Israel and Turkey face-off in Syria | On the Record with Charles Lister

[music] Good evening and welcome to On the Record, I24 News's in-depth interview show. For the better part of a year, Israel and Turkey had been operating under an informal agreement dividing Syria into [music] security zones in which each side can operate. This included a direct hotline to prevent clashes between the sides. But those understandings appear to have collapsed or at least challenged after Israeli air strikes two weeks ago targeted the Abul Dhour air base in [music] northern Syria located some 70 kilometers from the Turkish border. Israel said that Turkey was preparing to deploy air defense systems at the base, a claim that Ankora denies. The strike [music] sparked an exchange of harsh rhetoric between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Turkish President Reupta Erdogan with each leader accusing the others country of posing a threat not only to their own nation's national security but to the region as a whole. Now Israel and Turkey appear to be on a collision course with Syria emerging as the main battleground between these two regional powers. So to break down what this all means and whether a direct clash between Israel and Turkey is avoidable or simply a matter of time, it's a pleasure to have back on the show Charles [music] Listister. [music] Listister is a senior fellow and director of the Syria Initiative at the Middle East Institute. He consults the United Nations on issues related to Syria and also serves as an expert witness and adviser on counterterrorism for US, [music] European, and Australian law enforcement bodies. Charles, thank you for coming back on the show. >> Ariel, thanks for having me. >> So, are we witnessing the collapse of these understandings between Israel and Turkey regarding Syria? Well, I think certainly the understandings themselves that date back as you know well over a year to the kind of quiet negotiations in in Azaba in Baku. Yeah. I mean they essentially sort of did collapse uh a few weeks ago with those air strikes that you mentioned. Although I think there is a desire certainly on many other sides to see those very same understandings essentially reestablished. that was a good place for all of the actors to be in and there shouldn't be a reason why um those understandings shouldn't be reestablished. So I think that's where the energies of the US government have been in the last few weeks of trying to get both Israel and Turkey but also Syria stuck in the middle uh back to the table back to a place where all sides can agree on on those kinds of understandings. So could you take us back to those talks in Baku? I mean what was the thinking behind these understandings kind of drawing a line across Syria? Israel claims that the line was as north as Aleppo. Turkey claims that that line was positioned in the T4 base in Palmra further south. But generally speaking, what was the rationale behind these understandings? I mean well the impetus of course for those talks themselves was first of all the fact that Assad's regime collapsed and into that sort of space uh was created a great deal of sort of uncertainty and of course we saw tensions very quickly rise between Israel and Turkey in the wake of that kind of perceived vacuum. Um Turkey clearly a longtime partner of the Syrian opposition, Israel clearly an actor with long-standing concerns around Syria. Um and uh and Turkey was was seeking to fill vacuums and Israel was seeking to continue to exert freedom of operation and freedom of maneuver. And of course in the wake of October the 7th probably all the more so. Um so with some US uh encouragement those talks uh were convened in Baku there were several rounds and long story short at least from what I understand from the US side. So not from Israelis, not from Turks and not from Syrians, but from the US side is that more or less their understanding was that the line was drawn more or less from the center of the country. So around T4 air base and several other air bases in the center of the country. Um and so certainly from the perception and that was why the US was quite surprised that Israel took that recent action just a few weeks ago um was because that air base that was struck was way above the line that had previously been agreed. And so there was a perception at least that Israel was seeking to renegotiate those understandings um by pushing that line further north. Um so yes, as I say that therefore we are in that more uncertain place but Turkey is a natural partner of the opposition. Turkey is seeking to exert more influence particularly over the military sector uh in Syria. Um and given in your introduction, you know, the aggressive and hostile rhetoric, frankly speaking, from both sides, um then that kind of activity naturally creates um serious concerns and in that space there has to be diplomatic understandings to avoid uh any kind of escalation, which I think frankly neither side wants. Um but without those understandings, it is certainly something that becomes a lot more possible. Mhm. Now, you're saying that Turkey here is trying to both fill in this vacuum that has been left by Iran basically being kicked out of Syria, but also trying to increase their influence, their foothold in Syria, at least militarily. Now in Israel, this step by Turkey or specifically by Erdogan is being painted as part of Erdogan's ambition to establish this renewed neotoman dream to revive the Turkish Empire. How do you view Turkeykey's um interest to increase its influence in Syria? What is driving this? Well, I think I honestly as an analyst I think all of the kind of neootman talk is is a bit childish and we should put that to side. All governments around the world are naturally self-interested. Turkey sees an opportunity in Syria just in the same way as dozens and dozens of other governments around the world have seen a new potential opportunity in Syria. Turkey is naturally better positioned geographically to take advantage of that. uh politically it has pre-standing relationships with armed previous armed opposition groups in Syria and I should emphasize not so much with Sham the group that others worried about the most but with what's called the Syrian National Army more mainstream but equally more probably in terms of corrupt practices and and and violent histories. Um but so Turkey sees and saw the fall of the Assad's regime as an opportunity to take advantage. Now what we have quickly seen over nearly the last 2 years is that Turkey doesn't have an economic advantage. So it's not really been able to get in on the game in terms of investments, construction, you know, holding cards within the economic recovery of Syria. The one opportunity it has had is given those price pre-standing relationships with certain armed groups in Syria is within the Ministry of Defense in Syria. And that's where we've been able to see Turkey step in more or less unchallenged by other regional states that in lots of other sectors of Syria have sought to compete with each other uh fruitfully compete but compete nonetheless. Um now does that mean they want to take over Syria? No. Does that mean they want to use Syria as a base for launching attacks on Israel? Of course not. But Turkey is a self-interested actor like all other governments and it's seeking opportunities. Now, the only other thing, and forgive the long answer I'll add here, is given the fact that, and I'm going to be plain and blunt here, there is a very short list of governments or entities around the world who have been hostile to the new Syrian government since Assad's fall. It's very short. It's Israel, it's ISIS, and it's Iran. That's pretty much it. And given that, Turkey has invested in shoring up Syria's ability to deter or confront, depending on which of those actors is on those list, those threats, whether it be counterterrorism assistance to the Ministry of Defense to defeat ISIS or or Dash, or whether it's structural abilities to withhold the state against external attack from governments like Israel and like Iran. And so again, the only reason Turkey is seeking to do that is because there is that threat. There is that hostile challenge. And my opinion is we should put all of that aside and realize that Syria could be an opportunity for everybody. It doesn't have to be automatically hostile and a and an area for kind of hostile competition. >> I'm I'm I'm glad you touched on that and also the way you presented that because I want to bring the flip side of that coin. Israel perceives uh Turkey creeping down to its northern border as a threat. Now I will say that I I personally feel that in Israel the discourse against Turkey has been blown out of proportion and I think we need to look at this as what it is. This is a regional rivalry. This has not yet reached the level of enmity. And yet Israel does feel like it needs to draw a red line in the sand. and that what it did in the strike a couple weeks ago was to present a very clear warning to Turkey, don't go further south. So, you know, in given this kind of sobering view that I think you and I share over uh Israel versus Turkey, how can Syria not become a kind of a battlefield for influence between Israel and Turkey? or is it inevitable? >> Well, it's a very difficult place for what is still a fragile Syrian transitional government with very little resource and I, you know, cannot overstate that point, they have still not enough money to pay their own public sector salaries. So given the fact that Syria's transition after 14 years of civil war and over 50 years of dict dictatorial rule from the Assads faces a thousand1 internal challenges and I'm not just talking about security here everything from you know social challenges to economic challenges and everything else given that Damascus is taking the help that it can get from almost anybody at this stage. I mean, look at the transformation in their relationship with Russia, for example, from enemies to friends overnight. That is because Damascus needs all the help it can get. So, it's a really difficult place to be in. When Ahmed Alshara marched into Damascus in December 2024, the first public message he made was, "We seek to be nobody's enemy and everybody's friend." And ever since then, Damascus has been seeking to balance all of these competing relationships, whether it's historical rivalries between the UAE and Saudi Arabia or whether it's between, you know, Turkey and Egypt or Israel and Turkey and many others. You, you know, you could make a very long list. They've been seeking to balance that. But when those rivalries become potentially de facto hostile as we have seen between Israel and Turkey, it's an increasingly difficult balance to tow. And to make it even more difficult and again I'll be speak plainly here to make it even more difficult is the fact that Syria has continued to have an open kind of olive branch to creating or to establishing or negotiating security accord with Israel with a mind to eventually seeing that transform to a political or a peace agreement. The difficulty is is that the current Israeli government has consistently resisted coming to an eventual agreement. It's been an open secret for many months that the terms of that agreement have been on the table for a long time in American mediated talks, but repeatedly the current Israeli government has refused to essentially sign that piece of paper. So in that vacuum, inevitably Syria will continue to try to find other ways to protect itself from potential Israeli aggression. And that's where that's the crux of where we now have this difficulty. Israel seeks protection. Would you say that Israel's actions in Syria are pushing Damascus closer to Turkey? Because Syrians I'm speaking with, they're not that, you know, pleased or or or happy, you know, to put it plainly about uh be becoming a proxy of Turkey. But they are saying that Israel's actions are pushing Damascus closer um to Turkey. >> Yeah. Well, so so let me rewind briefly and say, you know, when Assad fell, Turkey was naturally the government that could have had the most natural advantage to have influence over, you know, every sector of Syria. But nearly two years later, as I said a little earlier, they very clearly haven't achieved that. And part of that is because Turkey hasn't got a big booming economy. It's not the Gulf State. It's not a UN Security Council actor, etc., etc. But part of it is, as you say, because Syrians realize that they absolutely do not want to be seen as anybody's puppet, but they also particularly realize being sat right in the dead heart of the Middle East, they do not want to be seen as a Turkish puppet for obvious geopolitical reasons. So yes, from the government on down to the population, there's been a resistance to doing that. But yes, I've been saying from very very early on that Israel's policy and behavior towards this new Syria is a self-fulfilling prophecy. I mean, first of all, the idea that there are constant threats on the southwestern border and therefore we have to have, you know, what now in 2026 an average of 60 ground incursions, 60 essential ground invasions of Syria every month, over 20 air and artillery strikes a month, nearly 20 arrests of Syrians every single month on average this year is not in my mind reflective of there being that scale of a threat. But is it going to create one one day down the line? Absolutely it is. And the same thing with this broader geopolitical challenge. If there is absolutely no faith, no trust, and no willingness to enter into any form of an agreement with this new Syrian government, and therefore hostility is the only path, then yes, absolutely. That's going to push the new Syrian government into the hands of any number of other people who are willing to try to protect it from those external threats. >> Now, you're talking about the Israeli government. you know, that government may change in uh just a matter of uh a couple of months. Does >> do does the Syrian government know who it wants to be to form the next government? >> Well, I mean, Syria is not going to get involved in Israeli domestic politics. I don't think that's probably likely to be very helpful. But I think again to speak very plainly, anyone but BB Netanyahu right now. I think uh for the for nearly two years, Syria has been unbelievably patient, unbelievably patient uh in the wake of all of the military actions by Israel. There hasn't been a single response from the Syrian government. Thousands of incursions, air and artillery strikes, and everything else. >> Uh that patience cannot last forever. But there is definitely a perception in Damascus that if there was a change of government in any of the likely directions, and I'm no expert on Israeli elections, but I know enough to be able to say that in the potential directions we may be headed in, then we're not going to have a game-changing development. The new Israeli government is not going to say, "Let's make peace with Syria tomorrow." But they will almost certainly be more open to negotiating in good faith. Negotiating with an intent to potentially make an agreement at the end, not just to string the Trump administration along for as long as possible and then return to hostilities again. And that's the space we need to be in because honestly despite all of the history between Syria and Israel, despite the history of who currently sits in the presidential palace in Damascus, you right now Israel have the most kind of interested government in peace with Israel than has been in Damascus for decades. And so this is a huge potential opportunity, but it will require both parties to be interested in making those deals. >> Very interesting. Now I I want to move on to the situation inside Syria which some could say is uh not less interesting if not more interesting than the regional game. Now last week we saw a very interesting development with Mazuma Abdi the head of the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces basically announcing the dissolution of their force as a separate armed militia integrating into the government. But this, you know, comes at the end of a very long process which was often bloody at times. And so, you know, how what what changed? What finally brought upon this decision on the part of the SDF to dissolve itself and integrate with Damascus? >> Well, I mean, to answer that question, we have to look back at a little bit of the recent history again going back to Assad's fall. And I wrote fairly quickly after the regime fell in Syria that the SDF's days as a kind of autonomous entity that got to control a third of the country were over and that it was going to have to find it was going to be forced to find uh preferably diplomatically uh a way to integrate into the rest of the country. That was inevitable. Well, that was an inevitability that the US government from the CIA to the SenCom and the military to the White House and the State Department and everyone in between all came to that conclusion very quickly after Assad fell. Now the SDF took to its uh you know to its discredit a long time to come to that conclusion sadly and that is why in January this year we we saw the relatively brief eruption of hostilities between government forces and the SDF and sadly after that the SDF was essentially forced to realize that it had no choice but to integrate into the state. Why? because all of the Arab contingent that had joined the SDF over the years with you know with US support and everything else they defected in 24 hours. It was a humiliating uh development for the SDF and Masloom and and other senior officials have since said you know we should have been much earlier in recognizing where the path was headed. So we are where we are now. But I think that wakeup call made it clear to them that if they were to protect some of the kind of political and social gains that they had achieved in northeastern Syria and try to bring that to Damascus, the only way to do that fruitfully was through diplomacy and through integration. And so much to think everybody's surprise that integration process has been relatively smooth. It's not been without its challenges, but the military and security integration of the SDF is now complete. Um, and that's a remarkable, you know, development considering we're only in September. It's only been seven or eight months since this process started. But it's huge for Syria. Uh, and it should be huge for the Kurds of Syria who historically have never had any rights, not even citizenship, uh, in Syria. Now, citizenship is being uh, passed out uh, through a normalization, sorry, you a naturalization process. Um, the Kurdish language is now an official language of Syria. education uh is being integrated. Kurdish language will be taught in northeastern Syria having previously been an illegal language. So there are great gains. Of course, there can be more. >> Now, uh I before I move on to the last part, I do just want to briefly, you know, that's concerning the Kurds, but what about the Drews? We're still seeing clashes, flare-ups in Sedua area. what is preventing them from receiving this wakeup call that uh you said that the Kurds had adhered to briefly please if you will. >> Yeah, I'll try. It's very complicated issue. Uh at the core of it quite frankly there is one man in Sueda who has used uh in a horribly tragic way of course the killings and the massacres that happened in July last year. He has used that as a rallying cry to consolidate his own control. Hikma Hijrier Hiji never wanted a deal with Damascus. Way prior to the violence in July, I saw him twice in person. Both times he said to me line for line, "There is no deal to be made with the Takiri jihadist in Damascus." He said that in January, right after the regime fell. He said that again in the spring. He's never had an intention. And he has used that violence to consolidate his dominance in Sueda. The difficulty is that dominance is starting to fray. uh increasingly the population is beginning to question whether or not you know becoming part of Israel which as you know is never going to happen uh or being its own independent state which is also never going to happen is a very smart strategy and in the wake of those questions instability inside Sueda is increasing in fact last week was the most unstable week SUA has seen since the July violence internally no in not not looking at incidents involving the government purely Drews on Drews instability >> that's [clears throat] increasingly going to require contact with Damascus and some kind of some kind of a compromise. >> Obviously, the list of challenges for Syria internally is uh very long, but it may have just gotten a little shorter with this integration. Now, I want to move on to the last part of the show. That's the rapid fire segment. I'll show you three pictures and briefly, if you will, tell me the first thing that comes to mind. So, here's the first picture. These are the leaders of uh Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signing the Mecca agreement just a few weeks ago. >> Well, I think this is a huge development for the region. And I think it's very emblematic of equally I would say post October the 7th reality um that a large part of the region feels the need increasingly to look after themselves to take you know to look after their own affairs to gather their own kind of geopolitical weight in order to push back or deter uh challenges from others and yes quite frankly Israel is a core part of that. Um, and I would say talking about Syria or all three of those, but particularly for Saudi Arabia and Turkey, a challenge to Syria's transition, an existential challenge is precisely one of those reasons why something like the Mecca Accord has been put together uh is to try to deter any kind of existential challenge to opportunities they perceive such as Syria. >> Mhm. All right. Even though they say it's not aimed at a specific country. Now, uh let's move on to the next picture. This is US ambassador to Turkey and special envoy to Syria and Iraq, Tom Barack. >> Well, I think Ambassador Barack has has emerged and has remained an extremely influential figure within the Trump administration. Uh his his views, his opinions may not always please everybody. Uh but it is palpably clear he has the full backing of President Trump. So despite lots of attempts on the internet and social media and arguably by other governments around the world to try to get him unseated, it's not going to happen. Um uh he the policies he has implemented as special envoy to Syria are the policies of President Trump. There is no gap between those two individuals. And so so long as that remains the case, he will remain uh in his position and continue to be highly influential uh special envoy. When you look at the the history of special envoy influence, Barack is is right at the top in terms of the actual influence he's managed to have. >> Mhm. All right. And the last picture, you kind of jumped the gun earlier in the conversation. This is uh Syria's uh spir Drew spiritual leader briefly because you've pretty much given a lot. Yeah, I I would say and again because my style is to be blunt, I think Hri is at the point now where he's holding Sueder hostage and that's not to take away from the horrible violence that happened last year, but there has to be a solution for Sueda. Um, and at the moment his absolute zero sum position, no contact, no negotiation, no compromise, uh, is totally unsustainable. The fact that students in Suede are unable to take examinations because he deployed his militias to prevent them from traveling to examination centers is a palpable example of him prioritizing his own personal interests above and beyond the population that he socal governs. Um, and I think there has to be more flexibility from him or an alternative to him inside SUA to open up a path for diplomacy on Sueda. >> Mhm. Well, you know, I always appreciate bluntness and uh your cander. So, uh I want to thank you again, Charles, for joining. We are going to though have to leave it there for now. Tune in again next week here at On the Record. You can find today's episode and all previous shows on YouTube and Spotify. Thank you for watching. [music]