to take you all back in time uh to January 3rd, 2026, which if you know you are anything like Ian, that feels like whole lifetimes ago. Uh I'm not sure how many of you in Miss Gruden can think about where exactly you were uh earlier in the morning at January 3rd this year, but I can tell you exactly where I was. I was sleeping off uh uh sickness that I come under uh over New Year's. I was really embellishing the fact that it was a Saturday and I still had uh 24 hours before I had to be somewhat capable to report back into the office uh for the new year. When I was rudely awake, client Paul wrote two of my friends told me that the United States military just kidnapped uh Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro and was in the process of transferring it to Southern District of New York where he would face uh trial for narcot trafficking and a horrible trafficking uh charges. And my first reaction to that was, "Guys, this is a really bad prank." Um, but of course I I opened my social media feed and the first thing I saw was images of helicopters over her eyes. Uh, and and little did I go, but this was in my opinion uh the first footage I would see of one of the most uh daring and successful special operations raids in history, Operation Absolut. Since then, I think there are two key lessons that we can draw from uh operation absolute resol policy for Latin America in the Caribbean, but also boldly for our understanding of the multitude of crises that are facing the world order. The first of these uh is a return to a bruder cruder form of the club of seek at the end of sort of in my opinion the fitted end of the postcold war uh uh non-interventionist stance that the United States had in Latin America and the Caribbean. The second of these is what I would call the pivot to the Americas and what some other people might call the Trump corollary Osa Monroe doctrine and rising US focus on Latin America and the Caribbean. But but starting with first the what I would describe as kind of the end uh to the non-advent sexist in the Americas whereas here we used under both you know the Roosevelt or used to come under a doctrine later under US cold war rite communism the United States sanctioned all manner of overtly covert military conventions in Latin American drug westmosphere since the end of the world war since the announce the United States had relegated this region to something of the after all uh and in the process had had actually pulled back significantly from a lot of the military engagement that had colored US Latin American relations and that continues to color those relations. Then on January 3rd, 2026, that IP came crashing down and the United States, most notably through the Trump coralary doctrine, indicated that it was willing to view this region through the lens of US on a hard-nosed analysis, US interests, of friend, foe. Uh, and it was willing to use military force to back those plain soft. We would later see that uh that lot same logic applied in my opinion in Iran and as Will described uh basically what went right in Venezuela went wrong in it. In Venezuela, the United States was said to quickly uh effectuate a change in governance through a very targeted removal of a leader uh and in place uh basically a client successor from Deli Prizes who is willing to basically play ball having seen the overwhelming military force raid against her in Iran. Of course, that has not turned out and I you know you've already heard how that the assumption war was grounded upon uh broke down. But I think for a moment I have awakened the Venezuela operation there was a sense that this could be a temp for future US power projection and I think it continues to be you know flirted way in Latin America and the Caribbean as United States looks to double down and trickle down of its presence in this in this region. So that brings me to my second point which is that the pivots to the Americas has made US focus on that area of the Caribbean uh and US renewed interest in this region is weak um and and this is a new uh something new that we haven't seen at least the last three decades where the reach is largely that kind of an after US foreign policy instead trying to buy a US national security strategy same strategy outlined the Trump corollary situate the west kind of here as the first of any able to reach higher than Europe, higher in the Indo Pacific, higher universities uh in terms of US action piercings. Now, how do we square that with the fact that the United States continues to be involved in uh you know a long running conflict in the Middle East? Uh the fact that crisis in the Indoacific and in Europe, we continue to pull US sources away from this region uh the Americas that's theoretically at the top. Our priorities less, you know, how do we make sector seem somewhat contradictory and and and what I would say basically is that uh you know you make sense this by the fact that the costs of US power projection in our Cherokee are significantly lower than the cost of US power production anywhere else. The US gets much more bank for its in the Western Hemisphere than it does in the Middle East, in Europe, uh in the Pacific versus anywhere else. That means that even though we're not seeing the same uh absolute investments in this region in relative terms, US uh engage with American is much greater than any you've seen uh in the last three decades and potentially even even further. As I speak, Secretary St. Marco Rubio is currently doing a a three country tour of the Andes where he's visiting new governments in Peru and Colombia uh and sort of a new old government and announcing several security partnerships, economic engagements, uh and and a broader, you know, sign of US commitment to this region. In Venezuela, uh we also saw what President Trump described as the largest deal he announced uh recently to patrol over 5 billion barrels of Venezuelan crude reserves across 17 different oil fields. We'll see and I'll gladly discuss kind of whether that's going anywhere fast. Uh but certainly uh from the standpoint of rhetoric aside uh the focus on the Americas and on Venezuela in particular uh is real and it is significant and I would argue this commitments to the Americas is something that's going to last uh is going to outlast the current administration. uh the US is setting up historical time institution uh that are going to color the way uh Latin America the Caribbean countries perceive us and that are going to demand you know continued focus on this region. I mentioned that royal deal. That old deal is predicated uh in Venezuela is predicated on a one to threeyear lease uh for patrol over these 17 fields. Assuming that it lasts and that it does draw US investment greater production, subsequent administrations be they democrat, Republican uh or what have to have to think carefully about how they engage Venezuela partners on the matter of US standard of security. The Trump administration has also fitted itself into a three-phase transition plan to give Venezuela aggressing on um uh stabilization and recovery and eventual uh democratic transition. If the Trump administration is not able to get us to a position of democratic transition while it's still in office, the next president is going to have to think about what pursuit they're going to take uh to advance that promise. Um or broadly again look to the region. One thing you've seen is a real demand for US security assistance. Uh the rise as a transnational organized tri throughout Latin America, the Caribbean is one of the single greatest reasons that we've seen a number of tough on pride model governance rise to power over the past two years. And that only is going to change. the demand for uh credible resource fat security is going to remain a top priority and and US perspective the desire to crack down on urot trafficking and irregular migration patterns is continue to be a draw on this region and a driver of of cooperation so I think I would say that uh you know this is a real change it's a real pivot uh it's created real ties uh to latave that we haven't seen in the last several benad and that we should be quick to dismiss this as something that's would simply be overwritten by crisis and other geographies or by demands and Washington protection that we should learn to live with this. And the final thing I I guess I I'll conclude on is that Latin American also has little to offer the world. when you look around uh you know the the globe today you see mounting the instability in the Middle East uh wars in uh Europe in Eastern Europe uh crises and contests in the Indo Pacific you look to the water region that is seem to be scared from the spectre of interstate arms collapse effect it is Latin American Caribbean and now that your risk profile I uh for NATO sector for instance might include the probability that a cruise vessel would blow it up uh or the odds that an adversary might seek to uh blockade a critical waterway. You look the one region where that seems unfortunately far far away uh those sword clouds seem to be seem to be you know very pushed out of the horizon is latin epicuropean uh and a reach that has tremendous potential hydrocarbons uh in critical minerals uh and indeed in a technologies hypoplatin therapy has a lot to offer. I'm not saying Dakota had easy, not at all. I'm not saying that it's fair enough and domestic crisis, but I do think that the world as a whole, and I'm, you know, conscious of where I sitting here, Southeast Asia, and the global south as well have a lot to gain from our partnerships, not American. >> Thank you. Look for questions. Thank you for being here. >> Hello. Good afternoon. um had a blessed afternoon to all of you and to my panelists and thank you for this opportunity to speak and my task today is to actually uh discuss with you the impact of the crisis in the Middle East particularly uh on the Philippines and uh specifically on migrant Filipinos. Um, expectedly the prices in liberal east would affect the Philippines uh especially economically because we import 90% of our fruit oil from the Middle East and so uh President uh Ferdinand Marcus Jr. had to clear a national emergency declaration uh to facilitate the um procurement of oil and to sort of manage uh the fuel um prices and a rising oil prices. However, um unbeknownst to probably some of you who are not Filipinos, a key impact of the crisis, um is the fact that more than 2 million Filipinos live and work in the Philippines. And as of today, uh the Department of Migrant Workers has already um accounted for about 10,000 migrant Filipinos which the department has repatriated from the Middle East and the latest of which uh were uh the bodies of two seab bears who were um victims of a strike in the straight of Horus. Um so why is this the chaos? Why does conflict around the world actually um is so much in the radar of the Philippine government? And I have three reasons for this. Um migrant Filipinos particularly in the Middle East um um is very much a part of the Filipino imaginary political economy. One in 10 Filipinos have relatives abroad all over the world. The Philippines is found in Filipinos are found in more than 200 territories and countries in the world and migrant Filipinos contribute more 8 to 12% of GDP an average no annually to our economy. Just last year ago, Aloe contributed about $35 billion in remittance sets. These remitted sex actually account also for uh social welfare services because uh instead of relying in the government might have Filipinos, Filipino families rely on these remittances for housing, education and medical costs. And another reason why Filipinos abroad are so much in the hearts and minds of the Philippine government and uh Filipinos in general um is because um they are often called modernday heroes. No, the discourse of heroism is very much in our national imaginary because we perceive of them as uh sacrificing a lot. They're rendered secondass citizens abroad and they are away uh from their families for such a long time to toy in jobs that are considered uh dirty and demeaning uh by locals abroad. Um also migrant Filipinos occupy um the third I think and uh as a pillar of our national uh security. No. Um and this has actually made the government act irrationally in some decisions. I mean at least on the part of uh some who are not familiar with this uh context. For example, in the 2000 or uh Iraq war, a migrant Filipino by the name of Angelo de la Cruz was kidnapped and uh by Iraqi Minta and he um was on CNN. Um the government acted very quickly. Our president was then Gloria Pakapaloyo and she acceded to the demand of the Iraqi militants. uh when she agreed to withdraw our humanitarian troops um from Iraq, she earned the eyeire of the US president and members of the coalition of the way. So why did Gloria Aoyo decided uh this way? Particularly because of the fact that they are migrant considered migrant heroes and also because Gloria Makapagal Aoyo at that time was facing a legitimacy crisis over allegations of uh electoral fraud. No. So this is something that's very much unique in the context of the Philippines. Can you imagine if a crisis in Taiwan suddenly arises? So that's going to be a logistical nightmare for the Philippines. Not only because there's going to be tension very near our territory, but also because we need to protect no Filipinos. Um, so that's not going to be an easy thing. We have 150,000 to 200,000 Filipinos in Taiwan. No, working mostly in semiconductor uh factories in in Taiwan. No. And so in a nutshell what I'm trying to say is that uh this is uh why conflicts around the world are very much important on the part of the Philippine government and on the part of ordinary Filipino families >> and this is how it will continue to shape our reaction to conflicts because it uh affects every Filipino. It also affects our political economy. Thank you. That's it for my talk. Welcoming your comments and questions. Thank you. >> Uh thank you very much for the invitation. Uh it's great to be the last speakers. I'll rarely just square the circle here. Uh I think it this scandal was formed maybe four or five years ago. ISIS wouldn't be the term war you know. Uh I guess if that was uh the case we would just be more focused on possible flash conflict. The big difference is that not just this year but since let's say 2022 invasion of Ukraine wars have become the new level in gol and that is be uh countries in this part of the world where she very ancient or get uh a war happened in central and eastern Europe. war h a leader was kidnapped in Italy. There's a there's a war in the Middle East regul Asia's term given the multiple clash points is causing heat. So the temp is hot and uh what we've seen in the wars that you don't need even the temperature to to have these uh my colleague Dr. GRA already mentioned the the vulnerability of the Philippines that said just double down on that at the end emphasize that the vulnerability is not just because we are a lot in the East Filipino workers that we rely so much on Middle Easter. The vulnerability is our capacity as a small state but also our historical commitment to the roots based international order and we put where our our mouth where our money is. We have invested in bulkity a bounding member of the United Nations. We felt so bad we didn't get the US uh the US Supreme 3000C but that that's fine been in that institution for you of it. So you're talking about a country that's very vulnerable given its fil over overseas partners give it that it's a frontline state to so many regional flash books but at the same time it's because it has historically led that if it invested in multilateralism in peace in nonvention uh the manila declaration of the Pacific settlement of disputes in 1980 Cuba side in Manila it is on the pill tells you that Utilities is one of the very first punching that is committed that small states despite their capabilities could have an impact if you shape a envy making a way towards peace stability. So what the crisis revealed is the fact that have to be very quadlavic but at the same time comes to public with some values that have A4 or for I suppose it's it's not what you see is that you can't just rely values Asia is very important and our Assean neighbors has showed that you just have to be more prag but at the same time the Philippines always go at the long hedging and highism only upon that it's important to invest in institutions >> because as small states we're the grass we can't do anything for elephants we will get trampled it's just how much will we get and whether we can keep a silate you know because we can't be elephants >> is limitations uh supposed to be this is on the importance who directs any choices at all. uh would prefer the defense secretary and this become some sort of a catalyst uh or the governor to speak with Juan Bus but unfortunately as someone who was dead watcher dealing politics and for politics doesn't stop the water's edge in this country in fact the is in terms of which superh to support although trust maintains the highest is China could be used to be the least distrusted uh the least trusted country according to whole but China's numbers of approval will take and where action outliers uh due to quote the IC snake Southeast survey plus other Southeast Asian countries seem to have made a choice then divorce and attack in Southeast make the choice in in that survey. Sorry if I keep using it. Joan is here because that's other hospitaliz geopolitical of the region. It's just that where will the US come in the next time the muro points you that heads of states could just be extractable and if we're talking about autocratic leaders they're to a region where there's not a block there or democracy remains deem we also pick out that uh the crisis also revealed that the stress test on regional incipation I'm not going to for we've been bashing asan since this warning but as someone who has studied asan for almost two decades uh the point in the previous cannons correct if he might leak it might be slow but it's the only thing it is we have to make it burn and the buildings as share comes in a very 15. Why do we have to act a concert which happened if after Iran is that Southeast Asian states in the bit because she had to negotiate for deals with Iran. We had to reach out to Russia to buy Kil. Um so what I'm saying is small stakes arm auctions are great. You want institutions to work but without the support of our big brothers without the support of our uh the elephants the super powers it's very we can only hold so much let me end by saying that uh crisis in the uh international crisis when we when happened most Filipinos is like oh where is all it's okay then food prices uh when Venezuela happened. Oh, Venezuela that is far civic ocean our way then uh oil crisis got hit again where Iran happened it's like oh it's not that far when you know it's still not with the Asian backyard the dual crisis increase by 50 people so I think it's important for the building government to make sure that it won't just be reacting to the next crisis but at the same time to have the information regional experts to tell the Toby government that these are clash with these are hot spots and we better start with that uh preparations for possib Taiwan that would be very scenarios 200,000 of Taiwan uh where the front light stick where the nearest of Taiwan he signed the 1956 convention as stateless. Yes. So we have to take in refugees in the contingency because we're so the big question is thanks. >> Uh we're going to transition your question uh shortly. I'm gonna take the first out of this though. Uh I think we've already heard just now about a few things that hearken back to yesterday's discussions. Uh, and I wanted to ask about this small and middle power agency uh, issue that keeps coming up and maybe to Will and Henry. When you look at how countries in the Middle East in the Western Hemisphere have responded to these kind of unilateral surprise actions in the United States? Um, have there been lessons that people can draw? uh for potential crisis in their own region. Are there are there countries that were more prepared or uh have there been responses that some that have helped them to kind mitigate uh the ball up? >> Thanks. Yeah, I I do think that this war had shocks for lots of countries in the Middle East and certainly either that they felt about uh the onset of the war and the decision to launch the war but then of course also Iran acts is helpful and uh it's caused a societal shock you or not but I think these countries are already identifying opportunities that are emerging uh and I think that is the lesson from this that in the midst of crisis there is a opportunity to rethink uh I should say that these opportunities not always seized but if we take some of the Arab states uh the Middle East is famously the peace to create future world the multicultural institutions are basically the GCC driven by divisions but there were some ways which Arab states or GCC states came together which will have longerterm efforts. So they immediately lifted some of the customs um restrictions that we uh produced to sort of uh facilitate trade in the urgent crisis for some of those measures are going to outlast like the conflict and so there is opportunity to come together. Certainly Syria has identified this as a real opportunity to transform its geopic role in the in the region to present itself as a potential club for regional connectivity or trade across land or the Gulf to Europe. Um they have this on four seas and shot it as well with the Mediterranean on the Red Sea, the Gulf, the Casin and um so I I think the idea that bits of crisis there are opportunities. Um but one of the real challenges is they're not able to fully pursue the strategies that they'd like to because they do still hand so much of the decisions of great halls such as the studios. So when I was in Qatar, this was in there was discussion about completely transforming their relationship with Iran. They talked about the idea of economic even as they were getting attacked by Iran. They were talking about how can we restore deterrence traditional the deterrence fail and so instead they could consider building up victimized disincentiviz. But ultimately they're not equal to pursue this strategy in uh in light of US sanctions. Now secondary sanction sheets being announced by the Trump administration you could say that stretch would never have worked but I'm just saying some of the options they have to try to navigate it and pathway is still pretty restricted. And so I think there are still major obviously if it was to their agency attempt to problem solve Austral. Yeah, thank you for that question. Um, I'm going to raise yet another crisis or we're an almost crisis. Uh, my response could just be uh if we could remember back to January 2025, one of the first countries see that um that the time President Trump used about uh seizing territory from Louisiana Panama uh where he mentioned his inaugural address you to take back if you had to let them. And I remember thinking uh when when I when I heard that being like geez I would hate to be right now because you know in other conflicts contexts a lot of countries have had parts played. Ukraine had Europe standing behind it. Similarly in the case of Greenland when there was the rumblings about buying Greenland or acquiring it or some other method of curing Greenland the European Union became involved. you saw this kind of regional coming together standing behind Greenland and Detark um and that doesn't exist in my opinion in any real way or any any meaningful way in Latin America and the Caribbean which is a shame because unlike the Middle East there's a raft of international bodies in Latin America and the Caribbean in many ways you know the region prides itself on being one of the birthplaces of multilateral the organization of American states uh the the uh ELAC, the examiner Caribbean. Um, but they've been pretty bad, I'd say, at rising to the challenge of today, which is how you build a real integrated coordinated response. And so, um, you know, I I guess if there's any any lessons to be learned, uh, we have to look to other regions of the world, other other cooperation areas. But the last thing I guess I would say is just that there's no there's no deterrent like capability. uh and and the countries that we see best able to respond to global crisis are the countries that are choosing to leverage uh this moment into unlocking growth uh it's building into form you know actually real investments channeling um you know real real uh resources I would say especially critical infrastructure uh and that's an area where lately fallen pretty far behind where there's there's severe infrastructure gaps uh there's many ways that but there's there are the roads or the ports or the rail connections that are needed to facilitate intra regional trade. Uh and what little there does exist is controlled by powers that in my opinion are it's risky to pivot your future act. Now for China letting China control the telecommunications in your country is not a particularly good way to achieve sovereignty or independence uh if you're a small and middle power. And so these pinters need to think in my opinion really carefully about where they're getting their their critical infrastructure from and how they're going to supercharge that. >> So interesting parallels there in terms of maybe not holding on to what was but seizing new opportunities that come out of these uh crisis. Uh Gan and Aries, I did have one question for you about another theme um and we talked a lot about yesterday and it's coming up here again is uh US credibility and unpredictability uh and perhaps >> the comparison between those um as a US treaty ally the Philippines um >> what is your take on this unpredictability and these unilateral eneral ashes the United States does that have a deterrent power in Asia does that have some benefit um or conversely you know is walking away from commitments and finding us to multilateral norms you know where where is the balance on those two >> yeah take the first crack this difficult question. But I always tell my Southeast Asian colleagues and counterparts that uh what is the Philippines has been dealing with the US were uh the longest >> uh in in different bowls forward how long at the and now is an ally. So we've seen the US evolve in so many ways and so many directions that's one. So therefore uh if there is anxiety southeast Phil it'll be might still be anxious what the level might not be as high you bet the historic feelings uh in the way that we see the US uh transform it the second is that uh that's why they're called government the day right so uh and and uh some of the speakers that would take to be already uh yesterday the mere fact that uh which we can relate to because building for policy also has tendency do depending what who sits in yeah the office which uh we hope could de lessen the future and this is why I'm not fan with behind uh the the role of the president him as chief architect or an allseason power because I do think that role for these it's a bit too much out to the present. That's just a personal opinion of a political scientist. >> On the other hand, uh the the unilateral actions course bother the the Philippine perspective quite a bit because uh much of our faith in multilaskism comes from faith. This is not just something in heaven. It's a combination of our small our status and our I think idea that many Filipinos are deployed of wall. So we want the entire world safe because if there's a war there's a conflict out there still get exits after convention and so therefore for us when the US does things the vilities still we were the first to volunteer uh during after 911 right so and in terms of reliability uh we cannot be accused of being less reliant although of course October president almost started the process of appreating the policy he led by stating that we understand US politics because uh because still politics tend to have the same characteristics so there's a level of emp of empathy there uh our journey towards bettering our democracies continues needs to be something that they share. But I also think the US alliance is so dense, so okay, who had some loring trust despite unilateral actions towards Muslim? >> I I agree with Alice. No, maybe because the ties, the Philippine US ties are really very deep and it's really structural. no uh historical, economic, and um uh military ties, but more importantly, we have strong cultural ties with the United States. I'll always say that we're more American than the Americans. We've been exposed to so many Hollywood films. No. And that um tells you why uh the United States is still very popular according to surveys with regard to current unilateralism. Of course, it has affected many Filipinos. It has reached uh every Filipino household because of IO cause, but I think this is more episode. No. And Filipinos would probably just um blame uh the current administration and not so much the United States itself. Thank you. >> All right. Well, with that, I'm going to turn to the audience. Uh as always, if you have a question, raise your hand and uh please identify yourself before speaking. Uh I see two right there. Maybe we can take both of them. Uh good afternoon. Uh my name is Jose from the University of Pat and uh also I would like to thank you Dr. Franco. We always acculate our uh immensity. Um so my question uh is very much simple. So how should the Philippines respond to the growing internal problems that uh I think it get it is springing from the conflict of uh in Iran. uh this is because uh the long affect of the rise of fuel uh prices uh down to being you know the uh also the rise of the prices of commodities. So how shall we uh Philippines respond strategically uh it is uh growing internal profit. Thank you very much. >> Thank you. Can we take the second question right there? >> Hello Levi alter threat consultants. Thank you for your time. Uh this is pretty funny. United States uh template through regime change in Venezuela. We can see that they attempted to repeat that method in the Middle East. The outcome has been very different this time around. So how will that change the US's approach to other countries when it comes to as you said playing ball that are less likely to cooperate? Also on the other hand, does Iran's approach to the more philosopher a template for those who choose not to play with the use as well? Thank you. >> Thank you. How about uh first question on the key internal energy economic problems. >> Yeah. Yeah. Uh there talks about for example to link to other any energy sources as a means to be uh less reliant on uh uh oil from the Middle East on imported oil. That's I think something that we've that the government uh has talked about so many years but it has uh even become more palable because of the recent uh uh tension in the Middle East. Um and I think um because of what happened and because it's somehow lingering um still protracted uh my sense is that uh the Philippines will uh be even more uh gung-ho will even uh expedite and will really use its resources and all its efforts to finally um you know make this unproductive case. uh in terms of not relying on uh imported fuel. Thank you. >> Uh I failed to mention earlier I think this is where Assad would could make a thing. So while Assad had divided interpretations on on the Iran war they they did some concrete action. They Assean likes to plant things likes to lay down frameworks likes to have blueprints. So it had it has an a prayto spirit you have assean members or actual trees there's an Asian power grid I think to to down the road uh that might be the low hanging fruit but the idea of the park the idea that going beyond fossil pupils there's a lot of other uh certain enemy that have there's the cow pie find it. But I I'll try and finally we have the Milky Seeds to explore all possible sources of oil and control and this is why it's important that it's of what exists within its area. >> Okay. And then the second question about uh the template for regime change and then if you also for defiance I'll speak in particular on sort of the template which is definitely in the wake of absolute resolve. Uh there was absolutely a sense that the United States had stumbled onto a new model uh right that as a popo instead of doing these open-ended regime chain wars I mean that involved nation building and long-term commitments to US resources we go in we fix the guy we take the guy out uh who wasn't frag um and we find someone who would and then the adventure back that should pay for itself many times over um I hate what we've and I think This belies a broader kind of approach that the Trump administration has which is incredibly leader segmented right Trump likes to deal with personalities. Uh and so you see this other in other um moves where you know US is falling a move to endorse a particular candidate in an election as the person be the credible uh and where it falls ser is a big cases where uh the leadership apparatus is well institutional and so the most the question the billiond dollarar question everyone's hides I feel right now is what are we going to do in Cuba and I think what's happened in Cuba is is isa the Cuban communist party has to signal that hey via or past ros in his 90s uh we're just going to have a conference and we're going to find someone who we all approve and and and have them continue to say also as if you really want to uh you know impose your preferred regime on us you got to invade yourself to a potentially opened conflict and that has given the United States a lot more feet than I think they would have had in January and February of 206 so you the the the I guess the the um the template or the the the the counterplays that seems to be if you could show that that removing a leader will result in any policy change uh you can up the costs ah the United States thinks it's going to have to be >> um I I think it is in some ways too early to say what the implications for the US are of the war with Iran because we ultimately don't know it out yet. I think it's clear from what I said earlier that I do not consider this to have been a strategic success so far. But Iran has not won this. Iran is emerging from this severely and we don't know what that will lead. It could ultimately result in the collapse of the regime. It is very possible and I think President Trump likes to make comparisons between the duration of the conflict in Iran and the Vietnam war for example. And you know ultimately this has only gone on to six months so far. So we don't know exactly what the what the consequences will be because I think people will draw less than you the outcome. But I do think there is a growing sense across the political spectrum in the US of a um you know a push for more restraint in uh US foreign policy uh and renewed opposition to these so-called forever wars. So I have to assume that a future administration will be less likely to embark on such a bold risk like trying to uh you know attack or facilitate or ferment some kind of regime change in a place like Iran. When it comes to um the lessons that others will take from Iran's response, I think there are several. So one is what sort of mirrors Ukraine's response to the Russian uh invasion as well which is the power of asymmetric tactics the evolving nature of war uh the premium that is put on very cheaply produced drones um and other kinds of weapons and the ability of using those uh systems to uh impress costs on farther accounts. So I think that's something that a lot of smaller states around the world will learn and be fully invested. Um I think there are also potential lessons for what Iran has done to straight up moose. Um in some ways this is now opening the Pandora's box of threatening a key artery of global trade. Will others try to draw lessons from that stand power uh that it has bought Iran? That's a real possibility. And then also at CSIS we've done quite a lot of work on the so-called crinks China Russia or Korea. I think there are also lessons for those countries in the support that they've been able to provide for Iran particularly China and Russia both in terms of economic support the ability to uh withstand to bolster Iran's ability to withstand pressure but also in terms of intelligence sharing which is looking pretty successful. Okay. uh a a reasonably low investment for China and Russia, but a an important um incredibly important strategic outcome to hold US down so much. Uh so I would expect um you know this will probably further invigorate this this spring. >> Right. Thank you. Uh you have one year. Is there another I can take? I guess we'll start here. Yes, sorry diplomat. I just two questions. First, professor, yes, the government has a lot of criticism about what happens to our post. I think direct criticism has been pretty good and our response we did, but when China seized alleged TNT, we did not change any of our positions. China arrested 10 100 TNTs. We did not change any of our positions with respect to the implementation of our domestic law or our positions on the subs. That's one. My real question is to bring something from the previous session. This US tendency in tech and trade to do my way or the highway. Is this kind of thinking going to infect US strategic approaches here given the increasing reality of cross regional connections in crisis? Is the US going to be so narrow line that it's going to ask people to line up on one side or the other because that's almost guaranteed to lose. But did you ask the first question? He was >> the first question. >> Yeah. Um concern David right then and you said that the China arrested undocumented Filipinos >> undocumented Filipinos were allegedly reportedly eating >> because of what we were doing with respect to the sand ski mill. Okay. >> Okay. >> We did not change our position. Okay. So there are limits on our vulnerability to uh our oil villages. >> Uh so China arrested uh 100 suspected undocumented Filipinos, we did not change our position towards >> the West Philippines in >> adopistic law. Then they say they tap on and let the actual >> all the can you help put microphone on or there we go. Chinese >> retaliated because of the co-owner. >> Arrest of Chinese nationals here are the violation of our laws in connection with the Sandia steel mill and other Chinese investors. We did not change. So there are limits to how far the Philippine government can push. Maybe uh let me offer a hypothesis. The the the why as as Dr. Franco earlier mentioned Aoya was facing a legitimacy crisis and therefore the the political conditions of the government of the day patterns and uh for my own analysis of historical analysis of the foreign policy is that foreign policy tends to be used as an instrument to crop up legitimacy when it's in deficit. So there the there's there's no current legitimacy deficit on the part of Marcus Jr. I mean he has a much it's the only VB president that has a majority mandate one he did not cheat the elections right or less uh and second uh the idea that he might have low trust ratings now but that doesn't amount to that he should be like so what I'm saying is that from the angulo de la case to to this case changes in foreign policy is an instrument of the president which he or she see domestic right so the key here is one should not use court als as if it's an instrument to sanitize oneself or to improve one's image but that's the reality that is building all sex and this is why I say politics the stop stop at the water's edge or strategic interest is filtered through the survival of current governance and how legitimate or unpopular they part in the domestic. >> Yeah. And and may I add also that um in Anglo de la Cruz's case it was quite different because he was kidnapped by Iraqi militants but uh with regard to undocumented Filipinos I think um the Philippines is also thinking about the fact that if we sort of uh deposit as candling undocumented migrants then it might affect our reputation in other parts of the world where migra Filipinos are actually living and seeking or having u work in these parts of Europe. >> See, anyone want to venture in the technology and trade US tech stack? >> Maybe no other on the text. Can I talk about sort of the forcing US uh for Carters to fall in line because I that was part of your question there. I wonder if I I heard it. Um so I think there are sort of several kind of remarkable things that we have seen after the outbreak of the war in Iran. One is uh how many US allies have refused to not only participate but actually actively tried to uh block the US uh from pursuing this war. So we've seen Italy stay refusing uh to let the US uh use the ACES and airspace to defuse tags. Discussions about the same in the UK. Um and and so clearly there is very you know the US has has really failed to bring along its allies and partners in this effort. I would also say the Trump administration doesn't seem to have really tried to do that. Um there doesn't seem to have been a effort to engage with allies and answer the cop sort of after it began really to to bring on board and and have them participate. Um but another somewhat remarkable thing is that we haven't really seen any alternative despite the huge economic sinks uh that this conflict has had or economies around the world. Um, as you can probably tell, I did the UK and I, uh, you know, the sense of crisis earlier in the summer in the UK was really quite real. Even though it's not in any way like the Philippines has um, or other countries around the world, there were expectations that flights will be over the summer. And yet despite that we saw only really one uh effort by France to set up some kind of alternative for uh to to secure the stra but only after the conflict is over. There's a really a very low appetite for other powers to be a tool in an alternative. So although the US has certainly failed to bring his allies and partners uh along with it in the in the war um I think other powers also really failed to put forward an alternative that could help pursue trusts. Maybe it's only a matter of time for initiatives like cat or efforts to work against the US and detain the US in a way but so far we not really see. >> All right, other questions. Yes, right here. >> Hello, I do definitely uh my name is Francis Prop Paris University. Uh my question is for uh professor Aruguay uh on your work of the localization great power computation. We've seen how uh several provinces in in the Philippines for example in Kabayan at Palawan are becoming more and more entitled to plate power uh competitions specifically and of course the US and China. I was wondering if you see this as a continuous trend and expanding in various local government units here in the Philippines even though this or even if these local governments are not necessarily in the forefront of the conflict because as you know Alawan and Tayad both host uh edes so uh Thank you to your thoughts on that uh very much like Thank you. >> Thank you Francis. Uh that study was really just a snapshot of what we kind of know is an ongoing and gradually spreading phenomen. And we've heard reports that what Kagan Plawa might be your your first sight. uh Chinese influence in Kagayan has been years a that was what we found out. That's my obvious by the way. Uh but what we're seeing in fact is uh and and it's it's very benign because they start off with sister city sister province arratios rightawan is a sister province arrangements withina right and what we've observed if I not get coincidence is that a lot of these sister city sister province arrangements are a voter rich policies. So let's say you have a a pro-China candidate. All that candidate needs to go is to window because we don't have a major carry assistant or be a plurality with the presidency and there's a lot of nickel deposits in some of these places where there are sister cities savages and I'm not quite sure whether they're just accident or coincident. That's one. Second, what we're noticing is that it's been shifting from the uh western part, western frontier of the country to the eastern and this goes to the of our strategic takers that uh terms of influence and in terms of say aerent spell China is go well for them like the westb that's ours there but on the other And this tells the huge burden of the Philippines inhabiting because we're surrounded by all these key maritide zones north, south, east, and west. So we're still looking at the west uh at the desert here, but our neighbors are already looking at the other. The question is, what are we doing on the second island? What are we doing? because we've been receiving records at more and more pre and it starts from that and and so therefore the the local governments on that side of the archipelico what we observe is that Chinese registars unfortunately local government or colon provides that these local updates could engage this why there's a moratorium is republic. Ask here why the government covered but a core government sign these arrangements without >> since we're on that note maybe Henry can I ask you about Chinese inputs in Latin America we know they're making investments uh they're they're making new relationships uh how is that shaping I think this is transforming reg you know the relationship US is transforming a lot right now. How is China's place uh interacting with them? >> Yeah, absolutely. I'm a gratefully hero professor because uh we've seen many of the same things happen in land of Caribbean in particular. uh Chinese influence showing up increasingly at the local level uh even as it remains well trenched to the national uh what I would basically say is I think um we've seen a kind of a bifurcation of how a lot of countries treat their strategic partnerships they view United States as still very much the top dog in security states uh there's no country in the western hemisphere I would say that believes it can United militarity or that has any interest in sort of you know opening a Chinese military facility on its territory uh that that just squeeze or even you know cooperating extensively in China on public safety or security stuff you see some of that but not as much as we might expect uh but there's a that okay I play that states security go and reassuring them that we'll work with that on military and law enforcement issues we can trade economically engaged with China to our hearts content. Uh and of course China has become over the past decades the number two trading purpose for Latin America as a whole and the number one trade for South America in particular. And that's why you see that even as uh very pro- US presidents have risen to power in South America. We now have the space that Brazil standing that's that's on um uh pro you know chest thumping pro US governments uh even those even those um you know new governments like Javier Millino said he wouldn't trade communists well Argentina's trade uh with China has increased every year since the office uh and so China's influenced by in the economic domain I guess be tremendously durable and in particular I think a big source of that is China's global gal infrastructure critical critical infrastructurally ports and energy uh telecommunications. >> All right. Actually audits I see one over two. Thank you for pursuing uh preparing here your research scientist of the Asian technology also. We are the name and under we need sorry we all have needs and either we are or so we reach an adver for needs before we reward our so I asked if I just we it emphasize border security is still achieved through jurisdiction stewardship but then it is similar leaders to banish shark for you to typically comprehend um jurisdiction. juristics stewardship. >> Is there girls on the team? >> I think some of us may lack the international legal education to comment sensibly on it. Uh is there any comments perhaps on the maritime situation >> that has been offered as a way to >> resolve South China Sea is uh because that argument could be made that who who who cares who owns what show what rock when the the the marine environment is destroyed. So uh while we're still looking at different guides uh findings of our marine scientists have revealed that the marine environment in the south China sea which is the hub on global marine biodiversity is already be destroyed. So there's an argument could be made that could we just bypass or at least shell put it put all these sovereign claims aside to to take a look at the bigger issue uh to work uh collect it for leaders agree between AE and China who take care of the Minia in the south unfortunately that in mindful idiots to just be it's less worth than the paper lips because the marine environment he's destroyed as we speak and uh in fact there already news that the secretary of national defense said that a new case because unfold that burg would take care of all the requirements in their respect >> Iris have to >> thank you >> another question. >> I would have to clarify that uh a majorification would be that we get reputations and will stay and make the plan defense of territory. Yeah. >> Well, uh, that's certainly an interesting proposal. Um, do we have a question from someone else in the audience? If not, I might I should ask one myself. Uh, we've been talking about US actions in different regions and the potential for a crisis in Asia. Um what we've seen from this administration I would say there's an attempt to separate uh different regions of the world and treat them as completely isolate. Uh even efforts to tell Europe to stay out of Asia. Um efforts to say that the Western Hemisphere is the United States business and no one else is. Um and it sure be that you know in some ways this argument uh could be similar to what we see or what we fear from China in terms of uh becoming a regional edma. Um how maybe from the Philippines perspective how do you make sense of that uh approach from the United States resembling what we see uh in your region? together with an ISIS colleague we actually brought a short piece on what the theations aware of the Maduro affair he says some sort of demonstration effect so if Russia gets to do its own thing in this sphere if the US does its own thing with western youth sphere that it's pretty much Asia in China's official input in the China start you know arrest Tai events who are very much local or they uh use some sort of law if you with the Chinese legal system and throw that against any soilation. So far our analysis that China like epilog although it might this on other hat give the scaps in southeast which is a gray area in terms of loy but for saying that China might plant the military action to kickers or autocratic leaders but they might use their own to prosecute and capture uh elements, gangs, uh people his camos that are chain but in terms of I think if they were going to ask me will China respect his gears of influence our colleagues have shown here that China wants to be every positive and not just in a specific area. Okay. And therefore it will not concede into that idea of dividing the world. They just be be content with having East Asia as as experiencing China has always said that the US has caught us well as a light rest week. Uh the idea here is that the behavior of the US in terms of its uh in peace crisis tells China that it's way more obligated just militarily intermediate uh and therefore we're learning from what the US practice. >> All right. Any more questions from the audience? All right. Well, I think if that's the case, we might wrap it up here. Uh why don't we thank our excellent panel here for this very interesting discussion, some tough issues. Um we're going to be back at 250 for the next panel. So, please get some coffee and uh join us for the last session. So be