Is Turkey a threat to Israel? | On the Record with Hay Eytan

[music] Good evening and welcome to On the Record, I24 News's in-depth interview show. Relations between Israel and Turkey have known their ups and downs over the years, but tensions between Jerusalem and Ankora entered yet another period of friction in [music] the wake of the August 18th Israeli air strike on the Abul Dhul air base in Syria's northwestern Idlib province. Following the strike, the Israeli prime minister's office for the first time explicitly characterized Turkeykey's military deployment in Syria as a threat. This new characterization marks a significant shift in how Israel views Turkey. This shift officially began in January of 2025 when a commission headed by Israel's former National Security Council Chief Yakov Nagiel, tasked with drafting Israel's new security strategy placed Turkey in the category of [music] a quote rival state with the potential to become an enemy state. So, how did it happen that Turkey, the first Muslim majority country to recognize Israel's independence, has now become a potential threat? The host of Hamas leadership and one of the leading voices against Israel on the global stage. Well, to break all this down, I'm joined tonight by Kai Eton Coin, Yanar Rojak. Born and raised in Istanbul, Etton is a Turkey expert at the Moshe Dan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University [music] and the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security. He teaches at Tel Aviv University and Shalm College in Jerusalem. Kai, thank you very much for joining me tonight. >> Thank you very much for having me. >> So, [snorts] you know, I drew up in the introduction a shift in relations between Israel and Turkey, but if you had to define right now the current state of relations between Israel and Turkey, are we talking about regional rivals, emerging enemies? How would you define it? >> First of all, I would say it is complicated really. I mean, as you said, Israel and Turkey enjoyed uh bilateral relations since 1949, you know, bilateral recognition without needing any kind of an signing of a peace treaty. Uh these two countries never declared hostilities against each other. So, it was a really the best case scenario to have a proper relationship with a Muslim country. However, unfortunately, uh we began to see that first of all in the Turkish for in the Turkish politics itself the dominant actors began to change after Erdogan came to power. The most important engine for deepening the relationship with the state of Israel was the Turkish armed forces. uh when Erdogan intentionally began to weaken uh the Turkish armed forces and also at the same time when began to see uh that there was a peace process with the uh with the Kurds I mean the PKK. So uh the dependency of Turkish armed forces to the Israeli military technology began to decrease in a dramatic manner. uh in his first and second term, Erdogan was praised as a liberal leader by the European Union. So when you're looking at all of these uh factors, we begin to see that the dependency of Turkey to Israel began to uh you know decrease and uh then uh due to um the ongoing violence here and the attachment of the quality of the relations by the Turkish side on the Israeli Palestinian conflict unfortunately uh deteriorated the relations in an unprecedented manner. all of these cycles of violence in the Gaza Strip. But not only that, we also see that in my opinion the most important issue here is the fall of Assad uh you know since uh December 2024. Two countries in an unofficial way have turned into neighbors in Syria. And I think this is the most important game changer uh in the relations. And that's why you know from the very beginning I I will say that you know it's uh for me it's a kind of a nightmare but I unfortunately I cannot see uh the light at the end of the tunnel. Like even you know nowadays we are marching towards an elections in Israel. >> Mhm. the general elections, maybe even we may see a new Israeli government. And even if I I believe even if we will have a new Israeli government, it will not be enough to mend the fences with Turkey because of this very deepening regional rivalry that we are seeing in Syria, Eastern Mediterranean, Horn of Africa, Gaza Strip and uh these different alliances that we are seeing. Turkey is forging an alliance together with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. H in the brackets we have Egypt which is a very has an ambivalent policy. Uh they're also making a reproan towards the helenic states of Greeks and Greek and Greece and Cyprus and on the other hand they are also approaching uh towards the Turkish Pakistani and Saudi triangle. So on the other hand we are seeing Israel is deepening its relationship uh with Greece and Cyprus and together al of course with United Arab Emirates and India again in the brackets. So this is much more complicated when you have more components in the equation. So I believe that uh the the problematic is becoming more and more complex. Mhm. We're going to get to a lot of the different issues that you raised, but specifically on Syria, when Prime Minister Netanyahu >> warns Turkey that any that Israel will not tolerate Turkish military advancement southwards >> in Syria. >> This basically puts Israel on a direct collision course with Turkey. So, is such a confrontation at the end of the day inevitable? I really hope that uh such an confrontation will never happen because it will not be uh in Israel's interest but it will also not for uh Turkeykey's interest. I think uh both decision makers in Ankara and in Jerusalem they should be more responsible uh to avoid such a confrontation. And I only would like to emphasize that such a uh such a friction between the two states will only play for the hands of the ayatah regime in Iran which is also considered as a traditional rival of the Turkish administration. >> So they also would like not to see such a such a deteration in the relationship. And I know that it sounds weird, but from an Israeli perspective, I can definitely say that uh this uh air strike that was conducted in Abu Alur was a preemptive strike and was a preventive one so that there will be no future real friction. In other words, if we're going to uh translate it into simple English, it was designed to avoid a future direct confrontation because in Israeli eyes since Israel has no strategic depth, let's say, you know, unlike Turkey for instance, Turkey has a huge territory. So they have this strategic depth. But October the 7th shaped the Israeli uh security perception and this Israeli security perception and the new trauma uh is not well understood in Turkey and in other Arab capitals. and uh therefore in order to have a precautionary position in order to stop future threats that might uh threaten Israeli civilians in the future. So Israel is taking some preventive actions. For instance, uh it is controlling some five important hills in Lebanon and also after the fall of Assad, Israeli Defense Forces also maintained control uh in the Syrian golden heights. Well, these are not the parts of a new conquest. Israel is not eager to, you know, um to occupy and then to annex the uh the territories of other nations. We uh truly believe in the spirit of the Abraham Accords. I only would like to remind to our audience that uh before uh the October the 7th, we were only talking about regional peace. We were only debating here in these studios when uh Saudi Arabia would sign a peace treaty with Israel. And then uh these uh the so-called axis of resistance people that that were driven by Iran, they turned everything upside down and now we are we are talking only about war or absence of peace and this is the main problem. So Kai, I'm really glad you raised the, you know, the period before October 7th because back then Israel's president Isaac Kerzog hosted Turkey's ambassador to Israel and this is what he had to say about relations between Israel and Turkey. >> President Erdogan emphasized over the past year in his conversations with me and publicly how much he recognizes the importance of Israel and Turkeykey's partnership. And I would like to take this opportunity as president of Israel to invite President Erdogan to a visit in Israel, which I am sure will contribute to the deepening of relations and cooperation between our two countries. >> Well, Kai, not only did that visit not happen, but [snorts] this looks like a alternative reality. Earlier you explained how we got from where from back then to now, but can you explain why we got to where we are right now in relations between Israel and Turkey as opposed to what we just saw? First of all, we saw a wonderful picture and it was not a photoshop. Right. During the same days, we also witnessed a very important cooperation of the Israeli rescue teams in Turkey. You know, Turkey those days were devastated by an very strong earthquake and the Israeli rescue teams, the IDF were dispatched to Turkey southeast. and they saved dozens of lives of Turkish citizens. And then the IDF was very much appreciated and everything, right? But unfortunately everything was forgotten and on the 7th of October and it was a tectonic change in the uh relationship between Israel and Turkey. And uh on this the darkest day of the Jewish peoples after the Holocaust, when you're looking at the uh the uh statements that were that was released from the Turkish foreign ministry, you're going to see uh that it was only a lip service that uh the Turkish foreign ministry asked from the two sides to refrain from uh killing civilians and etc etc against violence and two peace solution. ution. It was incredible that nothing was happened on the Israeli soil and they ignored it. On October the 8th and then you know the rest of the period the Turkish public and also the Turkish administration itself they did not speak about the Israeli suffering but they only began to focus on the Palestinian narration. you know, they focused on the Palestinian narration and they again victimized the Palestinian, you know, situation in Gaza. And during those days, I only would like to remind you that some of the Hamas terrorists were still inside the Israeli territory and the IDF was very busy uh to thwart these attackers back to the Gaza Strip. Right. But unfortunately we began to see uh that there was a very important shift in the Turkish public opinion and in my in my opinion that was a topdown decision >> when the Turkish decision makers they came to the conclusion that this current war was not a limited one but it was a total war. So they could not digest this um normalization that we saw and the ambassador and the president etc. and instead they decided to collapse this normalization. And if you you ask me how we came here, well before uh October the 7th, we got used to it that Turkey had um pro Palestinian stance for the Israeli Palestinian conflict. That's not the new thing. The new thing here is Turkey upgraded its diplomatic stance from pro Palestinian to pro- Hamas. And when they did such an act, it also accompanied with another bold decision, the systematic delegitimization of the state of Israel. Today, if you're going to look at the Turkish TV or the Turkish press in the Turkish language, I'm not talking about the uh you know newspapers uh the Turkish newspapers who are publishing in English. I'm not talking about them at all because they have a very different discourse. Okay? When you look at the Turkish language, you are seeing there a very systematic delegitimization against the state of Israel, against the prime minister Netanyahu. And um Israel is tagged with many different adjectives like the rogue state, genocidal state, gang, you name it, right? And also the Israeli citizens began to be labeled as potential terrorists um you know because of their because of the conscription here in Israel >> all Israeli citizens men and women you know according to the law they have to serve in the Israeli army >> right what you're describing is similar to jazer that in English they have the human rights banner in Arabic they have the occupation terrorists settlers But definitely, you know, you you recently wrote that behind Erdogan's escalating rhetoric against Israel, there is a strategic attempt by Ankura to establish a new ring of firedeed around Israel essentially turning Turkey into the new Iran. [clears throat] What do you mean by that? >> Okay, I didn't say that Turkey will be turned into a new Iran. Let's be precise. Okay. In my article, I was talking about my personal conversation with uh professor Bernard Lewis who visited our Tel Aviv University if I'm not mistaken. I wrote the exact date there but if I'm not mistaken it was 2012 >> that I had a lunch with him and [clears throat] we have spoken in Turkish language about the quality of the relations between Israel and Turkey and then he had a very unfortunate prophecy that that day I rejected it you know at once and what I have written in the article is that today it's very hard for me to reject this prophecy But I still believe in the future of the relations because look um I was born and raised in Turkey and I uh I was the first witness, you know, uh of this uh special relationship between the Jewish people and the Turkish people. I really love Turkey. I really do not want to see uh the country that I'm living in would be at odds to be in a hostile situation with the country that I that I grew up in. Okay. For me, it's a nightmare scenario. >> But you're saying that that country is trying to establish a ring of fire. Yes. Around Israel. What describe this ring of fire as an academic, as an expert who has eyes and ears, right? And a kind of an intellect. I can understand what I read and I can understand what I can watch and I can foresee uh, you know, some steps. So when I'm looking at the Turkish decision making process especially after the fall of Assad, Turkey um managed to fill the vacuum that came into being after Iran's departure from Syria. >> I mean when we are looking from a historical angle, Turkey is not an external force here uh in Middle East. I mean they ruled all of these geography for 401 year. I mean that's a lot. Okay, we are not talking about an artificial um military presence for instance like the Russians came here and established two bases and then they they are gone. No, this country will stay here. Okay. So their presence also will be felt here. So after Assad's departure when Turkey began to penetrate into Syria, you know, in a very deep manner and they began to play an crucial role in uh rebuilding Syria's um you know infrastructure and uh accommodation like uh buildings and everything. So we also began to see that they signed cooperation agreements with the Syrian Ministry of Defense and they began to train the uh the Syrian army. I mean these are all influence in Syria is clear especially militarily but where else is >> where else? So uh in in May 2025 uh Turkey launched a very ambitious organization or let me say a formation of an alliance a kind of called the neighbors of Syria which which states are neighbors of Syria. Of course Israel is a neighbor of Syria but unfortunately was not invited to take part in this initiative. So we have Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan. these five states. If you're going to look at the map, well, you're going to see that from north, northeast, and from east, this uh alliance is h, you know, containing Israel and circling Israel. And given also Turkeykey's very uh close relationship with Egypt that they conducted uh uh military drills with the Egyptian army and they are also deepening their relationship uh in terms of military uh industry. Well, uh we can definitely say that in an unofficial way you can encircle Israel also from the south, but uh luckily uh the Egyptians did not collaborate uh with the Turkish uh foreign policy vision and they did not sign the Mecca treaty. Also we have this neighbors of Syria initiative and also we have a second important factor which is the the Mecca agreement that was h that was formed by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey and in the very beginning last August also we witnessed in the Turkish in the Turkish press there were some headlines that uh also the Egyptians would have been uh added admitted to uh the same mechanism. But as far as I understand because of their special relationship with the United Arab Emirates, with Greece and Cyprus and also this very uh delicate security relationship with Israel, the Egyptians did not fulfill their membership in the uh Mecca agreement. So when you're looking at these two structures together, well um yes, here we have a very problematic situation for the state of Israel. >> So let me challenge you on this because I'm I'm hearing this very, you know, uh militaristic rhetoric a lot that is pushing basically presenting the sides at being on the verge of war, Israel and Turkey. But if you look at these steps that Turkeykey's doing, Turkey is a sovereign country. Yes, it has every right to establish whichever relations it wants. Yes, granted the rhetoric is very escalatory when you have the deputy defense minister saying he wants to become the next governor of Jerusalem obviously >> minister. >> Yeah. So this this isn't calming rhetoric. Yes. >> But we have rhetoric and we have capabilities. But in my opinion, is that enough to turn a rivalry which is legitimate into enmity? >> Look, rivalry is fine. I mean I'm not complaining about rivalry. You know two states may may declare a rivalry against each other may compete but once you are making this delegitimization on daily basis okay and once you um issue arrest warrants against your so-called rivals. So um your rival begins you know to think twice about your intentions. are these only um you know words is it only rhetoric so the Abu alhur air strike is showing us that it's not only rhetoric also we saw the same pattern uh last year uh Israel conducted a very similar uh military operation in central Syria against the T4 Kama Holmes Palmira area again uh according to the Israeli Um, according to the Israeli uh press, we uh had some reports that the Turkish military uh should have been stationed there. You know, they would come there. So, prior to their arrival, Israel conducted such an act. But then, unlike this time, you mentioned the Israeli prime minister's office. this time right after the uh military air strike in Abu Aluhur. This time they openly declared the Turkish presence in Syria as a potential threat for the state of Israel and this is a new this is the new thing and that's why in my opinion this is the game changer. So once you have you mentioned the Turkish interior minister declares that he wants to become the new governor of Jerusalem. So maybe we could see uh Mr. Fedan or Mr. Erdogan could have an official statement. Yeah. So they may have said that maybe uh the um the statement of the Turkish interior ministry is not representing the views of the Turkish government. Did we hear such a statement? >> No. >> No. No, we did not. And I I feel >> this is the this is the main problem. So, >> and I feel like we are going to have more of these kind of statements and unfortunately more pinpoint operations to draw red lines in the sand. But we do have to move on to the next part of the show. This is the rapid fire segment. I'm going to show you three pictures. Okay. >> And briefly, if you will tell me the first thing that comes to mind. So, this is the first picture. This is uh Turkish foreign minister Hakan Fidan. >> Okay. Erdogan successor. >> All right. Next picture. Syrian President Ahmed Ashara >> Erdogan's puppet, the new Ottoman governor of Syria. >> All right. And the last picture, this is uh Erdogan in NATO, NATO Secretary General Marut, previous Secretary General along with uh French President Manoron Mcron and Turkish President Reipt Erdogan. Well, Erdogan is the most complex and one of the most intelligent politicians that I have ever seen in my life. He can understand the weaknesses of the NATO alliance because of uh this many important decisions that NATO has taken because of this global warming issues. All of the steel industry shifted into Turkeykey's hands and also the Russian challenge. Right. So Erdogan is exploiting the weaknesses of the NATO alliance and he's turning into political concrete political gains uh for his uh also for his own uh political uh future in Turkey. >> Very clear and uh unfortunately that is all the time we have but I obviously you and I could uh go on a lot longer so much break down all this. Um, so I want to thank you again for joining me tonight. Tune in again next week here at On the Record. You can find today's episode and all previous shows on YouTube and Spotify. Thank you for watching.