From Orbit to the Battlefield: The Future of Space Capabilities

[music] >> Welcome to the last line of defense. I am Seth Jones, president of the defense and security department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. And I'm honored today to be joined by Robert Cardillo, former director of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, also the executive chairman of IonQ. And I also may ask you uh some questions that bring you back to your former life as a presidential daily briefer. So, um AI actually tells me that you delivered more than 325 in-person briefings to the president. I don't know if that's true. I don't know if you even counted. But anyway, that's what that's what AI says. So, regardless of the number, thanks for coming on. >> Well, you're welcome and thanks for having me. Uh I know it's going to be uh enriching uh and rewarding and uh hopefully a little bit uh informative to having this conversation with you, Seth. Thanks. >> All right. Well, I think it definitely will. Okay, let me just start off with Ukraine. You know, I think for many people Ukraine has ar- arguably seen the most use, at least publicly anyway, of space in the warfighting domain. So, e- even as the war starts in February of 2022, Russia launched a major cyber attack against Viasat satellite network, and which disrupted tens of thousands of modems across Ukraine and Europe. Um then came, over time, uh the Ukrainian use of Starlink. And then, earlier this year, Russia's loss of Starlink. So, fro- from your perspective, just starting here, how is space been used in Ukraine? And what does this tell us more broadly, or you? What does it tell you about the evolving role of space in the military, and even the warfighting domain. >> Yeah, look, I think there are many lessons to be learned. And I should quickly add uh I love lessons learned, but I No, I'm sorry. I like lessons learned, but I love lessons applied. And so, it's one thing to learn it, but it's it's quite another to do something about it, which I I think goes to the heart of your question. What What What should we do given the lessons that we've learned via the Ukraine uh experience. And you know, we should probably start with, you know, the recognizing the old saw about the the mother of invention being necessity. Well, you know, if if you're the Ukrainian defense forces, whether formal or informal, right? You had a compelling necessity, right, to find a way to first blunt uh an overwhelming force, and then ultimately push it back, um and now sustain you you know, your defenses over time. And I think we've seen that across the board. And you know, you you mentioned appropriately the use of space. Um and I know what you mean by that. Uh and and I will certainly include space in my answer, but uh I think it's important to say that that those same lessons uh have been learned in the airspace as well. Um But let's start with the traditional uh uh concept of space. Again, you know, they're they're pressed against the wall. They're literally up against, you know, one of the largest, you know, uh and most, you know, at least on paper uh compelling army in the world, uh and yet they find a way to to blunt the attack. And I would argue they did that, you know, at their core with, you know, their you know, their pride in their country, right? And their dedication to its freedom. Uh but then they quickly turned to uh what what I would call traditional and non-traditional sources of support. Uh you mentioned Starlink for example. Obviously, Russia had a way to impose restrictions, you know, if not complete denial of communication assets. Uh Starlink offered uh an opportunity um uh you know, for the first time in such an operational scenario that it ever existed. And I think there's two things that are important here. I think one is the kind of the tactical effect, right? Which allowed them to communicate beyond the the bounds of what Russia would have wanted them to do. And because they had that improved communication, they had an improved uh defensive maneuver scheme. But two, I think there was a strategic messaging that occurred through that um that I am sure or would suspect at least, you know, confident that wasn't the intent, but I think it had that same effect. And that is I think it began to undermine the Russian confidence in their ability to control the environment. And and look, if you know, if I was in Russia's shoes, I would be doing the same thing. And and I think you can look throughout the US history of you know, approaches to you know, operational engagements. And what do we do? Yes, you want to control the skies, but you know, you always want to control the airwaves. And if you can, right? You have a great advantage. And if you can't, uh that begins to undermine your ability to affect uh the intent of your operation. And so, I think the uh of of Ukraine's immediate uh access to uh what was broadly known as commercial space. And we can come back to that if you like, Seth. But also, you know, >> [clears throat] >> I think they they took advantage of nascent research and development activities, things that were quote not ready for prime time, and they put them into play in a way that was you know, people talk about DevOps environments, you know, where you you know, you you try something, you get some feedback, and then you make adjustments on that. I think Ukraine has become the uh the true uh best in class in that now, where they are so dynamic in their interface with their application of a technology, and then their their assessment of the left and right bounds of that application, and then their adjustment, and that cycle is just so fast. And uh obviously, I think they've learned a lot through that, and I think it's now up to us to learn and apply those lessons ourselves. >> Well, which which among other things brings us to the more um recent least US use during Epic Fury in Iran, but also the US used some assets in Absolute Resolve in Venezuela, uh non-kinetic non-kinetic electronic warfare jam jamming adversary communications, uh space-based assets to provide overwatch, satellite communications, positioning, navigation, and timing that enabled, including in the in the case of Venezuela, uh the precision raid. How How are you seeing the US evolving its use of space in the Iranian and Venezuela context? And I I want to ask you after that sort of We've seen some restrictions also on the use of space on the commercial side. So, after that, I do want to get to what sort of what that what sort of the impact is, but let's start Let's start with the US use of space in some of the more recent wars, which is I think a little different from what we've seen the Ukrainians able to do. Yeah. So, you know, in in many ways there there certainly overlaps in the two missions, Venezuela and Epic Fury. Um but I think the differences are more stark. And so, let me first lay that out and then address your question. So, uh obviously I was way out of government since both of these and and and so can comfortably discuss because I have no >> That's why I'm asking you. >> [laughter] >> So, so you're going to hear some you're going to hear some you know, I'll call them informed conjecture, but but you know, look, I I have admiration for the for the Venezuela operation because I saw it as really uh a very surgical operation that had a very pointed objective that was arguably as difficult as they can be to, you know, remove to securely remove um the leader of a of a nation who is, you know, surrounded and inside uh a protective apparatus. Uh and to do it in a way with, you know, you know, minimal loss of life and quite frankly minimal disruption to the country itself. Um and so, again, having having no exact insight, I would say that it was really the epitome of US high technical uh capabilities um with with both sensitive technologies and and and openly commercial technologies. But more importantly, combining them in a way that brought the effect to the point in time that it was needed. And, you know, obviously that that's the raid and that's the denial of information to the adversary Um affect enough confusion and disorientation that allowed not just the success of the mission but minimization of you know of of harm to the country. And so I give I give the administration and the department and the intelligence community that that that underpin that a great credit. I think the operation in Iran is obviously quite different. I mean I guess the analogy is it And I appreciate there's a debate about whether or not regime change was at the heart of you know our motivation. But there was certainly the intent to decapitate the leadership of of the Iran hierarchy in a way that obviously destabilized you know their command and their control and thus their operational effectiveness for the follow-on mission which was continued debilitation of their nuclear program and to reduce and mitigate their ability to project force you know in a malicious way from their country and whether that you know includes you know a missile threat or a naval threat or an air threat whether that be manned or unmanned the campaign then proceeded to do that and you know from everything that I can tell again from open source obviously a very you know initially strategically successful campaign exquisite intelligence provided time and place of the leadership that was your objective and then obviously operational uh that was involved in in our planning and employment and deployment of forces in a way that that that minimized uh surprise or or maximize the surprise on their end um uh led to, you know, at least that successful opening phase. Uh the longer-term you know, effect you know, I think can and should be debated. Um you know, the you know, the nuclear program which had already had suffered uh setback uh in the summer uh prior summer in uh uh Midnight Hammer um you know but again, and Seth, you'll recall there was great debate about the effect of the destruction and and denial of capability to their nuclear program um coming from the White House, coming from the Pentagon, coming from my old colleagues in the in the intelligence community. Um but it was it was certainly the administration's case that it was effectively uh mitigated that nuclear threat. And obviously we went back and did additional strikes to affect additional damage. Um I think the jury's out as to, you know, whether or not the long-term, you know, impact will be what we sought. Uh but but I guess get to get back to your question, uh I I'd I'd give the team uh great credit for the application of both what we used to call what what are called national technical means, so that's the government's, you know, assets and satellites and capabilities combined with uh commercial support. Um um to your question about Ukraine, we also uh reportedly employed a denial of communication service uh program against the Iranians. Obviously, that's kind of standard operating procedure. You want to keep your adversary's ability to communicate at a minimum. That seemed to be broadly successful and and again, I think there there was there was I think the the administration should get credit. There was, you know, you know, in such a large operation, there was relatively limited number of casualties. Now, any number greater than zero is a travesty, right? And a tragedy, obviously, but when you think about the broad scope, I think I think the operation was employed rather effectively. But yeah, I think it was a good combination. Yeah. >> Yeah, and I did want to I did want to ask as a follow-up um there have been restrictions on the commercial use of imagery. What what can you tell us about that and what what sort of impact is that is that having? >> Yes, so look, I you know, you mentioned in the intro, I've been involved in the you know, the the business of remotely sensing our planet since I signed up under the Reagan one administration. So, I've been around for a while. And for most of my career, I experienced you know, almost complete, if not complete, government ownership of that capability, right? You you just you had to have a government satellite government rocket with a government satellite. They tended to be classified and and obviously protected. So, they were used especially in the Cold War as a as a competitive advantage against our our adversary, the Soviet Union. Middle part of my career, I experienced the the evolution of this commercial imagery industry starting around the turn of the century. There there are actually presidential directives uh that espouse and support the commercial imagery industry of the United States that to not only be competitive but to be dominant uh in the world market. It's in our national security interest and our economic security interest uh for that to be the case. So, uh the government uh spawned uh this industry and and funded it to a great uh extent. Uh there's obviously the government's a big buyer of these of these services. Now, to get back to your question, um and I need to be particular in my language because the government did not direct commercial companies to restrict the imagery. It was a conversation. Uh Planet Labs, at which I still have an affiliation with, I actually chair there uh Planet Federal Board, and uh was on the receiving end of those conversations or or I should say the participant in those conversations. The government's point of view was as follows. We have deployed forces in an active war zone. Uh a commercial image of a deployed US position in and around the region can be used by the adversary to affect harm. Nobody argues with that proposition. That's of course true, right? Because Yeah. Imagery is what I used it for most of my career as an advantage. >> Yeah. >> Um and so the the question was how can you The challenge is how do you at least You can't eliminate that risk, of course, to deployed forces, but can you minimize it? And so in our discussions with the government, uh Planet as well as our colleagues in the in the industry, BlackSky and Vantour, uh decided on our own to withhold imagery over certain area. In the beginning, it was for a certain amount of time. It was 4 days then 14 days and then it moved to indefinite. Because quite frankly, the war kept evolving and as we speak today it keeps evolving. >> Yeah, it still does keep evolving. We're not over. >> It we're not over. And so by the way, the the the withhold is is the term of art right now is is actually active today over the region. So Seth, I let me get to the heart of your question. I don't dispute the motivation of the government. Of course, I served the government for nearly four decades. It was it was, you know, my job to minimize harm to US deployed forces. So I certainly support that objective. But I have two broad concerns with it. One, because the US commercial imagery industry isn't the only commercial imagery industry in space, I do worry that we might be uh overestimating the effect. If you reduce the access to US commercial images, that you reduce the risk to US deployed forces. Because let's face it, there are Chinese satellites and Indian satellites and Russian satellites, etc. that will not obviously withhold their imagery. Now, I get the counter argument to that that, you know, having 10 images is or if you can go from 10 images to two images, that's an improvement, right? It's better, right? They're not arguing that there's no imagery. But I just worry that there's a there's an overconfidence that comes with the restrictions of the withhold. And then if I could just put my commercial hat on firmly, these restrictions, these withholds will reduce the competitive now competitiveness of those US companies as they seek international markets. And I don't have the statistics in front of me. Maybe I should because Planet is a public company, but a good percentage of Planet's revenue comes from its overseas contracts. Planet announced a big constellation as a service deal with Japan uh and with Sweden and with Germany. And very proud of those, you know, contracts. And by the way, you know, you know, uh Vantour and BlackSky, same, right? Well, imagine the next time we get down to a close competition to support an ally and, you know, we have our package on the table. It's we're a US company with a US license and those are US satellites and we're going to sell them to an an ally um and we're competing against a Chinese company or an Indian company or a Russian company. Yes, the tech matters and we're proud of our tech, but at some point those restrictions, you know, we can reduce the confidence that those countries would have, will you be there when I need you? Will the US government turn you off, you know, the next time this happens? >> Right. Will you not share that information? >> That's right. And so, don't get me wrong. We have very thoughtful leaders in the administration. We are engaged in these conversations on the hill. Um I think there is agreement that we need to have some sort of balance, you know, going forward. Uh but uh but it uh but it is it is complicated by the fact that, you know, that the those two goals, right? Protection or minimization of of risk to US deployed forces and competitive competitiveness, which is also a national security imperative. And I and I'm not trying to weigh, you know, the the value of somebody's life versus, you know, the profit of a company. Please don't uh view it that way. But, we do want our companies to be competitive, right? That's part of our uh national security as well. >> Well, you raised, in terms of competition, you raised the Chinese. And as we've been tracking Chinese commercial space capabilities, and military as well, but they do appear to be growing at a stunning pace, and in some ways on an unprecedented scale. Uh Chinese startup companies, satellite internet companies, remote sensing firms are building a whole range of things, reusable rockets, mega constellations. And then if you look at the gigafactories, aerospace cities, technology hubs, and new launch sites that the Chinese are building across the country, it it appears to be quite impressive, but I'm wondering your take. What what's your assessment of the Chinese commercial and then government capabilities in the space area? How much of a competitor are they to the US, and and how much of this really is a space race? >> Uh it's real, Seth, and it's it's growing um more intense every day. Um I've mentioned my association with Planet Labs. You know, Planet Labs is quite proud of the fact that that that, you know, through their mega constellation, they were one of the early ones to go in 2014 to a a large fleet of about 200 small satellites in orbit to scan the Earth once a day. And that's now been done. I think we're in our eighth year of doing that, you know, a global scan once If we'd had this podcast a year ago, I would have said we're the only company in the world that does that, and proud of it, right? And uh and now I can't say that anymore. The company called Jilin um out of China, um I I know they've had some hiccups, which all space companies have, you know, whether it's launch or supply chain, but they are fastly moving to not only once a day, but at a higher resolution than Planet does now. Now, Planet's today is like 3 and 1/2 m resolution, which is which is low. Uh Planet has announced the intent to replenish that fleet and and to grow the or to increase the resolution to 1 m uh over the next few years. Um but at least China announces sub-meter resolution uh at that. And so, go back to our conversation about the withhold. If you agree that there is a risk in the Planet, you know, imagery over the Middle East at our current resolution, you have to appreciate that the Chinese risk is growing uh and by the way, without obviously control uh etc. So, this race is real, Seth, and it's growing more intense by the day. Again, I I'm fond of saying I've no interest in trying to out-China China. I want to out-America China, meaning we we have, you know, an investment base and we understand risk capital and we have entrepreneurial spirit. And And let's face it, we have a market and people can pursue, you know, a way to make, you know, returns on their investments. I love that model. And by the way, Planet is a proud product of that exact model, as are many of this in this business. But I guess what I worry is is that, you know, while the US government has been generally supportive and a good customer of this emerging technology, it doesn't do us any good if we have the quote tech in Boston, Austin, Silicon Valley, but we haven't employed it yet. You know, we're still studying it and in the in the in the department or in the intelligence community. And look, I know that's always been the challenge. It was the challenge when I was in government, so it's, you know, we don't go fast enough. And I And look, I think the government has made good strides with things like Defense Innovation Unit and the and the you know, the the the SIBER small business investments have been good starts. Uh but there still is this gap, I think, between that you know, that commitment uh and that scaling that I think we need to do if we're going to truly compete with and and and win the race with China. >> Yeah. Yeah, that makes that makes sense. On the China issue, you're now at IonQ among other places, which has a full-stack quantum platform. That's another area where there's a race going on. And so my the question then that comes from the quantum is where where we headed in the national security space for quantum uh and what what does that race look like depending on who gets there? Does it matter who gets there first? >> So, it matters in this way. Uh people the audience will be familiar, you know, when we have races in the Olympics, you know, they they finish and we have a nice podium and there's three flags and there's, you know, gold, silver, and bronze. Uh there's no silver medal for this race, Seth. Uh there's one winner. And the reason I say that is that the the country that actually delivers a fault-tolerant quantum computing capability that is cryptographically relevant. Okay, so that's a lot of words and that's a lot of complication and by the way, I'm the wrong guy to explain it to >> [laughter] >> your audience. What No, please don't. But But all as I can tell you is I know I know what it means when we get there. It means that those protections that we have grown uh reliant upon, and I don't want to be, you know, you know, you know, too much of a of a, you know, doom and gloom guy. It won't go poof overnight. It won't you know, if you people talk about Q day and that that is the quantum day when when when quote the unlocking of all the encryption happens, it will not happen like that. And let's pay face it, people especially financial institutions are paying close close attention to how we protect, you know, financial transactions and you know, everything from you know, you and I, you know, online banking to large-scale Wall Street, you know, uh moves. Um so there will be an evolution here, but the but the country, the entity that achieves that capability first will have an enormous advantage. Um uh and and and I think unlike AI, which which obviously is another race that uh is quite important, I think what will happen is if if you do get that first step advantage, it will become a very large lead for at least a meaningful period of time. And again, Seth, I don't know if that's, you know, weeks or months or possibly years, but I worry greatly about that window of opportunity. And let's face it, right? Uh you know, it's kind of at the heart of the confrontation between uh the US and China is the issue of Taiwan. And I can imagine a scenario if China were for some reason to able to get first to that fault tolerant quantum computing capability, I think that would open an unfortunate window where they would believe at least or have the confidence that they could act with and limit our chances of, you know, response, right? Either through, you know, cracking encryption or denying communication or both. Um and and that's what I worry about. You know, that even if that vulnerability is days and weeks, I I it will be I think it could be uh ultimately catastrophic on issues like Taiwan. >> Yeah, and where it could give the country that has it a potential first mover advantage at least a perception of one. >> Yeah. Okay, last question real brief. Um Uh I'm going to go back to space and ask as you look at the way space is being used uh for a range commercial space is being used for a range of of helpful reasons from aggro to a number of other areas. What as you look over the next 5 to 10 years what what are some areas where you you see there's a real potential for added value and goodness for space to help us in and I'm not necessarily talking about protecting the homeland so golden dome. I'm talking more about sort of commercial everyday Americans where where where can we expect some areas where space can really be helpful to the way we do business or or range of other things in the country. >> I just I just peeked at an article. I can't remember the newsfeed that popped up on my screen today, but there's a there's a a unification of the Democratic and and Republican voter these days and it's it's data centers, right? Everybody hates them, right? So So with the the finally our country is coming together over something important. And I say that only half jokingly to get to to get to your question. I and again, I'm the wrong guy to explain how or why, but I do believe computing space is a game changer. Now, I appreciate there are different points of view about how and what if how and when that can happen. Um I believe two things. One, of say what you will about Elon Musk, but when he puts his mind to something, he tends to get there. Usually doesn't get there on the timeline that he originally sets out, but he gets there and he's dedicated to it. And look, I just you know, we didn't talk about it around quantum, but let's face it, you know, one of the challenges of the AI curve is is power, right? We're just at some point going to hit a limit. Now, I appreciate, you know, nuclear's back and you know, people are talking about fission and and you know, potential there, great. Um uh but I think space is going to be part of that answer and by the way, weaving in that last question, I think quantum's part of the answer because even though well, we won't, you know, wake up one day and be, "Hey, let's swap out all of our classical computers with quantum computers." It'll be a hybrid for a long time. The power demand on a quantum computer is much less, right? They just operate at at at much lesser cycles than a classical computer. But back to your question about space, I do think that computing space is a way and I do think that because we're I think we are going to do that, that power from space or energy creation from space will also be a game-changer. It'll first start how we were going to power these space data centers, right? And so, you know, the obviously there are advantages to collecting solar energy in space that we don't have on the earth. There's cooling, natural cooling, and there's better uh absorption rates from the from from the sun's rays. But I think that if you put those two together, I think that that will be and and I think you're it's I think it's in the time frame of your question. I think this is a five-year kind of opportunity. So, I suggest if we if we recycle in five years, we will be we will be I think admiring broadly the achievements we've made in both of those camps, both the compute and power from space. >> Well, I think that's what we're going to have We're going to invite you back in a couple of years and see where we are on that. Great way to end it because uh the uh AI data centers have been controversial cuz they take up such significant territory. So, this would be quite positive step uh to to push push them into space. Got unlimited location for that. Well, thank you so much for taking the time to come on, Robert. Great to have you on uh and thanks for all the work you did on the government space side that you're now doing on the commercial side. >> Well, thank you, Seth, on both counts. One, this uh for your kind words, but this has been a fun conversation. Thanks for what you're doing though to continue to to to uh share these discussions uh to help us all think through the opportunities and uh and to take best advantage of them. Uh you're you're doing quite a service. >> All right. Well, thank you very much. Appreciate it. We'll We'll We'll We'll make a marker down to have you on in 5 years to test this uh uh space to uh test the AI data centers in space. >> It's a deal. >> Thanks for listening to our episode today. Please subscribe >> [music] >> wherever you listen to podcasts. For more analysis, please visit csis.org. [music] This is the last line of defense. >> [music]