How War Looks From the Rest of the World | The High Top

Nancy, you didn't expect to hear about the Iran war when you were traveling a couple weeks ago. Where were you and what did you hear? >> So, you know, I've been covering the war in uh the US war in Iran since it started. And this is my first trip overseas. I was going for my summer break and I happened to be in UAE and India and it was so interesting because everywhere we went, we saw two things. People directly impacted by the war and a real sense of national unity that had been born out of that. So, I'll give you a couple examples. So in the UAE we heard stories about um people of course losing their jobs and layoffs. We saw at the airport at um in Abu Dhabi that um there any damage had been dealt with immediately afterwards. There was huge signs that says we are all Emirati and and everywhere we went we heard about people directly personally impacted by the war. Same thing in India. I traveled around the country and you know I was talking to our tour guide and he had to stop in Delhi because he was trying to redo his kitchen and the supplies couldn't get through the straight of Hormuz and so and the prices had gone up or we were at the Dodge Mahal and the tour guide was saying usually I'd have Spaniards here but they're not here because of fuel prices. You couldn't get away from this idea that the war had directly impacted so many people and that had led to a new conversation about um the relationship with the United States. I never heard anyone say we need to walk away from the United States. The Gulf of course depends on the United States for security and the Indian economy is so um intertwined with the world economy and certainly United States. But there was a whole re-examination of what that relationship looks like. How much of it is a friendship? How much of it is something to be managed? I had been so focused on the war in terms of tactics and strategy and munitions and um where things were headed and what where it fit in the midterms. But to see the impact on the on the global um stage really gave me a different perspective and it reminded me that the the decisions here are affecting everyday lives all over the world. You know, in India and the UAE are two of the countries that we looked at in our our fulcrums order. That's right. project. And you know, you do get a sense that these countries are feeling at both the national level and the popular level that they should have a sense of agency. They're directly affected by things. The physics of how the world works are changing partly because we have a much more complicated economy, but also because what does security mean? What does security get you? What kinds of systems and relationships do you need to be prosperous? I don't get any sense people want to turn away from the United States but they feel I mean almost like modern portfolio theory you want to diversify >> that's right >> your relationships so the risk is minimized for the maximum return and there's a sense >> that if you rely too much on the United States that itself has become a risk >> that's right it's funny I I thought of the fulcrums of order project because what you were describing on a macro scale what I've just described is on a very micro scale, right? In terms of how people are looking at these relationships and those policy changes that you guys outlined so beautifully, I think are being born in these little these one these conversations that we were seeing on our on our own travels. And so I I think you're right that there is a more um interest in a diversified portfolio, one that doesn't just rely on the United States or as you point out in the paper, doesn't assume that a relationship with China or Russia means that you can't have one with the United States, that there's room for both. >> And I think there's also an important instinct certainly in India, certainly in Brazil, they [clears throat] don't want the bricks to become an adjunct of Chinese and Russian foreign policy. that they they want to have a different lane. I think they want to preserve a lane with the United States. That's right. They want to deepen a lane with China. They're interested in what Russia means. What do you think from the perspective of a somebody who covers defense? And how does the United States have to be thinking about defense going forward if you're trying to to defend a whole bunch of things around the world where the old tools might not be as effective as as they were 5 years ago? >> I want to answer how wars change first because then I think it answers the relationship with the United States. To me, the connective thread between the war in Ukraine and the war in Iran is the is how technologies become a great equalizer. That drones um cheaper um made missiles are are actually this the cornerstone of of operations. Whereas the United States offers very expensive, very sophisticated weapons, the very systems that the United States provides, Patriot missiles, THAADS, some of these other air defense capabilities are unmatched anywhere else. But because warfare has become so fluid, the US's inability to pro to resupply those weapons either for political reasons or for practical reasons because it takes years, um you can't get raw materials as quickly. And the Iran war has shown the international community that actually having the most expensive um weapons and systems can be a disadvantage. Um but how about the issue both on the the targeting side, the intelligence that goes into targeting and the the surveillance side and understanding where missiles are coming from. Does that give the United States a persistent advantage in technology? or if you just do something cheap and highly distributed, can you replicate it at low cost almost like massively parallel computing? >> To me, the Iranians show that they have the capability to do both. If you look at the strikes that they did on US installations, the ones they've done not only in the Gulf, but as far away as Jordan, they've shown remarkable precision with relatively um cheap munitions relative to what the United States has. that cheaper technology, even if it's less precise, even if the intelligence is not as sophisticated as [snorts] the United States, the combination has made that such that they are able to be real players on the international stage and are actually able to pro um become real um real threats to to the United States and its allies and partners. >> So either what countries consider good enough is easier to achieve. Well, first of all, they're working together, right? You have Russia and Iran using the same Shahed drone and developing those technologies. So, yes, there's that, which again is far less sophisticated than than the drones that the United States has, but they're able to produce them in mass. And that allows that to sort of fill the gap that that's missing in maybe the intelligence that we would expect. So much so that they were able to hit precisely US installations, um, oil resources for Gulf partners, US bases. >> Do we think the Chinese help them with targeting? >> Well, the United States does um to some degree, but I I always worry when we have that conversation that we're focused on the wrong thing that it's not the targeting, it's it's exactly what you describe um in the fulcrums of order project. It's this it's this new order that's emerging of the of an integration of technology and intelligence and cooperation that is um a counter to the order that the United States has stood up for so long. Do you think do you think that's a fair way to some to explain it? >> Certainly when we thought about the new world order after World War II, it was a clear departure point. The world had been through two world wars, right? and we had some really really clearly articulated writtenout ideas about how the world was going to work. I don't think we're going to get to a point where there are really clearly articulated ideas. Are we going to move back to maybe a modification of the old way or are we moving to a much more chaotic order where there's a lot more hedging? That could be where we are. Not because we know what the rules are as we did during the Cold War and even after, but everybody's trying to work out the rules under the the the cloud of a sense that with technology, the global economy may work in a totally different way 10 years from now, >> right, >> than it does right now. >> Is that a multipolar world or is it something different, a chaotic world? I mean, could we, for example, see spheres of Chinese influence, spheres of Russian influence, spheres of Western influence, or is it a little bit more discombobulated than that? >> I mean, my sense is it's a a deeply dynamic world. I think people systematically underestimate the ability of the United States to move forward in a dynamic world because the United States because of the size of its population, its economy, its educational levels, all these things, we are so much better poised than so many other societies and we have a depth of financial resources, >> right, >> for investments in technology that other countries don't have. We're good at we're good at sponsoring a whole set of things. Maybe only a few will work, but they can work spectacularly well. In other countries, they have to place big bets and sometimes the big bets are wrong. So I think even in a more dynamic world, the United States is in a strong position to do well. The point of the fulcrum's border project is that in many ways the decision makers for how this world works are countries like India, the UAE, Saudi, Brazil, Mexico, >> Indonesia, Turkey. These countries that could go either way want strong relations with the United States. to what those strong relations mean and what other relationships they have will determine whether this is going to be pretty orderly or pretty disorderly. Again, disorderly is not necessarily a disaster for the United States, but it might take more energy to maintain order, >> right, >> than we've than we're accustomed to to paying. You know the thing that struck me though in my travels and you tell me if you see this as well to me the international community outside of where we are sees that world emerging and is responding to it and is engaging in conversation about it whereas I feel like in the United States we're not having that conversation as as as much or as um with the same kind of um look towards the future that there's that that when I was talking to people overseas these it's a real conversation happening right now. It's a debate happening at dinner tables um and and and at businesses and and and and you could you could literally hear the conversation all around you in a way that I don't feel happens here. So the question in my mind becomes if we're not having that conversation, can we be as prepared for this this more disorderly um world order that that may be emerging around us? You know, I think I see a diminishing patience with longer arguments, with thinking about governance in a sustained way, with trying to work out with stakeholders around a table compromises for how to go forward. I think to me that that that withdrawal from a discussion about what kind of world we want to live in, what should the rules be, what should the country be doing in a sustained [snorts] way. That's really dangerous. I think we have the ingredients as a country. We have the ingredients of the government with capabilities to do a lot of really useful things now. But the mood is to not do hard policy things. The mood is to keep sampling things very quickly and nothing really occurs. To me, that's a bigger danger than anything China, Russia, or anybody else is trying to do. It's about citizens feeling there are two sides or more to this debate. I have to engage because the choices matter. And to me, that's that's the missing link. How media contributes to that, how think tanks contribute to that, how we can get to a point where people stop just reading headlines, >> right? >> I think for the country is really important. >> I mean, I write about the war every week and people tell me all the time, I don't want to read about it anymore. I just know that gas prices are going up. But then how do you have a conversation about where does this war end? Where does it leave the United States? Where does it leave its place in the Middle East? Is the United States more secure? At what cost? Um, is the United States pursuing, as the president says, making sure that Iran never has a nuclear weapon? Is this the way to do it? I do think people are hungry for the conversation. It's the format in which it's being presented that I think makes it so hard to to to have it. >> What does it look like when the war ends? >> I mean, >> what is end? What is end? What is a war ending? Because the US says the war ends when when what the Iran never has a nuclear weapon and yet there are no talks to sort of >> never is always a day away. Right. >> That's right. I mean right now I think the most immediate thing the United States is seeking is to reopen the straight of Hormuz which was open before the war started. That is the most immediate thing the United States is seeking at least the Trump administration is seeking because then they can claim some sort of victory. But that doesn't deal with things like proxies operating in the region, Iran's nuclear weapons, governance there in the future, you know, and and there's no pathway to sort of in that. And I think we're seeing this escalation militarily because as we toggle between sort of economic, diplomatic and military options, the military one is under under propping up the other two. And we keep coming back to it in the absence of um immediate impacts of economic and diplomacy. Economic the sanctions and the closing of the streets for sure is having an impact in Iran, but that could take months if not years to lead to the result the United States wants. Diplomatically, those talks aren't happening right now. So, we keep coming back to this military solution for these short-term goals of sort of reopening the straight. I think we're at a point now where the end might be no end at all. That maybe one issue like the strait is resolved, but other issues like Iran's nuclear program, its proxies um goes unresolved. >> Do you see a silver lining in any of this for the United States? I mean, you painted a dark picture, but I assume there. >> Yes, I do. [snorts] But I think there are some opportunities here. >> I I do I mean I think there's a real opportunity for a reset in the United States military in terms of how it supplies itself h where raw materials come from that I do think it's led to a more a new urgency around those kinds of conversations that you have a military that maybe isn't spending over a trillion dollars to be to be weighed down by its technology but actually spending less for to create a more agile military. one that's more adaptive to the kinds of different conflicts that it has. You know, we we we we came into this business out of an age where the United States had to be prepared for two simultaneous conflicts. That's an anacronistic model and I think our weapon systems and our training is too focused [snorts] around that model. So maybe this is an opportunity that you that the US resets its its military training iss kinds of weapons that it it buys for for this kind of new order because of the war in Iran has been such a clear lesson in terms of um of where where conflict is going. >> And I [snorts] think you know that applies more broadly around the board across the board too in in terms of economics in terms of diplomacy in terms of how we think about our role in the world. [snorts] The Cold War ended a long time ago. >> That's right. >> And we're still working based on those premises. Is there a way for the United States to be more agile, more engaged, more proactive, even more expeditionary in some of these things? >> That's right. >> I think that it's an opportunity for creativity. It's opportunity we need to take. And by the way, those eight nations that you mentioned, they're all having those conversations right now and there may be lessons to be learn to learn from them and we may see them actually more involved militarily because of their new place in the world order. We're seeing India and Turkey invest more in their and even the UAE re reassess what their military looks like because as they see themselves as um bigger players, their military becomes um a part of that conversation as well. So you might not see United States that is um as leaned on um to prov to sort of maintain the order but that it becomes actually more complex militarily as well. [music]