How Close Are We to World War III? A UK General on Iran, Ukraine, and the Changing Character of War

[music] Welcome to the last line of defense. I'm Seth Jones, president of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. And I'm joined today by General Sir Nick Carter, who served for 45 years in the British military, including as chief of the general staff and as chief of the defense staff. Thanks uh General Carter, although I think I may switch over and call you Nick in a moment, but thanks thanks for coming on. Appreciate having you. >> It's great to be with you, Seth, and I'm much looking forward to our conversation. >> All right. Well, we have a lot of ground to cover and not a lot of time to do it. So, let me start off with uh asking you to tell a bit of a story. um your 2001 [clears throat] tour of the Battle of the Psalm, which I think is an interesting uh story that gets us to lessons to take away from warfare, including learning the the right lessons. So, can you kind of set the mood for us and tell us a little about what what you did and what you took away? >> No, absolutely. Um I mean one of one of the highlights of my sort of staff training um as an officer in the British Army was [clears throat] a course they call the higher command and staff course which we always have an American student on as well uh and a German usually uh and probably a Frenchman um and the idea is it's for sort of 06 level sort of sort of bird kernel level and they're in theory people who are going to go on to command at a level above that. So a brigade command and then perhaps divisional command for the very lucky. Um anyway, the great thing about this course is the highlight of it for for most of us I think is the two-week staff ride come battlefield tour that we do in France um towards the end of the course where each student is set up a a problem and has [clears throat] to handle a particular stand on a particular battlefield um asking a set of pertinent questions about what's going on. Um and one of the ones that was particularly memorable to me um was the one that was conducted um on the battle of the SO uh which you know listeners will remember took place the sort of middle point um of World War I um started on the 1st of July 2016 and was a very bloody affair. I mean, I think on day one alone, um, the British army took something like 70,000 casualties, which when you compare it to what's going on in Ukraine now is is is is immense, uh, for no question about it. Anyway, the historian who used to take us on this wonderful trip was a man [clears throat] called Richard Holmes, who's sadly no longer with us, but was a tremendous narrative historian and had a wonderful way because he was also a reserve brigadier, uh, of bringing it to life in military terms. Um and he always insisted on the morning that the course used to go to the SO that we would have to get up well before dawn and we would go forward uh from where we were staying in some other civilized obe somewhere I imagine to what were left of the trenches on the battlefield and we always think I think he always used to go to the same place for the first part of this battlefield tour which is where a particular British battalion uh from Stafford um which is a a county in in the Midlands of of the United Kingdom uh was formed and fought and um just before first light uh the course and there were probably 30 of us I suppose climbed out of the trench and then walked up the hill through what wasn't a plow would have been a plowed field probably back in the day but on this occasion was not was was was reasonably good grass and as we walked up this hill Richard Holmes would relate where you know each soldier had died or collapsed or been shot or whatever it might be. And the extraordinary thing of course was that in the 200 m or so that we covered going up this hill to the German lines, by the time we got to the German lines, um not a single soldier was on his feet. Um in fact, the battalion took something like 90% casualties in that particular attack. And it was a very moving experience. Um and for me what it uh I think um helped me remember is that you know we can all bang on about how the character of conflict changes and we'll talk a bit about that in a moment but of course the nature of war doesn't change. The nature of war I think is always going to be that violent interaction in the final say between human beings. Uh it's essentially a political act as um Clausvitz would have described it. And that sort of visceral experience of understanding how over 800 men could be killed in no more than 10 or 15 minutes is remarkable. And I think as a soldier, it's an incredibly important experience to have because of course it makes you reflect before you commit soldiers to battle in the future. >> Well, uh that is sobering. It's sobering for anyone that has walked the battlefields in the US of the Civil War, the Revolutionary War, battlefields of Gettysburg or Bull Run, um, Manasses or any of the other battlefields. Sobering to uh, put oneself in the position of soldiers at that time. Um and it is a reminder as you note of that at least the nature of war though we are going to talk about changing character war the nature of war is still what it is uh which is it's not pretty it is it is a violent interaction of of human beings. I do want to go though uh to some of the more recent campaigns. I want to talk Ukraine, but before we get to Ukraine and the Russians, um I I want to talk a little about Iran right now in Operation Epic Fury. So, uh we're 6 months in right now. What do you take to be some of the main lessons that you have seen? Not necessarily ones that have been learned, but what what are some of the lessons you have uh taken away both on the side of the Americans and andor the Israelis and others? And then also on the side of the Iranians. >> Yes. I mean I think um it's pretty remarkable the way the Iranians um have played what we all thought would be quite a weak hand very effectively. Um, and I think that again tells us reprising what I've just been talking about in relation to the nature of war that you know the enemy always gets a vote. And of course, um, before you go to war, generally speaking, the advice of clouds would always be that you need to think about how it's going to end. Uh, because we military strategists tend to work out what the end looks like and then calculate the ways and means necessary to realize that end. And I think that is still the case. um you know and that of course is what has been revealed I think very much in terms of how this war has played out over the last six or seven months no question about it um I think what I've also would take away from it um is that um in recognizing that the enemy has a vote it is worth I think considering those two military things you what's the most likely um course of action he's going to take but what's the worst case course of action he can take and I think that um you know we've all thought about the Iranian problem for many years and indeed us Brits have been involved with Sentcom uh Central Command in planning and thinking about um how a war with Iran might play out and I think in all of those scenarios we generally reckon that the straight of horm was an obvious vulnerability and I think we also reckon that reprising Eisenhower's advice about if you can't solve a problem make it bigger um that there was always a risk of course that Iran would involve the neighbors, not least the Gulf States in any war. So, I think we were all, you know, sort of prepared for that. Now, of course, what I I don't know is is what was um what information intelligence was available to the decision makers at the time, but those were certainly things that would have been considerations, I'm sure, in the way that people people thought about it. And then, of course, I think, you know, there are some really important lessons for modern warfare and for the western way of war or the US way of war. And we've learned a great deal about what cheap mass can do, whether that's drones or ballistic mass missiles. And um the asymmetry of the economics in modern warfare is something that all of us military planners need to reflect quite hard on, I would have thought. Yeah. So, we've we've documented, for example, just to build on that, we've documented um using actual the the Pentagon's own budget numbers and and information that's come out of industry from companies like Lockheed and RTX, uh stockpiles of some of the air defense interceptors like THAAD and Patriot, which have dropped significantly. You also note um that uh that there's this trade-off. I think you call it at one point Ferraris have been thrown at frisbes. Uh if which is a great phrase I mean it's um uh sort of sticks in one's mind uh about the tradeoffs of using some of the um high cost exquisite systems against much cheaper ones. Uh, and so I just want to push you a little bit more on this. Your thoughts on how do you fix that difficult tradeoff? Um, I I mean ballistic missiles is a good example because there at this point we haven't figured out a cheap solution to shoot at ballistic missiles. There have been some options to think through counter drone and even some on the cruise missile side which are sort of medium range. But how do you think think through uh dealing with this with this cost uh issue that militaries are going to have to I mean this is the world we're living in uh missiles, drones and defense. >> Yes. I mean you're you're right to put your finger on this. It's it is a conundrum I think for all military planners at the moment and [clears throat] um we see it playing out of course every night in Ukraine as well. Um I mean I think it's very challenging. I think, you know, it starts by being really clear about what you want to protect because you probably can't protect everything. And I then think it starts uh the next question of course is is that is is how you um having worked out how you're going to protect things, where do you therefore deploy things to make sure that they are as um least vulnerable as possible. And I think um you know the US Air Force I imagine has learned a great deal of lessons about deploying some of its assets on the ground in airports and airfields in Saudi Arabia for example and in Jordan for that matter. So I think where you deploy assets >> if I can just interrupt you for one moment you talked about the air force just the sheer number and the cost of US aircraft that have been uh destroyed or severely damaged is extraordinary. >> Definitely. Uh, and when you add to it sort of air defense radars and data centers and MQ9 Reaper drones, I mean, I think it I'm right in saying it's in the open domain that in terms of value, it's more than in any war since 1945. Uh, that's been lost, which is truly remarkable. But getting back to answering the question, so I think protection and deployment and how you disperse and how you handle all of that has to be the starting point. Um and then I I think you know work needs to be done urgently to identify how you can find a cheaper solution for dealing with a ballistic missile than something like Patriot or Bard. And we also I think need to be conscious that we're only seeing the beginnings of missiles. I mean we've heard lots of talk about Chinese um hypersonics and things associated with that. that will become a much naughtier problem for us because part of our deterrence theory will be completely undermined if we can't protect ourselves from these sorts of attacks. I do want to ask one question and that you talked a little bit um around but I want to ask it explicitly which is uh the danger of hubris. Uh and you might start off in answering this question. I mean, this may be partly on Operation Epic Fury is whether there was hubris involved in how easy this could be from the beginning. But I wonder if you could start us off the answer with a cautionary tale of Crosus. Uh for those who don't fully know who that is, uh it is a reminder that hubris is dangerous, is it not? >> No, it is. And I think um you know many people have gone to war on the assumption that the enemy would roll over and we saw that in February of 2022 didn't we with Mr. Putin. Um yes I mean it is a cautionary tale. Um I mean listeners I'm sure will have heard of that expression as rich as Cusus. Well Cryus of course back in the day was the richest and most powerful man in the world and he was the ruler of um of Lydia which which is broadly speaking modern day Turkey. and he became rather concerned about the rise of the Persian uh empire to his south uh under Cyus the Great. So he decided to go and visit the oracle at Delelfi u to get a sort of forecast as to what he should do. And he asked what turned out to be the fated question, should I go to war with Persia? And the oracle replied in a pretty enigmat enigmatic fashion, which is why one always talks about the oracle of Delelfi being a bit delphic. um and said, "If you cross the river Halis, which was the northern border of Persia, a great empire will fall." Anyway, um Criesus, being a rich and very powerful man, made, as it turned out, the incorrect assumption that it wasn't going to be his empire that fell. It would be Cyrus's empire. And of course, it was the other way round. And um Cryus lost his empire. Didn't lose his life, but certainly lost everything else. Um and you know I think that that is a cautionary tale when it comes to thinking about what the opponent might say if you choose to attack him. >> Yeah. So a a reminder uh on resisting the urge of hubris in modern war which does bring us to the war in Ukraine. You mentioned uh the Russians almost certainly made that mistake in uh early February or in late February 2022 as the war picks up and the decision-m that led up to it. Um but in the war in Ukraine as with Iran, there has been a lot of focus on drones and more broadly on technology. One could include electronic warfare in that. uh and how much maybe has changed in the character of war based on drones and that could be not just unmanned or uncrrewed air but also ground systems. We're seeing a lot of focus on uh surface vessels also uh underwater vessels. The the interesting thing which which you have pointed out but I think others have as well is that drones despite their use on the battlefield in Ukraine both by the Russians and the Ukrainians have not actually effectively broken the stalemate. They've not allowed either side in and of themselves to maneuver. And so my my question really is what do you take to be the the importance of drones and sort of set this if you can in a broader context. How much also are things like doctrine uh concepts of operation uh and and can you put that in context? >> Yes. I mean, I think I think what one has to remember, of course, is that the Ukrainians have ended up using drones uh as a substitute for capabilities that they haven't got. So, you know, they they have a a a big disadvantage in terms of human beings when it comes to Russia. Um so, for them, they have a huge shortage of infantry and they can't afford to take casualties any great. And of course, they don't have large quantities of artillery either. Um so they've used drones essentially to make up for the lack of those capabilities in particular. And of course what's also happened on that battlefield is it's become very static. Um although the you know the front lines extend you know probably a thousand kilometers as it were north to south and there's probably a 50 kilometer kill zone between the two there isn't that much movement on that battlefield >> and that of course makes it relatively straightforward to use an autonomous system like a drone to be able to have an impact uh on the other side uh because they're generally speaking available and if not static certainly within range. Now I think that um when we consider a different character of the battlefield where maybe it's a bit more mobile um which indeed it was uh at the beginning of the war and we've had moments when it has become mobile namely uh the Kursk salient uh the for last um I I think the drone will find it's limited in in in certain ways. So I think um I think we want to be careful not to draw too many conclusions from drones. They're quite clearly going to be a major feature of modern warfare, but the context in which they're used um will vary the way in which they're used and their efficacy. Um and indeed, I think it's too early probably to write off the tank um which a lot of people are also tempted to do because the tank still provides um a capability that a drone will never be able to provide. not least the idea of shock action in enabling the infantry to get forward onto an objective, but also to be able to uh counter penetration by enemy moves and so on and so forth. Um, and I think was rather good analogy used the other day that um if you're invited to a dinner party and the dress is a tuxedo uh and you haven't got a tuxedo, then you look a bit silly. And it's the same with the tank, I would suggest. But I think what we should really um do is to stand back and and think a bit more profoundly about how the drone and autonomy more widely uh will affect the way that we want to fight in the future. And in my experience, whenever there has been a significant change in the way we fight, and the last time I would suggest that happened was when air land battle uh was brought into western armies, but particular particular the US army. The way that change was very much affected uh was through thinking, it was through concepts, it was through doctrine, it was through training, it was through experimentation, it was through uh the fielding process and so on and so forth. And and I think that what we now need to do is to take this technology and test it properly and understand what it might mean to the way we fight, understand what it might mean to our force structures, um understand at what levels in our various militaries it's going to be deployed. Um because until we've done all of that thinking, I think it's very hard to see how we'll use it and therefore how it's going to change the way that we fight. So I want to ask you one question and sort of get your reaction. There there is an ongoing debate within the US military about even the utility of trying to learn lessons from Ukraine. I mean there is an argument from a number of senior US officials that we just don't have a lot to learn from the Ukrainian war. These are uh two militaries that are relatively poor fighting it out. that we the US or maybe other other western militaries would do it differently. we would maneuver different, you know, we would be able to maneuver, we'd be able to integrate joint uh joint uh platforms, systems. Uh and so what we one of the things that that you've seen is a uh either a disinviting or not inviting Ukrainians uh to learn lessons at a range of um US military bases uh and conferences. Uh just arguing that there's not that much to learn. I'm curious, would you push back to that? Would you would would you push back against that a little bit or how do how do you respond to to that sort of uh you know this the sort of skepticism that we can learn much from the war in Ukraine? >> I mean it, you know, it's it's it's it is sensible of people to to look at the war and say that, you know, it's a it's a very particular um battlefield um and therefore you do have to be cautious about what you draw from it. But I do think there are some things that we do have to draw from it. I mean, first of all, I think we have to be really clear that the notion of long range drones and ballistic missiles that can threaten our rear areas and indeed our strategic centers of gravity is going to be a feature of modern warfare. But focusing on the battlefield itself again I think we need to be pretty clear that the use of artificial intelligence the idea of these kill webs which you can plug all of your sensors and all of your aectors and fires is going to have to be a feature of how you fight in the future. But I also think we need to be clear that um as western democracies our appetite to take casualties is probably pretty slim. And on that basis, if we can find a way of fighting where our autonomous systems are the first things that engage the enemy and that our human beings follow um once the conditions have been made perhaps more preferential for them, then that's probably going to be the way that we'd like to fight. And my own view and um you know, I gave a speech the other day in which there was a vignette describing how the tactical level might change. I do think that in the future, company commanders, battalion commanders, battle group commanders, whatever else, they're going to be given autonomous systems that will enable them to prosecute the fight absent human contact for quite a long time on a battlefield. And I think that's something a lesson that we have simply got to learn because I just don't think we have the ability to be able to fight in the way that Richard Holmes described to us um back in the day in 1916. And I'm assuming that any force forward deployed, whether you're Army, Marine Corps, or even deployed forward at naval bases or on air bases, you're also going to have to deal with the defensive side of that, dealing with incoming drones and uh missiles. You know, it is interesting to watch base defense evolve in on both the Russian and Ukrainian side. Having to think through, we talked a little about both the active defense side, but also passive defenses going underground. It's it's not a coincidence that one of the largest Ukrainian drone factories goes eight stories underground uh so that those those drones can be both built, stored, and protected by uh incoming strikes. I do want to ask you what um you know because we talked a little bit about this but maneuver. What is your sense about what is possible particularly for land forces in maneuvering? And how are you thinking about what combination of of concepts of operation andor technology and capabilities, command and control networks might allow land forces, you know, operating in a in a joint campaign to maneuver on the ground, which which both the Ukrainians and the Russians have struggled to do right now. Yes, I mean, you know, not least because there are some really quite challenging obstacles that have been laid certainly by the Russians and probably also by the Ukrainians. Um, and countermine warfare, um, is a very unpleasant activity. Um, I think the other thing that we haven't had in this conversation is the importance of electronic warfare. Uh and I think that you know one should be in no doubt the Russians have be masters at taking out the electromagnetic spectrum and we need to work out how we can operate in a environment in which we have no access to the electromagnetic spectrum um which is going to be challenging. So I think it probably starts if we are going to get into a more mobile formal warfare and let's remember that the definition of maneuver is fire and movement. >> Yeah. >> Um it's not just movement. Um and of course fire and movement means not just um you know direct fires. It means indirect fires. It probably means electronic warfare. It probably means autonomous drones ahead of you. It means the integration of air into the land battle and so on and so forth. It's all of these things coming together. But I think what we will have to remind ourselves of is there's a reason why um the American army and the British army and let's say other western armies as well are effective and a lot of that of course is because we have phenomenally good junior leadership and one of the things that is definitely missing on both sides in Ukraine and Russia is phenomenally effective professional junior leadership and what that gives you and is a critical advantage of our militaries is the ability to be able to decentralize to practice mission command and to empower commanders at every level to seize fleeting opportunities even if they are not in communication with the chain of command. And given the nature of the electronic environment, you have to assume that at the critical moments on those battlefields, your junior leadership will be out of communications and you have to therefore trust them within certain freedoms and constraints to get on and seize whatever initiative they can seize. So I think we must never forget that the we will bang on about the technology and the autonomous and the AI and all this stuff. But going back to my point about the nature of war at the beginning of this conversation, our key advantage is the quality of our junior leadership and indeed I'd hope our senior leadership but particularly our junior leadership and we have to double down on that and we really have to protect that as we think about how we're going to change. So last question uh this a big question uh which is and I know one you've at least been thinking a little bit about with others is um sort of where do we sit this this this will be a little bit of an I'm going to put you in a sort of Oracle at Deli uh I'm I'm coming to ask you as the Oracle at Deli to to to peer into the future uh and h how worried are you about the possibility of uh World War III uh and really the need then to deter one from happening particularly in multiple theaters. Uh and part of the reason I ask is some uh publicly noted intelligence from uh the US and a number of of NATO member states have expressed some concern about um if there were a ceasefire even without uh in Ukraine that the Russians are considering uh not just rebuilding and reconstituting which which they're trying anyway but also seizing territory let's say in the Baltics and uh uh then being prepared for something along those lines. How concerned are you that we are inching towards uh a very dangerous environment moving forward and and and if if that's the case, how do we think about that? >> Um yes, I mean I think I think um if one looks at the Russia Ukraine war at the moment, I think we are at a very um probably the riskiest moment in that war since it started. um four years ago. And I say that because um you know, so you have to be careful about propaganda and both sides going to use propaganda to make it look like they're doing better than they really are. But even taking account of propaganda, I think we should be pretty clear that Russia is in a worse place um this summer than she's been throughout the war really because the way in which Ukraine has taken the fight to mainland Russia um and therefore bringing as it were the war into the front rooms of people who live in Moscow or St. Petersburg uh and whether that's through getting after the fuel infrastructure or their equivalent of Amazon so-called wild berries doesn't really matter. It's been brought firmly into the political space and of course that means however repressive the regime is it puts Mr. Putin under rather more pressure than it's been before. So my guess is is that we are probably at a point in the war where the risk of greater escalation by Russia is greater than it's been at any time in the last four years. Now, the question of course is what that escalation looks like. And I I'm not a prophet of doom. I don't think we're going to see nuclear weapons used anytime soon for reasons I'll come back to. But I do think there is the the potential for Russia to escalate its campaign of subversion, disinformation, and sabotage and so on and so forth in Western Europe and maybe further a field. I think more cyber is inevitable. Maybe something in space. You know, space is a, you know, an environment that could easily be contested. But I also think that there is a risk that Mr. Putin could take a decision to take a chunk out of a Baltic state >> um in a in a you know a false flag operation. You know there are plenty of Russian speakers that live in Lithuania or Estonia that he could claim are being subjugated uh by the existing governments as he's claimed before. Um or he could use the idea of little green men. Um and he has the he has the capacity to do this because he's created five new divisions in the St. Petersburg military district u over 150,000 conscripts are mustered every year and they are not used uh on the front line in Ukraine so they're available for activity elsewhere in his armed forces and you know that is a course of action which NATO might not be that well prepared for. NATO is well prepared for trying to deter World War II but a sort of limited action like that is a much more challenging prospect. Um and whether or not the idea of article 5, the attack on one is an attack on everybody um would be um understood by everybody in their circumstances I think is a is a a question that's worth reflecting on. So I think there's a issue here between worst case and most likely case and I I think you know we should be contemplating uh that sort of um maneuver uh at the moment. But in terms of the bigger picture, I mean, I I um I don't happen to think that the risk of World War II uh is particularly near us. Uh I mean, I think we've got to work how we restore um our ability to deter more effectively than we do at the moment. But in a in a in a interesting way, I think that, you know, the the the aspect of nuclear weapons um has led to some form of fragile stability. uh globally between the great powers in a way that wouldn't have been the case 100 years ago. Uh and I think that whilst we see more conflicts last year than in any year since 1945, I think they're contained and I think they remain contained because we have this fragile stability created probably by nuclear weapons and the power that's induced by that. But that doesn't mean that there won't be limited conflicts underneath that screen of stability that we need to be able to deter. Um, and whether that's, you know, a potential attack on Taiwan, which I don't think is particularly likely, or whatever it might be, we've got to have the ability to be able to deter that from happening. Well, I'm going to take that as a positive note and a positive ending and important, you know, important to still remain vigilant, but that we are not on the precipice of anything yet that uh that is is uh dangerous along the lines of a World War II. Thank you for taking a few minutes uh to talk to us. appreciate uh all that you've done including not just for the the British military but among other things uh your time in Afghanistan where you have to be the uh at least from a US standpoint uh foreign general who's probably commanded the most Americans uh or at least one of one of the the uh foreign generals who's commanded the most Americans. Thank you for for that. >> No, thanks Seth. No, you're you're right. I did have the privilege of commanding 45,000 US Marines and American troops in southern Afghanistan in 2009 and 10 and it was a a genuine privilege and I I can't think of many nations who would give a foreigner that opportunity. >> Well, appreciate it and thanks again. Thanks for listening to our episode today. Please subscribe [music] wherever you listen to podcasts. For more analysis, please visit csis.org. [music] This is the last line of defense. >> [music]