Lebanese government fights to reassert authority as Hezbollah retains influence in pilot zones

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The Lebanese government is attempting to reassert its authority in three southern pilot zones without engaging in direct military conflict, focusing instead on reconstruction efforts and service delivery. In these areas, the army has taken the lead in repairing infrastructure like roads while trying to convince residents that the state can provide security and essential services better than Hezbollah. However, a significant hurdle remains because Hezbollah continues to financially support thousands of families by paying rent, school fees, and medical bills. This creates a complex situation where simply removing weapons is insufficient; the state must also dismantle the deep-rooted system that has made the population dependent on Hezbollah's welfare network. According to Hanin Ghaddar, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the current framework agreement between Lebanon, Israel, and the US administration explicitly calls for "dismantlement" rather than just disarmament. This process requires not only eliminating armed militias but also removing Hezbollah's military infrastructure and its integration within state institutions that sustain its welfare system. Ghaddar notes that Hezbollah currently provides social services primarily to its members because it cannot afford to serve everyone, a limitation exacerbated by its continued presence inside government bodies. Furthermore, non-governmental organizations like Taawon operate in these zones with funding that often originates from Hezbollah or the state, creating a financial loop that sustains Hezbollah's influence even after kinetic disarmament efforts. The core challenge lies in purging Hezbollah from security, military, and decision-making institutions within the Lebanese government, which is fundamentally a political decision rather than just a logistical one. Ghaddar highlights that this process requires top-level resolve from the president and prime minister to challenge powerful figures like Nabih Berri, the speaker of the house who represents Hezbollah's interests within parliament. Without a decisive political will to sanction or remove these key allies, Hezbollah can easily maintain its grip on the system. The urgency of this action is underscored by upcoming elections in a year and a half; if the government does not act now, Hezbollah and its Amal movement allies could simply return to power through the ballot box as if no changes had occurred. Ultimately, replacing Hezbollah's influence will take years but must begin immediately to prevent the status quo from solidifying before the next election cycle. The Lebanese state has delayed this necessary transition for too long, and waiting any longer risks allowing Hezbollah to fully re-establish its dominance in the parliament and government once elections are held. Success depends on a clear political commitment to challenge the existing power structures that protect Hezbollah's presence within state institutions. Only by making the difficult decision to confront these entrenched interests can Lebanon hope to build a future where the state is the sole provider of security and welfare, breaking the cycle of dependency that has persisted for decades in border villages.

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The Lebanese state is trying to take on Hezbollah, but not on the battlefield. In three southern pilot zones, the army is now leading reconstruction, repairing roads, and trying to convince residents that the Lebanese state, not Hezbollah, can provide security and basic services. The problem is that Hezbollah still pays rent, school fees, and medical bills for thousands of families. Taking away its weapons is one challenge, but replacing the system that made people dependent on it poses another challenge altogether. To discuss more, we're joined now by Hanin Ghaddar, senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Hanin, great to have you with us on I24 News. Thank you. >> Thank you very much for having me back. >> Well, for decades, the Lebanese state has been somewhat absent, especially in villages along the border with Israel. So, in the struggle to regain influence, can the Lebanese state realistically replace Hezbollah's welfare network? >> That's a very good question, and it's really tied to what's happening today, especially in the pilot zone. So, there are two things. So, the framework agreement that was the trilateral framework agreement agreed between the Lebanese state, the Israeli state, and the American uh US Trump administration states very clearly that it's not just about disarmament, it's about dismantlement. Dismantlement means also that uh the state should uh replace uh all uh of the armed militias. They will be no longer uh present, and the state will be the only armed group, but also it states this dismantlement. Dismantlement means also dismantling Hezbollah's military infrastructure, but also uh Hezbollah's uh uh you know, um uh uh integration within state institutions that support this welfare system. So, Hezbollah today is capable of providing social services to its members, not supporters, only members because they can't afford to serve everyone, mainly because they are still present within the state institutions. Let's take for example the pilot zone that you mentioned. The pilot zone, the army is deployed, but it hasn't done disarmament yet because they are using the excuse of private properties which yet to be solved. So, and the mechanism that is yet to be verified. So, this armament that means that Hezbollah without disarmament means that Hezbollah can still have arms within these private properties. The problem there as well is that because of Hezbollah's other soft power presence within state safe in the state institutions and on the ground within these pilot zones, you have Hezbollah's NGOs like Taawon present in these pilot zones taking care of the people. And the money that they're getting is either from Hezbollah's services or from the state which works for with all NGOs. So, it's very important today is to purge Hezbollah from state institutions. Not just do it militarily, kinetically, but also really remove Hezbollah from the security institutions, remove Hezbollah from the military institutions, and from the state institutions where these decisions to actually send money to from the government to organizations that will fund Hezbollah's welfare system is very crucial. And this is this is what makes it very >> But moving forward with this, how long of a process would something like that even take? We're looking at three tiny little pilot zones right if it doesn't seem like it with the weapons, still has the influence there. So, when you talk about the the entire Lebanese state, how can we even start to look at that process? >> It's a political decision, honestly. I don't think it's just the process as soon as it happens, it will become a snowball. But I really believe that it is about a political decision. Does the Lebanese government really want to get rid of Hezbollah once and for all? Does Nabih Berri, the head of the Amal movement, who is today the speaker of the house still, who who actually is today the the guy who is representing Hezbollah and protecting Hezbollah's presence within state institutions? Why is he still not not not being punished for this or not being threatened with sanctions because of what he does? So, their purging starts from top, but also through all the state institutions. The problem really is a decision. Is the president and the prime minister willing to challenge the speaker of the house and Hezbollah's influence within state institutions to make sure that they no longer have any influence in the decision-making and the welfare system? That's a political decision that they have to make. Once they make it, it's challenge. It will take a few years, but we have to start somewhere because if we don't start today, the elections are coming in a year and a half, and then Hezbollah and Amal will use the system in order to come back to the parliament and to the government as if nothing has happened. So, we have the government of Lebanon should have done this last year, not today, but it's really starts with a political decision.