Hans Hermann Hoppe, Private Law Society without a State - Modelhof Academy 2012 - in German
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Hans Hermann Hoppe argues that the ideal state does not exist and proposes a private law society as an alternative where order is maintained without government intervention. He begins by explaining that interpersonal conflicts only arise due to scarcity, meaning when multiple people desire different uses for limited resources or physical bodies. To avoid these inevitable disputes in a world of scarcity, he outlines four fundamental rules: individuals own their own bodies exclusively; the first person to appropriate unowned natural resources becomes its owner; producers retain ownership of what they create provided it does not harm others' property; and all other property must be acquired through voluntary exchange with existing owners. Hoppe asserts that these are intuitive principles already followed in private life, yet society relies on a state monopoly to enforce them because some individuals choose to violate these rules.
Hoppe critiques the traditional definition of the state as an institution holding a legal monopoly over law enforcement and conflict resolution, arguing this structure is inherently dangerous due to its monopolistic nature. He compares the state's role in producing security to that of a milk producer; just as consumers suffer from higher prices and lower quality when one company controls milk production, citizens face worse outcomes under a state-run justice system where there is no competition. Furthermore, he contends that states inevitably act as law-breakers themselves by using their final authority on all disputes—including those involving the police or bureaucrats—to justify tax collection and expropriation of property. He also distinguishes between monarchy and democracy, suggesting that while monarchs have a long-term incentive to preserve the kingdom for future generations, democratic politicians operate with short-term horizons focused on maximizing immediate revenue before their terms end, leading them to act as temporary administrators rather than stewards who care about the country's long-term health.
In contrast to the state model, Hoppe envisions a private law society where security and justice are provided by competing firms operating under strict contractual agreements with clients. In this system, every provider must clearly define their services, obligations, and prices within a contract that cannot be unilaterally changed without mutual consent, ensuring transparency absent in current government systems. Competition among these private entities would drive down the cost of security per unit of value while allowing individuals to purchase only the level of protection they deem necessary, ranging from self-reliance for those capable to comprehensive coverage for others. Additionally, insurance companies within this framework would have a strong financial incentive to prevent crime and recover stolen goods rather than simply paying out claims or ignoring cases, as their profitability depends on minimizing losses caused by criminal activity.
The transition to private law society also addresses the issue of disarmament; unlike states that seek to disempower citizens to maintain control, insurance companies would encourage weapon ownership among clients who can prove they are responsible and experienced with firearms, offering lower premiums for those who take safety precautions like using safes or carrying weapons defensively. This market approach naturally discourages vigilantism because insurers will not cover retaliatory actions or unprovoked aggression that could lead to costly disputes, thereby promoting civilized behavior through financial incentives rather than coercion. Finally, Hoppe suggests that a universal law would emerge organically from the need for independent arbitration organizations to resolve conflicts between clients of different providers or when international business practices are involved, creating a harmonized legal system based on voluntary agreements and competition rather than imposed state decrees.
Read the full video transcript
I
thank Daniel Model for the invitation and
especially, of course, for allowing me to be the
first to perform here. For
this occasion, knowing that it was
taking place in the green hall, I
even wore a green tie. um, has
it already been mentioned that a
central theme of this academy
is the question of the ideal state? And
I will try to give an answer. The
ideal state is no state. um, or what
I call a private law company
. But when I come to the topic of
private law society
, I would first like to make a few
remarks about the
basic human situation,
a fundamental human problem,
and the proposed solutions that have been
put forward, which I consider to be
wrong. And then I come to the
actual topic. Um,
suppose, perhaps I should
also point out
that
this is a long train of thought
and you should simply try
to follow it in a relaxed manner.
If you want to read about it, or
at least roughly, there's
a little booklet by
me below, "The Competition of Crooks". uh then
they can take a closer look at these things again, uh
slowly.
Um,
if we imagine Robinson Cruso
all alone on the island, then there are
no social problems for a single person
. He can do whatever he wants.
Um, and then two people appear. On
Friday,
a problem arises on the island that would
n't exist for a single person. Uh, and to
explain what kind of problem it is,
let's first assume
that on this, uh, on
this island, conditions are paradisiacal
. There is therefore no shortage of
goods.
Um, and if there is no shortage of goods
, then there is hardly any
possibility that Robinson Crusoe and Friday
can argue. Because whatever I
take for myself, uh, that doesn't take anything away from uh, what
the second person wants.
Uh, in order for disputes to
arise, there
needs to be scarcity. Um
, that means there's a situation where
I
want to do something with something, and another person
wants to do something different with the same thing
. This is the prerequisite for
interpersonal conflicts to exist
. Without scarcity, there are no
interpersonal conflicts.
And conflict resolution
consists of
finding a solution. What do you do
when there are goods where one person
wants to do one thing and another person
wants to do something else with the same good?
Even in paradise there is
a scarce resource, and there is
also the possibility of a
conflict between Robinson Crusoe and Friday,
even in paradise.
Insofar as our own physical
body is naturally scarce. Robinson
might want to do something to Friday, or
Friday might want to do something to Robinson, and then there will be
a conflict.
And how do you resolve this conflict? In the
Garden of Eden, in paradise, it is relatively
easy to resolve this conflict.
Then [snorting] one would say, my
body belongs to me, their body belongs to
them, I can do whatever I
want with my body, as long as I do
n't, um, interfere with their body.
If I want to do something to your body
, then you must give me your consent
. And if you want to do something with my
body, then I have to
give you my consent and I can
move wherever I
want. uh, and take up every seat.
Unless that seat has
already been occupied by
another person. Then I have to wait
until he leaves and then I can
take his place. So in the Garden of
Eden, you only need this simple
rule. Every person owns their
own body.
If we now turn to the real
world, the real world
differs essentially only in that there is
an infinite number
of scarce goods, uh, regarding
which there can be conflicts.
Let me first
introduce the rules that virtually
all people accept to a greater or lesser extent in order
to avoid conflicts in a
world governed by widespread scarcity
. I didn't invent this rule
. These rules have been formulated by many people,
and if you
look at your own private life,
you will find that you almost
always
adhere to these rules. And those are the rules.
Firstly, that which would
already apply in paradise. Every person
owns their own body and has
exclusive control over it
. If you consider what
alternatives are there? Uh,
who else should
own my body
? I am the only person who
can directly do something with the body. The
only way I can harm anyone else is
by first
controlling my own body and then
accessing another body.
The alternative is simply slavery. Uh,
I belong to another person instead of
being the owner of my own
body.
The second rule, um, every person is the
owner and has exclusive
rights of disposal
over the things that were previously in a state of
nature and that
this person has acquired for the very first time
. Um, that also happens
in children. Every child thinks, "I
had the toy first, and
therefore I have a better claim to
it than any other child who
comes later." Um, so one becomes the owner of what
one has transformed from a
natural state into an
appropriated state. The
first person to do that is the owner of
that thing. Um, the second rule or
the third rule is, um, everything I
then do with my body and the
things I originally acquired, everything
I subsequently produce,
as long as I do not damage
the property of other
people through the act of production, is also my
property. The producer is the
owner of what he has produced
. And finally, the last rule: um,
you can also acquire ownership of things
by voluntarily exchanging them with
previous owners
. There are no other ways
to acquire property. All other
forms of property appropriation
would be considered criminal behavior
. Um,
I don't want to go into too much detail about the
reasoning behind these rules
. I trust that
everyone intuitively recognizes that these are the
rules we follow in normal life
.
Um,
perhaps I should
emphasize the following.
The idea that conflicts can only be
avoided by
assigning private property to individuals is by no means a mere
convention. There is no
other way to
avoid conflicts except by always ensuring that it is clear
who owns which scarce resource
. Well, with common property, for example, there are
always conflicts automatically,
unless there is a
harmony of interests.
Uh,
if there is a harmony of interests,
meaning I always do what
you expect of me and you always do what
I expect of you, then
we don't need any rules at all,
then the world is perfect. But
such harmony does not exist.
And since such harmony does not
exist, and if one
wants to avoid conflicts, this is only
possible if it is always clear that this
good belongs to so-and-so, and that good
belongs to so-and-so. He can
do what he wants with it, and I'll do what
I want with other things. Then
we don't need harmony.
Private property ensures that
people can live together peacefully
, even if there is no harmony
among them, even if they have very
different interests
. And if one wants to avoid conflict from the very beginning of
humanity, then
this can only be done by
applying this rule:
Whoever appropriates something first
becomes the owner. For he
who appropriates something first
has not thereby plunged himself into any conflict
. There was nobody there before.
Um,
and all the others who
come later, if they dispute the
first
owner's right to own what he first
acquired, they would then
cause a conflict.
[clears throat]
As important as insight into these rules is, um,
and it is equally important to recognize that
if one adheres to these rules, all
conflicts can be more or less avoided
. However, it is of course the
case that there are also people
who simply do not follow these rules
. Um, and the question that I
call the social problem is, what do
we do with
these people who are lawbreakers and do
n't want to follow these rules?
And the traditional answer to this
question is, what do we do with the
lawbreakers? What do we do with
those who attack me? My
physical integrity, uh, not be
respected? What do we do with those who
want to take away what I
have produced myself? What do we do with
them? The traditional answer is that this
is the task of the state. The
state is there to enforce these rules
, uh, to ensure
that rule-breakers
are brought to reason and either put back
on the right track
or punished for
breaking the rules, so that
civilized life can return
.
Um, that's the answer that all
classical liberals, for example,
have given. That is the task of the state, to
enforce law and order, nothing
else. Um, whether the answer is right
or wrong depends on how the
[snorting] state is defined. Um,
and the definition of a state that
I am about to present is by
no means my own definition. That is the
traditional definition of what
constitutes a state. A state is
not a normal company. Uh, a state is
an institution characterized by two
special properties. The
first characteristic is that the state is
the final deciding authority in all conflict situations.
Whenever a conflict
arises between individuals, the
state decides who is right and who is
wrong. And in particular,
the state also decides who is right and wrong
in cases of conflict that involve the state
and its agents themselves.
They immediately recognize, uh, if, well,
I don't know,
if they have a conflict with a
police officer or a bureaucrat, who
decides who is right in
this conflict? another person who
is part of the same organization. And they
immediately recognize—I'll
elaborate on this a little more in a moment—they
immediately recognize what a
strange construction this is.
Conflicts, uh, so
in all cases of conflict,
including those in which one
is personally involved, to have the last word
. And if one is allowed to
have the last word in all conflicts,
then one also has the right, of course,
to levy taxes. Um, that means
levying compulsory contributions from individuals.
You can instigate a conflict and
then decide it in your favor
by saying: "No, no,
you have to give me the money. Um, I'm
the one who has the final say in all disputes
."
Um,
what is the fundamental error of this
statism, this idea that we
need a state to be allowed to act as a
mediator and final judge
? Well,
economists
have always maintained
that there is something wrong with monopolies.
What is a monopoly? A monopoly is a
producer
who alone is allowed to manufacture a certain item
and who is allowed to exclude all other persons or
institutions from the manufacture of that
item. A
milk producer, a milk monopolist, is
a company that has the right to produce milk; only I am
allowed to do so, and all other
people are prohibited from
producing milk. Why is this
bad from a consumer's point of view?
Yes, the answer is because then the
price of milk will be higher and the
quality of milk will be lower
than it would be if other people
could compete against this monopolist. Oddly enough,
economists who hold this view—or
perhaps I should add—claim that
monopolists are bad from the consumer's point of view
. From the monopolist's point of view,
monopolies are of course
wonderful. Well, every entrepreneur would ideally like to be a
monopolist.
However, from the consumer's point of view,
it is of course disastrous to deal
with monopolists.
Interestingly,
almost all economists agree that,
yes, but when it comes to the production of
law and order,
we need a monopolist.
Most economists are not even able
to recognize that it
is a contradiction to be against monopolies on the one hand
and
to say on the other hand that we need
one.
And if one now poses the question of
whether a monopolist of
law and order is perhaps less
disastrous than a monopolist of
milk production or
car production, one naturally arrives
at the same conclusion immediately. That's a much more
dangerous monopolist. It's okay
if the milk
is a little more expensive or not so good;
you can live with that. Um, but
if law and order are produced by a
monopolist, and law
and order affect virtually
every aspect of life, that is
obviously a much more dangerous
situation.
What can one actually predict about what will
happen when a
legal monopolist,
a security monopolist, or
a law enforcement monopolist is
appointed? What can one predict simply based on
the structure of a state
? What can be predicted
is, um, that this monopolist will
naturally use his position and
cause conflicts, and then decide them
in his own favor
. Um, you don't have to
be Einstein to recognize that
this is a necessary consequence.
If one were to believe
that state employees are, so to speak,
angels, one might come to different
conclusions than that
it is dangerous to
entrust such a monopoly to anyone.
He will therefore provoke conflicts and
then decide them in his own favor
. Then there's always the
objection, yes, but there's a
constitution and there are
constitutional judges
and, uh, control bodies and things like that. Uh,
these control bodies, these
constitutional judges are also parts of the
state apparatus.
Can you imagine?
They are initiating legal proceedings and saying that
I never signed a contract to
pay taxes. So I'm suing; I do
n't pay taxes. Where are the
contractual grounds for this? If you
take this to the Constitutional Court,
the constitutional judges will of course
find, my dear God, my
own salary is also paid from taxes,
and they will come up with the
correct verdict, namely exactly that
this is an irrelevant
argument. Of course they have to
pay taxes, and if they don't,
we will imprison them.
So, what the state is,
one could say, is a
law-breaking protector of rights,
an
expropriating protector of
property.
And we can of course
predict something else: that the expenditures
made by the state for the production of law and order will continue to increase
.
Um, that means spending on
security is maximized and
production of security is
minimized.
The more money one can spend and
waste, and the less one
actually has to be productive and
work, the better it is for the
person in such a
position.
Now a few more remarks about the
democratic state, in particular.
I have a bone to pick with him too
.
Um,
the traditional form of government was that of a
monarchy.
Um, the monarchy has been attacked, uh,
with the simple argument
that it is a
violation of the principle of equality.
Not all people are the same. There is
the king, who can do certain things,
and all these things are forbidden to ordinary people,
and we want all people to be
equal before the law. And for this
reason, it was suggested that, well, how
we do it is quite simple. That's where
we introduce democracy. Anyone
can become, so to speak, a king
. Uh, and then
equality for all before the law is
established. Anyone can become king now
. Everyone is treated equally.
Is that correct? The answer is, no, that's
absolutely not true. Even
under a democracy, the
contrast between
people who are treated according to higher law or
a special law
and people who are treated according to a lower
law remains.
The only difference is that there are no
longer any personal privileges, but there
are functional privileges. Um
, that's supposed to mean that if I'm
acting on behalf of the state,
then I'm subject to the
regulations of public law, so to speak, and
I'm allowed to do things that a
private individual, who is treated according to private law
norms, is not allowed to do.
For example, I am allowed to do something that is called
stealing in private law transactions
, namely I am allowed to
collect taxes, that is, I just can't
steal anymore. Um, I'm allowed to, if in
private legal transactions,
if I steal something from you and then
give a gift to another person
, then that's called stealing and
misappropriating. Uh, if you do that as a
civil servant, then it's called
social policy.
You take something away from certain people
and give the
stolen goods to other people. And these
people who do such things can do it on a large scale; you
all know them, the politicians,
who are of course
extraordinarily generous in their
donations,
because it is not their own money,
but money that they
have previously stolen from other people.
People are always very generous with other people's money.
People are usually a bit more careful with their own money
.
Um, so the contrast is between
two different types of law. In a democracy, just as in a monarchy, there is a
group of people who are treated according to the law and
another group who are
treated according to the law.
But that's not
all. The situation is even
worse.
What has actually been done by
replacing a monarchy with a democracy is to replace a person who, in a sense,
considers the country as their property
with people who
are only temporary administrators of the country.
And that makes you more short-sighted. Uh,
people's orientation is becoming
more short-term. Imagine the following:
we have two identical houses.
One day I'll give you the house and say
you are now the owner of this house.
They can bequeath it, they can
sell it, and so on.
And in the other case, I say they are the
manager of this house for 4 years, 8
years, and so on. You cannot
sell it, you cannot bequeath it,
but during the time you
are the manager, you can profit from
this house. So you can try to
get as much rental income out of this house
as possible in 48 years. Would
you behave differently? Uh, what are
the consequences if you are merely a beneficiary, the
manager of the house? Yes, then it is of
interest to them. I need to get as much out of this house
as possible. Even if
the house is nothing but a ruin after 8 years
, you would behave this way if
you were the owner of the house. And the
answer is: No, that would
never be done.
Democratic politicians are the ones
who want to rob the country as quickly as possible
because they only
have a limited time to do so
. A king usually has
a much long-term orientation and
wants to leave his children an intact
kingdom.
Not only that, but
resistance to the
expansion of state power is
much greater under kings,
because everyone knows, "I ca
n't become king." What's that guy doing there
?
How could he possibly do something like that to me
? Um, I have absolutely no
chance of ever rising to his position
. That's why there is
resistance when taxes
are increased, new regulations
are introduced, and so on. Under a
democracy, everyone can hope, oh,
perhaps I too will one day be in that
position, and resistance to the
expansion of state power decreases
considerably.
And one last argument, which
speaks in favor of monarchy and against democracy as a form of government. I
am not a monarchist, but I have
sympathies for monarchy. Um, this is
it. Uh, a king,
because he
came to his position by chance,
can coincidentally be a nice man
.
Um, he can also be evil.
But what happens if he's evil?
If he is evil, the dynasty of
which he is a part is usually concerned
that the entire
country might be lost. And what does
the family circle do then? Well, they'll just order
someone up and that person will kill the king
. Uh, simply to preserve the dynasty
. Hundreds of
historical examples of this. And
that is of course an extremely
positive event, that such people are
simply beheaded.
And now we ask ourselves, what happens
under democratic conditions? Well,
under democratic conditions, it's like this:
no one comes to power by chance; there is
competition for
this position. Um
, but competition isn't always
good. Competition is good when it comes to the
production of goods. Something is good,
but competition is not good when it comes to
doing something evil. And as
I have already explained, states, as
lawbreakers and expropriating
property protectors, are in the business of doing harm to
producers. They don't want any
competition there. We do
n't want a competition. Who
has the best racket? Who is
the best man, uh, who
can manage a concentration camp? Uh,
who won the competition among the
killers?
Um, and in democratic competition,
it's precisely those who make
the biggest promises, knowing full well
that none of it can be kept
, who prevail. Imagine a
politician
appearing and saying, "I am against
any redistribution of wealth; I am in favor of
abolishing taxes." Even the idea
that one is in favor of reducing taxes by, let's say,
10, 20, 30%
. Ask yourself, what are the
chances of such a man being
elected anywhere? Maybe in a
small village where everyone knows everyone else,
but not in a society of
millions of people. Democracy
allows
individuals to indulge their desire for the property of
other people.
This promotes the formation of nasty
characters,
and of course, the people who end up at the
top are always the most cunning and nasty
characters.
So, after this observation, um,
I now come to the
private law society,
and as you have already recognized, quite
undoubtedly, the solution—uh,
how can people avoid their conflicts—
must also
be offered by frequent enterprises.
Everyone must
adhere to the same basic rules,
the rules I
mentioned at the beginning. So we need a
non-statist solution.
Law and order,
and especially law and order, must
not be offered by a monopolist
. Therefore, there is no
ultimate legal monopoly. There is no
tax privilege.
Um, nobody is permitted
to acquire property other than through
original appropriation,
production, and voluntary exchange.
And no one is permitted to
prevent another person from freely [ahem] using their property,
as long as they do not
infringe upon the physical integrity of the property of others. Um, and every person is
allowed to enter any business area with their property
. It is allowed to
produce whatever it
wants.
And specifically regarding the problem of law
and order, this means that in a private law society, the
production of security and law and
order will
also be carried out by
freely financed and
competing
service
providers and
service companies,
just like the production of everything
else,
because I do not presume to
predict
what a society of this kind would
look like in detail. But you
can make a whole range of relatively
detailed predictions about what
will happen and how what
happens will differ. very clearly different
from what we are currently facing
.
First, um, to the
small point, and I'll come back to that
later. Of
course, in such a
society there is a right to
self-defense.
Every person has the right
to defend their property if they are attacked
or if their property
is attacked.
Um,
you know, in Switzerland this is
less pronounced than in most
other countries, that most
states tend to
increasingly disarm their citizens. Um,
and to get straight to the point,
the reason for this is quite
obvious: if you're in the business of
taking other people's property, then of course you prefer
that the other
people are not able to
defend themselves.
I would do the same if I held a monopoly
on law and order: I would
disarm them all. First of all,
in a private law society,
gun ownership is sacrosanct. Everyone
has the right to own weapons, of course
.
And although I'll get to that in a moment
, although
self-defense will play a relatively minor
role in a private law society, um, one should perhaps
point out that there is
a myth that such
societies, which
were similar to this model, were characterized by constant murder
and slaughter. This is often
compared to the Wild West, where everyone ran around with weapons,
giving the impression that such
societies were characterized by constant use of
violence.
That's all complete nonsense. Uh, the
Wild West was an exceptionally
peaceful society. Um,
imagine you want to rob a
bank, and every one of
the bank employees has a gun. Uh, do
you think you'll get out of there alive
? Imagine they
want to rob a carriage and everyone
on the carriage has weapons in their pockets
. Yes, they'll never manage that
. Um, those are all
figments of the imagination, told
by state propagandists
that things are different.
[clears throat][snort] Robberies and
such have been extremely rare
. Uh, there's an interesting book. It
means, um, more ganun Less Crime, where
it is empirically
demonstrated in great detail that the
higher the gun ownership, the
lower the crime rate is for
all other things, of course
kept constant. In very
heterogeneous societies, there is
generally more crime than in very
homogeneous societies. [ahem] Switzerland, incidentally,
is a relatively good
example of a
low crime rate, even though,
or perhaps precisely because, people
own a lot of weapons. Most people do
n't like it when you point to Switzerland
, um, as an example of a
society that
is relatively peaceful compared to all the others, and
yet most people have an
assault rifle at home.
Um, but as I said, in a
private law society
one would generally rely on the division of
labor. We do
n't manufacture our own televisions
or sew our own suits. This is done through a division of
labor, and we can
expect that in a
private law society,
law and order are naturally also
established through a division of labor by
specialized companies, i.e.,
private police services, private
insurance companies,
private arbitration organizations,
and so on. If one wants to describe the
crucial difference between a
privately organized
security industry and
current state-run
practices, and
express it in one word, then
that word is contract.
Um, the state, that is, our state in the
current situation, is in a legally non-contractual state vis-à-vis us as the
ultimate legal monopolist
. There is no
contract between the state and us, and
it is not defined
what belongs to us as property, as inviolable
property. I just have to say, there are,
for example, property taxes, and there are
real estate taxes. What portion of
your property belongs to you, as much as the
state leaves you with. What portion
of your land belongs to you. As
much as he leaves them.
Um,
and it also doesn't say what the
price is that you have to pay the state
, as it's constantly
changing. Let's imagine, um,
that
a private security provider
would say something like that. I'm not
guaranteeing you anything contractually.
I will not tell you which
specific items I
intend to protect as your property.
I will not tell you what I am obligated to do
if, in
your opinion, I fail to
perform my duties.
I also reserve the right
to change the rules of the game at any time.
Um,
and furthermore, I reserve
the right in any case to unilaterally determine the price
for my rather vague service
.
Is there anyone here who
would sign such a contract?
And yet, that is exactly what
we are facing.
Conversely, it is also perfectly clear what would
naturally be the case in a private law society. in a
private company,
since a provider of this type
of contract would naturally not
find a single customer. Well, in a
private law company,
contracts must be offered. These
contracts must contain clear
descriptions of ownership
and clearly defined
reciprocal services and
obligations. Furthermore,
these contracts can
only be amended by mutual
agreement during their period of validity. No
unilateral changes to the contract are possible.
Well, from this fundamental advantage of the
private law society,
a whole series of
detailed
improvements result compared to the
current state.
Um, first of all,
competition among privately funded
security providers would ensure
that the price of
security per unit of value
tends to fall, whereas
currently it is of course always
rising.
Furthermore, competition would ensure
that there is neither an overproduction
nor an underproduction
of security. What I mean by that
is this. Security is
also a good that competes with all other
goods.
Um, if I spend more on insurance, on
police protection, uh,
then I can spend less money
on drinking beer or
eating out at a restaurant. Um, every good
competes with all other goods.
Um, how much security should actually be
produced? How much money needs to be
spent to
produce security? If you
leave it to a monopolist, the more money I
get, the better we need it. One
police officer, two police officers, three
police officers, 100 police officers get
paid 100 francs, 200 francs, 3000 francs. Do
we need one tank, two tanks,
100 tanks, uh, do we perhaps
also need to send a personal bodyguard next to each person
, uh,
equipped with a machine gun, and
so on?
The state's stance on the state is always: the
more money I have, the more I can
protect you. But perhaps
we don't want to be protected so extensively
, because this good
competes with all other goods.
Only through competition will it
become clear how much money people are
actually willing to spend on their security
. Not everyone wants the same
level of security. Some people
are strong and can
defend themselves, while others are
weaker and want more protection.
People in the city
may need more protection than
those in the countryside. Younger
people may need less,
older people perhaps a little more. Well,
in eastern Switzerland they might want
less than in
western Switzerland, and so on. In a
market society, everyone gets as much
security as security is worth to them.
Um,
but most importantly, the
difference between state-run
security producers and
privately run security producers
lies in the content.
First, there is the problem of
fighting crime.
Um, as you know, the state is
notoriously inefficient in this area
because the payment of its
agents tasked with this job comes from
tax revenue, meaning it is
independent of productivity
. Why work when
you get rewarded for doing nothing?
Why should I chase criminals when
I can hand out parking tickets?
Furthermore, one can even
assume that the state
has a certain interest in
deliberately allowing a certain level of crime
, because then one
can always hope for larger budget allocations. Um, as an anecdote, for example:
The American intelligence agency CIA
systematically
dramatized the fighting strength of the
Soviet Union during the Cold War.
Uh, for what reason? Because then, of
course, they received a larger allocation for the CIA
. Everyone who has
seen these countries knew
that of these thousands of tanks,
half of them didn't work on any given day
because a few screws were
missing. Uh, and the
economic power of the Soviet Union
was of course incredibly low and
simply exaggerated. Well,
one can of course assume a similar interest in
all police forces
.
Um, it's even worse when, um, in
the fight against crime,
you realize that currently, uh, it's
not about compensating the victims in any
way. On the
contrary, if the state
actually catches the criminals, at which it
is very inefficient, then
the victims are often forced to pay
for the
accommodation
of these crooks and bandits through taxes, so that they
can play table tennis and
get their Bircher muesli every day,
and possibly even
study law in America.
And are there still halls where one
can, uh, strengthen oneself, so that one
might
be a little more successful in one's, uh, performance next time?
Um,
look into
private security services
.
And when I say "sometimes
insurance,"
always keep in mind that
insurance companies are currently
heavily regulated
businesses under state control. Insurance
organizations are
no longer doing what
insurance organizations
would do in a free market. Um, an insurance company, for example, would of course be
good when it
comes to crime prevention. Because whenever
he can't prevent something, he has to
pay. The state is not coming
to the rescue; he says he actually wanted to
protect you. Unfortunately, that did
n't work out, but he's
now getting 10,000 francs in compensation,
100,000 francs in compensation. No,
no compensation will be paid.
An insurer must provide compensation. For
that reason, he will be good at prevention
. If a
crime has been committed and damage has been
caused, an insurer must compensate for the
damage. So he will be good at
, uh, for example, finding the stolen goods again
if your house
is burgled and you go to the
police and say, well, this and that has been
stolen, you can
be sure that it will simply be filed away
. No one will
make any effort to recover the loot
. Uh, an insurer will make every
effort to recover the stolen goods.
He doesn't have to replace anything he finds
. And finally,
an insurer will also have an interest in
tracking down the perpetrators, because
only then is it possible to hold the perpetrators liable for victim
compensation,
instead of having the victims pay for
locking up an apprehended perpetrator somewhere.
Furthermore,
the private sector and the
security industry are also generally conducive to
peace.
Um, states, as I've already
hinted, are inherently
aggressive institutions
because they can shift the costs
associated with aggression onto
third parties. Um, these
are, and this applies both to
the relationship with interfering citizens and
to, uh, foreign states.
Look, uh, when Bush and Clinton and, um, what's the name of
the current guy, Obama? Um, if they
went to war and had to
bear all the associated costs themselves
, they probably would
n't do it.
But since they can shift the blame onto innocent third parties
who have absolutely nothing to do with it
, well, then
I am naturally more aggressive. Um,
for private organizations,
aggression is costly. One would have to
increase the premiums. Uh, and if I
increase the premiums,
then I lose customers compared to
companies that say, "I stay out of
all conflicts, uh, and therefore
offer you lower
premiums."
Furthermore, not all
risks are insurable.
Um, for example, is it possible to
insure oneself
against, let's say, the risk of
committing suicide tomorrow? The
answer is, no, an insurance company will
not do that. Is it possible to
insure oneself against
setting fire to one's own house? Um, that's not
possible either. Is it possible to insure against
business bankruptcy?
That's not possible either. Is it possible to
insure oneself against unemployment?
That's not possible either. There is
something that calls itself that,
but it has nothing to do with it. You can
only insure yourself against events over which
you have no control.
Anything that you can control yourself
falls under your own
responsibility.
For this reason, insurers,
for example, will refuse to help them
if they have provoked conflicts. That
means no insurer will say, "I
will insure you in every case if
someone attacks you," but rather
they will say, "I will only insure you
if someone
attacks you unprovoked." However, if they
have previously committed a provocation and there is
a retaliatory measure,
we do not insure them against such types of risks. This means that
every insurer will insist
that policyholders behave in a
civilized manner and
comply with the rules.
Uh, otherwise there is no
insurance, uh [snorting] there is
no insurance coverage. Um, for the
same reason, insurers will
also insist that they do not take the law into their own hands
. Um,
vigilantism, even if it
is justified, i.e.,
in the case where one is attacked and
simply defends oneself. Well,
vigilantism carries the risk of
retaliation and the
creation of uncertainty
. Um, and since all of this
is costly, insurers will insist
that in such
cases [snorting] one submits to regulated, orderly procedures
that determine who is
right, who is wrong, and so on.
Therefore, vigilante justice
practically never occurs in such cases anymore.
Eventually,
insurance companies will no
longer prosecute victimless crimes.
Currently,
endless sums of money are being spent by
all states to prosecute
crimes for which there are actually
no victims. These are things like
prostitution, uh,
drugs, drug use, uh, luck,
gambling, and so on. All of
these things are things
that
are voluntarily agreed upon between adults. Um, there is
no victim. If there are victims, that
's a different matter; then it's just
ordinary crime. But there are
a multitude of things that are
currently being prosecuted, for which
vast amounts of money are spent, where there are
no victims whatsoever. Now you might wonder
, would an
insurance company
insure something like that?
First, they must collect a huge,
huge amount more in bonuses
.
And who would be willing
to pay such increased premiums for something
they are not affected by at all?
That means victimless crimes
would revert to what they are.
These may be private sins, uh,
these may be people who get involved
in things one doesn't
want to have anything to do with.
Since they do
not affect one's own person or property,
one would not
insure against them.
Um, to
come back to the
problem of armament,
already emphasized [snorting] why states
disarm their populations.
What would
insurance companies do? Imagine
you go to an
insurance company and they
say, "I will only insure you on
the condition that you first hand over all
hammers, all nails, all knives, uh, all
firearms to me
."
[snorting] Um,
you don't need to
be inventive there either. You would immediately know that something was
wrong with this
insurance company. On the
contrary,
insurance companies would
encourage that. That reduces the risk.
They would offer special discounted premiums
if you can prove that you
are experienced in handling handguns.
Just like you get a reduction in
insurance premiums if you
say, "I have a safe at home and
all my valuables are always locked in the safe
."
Um, insurance would actually
contribute to
the population being armed, whereas
currently the exact opposite
is true.
And finally, a system of
competing security producers
also has a twofold effect on the
[snorting] content of the law. On the
one hand,
this allows for greater variability in
the law, and on the other hand,
it leads to a
harmonization of the law.
And I'll explain that briefly.
Insurance companies can
now say, for example, I offer Mosaic law
, I offer atheist law,
I offer Islamic law, uh, I
offer canon law. And
then people can decide.
As a Catholic, I submit
to canon law. As a Jew,
I am subject to the Mosaic
Law and so on.
Then, of course, the problem arises:
what happens if there is a
conflict between
people who are insured by two different
insurance companies?
What happens in that case if you and
I
are under the same law? That much is clear from the outset
. We
agreed to that. Um,
but as I said, what happens if
the insurance companies
are of different types? And of
course, every client of
insurance companies knows that
such cases can occur, and everyone
will naturally be careful to ensure that
their own insurance company
has also made provisions for such situations in its contracts. What
happens in such cases?
And also, what happens in
cases where I, as the
policyholder, have a conflict with
my insurance company?
And there is
only one solution.
If both insurers
reach the same conclusion, there is no
problem, just as is the case now.
Um,
but if they don't reach the same verdict,
or if I have a complaint
against my own
insurance company, then
each insurance company will
provide for this in its contract with
its client.
Then an independent, simply independent, arbitration
panel is involved. If there's
no insurance history, then
I decide, or someone else decides,
then I decide. Every client
knows that this can't work.
It can only work if there is now
an independent arbitration
organization. And there is
n't just one of these independent arbitration organizations. There are
competing, simpler
organizations to which one should then turn
.
And this simple organization, which
also competes with each other,
ensures that there is something like
a harmonization of law,
that a universal law
emerges, namely precisely in those
cases where, I don't know, a Jew
has a dispute with a Christian or a
Muslim has a dispute with a Jew. In
that case, there are no Jewish
rights and no Muslim rights;
it must be an international
law.
Um, something like that does exist
,
if you
look at international business, i.e.,
business between Swiss and
Germans, Austrians, Americans,
whatever, [ahem] there is
no superstate.
Uh, they're looking at the tripoint near
Basel. There they have French people,
there they have Germans, there they have
Swiss people. Are there
more conflicts between these people
, let's say, than between
the people of Zurich and Bern?
Uh,
I've never heard of that before.
Um, it seems to me that there
is just as much or as little conflict between people who
are on this side of the border and those on the other side, as there is
between people who are inside a
territory. And what do you do in
such cases, when these people
have conflicts? Yes, people also go to
arbitration organizations,
and in international business transactions
it is quite common for companies to engage with
arbitration organizations,
and if they do
not submit to this simple ruling, they are
finished in business.
You don't do business with people like that anymore
.
Uh, well, in international
business transactions we already have something
similar to what I would develop in a
private law company
. From the conflicts
of individuals, which are handled by
insurance companies
,
competing simple organizations then form,
and they make judgments according to a
universal law, which gradually emerges
in legal transactions
.
Um,
and if these mediators fail,
that is, if they come out with judgments saying things like, "
This is
outrageous, how can anyone do such a thing, how
can anyone make such a judgment," then
you can be sure that these
mediators will not be used again in the next case
. And what can you
do in such a situation if you feel that the
verdict that has been handed down is a huge outrage?
Then you can't do anything at all.
Can they go back to an authority
that
is itself part of the organization that was responsible for these
outrageous rulings?
Okay, so with that
I'd like to conclude. Uh, as I said, if
you want to read up on it a bit,
my little booklet is here. I hope, um,
that this was at least somewhat stimulating
and thought-provoking. That's what
this academy is for, [snorting] so that
we can think together and
they might hear something that might seem
strange to them at first. But I am
confident that you have
realized that what I have presented here is not entirely ill-conceived
. Thank you very much.