Video summary
The central theme regarding China's future military strategy is its aggressive shift from passive defense to an active expeditionary posture designed to project power globally. Rather than merely protecting mainland territory, Chinese doctrine and system development are increasingly focused on creating anti-access area denial capabilities, often referred to as Triple A, which allow Beijing to take the fight directly to adversaries rather than waiting for them to approach China's shores. This strategic evolution is further underscored by a significant nuclear buildup aimed at establishing credible deterrents against rivals like the United States and enabling strikes from locations outside of mainland territory. The intent behind these developments is clear: to complicate an adversary's strategic decision-making process and ensure that any potential conflict involves challenges far beyond China's immediate borders, thereby forcing opponents to contend with a multifaceted threat landscape rather than a singular front.
Beyond its own military hardware, China seeks to amplify this global pressure by cultivating extensive security ties and assistance networks worldwide, effectively ensuring the United States cannot focus solely on Chinese threats while ignoring other regional instabilities. The speaker highlights that every major move made overseas is intended to come at the expense of American interests, a strategy vividly illustrated during recent military parades where leaders from North Korea, Russia, and various nations gathered in Beijing. This gathering signaled China's intention to create a web of alliances based on the principle that an enemy's enemy becomes a friend, fostering mutually beneficial relationships with great powers like Russia or entities labeled as part of an "axis" by Western observers. By diverting global attention and resources toward these diverse partners, China aims to stretch U.S. security commitments thin across regions such as the Middle East involving Iran, the Korean Peninsula, and Eastern Europe, ensuring that America is never able to concentrate its full might against Beijing alone.
To execute this expansive foreign policy, China utilizes a sophisticated toolkit of instruments beyond traditional military forces, leveraging paramilitary organizations for diplomatic leverage where other nations lack similar capabilities. A prime example cited is the People's Armed Police (PAP), an internal security force responsible for domestic stability that also serves as a highly effective tool for international security assistance and military diplomacy. Unlike the United States, which lacks a dedicated national internal security force comparable to China's structure, many of its allies possess their own police forces; however, China actively deploys its PAP and Public Security Bureau (Gong'an) units abroad to provide training and support that functions as both humanitarian aid and strategic influence operations. This approach allows Beijing to engage in military diplomacy with nations that have no equivalent domestic security apparatus, thereby expanding its sphere of influence through specialized expertise that other global powers cannot easily replicate or offer on the same scale.
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The next question is whether and how
expeditionary
the Chinese military will be and what
China's thinking is on being able to
protect their power abroad. And this is
related directly to the previous
question. And I would argue that their
whole military defense buildup strategy
uh to provide them with an anti-access
area denial capability or triple A is
inherently active as opposed to a
passive defensive strategy requiring an
expeditionary capability. So the short
answer to that question is they want to
be expeditionary. The question is to
what degree do they want to be
expeditionary? uh and I would tell you,
excuse me, that they are aggressively
developing
systems and doctrine that will
facilitate their ability to project
their power and to increase their
ability to project power. China's
nuclear buildup is aimed at expanding
their ability to provide a credible
deterrent to their adversaries,
specifically the United States, and also
to provide them with the ability to
strike their adversaries from other
places besides mainland uh other places
besides mainland China. Okay. Um and so
I would tell you that uh they want to be
expeditionary. when we look at let's go
back and look at the parade of September
2nd uh and some of the systems that they
had on display at the the parade and and
a friend of mine explains as drones,
missiles, tanks and other messaging. But
clearly this is a military that wants to
be able to project their power beyond
their shores uh and take the battle to
their adversaries and at the very least
complicate their adversaries approach or
complicate their adversaries strategic
decisionmaking in how they approach uh
what how they approach China. We'll talk
now a little bit about China's security
ties and assistance around the world.
And I would tell you, forget about the
drones and missiles and underwater UAVs
that you saw during the parade. I think
the most significant message about
China's security ties around the world
came by looking at who was on that day
as overlooking Tiana men watching that
parade. You saw she you saw Kim from
North Korea. You saw Putin from Russia
and a number of other world leaders that
were standing there on that deis above
Tiana Men um sending the clear message
and this was China's intention that the
United States will not only have to face
China in a potential conflict but will
have their calculus vastly complicated
by having to face challenges potentially
all over the world. whether they be in
the Middle East from Iran, whether they
be on the Korean Peninsula, whether they
be uh in Europe and Eastern Europe. And
listen, if I was an enemy of the United
States, I'd certainly make sure that I
wasn't the only focus of the United
States attention, that the United States
had to address its other security
commitments while simultaneously having
to deal with me. So, I would tell you
that that is the principal focus of both
Chinese foreign policy, okay? to ga
gather and garner influence around the
world. China has a stewed as we know
permanent alliances but this is very
much a case the quitessential case I
would say of my enemy's enemy is my
friend um and so the other players in
this the other great powers in the case
of Russia or other nations like North
Korea uh and uh the so-called axis of
evil or whatever you'd like to call it
they benefit from not having sole focus
of the United States uh by China
diverting them and so it's a very
mutually beneficial relationship between
all of these nations and I would tell
you that is the principal focus of
China's foreign policy from a security
perspective. They want to make sure and
as we know every move they make or every
chess move that they make overseas and
across the the the global security
landscape uh they hope comes at the
expense of the United States. Um, and so
I would explain their strategy of
security ties and assistance around the
world. I would also mention and several
of our colleagues have done some
excellent work on this. We tend to focus
on the PLA's security ties, security
assistance around the world, but China
has other tools to use and that are very
effective tools. The People's Armed
Police very effective tool. This is the
paramilitary force in China responsible
for internal security. Very effective
foreign policy tool. and security
assistance, security cooperation tool
for the Chinese. The United States does
not have a national internal security
force, but many countries do. Uh, for
example, our allies like the carbonari
in Italy have a national police force.
So, China uses the people's armed police
sometimes for security assistance and
and for military diplomacy. And they
also use the Gongan, the public security
bureau for the same purpose. So, they
have a number of tools that they use.