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hackmas2026 - Vibe hacking - Agentic vulnerability analysis for security competitions

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The presentation introduces the concept of "vibe hacking," which refers to using agentic vulnerability analysis for security competitions and coding, particularly in response to the rise of AI-generated applications often referred to as "vibecoded." These applications are frequently targeted by hackers, alongside high-profile incidents like the Moldbook hack and data theft involving Claude. The speaker also defines "wipeware" as malware created by nation-state actors using niche programming languages such as Nim or Crystal to evade signature-based detection. While acknowledging that AI models from major companies face scrutiny for model escapes, the talk argues that sandboxing failures often stem from human error rather than superior AI capabilities, highlighting that current AI excels in reading cryptography papers, reverse engineering assembly code, web vulnerability analysis, and log forensics, though it still struggles with hardware challenges requiring graphical user interface tools. In the context of Capture The Flag (CTF) competitions, a survey of Austrian players reveals that 75% utilize basic agents like CodeX or CLCode primarily for documentation search and "rubber ducking," with most spending under €100 per contest. The speaker advocates for this approach over standard AI coding because the latter often leads to defensive over-engineering and poor code quality that complicates reviews; in security contexts, low-code quality is acceptable since finding a single exploit is sufficient to win, whereas proving absolute security is impossible. Technically, the talk covers multi-agent systems and swarm intelligence, recommending frameworks like Squid Agents and strategies such as using smaller, cheaper models like DeepSeek in parallel with supervisor agents to avoid context limits and safety refusals, often achieved through reverse proxy tricks or fine-tuning open models to remove censorship. Looking toward the future of the industry, the speaker suggests that current subscription models are merely temporary "free samples" designed to lock users in, predicting that pricing will eventually rise toward actual API costs as companies adjust their offerings. Open source models are expected to close the performance gap with proprietary models within a year, potentially becoming available before late 2025, while new roles like "AI trashmen" may emerge to utilize CTF archives as training data for these evolving systems. Ultimately, the conclusion emphasizes that successful security practice requires solid software engineering, continuous testing, directed fuzzing, and human-in-the-loop supervision, urging learners to reproduce writeups, reimplement tools, and engage with communities rather than relying solely on AI completions to avoid ruining competition environments or falling victim to unverified exploits.
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Vip hacking. Thank you. Uh so the talk will be in English and with VIP hacking as the word means very little without context. I'm talking about agentic vulnerability analysis for security competitions but also for coding. My target audience is people who have at least programmed before or heard of the concept of CTFs. You can't click the links on screen but you can click them on your device if you go to L/vipe.pdf. Yes, that's an actual domain. I'm sorry if you don't have um lots. Long press your O and your R. Uh and this the second version of the talk. I already gave it a technology pl in lint once. And I'm Marcus. Uh so I'm a software developer. Uh I'm a founding member of the Lintz CTF team, Sik Flag. We've been everything from second in Austria to fifth or 10th in Austria in the previous years. I'm mainly playing web miscellaneous in crypto for the CTF people that are watching. I'm studying computer science and AI in the master and I'm also in UHA. Uh I was into natural language processing before it was all about transformers. Uh, I like games, Linux, music festivals, beer. Uh, and I use Arch, by the way. Uh, and then here is the outline of the talk. Uh, as I always do it, I somewhat over booked it, but some of the content is essentially bonus content. So, I'll quickly go into what's the news of the recent years. uh I participated in the Austrian cyber security survey and they did a questionnaire about the AI usage of professional CTF players. So it's not just my opinion, it's the [snorts] best and people who try to be the best at hacking. I can also highly uh recommend the Austrian Cyber Security Challenge. Uh I'll quickly go into what even is a CTF. I looked into academic papers especially from the teams that won at some bigger CTF things uh because CTF is really linked to academia. Uh I'll quickly give my opinions and my setup uh and I'll do some future predictions and I have some bonus content that I'm afraid we won't get to but maybe. Uh so the news recently were all about uh vip coded apps because now that aentic engineering is a thing. So especially after the copy pasting from chat and stuff running in an agentic loop everyone thought they can totally program an app and you're done if you program an app and you get it someh how on the internet. Uh, and then all of those h apps get hacked. So, it's actually a great time to go into security if you just lost your software job due to AI cuz there are a lot of great apps now. For example, there was the tea on her app. Uh, which is essentially an app where people can rant about their data and it's the gender swapped version of the tea app. Uh it was uh pretty big thing uh when I made the slides initially for the version one was like uh rather big news and also mold book like a social media network for AI agents was just hacked in that week. Uh it's all horrible vipcoded apps and it's hilarious because they're pretty close to CTF challenges. Uh, also Claude was in the news a million times. For example, they uncovered that nation state hackers from China and from Russia are also too lazy to program their exploits just like you are. And uh, they also vip coded their stuff. But of course, the Americans uh, and Claude and the Secret Service had all their code and knew exactly what they did. This is one of the reasons why all the bigger American providers now have safeguards. uh also uh yeah Chinese attackers and uh the claude was also abused in some bigger data theft so not just plain hacking and one of my favorite terms that was coined was wipeware it's a tweet that apt 36 so advanced persistent threat it's threat actors from I think Russia uh essentially had in their internal documentation that they now use wipeware because most virus detection is signature uh based. So if you write a completely new virus for extracting stuff, it's not in any virus signature. So in that sense, it's better than reusing some framework or some toolkit to do your viruses. And I just think uh wipeware sounds kind of funny. And they're typically using niche languages like Nimse Crystal uh because they're also great for evading uh standard detection tools because most of the standard dynamic analysis tools are optimized for CPython Java stuff with code. Also when I initially built uh the talk, Claude Miffus was just released. That's the claude model that's really really good at cyber security, but it wasn't released to the uh full public. Uh and it was a huge trend. I just see I cut off uh the slides. So you have to go into the original slides to see the second chart. But there was a huge spike and it was a pretty big topic uh not just in IT security that is also partially cut off. Uh yeah then the new news that are pretty much from this week uh is that uh OpenAI everyone is now claiming that the model is super smart because it hacked something because they weren't able to sandbox their AI systems during training. From my perspective, that means you just don't have employees that are that great at sandboxing their models. Not necessarily that the model is that great. And uh it's not just OpenAI, it's also anthropic. And it's also Facebook Muse, the big model. So now everyone is claiming who is the most dangerous AI that can do the most harm out in the wide world and go completely out of scope which would just be unacceptable for a security professional. Uh, Life Overflow made some really cool videos where he went into how the whole hugging face hack happened because the media is uh distorting the actual events uh quite a lot. And also now kill switches are discussed in the uh White House and in the Senate in the US like the big off button for AI essentially. So we reached that point. uh there were even more escapes uh from yeah entropic and uh meta. I already said that. So where are we in the whole development of AI? In my opinion, it really started becoming useful sometime around 2024 when we had a million context window. So you can just copy paste your whole code base into back then only check chat interfaces. With Claude 35, we finally reached acceptable coding skills. At least to my opinion before that, it wasn't really usable in a code base that you're responsible for. Uh then with uh 01 roughly 2 years ago, uh we had the thinking which really increased the capabilities. uh and just a month after that we had agentic capabilities which means that the AI models can execute code and can react on the output and essentially use a terminal. theoretically they also can use a UI and this is really when all the security work that is interactive you have to try stuff really took off and the big uh new thing essentially was that open source model uh adapted that and became really acceptable uh just the January after then last year wasn't that much exciting stuff it was just bit bigger models becoming slightly better And roughly a year ago, we finally reached a point where the sessions could run autonomous for a long time without babysitting, which was then used for reinforcement learning and essentially gave us better tool usage by just letting the AI run and try, for example, from CTF archive, previous CTF challenges, and it tries to solve them. And they do it with different levels of hints from the writeups. And there are some interesting papers on how people are training that. Yeah. And uh roughly 4 months ago the cloud methus thing was pretty big. It found the PSD exploit with copy fail and with like five other things. And it in my opinion really was an interesting exploit and actually good security work. But it was a hybrid approach. It wasn't just the AI. They gave the AI some hint. They gave it some harnessing. And this is foreshadowing for the later part. And the big thing of 2026 is multi- aent. So you have multiple models or you run the same model but primed with different contexts. Work trees. So you spawn sub agents or you spawn trees and you fold your trees. Again, uh swarms and open claw was pretty big in the media. Doesn't matter if you don't know what that is yet. Uh, and I'm quickly going into VIP coding. The term I guess everyone has heard. Has anyone in the audience not heard of VIP coding? Okay, good. Uh, for everyone at home, no. So in my opinion uh VIP coding is typically not that great because the code quality at least for me as a person who does everyday coding is really not that great especially in terms of reusing existing functionality. So dry also it doesn't always take the most simple thing the kiss and it often defensively program stuff you won't need that's the yagn you ain't going to need it. Uh a lot of examples showed that the security if you don't review the code properly uh is often not that great. For example, the toner the mold book uh or just because it's in the training data that some people commit some git keys uh or some API keys. AI models also do that. And sometimes if you're too lazy to use git and you say javis do [snorts] my git stuff commit everything uh there is a realistic chance that it will commit your end file for example because a lot of repositories have an imp file so probably just do the five clicks in your git interface yourself don't do everything that isn't necessary with AI and the worst thing in my opinion especially in the context of teaching The code looks plausible. It looks aesthetic. If you give a first semester student coding homework 3 years ago, you already see from the shape of the code uh five-fold if and you need a widescreen monitor to even read the code. It doesn't even look plausible. You just from the shape of the code can somewhat determine okay that person shouldn't pass programming one. But now with AI, most code that is submitted somewhere uh looks plausible which makes it harder to review. Uh and Vipacking on the other side where I'm kind of hyped about it. Uh first of all, all the script kitty news uh made it seem like it's becoming industry standard that even people with lower skills and a lot of security people aren't that great at programming. Even though I think it's really necessary to know your programming to hack programs to understand programming logic, uh the great thing in security is you're the winner if you find one security hole. In programming, you're the loser if you program one security hole. So the AI being wrong a million times isn't that much a problem in VIP hacking because if you just find one exploit in a big program, you won. Nobody cares about your code, your exploit testing code. It's throwaway code. It's perfectly fine if the code quality isn't that great. Asterisk uh in most scenarios. Sometimes you want to share it with people and then you have to refactor your exploit code. Uh and typically the whole hacking process is really reading and testing intensive. You're like, "Oh, maybe it's a path traversal for the webcam thing. let's just do a for loop over a million IPs and send something or maybe I want it multi- threaded and all of that now is so much easier and it's way simpler to validate it with Y packing because you can just see did it give me a response code that's not a forbidden if you get an okay okay response code in HTTP or a file falls out it's way easier to validate that something is broken than that something is not broken. It's even one of the core principles of security. You can't really prove that something is secure. You can only prove it's insecure. Everything is insecure. Uh then uh the Austrian cyber security people did a questionnaire uh so it's all the people that competed uh from uh March to May. And the questionnaire was done after the contest. uh it's not very representative because it's only 30 out of 500 people and I didn't do the questionnaire. It's the Austrian cyber security people but it's security experts so it's still relevant I think. Uh so most people use basic agents like Codex CL code and so on that's 75% and a lot of people also use it for rubber duckying. So instead of explaining your teammate what you just did, you explain it some chat tool like chat GPT or claude uh also for search engine because often you need to read a lot of documentation uh and inline code completion isn't even that popular seemingly uh I'm probably in older uh categories. And how much AI did you use? the majority of people uh essentially said seven out of 10 uh challenges or more uh or percentage so it's 70% or more so it's really the industry standard that you use some level of AI on the challenges uh and that you even use it on most because nearly every challenge has some tedious stuff that you can just automate away and CTFs are time critical so it's really in the spirit of your better at the competition if you can automate stuff away. It's not just laziness. Uh which L&M providers there aren't really many surprises. Openropic and Gemini. Uh all the smaller providers like Mistral and Deepseek are also in there, but it's mostly the big American ones are somewhat the industry standard. I think it's slowly shifting. Then I have something to make all the colorblind people angry. Uh the big chart is the smaller than €10. The other ones, even if you're color blind, should work from uh just the brightness. So the majority of people really don't spend a lot of money. This is because this is 4 months ago uh where you had a lot of options that the free usage for the web interfaces still wasn't that rate limited. They are slowly in shitifying that and it's slowly getting worse. uh everyone is token charging you, but I'll get to that later. So, just as a summary for people who don't want to go fully into it, nobody really spend more than uh 50 to€100 and the average is more like 10 to 20 over a contest that goes for 2 months and that has like 50 challenges. So, it's really not that crazy if you see it from that perspective. So, quick recap. What is a capture the flag competition? Who hasn't heard of capture the flag as an esport in the room? Any hands up or does everyone know it? [snorts] I don't see a single hand up. Uh, so I'll just assume you know it and I'll uh do it really quick. It's essentially an esport where you try to hack a centralized system and you extract a flag. A flag is a string that has a format like six, some curly braces and some content and then you have to submit that to a centralized system typically CTF uh to prove that you hacked some system. Uh and it's intended to be hacked in a specific way to typically use either known vulnerabilities or half known vulnerabilities that have been disclosed but not published yet because they are not yet fixed. So you very technically speaking get zero days at CTF sometimes but very often it's some niche obscure tool or it's a weird configuration bug. Uh so it's really close to actual uh security research I would say especially if you go to the higher level. The easier ones are typically custom toy programs. Uh yeah and it's very university connected and educational. uh you're typically uh in the easier CTFs you get a minimal vulnerable product let's call it that uh if there is code in the thing there's a high likelihood that that code is actually necessary people don't give you like 20 end points as a red herring typically you get like five end points and you probably need to use actually three or four of them to get to the flag it's typically not just one end point uh because that's by now stuff that AI can just do uh single shot. Uh there are Jeopardies and attack defense. Attack defense is everyone hosts that service and you try to host someone else. Jeopardy is the centralized setup that I described. Uh it's typically time limited. Uh it can go from uh 2 hours to uh multiple days. there very technically is a platform limit of two months uh that you can't have your CTF on CTF time the centralized uh platform for most of that. So if you want to get into that ctfftime.org or uh and it's uh free organized. You don't have to pay anything. You can play solo. You can play with your team. All the bigger cities in Austria or Germany have a CTF team. You can just Google it up. It's way more fun if you play with people. It's perfectly fine if you have no idea what you're doing. All the teams are really accommodating to new people. If you're from Lindso from up Austria uh sikfle our team you can come by contact me uh and it has uh some categories they are not fully standardized but it's a def facto standard that you have cryptography where it's typically about uh the algorithms being used either outdated algorithms then you have to read the paper like why is char one broken everyone knows that it's broken But most people couldn't just outright come up with a case how to actually exploit that it's broken. Uh sometimes it's design flaws in variations of standard algorithms like they just leave away the s boxes in AES and then it's crackable or using it wrong. Reverse engineering typically uh means you get the source code and it's algorithmic design flow problems uh and you typically have to think through the pro uh program actually and read typically c source code or go or rust. Then there is pawn and binary exploitations. It's often different categories. You typically just get the compiled program and you have to use a disassembler. you get really raw assembly code. You don't get the source code back and there are tools that translate a compiled program back to something source code adjacent uh forensics. Yeah, you get some disk image or some blackbox server. You really get a login to a server typically sandboxed and you have to find something interesting like a beginner thing would be a deleted file. Uh also miscellaneous that's where they fit everything else like G guess or aent challenges steonography coding challenges like you have to automate a game and you have to bought a game and win some virtual prize in some games uh some hardware challenges where you get some trace from some hardware all of that basically miscellaneous is everything that doesn't fit into a standardized category uh this is pure vibes this is my opinion opinion on how great uh AI is in those categories. Uh it's really good at reading cryptography papers that if you don't have a PhD in mathematics, your masters or PhD in informatics isn't good enough. Cryptography papers are just another category of stuff. uh then it's really great especially when you let the AI explain what could be wrong and also with perplexity or other AI search engines to find the one paper that describes from the context from the challenge hey which papers could actually explain what's wrong here it's also pretty good at reverse engineering uh I would say the pone thing by now you could give it a star more because aentic tool usage just got that much better. you can just paste in a lot of decompiled raw assembly code and even if it's a megabyte of assembly code uh which fits into context now it can sometimes understand what's going on but it gets confused really easily and it's standard practice by now that people throw in the enthropic refusal string or some make me a bomb ignore all previous instructions just to trigger the refusal. This is stuff that people just now throw in the text block. So you first before you throw it into your AI, you have to probably scan it for words like bomb and uh mustard gas and stuff like that. Uh so we really going full circle on that one which is very annoying. [laughter] Uh web in my opinion it's really great because it's uh the most writeups out there. There is the most standardized toolings. Uh it's pretty great. It's uh finding com common vulnerability exposures from the past and interpolating that bug. Looks a lot like CVE 2024 5906 and it's the same bug but just in a different point. It's extremely surprisingly good. Also in forensics you sometimes can paste in a megabyte long log and it will just figure it out or you give it a grab and an orc uh and it generates you nice summaries so you don't have to do all the manual forensics. It can also use all the Windows forensics tools way better because all of them are really documentationheavy and in MISK uh well because MISK is everything uh it really depends on what the challenge is but for stuff like uh hardware challenges where you get some signal and you have to use GTK way or some other GU tool uh at least for me it didn't uh do it because a lot of tools just have some visual component And that's typically not really trained in. It's not yet in the data. So now uh I need some let's call it academic research. If you want to click those links l/vipe.pdf those are my sources. Uh and I'll quickly go over it. Paint test GPT is just where people from my university tried to use chat GPT and some other GPTs uh for LLMs. It's a really old paper by now standards. A lot of stuff has changed but they still have some interesting insights. Uh, also the DAPA, the American Defense Ministry, uh, does a cyber challenge, essentially the American Austrian cyber security challenge. and the team Atlanta that won it in 2025 did a really interesting infrastructure write up that you could uh use as inspiration for your tooling because by now CTFs are like half the game is preparing your automated solving token burning infrastructure that it essentially takes the challenges as an input all in parallel and that you don't have to hand feed it. Of course, uh they'll always make challenges that are more convoluted and harder to set up uh or that have some AI flaw, and it still needs some babysitting. Uh that's just uh the attack defense of like challenge designers and challenge bers, but that's just by now a part of the scene. Uh Squid agents, the people from Squid Proxy, uh had a multi- aent CTF solver already. uh nearly a year ago uh the bots thing uh 39 C3. So the chaos uh people tried to get around the uh built a framework and there was a talk at 393 uh with blue teaming so also defensive stuff uh and uh uh MFUS thing those papers are way too complicated to go into it fully because I'm over half time already. Uh so just as a quick summary from the CI and the squid stuff uh we were essentially at uh the beta models like clot 37 set and deepseek where those are sorted by difficulty pretty much where difficulty is defined as how many models solve it but also pretty much the human difficulty. uh and most models by now if you instrument them properly that's even 37 stuff are at some point able to solve it and this is pretty much representative for standard CTFs if you know your tooling and if you instrument them properly you get threeirds of the challenges of like the standard difficulty CTFs there are the dark soul CTFs that are just uh insanely hard and uh require real world zero days there it's more like 20% and uh the standard framework that a lot of the papers have is that there's one centralized web manager that has some sub agents and some subframeworks that are running autonomously uh and do the script development and all of that stuff and the expert development and all of the these things are separate teams in separate tools that can then interact and throw it back to the web app manager and uh also for the vulnerability researcher there's the triaging which vulnerabilities even make sense to go further into uh the Atlanta uh team did the Atlantis framework I think it's a bit hard to see for the people in the back rows uh but it's a bit like a standard Atlantic loop just with verification patching uh and this is for attack defense. So they are also live vibing the vulnerable programs. They are live patching programs typically with LD preload. So on programs start they modify the program that they have to defend uh and they check that previous exploits that they're getting in if they're still working. uh and uh they also steal the attacks that they get in uh they throw it essentially in their pipeline if they get attacked. Hey, can you out of this attack code that returns this typically with traces, can you write a new exploit? So, we're really in the attack defense scene, we're full circle that you can now automated throwback attacks from other people. So you probably shouldn't attack the Atlanta team because then they'll have your exploit. So we are really metagaming now that you know do they have an automated framework for that. And the interesting thing here is uh the chart on the bottom the sidebench is a slightly newer uh framework and claude opus for five uh did really well and saw that also. So you really can see roughly middle last year the models became let's call it acceptable because anything below 50% isn't that great and all the new models because they're fine-tuned on security work are getting really good at that stuff and people are mostly benchmarking clots uh because uh on the one side they claim it's good and also uh back in when they did the benchmark the Chinese models weren't that great. So common tricks that all the papers are essentially using chain of thought, tree of thought, think step by step. This is pretty standard and everyone does it anyways. The React framework, it's just a formalized variant of think, act, observe, do it in a loop. When you think you're done, tell me. So you run like for five challenges, you run five agents and you're essentially waiting until they ping you back uh or until they time out and give you an intermediate summary. Uh OSER is also really popular that you run multiple LLMs from multiple providers typically the cheapest ones. Uh sometimes you aggregate them, sometimes you give them different prompts. Uh, and the trick about it is that the best models are so expensive and so energy wasteful that it's typically a smart idea to let five small models try it. One of them will probably be lucky. uh and planning and to-do lists with MCPS are also a thing like try this approach try this approach try this approach because if you run out of context you have to clear it and then the to-do list is really helpful that the cleared context knows I already tried this approach it didn't work uh and the newer models are typically always better uh like claude 37 7 wasn't that great. And with GPT5, we saw something. So new is always better. It's not like you typically get the old models, but Google, for example, didn't release anything interesting in months. So they're essentially out of the game. I still like it for conversation, but I wouldn't use it for agentic work anymore. Then uh common tricks, uh you still need to know your standard tooling like ID Pro or GRA. they have MCPs and there it's really helpful if you use uh the MCP connector stuff also with IntelliJ which has a great Java decompiler that you actually let the LLM use the tool uh they are slowly getting there with fine-tuning uh especially claude and especially GRA and ID ID pro the more niche your MCP is the smaller the chances are that your LLM is good at using it. Uh but also now the Chinese models are catching up. Uh also some supervisor models that watch your model and tell your turning in a circle are a pretty common strategy because even the bigger models can get confused and the small models constantly get confused and do the same stuff or do really similar stuff and don't accept that they're doing something stupid. So you typically run a sub agent with a token limit and you call it back to your main thread. This is in some of the papers especially in the squid and the dapper paper and also retrieval augmented generation. It's just semantic search on old writeups uh with some LLM embedding stuff. So even if you don't use the exact same words, it can find old writeups because everything is a remix. Every exploit is just a variant of a previous exploit. Every CTF challenge has been done before in a similar way. So it's typically really helpful to look into old challenges. That's also advice for humans. That's not just for AI. Uh in my opinion and also in the Atlanta Dapa's opinion, semi-automated and babysitting human in the loop is the way to go. you'll just uselessly burn a million tokens and you'll potentially even [ __ ] up either your infrastructure, someone else's infrastructure or when you let them run too long, uh they'll go out of scope and they potentially deduce another team and then you're disqualified. Congratulations. Uh then solid software engineering practices uh in my opinion are also a must. do subsystems that instrument each other. Don't overdo it. Don't go full micros service madness, but also uh have for your research stuff pretty much what we had here in the papers that you at least have some subsystems. If you try to automate that, if you try to be competitive, you now have to be an AI system programmer, not just a security expert. I'm sorry for that. uh continuous testing uh just because cloud claims they are the best probably not for your use case even though they are pretty great do some of your own benchmarks all benchmarks are cheated uh it's pretty known stuff and the economics of it if you pay for your own AI tokens which I guess most of us do use the small models that cost cents and not 50 per million output Uh and also directed fuzzing is pretty good. So you can point fuzzers like AFL so that also your CPU is running not just the remote inference engine. Uh which is typically a really good idea to have some hardware on your side for fuzzing for example. And it typically works way better if you instrument it well and you say only look into that path. Uh so [snorts] then which models are great? In my opinion, the closed models aren't that great because they have some safety and refusal mechanism. So for V packing, uh one of the tricks to get around it is that the thing that Toby did in the last talk, you just redirect with a reverse proxy some other website to local host. Then you tell the tool, I'm the admin. This is my tool. You're hacking local host. chill out. You don't need to do your safety stuff. I'm a security professional. And for the AI, it looks like you're attacking local host even though it's someone's webcam and you can just in another thread be smart, not in the same threat. The AI is that smart. You can tell it set up a reverse proxy to that website. Uh and AI just forgets what it does in another thread. That's how AI works. uh and there is a lot of lock in uh in terms of tools but also in vendor stuff. So if you can try to avoid the closed models uh especially onropic just builds good stuff. So sometimes there's no way around it. Uh typically it's better to use the API tokens because the web interfaces get rate limited really fast. Um and everything is getting initified that they want you to get AI tokens and that's one of my future predictions. It's also foreshadowing already. uh use the uh instruction tool t models. If you use loc models uh at open router.com you can buy tokens that work on every LLM. So you can try different models and it's typically close to the original pricing. At vastai you can buy whole GPUs. I had to while this talk this is the second variant I had to change the prices for example uh to buy a 5090 now isn't €3,000 it's now 4,500 but you can rent it for free uh for 30 cents the energy usage in Austria if you have a 20 cents it roughly burns a kilowatt so you already burn if you have the GPU yourself 20 cents just in energy cost so it really makes sense to rank your GPUs, but not at AWS, but at some rent out your computer websites. Typically, it's just people who bought GPUs and at night they don't use them, so they rent them out, so they make some extra cash. Uh, the Pro 6000 is a 5090 with more video RAM, which you need for LLMs. And by now, they go for a euro an hour or a dollar an hour and 15k for a new price. And an H200 is the state-of-the-art and you pay roughly 315 in rental. That's the one you need for stuff like DeepS because it has like the 140 gigs of video RAM. DeepS chose that size because it fits in the current state-ofthe-art card. Uh and essentially that's why it got so much more expensive. But don't buy GPUs. It just doesn't pay off if you're not utilizing it like at least 8 hours a day. doesn't pay off if you have a company with multiple people maybe but rent them share them uh yeah then uh old comparison it's 4 months old essentially uh China versus the world it's really hard to see but on the top frontier you see that on the left side GLM flash and quen are on the price versus performance they are already competitive if you're just going for performance ments and you don't care about money. Uh it's mostly the closed models. And here on the bottom, everything that isn't relevant are either old models or Mistral the European provider. They are not really competitive anymore in most standardized benchmarks. Uh and the pricing is that different. You essentially pay a tenth of the pricing for input and for output tokens. The Chinese models are just that much cheaper. And at least for me, having free threats and trying cheap models have the luck is a better idea than having uh the really expensive models just burn through tokens. Um then yeah, benchmarks are artificial analysis.ai. Uh in my opinion, most benchmarks if the benchmark is out longer than a month, they are just trying to cheat it. they will cheat it. Uh closed models will always cheat them because if they do inference on the benchmark questions, the questions get sent to the person running the thing. So even stuff like humanity humanity's last exam where they claim they only run the inference on their servers, it still gets sent to the data center of OpenAI and everything is essentially polluted. So if a benchmark is new, it makes some sense. But other than that, uh it's pure data pollution. In terms of data science, it's a joke. Uh coding for coding and tool calls. Uh so this is now uh my opinion. The striketh through is 5 months ago and the non strikethrough is my opinion now. I'm a big fan of deepseek for flash because it's really great. I was a fan of GLM and Sonnet. For conversation, I still think Gemini Pro is pretty great. You get it at uh AI studiogoogle.com for free if you have a regular Google account and I struggle to rate limited in conversation. Uh I also think for long data it's now deepse and not Google because that was the one thing that Google was great at 1 million context. And in my opinion openi isn't that great. It's just a flavor thing and also we had Quinn at work self-hosted. Uh I hated it. It got stuck on a million things, but I've heard a lot of great things about free, but it's only out for a week and I didn't get to test it and we didn't get to deploy it at work. But maybe look into it. Uh, also, previously, GitHub Copilot, which you got for free as a student, was pretty great, but they enchified it that you run in your monthly rate limit with roughly 10 minutes of usage. So, it's just plain useless, but the AI studio is still great. Uh so short ad break for the Google chats of AI research. Uh the state sponsor DeepS 4. Uh they are doing a lot of uh great research. I'm only half joking. Uh in my opinion they're doing more interesting research because all the American labs uh are keeping everything closed and uh it's highly likely that they're reusing that stuff. Uh read the deepseek paper at home. uh we don't have that time but essentially uh they really reduced the memory usage and they made the training faster which also means fine-tuning is faster which also means that to get a model that doesn't have refusal safety training baked in because that's just fine-tuning on top of the fine-tuning. Uh you can do that now with the Muan optimizer on hardware that you can afford to rent for. You can essentially train out the DeepSseek model with less than €100. You can essentially make it the uncensored model. You can download them by now and you can also apply a lot of stuff that is done here on all the other open models like Gemma. Uh and yeah, Gemma and uh Google stuff is still competitive funnily enough now in the closed models and not in the open ones. Uh and there is a lot of stuff still going on how they improve attention. Uh I think it's going too much into machine learning but essentially there is still progress and AI is still progressing on a technical side especially the LLM stuff but also other AI approaches. Uh, and if you read one paper about the I read the deepseek paper, just watch a video from BCloud. It's a YouTuber that explains it. So, now we go to my setup, my opinions. Uh, and I won't give you sources because it's pure feelings, pure vibes. Trust me, bro. Uh, I use the PI agent framework. It's made in Austria by Mario Techno. Uh, there's an interesting what I learned article. uh on his blog on why he designed the thing. It's essentially reading a blog post that also functions as a uh documentation and also as my explanation why I don't like open code intellig codes. He essentially rants why the other systems are bad and why he did his system this way. So that's your homework. It's yolo mode by default. It doesn't do uh any security checking except for pseudo password. It just says I can't do pseudo. Uh it's in design philosophy very Unix. It has some opinionated stuff and you should read the manual. It's really short. uh and it can self-modify it, can write plugins for itself and it has like a hierarchical documentation where it starts at one point and then it goes into the relevant part of the documentation. Uh and I also think set editor uh has some nice AI integration but more for coding than for the security stuff. And I pretty much ex exclusively use PI. It's a CLI tool. Uh yeah, and as you probably can think, I'm a huge fan of Deep Seek 4 Flash. Uh it's hard to see, but here I tried the Pro model once and it cost me $4. I mean, I was using it all day. Uh and typically I'm using $1 if I try really hard over a day because the flash model is just that much cheaper. Uh and Pro isn't really better. You pay for cash pricing less than than a cent per million and the input tokens because you continuously send your whole chat back to the server. Uh here you see it I very theoretically in a month burned like uh half a giga token or third of a giga token in another month but it's mainly cash tokens. 99.9% of that are the cash tokens and they burned probably less than a million output tokens. So the relevant pricing metrics released the cash pricing. Deepseek recently 3x their price. I'm very sad about that. Uh also clean your context. So you should in PI agent not make use of the whole million context but make it autocompress. hand over via uh readme files or markdown files. So manual handover, it's in the documentation what I mean with that. Uh I've heard Luna from GPT5 has similar pricing and is similarly great. I've also heard it's really not that great. Uh I didn't get into it. It's the model that also was released this month. And GLM5 was released when I made those slides like two days ago on that day. And according to the benchmarks, it's the new deepseek for flash. Essentially, it should be really great, but exercise left to the reader. Uh if you're rich, use cloud, but yeah, it's really expensive. You can easily burn 10 20 euros a day on cloud. Uh plugins I use in pi uh for root granting if I want to install some packages. uh ask user that instead of giving a full reply it also suggests you like three to five options and you just go option one two three or something else pi notify that it makes a little ding sound or it does some text to speech for the response with the summary uh if it's especially relevant if you run multiple agents at the same time in different tabs uh pi web access so that it can search there's also the yagami plugin which really doesn't work for me or I need to configure some tokens use the PI web app access one also sometimes and it's funny and I think it's in theory really fun there's the caveman skill where it uh drops the flower language and it speaks ugabooga but it leaves in regular technical terms and it reduces all the token output which also means it's way faster because it's not yapping around all day it's really coming to the point they also have a caveman subskll where it talks in traditional Chinese which is very efficient at uh deepseek and the Chinese models the American models aren't that fine-tuned. Uh the Chinese model sometimes do it if even if you don't ask them to that they fall back to thinking in Chinese. You then have to tell them English please. Uh also the MCP adapter is for some tools really great but MCPs are kind of bad. It's a whole rabbit hole. Why Mario Techno wrote two blog articles. It's also homework why they are bad. Uh also then you have like 10 seconds to read that slide because I'm short on time. This is my pen system. This is what I put in my prompt. You can read the files at home. Essentially it's a lot of stuff I already told you and information about my system. Uh and that's the second part. One of the relevant things uh the send of Python thing. It's a philosophy about how to write code that doesn't just apply to Python, but it's for making code in a way that I like it. Uh how you become more knowledgeable. Uh read writeups, try hackme like hack in the box is really great. Watch life overflow videos on YouTube. Uh learning by doing, you can't just watch videos. Use AI as an explainer or add learning. Turn the AI off. Not even line complete. you don't learn much stuff. It's also for learning programming. Uh play CTFs, talk to people, rubber ducky your teammates if they want or not. Find a team. Uh reproduce CTF writeups uh and reimplement standard tools like web servers like a JavaScript interpreter uh or frameworks because you learn a lot. It doesn't matter if it's bad. But if you wrote the web server once, you'll know that for example multiart passing is really hard and everyone is doing it wrong. I recently at my first CVE because an Apache web server, not the standard Apache but the CXF wasn't able to properly do a standard HTTP multipart parsing and I learned it because I had to look into it via CTF so often. uh prompting look over the code for hotspots. Look into versions and CVES. Typically, you should always at the CTF expect that you they give you everything the Arch Linux way really the version that was released yesterday. And if something has a dependency that's even two months old and there's a newer one, that's already a good hint that you just have to reproduce a CVE, typically one that doesn't have a proof of concept. This is made easier by now. This is a really great trick to get some easy points in CTFs. Uh if you are not that much in the topic, you can ask it to suggest your attacks and potential vulnerabilities. Uh you then typically have to look into the thousand options that it suggests for you. You can also already let it uh set some debug break points. Uh yeah, code and exploit if you already know what to do. It's really helpful. uh it typically needs the whole agentic loop thing. It never zero shots it and never trust what your AI tries to exploit. It's not that great at writing exploits sometimes. Uh and always run it locally against the local system. Uh that's just standard developer knowledge. Don't shoot against the server and do the server because your agent multi thread loop brute forced something and you ruin the CTF for everyone else. Uh I did some future and not future predictions. Uh so essentially bad AI and good steering. So that person using it is way better than using the best model but being bad at steering. Uh I corrected it and it's still wrong. Uh Quen recently uh did a QUA the Quen UI uh agent uh which is a really new paper where they fine-tune it on agentic usage and seemingly they claim they beat everyone even the proprietary models with the MCPS also with UI usage. So I think this is the thing that a lot of the big labs are currently focusing on using standard tools. Uh economics uh subscriptions I don't think subscriptions have much of a future because people are just exploiting it left and right. Everyone is faking benchmarks. That's bad. I think people will stop faking their benchmarks or people will finally figure out the better way to benchmarking. And here you have the two lines. This is an expert using the thing. this is uh a beginner. It's pretty much the same thing. And over time, so you essentially gain a year of model advantage uh if the person using the model is an expert in the field versus a beginner. So you can already have the AI experience of the future if you just get your personal skills up. So that's essentially the way to uh to go get good. [laughter] Uh then the future predictions I made those. Yes, I'm nearly done. Uh future predictions uh updated uh because I made those predictions uh four months ago. So the updated text in Gala uh GitHub it's the end of the VC funded free samples. If you don't know it, all the US companies are essentially getting money from vent venture capital and are shoving a lot of money around. The pricing you pay in a subscription has nothing to do with the real pricing. It's essentially free samples to get you hooked and locked in. It's the standard initification strategy. And I think if you're the kind that they can get hooked, they either have you hooked now or not. For example, Copilot from GitHub, from Microsoft is essentially dead. The rate limits are unbearable even if you pay €100. Uh, DeepSc 3xed their pricing last month and DeepSync doesn't have the cash pricing on open router. So, they try to lock you in and make you buy the tokens at their price. The subscriptions that exist are getting really expensive with 100 to€200 and I think it will go up. I think we'll see,000 euro subscriptions uh or pushing towards API pricing. That's already stuff that happened and that will get worse. uh models that can ingest any kind of data are already happening uh literally happened yesterday. I didn't update my slides in the meantime. Neatron Omni, Cosmos and the new one is Ox. Uh and they are really doing well because you just feed them with more data and especially with aic data and it helps the text part of the model to have image understanding because they understand geometrical concepts better. uh tooling majority is getting better. You get a hosted agent by now. That wasn't a thing months ago. And OpenAI bought Open Claw and therefore the thing that's built around PI. So all the big ones are now buying software companies left and right all the AI companies. Uh then I made the prediction that the open gap Yes. Uh I think it's my last site. >> Yeah. Okay. Uh open AI stuff will catch up. We have a gap of four months of uh open versus closed models. Uh some technical stuff that you can look at at home. We will have technical progress. Uh and I think AI trashmen will become a job. A CTF archive will become training data. Uh and I think open models premisy before 1.8 million UTC. That's beginning next year. uh questions, corrections, discussions in the beer garden because we're over time or in the outside. Uh thank you for your attention. I'm sorry I was talking that fast. [applause] Thank you very much for your talk.