Panel 1: Latest Shifts in the International Order | Manila Strategy Forum 2026

Good morning, excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. I am honored and delighted to moderate the first panel of this year's Manila Strategy Forum. My name is Will Toddman. I'm in chief of staff of the geopolitics and foreign policy department at CSIS and the CD of Yellow in the Middle East program. And this session is uh going to talk all about the latest shifts in the international order. And as we just heard from Secretary Lazero, the three views, upheaval, uncertainty, and unpredictability. And I think these are going to be themes that come come out strongly in the course of this discussion. It has been quite the year for geopolitics. Relations between the great powers have continued to shift and evolve. We had the Trump meeting uh on the sidelines of Apac last year in South Korea where they agreed to a one-year trade truce. Yet, we continue to see the weaponization of trade by the world's two leading economic powers. We've seen unprecedented, I think, US pressure on its allies and partners around the world, including here in Asia and in Europe. And then of course we've seen two dramatic military interventions uh from the Trump administration against uh its adversaries starting in January of this year with the capture of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela and then the joint USIsraeli operation against Iran that has now endured for just over 6 months. So to help us think through these shifts in the in the international order uh I am really delighted to introduce a distinguished panel of experts um whose expertise spans the whole world. Um so uh to my left we have Dr. Vic Sha um who is the president of the geopolitics and foreign policy department at CSIS the career chair and also a distinguished professor at Georgetown University. Um we're also delighted to have uh professor meo Anthony who is professor of international relations and associate dean of the gradam school of international studies RSIS at Nanjang Technical University. Uh, Ambassador Edgar Keagan uh is a senior advisor and the Freeman chair in China studies at CSIS. Uh, and until February this year, he was US ambassador to Malaysia uh after a distinguished uh career in the US foreign service. Matt Burvin um is the director of the Europe, Russia and Eurasia program and also the Steuart Center at CSIS. Um and last but by no means not least, we have Dr. Enrique Bura who is assistant professor at the University of Philippines at Dilliman um and I said to him already he wins the award for the best bio because at the very end he professes his his love of Mariah Carey. Uh I think there's a lesson for us all to make our bios a bit more fun. Um so I'm going to ask each of our panelists to provide some introductory remarks 7 to 10 minutes or so. please not longer because let's let's keep this going. We have so much to to cover. Um I will then ask a few questions, but I really do want to then open up to the audience. So please have a think about questions uh that you have and and we'll make sure there's a good amount of time uh to to to take any questions you have for our panelists. Um but first uh Victor, if I could start with you please to to uh kick us off. Well, uh, thank you, Will, and um, thanks, uh, to Greg and the CS Southeast Asia team for hosting the second Manila Strategy Forum. Um, we're really grateful to ICTSI, Lockheed, and RG Monot for their support and of course to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Aaro, for joining us. We're very happy to host you in Washington, DC, and it's so good to see you to see you here. Um so well I think my initial remarks I'm just going to talk about two things. One is uh US alliances and allies. Um and then the other very quickly is on trade. Um first in terms of um the US allies and partners um I think it's uh well known to everybody that we are right now in a period of great uncertainty when it comes to allies. looking at the United States, looking at the key ally in the United States. But I would also submit that it's not just a period of great uncertainty. It's also a period of great opportunity and opportunity for transformation of um uh our alliances in the region. Um on the one hand, the United States under um the current administration under MAGA foreign policy if you will has express the view that uh US alliances in Asia are one very expensive and two um uh replete with free riders uh that are free riding off US security as well as trade uh having trade surpluses. But at the same time and on the other hand um the interaction was largely over tariffs with the United States have provided opportunities for allies to pursue what we might consider high risk highreward opportunities. And what I mean by that is that in the process of trying to negotiate down uh the liberation day tariffs or any of these other tariffs um um and to negotiate investment deals, allies have also been incentivized given the unconventionality of this administration of pushing for more trying to push for things that they may have wanted in the alliance that were previously taboo. And so this is what I mean by potential opportunities. And I would argue that um certainly the the allies and partners in the region that um I spend more uh time with Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. Arguably we've seen all of these allies try to do that with the administration. Um the bottom line is that I think there's certainly a degree of trust in the United States um as a very certain and reliable partner um uh has gone down I think um uh but at the same time that trust among allies and partners has gone down there's one very clear and stark reality that I think most allies and partners um have although they might not state it publicly. And that is while trust has gone down in the United States, they still need the United States. Um, yes, multilateralism is important, uh, uh, yes, middle power, diplomacy, all of these things are important. Uh, but in my mind, these are not alternatives to the United States, they are compliments to the United States. And they're compliments, I think, that are not just a function of the current administration's policies. I think they will create an in form a stable basis going forward as allies become more capable as a result of these alternative strategies. So here I think you know there's a very good piece by um Kurt Campbell and Rush Doshi in the current foreign affairs where they talk about how um the efforts by the United by US allies to do more on their own and to reach out to new allies and partners is in the end actually a good investment in the alliance system because it means you know two years from now three years from now um the United States will have more capable allies around the and and that that that's a positive thing. Um second on trade as you mentioned in your initial remarks will um all ally are dealing with the weaponization of trade by the two lead powers in the global economic system that is both the United States and China. I would submit that while US tariffs have gotten a lot of attention I would submit that not all US tariffs fall into a definition of economic coercion. Some of them do, but not all of them. Uh, but that the real sort of purveyor of the weaponization of trade and economic tourism really is China. I mean, for the United States, it's relatively speaking a recent phenomenon, but China has been weaponizing trade since 1997. Um, and has been going on for a long time. and that it's pervasive and it portends the greatest threat to the global trading order as well as a rules-based order. And so here, and we can talk about this some more, I would say that um for the United States, the United States in my opinion needs to stop tariffing our allies and start pulling to them together in co pulling them together in coalitions, whether it's on critical minerals or uh critical intermediate goods or other sorts of production supply chains really to organize to deter further use of Chinese economic origin. um not unlike something the European Dynamo Max is going to talk about but here not unlike what the Europeans have done with the anti-corion instrument there here I actually think the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies are behind behind in terms of progress compared to what Europe has done on this uh on this particular issue. Finally, having said all that, um I mean having said all that, I certainly expect that the United States will pursue a tariff at the agenda uh in advance of the midterm elections that are uh less than two months away. um USR investigations into 301 on 232 potential on agriculture is politically electorally a safe space uh for um uh in terms of pressure to try to ramp up investment in the United States and reduce merchandise trade surpluses. So unfortunately I think in the next 8 weeks or so he may see more of this. Uh but in the longer term I think there is an agenda both for alliances in terms of all life's capabilities and trying to stop the weaponization and trade where there's plenty of areas for the United States and its allies to work together. Thanks so much. Um, thank you. Uh I think for for providing some ideas of opportunities as well in this moment and I think that reflects some of what uh Secretary Lazarus said as well about seeking out the opportunities in this moment and I will endeavor to make sure that this isn't a panel of due dun and and that we do try to focus on the way forward as well and how different actors can navigate uh the emerging international order. And so on that note I would love to then hand over uh to Professor Pavier Anthony. Um thank you for your services. >> Thank you Will. And let me also thank uh the organizers of this uh forum for the invitation to come and join uh this panel and share my thoughts to you. Um it's always good to be back home to the Philippines. Um I would like to sort of broaden the discussion beyond the US and I want to uh free my presentation from the perspective of smaller middle powers given the significant and dramatic changes in the international environment. I would put a put a caption to where we are now. It's like smaller than smaller states or medium power states with the big big states if you like. And the fact that uh the concern about a rulesbased order that's been challenged that's been broken and applied selectively is really not new. But uh what is really more profound is the scale and the intensity of some of the conflicts and challenges that we now face. Um on the one hand you do have uh conflicts uh from Europe uh and of course in the Middle East and the kind of uh ways where uh some powers have deliberately broken the sanctity of international principles like sovereignty and interference. Uh so you have a pattern of major powers in plural asserting that money is right and security has a competition has particularly high and for the first time since 1972 we face a situation where Russia are no longer bound by all nine major powers Nuclear powers are modernizing their arsenals and there are things that modernization of trade if you like >> and it shows economic corion has now become a central feature to major power competition. But there are other challenges coming from frontier technology. rapid advances in artificial intelligence, the risk of accidents, misuse and coupled with accelerating arms race and cyber enabled weapons, the convergence of AI and biotechnology lowering the barriers of designing dangerous pathogens, AI biomisk and the worrying thing about this is there are no uh regulations, no frameworks where we can regulate them unlike of course the threat of nuclear weapons. Um but you put that on one hand and on the other is really a more worrying uh if you like environment where while the risks are rising the very institutions and frameworks that have been established to manage this. You talk about international institutions like the UN which is good luck right uh UNC that which is good luck. You have the WTO which is depending on how you want to describe it. Uh you have the WH which are lacking family. We have the Paris climate agreement which is not moving forward. So we have weakening institutions. I think you have rising risk. Has the order international order has it been broken? Has it collapsed? Arguably not because um there are other orders that have emerged and some analysts will talk about the China le bricks and the Shamblai cooperation organization offering alternatives uh which you know we don't have all of these requirements of democracy and others but perhaps are welcome by other countries by the smaller countries. uh but I also wanted to flag you know apart from competing orders an issue that that is not covered in many of this discussion and security forum and I think about particularly from the perspective of smaller states right and in this region Stheast Asia is really the climate security risk um you know we can see this uh vividly demonstrated by what just happened a few weeks ago when the Asia collapse and we had I think one of the most catastrophic floods happened in the borders between China and and uh Nepal. So this is a worry for small states uh and little powers who really have little hand in creating this uncertainty and predictability whatever you call it fragmentation and whose greatest asset this studied neutrality right is really gay weaponized. So what does this mean? Uh from the perspective of Southeast Asia, Secretary Lazero talked about ASEAN was long relying an institution that has been described as the most durable regional institution at least in you know in the nano rest of the world. the principles of consensus of sovereignty to strategic balancing or getting whatever you call it uh to avoid overdependence is really under strain right on the on the one hand we have the persistent problems of the South China Sea and a single number in just simply block any collective action we have of course the straits at least for this region the most consequential potential point and we have no mechanism to deal with this Then you have new arrangements. They're not necessarily now like a quad and others but are shaping including the for alliances are shaping their and with all the other economic what's happening and what it means is a collective bargaining with a symmetrical relationship leaves the regions really fragmented and that in spite of the fact that small states may have somelex disability. Um, >> so what can we do? So all you have all of these situations well and account of middle power regardless of what the literature says must begin to realize what is actually structurally impossible. We cannot replace major powers as Victor said you know you can complement in some of those arrangements but major powers which still battle. Um and in the ceiling for how much we can do how much we can maneuver is real and so the much talked about agency of smaller powers uh perhaps is conditional on three things. One is to be able to act collectively. Uh as the Canadian prime minister have said, if we're not on the table, we're going to be on the menu. This is also called echoed by several leaders like in Europe uh France President. So that instate already has an institutional face. I I repeat that institutional face in this region. And what does it really mean? Well, we have frameworks like the treaty of a cooperation which has at least 53 signatories including major powers. We have our, you know, critical infrastructure in the form of the East Asia summit, the Assean regional forum, right? Uh if you're from the security defense side, you have the Assean defense ministerial meetings and all the other frameworks. I call this critical infrastructure that are very valuable. They may be normative but at the same time they provide platform for military to military dialogue. We have uh exercises even if they are free within humanitarian assistance and disaster relief they're equally significant. Second is to be able to lead selectively. Some powers or some countries can lead where they know the expertise and even the legitimacy. Um I talk about Singapore going to be a leader on digital governance while growing support from like-minded states. We have countries like Japan that have pushed and maintained uh CPTP's example kept alive by powers even after the US withdrew in 2017 and it can prove that regional architecture can exist or can endure even without major power limit. Uh we have Uh and then the third is shape shaping competition and I think most importantly especially for us here in the region is leading on shared vulnerabilities. Um we can manage for example and these are the discussions now at the UN there are discussions on how you manage control. uh you don't have to have uh big treaties that have proven to be ineffective but on the other hand you can push for what the region does best and that he is promoting for different types of confidence building measure right TCBM transparency and confidence building measure so the biggest risk really is on shared vulnerability issues I think this is where we can have uh this is a good starting point so to speak and when you talk about where do you begin? I mean we can talk about Islamic security is a very important uh pillar of cooperation. We can also talk about cooperation in dealing with epidemics. It's not too long ago that the world stopped as a result of 19 where everything is at so there are many things that you can talk about in just by looking at two issues in the regions. We have disaster management health dynamics. You can talk about promoting green energy if you give in with ASEAN. We have the Assean power grid. Perhaps it's about time that ASEAN has its voice in glo global discussions and you must have while you have an envoy to deal with the problem in Mayana, you should also perhaps an envoy to talk about climate issues. Yes. So none of this closes the problems that regional organizations like Assin have. I'm sure I fragmentation would be an issue. But I think you cannot afford to be fragmented in a world that is torn apart and the the greatest perhaps strength or weapon that smaller countries have is to work as as closely as possible and to focus on shared vulnerabilities. I think it's stopping. >> Thank you. Thank you so much. Smaller stakes with big stakes. I like that. Um so I'd like to turn next um to you Kenan to talk about China and particularly the US China relationship. Um this has already come up quite a lot but I think the defining relationship probably for the international system is is the competition and and the relationship. So please your thoughts. >> Certainly. Thank you very much, Will. And I want to thank the organizers and to say what a tremendous privilege it is to be here today. I have spent 35 years um as a US diplomat and I just retired and I think that one of the things I was really struck by as I shifted to moving full to working full-time on China at CSIS is it's not that different from what I spent the last 20 years working on. I mean the truth is the last 20 years no matter what part of the world you're involved with but particular if you were working in the India Pacific and I you know last 20 years I've served in China Australia done a variety of Asia related jobs in Washington worked on UN issues served in Malaysia and in India and at the White House doing Asia uh policy what's striking me is China was really the dominant future in almost that entire period and managing responding to analyzing understanding the rise of China has been I think a challenge for anyone who's been involved in foreign policy particularly in the Indo Pacific but I would argue much of the world uh in that period and I think from an American perspective what is very striking is how the USChina relationship has helped define how much of the rest of the world responds to China and also how China responds to much less of the world. As Americans, we almost always assume the world revolves around us. Um it's a sort of national problem. Uh and we're not doing a great job recovering from it. But I would say that the you look at the USChina relationship, there is certain element of truth that that has shaped much of the rest of the world's response to China. And I think that what we can see is something very interesting, which is that 10 years ago in the 2016 campaign, the presidential campaign of the United States, you started to hear people talking explicitly about China as a competitor and a threat. And I would argue within the last two years of the Obama administration, attitudes have really been shifting towards that direction. But President Trump during the campaign really articulated this and then took steps in his first term to impose tariffs to change to a much more competitive relationship including is articulating it as a competitive relationship that was continued during the Biden administration. uh now there was some modifications there were things about differently but the basic framework of the US and China being locked in a competition that it would very much define how both countries would be able to develop and engage with the world for the next 30 years really was kept the beginning of the Trump administration I think the general consensus was it would be even more hardline on China so last year at Busousan and then the Trump visit to Beijing in May I think came as a really big surprise to many people including in both countries in in both governments because suddenly you have gone from the person who was articulating China as a strategic governor in the US China as a threat now saying we want a stable more predictable relationship um some sort of motus of vending and what is interesting is China despite the perception that it has played its cards very very well is very happy to accept that. I think it suggests a couple of things. One is both leaders are convinced that they are the only one who can deal with the other. Both of them are also convinced that there is a window to have a more stable relationship which allows them to work on other priorities. I think that in both cases and and there's a focus on technology, there's a focus on domestic economy that they believe now are probably better served by some sort of more stable framework. The term of us is constructive strategic stability. The US likes to act based on reciprocity and fairness. Well, I noticed that over time that's used less and less. And I think that the the key on this and the way it affects I think the region is that a year ago across the Indoacific and I would say in many other regions there is deep concern about too much friction in the US job. Concern about being forced to choose concern that interests of smaller players would sort of be lost or put aside as part of the competition. But as we all know, the way things really work is there's two extremes and there's a black. So it turns out now there's concern about a GC. There's concern that a relationship between the US and China that is too positive actually in many ways is as threatening to the interests of countries across the Indoacific um and I would argue in other regions in the world as well that as a one that's too hostile. And so people are scrambling to do that. I think that as we look at how China looks at this, I I would say a couple of ones. I think one is we like to think and and I think people like me, foreign policy people, I suspect most of the people in this room work on foreign or policy issues. We like to think our stuff is most important. But the reality is what really matters in most places is the economy and the economic relationships. And I think that what we can see is China is focused on its domestic economy. It is passing up opportunities to I would argue to take advantage of the mistakes that the Trump administration has made. I mean you could imagine in April 2025 if China were suddenly say we're going to rebuild our economy, focus on domestic consumption, take in more imports. that would have been incredibly welcomed from a world that was reeling from the threat of very widescale tariffs. China didn't do that. And instead, and I think this is very interesting, China has doubled down on the export of overcapacity in ways that are causing real economic and increasingly political damage in its trading partners around the world. It's doing this despite the fact and you could see this in Europe, you could see this in Southeast Asia, you could see this increasingly in Latin America, the countries are trying to say, "Hey, this is a problem." And China's doubling down. So, I think that what we can see is the Chinese focus continues to be demolition wanting to have space to focus on. China also is looking to prevent itself as a status quo power as a force for stability and I think we can see that with the recent Shanghai cooperation organization uniques uh where China has tried very hard they've done this in other international four as well they've done this bilaterally to present itself as a status quo power but the significance of that is I don't think they are a status quo I think they have a very clear agenda for where they want the world to go and changes they want but They don't want them to happen too fast and they want to try to continue to benefit from the existing order for as long as they can. And so I think what you'll see out of the the sheets of Washington, I don't think there'll be any really big announcements. I think they're going to build on what was done in May, which in turn built on what was done with. I think they see the extension of like sort of trade truce. There will be something I suspect on AI that will to at least answer the fact that in both countries there's pressure to figure out ways to talk about AI. But I think that the real issue here, the real message is the two leaders remain deeply committed to a better relationship. And what is interesting is certainly on the US side, but I would argue them also on the Chinese side, most of the people in their governments actually are surprised and aren't totally sure that they want to keep to this. And so I think that to maintain the sort of deton that seems to be evolving will require constant pressure from the leaders. And so the real question is going to be after this visit and the possibility of further exchanges at APEC and 20 and my view is as much as they may want to do it domestic politics in both countries will make that a challenge and thank you. >> Fascinating. Thank you. Thank you so much. >> So now we'd like to turn to Europe and Max. Europe has certainly felt its fair share of pressure from President Trump over the last year. Greenland seems like a long time ago and yet those threats started this year just what eight weeks ago. So I'd love you to explain how you think Europe is responding. >> Thank you and want to thank Greg and the all the organizers. It's a really excellent conference. Um Europe is really I think the place that's the region that is filled with world changing uh and there's two major crises at one but but really the other big proverb is Russia season every day roughly about Russia soldier center uh every day the phone alerts that are coming on are happening to keep around Ukraine because there are constant missile value loggers. uh and what happens in the war that goes on uh for four years now uh one fought at this level that's changing the nature of war uh such that there's a lot for the United States to 185 something have discovered while there was throws I actually think there's a lot for lots of tempies Asia and other places Jordan slower um could fight back against a much larger country. Um but what the war is fundamentally is doing is changing a nature of earth uh where for uh really for a long time since the end of World War II or the beginning of the United States uh to guarantee uh that has been Korean part that they uh cemented data uh we actually didn't really want the Americans who work at air defense we wanted her through us um and so what the Europeans have done is on the economic side uh they built this uh uh so the European Union is second largest world for 50 million people uh strongly believable component parts and so when it comes to this question of middle pups the question was what is Europe so in some ways Europe is a region of declining powers of states that uh had power and now but it is also a region where the question is whether Europeans actually GF on this final flight European project build Europe on defense foreign policy because on the side Europe this global uh economic colossus what we've seen in reaction is the Europeans are taking action they have got uh intrinos and his stock for two decades itself a trade to do stock for multiple decades with Australia Phil is out there I I think it's sort of the final phases what you're seeing is D trying to figure out how to diversify something because on the economic side in Russell they think about question now uh with that Trump is using >> is the United States uh is is free uh we are undeligy attacks Russia and so the question for Europe is how does Europe organize itself And I think that we're beginning to see are trend lines that point to a major shift in uh in the overall because now that European defense spending uh is has now that the Europeans are actually the ones financing on the United >> all of this will begin to have effects as the EU begins to collectively spend and >> not quite as much as the United States is and not all that far away. >> Uh no, it's not organized the same way. It's the system is fragmented. But what you're going to see in the next 5 to 10 years is that we're on and then so what does that mean for what does that mean for European defense companies that are going to partner with other countries? uh the BU I think we sent an award signal to the Philippines by providing 15 a very small amount about 15 million um in security assistance funding uh to the Philippines for airtime domain awareness all of that money had been going to Ukraine and so I think what we're going to begin to see is that has indeed an interest now free and rules basic national border where the law of the sea which the party uh is adhered to uh and so I think we're going We increasingly see Europeans and suddenly returning not as colonial powers uh but play a bigger region bigger role in lots of regions. Um I also think that the main China relationship is one to watch very especially this fall because Chinese uh over capacity or however you want to describe it when it comes to industrial production is causing um a major crisis in Europe. Europe has there's more in manufacturing se industrial sectors in Europe uh are larger than they are in the United States. German automotive industrial sectors a really big challenge. So Europe now faces a problem. It has to confront China and it really wants to work with the United States on this but instead it is having to have to deal with the United States as a retention adversary when it comes to trade. And so it is looking right now at the saying do we punish the Chinese or do we punish the Americans or do we sit here and crush? And so it is very this is very much not in the EU DNA of to how do you how to get into Detroit's spatial rules. So this is I think told to be a big challenge for Europe. they're reckoning with with this at the with the the changing nature of the the trade room of the Russia uh based system but they strongly believe it and so they are working in and attempting to serve the Russia from other international institutions uh even if they are opposed by Washington. And so this is I think going to be a very contentious relationship between Washington and Europe over things like digital regulations all these other issues as well. Um but what we are then seeing is I think Europe turning it to the rest of the world to engage. Well I think that's an important trend and one that um I think we'll make >> fascinating. Thank you. Thank you so much Max. Um, so then I think to bring us home and to bring us closer to to home here in the Philippines, um, Dr. Kubori. >> Good morning to everyone. Um first of all it's an honor to be in the presence of u fellow academics thinkers foreign for foreign policy practitioners and I'd also like to extend my thanks to CSIS for giving me this opportunity to share some of my insights and rightfully so um based on the perspective of smaller powers especially the Philippines and I think I want to contribute to discussion from uh I think a proposition that really applies for the Philippines uh evolving role in the international system. While smaller powers, smaller states have lesser capabilities to determine the power distribution in the current system. They however remain consequential as they can influence how major powers can legitimize and organize their overall outreach of uh uh influence. And in an international order intricity defined by weaponized their defendants, growing uncertainty surrounding one's predictable commitments from allies, we are clearly moving towards a form of transition. And in this transition in this environment, the agency of the Philippines uh I think is not only increasingly sought sought after, but it is also becoming consequential. And I think there are some concrete ways we can see sort of this uh phenomena or transition today where the Philippines could be to be consequential. First is in its institutional and diplomatic entrepreneurship uh in the current context of the disputes and tensions in the South China Sea. I think it remains very common for the average at least Filipino observer to expect diplomacy to eventually resolve the differences. But these disputes have existed for decades and none of the claimment states is likely to abandon the respective claims. So given this scenario, the name of the game is really effective dispute management and the existing preoccupation in the South China Sea has been to manage a contested status quo without allowing persistent competition to escalate into an unmanageable conflict. And this is where the Philippines relatively weaker power has shaped the rules of the game in many ways uh at least for the last decade decade or so. And first would be the Philippines overall legalist approach to strengthening its position epitomized of course by the 2016 victory uh in the um court of arbitration. This has not only bolstered our claims but it has also rallied like-minded countries around the broader objective of defending the normative authority of international law. Um it also places uh the South China Sea at the center of a much wider international discussion and I think a lot of this goes to the agency if you will of the Philippines. So in doing so, the Philippines has helped place important constraints on how larger powers in the region can actually influence other actors. And this indeed demonstrates how weaker states can turn to international institutions and legal mechanisms to defend their interests and with that the Philippines remain a shining beacon for how small powers can assert their agency where region powers can occupy the spotlight. Second would be likewise under the Philippines current asan chairmanship uh it has invested considerable political capital in acceler accelerating negotiations for the code of conduct. The frequency of negotiations has increased raising hopes that the delayed code may finally be concluded by the end of the year. uh all payments I think have also expressed their respective optimism that this is actually something that we can see sooner rather than later. And of course as observers many of us as understandably develop a certain fatigue over repeated expectations that the code of conduct is somehow just around the corner. But I think the persistence of these negotiations is itself a significant achievement. It reflects an enduring multilateral commitment to managing differences even in the absence of an immediate resolution. And I always stress that it's important that these countries actually continue to keep on talking despite the fact that tensions are flaring up um in reality. And what is particularly interesting for the Philippines, it has continued to use its um institutional position as asan chair to bring the parties toward that wants to a common objective despite its clear bias if you will no towards a more assertive positioning with respect to negotiating or having a diary code of conduct. So overall the Philippines experience also showed that an increasingly volatile regional and international environment smaller states can actually combine bilateral and multilateral mechanisms in engaging a revisionist power. So in this regard, Manila has consistently complemented its otherwise difficult relationship with Beijing through continuous and successive um bilateral consultation mechanisms in the South China Sea which has been happening since uh 2017 after uh the arbitral was uh um decided. So the the Philippines uh through the bilateral creativity that it has cons consistently explored with China has actually created channels where both sides can continue to clarify their positions, manage individual crisis and align expectations. So while it would be difficult to assert that this is actually a clear victory for the Philippines, but again we go back to what I was saying a while ago that the name of the game is to really effectively manage the dispute. So that is our current status quo. Um the second way I think the Philippines has increasingly demonstrated this agency is through effective network building. Of course, the alliance with the United States remains central to Philippine security, particularly given the deteriorating security environment in the West Philippine Sea. But what is perhaps equally important is how Manila has increasingly sought to build a much wider portfolio of strategic relationships around this alliance rather than basically being just dependent on Washington. We see this most clearly in the deepening of relations with Japan and Australia, but also increasingly with other like-minded countries like India, Canada, New Zealand to name a few. I think this is particularly consequential because smaller states cannot assume that major powers will always prioritize their concerns in the same way that the Philippines does. >> Global powers will naturally be preoccupied by different theaters and crisis. understandably so. Their domestic politics, their domestic constituencies might demand for change in their foreign policy. And from the perspective of a smaller ally such as the Philippines, it therefore makes sense to create a certain degree of redundancy in its foreign relation, cultivating multiple partners that can contribute to similar objectives. Um, this tells us something about how smaller powers can actually affect the wider structure of regional of regional order. If countries such as the Philippines can easily develop overlapping partnerships rather than simply attaching themselves to one power, then the regional system that emerges becomes much more complicated. And I think this is where smaller powers has more leeway or um legacy to influence an otherwise complicated uh international system. Third dimension where I think the Philippines or we can appreciate the Philippine agency is in the political economy. Uh the we um the other speakers have already noted the growing in prominence of ideas such as the risking um French shoring economic security weaponized interdependence. No there's a ongoing effort to really separate geo uh economics from geopolitics. For the Philippines this changing environment introduces clear vulnerabilities especially given its development goals. But at the same time it creates opportunities for Manila to reposition itself more strategically within the global production network. And I think one useful example example here is um our participation impact silica in the wider effort of the current administration to position the country within emerging supply chains. The Philippines is already an important actor. It holds an important position in electronics and semiconductor assembly while also uh possessing substantial mineral resources and a very young um pool of uh available workforce. In principle, the diversification of global supply chains creates an opportunity for the country to attract investments that may have previously been concentrated elsewhere. But I think the important challenge for the Philippines is not simply whether these new supply chains arrive for the development of the country, but what kind of economic transport transformation can actually be achieved. No, for the Philippines. The objective should not be for the country to simply become a trusted subcontractor in somebody else's the risking strategy. Um, if the country is genuinely going to benefit from this restructuring, then the larger objective must involve using this investments to shore up Filipino capabilities above the higher value chain. Uh, true to preserving the centrality of Filipino agency. Um it is important that we must not replace um uh dependence on the Chinese supply chains uh with dependence on another payer power but actually see where these two dependencies can complement each other. So if the broader objective is to strengthen in Philippine agency then economic resilience would ultimately come from having several sources of promising investments. Political economy therefore becomes another arena in which small powers like the Philippines can expand their room for maneuver provided they are able to convert external competition into greater domestic capacity rather than simply becoming dependent on a different partner. So and there's a lot of things that still can be said on on the on the current strategy of the Philippines with respect to China but I'll leave it to the discussion and maybe the audience. >> Absolutely. Thank you so much. And as I said, I do want to open up to take questions from the audience. And I will come to you in a moment, but I'm going to abuse my position as moderator to Dr. Brown a little bit with some questions that I have first. And maybe Victor, if I can turn back to you, I I can't have you on a panel and not ask you something about the Korean Peninsula. And there have been some I think interesting moves and speculation uh that any uh that President Trump is interested in a summit with Kim. Um and so I would love to hear your assessment of prospects for diplomacy between the US and North Korea. >> Um well thanks Will. Um so I think that um I think there's a pretty good chance that these two leaders will meet at some point. Um, President Trump has made very clear his desire for resuming uh, summit diplomacy. Um, I think that um, from a North Korean perspective to the extent we can devise what those what their views are, uh, I think they see certainly a more unpredictable and um, more willing to use force Trump in his second term than in his first term. And so there's something to be said for trying to maintain some sort of contact to minimize the chances that uh he might consider something like that on the on the Korean peninsula. Um and I think for from the US perspective um um you know the the war in Europe has also had an impact on Asia in particular North Korea's um very very deep participation with Russia in this war. And so the United States, we have various tools to try to disrupt that relationship, but one of them might be to see um some sort of interaction between the United States and North Korea, at least to try to distract the North Koreans from what they're doing, what they're doing in the Russians. Um so I think there's certainly a possibility that something like that could happen. Um the North Koreans, uh some would argue seem to be sitting pretty well between China and Russia now. They're getting a lot of support from Russia because of the war in Europe and then they're getting a lot of support from China. Um, and so they might not be interested in meeting the United States, but that I think presumes, as I've written, I think that presumes that North Korea is a status quo power um, in the sense that they're happy with what they have with Russia and what they have with China. And I really don't think that's right. I think North Korea is a revisionist power and they're always trying to better their position. and um having a hedge in the United States visually both China and Russia might be something that they would be interested in. >> Thank you. Very very interesting. I have a couple of ASEAN related questions and uh we've touched on ASEAN a bit um but Melie can I turn back to you? We've had quite a positive view I think from um Enrio about how small states can navigate this and he touched on the uh Philippines chairmanship of this year. So, I'd love to hear some of your thoughts as well on on what uh you expect to see for the rest of the year under the Philippines championship >> and as how you assess the the Philippines role in in chairing at the moment, >> there are a lot of expectations for any country that leads. >> Um there's been a lot of talk about advancing the code of conduct. Um I recall um about 2011 2012 uh one of the Philippine officials actually said that the code of conduct is an exercise on futility and I think much has changed since then and there's a recognition that regardless of the kind of hurdles that uh many states face particularly those that are affected with the uh competition in the South China Sea there's really no uh way to for that to be finalized this year. fingers crossed but um >> to be honest I have my reservations so let's see how far this conversation can go but there are many things that advanced um um yeah talked about and I really like the way we frame it entrepreneurial diplomacy and this is something that's very asanat um you know you have a number of networks if you want to draw an illustration for all the networks all the institutions with art is actually very confusing that they believe because it gives allows you the space and in many of this uh whether it is in security or economics there are some small gains or you know that it can be pushed for example pushing ahead with RCP I mean we we we talk about the the TC CPTP but our is actually a right and you talk about one of the biggest And you just look at ASEAN in combination with all the major economies, China, I guess the you know and this is something that the US is not involved on Japan and Korea. ASEAN combined GDP alone is this about what four trillion four to four to four three trillion US dollars and when we bring that together with all the other funds the potential is there and there are many things that can be done in our and hopefully there's some initiatives there when it comes to energy security I think the Philippines push and uh you know in in making sure that the plans towards the uh uh the asan great Please can come. There's some steps ahead because there's been this for some of you that are familiar with some of the classes basically to ensure that you're able to find ways for us to help each other provided for example to meet some of the energy needs particularly in the times of crisis. And this is particularly important because for some of you who have also been following the news this year we're going to experience the super aluminium and super aluminium as most scientists would say is going to be the worst in the you know since the last 500 years and there are many doomsday scenario that's been put there but some cooperation in this regard can you for example provide some immediate assistance when it comes to some shortfall in energy efficient we not only experiience ing the after effects of the longest crisis, the longest rates crisis. But give them um I think some some so that is fun some movements again pushing ahead with the sustainability green energy and this is where I think together with sustainability I would love to have something on climate agenda for for the Philippines because this is really the thing that affects if you're talking about anti- faceted risk intersecting geopolitics is settling. This is it, right? How do you deal for example with the prospects of more disciplined population in 2025 out of the 30 million climate displaced uh people right about a third of that is actually from Southeast Asia the Philippines I mean we're experiencing it and you talk about uh how to deal with with uh displacement what are the outside plans and adaptation for example I mean these are not major for our discuss but touches the very security and wellbeing of individuals and stig and if you really want people in the region to appreciate what asset is apart from all his announcements is really that you have an asan banner giving all these things and uh how do you deal for example with the prospects of increasing uh diseases as a result of climate I mean many things so I hope there's something else that can be inserted when the Philippine council this with the chairman state. Thanks. >> Thank you so much. I realized to mention something in Vanilla, but that's another conversation. >> Oh, yeah. I'm being a bit selfish by asking questions. So, I'm going to hold off now and I'm going to open up to the audience. Uh, and so I believe we have um some people who are have microphones. Um, I would ask that you please identify yourself and that you please try to keep it to a question rather than a statement because I suspect there's going to be a lot of interest and ask questions. Um, so first over here just behind you. >> Yeah, switch. >> Hi. Uh, my name is Ryan from Mapto and my question is for Ambassador Kag. Uh you mentioned uh this very interesting dynamic between she and Trump um how this search for stability and how this has taken people by surprise. Um I heard it put another way of the most pro-China person in the Trump administration and so I was wondering if you can shed some more light on you know you mentioned that this is maybe going to be challenged. What are the kinds of things that people within the administration are pushing for? What are you know what is that dynamic >> last two years and then of course what does this mean for the for >> sure I would just challenge you on one thing which is for anybody who's been interviewing Donald Trump I don't think he would describe himself as pro China um I think that he believes that right now for the United States a stable relationship is very much in the US interest and that is probably different than the majority of the in the administration. Um I think that the the key thing for both leaders is that they believe that they the only one that the leader to leader channel is the only one that is effective in managing their relationship and frankly this is what has usually been the case uh that the administration the Obama administration even the Bush administration there was a sense that the only way to really effectively manage the relationship was to build in some cases the Bush administration the Obama administration tried to create some structures but that in the end that it all flowed from the relationship I think that the difference is right now neither of them really believe they need structures below them that what matters is the relationship between the two of them I would argue though that there's this comes out of frame which is that Yeah, >> both of them increasingly realize >> and that >> this idea of a global order >> is a bit of a misnomer. I mean the truth is that there the global order that's really depended on a kind of consensual willingness of countries to accept it and it underpins by certain a US willingness sacrifice it own interests in order to promote the world order. I think China has recognized it has some stake in even though they believe that it's too skewed in favor of the US and in favor of interest making a hostile place. So I think that what you're seeing is between them looking for ways in which they can manage the bilateral relationship in order to minimize the dependence on the rest of the global order at least as the idea of how the bilateral relationship can be managed. I think that the Chinese very much appreciate Donald Trump doesn't spend time lecturing around about their system. um the I think that President Trump feels that Chinese are pragmatic and practical and ultimately that he can work within and so I think that's going to be the main thing that sort of underpins what's what's going to be happening going forward. But there's always going to be a problem because there is a level of distrust in both systems that means that there are going to be a lot of pressure all the time to not find ways to attribute that very fast. >> Thank you so much. Maybe and maybe I'll take a couple at once because I think otherwise >> um my name is my question in a environment. geopolitical uncertainty. What do middle powers like the Philippines do >> to receive informationational? >> Wonderful. Thank you. Then next to uh the lady at the back. Yes. Thank you so much. Yes. Yes. Good morning everyone to our team panelists. Uh this is my topic for dissertation. So I'd like to take advantage of your uh presence here. Uh I've heard about passion centrality, strategic autonomy and strategic resilience. But this is the first time that I heard about strategic agency. So if you can enlighten on us about the parameters or indicators of strategic agency and shed uh light on uh what are the gaps for the Philippine government to be uh uh to have this strategic agency with our topics on bio security and disaster management and other challenging issues. Thank you. >> Okay. Thank you. I think the first question was um can I start with you? Would you like to tackle that first? >> Yeah. I >> Yeah. So I think the question was what can the Philippines do given this >> uncertain international system and I think I already lecture what's in the remarks available is the Philippines is actually better off if it continues to expand its partnerships uh not putting its eggs in one basket so to speak. So that could be a source of uh resilience for the Philippines. Um and at the same time I think the Philippines could actually benefit from for from a much more um longer deal with respect to its giving foreign policy direction. So that's something that I think obviously uh we can still do a lot of of work. uh but definitely I would emphasize um cultivating more partnerships with uh 99 countries while at the same time making sure that this doesn't come at the expense of um remaining true to what I think is also central in Philippine foreign policy which is emphasizing multilateral >> yeah it's always good to get an opportunity to rank on your dissertation Switch, switch. >> Okay. The many terms that have been used, strategic autonomy, strategic agency, uh, you know, or agency that I think the main idea is that you allow for states or a group a state or a group of states to be able to have the space, right, to do what they can deliver in their country. So the space in Asan speak, they always talk about asan agency, right? And so you know while major power competition and certain countries are really torn you push one if if you don't follow some of the tariffs if you become the US is imposed if you become too closely to China then at least neither here nor there but what has been doing and what Greek has said in the Philippines is to find that space right so in as much as you have for example you have your mutual defense agreement with the United treaty with the United States you you cultivate relationships with other countries like Korea, Japan, you know, whatever, Australia. So that can help you in many ways and you don't find yourself stranded or dependent totally on one country for your security needs whether it is in terms of raising you know enhancing your military capabilities, infrastructure etc. Right? And in Assean uh context the countries doesn't have neutral defense arrangements right because they want to be neutral you know but it doesn't mean that industries engage with either the US or the United States that's why few years ago this deep do not make us choose okay buzz word among security analysts but the other question about how do you make yourself valid language and I mentioned three things actually given the conraints I mean it's you have to be cognizant of whatever you can do what space you have and you are able to shape the environment by you know by promoting for example cooperation making sure that multilateral multilateralism is alive and well and the fact that you have ASEAN you have the Philippines chairing ASEAN this year and ASEAN is not an organization that can be taken for granted because during the ASEAN related summits which will November you have major powers coming in major leader coming in right you have oursel you have the east summit and other countries just wanting to join that framework allows it shows you the kind of influence it has and in economic cooperation in other things for example like dealing with climate security assean has been leading the Assean defense ministerial plus brings together many countries United States China you know countries in Europe etc. But they're interested because all these exercises on disaster relief actually is also a way to improve right enhance the capabilities of the military. It improves interoperability. There are many things in it. So ASEAN provides that platform provides space to be able to maneuver makes itself relevant by working on shared vulnerabilities working promoting to act collectively to the extent possible. Right? and at the same time meet their strategic needs political and economic. Right? So there are many ways to sort of slice that can address that question. But one thing is for sure in the context of Southeast Asia and powers in this region if you talk about you know East Asia you have Japan, Korea, right? And you have of course countries uh China you have Australia, New Zealand. What what do they have in common there? All of these countries have never turned their back on multilateralism despite facing their own pressures like from the United States. >> Thank you so much. Questions from this side. Yes, please. There are two questions next to each other. For this next graduate, I have a question for Dr. John. Uh now that the North Koreans can likely hit the uh American homeland, is extend the deterrence to South Korea still credible, is it time to become more open to other solutions like a South Korean capability, nuclear sharing, great reliency, etc. And are a uh continued strong USK alliance and a nuclear South Korea uh mutual disposable from each other. Thank you. >> Hello and good morning. My name is Jose from the University of the Philippines. So I would just like to ask uh because uh especially with the uh there's a need for us in the new international border to take our part to do our part in our country. So uh especially now in the context of the tax city uh there are also domestic differences uh that are being that are always going to be raised right now. So I would like to ask how can we strategically balance uh domestic interests and to that of our foreign policy interests. Uh Dr. Thank you so much. >> Um so uh I'm going to I'll answer the specific Korean question but again I just want to say something about the conversation here. Um and that is u in terms of the role of smaller powers, smaller powers and the question of agency. um >> so I sort of see three areas in particular where small and middle powers have agency. Um uh one of them is to u reduce security dilemas among themselves. So what we're seeing is a great deal of arming and rearming by countries in the region. I mean Japan uh is embarking on a major defense spending hike. South Korea is going to 3.5%. There there are a number of countries that are doing this. So in venues whether it's the animation form or others where there is conversations about what doing their own defense capabilities I think is a very useful information sharing exercise. Um the second in terms on the agency side is that I think these groups of smaller countries whether it's in ASEAN or whether it's in the G20 or the forum as a group can advance sort of agendas whether it's climate security or others where the big powers might be less uh that might they might be playing less of a leadership role. Um I think in particular you know obviously the US is hosting the G20 in Miami in December but then after that it's the UK and then it's South Korea and uh both of those countries arguably provide a more friendly environment to middle powers advancing some of the the what has been the the global south G20 agenda that we saw um uh in the the past three G20s before it came to the United States. Um and then third, I think for many powers and smaller powers, these venues provide an opportunity to also share how the two are de-risking from both the United States and and China. Uh I think in many cases, these smaller countries feel like they're doing it by themselves. They're all alone and doing it by themselves. But I'm sure there are many strategies that they are doing that are very similar to to each other. Um on the on the question of Korea, I mean I think the the most important to my in my mind can comment on this too because Edar managed the alliances as well when he was in government. the the most important element of of extended nuclear deterrence um for Korea and arguably for Japan as well is um not just the nuclear umbrella itself but also the US um uh troop presence in in these countries particularly in Korea. Um that is a critical element uh signaling u not not just US capability but US commitment uh and so Um you can do all these extended deterrence dialogues, you can do all these things, but if this is all happening at the same time that um we are drawing down the the true presence in Korea, that becomes a hard circle to square in the mind in the mind of the ally. Um and then the other thing I would say is that um the you know the growing North Korean capabilities as you said the ability to target the US main bail really calls out for much more not just bilateral but also trilateral uh defense and security cooperation with the United States and uh Japan and South Korea. Um there has been a lot of progress made in that. I mean that guard was in in on the scene when you guys did the camp David summit which was really in watershed in trilateral security cooperation. So they need to everyone needs to continue to press the accelerator on that. I would just add I agree with uh Fur, but I think the one key thing is that >> the I the ability the North Korean capability to target the US is one thing, but the US missile defense system was basically designed for that. So there's a certain amount of uncertainty from the North Koreans at present. I think that the greater threat to extended deterrence and its the regional architecture actually is the combination of North Korea's program and China's very very significant strategic buildup and I think those things in my view together are likely more of a factor than just the North Korean uh program and I agree the the key to managing this is to have a very clear articul ation of US policy and a sense of some confidence that what the US says particularly with regard to a very sensitive topic like sending deterrence actually carries weight. I would just like to make one point though on the strategic agency as well and that is that much of the thinking on this has been done in the context of a competitive in some ways hostile potentially uh leading to conflict US the reality is there's a lot more force protection agencies when powers with each other. I think that one thing that I find very interesting is in my recent uh discussions with friends across the Indo Pacific, it's very clear that they're actually they've gone from being worried about US China conflict to worried about a G2 because some G2 dramatically reduces room for strategic agencies particularly if neither of the leading powers feels. It's worth keeping in mind that during the cold war both the US symbolic commitments of multilateralist and you can in terms of the actual actions but neverthe multilateralism actually will dramatically reduce the room for others to find their own space. >> Thank you. Thank you so much. So I am very sorry to say that I think we are running out of time and so I want to do a quick recap of some of the points that uh you have shared today. So I think you started by uh characterizing some of the shifts in the the international system that are underway. Um Edward, you spoke about the USChina relationship of course this critical uh relationship in the international system and after 10 years or so of successive administrations in the United States very relationship now both leaders are seeking a stable more predictable relationship and it's the leaders that are driving this and then you also has been uh has has a domestic focus which has led it to prioritize economic interests even at times over political interests And then as you just repeated the fear that many other actors have that a G2 would be emerging that is much more difficult for them to navigate. Um Victor you talked about how this is a high-risisk highreward environment for US allies. Uh diversifying their alliances is ultimately good for uh the allies. It's also good for the US. Um but you also talked about how they are now debating the economic coercion that's rising. China has been doing this for a long time and the US is increasingly now turning to economic coercion. But there are opportunities now for new coalitions of partners to push back against that. Um, there we are. Anthony, you you uh started by saying smaller states but big states and um I think you you highlighted that we have rising risks in the international environment at the same time of weakening global institutions and you talked about uh three factors on which an agency for small states is conditioned. The ability to act collectively, the ability to lead selectively and then managing shared vulnerabilities together. Now you talked about Europe. What is Europe? It's a it's a continent of declining powers but also an economic superpower. Uh the Ukraine war has changed Europe. Europe is rearming and uh it will probably start investing in security uh not here in the Indo Pacific but elsewhere as well. And then Enrio um you uh said that effective dispute management is really the name of the game. uh smaller states can use international institutions to face constraints on great powers. Uh this idea of entrepreneurial diplomacy, building diversifying partnerships and building in redundancies as well. And then I think you also highlighted uh that the political economy is a new arena for powers to maneuver. So I hope you will agree with me that I think this has been a very rich uh conversation about a highly dynamic uh changing environment. But I think you have all given us um a sense of of of what's to come, how you think uh actors will try to navigate this environment going forward. So I want to uh thank the audience uh for your for your questions. Um a really big thanks to Greg um Harrison Jaffed the whole team for making this possible. I think if this is a sign of what's to come over the next two days, then we have some fascinating discussions ahead. Um, and just before I thank the panel to really be shameless and do some self-promotion, um, I'm the host of a podcast called State Play at CSIS. And we're recording an episode tomorrow. We're raving with Ambassador Negro. Um, and this is exactly what we cover. We cover how uh the the international system is changing. So, I hope you might consider giving a listen. But I want to thank uh my panelists um Victor Char, Melie Janari, Anthony um Edgard Kagan, Max Dman, Enrique Gloria. Thank you so much. Uh and I believe we now have a break before lunch. Thank you so much.