Governance in a fragmenting world: What does it mean for anti-corruption and accountability reform?

This is a recording of a public event entitled "Governance in a Falling World," hosted by the School of Oriental and African Studies ( SOAS) as part of the Anti-Corruption Evidence Programme conference, held on 25 and 26 June 2026. The SOAS Anti-Corruption Evidence Programme is a research program funded by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), which focuses on identifying practical and politically effective approaches to governance reform and anti-corruption, where traditional methods have failed to deliver results in the past. This panel discussion explored an issue that is becoming increasingly important to those working in the fields of governance, accountability and anti- corruption around the world. What does the collapse of the rules- based international order mean for reform? For many years , international standards, institutions and incentives have shaped governance and anti- corruption efforts across developing and emerging economies. Integration into the global system was used as an incentive for reform. Today, this landscape is changing. The major powers are no longer able to present themselves credibly as rules-abiding powers , and fierce competition in the areas of technology, security and economic influence is reshaping the incentives for compliance with international rules and institutions. This has enormous implications for governance, accountability, and corruption reform in practice. The panel discussion included a distinguished group of speakers to help us explore these questions from different perspectives. The session was moderated by Professor Balabi Roy, Professor of International Economics at SOAS and Research Director of the SOAS Anti- Corruption Evidence Programme. Also with us was Joe Powell, a British Member of Parliament and former Deputy Chief Executive of the Open Government Partnership. Anna Bosman, former Director of Integrity and Anti-Corruption at the African Development Bank and former Ghanaian Ambassador to France. Jonathan Papaloudis, Vice President of Food for the Hungry. He is also a non-resident fellow at the Center for International Cooperation at New York University. Finally, Professor Mushtaq Khan, Professor of Economics at SOAS, a leading researcher on political compromises and institutional change, and Director of SOAS’s Anti-Corruption Evidence Programme. Something can be concluded from that. There was something tangible about this, and it gave local reformers a baseline, which is the baseline we started with. But we clearly know that it is falling apart, and there are two things that are already happening at the moment. The first is that we are witnessing a lot of focus while the rules-based system is unraveling. This also means that it is within local scenarios, and there is a little context that I will explain here. We are seeing a lot of authoritarianism and state takeover, which is reinforced by this sudden disappearance of the rules-based order, because, as Anna said, pressures from above or external pressures are no longer there. A good question arises: Should reform be left to external pressures? This is a matter for the committee to decide . But in many low- and middle-income countries, we are now seeing patterns of economic concentration that are hindering the transition to more productive, diversified economies capable of delivering broad-based prosperity. This was the supposed goal of the rules-based system, and that hope now seems to be fading, largely because we are seeing a strikingly similar pattern in advanced economies. However, this is happening at a completely different level of development, and the consequences, both for development and for the emerging world order, will be very different. What we see in low- and middle-income countries is happening in the sectors we call non-tradable sectors . It's in the infrastructure. In ports, and in energy. Where we see this concentration in advanced economies, along with this fragmentation, is in technology. This has a direct impact on how we define what progress is. The race for technology and the race for capital have become more objectified. Although we now have two competing paths, as Anna said , there is China and the United States, and China is helping to build alternative frameworks based on its technological capabilities, its industrial strategy, its control over vital parts of global value chains, sensitive minerals, etc. Now the West has begun to talk about industrial policy. Who would have thought that ten years ago? When I started giving lectures in this room about 14 years ago, nobody was talking about industrial policy. You would be considered an outdated, traditional person if you did that. Now it has suddenly become a preferred policy, as if they have rediscovered it . Therefore, most countries fall somewhere between the United States and China, and access to technology has always been linked to access to capital . Access to capital was also linked to power. Therefore, the governance structure in the past reflected a particular distribution of technology and capital. That certainty, you at least knew what you were working with. You had a certain certainty about the destination you were heading towards . But the governance structure of the future will do the same thing. The difference is that the distribution itself is in a state of constant change now. We don't know what the outcome will be . We are all navigating a very difficult transition period. Therefore, I would like to raise the issue both broadly and specifically, and I invite the committee to do the same here. Committee members may choose to interpret the rules-based system through the lens of development assistance, trade, technology transfer, conflict, or political inequality. But each of them reflects a different dimension of the same fundamental transformation. The question that unites this session in trying to answer is that something has changed . The current situation is no longer the same as it was. It's about how we harness this change. Do you see this as a challenge, an opportunity, something that causes deep concern, or something we can consider an opportunity? But what is likely to emerge from this period of fragmentation and competition? What will be required next to achieve progress, stability, and a degree of certainty? You know, whether it's about climate or the rules-based system, what we're leaving for future generations is a whole new set of uncertainties. We may be the last generation to have grown up with a certain sense of certainty that is slowly crumbling. It is not fair to the generation that will come after us. For the many generations that will come after us. Therefore, the issue of a rules-based system is no longer just about compliance, auditing, or accountability. It is actually a much bigger philosophical question . Will it make way for something fairer, more representative, and perhaps more just? I really can't think of a better group of speakers to answer this question on our behalf . Joe Powell will start. Joe is a member of the British Parliament and the former chief executive of the Open Government Partnership, a global initiative that brings together governments and civil society to promote transparency and accountability. He held this position for 11 years, and we welcome him very much. This place should make you feel at home. We hope that the dialogue we are having , whether you are feeling upset or worried about what is happening, is what we will hear about. Jonathan Papletus is an old friend and lover of the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). He worked in the development sector and in the humanitarian sector in conflict situations such as the Democratic Republic of Congo. Jonathan is the vice president of Food for the Hungry, where he leads the organization's global political engagement . He is also a non-resident fellow at the Center for International Cooperation at New York University. Welcome back, Jonathan, and welcome back, Professor Mushtaq Khan. He is a highly respected professor of economics , and a close colleague of ours here at SOAS. He is involved in leading the SOAS program. He is a leading researcher in political settlements and institutional change, and the director of the Anti-Corruption Evidence Program at SOAS. Feel completely at home. Mushtaq, I'm sure you've taught in this hall several times. So , the floor is yours. I would like to begin by inviting each of you to think briefly about a question for 60 seconds. This is our quick tour . Think of it this way. Are we witnessing a breakdown of the rules-based international order, and is this important? Joe, can I start with you? Yes, this is important, and yes , it is already happening . I mean, what you said in the introduction, Pallavi, was interesting because when we started the Open Government Partnership in 2011, one of the reasons was that we felt the rules- based international system regarding corruption was not ambitious enough. Therefore, we believed that the United Nations Convention against Corruption was resorting to the lowest common denominator. We felt that none of these bodies were really working as much as we would have liked . So we added something even more ambitious on top of that . And now, as I reflect on your introduction, I wish we could go back to that moment when some of those bodies, which we thought were unambitious, were actually able to achieve that basic level. Unfortunately, we have regressed a lot since then. John, we are going through a state of disintegration. This is extremely important. There is an element of shock in this in the sense that official development assistance has collapsed so sharply that everyone has seen it as a real break. But let's put the shock aside for a moment. It is more interesting and exciting to see this moment of disintegration not as an anomaly, but as a natural outcome of the system we have built; Because as developing countries gained access to trade opportunities, it took China 13 years to negotiate joining the World Trade Organization. This shaped the organization in a way that allowed it to grow exponentially over 60 years. All these other countries benefited enormously . Did we think that it would not take this growth and invest it in the military, political alliances, and strategic competition? What we are seeing now is that outcome, where we are sort of concluding the “end of history” moment with the rules-based order, and we are seeing the inevitability that makes all these other countries become more powerful, have more capital, and hold the reins of power. We are in a moment of strategic competition, but it is not a break with the system. It is his product. The other major part that is not pleasant to deal with is that with this deep interdependence and interdependence of the system, all epidemics, pandemics, trade shocks, balance of trade shocks, and disasters spread out to affect the entire world. We are now facing these multiple crises, as previously described by the World Economic Forum, where disasters, economic shocks, conflicts, and others are hitting us all at once. We have the Hormuz crisis, food insecurity due to Ukraine, and recovery from the pandemic. Therefore, we now have to manage strategic competition and rivalry, but we also have to manage this huge number of disasters that keep happening. Therefore, the future will have to be a system that relies more on flexibility. The focus is not on maximizing efficiency and processes, but on better predicting the risks ahead and developing those diverse capabilities to be able to manage shocks, pressures, and transformation in the face of them . Thank you. So, a degree of predictability as well. I mean, definitely . I think this moment of turmoil is a period that we hope will see some stability over time, especially now because we don't want world-ending events, do we ? You don't want conflicts that get out of control. You still want institutions that can mediate some of this work wherever they are. Then you want a kind of stability over time as everyone readjusts themselves to the new system. No , it won't be entirely peaceful. That was never the case in reality. It's always about pushing the boundaries. Every country is always trying to compete in order to maintain its power and influence. Yes, but we want to get to a place where we can print the discussion, where we can talk like diplomats again , and where we can talk like civilized nations. We don't have that speech now. It is a highly polarizing speech. correct. Yes. Okay, thank you. I think let me ask the question a little differently. I mean, I think the old system didn't work very well, but any system and any set of rules—and this is the approach to thinking about political compromises —requires the powerful to abide by it. The cornerstone of the old regime was, in fact, the liberal market economy. The liberal market economy of developed countries has succeeded because, in the post-World War II period, developed countries were the most competitive, and the free market system works in favor of the most competitive while the rest of the world was trying to catch up. Behind the liberal market economy came many of the pillars of capitalism in its open period, namely democracy, governance, good governance, and so on . The idea of good governance, as applied to developing countries, came from international financial institutions, the World Bank and the like, as a means of imposing discipline on developing countries that were borrowing and were unable to repay the money. Isn't that so? Ultimately, behind this rules-based system was a vision for how to manage the global economy. This global economy has largely worked in favor of developed countries. I remember giving lectures at SOAS 10 or 15 years ago, when many were arguing that the international system was not working in favor of developing countries. They were unable to catch up. They were unable to protect their industries. And that the liberal market economy was actually preventing them from progressing. Furthermore, much of this system of so-called " good governance" was a means of imposing discipline on capital markets and repaying funds. How the world has changed! So, in a sense, the rise of China has emptied industry in the United States as well as in Europe, created a sense that the global system is not working in favor of the working classes in developed countries, and led to the emergence of the Trump phenomenon, the rise of the right in Europe, the rise of fascism and populism, and all that remains of that. The result is that the world's powerful nations, and in particular the United States, no longer believe that the rules-based international order works in their favor, and the United States now wants to pursue an industrial policy. The United States now wants to use its power to seize markets and impose conditions on countries, such as saying, "You must buy our Boeing planes, our soybeans, or our oil." This is what they do in developing countries, where they impose very high tariffs and say they will lower them if you buy their gas, their Boeing planes, or anything else. This is inconceivable. As you know, it is a complete reversal of the market-based system because it no longer works in favor of the powerful. Now, the dangerous point here is that when the rules of the global order do not work in favor of the powerful, two things can happen. The first is to evolve into a new, gentle balance that acknowledges the true distribution of power and capabilities, which really means acknowledging that Western hegemony is over, and you have to make room for China and the like in the world; Or a war could break out. I think if you look at the history of how world wars start, you will find that they always begin when existing trade systems break down and people cannot find a way to restructure the rules to accommodate new players, and then war breaks out. We are witnessing the beginnings of war, aren't we ? So, I think that's the downside of it . On the positive side, and this is where the optimistic view lies, and I think many of us will need to work hard to reach it, is the recognition—and this is what I complete from what Jonathan said—that we now live in a more open world, and there are new sources of power and capabilities, and international rules must reflect that. I don't know how, but it should reflect that. Therefore, the idea that one group of countries can dictate how another group of countries should manage their affairs will no longer work. Now, I would just like to put forward one real warning here. The warning is that most developing countries still lack sufficient internal cohesion and effective mechanisms for conveying what the people want and what the leadership offers. The only advantage of the rules- based international system —and here I agree with what you were saying—was that there was some kind of disciplinary mechanism with regard to corruption, and a disciplinary mechanism with regard to human rights , so that things did not get too far off track. But if this fragmentation occurs and the logic of chaos prevails, with everyone trying to carve out their own spheres of influence, one of the most negative features of this is the potential for unchecked authoritarianism in developing countries and unchecked corruption, fueled in the short term by an abundance of easy money coming from China. But this is not sustainable because the Chinese will not be able to recover their loans, and this has already begun. The Chinese have begun to realize that by lending unconditionally to so many countries in Asia and Africa, they will lose their money. So, there will be an interesting shift in the next five years, as the Chinese will want to enforce discipline to get their money back, while the West will come under pressure to make room for newcomers on the global stage. Therefore, the task is extremely exciting if we can remain calm to formulate a new set of rules that work better. correct. Thank you. I mean, we have two completely different points of view, and Joe, you really did keep to the time, and I think we'll give you extra time for keeping to the time, so go ahead . Yes, I know it's a test. It is a special academic ordeal , so please allow extra time. As I would like to return to what Jonathan and Misha have said, they have given us a comprehensive view. We don't actually talk about the UK much, but we will because we are part of the community here, and the rules-based system works both ways. Some will say that it has not worked for developing countries, but as Inbuchak also pointed out, it applies to the United Kingdom as well. Many people are asking: What kind of rules-based system is this? It didn't work for us. So, I don't really care about official development assistance going to Ghana, Nigeria, or Nepal. What about me, my low-income housing, and my education? As you know, it was quite an interesting day. After Mackersfield's victory, the BBC was interviewing a couple who said: "I'm just waiting for my child to grow up, and then we'll move out of here." I was completely stunned. Has this country been moving towards home for almost 25 years? This is the furthest we can go . Here is someone saying: "This country no longer offers me anything, and I wanted to leave." So, this rules-based system that is supposed to work here, has not worked in their favor. Okay . I think that initially, I don't believe that we—the United Kingdom, the United States, and others—have followed this rules-based system honestly, from my point of view anyway. Regarding corruption, one of the reasons I ran for parliament two years ago was because I saw our significant decline in the fight against corruption. We have seen massive procurement scandals involving billions of pounds sterling during the Covid period. We are still in a situation where the British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies...those countries that are part of the British family, are responsible for a very large proportion of the illicit financial outflows from various countries, including this one. There is £325 billion a year that flows through the City of London alone, and it is illicit money. Therefore , our track record may include some areas where we have done very well . Such as broad press freedom and parliamentary democracy. I don't take these things for granted . Things are not entirely bad, but on this issue of corruption, we still have a long way to go before we can say that we are implementing what we advocate . Hmm, there are some things we've done in the last two years that have been improvements, but we still have a long way to go. But I believe the threat to what I mentioned is in this by-election we held last week, which will lead to a change of prime minister. So this is a very dramatic political moment for the country, this real collapse of confidence in politics and institutions. One of the things that concerns me now, as the other side in parliament, is the kind of weaponization of corruption as one of the reasons. correct. So it's like everyone is corrupt, and therefore you can blow up the system. This is partly possible because of this prolonged stagnation in living standards, economic growth, etc., which has created more fertile ground for populists who amplify this kind of issue. So there is a link between what you are saying about young people feeling that they may not get the future that their parents or grandparents had. And how people have used corruption in a way that I personally do not support. For me, at least part of the answer is that we need to do a better job of cleaning up Westminster, and cleaning up our own politics, so that we do n't give that opportunity to parties that I think would be very dangerous to this country. correct. certainly. We completely agree with that. But what can we do in practical terms? We have been dealing with this question for some time, and the answers have been clear for a while. Well, I think you said it in the speech at the beginning, popular pressure on politicians is the number one thing now. I used to work for a long time in the field of international development, aid budgets, debt relief, and all that stuff . We were able to rally people around those issues. People would come to representatives like me and say: We want to cancel the unfair debts. We want to increase development spending. This is extremely difficult. Now, as you know, the United Kingdom has reduced its aid budget. It's something I personally disagree with, but with three billion dollars being sent annually to Ukraine, it's a difficult trade-off, but almost no one has told me that they think this was a bad decision. I represent a constituency in West London. I am not a representative of areas where it may actually be common practice to do that . So I think the question is how to mobilize public pressure . I think people do that in relation to the climate . I think it was done a little better . But the power to actually mobilize public opinion on these issues, and the non- governmental organizations that traditionally did so, has become less influential than it used to be . So, this is a practical question. How can we rebuild such campaigns and public pressure? Because it would be beneficial for people like me if we had more of them. amazing. General pressure. We will return to this question, and perhaps you will receive some questions from the audience. Thank you, and I'll move on to you, Jonathan. I have spoken about the model of resilience in this new world order. Perhaps you would like to clarify what you mean by that, and how it can address the problem of uncertainty that we also talked about, because good governance, let's put it on the table as it is. Good governance has given us a sense of certainty. We knew what it meant. You may not agree with her, but you knew what requirements you had to meet. But if you are saying that we now need to move to a flexibility model, how does that replace good governance as a model of certainty? Darwin said that the future does not belong to the strongest, but to the most adaptable. As an international aid community, we are not very good at dealing with risks. We are not looking at it in a strong enough way. In fact, if we had been talking about resilience a decade ago, we would have been talking mostly about food security and perhaps a little about the climate. But there is a growing recognition that resilience is the kind of strategic model we need in this era of crises. Not only to be able to manage competition well, but also to manage shocks and pressures. China has many advantages in this area. Where Hormuz has put significant pressure on gasoline financing in the United States, China has had a 100-day oil reserve, backup agreements with Russia and others, in addition to the electric car revolution and other renewable energy sources . They are more adaptable. They have more flexible capabilities that they can utilize, as they can withstand shocks and change their course when needed towards different resources. This is what we are talking about when we refer to flexibility here. Okay. Therefore, it is not just about having the capabilities to manage uncertainties, whether those you can anticipate or unexpected "black swan" events . If you don't design your infrastructure, economy, and policies to be able to do that, and if you focus too much on efficiency and optimization, then you are in a really precarious position. certainly. I think resilience is often reduced to mere social protection. We reached that point, and then we stopped moving forward with regard to developing countries. But for developed countries, flexibility means something entirely different. For example, for the United Kingdom, what could that mean ? But, Mish, the question I would like to ask you, which in my opinion touches on an aspect of your research and interests, is the idea of distributing productive capacities. I spoke about China as an investing country; Where do you see the possibility of expanding this scope, or what opportunities exist to create more productive capacity ? Because once again, one of the promises of good governance reform was, as I always repeat whether you agree with it or not, that it would lead to a redistribution of some of the progress. How do you think that will happen? Because that was a promise and a cornerstone of the good governance agenda , with regard to the productive capacity and progress aspect. Yes, thank you for asking this question. I think this is the core of my thinking about governance and progress, isn't it? The problem within the framework of good governance and everything that has happened so far is that people are not talking about productive capacities. So, let's start with Britain, okay? I don't think we'll have a good society and good politics in Britain unless we can rebuild a broad base of productive capacity that has been lost over the past 25 years, which has already happened. And that's exactly what happened. There is no way to have a socially progressive democratic society if people's jobs are limited to delivering fast food or arranging hotel beds, you know ? It is a type of low-paying service. This is what happened; Societies have become extremely unequal. You have a few people who control what you started talking about, the technology sectors, and now we have an artificial intelligence revolution happening. I am very pleased to see that the British government has set up a center for artificial intelligence economics, and they will try to think about how to direct artificial intelligence to create jobs rather than destroy them. And how can they use artificial intelligence to improve government services, etc.? I think this is the kind of initiative that is needed. But we also need to build productive capacities. Our work in developing countries has always focused on the fact that good governance has not helped us build productive capacities, and this challenge still exists. Therefore, this challenge is no longer limited to developing countries. It has even become a challenge that developed countries face as well. And I think what we should really be thinking about is how to deal with the enormously unequal distribution of income and assets in the world, with so few people, I mean, we recently saw the world’s first trillionaire , didn’t we? And these people, I mean, it's really questionable what they add? I mean, this guy is going to take us to Mars and build things there, while in America we have people living under bridges in little bags . So there is something wrong with the social arrangement and the distribution of power and capabilities, and we really need to come up with productive strategies that provide jobs for people and give them something to look forward to. I believe this is the crux of the problem, along with the governance rules we have. Here I agree with you, but I think we need to go a little further . Flexibility is a result. We need to find the rules that led us to that result. Therefore, we need a kind of thinking about what we should impose on ourselves as rules of discipline, in order for the whole of society to work towards flexible outcomes, which for me also includes productive capacities. This is the real challenge, and I think we don't have an answer to it. But this is what we must work towards. certainly. Thank you. Anna, I'm going to include you in this next round because we're going to wrap things up and take a few questions from the audience, and it will be a joint question again. So we'll start with you. Now that we have seen this influx, fragmentation, competition, and pressure on the rules-based system, where does that leave the " holy grails" of accountability and transparency? I know you have 45 to 60 seconds for a deep answer like this, but it's one of those questions you can really shorten to ' Yes, I really don't know.' I mean, this is something I've always asked myself all the time, where are we really headed? As you know, yesterday when we were at dinner I was asking and talking to Jonathan, Jonathan talked about flexibility, didn't he? Then she asked, "I'm trying to find a word in our language that translates the meaning of flexibility, because if you want to explain that to people, you have to be precise." My way of understanding resilience is very simple: you need to have a kind of patience to be able to weather the storm. But this is not the only thing we are talking about; this is just the tip of the iceberg . So, when you ask, where will this lead us now? I truly admit that I don't know . I'm not trying to be pessimistic or defeatist, but really, there's something I'm struggling with right now: where do we start? Especially where do we begin, particularly for developing countries. In a country like mine , we are always lagging behind when these rules are being put in place, let's say , etc. We are always left behind . There is always this gap; we start something, but the gap remains. How can we catch up? This is correct. The question here is, how do we catch up? How do we catch up? This is a very fair and profound question, actually, but we can discuss that later. oh well . Vashant, it's your turn now. You have 45 to 60 seconds for this. I think my answer will be very predictable. I think we need to get society working again. I think we have lost that hope that there are things we can do , and production does not just mean manufacturing. It could mean high-quality services. It could mean care. It could mean health. It could mean all sorts of things. But I do not see enough understanding or initiative in any government to actually begin reorganizing society to produce valuable goods and services in competitive ways. I think it really comes down to organization. It's about reorganizing society. Organization requires rules. Therefore, the rules we need are those that actually help society to reorganize itself to become more productive in a comprehensive way. So you create a lot of jobs and you don't have obscenely rich people while everyone else lives in poverty. You need to have a very broad middle class of really productive people who do lots of useful things. I believe this is the most pressing agenda, and we need rules that allow us to even imagine it. And I think this is where I see a lack of imagination. correct. Thank you, Jonathan. I, umm, think that when we talk about resilience, there is a common framework among many multilateral donors and there is a consensus about it, which is that it is about taking hits and adapting, but it is also about transformation. And I think that's where your Mosch left off, isn't it? The ability to transform, create productive capacities, and reorganize around that as well. To do that, you must truly understand the political compromise. If you look at Rwanda, we find that some sectors, such as utilities, communications, etc., have been contained to maintain the political settlement and prevent chaos, while other sectors have been open to competition. The same thing in Bangladesh, is n't it? When you had the market, there was a moment when nobody was competing in that field. Therefore, the competition was open, but politics came under it and supported it. Therefore, there must be some question about how to manage this matter ? Unfortunately, in this age of crisis, you have to do this while dealing with a whole host of upheavals and shocks at the same time. So, it is not just a complex problem , but a compound problem as well. Thank you. Yes, that's a difficult question. I've been thinking a lot today about, umm, Sudan, because we now have in Sudan , in El Obeid, a fundamental danger of a repeat of what happened in El Fasher. In the case of Sudan, historically, in this kind of protracted conflict, you would obviously have had your main partners—and I'm thinking of this from a multilateral perspective—you would have had your main partners, the United Nations and so on, coming together, trying to come up with some kind of ceasefire, putting pressure on the parties, and so on. But in Sudan now, the biggest players are the UAE, Iran and Turkey, and they are all arming different groups. They are all trying to run an illegal gold trade . Or are they not susceptible to being influenced by a special meeting of the United Nations Security Council? The United Kingdom is in fact responsible for the Sudan file. So she was trying to do some things, but without much success. So, what do you need in this regard? You will have to build something slightly different to try to make your point about accountability. You will have to try to gather some partners who can influence those countries, and neighboring countries that have of course been affected by refugees and so on . But at the moment I don't see how any of our existing multilateral institutions can come to a solution quickly enough. And I fear that this is the truly harsh lesson from Gaza and Lebanon as well. As we saw, the only way to finally reach a very imperfect ceasefire was essentially a series of consequences of brute force. Therefore, I am extremely pessimistic at the moment regarding the restoration of a broad system of accountability and transparency. Of course, as you know, things can change and go back to normal . But I think I'm thinking of practical examples of places where you might need to build this kind of alliance. It could be argued that the situation in Ukraine, the so-called coalition of the willing, has received more attention, certainly in Europe, because of the consequences for energy and so on. Certainly much greater interest than in Sudan. This alliance held out almost unopposed against Russia during the initial invasion, but at a heavy cost. Therefore, this type of alliance of the willing may be needed elsewhere . Yes, of course. We wanted to come away with a sense of being able to make an impact, and with regard to these alliances of the willing, if they could be implemented in Gaza, and if they could be implemented in Sudan. Absolutely, most certainly. And also with regard to natural disasters and climate change, it doesn't matter whether you are a skeptic or not, but can you mitigate what will happen? So, I will open the floor for questions. We'll take three questions because Joe has to leave, and the rest of us can mingle over drinks afterward. So questions, yes, Danny. Help yourself. Countries. What is the role of cross-border companies, both legal and illegal, in international corporations? Transnational. correct. In global governance. Yes. These ultra-wealthy corporations appear to be the ultimate expression of liberalism, and how states and other institutions can have the power to enforce rights over them. May I ask Joe this question, since Machad talked about Tesla? We don't have that kind of concentrated capital here in the UK, but for example, Palantir has become a big spark. Shall we name it? Should we even name it? All I am saying is that, despite our lack of it, we face its consequences; Returning to Daniel's question: What can states or multilateral organizations do when capital and technology become too big for the multilateral system ? But I will give you an example that may look a little different . One of the things I 've worked on a lot since my election two years ago is the harm social media companies are causing to children. We have allowed ourselves to reach a stage—which is really a matter of governance. We have allowed ourselves to reach a point where strangers can message teenagers. They can be lured online. They can watch content they never wanted to see and never chose to watch. They can use the infinite scrolling feature and everything like that. These rules were never established in the United Kingdom . Rather, it was set up by the four or five largest companies in the world, whose interest lies in people spending as much time as possible on their devices in order to sell advertisements. So we made a decision three weeks ago—and to be fair , following other countries such as Indonesia, Australia, France and others—to impose a ban on these companies for those under the age of sixteen. This decision is difficult to implement. There are many implementation questions that will arise. But it is truly a historic moment , especially with so much pressure. I can tell you that I was under pressure. If you go to Westminster Chew Station, you will find everything saying that YouTube Kids is safe. You know , please don't ban " YouTube Kids". Please don't ban the "X" platform because everyone will go to the "dark web" and all that kind of nonsense. Therefore, standing up to these companies in this situation, I personally feel it is the right decision. It may also change the paradigm a little, because it proves that we don't have to accept what they offer us, or accept the excuses that it will kill investment and that our AI industry will collapse, and all those scary stories. So, this is a recent positive example, and I think many other countries will now start doing the same thing, because the damage is enormous. Oh yes, yes, thank you. Can you reply to this in 45 seconds? 45 seconds for both of you, and you, Anna, are welcome if you wish. I mean, I would just like to say that this is a question related to the old system. The question for the current system is how to mobilize those multinational corporations to establish themselves in new industries in ways that block competing technologies and hinder access to certain capital and currencies. The Brussels-based think tank ECPPM has just written a research paper on how the UK can better utilize multilateral development banks (MDBs) to achieve its priorities and strategic positioning. If you observe what multilateral development banks and development finance institutions (DFIs) are doing, which are becoming more powerful in reducing the risks for companies entering countries, you will find that more capital is leaving Africa , whether through illicit or otherwise, than is entering it. This has been the case for a very long time . Therefore , I would like to refer to the "SOASS ACE" methodology in terms of how to try to put real controls on that. I believe that countries that are now trying to build local institutions, capital markets and self-sustaining capabilities will have to find a way to control who and how they build their own companies and capabilities using the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement, etc. But this system, this new thing, will not have many rules governing it. correct. Shall we move on to the second question? Okay, I agree. I actually believe that companies only have power because they have the support of a state behind them. If countries want to regulate, if they really want to regulate a company, then that company does not actually have any ability to resist. The problem is that countries have allowed their companies to do things for too long, based on the belief—not entirely wrong—that "this is our company, and if it conquers the world, that's good for us." I believe this was particularly the American philosophy of allowing a very light touch and broad freedom for corporations; But this only happened because the state allowed it. correct. And I think, as you said, once countries get their affairs in order, the free exploitation will stop, right? People want to control other people's companies, not their own, because they want their own companies to succeed and triumph. But I think one of the things that will most likely emerge from the turmoil the world is going through is a significant increase in attempts to regulate companies. I mean, especially with artificial intelligence, I think it's clear that countries can't just leave things as they are now, but keep an eye on this area. I mean, they won't do that . Okay . Well, I think Shack and they both said what needed to be said. My question was actually, when Joe was talking, I was thinking: how are they going to be able to pull this whole thing off? Think about the issue of having children, how are they going to do that? Obviously, I think parents should have a say in this, but will they? For me , it's something I've been thinking about: how are they really going to be able to do that? Is it a matter of... I mean, there's a very long answer, but the short answer is that all these companies know exactly everyone's age because they serve them advertisements based on their age. I get ads, you know, for older people to buy activities for toddlers that I'm supposed to buy, and teenagers get ads for certain things , so age verification, i.e., robust age verification procedures, is the short answer, but there are a lot of complications. Of course, it is . certainly. Yes, please. My question is, what role do multilateral institutions play in this new world order? Should it adapt and what is the UK's place in that? You want to do it because that's the way it is. Yes... I mean, I'm not very familiar with this, I must say. But I think the reform agenda of those agencies, I mean, the UK historically has always been on the side of reforming the bank and so on. But it is clear that the overall situation in the United Kingdom is not as influential as it once was . In fact, aid cuts in relation to the multilateral system, as you know, if you reduce your contribution, you will have less impact . So, there are a few that we have protected: the Global Fund, for example, and Gavi with regard to vaccines. But I don't think our seat at the table is the same as it used to be . Hmm, but perhaps others have a more modern view of reform. Should we leave? So... yes, that's a pointed question, but I'm 17 years old, and in a world that's so fragmented , and as I mentioned before, where sanctions are so selective, it's easy to feel powerless and as if the biggest challenges are beyond my reach. So how would you advise me to ensure that my voice is somehow heard by these elites or these movers? This is a question for you. Yes, I know. That's what I'm looking forward to . Okay, you said you're 17 years old. Okay . So, is this it? What is this? Is it called Generation Z (Gen Z) or what? Generation Z. Generation Z. Well, you know , Generation Z isn't doing too badly right now . I understand that Generation Z members are quite successful in making their voices heard, as you know. Hmm, what I always say, the kind of advice I always give, is that numbers matter, numbers are important. You can't do it on your own, but if you have what they call a critical mass—don't ask me what a critical mass is exactly—but when you have a critical mass of Gen Z people who are making their voices heard, which they are already doing, you know, they are actually being heard, that's how you'll make your little voice heard. But you can't do it alone. You should have an actual mass, though. And I think it really works when you hear what they do . It really works, it really works. Yes, you members of Generation Z have a greater influence today than we did. Ah , we had lost count. You have lost count. Yes. But actually, I think you're not doing too badly . We hear a lot about you. Ah, you know, we hear about Generation Z more than we hear about Millennials. You're from the millennial generation, aren't you, Christopher ? Are you a millennial? You are too. Yes, we hear more about Generation Z. So, you are not doing badly . But perhaps an alliance could be formed, bringing together Millennials and Generation Z. You will possess the critical mass. A wonderful alliance. certainly. a question. Yes. Welcome. Um, I'm from Canada. I am currently a professor of economics at New York University in Paris . Yes, I teach social policy and I teach unfree market economics as part of my program. I find teaching economics, and mainstream economics in particular, extremely difficult within academic departments. There is a lot of resistance to teaching different viewpoints, complex systems, or anything else. Do you have any advice on how to integrate them? I feel that educating and changing the prevailing economic mindset is essential to making a difference for future generations. Do you have any advice? I think this should be... I think you should come to the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). No, I really think you are asking a very serious and important question . There is no consensus on what type of economy we should study. I think this is the straightforward answer. As you know, I teach economics in a certain way. Other people at SOAS are studying it in other ways. I think that's part of the problem, because we know what the problems are but we don't have a consensus on the right models, tools and assumptions that we can use for analysis, prediction and so on. So...the best thing we can do now is to be really open and understand several models, including the dominant one, which I think is very important to understand before criticizing it. But other models from different traditions must also be accommodated; institutional economics, which is my specialty, is extremely important. Having a good understanding of the history of classical thought and economics is also very important. I think this is the best advice I can give you. In my own work, I use multiple models in a way that is somewhat similar to assembling puzzle pieces. Different problems can be better addressed by looking at them from a certain angle. Therefore, I believe that pluralism is at the heart of the matter. We do not have a consensus, and perhaps it is not good to have a consensus because the economy is too complex for one model to answer all the questions. One last question. Is there more? Yes, please go ahead. I believe the entire system is based on this change in the past. I am not...right. Good. I think, Jonathan, what about you? Well, this is also aimed at Gen Z. There is a moment in Harry Potter where Voldemort returns, but the Ministry refuses to acknowledge that he has returned. He is no longer here. I was in Paris a few months ago for an OECD conference on the future of Development Assistance Committee ( DAC) cooperation, and the situation was business as usual: we have to achieve these goals, and the committee has to review them. We are just doing things as a routine procedure. Meanwhile , strategic competition is already taking place . You have Anthropic, which was sanctioned and forced to shut down Meth and Umm...what's the other one called? Sorry, Fable. Fable and Mythos because it's highly strategic. It is of very high value to any foreign nationals. The U.S. Development Finance Corporation ( DFC) has secured $250 billion for its "America First Opportunity Funds". They can use that in any way they want. So if you look at the OECD world, and if you look at what happened at the World Bank forum on fragility last week, you wouldn't know what year or decade you're in. It's the same old broken record. The models exist, but the world is definitely changing. We can be very competitive. Chinese 5G technologies are restricted in certain countries. The World Bank is required, through the MBBS system itself, to begin graduating some countries from aid and they have a kind of standardization. But who are they to bring them out? All these competing countries. Therefore, tectonic shifts are occurring, but they are not prevalent. If you are at an OECD conference , or a World Bank forum on fragility, it is more like how we get to the last mile? How, you know, this is the last mile. We are in a completely different space, but it is not obvious. You are right. It's not in the mainstream narratives, but it's actually happening. Thank you. I think this was captured really brilliantly . Multilateral institutions are not prepared for this, but it is beyond their control. I thought you would mention Harry Potter brilliantly. I'm not sure Generation Z knows Harry Potter. Have you read Harry Potter? Harry Potter. Have you read Harry Potter? Oh, my God. None of the Generation Z I know has read Harry Potter. So, great. Good. But that was great, Jonathan . So, we conclude here and thank you very much to Anna. It was very inspiring indeed for the courageous work you have done and thank you for accepting this invitation. Thank you to our wonderful speakers. I think you all brought your life experiences and philosophies and made the discussion very interesting. Thank you to the audience. great. Generation Z and all other age groups are included. Thanks to SEDO for making this possible and allowing us to think about anti- corruption and governance in general. Thanks to Inet, Sandanda disappeared, but someone from Christina's team is here. Thank you very much for giving us this meeting space, good night and see you at the reception at the monastery. Now explain where that is located.