Governance in a fragmenting world: Keynote by Anna Bossman

Uh good evening. Welcome to SOASS. I'm Palvi Roy. I'm a professor in political economy here at SOASS and I'm also the deputy dean for uh research knowledge exchange for the college of social science and I wear another hat which is research director for the SOASS anti-corruption evidence program. Now the two together make for a very happy combination because we've always wanted Mushtak and I my my colleague here who leads ACE with me. We've always wanted to do an ACE program, a big ticket ACE program at SOASS. We haven't ended up having too many of it. So, we're delighted that we could do this today. And we wanted to do an ACE program with early career researchers. That's been literally an ambition. Um, you know, we have a new way we think of thinking of anti-corruption. We wanted to know what all of you working on anti-corruption, the sort of gen z's and the young guns because we're getting old and somebody has to start thinking uh uh you know in novel terms about anti-corruption. So so this was an idea that came with some of the work that we did with Inet but I'll come to that later with Sanda and her team. So this is essentially that an exchange of ideas. Today we had uh uh should I I dare say an adult or a more mature conversation on research that's been done that's funded that's implemented and tomorrow we move on to the research on early career research uh outputs but we wanted to end today with u we thought what was a very relevant topic of discussion based on the themes that we had in the morning. So what did we talk about? We spoke about illicit financial flows. We spoke about state capture. We spoke about corruption in health services delivery. And I know I'm forgetting something. Uh infrastructure procurement. That's the one. Infrastructure procurement. Now these are all elements of a globally connected world. These are all variables that we used to study growth and and inclusive development. [clears throat] And there was we would we would say till about COVID an understanding that there was a certain set of rules. there was at least a baseline of rules that we could all uh use and refer to and and carry on our work based on those. But increasingly it seems to us and I think it's quite clear that we don't have the uncertainty of those rules just like London's become ridiculously hot like Abuja. uh though Abuja has air conditioning I have to say everywhere that you go and we don't um but uh this is not something we would expect and we are also seeing that the rules-based order is not fragmenting but it is under a lot of stress and we're beginning to question that and uh you know the this rules-based order has shaped anti-corruption laws has has shaped how we look at governance but it was also used as an incentive for reform and that's coming under stress. So what does that mean now for anti-corruption in this new rule-based order? We're seeing a recasting. What is the outcome of that? So um as you know that landscape is changing. Major this is the the really important shift. Major powers and we know which major path we're talking about here can no longer credibly cast themselves as being rule following. When that is the case, what then is the authority and credibility to ask for other countries to follow this rules-based order? That that is a very fundamental question and uh we are very fortunate to have an outstanding group of speakers with us. But I will come to the speakers and the panel later because we have a panel uh discussion but before that a keynote now this discussion will run until 7:45 and I think this is the important bit. There's a drinks and reception after that to which all of you are cordially invited. Um we begin with a keynote and before I introduce our keynote speaker I would uh just like to say that so anti-corruption evidence program is an FCDO funded program which is a foreign commonwealth and development office who've very generously funded uh our uh you know in in the beginning rather risky way of thinking about it but I think we've if I may use some terms return on investment hasn't been that bad. So we we try and chart pathways of identifying feasible and impactful anti-corruption that actually makes a difference and is implementable. Uh and then this is also being co-hosted with the institute for new economic [clears throat] thinking and its young scholars initiative. Hence this focus on early career researchers. And uh one of our aims of course is to strengthen this this growing community. And we hope that this we haven't really had a community of young practitioners in anti-corruption. And we hope this is the beginning of a conversation and a network that that goes forward long after soases um is over and done with. Sad though the thought may be and uh the topic of tonight's discussion speaks directly to the wider context in which soases is placed. And we have a really fascinating speaker here. Uh and before I name her, our our speaker, Anna Bosman. She's been the former director of integrity and anti-corruption at the African Development Bank. She's been the chair of the Commission of Human Rights. She's been uh Ghana's former ambassador to France, to Portugal and Monaco. And the reason why we thought that she was a very interesting fit for today's discussion and you know we had um other than the fact that she's a boss man uh that she she has been on the other side of observing the rules-based order she's been an ambassador from Ghana in in countries quite powerful countries in in the global north she's had to interface with that rules-based order but she wasn't part of the order that made that rules-based order and she's worked on human rights again how we deal with issues of governance and anti-corruption has a direct impact on how we now start processing human rights issues. So over to you Anna we couldn't think of a better person to um you know basically headline our panel discussion. Thank you very much and it's an honor to welcome you to the stage. [applause] Thank you very much. Thank you very much. I almost didn't recognize myself in what you were saying, but thank you very much. Uh I owe I think I need to say it. I owe this u this honor really uh to a person who used to work for me well as an investigator, a lawyer investigator uh at the at the uh African development bank, you know, and he actually uh actually mentioned my name to you and they sort of pulled me out of what I call my senior retirement. In actual fact, I've been retired uh twice. I've retired twice. The first time, and this will also speak to this paper. Uh the first time was uh when I was commissioner for human rights and uh uh anti-corruption also because during that time I was um I was becoming quite inconvenient with the way that I was I was uh conducting our investigations and therefore uh and we were supposed to be no we're supposed to be under the constitution the commission on human rights and administrative justice uh is an independent institution and we are the commissioners we are uh on the the same level as the justices of the uh high court and the justices of the appeal court and therefore we once we've been appointed we cannot be removed except by impeachment you know and so if we can't find something to impeach you uh with uh try to make it a little bit uncomfortable for you very luckily for me when it was getting very very uncomfortable I got um I got uh hunted apparently by Africa Development Bank and they asked me to come. First, my first reaction was saying, "No, no, no. There's a lot of work to do in Ghana. I haven't finished that work yet." But when it was getting more and more and more uh uncomfortable, I decided that I would take it. But you see, I had a problem. The problem was I could not resign because if I resigned, it looked as if I was poking the eye of the uh of the executive. So, I went and said, "Oh, I'd like to take early retirement." And they took it much better that way. In any case, with these few words, let me say thank you very much. Thank you very much for inviting me. Uh what I'm going to talk about may be a little bit uncomfortable, especially for me because I've been as you said on on both sides of it, but a lot of you also I believe there's there's practitioners here as of course there's academia, there's young people also here. But uh and I think I I'm sure that um when we're going to have the panel, we'll have a lot of questions. But I'd like to say from the very beginning for that for a long time, a lot of us, a lot of us here, myself included, we really built all our form strategies on a foundation that we believed in that we really thought it was something that we could rely on. although it wasn't really ours you know we borrowed we borrowed the leverage of an international because this international order which we really believed in in fact I had some training in the uh the US state department came and took us over and we went to FBI we went to all sorts of places they really really really um helped us a lot you know but um one of the things that we are finding out now as just pointed out you know that it looks like this order and it's not only anti-corruption but the whole order seems to be on its very wobbly legs you know um is becoming increasingly difficult uh trust issues and even there's there's there's there's not only trust issues but what are we doing now what is it that we're doing you know u so it's it's been you We we we we accepted we accepted the basic international foundation uh the ant of anti-corruption reform. We also adopted all that as our own way of reform you know and it was a rule-based system and it really resonated with us. It made sense and it helped us. It also helped us. But I have run an anti- an anti uh corruption agency for the commission of uh human rights and administrative justice which is three three institutions under one umbrella and it's very important. Keep that in mind because it's very important. That's what I'm going to say a bit later on. But um what we really saw or what I really saw that we had in front of us was not only the law, constitution, the law. Uh it was not only the fact that we could investigate public officials. We could not prosecute anything that we did. Any investigation could investigate. Okay. When we investigated the the to be given to the um attorney general. The attorney general then had to investigate uh prosecute, I'm sorry, prosecute if he chose to. So that was one of the that was one of the uh I think the flaws in the system. We're trying to change it now. We're trying to change it now. It's very difficult, but we're trying to change it now. But it was also how did we work also? How did we push the needle? Sometimes it was because uh we were also peer reviewed. We were peer reviewed and we also had to report every year to the uh to the uh um human rights uh in in in Geneva. We had to so um the UPR we had to do all that and also when we needed when we needed uh some funding especially from the World Bank you know uh uh there was some conditions that they would give us and therefore you got you get we would get at that time we would get some uh help from uh from uh the minister of finance who had been blocking us all the time but because the world bank would say you know this and that and the other they would then give us some some money but um I'm not criticizing it but I'm saying that that's reform works. You know, that's how reform works. That is how we get our funding and whatnot. You get external pressure on uh the domestic political space and then we use that we learn how to use that space, how we can get ahead with that space. But we didn't always at that time really question. We didn't really question what it was uh that we would do if that particular external pressure was no longer there. We didn't really we didn't we never really thought about that. I don't think any of us thought that that was going to change and change so dramatically, you know. So we really believed in that system and we believed that we had adopted a good reform program. But here we are now today 2026. The powers that designed and enforced all those postwar all that postwar international order as said they are no longer they are no longer credible. I think credible in presenting themselves as the ones who are following the rules. They are not following the rules. And if they're not following the rules, why should we follow the rules? We know right now from what we've seen globally that sanctions are selectively taken. Sanctions are selectively. They applied on strategic interests and not really principled consistency sanctions. You can get some country being sanctioned for something that somebody else has another country has done and you wonder why is it that A has been sanctioned B doing exactly the same thing has not been sanctioned you know and and then the thing also you know our multilateral institutions that we've been following you know what's happened you know they've been starved of their of their funing they've been bypassed you know and if the political if you don't have if you don't give particular political support well uh you don't get the funding anyway. So all of what's happening right now is really very very difficult. It it it creates something which is much much more fundamental also for the smaller states like ours you know uh because now we are seeing that um many of our uh of our governments seem I'm using the word seem they seem to have some options they seem to have some choices because we have competing offers now we really have competing offers we used to really rely on on certain countries and certain governments but now as you know we have a lot of other countries well everybody knows that we have China now to also which is also competing China's competing and China has got quite a lot of sway for countries like ours is it good is it not good I leave that to you but um we we so we do have multip So we also have uh uh um you know people we also have countries like uh Russia which has been a a part in partnership with most of our countries for years and years and years and years. In fact a lot of our students not now but our students before they were students in in in Russia USSR at that time you know and in the Eastern blocks as well but um so what we're seeing is that when a a a competing state, China, Russia, wherever, you know, now is giving you some money, some funding to to get your infrastructure running to get uh some some some uh a bilateral deal here or there. So, what do you do? You know, but as we have to ask our our our uh ourselves. Is this something that we want? Is this something that we want? Again, I leave it to the panel. I'll leave it open. But you see, one thing is clear. If now when you're talking about governance, you know, governance uh the conditions becomes well is going to be one of the things that we're going to be working with for ge geopolitical reasons. negotiations if it's not the question is not can you meet this standard you know but can China can Russia can America give us the best package forget about governments who can give us the best is it the best thing for us you know but this is what happening this is actually what's happening in real terms and in practice you know and of course reformers, local reformers or domestic reformers, whatever you'd like to call them. We know that. We see that. So, we work with that, you know, we work with that. Um, now it's not a criticism. It's not a criticism, but it's um certain things that I'm sure will come up uh in when we're talking in our panel. Is it our job or do you think that the best thing for us today is to try to restore the old order? Is that what we want? And in actual fact, can the older old order ever come back? I doubt it. It's gone. It's gone. You know, I'm not sure that today the major powers that we have, the way that the the the whole world is is the conflicts and whatnot, are they really going to rediscover or when are they going to rediscover their commitment commitment to governance and accountability? But but let's let's let's be frank, some of these things did work. I mean, I used some of that, you know, and it also made my commission, the commission on human rights pretty strong because we used uh the framework of the old order, you know, but um we have to also admit to ourselves that the old order also had some some basic flaws. I think what we can call I think I've seen somewhere where it was they were they were they were mentioning that it was hypocritical some of the things that the old order had was hypocrisy etc because the what was happening that whilst the America whilst the major powers were demanding and they actually were demanding accountability we went and learned all those things you know they were really demanding accountability from because they were not being accountable themselves. they were not following themselves you know and so that becomes very difficult also and that is where the question also comes to you know when when you know um but can I say that should we be pessimistic about this there's a lot of dispondency I'm sure I'm not in anti-corruption anymore but but since I was being brought here when I plenty as they say but I think that we can't be pessimistic about it though we really do want to be pessimistic about party I mean the first thing that you know when I'm talking to people people are talking to I say it's not going to change that's that's how it is we can't do anything but is that right can we I don't think we should be too fatalistic about these things but it is really difficult not to be despondent about this whole thing but the thing is what we have to ask ourselves today you know as an anti-corruption agency is or anti-corruption reformers I should say rather is so if we don't have this external uh you know pressure or yeah pressure on us uh does that mean that we can't do anything does that mean that you know our domestic local reform cannot work, you know, because we don't have that external compulsion to push us forward. Does that is that what it means? You know, uh, you know, I've I've heard people saying that yes, if you don't have that, well, we don't think that you can even reform your own agenda, your anti-corruption agenda. But I think that that that uh yes I was in the anti-corruption agency. I was also in African development bank. But actually having attempt attempted or having done this work, I can tell you without uh doubt without you know that when a commission or an agency survives a change of government, it's not usually because the IMF or the World Bank has put pressure on us to do anything to change our reform. It hasn't been that you know uh and it's it's not even sometimes it's not even the law the law which has actually made us change our behavior but when we have survived is because we did something about it. There was either some some uh an agency like ours or even individuals who thought it was necessary to actually stand up and make the change, try to make the change. Even though these people, myself included, we were not protected and the investigative journalists who were working with us were not protected. But we decided to take a stand and we change certain things. Um and you will get in the literature and whatnot you'll see that they'll tell you to well um you know you can build domestic constituencies, you can strengthen institutions, you can invest in in regional cooperations. That's correct. It's true. You can do all these things, but the foundation really has to be domestic. And the real problems that we that we faced as as anti-corruption reformers is that um that's not enough. It's never been enough. Those are good. It's a good thing to build domestic uh uh constituencies, which we did. very good things to try to strengthen institution which we did. We did also invest in regional cooperation and even in international cooperation but that's not only the problem you know because the anti-corruption agencies like the shr very good agency we have like I said before three institutions under And if we don't have under one umbrella, but we're given the resources which set us up to fail. We don't have enough, you know. So, and we know that the underfunding is really intentional. It's not an oversight. It's intentional. The lack of political commitment is also intentional you know they say okay go and do some training and whatn not that's not enough you know and of course the biggest thing is the political elite which shield each other it doesn't matter from which party you come from or which regime comes they actually protect each other becomes very difficult. So when a anti-corruption agency is is is um set up was created you know it's supposed to work in a way that that uh the design the design is supposed to be something that you're going to be working with. Okay. But and then it has to to operate independently, you know, but the when a government sets it up, we were a bit we were a little luckier because it was actually under the constitution and they could not remove us, you know, under unless we had you were going to be impeached. But when the government has no intention of letting you function independently, they know what they're doing and they know how they do it. The first thing is that they start you off funds. That's the first thing they do. They starve you of funds and they give you a very wide mandate so you look as if you're doing something very good. They they they but your budget does not allow you to do the things that you're supposed to do. the commission on human rights. We had at the time when I was in the commission on human rights, we had a 100 district offices. We had uh at that time 10 regional offices, you know, and of course we had the the the uh the uh headquarters and so on and so forth. The way that we could operate, you know, was really by mainly by donor funding. But to get the donor funding, you had to show that you were really a credible institution and then they'll give you the funding, you know, uh and that's what happened. You know, we got funding. They I'm not going to mention the countries because then uh I'm not I'm not sure I don't think I'm supposed to do that here. Or perhaps I can. I'm no longer a diplomat. Perhaps I can but you know we had agencies like Danita which gave us funding because they saw what we were trying to do and they gave us the funding and the only um conditions were of course the reporting conditions but they didn't try to uh influence where we wanted to go. They gave us the funding and they gave us quite a bit of funding to help us to uh really prosecute our mandate, follow our mandate. We had other countries that gave us much less and then tried to insist on the things that they wanted us to do. Um uh I can tell you that um much to the uh much to the horror of those countries of that country and much to the horror of my own the minister of uh of uh the attorney general and even the presidency. I said no I wasn't going to take their money and I even got under some uh I got some flack from my own people because we needed the money but I said no way they are giving look at the money that they're giving us over five years and all the conditions that they have set for us it's not worth it let's not take it and when we didn't take it we got some more funding from GA so you know that was a good thing you know but um what can we we do. Let's get to what can we do? Um again, you know, um the the literature would tell you that um uh make to make the resource gap that you get really a political cost. Yes. Okay. Perhaps, you know, uh, publish what it is that they do. You know, publish how much they give you compared to what your function is or your mandate is, you know, make it public. Make it public. And we did. And I'm glad that we have somebody from parliament here today who's going to also be there because we used to go to parliament also to the to the city to parliament the committees and show them what our budget is and what they could do about it. what can they do about it for us to help us you know then we had the press and again uh the press I would tell any any institution that you should make the press especially the investigator journalist your friends because they are the ones who will stand up for you if they think that you're doing a good job they will stand up for you know um so the press parliament and then the records you must keep records so some of the cases that we've taken and some of the u um some of the funding that we've been we've asked for over the years if they all been documented. So every every uh um that comes has it. Of course, when the opposition, they'll be telling everybody that look at what they've done. They're trying to kill the the institution. They're trying to kill the institution. When they come in, they do kill the institution themselves, you know, but you you what we try to do, what the agency is trying to do is to set up an accountability system, is to set up the documentation so that even when you are not there, it's there. and maybe on one day it will be used to the benefit of the agency you know. So we also tried to um to get budget protection. You go to the the the the parliamentary committee you know on appropriation and speak to them about it. You always get one or two parliamentarians who see what your your your problem is and who speak on your behalf. so that we can have at least a minimum guarantee for our funding. You know, then we also tried to get uh parliament and the executive to agree to give us a certain percentage of the national budget. That was a bit difficult, you know. Uh but what we said was the cases that we take, if there's any way that we can get from it. Give us something out of it. That was very difficult. I'm not sure that they do it right now anyway, you know. It's really it's really almost impossible, but it's not impossible, you know. And uh so we we we you have to use that. You have to use the press, you have to use uh the the the uh parliament, uh you have to use uh people, NOS's. We've been using NOS's also and also because your funds you don't have uh so much you know you do not do you do not do all any case you pick certain cases and you do them those cases those cases that can bring you at least some visibility I took two such cases and that was I think part of the reason and others also gave us more funding because they thought that at the time that we took those cases um and that nobody would take uh that you know they thought well you know she's crazy she's taking that case. I took a case against the sitting president and um and I can tell you that um it wasn't comfortable because uh I had to be protected everywhere I went. But to be frank, this president uh also didn't want to look as if he was uh you know uh being heavy-handed or anything like that. So when we called him up to come and speak to come and and come before us. He did, you know, and uh so he looked very good. He looked very whether he felt it or not, but he looked very good. And then I got him to um sack one of the ministers that had really been behaving badly who was very very close to him, you know. But I used investigative journalist journalists also to help me. Now everything didn't go too well when this this gentleman was was sacked. The minister was sacked. So the minister took up the matter to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court in a in um in a decision 5 to one a four to one or five to I can't remember decision uh reversed what the lower court the high court said that yes, this guy couldn't, you know, be a minister or anything like anything like that, they reversed it. And then to make matters worse, the Supreme Court also decided that we could no longer investigate matters without having a complainant come to us. That of course took away a lot of the the uh the the independence that we had. first and also it took away some of the leverage that we have. They took it away. They took they they they interpreted the law in another way. Altogether desending the dissenting judge said that uh he desented because he thought that the judges uh this was the time for judges to stand up for accountability. So what did we do? We were very very dejected. My investigators were so so so sad, you know. But what did we do? We were not allowed anymore to take up investigations. So investigations. We had to wait for complaint. So what did I do? I went to the journalists and I went to um uh some NOS and said, "You see this matter? Bring the complaint to us." And they would. And when because What are we doing? We are We've got a complaint before us. We didn't go for the complaint ourselves. We knew that there was something there. Investigative journalist go look at it and bring us the complaint. And that's what they did. So, we had to go around it. It worked. It worked for a while. After I left, I'm not sure what happened. But, you know, but you have to take those strategic cases. So out of those two cases I got quite a lot of of of um uh kudos and then it also translated into funding from other to external donations which even before that yes we do the work but as you can imagine the hardest problem and we've talked about it we heard about it even during the the the the form the um panel U the panel sessions that we had today is the elites protecting each other didn't matter from what doesn't matter from what uh from what what you call it party they're from you know so when you have the elites who are protecting themselves uh it becomes very difficult it becomes very difficult to operate you know, uh it you you get a little bit of restbite when there's going to be a uh an election because then of course those in the opposition always come to your side and help you. But once they get there, it's another story altogether. And um the protection of the elite, you know, self-protecting themselves, you know, it's not in our control. It really is not in our control. we can document it which we do you know but it's it's it's it's difficult um so what would I say to the researchers and and students you know here and others also is public pressure is always something that will move the needle. Public pressure will always move the needle. But you do have to have some very very committed people who will do that because it's not I mean in Ghana for example, we don't have that with the history of when you are against a particular government that they're going to shoot you or whatever it is like that. They do other things. All right? They make it very uncomfortable for you. But other places in other in other jurisdictions I mean that becomes a matter of life and death and I won't say that that uh I'm saying touchwood because we are seeing things like that why are we seeing things like that because the people or the countries or the major powers who were showing us the rule based order etc are not following it themselves and are doing all sorts of things which has a negative impact on socioeconomic and ethical considerations in our own countries. So what we never or we didn't think about doing today we think about doing it. So it's becoming very difficult very difficult for governance very difficult for anti-corruption. So we do have to know how to build conditions so that we can really do something about it. And then again I'm going to leave it to the panel to tell us how we can do it. You know I spent a lot of years as I said looking for resources more international support which I got more political will a little bit you know uh and then when it became very uncomfortable and whatnot as I said African Development Bank uh asked me to come so it was easier for me to say well I'm retiring and you know and I left you know but u again let's put a balance here the international order the rule based order did give us some le leverage it gave reformers like me you know and agency like I like like like the commission it did give us you know a a stronger hand actually it did but now I think that with all that's happened the fragmentation you know it's become extremely weak become extremely weak uh before I came Um I had been asked by the um uh by the NGO uh to help to review the code of conduct for public offices because when we were at the commission we wrote one. Uh this thing was very this this this this document was very uh uh strategic because what it did was the the document we put down all that we felt should be followed you know for the public for the code of conduct of public offices. But what we're seeing now is becoming very difficult. Even though the president said, "Oh, we'll follow it and follow it." Up to today, they have not done anything about it. It hasn't it hasn't passed. It hasn't been passed and it's not going to pass easily. I don't think because uh the government or the political elite again are protecting each other and with what they've done and what they intend to do, a code of conduct for public officers is not nothing that they want to put forward but we pushing on you know so uh the work of building institutions which must also outlast governance the work of trying to protect people who are willing to stand up and tell the truth you know that work was always ours agencies, the reformers and it remains the agencies and reformers investigating journalists that is our work you know but the question for the panel and for all of you is how do we do it at this time? How do we do it from here? So I'm going to leave you with that thought. How do we do it from here? Thank you so much. [applause]