Kurt Campbell on China Strategy and Diplomacy

China [music] is one of the 21st century's most consequential nations. It has never been more important to understand how the country [music] is governed and what its leaders and its people actually want and believe. Welcome to Pecking, [music] the podcast that unpacks China's evolving political system and the trajectory of China's domestic and foreign policy. [music] I'm your host, Henrietta Levven, senior fellow with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at [music] CSIS. This is Pecology. >> To our loyal listeners, Henrietta is away this week. So, we are revisiting an earlier episode. On July 10th, 2025, Pinology released an episode with Kerr Campbell, former deputy secretary of state and President Biden's Asia. Henrietta and Kurd discussed how Beijing views American power, the development of US strategy toward China, and US China diplomacy. As we get closer to the Trump seat summit this month, we thought it would be a good time to revisit Kurt's insights and personal experience in managing the highest stakes questions in USChina relations. >> At this incredibly complicated time for the USChina relationship, I am thrilled to be joined by Dr. Kurt Campbell, an exceptional scholar of China and the Indo-Pacific, who previously served as deputy secretary of state and President Biden's AsiaR at the White House. Kurt is currently chairman of the Asia Group and a distinguished fellow in diplomacy at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service and he may have spent more time in the room with Chinese presidents and top officials than any living American. Kurt, it's great to see you. It's wonderful to be here with you, Henreda. Congratulations on your new position, and I'm thrilled to be able to join you on the podcast today. >> Thanks so much. So, when it comes to China strategy, it seems like you've often started from the question of how Chinese officials see American power and how that influences China's goals, its sense of urgency, and its tolerance for risk. And you've said quite a few times that by 2020, Chinese President Xi had viewed the United States, the nation, in uh I think you've said hurdling decline. And when you joined President Biden's staff in 2021, you set out to change she's mind. And I'm hoping you can talk a little bit about how you thought about achieving that. >> Yeah. Well, first thanks again, Henrietta. I I will say the idea of tracking or monitoring or raiding American power is not unique to China particularly in the Indoacific. It has been a practice of leadership and strategists in the Indoacific frankly [snorts] for decades and the idea or the concept or the belief in American decline has been a thoroughgoing affair frankly for decades. And it's interesting how many times Asian elites have predicted that the United States was on the way down. It happened during the Korean War when initially American forces were overrun just a few years after the historic victories in the Second World War. It happened during the Vietnam War when particularly allies and friends in Southeast Asia were deeply worried that the departure under such difficult circumstances from Vietnam would have cascading effects. across Southeast Asia. It happened actually during the first financial crisis in 1997 1998. A real worried that the United States was late to the game and offering support for Asian currencies. And I think most consequentially it happened during the 2008 2009 financial crisis in which China in particular had deep concerns about the durability of the American financial system and then more recently with respect to COVID. I give you this with respect to the background in the Indo-Pacific. So the Chinese are deeply focused on American power. I think in some circumstances, Henry, they have been almost wishful in their hopes to see American decline and they've I think over interpreted a lot of data over the course of the last couple of decades and they've tended to focus more on elements of American challenges and weaknesses than some of the areas of strength and the American ability to reimagine and reinvent ourselves. I think it's not an accident that the person perhaps more important than anyone advising President Xi on ideology and how to see the world is Wong Huning. And he wrote a fantastic book about American decline that was written decades ago from his experience as a graduate student in the United States. And so I think beginning about 10 years ago, it became an abiding faith in the Chinese elite circles that the United States was in decline and it was really that global politics were there for China for the taking. And I think when President Biden came to power, the idea was to explore sort of the levels of that analysis and then try to design a strategy that would both be convincing to our allies and partners but also to others that you know those who are counting out the United States are are wrong. So I think the first element in that strategy ener was reinvesting in the United States and that means in a variety of technology pursuits. Now the truth is we're discussing this in the context of this new big beautiful bill which in fact I I think airingly has focused on rolling back many of these programs that are really about reinvestment in manufacturing and clean energy and 5G across a variety of arenas. that that first element in sort of signaling that we are not giving up particularly on cutting edge technologies was critical and I think those bills were extraordinary in both their ambition but also the fact that they were quite bipartisan. I think the second element of that is recognizing that contemporary Chinese strategy must involve working with allies and partners and that's not just the traditional allies and partners like Japan, South Korea and Australia but bringing new actors to the table countries like India and countries in Europe in particular who also have an interest in engaging actively in the Indoacific and then with those elements well underway then undertaking consequence potential diplomacy with Beijing. I must say in I'm not sure we did a great job articulating that strategy always and making that clear but implementing it I think in retrospect I think there are signs of success in this overall approach >> and why do you think in the end it was harder to communicate that strategy than to do it? So, you know, I don't think I need to tell you the challenges of governance more generally. And although I am very proud of the work that we did in the Biden administration in a variety of areas, particularly in the Indoacific, I don't think anyone is going to quarrel with the general assessment that we were not very good at strategic communication. And you know, I think President Biden had many areas of deep knowledge and competence, but the ability to really carefully explain complex policy areas that certainly not demonstrated as much as we would have liked. And I think it is also the case that so many other things were taking place on the domestic front and other areas in the Middle East and Europe that sometimes our successes were drowned out. I would also say just as a general level, you know, when we talk about the idea of pivoting or focusing more on the endopacific, it is not simply government institutions and people that serve in government that need to be more focused. But many of our dominant institutions, the press, TV, they are more trained and more knowledgeable and issues that play out in the Middle East are more recognizable than some of the issues that we experienced in the Indoacific. And it's going to take time to help sort of a new generation of people that are focused on global politics to understand the dynamics of power that play out in the Endopacific. You mentioned that questions about American staying power are not necessarily unique to Beijing, but one way in which Beijing's perspective would be unique seems to be the role of ideology in shaping their leaders worldview. Could could you speak to how ideology plays into both let's say President Xi's perception of at the time American decline and also how you crafted the American China strategy to try and change his mind? >> Yeah. Well, first of all, I do want to just correct you with a little bit. I think I was part of an effort and I'm proud of that work. But the truth is it really was a collective effort and the only way you can be successful in government is to share the role of rowing together. This is not an effort that can be [snorts] accomplished alone. And so I was grateful that I had the opportunity to serve with a variety of people including you who together I think we understood the nature of the challenge. We tried to marshall elements of the US government around a series of propositions that I think we had some mutual agreement on. It's interesting. I'm in business now and when you talk to most people who deal with China on a commercial basis, they will often tell you quite directly that look, China is a deeply practical place and people will make practical decisions in the workplace and in boardrooms. But what is striking about President Xi and some of the people around them is that the animating feature in their lives and how they see the world is less sort of you know the kind of practicalities that you see often in commercial enterprises. It is really animated by ideology and the truth is that President Xi and the people around him are the last true believers in China and they believe deeply that not just ideology but the role of the party is central to Chinese life. One of the things that we're always trying to understand is that at what moment in his life did he have such an incredible conversion? So he saw the brutalities and the difficulties of the cultural revolution, was thrust out of his home, was you know wandering and homeless for a period we think certainly hungry and you know alienated from his family. He saw his father treated poorly. But at some moment he decided that even though it was the result of the party that he'd seen all this hardship that it was also the party that could be the country's savior and you know he has exemplified that throughout his career. He has always believed in the role of the party to be the sort of saving grace and the driving force at keeping China moving distinctly into the future. It's often difficult to discern whether he is able to differentiate his own role because he believes that he is uniquely positioned to take China into the future and the role of the party. Right? And the truth is that they are two quite distinct things I think in some theoretical sense but from his perspective they are almost one of the same. And so what he has been involved in essentially since coming to power now over 10 years ago is a constant perpetual set of purges that has gone after people that he thinks are either impure or a threat to the party. And these are party members. So these are not just people in the military. That's the most recent manifestation of these actions. But you also see it against people that are entertainment in the news media in party bureaucracies, regional settings like Shanghai. He has basically taken sort of the shei focus on purification of the party into every sector of Chinese society. >> And we can talk a little bit about the Trump administration's approach later on. But in thinking about this period of time during the Biden administration, do you feel like President Xi and his entourage did revisit their assumptions about American intentions, American power as a result of, you know, this three-prong strategy, investing in American strength, investing in alliances, undertaking consequential diplomacy. Did you see a change? >> So, it's a really good question and it's one of those things that I think probably is going to take a little bit more time to fully understand. I I will say one of the factors that President Biden focused on intently at the outset was to develop a strategy domestically that was involved not just in investment but building bipartisan consensus and Ina you were involved in this. We were often briefing across the aisle in Congress and underscoring the bipartisan nature of our approach. And so what's interesting is all that work was quite bipartisan. Now there there's almost a new dimension, a Trumpian dimension which is in many respects not just differentiated from Biden's approach but also a departure from traditional Republican approaches so we can get to that. I think the efforts to build new allies and partners struck at the core of Chinese assessments about American standing and American capacity. And I think it would be fair to say that some of the work that we did, particularly the Quad and AUS, created quite a lot of consternation in Beijing and then quite a lot of careful, I wouldn't say rethinking, but at least reflection on their overarching framework of the United States. I believe it is correct to say Henrietta that the way that Chinese friends and interlocators in the inological realm dealt with this is not to say that gee we got this wrong that the United States has more staying power than we had anticipated and we have to take that into consideration. I think what they instead said to themselves and in internal halls of power is that in the last stages of American power, it's not unlikely to see, you know, rapid movements, sort of desperate efforts, you know, last ditch tries and that China had to be on the watch for that. So I think that's how they saw or interpreted some of the actions that the Biden administration undertook as not necessarily evidence that required a rethinking but more ah this is what happens in latestage capitalism. I will also say that I don't think that conclusion was shared across all practitioners and intelligencia. And I think as you recall a couple of years ago, Enria, there were a few people in their Chinese blogs or their writings raised concerns about spending too much time talking about the relative power of other countries like the United States. and that some of these commentators said, "Gee, we should spend more time thinking about ourselves and less about the power of others." And I think that was interpreted as a veiled criticism of the party approach. And those individuals that occasionally made these kinds of offerings in their strategic commentary were warned and some of them were restricted for travel for a period for suggesting that they were questioning the stated and clear view of the party which is the United States is in decline. So I don't believe fundamentally that has been revisited and I think they've sought instead to think that these tactics were again manifestation of a late stage urgent and you know sudden efforts at somehow restoring American power on the global stage. And in your April Foreign Affairs article, mostly on the importance of achieving allied scale, deepening collaboration with partners, you noted in reference to the American condition, the rise and fall of great powers often begins with flawed self diagnosis. But does that apply to China as well? Do you think China has a flawed self diagnosis of their own national power or were they only wrong about in your view the US side of the equation? So I think the secret in almost all these estimations is that when dominant views can be challenged and that it is possible in a system of government to speak truth to power and that's often why checks and balances in a systems can be useful. It can impede dramatic rapid, you know, movements sometimes, but it also can be checks on assessments that are incorrect or off base either domestically or internationally. And I think one of the things that I'm concerned by is we're seeing more and more that the assessments that are made not just in Beijing, but in Washington are very carefully dealt with by the bureaucracy. If the president decides that this is an outcome, no one wants to challenge that more directly. I think we see that keenly in China and I think that we've seen a number of areas whether it's on dealing with COVID in cities like Shanghai during the real crisis periods in 2021 2022 in China or whether it's on issues associated with property values in particular loces that some of both the assessments and the [clears throat] policy approaches are handled very genderly. that no one really wants to critique the Chinese government approach for fear of, you know, alienating leadership and then finding themselves in the crosshairs. And so the truth is, I do think systems that lack sort of the necessary ability to check the power of the central leader run the risk of getting off on the wrong track. I think that has clearly happened in China and we worry that it could be happening here in the United States as well. Even though very different systems of government, but still an accumulation of power in one man or one sort of small subset of people and a fear of challenging that dominant vision >> and the implications for getting real information to the people who make decisions is critical. >> Absolutely. Yeah. >> I'm hoping we can talk about USChina diplomacy. Mhm. >> You [clears throat] planned I don't know how many meetings and calls between President Biden and President Xi as well as National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, Secretary Tony Blinken and their counterpart Wangi, who of course was both the foreign minister and also the director of Central Foreign Affairs Commission. Is there one meeting that stands out to you as the most important? >> That's a great question and each has, you know, manifestations that are important. I found Woodside to be the most significant because that took place at a time, frankly, that we were able to develop all elements of the strategy that I laid out earlier. And I [clears throat] think we went into that meeting with a sense of confidence and strength and I think that played out in the results and I liked our preparation in advance of that. Henrietta, you and I were both involved in many of the engagements that Jake Sullivan had with his counterpart. And I think the latter engagements with Wongi were deeply consequential. You know, there's always the desire in Scientology land to have the kind of strategic conversations that marked the opening when >> everyone wants to be Kissinger. >> Yeah. Well, you know, and it is the romance of the US China relationship. Everyone wants to sit with Joe and lie and talk about the French Revolution. But in truth, Jake and his counterparts were able to talk about the world, whether it was developments in technology, what was transpiring in Ukraine, issues in the Middle East in ways that were deeply consequential. I won't say that the two sides always saw eye to eye, but I think there was a kind of professional respect and trust that was developed through that process that served at least American interests. >> I agree. I think it was striking how authentic the exchange seemed to be between NSA Sullivan and director Wangi even on issues where there was you know a massive strategic chasm between our respective goals and I wonder why you think that that channel that engagement proved so effective at a time where it was quite challenging to get past the talking points in other venues. Well, look, the truth is, you know, we've gone from a period where we had very substantial engagements with Chinese interlocators across many venues in our government to a very different period in which those conversations are severely constrained to just a couple of different venues and that puts an enormous weight and importance on those discussions and it also creates a lot of pressure as well. I would say during much of the Biden administration, the dominant arena of discussions frankly was through the White House. I can say that even during my time at the State Department. And what is clear over decades and this began frankly during the earliest periods of diplomacy in both the Carter and then subsequently the Nixon administration during the opening. And the lesson that we taught the Chinese is that if it's important and significant, it's going to come from the White House. And I think that's something that Chinese interlocators have come to believe. And the role of National Security Council adviser, I think, is deeply significant. The only other time in which we had really important, consequential, thoroughgoing discussions with the Chinese was probably during the period that Secretary Pollson was at the Treasury Department and the SNED was launched. And this was a period where really largely like-minded financial types on each side of the ledger, US and China, were able to sit down and talk about, you know, consequential issues together outside of some of the political framing that we have in other venues. But I think the Chinese began to understand the importance of this useful venue between national security adviserss. But it is also the case that at its core the USChina relationship now is animated by the engagement between our leaders. And I cannot begin to tell you what the stakes are like. That means that during a couple hour meeting either a video call or you know that both sides are freighting these conversations just enormously. And so one of the things that the Chinese would insist upon is that in advance of any meeting between our two leaders that levels of preparation really unprecedented dialogue would take place so that there were no surprises when our two leaders met and that at least created the prospects of being able to discuss the most difficult issues in ways that wouldn't lead us off the tracks. Right? So I think people understood that Jake and Wangi were able to have conversations in their own right about strategic issues, but they were also the essential sherpas in preparing the way for leaders to meet at the summit. >> And you know across these summits in Bali or Woodside, other meetings between the president and President Xi, you've spent so much time with Shei and with his entourage in preparation and in the meetings themselves. Did anything in their demeanor surprise you? >> Well, you know, I've had an opportunity to interact with a lot of senior Chinese officials over years. I was particularly close to a couple of Chinese diplomats like Suien Kai who I would consider to be one of the finest diplomatic representatives of any country and an extraordinarily able diplomatist at every level. I was able at the last to engage with Yang Jachure who as you know played his final role as the central foreign policy representative of the leadership and I sensed in him a frustration a tiredness almost a desire to get off the stage almost to retreat from foreign policy and national security and both a weariness and a weariness and I think that played out in some of the discussions with Jake Sullivan and with Secretary Blinken, we saw at times he was a person who was really there at the creation of the foundational elements of US China relations, was an initial interpreter, became close with the Bush family, spent summers sometimes on vacation in Kabunkport and really was there, you know, kind of among the chosen few who were the helmsmen of the US China relationship. And then he basically left office at the bottom point of US China relations and I sensed a sadness in him but also a role in helping it get to that level as well which I think he felt like he needed to do. >> If you think of the Anchorage meeting for example >> I mean that frankly steps on both sides. The decision to each of us to sort of air our public anxieties in front of the press meant that the whole focus of what took place in Anchorage was the back and forth in front of the press in advance rather than the moderately productive sessions that we had after. No one asks about the conversation after everyone talks about what happened at the press clash [snorts] and it is now in retrospect thought of almost as a cautionary tale right >> and after the press left is that where you saw more sadness from young >> no I would say I saw it more in meetings with Jake we would meet across Europe during that period and you know you're always looking for clues here there is that moment as you recall all when at the party congress when Huenta has that awkward moment and is basically ushered off stage and you know there are questions about you know whether the party ranks were stacked in a way to put his faction or his group at a disadvantage. This was a very highly public event >> public but what was striking at the moment when he's escorted off the stage and you know in front of him you know he's escorted behind and in front of him are all the basically senior officials of the party and the government and you know one of the people that had the longest relationship with young was Huenta he played a huge role in his early career And as he's been escorted off kind of roughly by these young security guards, you know, if you look at this video, you see Yang Jer just staring straight ahead. And you know, any system that kind of demands that, right? There's no human like, you know, let me help this poor guy off stage or anything like that. It just shows you the challenges that you face at this stage in the Chinese government. It's a great point that it shows the brutality of the system regardless of what that specific moment was intended to achieve. >> And we don't know exactly how Young felt when he left. But I sense the desire. You know, power is a thing that is hard to part with often. And most people want to keep it till the very last. But there are the rare people that decide it's time for me to leave. I think he was in that latter group. And how do you see the Biden administration's China legacy and and how do you think that legacy is viewed in Beijing? >> Well, you know, the hard thing, Henry, [clears throat and snorts] and it's a great question. When we first came to power in the Biden administration, I think there was an initial view that maybe the Trump administration was an anacronism, you know, a blip and now we were going to return to a more predictable kind of traditional quote normal way of conducting foreign policy and national security. I think now that rendering or that historic view has got to be re-evaluated and so you wonder maybe it's the Biden experience that is the outlier as opposed to the constant and that's something you know that's being thought about and and engaged upon politically in the United States as we speak. But I believe that history will be kind to the work that we've done in the Indoacific. It's not clear how much of it will survive and in what form, but it is absolutely clear that some of our initiatives were decisive and important. And I I don't mind revealing this. I helped run parts of the transition and I engaged with very senior people on the Trump team. One of the conversations that I had with a senior person, he came right out and told me, he said, "Look, there was some really good work done. I'm not going to deny that. So, what we're going to do is to say that some of those initiatives were actually undertook by President Trump even though you did them, but we're going to say we did them and they were neglected by you and now we're back to resurrect them and you're >> the highest compliment. >> Well, it doesn't feel that much like a compliment sometimes, but you have to suck it up. If that's what it takes to see certain things that you invested a lot of bipartisan effort in to continue to see the future, then that's a small price to pay. And you can see that even in Secretary Rubio's engagement with the Quad recently, convening the foreign ministers and issuing a joint statement that seemed in many ways almost surprisingly continuous in building on, you know, the Biden administration's work in collaborating on maritime security, on non-prololiferation, on really critical issues basing the region. >> Totally true. And it is absolutely clear that they're based on the work that we've done. And anyone who follows the Quad would know that and understand that. But if you look at how it's positioned, it's basically described as this is something that was launched and basically manifested during the first Trump administration. Then, you know, whatever happened the last four years, we're not sure, but we're now picking up the baton again. And that, to be honest, that's not accurate. We really resurrected the quad both at the foreign minister level made it much more thoroughgoing, much more processoriented and we had the first leader level meetings that took place basically since its inception where we had one quick meeting that was convened as part of the recovery after the tsunami that struck I believe in 2004. Is that right? And really very little since then. It was almost 20 years and then it was the president's very hard work. We had won over almost from the start the idea of a leader level engagement with friends in Australia and Japan. But there was a lot of ambivalence and uncertainty in India. And I really credit President Biden personally undertaking the necessary personal diplomacy with Prime Minister Modi. And Prime Minister Modi initially said I don't think this is right or not the right time. But President Biden insisted and then of course we were able to hold our first virtual and then a number of inperson which were deep and fundamental discussions and initiatives associated with how to recover from COVID, how to you know make sure that we built capacity for the region, how we took on challenges like maritime security, all the different issues that you know well and now we're in a situation that in many respects the driving leader of the quad is India and that's a remarkable transformation in a relatively short period of time to go from ambivalence to leading nation is a important journey. >> Well, now as we are speaking we are almost 6 months into President Trump's second term and Trump and she have spoken as far as the public knows once during that second term during Trump's period in office. The readouts from both sides were brief and conflicting with President Trump saying that it was all about trade and the Chinese for their part saying, "Well, we actually talked about Taiwan, we talked about Chinese students, we talked about broader issues and what are the tea leaves that you read to try and understand what's really going on in those conversations?" >> Yeah. So I think what I am struck by and everyone I think makes the important point about how different President Trump's second term is from his first. There's more of a plan. There's more discipline. There's probably less leaking. There is a tremendous sense of momentum and there's a sense that he's much more effective at putting his political opponents on their back feet. I think that's undeniable. But I think the one area where I see some similarity between the first and second terms really frankly is on China policy. And one of the things that is striking, the decision not to have a party platform. The decision not to have [snorts] driving documents that provide an animating structure to how China policy will be implemented frankly is on full display. And it is also the case, Henrietta, you and I worked at the National Security Council and it is everyone's favorite institution to kick around. But having served myself now, I've had a bit of a career. So I've worked at DoD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, the CIA, Treasury Department, NYSC, and frankly the Department of the Navy. So a couple of different areas of government. I believe that the coordinating role of the NYSE is essential. And one of the things that has been undertaken over the course of the last several months, I think largely because President Trump has believed that the closest manifestation to the deep state in his first term was the NYSE. And so he thought it was working against his interests. And so he's basically in many respects almost disassembled that we're down to an absolute skeleton team. But the essential role of the NYSE in China policy is orchestrating all the various actors and governments who have their particular approaches and pet rocks that they like to advance in a variety of settings. And so we've seen on a couple of occasions how even senior officials get surprised by steps that other actors in government have taken. So for instance, you know, it wasn't clear who would be the leader or the dominant second tier beneath the president interlocator with Chinese opposites. I thought initially that it would be Mike Walt sort of following in the footsteps of Jake Sullivan, but through a series of missteps on his part and frankly miscalculations, he I think lost power quickly and obviously has been moved to the side. We had encouraged him to continue the discussions with Wangi and I think he decided and his team decided that they wanted to elevate that and work with someone more senior. I think the Chinese resisted that and were of the view hey look you don't choose our interlocator we'll decide who our senior person is and that never really worked and so there were others that maneuvered for that role and it turned out that I think for a variety of reasons secretary Bessant has played the central role at least on some elements of the economic and commercial maybe macroeconomic relationship between the United States and China but there's been very little other discussions either at the NYSE or other parts of the government. That is the simple line of interaction between the two sides and frankly the leaders will likely play a critical role as we go forward. And the lack of specificity about what is being discussed I think reflects some divisions across the government. And what you have inside of the Trump administration which is a very large tent are remarkably divergent views on China. You have some groups that are manifested in the Department of Defense and probably a few other places that believe that without question, China is the greatest national security challenge facing the United States and that we have to muster all of our national power and frankly often look away from other places so that we are very focused like a laser on this often almost exclusively in military terms. Now I think there are challenges with that but that's certainly one group. I think there are other groups that believe that it's possible to cut an economic or commercial deal that will stabilize US China relations and I think you see that among some of the kind of oligarchs that are around the president. I think when I interacted with Mr. Musk with Elon. That was clearly his view that it was possible to find some way to work with China. And I think that group is primarily thinking in commercial terms. And there's probably even some who think it's possible to do that and then do more find an ability to stabilize relations even on some of the most difficult issues like crossstrait relations. And I don't honestly know how this is likely to play out. I believe that at the core of the USChina relationship right now is a substantial degree of distrust. In the first term, in the early parts of the administration, Trump really wanted to get along with President Xi and was prepared to make substantial sacrifices or adjustments to US policy, was very prepared to let President Xi move in Hong Kong. Now, some of those views changed and hardened after co and it's too early to tell ultimately where President Trump is going when it comes to President Xi. And this is the hard thing. I travel a lot across Asia as to you, Henrietta. And almost every Asian interlocator asks about what is the strategy of President Trump or the Trump administration. And the truth is that I'm not sure there really is a strategy per se. There are some biases, some grievances, some approaches. I will say I do think the president has a high degree of respect for authoritarian leaders. I think he really respects President Putin and I think he also has some of that same sense of admiration for President Xi. I don't know if he fundamentally accepts that the major strategic challenge to the United States into the future is China. I think there are many people in his administration that believe that. And so after Mr. Bessant, you know, announced these initial achievements in Geneva almost immediately thereafter, other actors in the system took different steps either to restrict Chinese students or technology with respect to the USChina relationship. And what can happen occasionally with all these different actors vying for bureaucratic influence and power and without a convening mechanism like the NSC, policy can appear somewhat uncoordinated. And I think that has been the case particularly on China policy. >> And amid this perhaps limited coordination, President Trump has mused very publicly about a trip to China. even though he seems to not love traveling as a general matter, he seems quite eager to go to Beijing. And what advice would you give him for that trip? >> Well, look, the only thing I would say, and this is not particularly unique, these trips tend to be more successful when there is enough planning that has been done in advance. In fact, I think Chinese interlocators insist on a degree of planning. I don't think President Trump thinks a lot of that is necessary, that he can just get down to business at the leader level. I think the Chinese view the risks with that as enormous and the potential to lose face or to have an unsuccessful meeting is real. And we've seen that in Asia a couple of times when President Trump decided right in the middle of discussions with Kim Jong-un in Vietnam that these talks were not going the direction that he wanted even though there was a full day and a half of programming that had been just meticulously worked out. He decided time to go and basically summon the Air Force One pilots who were you know out by the pool in Hanoi playing Marco Polo and stuff. They had to go rush, get their uniforms on, get out on the airplane, get ready to go because the president had decided that we weren't going to make the progress that he thought was necessary. >> He he also went the whole way to Manila for the East Asia Summit in 2017, but decided not to stay for the East Asia Summit. Yeah. And left just as it was beginning. Surprising. >> Yeah, I I think that's right. And and what we've seen even in this term Henrietta is that a couple of the interactions that he's had, you know, it's not clear he's completely comfortable. And so when he went up to Canada, he stayed for the first day and then said, "I got to get back for the Middle East stuff." But I think there is a suspicion. It wasn't just the the pull of the Middle East. It was the push from, you know, maybe interacting with leaders who were raising issues with him and engaging with him in ways that he didn't really like. Well, I think we'll have to wrap there. I wish we had more time. It's been an exceptional conversation and thank you so much for sharing your insights. >> Great. I'm thrilled. I really appreciate it and I think this podcast really helps understand and interpret the most important consequential bilateral relationship at the peak moment of uh importance and significance. So, it's been an honor to be with you. Thank you. >> Well, we're honored to have you and to learn more about Dr. Campbell's thinking on China. I'd highly recommend a close reading of his April Foreign Affairs article co-authored with CFR's Rush Doshi titled Underestimating China: Why America Needs a New Strategy of Allied Scale to Offset Beijing's Enduring Advantages. And of course, his classic 2016 book, The Pivot. >> Yeah. And be one of the five people to own that book. So, I think >> Well, they'd be six. big number >> if you could find it because print. But thank you. >> Um Oh, I actually just bought a copy because I felt like I needed one for my office and home. So, you can do it. You can do it. >> My aunt sells them, I think. So, [laughter] >> we'll we'll throw your aunt's contact information in the show notes. And to our listeners, we'd love to hear what you thought of the show and which guests you'd like to see on Peckingology in the future. 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