Panel 3: Strengthening Regional Alliance Networks | Manila Strategy Forum 2026

and money that we shouldn't be spending here in Asia. And there are serious and understandable questions about American resolve today and about American commitment to alliances including here. >> So part of the challenge in understanding alliances today is that you can look at them through two completely different viewpoints that tell two completely different stories. I mean, I think that's particularly true of your >> and for our topic on this panel, we're discussing alliance networking. >> And I think this is true on this issue. So you could say that the Philippines is networking and alliances, its partnerships because the relationship with the Trump administration is so good in the Philippines to step on more. The US is supporting Japan. Australia, Europe in their engagement and it's just in fact that the Philippines is going to be a more capable partner going forward and this group for the alliance. My own view is that actually the reason that the Philippines is reaching out this way is due to a lack of confidence in Washington. is due to concerns that the US is not reliable and that this is a right? That the Phil has to remember its relationships in a more serious way. I think now so much of the United States and I think that's unfortunate. Obviously, it's something that a lot of us in Washington wish were different. uh but let me just highlight three aspects of that dynamic that I think are particularly importantly for us to think about going forward. So, first we are in an era of heightened uncertainty. We don't know what the United States is going to do in the next week, in the next month, in the next year. And we don't know what the US Philippian alliance will look like as a result over that time period. And that means that the Philippines and other countries are going to edge against West. And I think that is what would us enjoy more multiplayer. So it's the second one. >> When we have more and more malware systems, >> we know from academics that what you often get is less reliance on fixed alliances like the US develop alliance and more reliance on flexible coalitions and the reason is because you have more players and a geometry very quickly. You speed down and it says hund for exception. So I think what we're seeing in terms of what we call our lines network is a natural reaction with the fact that we're moving from a air polar bipolar system into something that's more multiple still very practical multi and this to a third point which is I think the critical thing for the US and the fellows now is to just demonstrate that this alliance is working for people So the discussion that Christy just led on the Bazan economic border and other issues that is absolutely vital. So too is it the United States and with the Philines and the West Coast. And I'll be honest, I I'm worried about whether we're going to do that uh the way that I think we should. I'm worried in part because sometimes your dear American officials seem to suggest that this full level raise is really not America's time concern and it's something that our allies and martyrs should largely take themselves but let's be honest if the Philippines wants to do with China and West Phil it needs strong support United States and it's not helpful what people come dear frankly won't talk directly about China or won't mention it at all. So I'm worried that if the United States doesn't send your signals here at Rella that it'll be understandable that our Franks here will look for ways to tedge against the rest engagement and US and so while I'm excited to see all this alliance networking going on and it's a it should absolutely verge it I hear that some of the reason and we're seeing this from the Philippines from Japan through Korea Australia others is a natural reaction to fears of what's coming out of. >> Thank you very much. I'll turn it over to Christy is a senior voice of CSS. >> So I'll talk with my comments on hair role and the lights networking and I just want to make three importance overall. I think they accomplish Zach's quite batchy. So the first is that threat assessment of Jackie's government ensures the insecure environment is worse than his security much more dangerous. So this is driving a court changes to security policy including an expansion of the tools that it has to cooperate with other countries. Uh the second point I want to make is as part of this externally we see Japan basically double strategy striker alliance with the US and simultaneously reaching out to other regional partners. And the third point is that all this is embedded in updated vision which still strives to be inclusive but notably more emphasis security cooperation. uh promoting resilience and what they call malistic is freedom of choice for each. So the first part uh the security environment from the vantage point to it's getting much worse. If you think about what the 2022 Japanese national security strategy said um it said that Japan was facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II. But if you think about it in 2026 um it's much more severe. So not so long this but of course China has been expanded its conventional and nuclear capabilities and in specific interest to Tokyo had been applying a lot of pressure after Pabi chief's comments about Taiwan last November and that actually has been diplomatic and economy and military u we know that North Korea continues to advance its stabilities as the Russia wars China and Russian for cooperating including around in the areas of Jan Japan of of course concern of the Sasha and the general deterioration of the rulesbased border across not only wheat security but also trade any other issues climate etc. Um and as Zach just mentioned the US is an increasingly unpredictable legacy that is demanding that Japan do more for itself spend more and at the same time is distracted in other parts of the world. So this is a a pretty good picture for what Tokyo. So we see the government taking significant steps towards developing new robust defensive capabilities, bolstering resilience and even expanding its to engage in cooperation with other partners. So this is not a matter what the China would call new militarism in Japan. It's really a uh Tokyo making a very realistic assessment of what is required for its defense today and trying to do those. I won't go again through everything but we see pretty remarkable cases like and accelerating the APC's defense spending to 2% of GDP not by the Trump advisable war Japan Japan is revising as a schedule it relaxes which will make it better able to aid a defensive pass cooperation in this defensive base um earlier today talked about Japan scholar has a new official security assistance program which is being expanded and then for all of us who know Japan in room we know that economic policy is always trying to policy so Japan has really also stepped up based security um emphasis and it's invested strategic so that brings me to my second point of what this looks like is that Japan has continued to strengthen its relationship with the US as it's pointed at this awarding There is no substitute for the US but as a top that it is also continued deepening relationships with other key usual partners which to be here has been doing for a long time. So really this is an acceleration deed >> for US Japan. I actually think the alliance is in compared to many of the US issues relatively good uh a good place but um while they continue with many of the plans and have been in the for increasing your ability command control there are questions about how those plans are proceeding and about strategic alignment but for Tokyo we don't see any fundamental should that um at the same time if there are really developments in the region um and from the Japanese perspective This is all about helping to stabilize the environment, describe it position uh and also to some of the points that were made earlier to maintain transparency about what the Japanese government is doing and trust because again particularly since November there has been this ramping up here about drinking deer fascism and so by teaming these relationships strong by being trans this is the adept for gantic clear huge I think you see some of the most notable progress with the Gillipes uh already you already heard mentioned the reciprocal access agreement and the acquisition crosservicing agreement also really helped us to ease cooperation facilitate more engagement um Japan participated polyatam last year for the first time as a full pledged participant um we see the Japan security related ODA and OSA has been consistently targeted towards the Philippines and ways bombing um basically gi it's um you know your moderate whether into air time space or elsewhere and for a total space back this is really fast supporting the agency the past is now with the wings um Australia also has a notable amount of weddings going on I think or the ordinating activities already take place after there are a as a last occur a lot of deepening coaxity exercise scale of exercises and Another big landmark is last year when the Japanese company was selected to build up breeding class. So we see a lot of this um beyond just relationship relationships, South Korea, Europe, the Quad, the SP, all of these things um on part of Japan's strategy. And that brings me into my uh third or final point, which is that all of this is embedded in Japan's broader Korea within the Pacific vision, which is important to understand because I've been talking about where alliances, but it's not all about just those countries. It's a much more uh broad vision incorporates all the native Pacific. Um and in many ways many of you are familiar in the Fredo the Asian Pacific vision. It still has a very dealic continuity in terms of freedom, openness, diversity, inclusiveness, rule of law, all of those key words. Um but notably I think the the framing in this is that is seeking to strengthen the resilience of any Pacific countries including and to promote their freedom to decide for themselves to prospect economic social and security. Um so in assets if you look at these regional clients that were the idea is it contributes to a more resilient architecture in the region that gives countries more options. So more secure supply chain more trusted infrastructure better time permanent awareness capacity and basically the your ability to withstand port disruption and that's inclusive not only to alliance structure also to aion this is FG which Japan has as Paul's states I think the other notable is that when we look at the updated Korea both in Indo Pacific. We also see educated trying to think of from us these economic and security towards uh much more comprehensively. So talking about you know how the ODA OSNA defense equipment transfers technology and the infrastructure all of these that is to support the bay the security is so all of this is still defenseoriented or tradition but it's a much more common and sustain will it be enough whether challenges are so full how will the resources be available is it really enough to demolish this that the US is not ready to you know this kind of structure in the end um but maybe the chap its role in large part in response to this threat by not only to perhaps of great uncertainty for bulls based governor >> thank you and turning to justice Singapore National Security. >> Thank you. Thank you July and good afternoon everybody. So we currently particular focus on the US Japanese perspectives. Uh appreciation I'd like to handle my friend here Morris on the Philan perspective. So the topic of this parallel is how would you improve alliances um and of course uh full CSIS for example have uh explicitly that alliances need out and I think that's a theme of where Philippines US relations are getting uh right now when it comes to the Philippines has partner of course the Philippines is a cooperative largely because it shares with the United States a lot of mutual interests cover different perceptions and also defects policy responses particularly with uh with respect to the rise of China but just because there's alignment doesn't mean that implementation will be easy so we're transitioning now a few pain points the first one is that both Washington and Manila should ensure that allies are able to withstand retaliation per critical dependencies and a lot of speakers today have talked about from an economic standpoint which is why the United States uh is very supportive of nation like Aila and the Konga corridor and the Philippines also has to do its part to take advantage of these uh unique opportunities that as industries uh undergo what they call French story then the Philippines can a trusted partner for uh for these kinds of developments. Now on the point about uh on the point about where we are aligned right now in terms of threat perception what's really going what's really go what what the alliance has going for it is it the fact that the Philippine defense posture and this policy fundamental is something that China will oppose and that's really par for the host if you look at the details of Philippine deter form archalic defense as we call it. We have four things. Number one, we're we are disers dispersing our poly. We're transitioning from fighting internal conflicts within our own uh hinderlands and now we're projecting to for our private bases, establishing more presence in the West Phil. Secondly is naval and air force modernization of course check uh the geospatial advance uh of China near the Philippines. Thirdly, his air and missile defense. And fourthly, and this is more relevant for the Marcos administration particularly is the use of the federal diplomacy to be a convening power uh for all other interested and like-minded states who want to preserve regional balance of power and we have seen that uh with the current administration four out of the six status of visiting forces are payments that we have were assigned under the current administration. So it's been roughly just four years. Um so so the record is very much put uh with respect but regardless of the state of our diplomatic relations uh Beijing obviously has compelling incentives to oppose this humanitarian posture um at every opportunity uh which of course is as I mentioned is really something that should be expected. So we've discussed today economic resilience. Um we've also discussed uh critical infrastructure resilience particularly our energy security and food supply chain security. What I'd also like to touch on third point is on having defense industry collaborations between the United States and the Philippines because this is something that we really fundamentally figure in the overall calculus of strategic deliverance region. Another point that I'd like you to make is that the United States has to frontload these economic industrial military incentives for the Philippines because it is a fact that standing up to China will incur short-term risks and we cannot we cannot uh we cannot avoid that conversation uh entirely. So here's a question of whether the assistance from the United States is being rolled uh at an expeditious time especially in the change administrations every six years. So uh to wrap up that part so our foreign policy foreign policy is principal quarters should ground on mutual strategic interest. It is it should not be a power of finality and to perpetually you know be a decor labor time of foreign policy. We have to stand up for ourselves. The United States can assist with that. Ultimately Filipinos have to have coership of the modernization of our own of our own armed forces. And the another point I'd like to make is the alignment of strategy. So US the US Korean foreign policies particularly with respect to China have to be discharged with each other. So both countries have a tendency to vaccinate in their foreign policy and with changing presidential administration which is confusing to our auto domestic audiences and is also confusing to China so far as militarist concern. So at least some baseline defense policy has to separate apart and I think the political side is a little bit guilt is because we're the party that tends to fluctuate uh excessive appeasement and on the other hand uh with changel again with with another society has to have a life policies and stick to that cross in the restrictions. Um in terms of the development right now, I think US behavior toward China as a favor for nefinities in in part because the truck administration hasn't really tried to press uh China too much on a new host of issues. So that's sort of to uh some religion for now. Obviously with the United States distracted it the other and then third point we need to get comfortable with what one scholar calls stability without settlement. We cannot both Washington and Manila must be prepared for the longaul. It guards against our day states to corporate compromise or possession that we can the isrational and what this means is that unsafe interceptions, escalatory rendering and so forth are all part of what he would normally see in Philippines going forward. They have to make a transition. we have our address as well. Um and digging work that decide I think the lights can go four ways. Number one, I think it is high time for a more operational level flow rate of where we want to dig the US all obviously had to rein but I think right now more fundamental questions for me. If you are going to win by American forces here in the Philippines, what is the overall appropriate military crisis that you're willing to fight by? What types of weaponry, what types of assets and so forth? Secondly, what kinds of joint activities do we want to do in the question of race is it under consideration that they will seek assistance from the United States to help shadows? Is that something on the table? So I think we are at the stage where we have transitioned from the high level discussion toward a more logistics and less analytic oriented uh policy debate and then another another point in this is finally I just like to analytics what was the right now if we're transitioning from a pure house schools model one is called the lactis partnership so obviously the Philippines has but because the partnership the alliance with the United States but we are making a lot of um my partnerships with Japan with Australia the United Kingdom um and for for our national interest I think also we're diversifying that portfolio with usually uh our Asia neighbors and also for example Asia as well of course then it'll be hard to pick um but I just like to put you um with a point that both these and Washington have to fundamentally look at strategy and the logistics of how we are able to sustain uh these policies. We have a lot of aspirations but the question is do we have the capabilities uh for how to do it and then more reported the army told the right political environment to ensure that these changes in the US they have bipartisan successes in the Philippines if they will cut across different at the key >> thank you very much Justin and now senior EP >> thank you and then third point uh we need to get comfortable with what what Filipino scholar calls stability with our settlement. We cannot both flood and la must be prepared for the law and guard against our instincts to grab the nearest compromises settled that we can. The very nature of the conflict is untral. And what this means is that unsay interceptions, escalatory rhetoric and so forth are all parts of what we would normally see in Philippines fighting Malaysia going forward. They have image risks and we have viral risks as well. >> Um and big war on the military side. I think the the alliance to lead the group four ways. Number one, I think it's high time for a more operational level blueprint of where we want to take the US alliance. Obviously, in 2023, we've had a revated EDA, but I think right now more fundamental questions for me is if you are going to buy American forces here in the Philippines, what is the overall appropriate military prison? What types of weaponry? What types of access and support? Secondly, what kinds of joint activities do we want to do in the question of resubizations? Is it in is it consideration that you will seek assistance from the United States to help shi? So I think we are at the stage where we have a transition from the high level strategic discussion toward a more logistics and mess analytic oriented uh volume. And then another um another point on this is finally just like to that I think it's one good thing right so we're transitioning from your house model to what is called the latis partnership um so obviously the Philippines has at partnership the alliance with the United States but we are making a lot of u milestones with partnerships with Japan with Australia the United Kingdom um and for for aman ational lectures. I think it's also worth diversifying that portfolio between two uh our Azian neighbors and also for example AB as well. Of course that will be important practice. Um but I just like you with a point that both the Philippines and Washington have the fundamental look at strategy and the logistics of how to sustain uh these policies. We have a lot of aspirations but the question is do we have the capabilities uh for how to do it and then more importantly are we cultivating the right political environment to ensure that these changes uh in the USA held by Maris with the Philippines if they will cut across different areas. Thank you. >> Thank you very much Justin. And now PSMT senior lector to the GPD. >> Thank you July. Thank you very much and uh I'm very glad to be here and I would like to start my remarks by saying that um I'm European and absolutely the panel of alliances which I think putting in the sense that it actually underscores some of the major developments of uh network security of Philippines disability um but I think in our conversation should invite provide um you with uh what may be uh the European perspective on why are states invading uh the Philippines at the way they are participating in sustaining Arabic security uh in uh in an area of the world that is quite far from home. Uh so first um a bit of background because it is mentioned Justin just mentioned that uh one of the four parries that um sign during marketing history made with the Philippines was actually France. Um but I make pass the argument that European presence uh in in 13 mostly led by foreign countries in France uh the United Kingdom, Germany and in the uh perhaps quite basically since Italian but I tell it in this uh core group. There are of course other countries that are uh engaging in the Philippines but the reason why I'm pointing at these countries is their um military capabilities and their capabilities to employ. Now uh uh France of course has a closest alignment uh to resist with with the Philippines and uh France has uh uh initially employment support both uh Phil the pinnacle of this uh engage is a combination of course is the signing of the statistical forces agreement and we're seeing the United Kingdom actually uh following the France's steps um then and so I would say that these two countries for history capabilities and the fact that they are already present in the in the Pacific uh it's quite easy to explain in a way okay in the Pacific is part of their uh arguably was always their strategies right um then they have more two cases which are in our Germany that um updated or signed uh different uh defense cooperation agreements with with the Philippines and um Italy has uh deployed some masses for calls in in the Philippines and uh uh Germany is quite uh active in in manifest itself as a defense provider. Um, of course the uh idea that these countries may especially in Germany and Italy in that sense they stretching their resources um towards one in the Pacific and I will prove to a country that just stick like the Philippines that is um was never part strategic visions or causes. So um me and together we were trying to make sense of this. Uh so number one what is actually driving me? So these days I was present skiing um the Indo Pacific Hand in the Philippines as a bouncer glass. Um and he mentioned right mentioned this morning theater is do quite uh quite uh complex um and in the recommendation would be and we'll do it but at the same time um there's a sense that we need to be here that goes forward um throughout the years to you know like this idea that there's a certain kind of interconnectedness between the security challenges that they are experiencing in Europe and the security challenges that states uh left as your states are uh experiencing here and uh therefore this should also be marked strategized more uh more relevantly um there through the vid administration he had the sense that the vid administrations was in in a orchestrating our in presence here but that alone won't explain why this presence endure and it's enduring and is actually um so on top of the argument that there might be a strategic interest right in having an a sustained presence in in any city and therefore also be a defense partner the Philippines I also argue that European states are moved by two um uh two additional interests and towards the end I will also try to elaborate why this is important going forward. So number one, it has something to do with the increase of Philippine capacity in the sense that despite the challenges, right, the Philippines is testing social security and uh in order to to have season apparatus that works better. Um the Philippines is also reaching out to partners that can provide the impact that the Philippines needs. She forgive such as the zero IC events and and so on and so forth in a context where um there's a perceived unreliability and uncertainty coming from Washington DC for both these kind of uh alternative pathways but that alone will not explain why uh these European countries are actually uh sustaining your engagement of filigans additional argument on the fact that there are N reasons that uh although perhaps bit at the edge of what is considered strategic thinking are very relevant in explaining why we're still here and the first is of course the fact that the Philippines is not diversifying just to take short-term advantages actually I would argue that the Philippines is the only country that is trying to diversify barrierships because there's a necessity to show that the current rules basis national border works and has it and it has other countries and members they have a very big stake in on the fact that this border should keep working in a way that's always been working right so the fact that there won't be the strategic concern but there's a concern related to if we if if the border the mar collapses in such a sea then it will collapse elsewhere right it could be at that are in is a very important motive in my hierarchy that that drives her in educ. Um and the second which is perhaps a bit related. Um I think it has something to do with the fact that a moment of Southeast Asian countries and Philippines is considered still uh a bearer of democratic bias. And uh I think in a way when you talk about likemindedness um we tend to uh uh we tend to ignore the fact that uh confidence is also provoted to uh certain kind of fitive recourse abs uh I mean this also has practical uh practical uh research for example we cannot export the companies that are uh excessive authoritarian or violated expresses why you suspend that our our architects were considered during the 10th administration, right? Uh but the fact that institutionally or or not explicit or values of democratic values in Europe on this matter uh laid the foundations of consistent engagement. So uh to conclude right the the main question is okay we are here um we're here for certain reasons as I have illustrated in his short remarks. uh will bleed still here uh moving forward. Um and my my my answer to that question will be yes. Um and it uh the reason is that so far so far this presence has somewhat some dividends. Uh interest has been cementified interest have been consolidated. uh there's this kind of groom that is being uh and these kind of like practices that be established and perhaps there's an instit routinization of these practices that will perhaps sustain it in the future. Um at the same time the fact that uh the United States keeps referring to the defense of the traation the Philippines that terms of keeping is the party that lose base order. I can argue that is a result also of deeper European commitment to his order, right? And uh and the fact that if this kind of normative uh posture is sustained by more uh more stakeholders, there's no reason to abandon, right? Um so if I argue that um that there's a lot of work to do um but um I would also say that the foundation's time throughout these years will hopefully render where aging in the world solid and not just uh annoyed but perhaps in this year and assess uh what the developments are in in the next. Thank you very much. Thank you to our four speakers. I know that there will be many questions uh to this panel and I'd like to start now so that we'll have more time and Q&A now. Let the pan is over there ready. Sir, please go ahead. Sir, we can answer your questions. I am Dai, Eminent, Philip Public College, retired professor, Asian Institute of College, retired professor, Asian Business School. I'm not a senior citizen grandfather. From the time that I experienced my over years to the present, I have witnessed the interfing lower regional national challenges. And I like to say that they are now as I have three questions >> only monkeys because the first questions is related to the second and the second is related to the third. To prepare I articulate the sense of the millime. >> Okay. Now question how do we address this challenges in a very systemic manner interwin certain question if the challenges are systemic in nature how do we address them in systemic ways third question Okay. How do they create unlimited debt such that we want to transparent big or small countries such that we can be mutually reinforcing. We are mutually benefiting and at the same time the big countries are not imposing the might and build on the smaller countries and that we are creating one of my let choose a question from that and I like to remind everyone that senior citizen this come applies only to the scene. >> Second question >> and I'm bring up for the student debate on the college. My question is about accessibility strategy. How can the US national security strategy in the Indo Pacific reshape the current region security order in the neon? Specifically the part in the strategy that says Washington did not allow one country to become so dominant that it is a dance with the rests. Maybe we can put him to see this track. >> Thank you. >> Thank you. And I have I need one more question. Uh here in front. >> Yes. >> Hi Chan from the Asian civil audition office in Singapore. So this question is actually for Zach. um you describe you describe flexible coalition as a response uh to a more multiple effective system. So um particularly given the consensus of US antilateral militants. So how does this apply across Assyrian where the Philippines and the Thailand uh are US security alliance but most other member states are alliance atlas and have no longer rely on over partnerships and is this mainly hedging against possible US disengagement or more enduring expression of our regional agency. Thank you. >> You um I think the last question is not to take the first class and it just say >> all right we have a number of great questions there. I'll just hit the last one since it was uh directed to me directly. Uh so I think part of the challenge that we see right now in ASEAN and I know this will be controversial is that there is a tension between AION centrality and ASON and what I mean by that is uh if ASON wants to get things done there's going to be a pressure to break ASON into smaller groups into coalitiones they can actually do And yet by doing that we will risk >> and I worry that trying to maintain unity is going to actually undermine ASEAN centrality as this I think is the challenge for Philippines this year in his chairmanship right the more that the Philippines tries to build unity within ASEAN the more limited it is in some ways of butching mad against Chinese behavior >> because building a coalition that's willing to do that is going to be very very difficult within you know 11 group with very different views and so you know we we mentioned briefly this morning the code of conduct for example um I'll put my cards in the table I'm a skeptic um you know we thought the declaration do something useful in the West Phil it didn't really eventually once you get a code of conduct the Chinese will ignore that also just the way they ignore alcohols and then the question for Manila is going to be well do you want to safeguard ASEAN centrality by actually making sure that ASEAN was doing things or do you want to safeguard ASEAN by making sure that everybody's on board and no one feels uh left out and I think this is a prime example of why coalition going is is probably the way to go and why actually you know what we're talking about on this channel is alliance networking mostly outside because deliberating on what Manila needs right Manila needs support from its friends in West Phil and it hasn't done it to the degree that it deserves and so it's having to look elsewhere. So, I actually think that's sort of an example of why these flexible coalitions are the way to the future. Um, and let me just say one other thing that again will be controversial here. I would take Thailand and the Philippines and put them in two completely different categories. Look at polling data in Thailand where many elites see themselves as having Androids that are more aligned with China than with the United States. And then look at the polling data here which is completely inverted. And I think from an American perspective, you know, I I wish we were talking about the rules based order and sharing values, but that doesn't sell in Washington anymore. What sells now is share interests. And Philippine people when they enter his poll say that we share interests and Thai experts as black people to a greater degree are much more skeptical. And so I I think the US Philippine alliance is heading down the pathway which may be fairly irruptive and was talking about a lot of the good things happening. I think the US Thailand is is in a very direct position since you know be very candid. I worried about whether the US tlines were exist over the next couple years. Uh Ben, I will just offer a thought on the first question. It has a number of different parts, but I think it seems to hearken back to the first panel of the day that was really asking about international order, systemic challenges and how can Frederick find a place or space in that. And I guess I would just offer that in this conversation you know it's very clear that uh this is not a US and humble w exclusive kind of system anymore. This is one where countries uh in the region whether they're allies or partners or all have roles to play. And I appreciate the comments for about how you know in this world it becomes very important how the large powers sell or legitimize their policies the way that they care these other voices. So I do think there is um space but obviously systemic problems are hard to solve and they're often not systemic solutions that are sustainable. So uh something that needful have to think about. We're we're in no position to light solutions right now. >> Just let me that you address I think the spirit of a question uh posed by the gentleman about what the Philistines can do to ensure that it's not trampled upon by the big powers. I think I have to be frank. I think I I I think this is a narrative that tends to heat as I did here domestically in the Philippines because if you look at Philippini policy for example, the Philippines agreed to uh provide military basic access to the United States on a limited number of sites. The Philippines has not made any formal commitment whatsoever to any possible US military action. So we have that selfrespect to have a more nuance policy and I think unfortunately a lot of Filipinos are also not aware of our theuances of our own policy issues when we were sort of for v vulnerable to questions that were sort of blowing toward power after another. But when you look at Philippine foreign policy across the different administrations, one thing our defense policy in terms of our force posture has relatively big constant since it helps with the administration behind it transitioning toward an externally oriented uh defense posture. So that includes the modernization of the Philippine. So I think you appreciate more than stance of our foreign policy. ically there there's a lot to unpack there in terms of what the Philippines is doing and what the Philippines is not doing because obviously operation in the United States can run across a wide spectrum of activities of types of weapon that grand access but here's the thing we're not doing all of those things because the Philippines is already exercising some restraint on its part so I think we have to reframe the conversation to um because the onus of the the onus of the posture puts the burden on the Philippines. But if you look at the reality, the Philippines has actually quite had a modulated position on great power competition. Thank you. >> Yeah. Um we refrain from talking about the great powers uh and sticking with my uh secretary stakes and the European foreigners perhaps. Anything um it's quite interesting the the question to the gentleman on uh how to the if if I understood it directly right how to upkeep the current security order in in in the region I assume it's the in region um provey uh dominance from one single great pita uh so there is an interesting um reason why uh why we are seeing several partners doing the deployments in the South China Sea um which is less connected to specific strategic initiatives although there are but they're quite limited but also if you if you look at um what essentially uh China is trying to to make to obtain control of South China Sea is to consolidate a def facto presence right that uh actually in the east on issues for what we say, right? And when the circumstances change in other disputes that states domestic politics, then maybe there are conditions to legalize these faith. Um, however, the principles that stay here are quite important such as freedom of navigation, right? Uh, I think that's the the the main uh principle at staying. Now the fact that these states and I'm not just talking about of course uh European states I'm talking about all the positive geometries of NATO deployment joint early joint exercises port goals uh what you have these are all maram activities that are allowed by the current nighttime international order they're allowed by laws and by international maritime international law so by doing that I mean it's it's u perhaps a bit fictional whether The the question was pointing at order upkeeping, right? And how do we keep the order if one want to practice it if not by reproducing the practices a lot by his word, right? Which is the other part in in in international law because international law is a regular of attention on state practice. equally international obsessive radio attention to um actions to you know a sort of like factual situation that is reproduced once again throughout the certain historical period of time. So I think uh I think this is a relatively peaceful and relatively cheap response to a very big problem that concerns uh the maintenance of the the current the current border. And uh so perhaps in address a little bit that question and just to uh h on the third question the other gentleman uh was uh was asking which is how do you define likemindedness? Um of course like every concept right there are several interpretations but um when talk of likemindedness the hatchery constitutes the bloom of the lies for the deployment etc. I mean this is in the declarations right is the keeping of the current rules basing international order maybe yes it is reaporal and it underlies interests and so on and so on but I I think I believe that it also operates rather autonomously and uh based on what I conserve with all these uh engagements of affinities during the administration actually likemindedness and in a way so body administration certain receptiveness of um you know the the doion of free and open which reminds of uh rules based international order as well uh it is an effect of this um so yeah maybe again it's not a definitive answer but it's something that may partially address the breast that question thank you very much >> thank you I'll take a second round of question I think there's there table number three and then one in the Uh okay. Cable number two here and then there are couple more in the back and then you go ahead. >> Hello. Good afternoon. I'm an international studies student university. And this question may be answered by any of you candidates. Three years ago, the squad, US, Japan, Philippines, and Australia presented a major opportunity. My question is, is a Latiz security network like this squad possible today given the alliances regard constant upkeep and the region is shifting toward multipolar model with less reliance on fixed alliances. Thank you. I'm glad we had the next generation asking sensible questions >> there at the back. >> Hi, good afternoon. My name is Gabe. I'm with the European Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines and this question is actually for uh Ser actually I know you will take your plastic if you did a lot. Um but I think the past couple of months and years have been pivotal in the relationship of the European Union and the Philippines with the free trade agreement being one of the most concrete examples. My question is like what are the best ways to balance local because I know there have been some issues with balancing local interests and local autonomy versus the standards and expectations of the European Union a millionaire of agreement. So what's the best way to balance these two concepts to make sure that this relationship becomes more in the long term as you mentioned? Thank you. >> Thank you. I think there's one here. Yeah, please. >> Hi, good afternoon. I'm Pargas from PWC and I'm also a lecturer for Sidiman University and QA. So actually I'm asking is also in the context of primary sector contribution especially that we have the Houston economic corridor as part of the strategy forward. So one of the challenges is really converting all these policy discussions into opportunities and operational elicization for private sector to join and as a practice city lawyer what would you recommend as our focus to address regulatory challenges so that we could bring Philippines first and foremost post into the upper middle class economy and take advantage of this position. Thank you. Trust the private senator to bring your highutuding lashes done. And I'll have one more question here. >> Hello. Good afternoon. H is a step for us. uh American country is quite early on the concept of unilateralism and and as we could see right now there are these o and as what is mentioned a while ago if as yet to form smaller groups to handle things better I was we seeing a new definition of how alliances are formed albeit in an informal suggested this miniateral um unilateral conventions for uh convocations and in relation to that do we see an essence or do we see any sense in the Philippines in its claiming how actually convene these uh bilateral efforts and maybe I will start with Mateo because there was a question directed to you and then Justin in Yeah, thank you. >> July, can I address the direct question that I have a couple of points? Sure. Mini after us. >> Yeah, that's already so uh thank you for the question and I want to sustain the uh EU Philippe relations. It's it's actually a quite relevant question, but allow me to draw you a little bit. It's a relevant question for the Philippines um because of of course different uh economic assistance right uh so uh the idea is that the European Union is economically normative block and now because of uh the return of SC 15 euro we are also trying to to see if will ever be possible having a defense operation mechanism but that's uh beyond the scope of the question So we'll focus more on more relative and economic matters, right? Uh of course there's this idea that the more you sustain likeminded countries economically, the more these like-minded countries will give you dividends, right? Sustain um sustain your normative stance. So it goes hand in hand. Um uh now um the EU Philippine relations during the duty administration was at its lowest and uh my point is that it was a self inflated damage from the Philix for obvious reasons right um because it impacted the bilateral relations at the personal level and it impacted of course the the normative stance. It's as if your um distant partner that you know you have a sort of like uh affinity with uh al all of a sudden turns uh to be the opposite right and even from the European side you have to deal with a very different Philippines uh during the administration this didn't happen so far but this also get underscores how this set of values right enable further operation so I I would say that given the fact that the flipped economy has some of course like every uh economy some value to offer but it's not fundamental right it's not a fundamental trade relation we have to be honest um it is not a fundamental the trade relation compared to China either right so um I think uh I'm a bit u on the the opinion that the burden is more on the Philippines in order to understand that the second largest economy in the world could be uh a set of opportunity to uh worthy of exploring forward. Given that um somehow the relationships to um several administrations perhaps there is a uh mechanism that is connected to migration right that could sustain uh a stronger Philippine uh EU migration moving forward. I know there's a fridge agreement being signed but like practically speaking uh the fact that Europe is in a population uh population crisis re workers but at the same time with rhetorical conservatives before big governments in Europe like you don't want we want to have control it's a matter of fact of who arrives in our countries right and I think that the fact that the government um uh pays a great deal of attention among many migration foxes This is right that could be probably um uh in in practical terms what keeps the relationship going uh and it beneficial was all the pillars that I that I mentioned right um so let me just quickly go to two points on on miniism uh I have found very interesting the last question is the film is a convenor of miniaturalism um well if you look at the if you look at the historical record right in recent time the Philippines is actually in the Basan country more prone to the joint medilateral there's this uh trilateral cooperative agreement in 2017 with Indonesia and Malaysia so it's an intra asan in materal what Dr. Good was actually mentioning in the fact that you do smaller coalition maybe as effective at the cost perhaps of centrality but the fact is my opinion the margin organization has gone a bit beyond because um there is I think stake in in especially in the Philippine Japan United States right there parka all this is possible because there are it's a multi-partner endeavor that enables right having this kind of cooperation Plus the current administration probably sees as sees it flexibility and informality as a void of advantage. Right? You can fold the different beans in a pre-existing platform and let's see what happens right in a way in a way um it is a very big opportunity because it's actually a new uh tool right and a new opportunity to grasp. we talked about uh all this uh during this kind of uncertainties and opportunities the common tren of uh many of our fans. So I really think that there's a very stake by the the current administration in making sure that this bilateral has happened and continues. I'm not sure how cool Venus they are but you know there is for sure um this kind of track uh and I think this brings you al to do squad right it's um okay uh squad I would argue that uh integrate Australia and let Australia more into more cooperation will also sustain squad because uh the elites see security and economics as a incentive Right. So in a way if there would be an administration that is less keen on the terance right the European may survive on another dimension. Uh and so this is perhaps hasn't been talked too much but I believe Australia has a very unique role to play that this happens smooth. I'll stop here. Do you hear what he said? I just like this. I think in a broad strokes yes I do understand the concern but I think on a more proud for example what is your mini operational data Thank you very much. Don't take that. That's what for for that. So I think I I guess there right now could be the general concept of also how go out all of these things. perhaps I'll take the question about economic for operationalization regulatory challenges. I think a lot of these you were to address them the pill that we just had but I mean I think before you think about regulatory challenges public sector consultation it's essential essentially because you need to understand what the regulatory needs are and uh things that serve the sectors better. Um in that sense also much regulations there used to be transparency about how they're implemented any forced and there needs to be an understanding that there is a plot evenly there's a fair level playing field for industry and then I think the third element would be policy stability it is in the sense of you know you really want to think you need changing direction particularly many you know heavy invest industries which really require a long-term commitment maybe just freely on the conversation about mining is the squad etc. And I think there are a number of ways to cut this and well maybe is not the alliance and it really depends on which you're talking about if you want specific context. I mean the entire appeal of these as they have evolved recent is that they are somewhat ad hoc they are flexible but the you know flip side of flexibility they are not binding in a particular way. So the substantiation really depends on the content. So in the case of coffers in a specific field to um develop specific technology together which is facilitate industrial basic cooperation etc. In other cases um like a squad if the other legs of the alliances are strengthened through um if we find agreements like RA etc then you know that can also be substantiated but I think that fundamentally you know you have to distinguish between a treaty and allowing because they were not in the same thing and they're not intending to be so they really >> yeah I really agree with that last point that just made and I just have one blame which is that ultimately I don't think anyone believes that the squad is going to deter China in the west which is not to say that I think his squad is bad that it's could potentially be helpful lots of ways right there's defense industrial operation there's economic investment but my first view is what's going to charge China is Philine capability and Philine intent gained American And I don't think that they're sitting in Beijing and particularly worried about the decisions that CRA is going to make about what happens as Russia. >> So I'm a big fan of coalitions and you know I think we should try and build them. I think we have to be realistic about what each of the coalitions is really meant to do and what they're able to do. and I was connected to blame on Philippian agency. I think there's huge interest in the Phil to build effective coalitions and the the challenge is that this takes a block for an extremely careful and uh Phil is sort of like camu but we've seen when this goes wrong the last couple of months you know uh we are in a giant US Canada trade war triggered in part by American actions and in part by Canadian efforts a sort of buildable network of middle powers that's the anchor the tough administration. So part of the challenge is how if you're sitting in Manila do you step up and build these coalitions because you can't ignore the US and Brit KBY was just here to say well if you build that groupings we have to be included but if you include the US then it's easy for the US to sort of claim credit for these groupings and then everything rises or falls on whether Washington is support I think that's a really big challenge going forward for policy makers. >> Thank you. I'll take the last two questions. Make it count. Okay. Okay. There's one here and then John. Okay. The two ladies there and thank you. >> Yeah. Thank you. Thank you for that. and tin for the institute of Southeast Asia studies in Singapore. Uh we have been talking a lot about uh Berlin sharing in terms of uh between us and the just thinking of uh this uh question in case that Japan or South Korea decides to have their own independent nuclear deterrence. Uh do you think that US is going to agree too bad? I see he wants allies be doing more for themselves and he uh can my name when she is for Christie. You say and I remember you say during your speech that uh is suffering of threat for outside and this year uh Japan the Philippines amount that a deliberate area also overlap with the target from Taiwan. So Taiwan didn't say but Beijing were praising. So this is that the action of the Japan and the Philippines in my friends to listen and how to process that sit there's one here. >> Yeah. So I am ready from civil lab condition. So my question is considering that critical defenses relies on securities. How are the US and the Vietnamese defense estem? And maybe while you think about the answers and the moderators privilege to ask a question that can help our panelists frame their final remarks. You know one of our favorite activities here in Southeast Asia to cast aspibility that how do you assess US credibility in this current city global and coasters whether it's in Europe northeast Asia or Southeast Asia but also related and so on our useful and effectively are these coalitions. We count presence gently. So this is what I nearly was going to ask a hard question. You just waited until I to maybe I'll take that and Joan's question together. So I think Americans should be very candidate at this moment. America probability is is substantially decreased. I I don't think there's any other remedy that you can argue at the moment. Um and I say that as you know someone who focuses on Asia and wants the US to be highly credible here. But we're not I'm not saying we're not credible at all. I I still think that actually um if we got into a conflict over Taiwan that the US would fight or the US would win. But I think we have to be clear that American credibility has decreased in the last year or two at least and there are a lot of reasons for that right one is statements by the US president which have called into question alliance commit events including what he said just in the last one about South Korea. uh statements in other regions especially Europe where he's called into question and the usefulness and the collectibility of Mayo and security guarantees that the US has made to treat allies that carries over into other regions and I think this answers Jan's question too which is you know we are seeing the whole data in South Korea that suggests that 60 to 80% of South Koreans would buy independent get bill that is a comment about barrack and reliability, right? Um, and so Christie and Richard have written very smartly on this issue and we do not add this as opinion. So Christie will give you a more thoughtful uh answer on on the question of allied purifation. But my view is that what we're seeing is a natural response to questions about whether Washington could be trusted. And I think the place to start on that question is acknowledging extended deterrence, right? Saying that we will use nuclear weaponist or mass interventional strikes in response to an attack on an ally is in a way unmatched, >> right? It it requires you to be so persuasive that you're serious about actually putting in risk your country for another country. This is really hard to do in the best of times. And it's even harder to do at a time where people aren't really sure where the US stands. >> So I if I had to bet I would say I think there is a probably a 50% chance that we will see a US ally going there in the next decade. This is a huge change in global politics if that happens. But I have to say if you're sitting in Soul right now and you're watching China, Russia, and North Korea all do massive buildups and useware press and at the same time the United States is talking about pulling troops off the Korean peninsula and questioning whether the alliance is worth anything and withdrawing for from exercises is I think you'd be crazy not to think about an independent capability. And I think Japan is far down the line on that, but I'm guessing that the sole guy of the weapons to carry would be racing as well. Now, obviously, not to put Manila in an incredibly difficult position in many different ways, but I think these are all manifestations of the lack of confidence that we're seeing from the free in the United States. So let me just try in a one slightly positive code which is uh we're a year and a half into an administration. They're two out of years left. It is very possible that you will see a total reversal in the US policy. If you've learned President Trump is that changes his mind very in 2020 he changed his mind on China. the US policy shifted 100 or so in 2020. We could see something similar happen when the Chinese inevitably do not follow through on the promises that they made to President Trump over the last year. So I'm not saying that this pathway that we're on at the moment is going to continue. But I am saying that if something doesn't change, I think we're heading into an Asia that is much more visi much more predictable and very for >> all right so there's a lot on the taping so let me try to sum this off quickly u maybe I would just uh throw out that I agree that Americability is unfortunately declining but American unpredictability the predictability is skyhigh somebody be that in a selfag deterren we take the base that way it got out of us. So in terms of following on the nuclear question um so the question was really about burden sharing is like on the US seek and nuclear wiring I think that that is not at the top of the list but US I was wanting to prove Japan said burden sharing a lot of Japan developed its conventional abilities etc that would be you know much more grant for granting reasons um but just to follow up on Zach's cause he's referring to the research that I did in my heli cha surveyed strategic police chapek and South Korea and Khan that the majority of its vote touching non in favor of a maybe just as a follow on you know as con that of course we be thinking about it there does seem to be a difference between thinking about it and then actually moving forward with that and what as why folks do not want to acquire their weapon is site arms race the economic and reputational cost of proliferation damage to relationships humanitary break insurance all types of things. Um but then I did ask scenarios for example about well you know would you more support for the accusation that they throw up increase at the end of a draw down in US courses of the great peninsula and that did many people to say that they wanted you to use support not necessarily change but if I support um but actually we thought that an even more significant driver once the uh policy of the other country so uh it is to the point that if if South were to be as per Louis in even even when opponents again maybe not changing their minds but that does suggest that these decisions are all kind and that countries need to get carefully about when they're signaling to others and our idols does suggest that they are about this so there are many maybe straits on on that decision um just briefly there was a question that is in fact complicated about whether the actions subject the invite or threat um you know there's always I thought it getting about the argument that Getty would be the Egyptian has been once trans what they're doing much more measured in their actions overall. So, you know, we can never judge you know where our bad process began but we can certainly judge Joe who is accelerating immortally faster. I think there is perfect at that and then just glass thick and Islam I actually raised the question about how like these are without the US I mean I in some ways if they still exist without the US that's a very right because of these countries are showing up they're not by the US know for example but the US Japan South Korea China if Japan is South Korea are cooperating primatily if they take the lead that's our signal I'd say but of course US support is necessary seems US disregards or even this not entirely work the mission of these uh video at all and indeed they may not the US not try it as much if they bring you know and regional delaying but I do think that these words that actually um I think it is quite a bit on On what point on US did you say I feel it's a mixed flag as Jack the Philippines has the distinction of having the highest level of trust to the national law with President Trump and also trust of the United States as a country. uh I I will I will attend you as why Filipinos think that I just take it as it is this sort there's also this preference uh by Filipinos of this um president right so this a seven cultural arguments for that where as said I think the the cultiv man theory of literates where it the more unpredictable the one hour is the more sort of indiv idase each other because of uh the Iraqiness of that history. So I I do think there's I think on average it's a typical vib that the US read and the survey results. I do think however that there the for what happened in Venezuela and then also with the US Iran conflict. I think um it might not be lacking well with some sectors of the faith TV elite or uh at least some gigs of uh some of the social political society here in the Philippines because increasingly this is the reality there has been a decreased voice in the Philippines to have a more neutral response in the world China that's something we're going to grapple with not just this year but in the next election as well that's going to be a United States with the audits because when people look at the list how much of the relationship it costs while the political ramifications standing up to der and so forth some sections of society decided it's not worth right and I think that's a realistic assess where some sections the Philippines are at the moment and I just like these things so I think in terms of the confidence here of course number one less confidence in the defense industrial capacity of the United States particularly because of the um the low stock quiets uh the detection of interceptors and so forth um and that's become very palpable to everybody following the news on the Middle East. Uh secondly um the decline in belief in the United States in the K-pop diet in general and not just its industrial capacity. So this really tells the mo that the United States used to be able to do trially. it used to be able to fight o2 theaters but right now it's very hard to look at the news and see and see um the abandonments on the United States and the Middle East and it's hard to see whether okay if you have a conflict in the Pacific today and a conflict in the Middle East would the United States have the capacity to deal with crisis and I think a lot of observers will u put a big question mark to that issue and then finally um a lack of confidence on US strategy I guess uh because of the lockdown effects of the US Iran conflict particularly the Philippines has had the highest inflation rate among all Azio countries so there is a perception that um when the United States compartmentalized its decision making on the Middle East policy and did not sufficiently provide a cushion for allies here in Asia we have had to deal with the fallout of that and with this administration ation particular in the Philippines right now has had to be with a politically destabilizing consequences of high inflation, low growth and high empty debt geopolitical record. >> I came in here. Uh so I was like to have we I fully read my fellow panelists on the circuit and west was reliability issues and and so on. I would just like to uh go back to the the valley and materializes um and I would like to just conclude by giving the the the more domestic perspective of what these instruments uh look like because um from what I gather the the there's a big difference um between the the relative capabilities when it comes to being this many group beats. um thing is that there is really no treaty that establishes who's duty what to what extent etc etc. So in a way power season is played much much stronger in in my opinion in a in a miniatural whatever effort this coalition is established for. Um it can be a more adable coalition of course um but it can also you know survive in early years uh in its unstable way. So it's actually a precarious the one that we're seeing in in unilaterates and I think It is perhaps connected to uh in a way why the United States likes materials because flexibility goes both ways and without the shackles of uh obligations and also in a way accountability because you were talking about um semi ststructured talks. So all of these decisions are in a way uh for sure streamline efficient but at the same time in a way also um to the uh let's say hidden from the public eye and the August was uh was the the the example right it was confidential negotiations that uh the treaty is just not faithful actually the the maybe it's a favoric uh interpretation of what miniaturism was about is actually connected to the fact that um there is a recent crisis or that they haven't really addressed and that is this aim of obligations that uh you know encounters in my opinion both the preference of great powers uh we haven't talked to you about China that's aberration but there's a preference for the Chinese side as well um and at the same kind you know uh so great covers have uh an interest of course in not being uh boxing new frameworks and procedures and accountabilities and so um the reason why I claim it works is because at the same time you know smaller states that are facing a poly crisis right needs tools to act fast and needs tools that can convene and aggregate partners in order to do something about it um while at the same time time it's counting uh accountabilities and so on and so on. I think that's why in a way the Philippine Japan United States trilaterals is a clear example more important than swap actions right the fact that for example u the corridor rate initiative rate initiative but um they were announced offered negotiated uh in a way much hidden from the public eye than uh than you know uh what what was the more in the past in the notes this kind of sense of urgency by by states that are facing crisis and do not have the capacity to withstand this crisis alone whether they are economic security economic security uh and in you know mund as we talked so in a way July u will materalism be here to stay I would say yes because of this kind of convergence which is not necessarily the best configuration that or the best idea that we may have on international corporations But that's what we have now in the current servers. That's so thank you very much. >> Okay. Now you have to really thank this channel for substantially married to day one but also because we just went one even over time so we can let you go. Uh Greg you have to let enjoy the entertainment outside legally. Correct. So we have to that get funds out. >> I I fully understand uh well that's extremely rational. I just want to take time to thank all the views the fight traffic the whole day with us. Uh again support ICPS CS basic services and here is there all the real work just so I know we'll start by three panels I think by race and that's our linking Oh, that's good. Look at that. Oh my god.