New report claims Israeli help against Houthis will not change Riyadh’s stance on normalization

Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia needs help defending itself from the Houthis, but that apparently is not enough to move Riyadh closer to the state of Israel. Regional officials say the Saudis are running low on missile interceptors and have reached out to countries including France, Britain, Pakistan, and Egypt for air defense support. But according to a Saudi source cited by Israel's Khan News, even Israeli assistance would not change Riyadh's position on normalization. Saudi Arabia continues to demand an irreversible path toward Palestinian statehood, which is something that Prime Minister Netanyahu's government opposes. So, what does this tell us about the limits of security cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia even as the Houthi threat grows? Well, joining us now in the studio is our senior Middle East correspondent Ariel Oseran and international analyst Dan Perry. All right, there's a lot to discuss here. Obviously, if Saudi Arabia is facing this level of threat from Iran-backed forces, what does this reported refusal to accept normalization with the state of Israel in exchange for security assistance tell us about the priorities of Saudi Arabia at this moment? >> I think we need to look at both of these processes as separate pathways. Israel and Saudi Arabia are deepening their military cooperation. We know that uh IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi met with Gulf with the heads of Gulf countries' uh military apparatuses, and this is something that is continuing regardless of the issue of normalization. As far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, you know, Saudis I'm speaking with are saying that the price for normalization with Israel is the same today as it was on October 6th, 2023. And that is a credible pathway towards Palestinian statehood. That is the statement >> mean Israel won't be willing to help? >> No, because the I even Israel views both of these uh pathways as separate. However, you said in your introduction that Israeli government opposes this you know, this price on the part of Saudi Arabia. That is partially true. At least that is correct based on public statements. But if you look at President Trump's 20-point plan for the Gaza Strip, which Prime Minister Netanyahu agreed to and the government of Israel agreed to, there is a clause that specifically states that this plan is going to bring forward a viable pathway towards Palestinian statehood. Those words were chosen specifically to appease the Saudis. However, so what needs to happen based on that, you know, on the Gaza road map, it's enough for the introduction of the committee of technocrats and a few steps in Gaza that could put the Saudis in a position where they're saying, "Okay, this is enough because Israel agreed to this credible pathway, which is a fact. There are a few steps on the ground, and then it would be up to Saudi Arabia. So, theoretically, we don't need we aren't necessarily too far away from there. But again, there's a lot more in terms of optics that are hindering Saudi Arabia to come to that realization. >> Right. Dan, I want to turn to you. Um obviously, I think the question that many have is whether or not these who they tax are ultimately going to create more security cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia regardless of whether or not Saudi Arabia is willing to establish uh you know, diplomatic relations with the state of Israel without that pathway to Palestinian statehood. Doesn't seem like that's going to change. But is it within Israel's interest ultimately to get involved and help Saudi Arabia? And do you think we're looking at a scenario in which the entire game could change here? >> Absolutely. Uh Israel is a little bit the supplicant in this equation because Israel wants acceptance by the region and for Israel the game changes if Saudi Arabia joins the Abraham Accords. Unsurprisingly, the Saudis are setting a very high bar for that. The bar is actually lowering. It used to be the establishment of the Palestinian state. Now it's a credible pathway towards they also don't define what a Palestinian state means and when Israelis oppose a Palestinian state they're basically thinking in the entire West Bank and Gaza and a a regular state with an army and an air force and if you look at the map that's preposterous, it cannot be. But imagine a state that's defined a little bit different like Luxembourg without any military. I mean, you might think the Palestinians will never accept it, but for Israel to accept that idea and wait for the Palestinians to reject it is a different matter. So I can certainly see all kinds of wiggle room for an Israeli government that really is determined to make it possible for the Saudis to normalize to actually go ahead and do that. Meanwhile, even before such a government, Israel's absolutely interested in making itself indispensable to these countries in the region, to making it clear to all the countries of the GCC why they want to be allied with Israel. >> I think the question of course is what impact that's going to have on the United States' relationship with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states because we already know that there's kind of growing anger amongst the GCC when it comes to the United States and its posture in this war with Iran given you know how it's impacting the economies, the infrastructure of these countries. Saudi Arabia we understand reached out to Trump asking for military help and basically got a response saying we'll give you intelligence support, but that's it for now. We know the US doesn't want to open a second front. So is there a world in which Israel could somehow be a replacement? >> It is very possible that that is the viewpoint from the White House that the reason why they're not taking this more hands-on approach in supporting the Saudis is to leave some sort of vacuum into which Israel will place itself and then it can also increase its cooperation with Saudi Arabia and with other Gulf countries. That is one thing. However, I will note that in the reported meeting last week between the military chiefs of Israel, five Gulf countries, and Egypt, Jordan, and the United States. Again, I said five Gulf countries, there are six countries in the GCC, Oman wasn't there. And I think that is very interesting because this shows that either there's two options, either they were invited and snubbed the meeting or they didn't receive an invitation. Both options do not bode well for the unity of the GCC and this is also a byproduct of Iran's aggression against its Gulf Arab neighbors that it is causing some, you know, wedges within the GCC. >> It also reflects the sad fact that Oman is playing along with Iran in its efforts to reestablish some sort of presence in the Strait of Hormuz and and so they're a little bit isolated. No less relevant is that Qatar was at this meeting. I see a world in which, yeah, the US maybe isn't involved because until the midterms Trump can't do that. Uh but Israel gives intelligence and Israel perhaps provides air cover and that they've already done against the Houthis a plenty. So it's not such a game changer. Meanwhile, if you need boots on the ground for a pincer movement against the Houthis from the north uh and the Saudi-backed uh government forces from the south, Egypt is not irrelevant and of course Sisi met with NBS a couple days ago. There's a lot of scenarios here that can arise. >> Right.