Far Right STORM To Victory In Key Elections

Germany's farright party alternative for Deutsland or the RFD has been steadily gaining ground in German elections but this weekend it scored its biggest victory yet. The party has won the state parliamentary elections in East Germany's Saxony Anhalt. Um the AFD's leader in the state Uric Sigman drew thousands to rallies across Saxony Anhalt in the run-up to the election while running a savvy social media campaign. As a result, he could soon become the first far-right politician to lead a state since Germany's Nazi dictatorship. The election saw a historically high turnout of almost 80% um and the AFD won by a significant margin. It took 44% of the vote while the Christian Democrats its major competitor and the party of German Chancellor Friedick Mertz saw its vote slashed in half compared to the 2021 state elections and when it [snorts] managed to govern Saxony on hold in coalition with the SPD, the Social Democrats or the SPDR, the Social Democrats and the Greens and the AfD was also the favorite party across all segments of voters. It's pretty extraordinary including those that have sometimes leaned um towards more centrist or leftwing parties. So 39% of women voters opted for the AFD. More than twice the proportion opting for the party at the federal elections last year. Um 41% of 18 to 24 year olds also voted for the AFD. Um again about twice the nationwide share that the party took from that group last year. Um and double the proportion that voted for the AFD in the last regional election 5 years ago. Meanwhile, blue collar workers and others engaged in physical work voted overwhelmingly for the far right party with almost 60% of them picking the AFD. Um, and while the farright may have won this election, um, it doesn't automatically, um, grant them power. With just 39 seats in Saxony Anhalt's parliament, the AfD is free short of the 42 seats needed for an outright majority. But there are limited possibilities for an alternative coalition to rule instead. So if the five opposing parties or the five other parties join together respecting what's called the firewall, which is an informal agreement between political parties to keep the farright out of power, um it would have 44 seats and the ability to govern. Um obviously that would be pretty fragile coalition. Um, and it gets even tougher because one of those parties, um, the Sara Bargain Connect Alliance or BSW, um, has said it won't respect the firewall and has ruled out a pact with the Christian Democrats. The BSW, um, interesting party, socially conservative and anti-immigrant, but economically left. So, it's a populist party, but saying it's a different kind of populist party. Um it has said it would enter a deal with the AFD and both the AFD and the BW agree for example on ending sanctions against Russia and particularly Russian gas. Um the AFD thinks it might not even need that though. It thinks it has other options. So on the basis of there being by far the most popular party in the state. They've said the democracy demands other parties work with it in the state parliament or risk undermining the will of the people. And so they're sort of demanding you know all the parties consider working with them. Um its leader or Segment has also said he would be prepared to call fresh elections to secure the majority needed to carry out um the AFD's program. Um so what are those policies? Well, Germany's state governments are constrained um by the federal federal parliament. Obviously, this is just a a state government. Um but they still have significant power um including control of culture, education, and policing. Um, and in its policy program for the state, the AFD has reaffirmed its commitment to restricting access to abortion, beginning mass deportations via detention centers for irregular migrants, and building so-called citizen patrols, um, which some are described as militias as a wing of the state security architecture. But power in Saxony unhalt could also be a stepping stone to success in federal elections, so nationwide elections. The AfD is already the most popular party across Germany and its victory this weekend is having an immediate impact on Germany's national politics. The country's deeply unpopular chancellor Friedrich Mertz is under increasing pressure following the Christian Democrats abysmal result with voices calling for him to be replaced um growing within his own party. Um speaking earlier today, Mertz said this about the AFD win. This shakes our party to its very foundations. We cannot simply carry on as before, nor can I, nor can the federal government. We have a strong constitution. We have all the tools to defend the constitution against a right-wing extremist state government. But our party system is undergoing a tectonic shift. Um earlier today I spoke to Isabella Babber. She's professor of economics at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. Um she's the author of the upcoming book Anti-Fascist Economics and she spoke to me from Germany. I began by asking her about the significance of these results. >> It's hugely significant. It's the first time since the Nazi era that an extremist farright party um has won an election on the state level in a way where they might well form the government which would be hugely consequential for German democracy. They would have access to all sorts of security protocols. They would have a seat at the table in the second chamber of the parliament and so on. Um but also in terms of where the country is at um the the fact that you know we have been seeing this in the polls for months and months and months and yet it's not been possible to prevent this outcome and quite to the contrary we have actually seen this massive surge in voter participation and particularly people who used to not go to vote 170,000 people I think um uh uh that used not to vote voting for the AFD so we really have seen this you know mass mobiliz ization of people um uh supporting this um this yeah party with very clear neo-Nazi elements. >> Talk to me about this the state. So this is in Saxony Anhalt. Um how representative of this how representative is this state of of Germany as a whole or there sort of particular characteristics of this part of Germany which you know means that we'd predict the AFD would be more popular there than elsewhere. This is part of a national trend, right? We see the AFD um polling the strongest um nationwide. Um we see that um the the current government is um really um slashing uh uh the VAR state with all sorts of reforms that they are planning. Um we have the situation of massive military um expenditures and austerity pressure on um social social welfare spending um which all of this is really a toxic um combination. Um and then on top of it we have this crisis of the German economic model um where you know the the industries that used to not only be um really key for exports but also key for the the identity of Germans and key for manufacturing jobs um are declining and are no longer competitive in the ways in which they used to be because of the e vehicle revolution. Um so that this is really part of a you know national trend. um and um in a way like kind of prefigures what might come at the national level, which is part of what makes it so incredibly scary. And as far as I understand, this is not the first time that the AFD have come first in a state election, but this is the first time they've done quite so well. So 44% is the highest they've ever pled and also the first time that they have a plausible route to taking power in a state. Now that's because they got such a high vote share. It's also because there is another party the Saravagaren connect party that has entered or will enter the state parliament I suppose after these elections. Now the Saravagaren connect party or the BW was part of Delinka. So it was part of the left party but split away. Um now this party seems like it might be you know the party to hand the AFD a state for the first time ever. um all the other parties are adopting the firewall policy of saying no coalitions with the far right or or sort of no collaboration at all with the far right. So talk to us about this. What is the the Sarra Vargon connect party? Why has a you know a party that considers itself in many ways leftwing? Why is it suggesting that it is the one that will break with all the other parties and help the AFD into power? for many years it's been very difficult for parties to win upwards 40% right so um you know it's it's I mean it's historical for the AFD but it's also like in the context of this you know enormous fragmentation of parties it's it's a very very very strong result um in terms of the BSW I mean it's really tragic in a way um you know it's it's this party that um split off the left party on the premise that we needed um uh you um uh cultural conservative conservative um policies and at the same time progressive economic policies. Um and this is now um becoming you know the kingmaker potentially for the AFD. We don't quite know yet but actually yesterday um as they went on on public TV for the first debate um the the person representing the BW was really you know like catering to the AFD. Um so um it seems that their understanding is is somehow um that uh you know being against the status quo um is is everything. So you you're rather with the far right and against the status quo than than um with with the other parties. Um but it's also in a way an existential struggle for this party at this point. Right? They didn't make it into the national parliament. Um and now suddenly um they hold power to who is going to form the government in in Saxony Anhild. um at this historic um uh uh uh uh moment. So in a way it's it also seems like a bit of a you know um cry for importance at a moment where the party really has has drowned in in insignificance. I suppose would they say it's a rock in a hard place because either because suppose there are also dangers in forming a coalition of every party other than the AFD because if the AFD want to say that everyone other than them is the same if you have a coalition which is literally the conservatives the center left the far left the greens you know everyone but the AFD then sort of does that make it harder to oppose the AFD elsewhere I mean I you know I don't want to overly rationalize their position but that's the argument they would one presumes >> the situation is of course that the government that could still be formed without the AfD is bound to be incredibly fragile right I mean it's going to be like a hodgepodge of parties that don't agree on anything other than that they don't want the AFD in government and that is not a good starting point I mean we saw this with the previous national government where we had the social democrats and the greens um and the liberal neoliberal party um in a coalition which still less of a stretch than what we would see um now on the state level in in in Saxony Anhard. So in that sense it's really this you know um Vimma type of scenario where you have such an extreme fragmentation of parties that um to hold the line you need to form coalitions that are basically impossible. But I think in a way this also shows that the firewall tactic um didn't work. Um I mean I think it's it's right to have the fireball. It's right to, you know, be very clear that one is not joining forces with a party that is right-wing extremist and that has very clear neo-Nazi elements. Um, but at the same time, you need more than a firewall. You basically need escape routes. You need an alternative vision. You are seeing in poll after poll that people are fed up, that they can't take the status quo anymore, that the status quo is unbearable, that they have lost any sense of hope for the future. It's really kind of a, you know, sense of futurelessness and then all that you're offering is a firewall to protect the status quo. This is not going to work, right? You need a vision that points to a better future, a better presence, but that is a democratic um uh improvement um of the situation rather than leaving the alternative to the status quo um to be a monopoly of the extreme right, which is what has been happening um in in in the previous years. um combined with this you know harsh social policy playbook combined with this massive expansion of military spending um uh combined um with um this implosion of the economic model it's it's it's just um you know a very very desperate situation. Let's end actually by talking about this concept of neo-Nazism because I say throughout the second half of the 20th century, Germany was a country where everyone pointed to and said sort of they've dealt with their history. You know, they they haven't sort of brushed the Nazi stuff under the carpet. There are memorials everywhere and every politician has to say that it was, you know, the worst thing that ever ever happened and there was a huge taboo about, you know, anything associated with Nazism at all. Now, this idea that there's a party that's doing well that has neo-Nazi elements, has the has the taboo about Nazism sort of ended in in Germany and people are actually reconsidering it, or do the people who support the AFD consider the neo-Nazi charge a smear. So, they say, "Well, I obviously I support the AFD, but I would never ever support anything associated with the Nazis, and so the people calling it calling them Nazis are the ones who are wrong." Or are people saying, "Actually, you know, maybe the Nazis weren't so bad." I mean what's the what's the conversation at the moment? >> I think there is a big issue with the memory culture right where you know this like celebration of guilt can almost reside in this you know clean washing because we are constantly saying it happened here it was so terrible it will never happen here again and meanwhile we are not paying attention to all the things that are happening that are actually you know pointing to um a pretty pretty clear reemergence of a fascist threat. So that that's I think one part of the story. Um another part of the story is that the AFD very clearly is changing the narrative about history. Right? So they are kind of you know um uh having a very clear agenda that we should have less emphasis on uh uh on on the Nazi era in in in in school education and history. Um they are kind of you know like we we should be able to say we are German, we are proud of it. One of the slogans of the um AFD in Saxony Anahhide is actually um think German, you know. So there is this um kind of you know um sense of our national pride has been um suppressed and now finally you know you're allowed to um be be German and be proud of it again. um which is a bit I mean of obviously very different context but I think there's a certain similarity with the whole discourse around beness and you know like what you're allowed to say and what you're not allowed to say and all of this. So um there's a resonance of this where I think um a lot of people um do um I mean do do feel a sense of liberation in in in this you know I can be German and be proud of it. Um which is in a way like a backlash against the kind of memory culture that we have been um uh uh practicing. Um but at the same time I would really warn against the idea that you know all the people who have been voting for the AFD are deep down neo-Nazi or all of them you know are deeply um revisionist in terms of history um or all of them are racist or something like this. Right? I think um that we have to recognize that um e the the the the extreme forms of economic insecurity shocks um you know I mean these are people that lost everything in 1990 lost their jobs lost their you know their communities people moving away um lost their you know their their sense of security their sense of um where they belonged um and then now they they're faced with this um implosion of the you know um new economic model. So they are kind of um aiming for some sort of um vision that gives them um security that gives them a sense of selfworth which then is built on this us versus them on this you know hate um based scapegoating um uh kind of rhetoric. Um but um I I wouldn't say that you know um this is the only way to reach those people. Quite to the contrary, I think what we need is um is is is is really an alternative economic vision to show that there is a possibility for a better future that is not going with the extreme right. >> That was Isabella Vber speaking to me earlier today. Um the AFD may soon make history by taking power in Saxony unhelp and becoming the first farright party to run a state since the Nazi period, but they're far from the only farright political force in the ascendancy um in Europe. Jordan Bardella, president of France's farright national rally, and spoke at Reform UK's conference in Birmingham this weekend. >> The waves of migration Europe is experiencing today are only the beginning. In London, in Paris, in many of our great European cities, too many citizens no longer recognize the country in which they grew up. Sometimes [applause] sometimes they feel like stranger in their own country. [applause] [cheering] They see insecurity rising. They see their identity changing and their way of life being replaced by foreign way of life that are sometimes incompatible with our values. >> Next year, France will hold presidential elections and the National Rallies candidate Marine Le Pen has consistently been at the top of the polls for the race despite being found guilty of embezzlement from the European Union to the sum of 4 million euros. Um that was in 2024. Now, across Europe, around half a dozen farright parties now participate in national governments. In Italy, Georgia Maloney's government has just become the longest serving in the history of the Italian Republic. Um, normally Italian governments are sort of very weak, don't last very long. Hers has done pretty well um in terms of longevity. Um, her party, the brothers of Italy, is right-wing with a fascist history, but the arrival of the farright challenger Futuro Natali has pushed her policies to even more extreme positions. Um, governments in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden, and Croatia all rely on farright support to pass laws. Meanwhile, farright opposition parties are growing in strength, too, becoming the second largest party in at least six countries, including the Netherlands, Poland, and Portugal. Um, Ash, uh, yeah, the far right has been the theme of tonight's show, sort of accidentally. Uh, this doesn't look very good, does it? >> No. And as I was uh listening to Isabella Vber, I was thinking somewhat glumbly that maybe you just can't escape the pull of history. So when you think about the rise of the Nazis uh in Germany in the 20th century, there's obviously a lot of things which precede that. So um you have the development of sort of proton Nazi you know hard right uh citizen militias right like the frycore who were responsible for the killing of Rosa Luxembourg for for instance um you had a story of national humiliation which was of course after World War I and the Treaty of Versailles and you also had the long tale of a global financial crisis. Um now not all of those things are um exactly the same in the present day but certain things stack up. One is that you definitely have the long tale of a financial crisis of prosperity of progression which just never came back and the feeling of quite a profound breakdown in the social contract. Um the second thing that when you're looking at AFD policies which include that sort of you know citizen security force is that I think you can plausibly say this has resemblance to a sort of far-right militia of of the kind uh that we saw in the 20th century and I think rather than there being a sense of national humiliation coming at the defeat of a war obviously the far right say that national humiliation came in the form of massive immigration. I would actually maybe put it a little bit differently because yes, the sort of headline figures are big, right? So, particularly when you think about Germany 2015 2016, you're thinking about that um accommodation of a million refugees. That's a big number. When you think about the sort of transformation of the national complexion, it's actually not right not huge. It's you're not seeing the kind of large scale ethnic replacement that the far right like to talk about and you're certainly not talking about um a sort of eradication of host culture. I think what's true is that you are feeling a loss of collective pride, purpose and progress. And you can in my view really locate that within neoliberalism which is industry leaves, purpose leaves, the heart gets ripped out of community and what replaces it is empty forms of consumerism. you've got uh the part you know widened participation uh into higher education which then means that lots of young people leave and they move to the cities and you've got this broadening cultural gulf between those who leave and those who stay and I think that into that comes social media algorithmic tailoring of people's feeds and the sense that we all live in the same country that we all have to deal with the same things really does break down and weaken and so That's going to be something which might upset some of our viewers, but it's something which I do think to be true. For me, my friends, many of our viewers, the genocide in Gaza feels incredibly present and incredibly up close because it's a live stream genocide. And I think that it is a huge um moral motivator in terms of political action. I can think of people who don't live in London, didn't go to uni, got a very different kind of job from me, who feel the same way and feel that sense of I know every new horror as it unfolds when it comes to migrant sex crimes. >> So, we are living in two different information universes. And I don't want to talk about things as moral equivalents and I don't want someone to take this away and you know, I know that people are going to say, "Oh, this is Ash's, you know, trip to the right." What it means is that um you've got countries which really have no unity whatsoever and then all of that gets blamed on immigration. All of that gets blamed on ethnic change. But I think that there is something which the right sometimes says which I think is sometimes true which is that sort of cultural bifurcation right what happens when you have um that kind of de-industrialization that weakening of social bonds that weakening of culture got lots of young people living in cities you have a very different kind of point of view in politics is that I think it is sometimes true that you've got young people who are more interested in um I guess issues around social equality um and are interested in the struggles of people in geographically far away places more so than their experience more so than the experiences of people who live maybe 100 or 200 miles away. I think that's true. [clears throat] Um, so yeah, I know that none of that is very um up and atom, but I think that moments like this you should actually take that time to reflect a little bit deeper about what's gone on and not just reach for the pat answer. >> Yeah. I mean, it also is, you know, obviously I don't think white people are being replaced, right? But but the proportion >> make up 50% of this hosting duo right now. >> Yeah. But the proportion of the the the change the demographic change in Europe has been very fast sort of historically. So in Germany it went it was 10% foreignb born population to now over 20% in 10 years. That is that's historically >> but the but the thing is is that you sort of go what does that what does that mean in terms of what you're seeing in your community daytoday right you know I I think that this is the sort of like is this big or is this close up right is that I don't think that white people are being eradicated. I think that there is a hyper vvisibility attached to people that aren't white. If I if I had a penny for every time someone told me I was the only white person in my school, right? I'm like numerically I don't think this is possible. But again, >> oh, sorry. I thought you were saying people were saying that to you. I was like, and now I'm super confused. No, you're saying people say tell you they're the only white person in the >> that they were. And I was like, I just don't think that's true. I think what is true is that there were a number of people of color which made you feel very aware of how many there were >> right might have even been you know 50 plus 1%. But in this country, you know, even if you're in East London or whatever, you weren't the only one. But, you know, there is this sort of hyper vvisibility aspect of it. Um, which means that again, it feels bigger than it is, but it's sort of our our sense of of what's going on in the field of vision is a bit distorted. >> Yeah. I mean, I'm very I love I love the kind of new labor style multiculturalism. Like I went to school where I think I think it was probably like third white, third Asian, third black and like I we sung songs about you know like paint the world with all the different colors and we s the Eid songs, the Dvali songs and the Christian songs. So don't get me wrong, I love all of this stuff, but I suppose the change has there has been a change. You know, when people think sort of like that where is this far right come from, you know, we have a more multicultural liberal society than we've ever had in many ways. And along with social media, economic stagnation, it has provoked a counter reaction which is like unpleasant and scary. I think you have to recognize both things. I do and I also think that this is one of the things that you have to reckon with which is very difficult is that I think that immigration has been blamed for all of that loss of progression and prosperity and the betterment of people's lives. >> What that doesn't necessarily change is that you've continued to have immigration in a context of economic hardship which is ultimately to the benefit of the far right. And so for me obviously the kind of change that I want to see is the meaningful economic change which uplifts everybody's conditions but I think that there is some sort of dodging or illision that's done where they go well this is the real problem which sort of neglects the ongoing impact of what happens when you combine immigration in a context of economic hardship >> because that was the that was also the new labor thing right which is you had economic growth you had high levels of immigration you didn't have social media and the whole thing kind of you I just kept kept moving. We keep that going. >> Yes and no. But >> there was backlash, but >> it certainly wasn't at um crisis levels that we see now. >> Yeah. Um let's talk a bit about the French left and I suppose the French elections coming up because I [snorts] mean this I I've seen some polls and maybe think the French left is in a difficult situation, an unenviable one. Um because in the presidential elections next year, Le Pen is pretty much sure to come first in the first round, but it's up in the air who she will face in the second round. So this is first round polling. So, Le Pen comes out on 32%. Um, Edoir Phipe um and Melanchon compete for second place. So, Melanchon is obviously the candidate of the left. Edoar Philipe is the candidate of the center. He served as prime minister for three years under Mcron. Um, now obviously the left will be campaigning for Melanch. Um, that's also an outcome though that Le Pen might prefer. So this is a poll, obviously just one poll, but in a hypothetical head-to-head, and a recent poll puts Phipe only four points behind Le Pen. So Le Pen wins in all of these situations, but it's very close when it's against Phipe, who's the centrist candidate. Um, against Melon, Le Pen would be on 66% and Melon on 34%. Now that's, as I say, that's just one poll. This is not to say, you know, I I suppose we'll get some French leftists on and talk about this because this is genuinely interesting. How do you do in a situation where you've got the candidate who you clearly think is the best for France and sort of would have the economic policies that offer the real kind of change that Isabella Bab was talking about in that interview but where I mean Le Pen is clearly hoping that Melanstein is number two instead of Edward Philly one would assume >> I don't know what >> so I did a little bit of research before this because I didn't want to come in here and just what do the vibes say? Yeah. So, I tried to have a look at um what level of uh sort of volatility do you see um as you get closer to the first round um of the French presidential election and then you're into the second round. And of a sample of four presidential elections, which admittedly is not a very big sample, what it kind of showed is that you can have very big leads which can narrow quite dramatically. Where that tends to happen, however, is where you've got an incumbent. >> So you've got a situation where if it was Melanchon versus Le Pen, neither one of them are political unknowns. Both of them have run for the presidency multiple times. Le Pen's been in the second round multiple times. Um, and it's also, you know, not the case that either one of them is sort of seen, I think, as a establishment figure, but they're both more known. Um, so I don't think you you can sort of say, all right, well, you're nailed on for that sort of um, you know, massive narrowing of the gap because there's an incumbent. Um, this is sort of uncharted territory. So it actually it might not narrow that much. What's interesting to me about the sort of internal um effect of LFI Leaf France and music at the moment is that someone who I know went to their sort of big summer conference and they're talking very seriously both in terms of membership and the deputies who are sort of their equivalent of MPs talking very seriously about government right they're talking really seriously about a capital flight they're talking really seriously about you know bond markets they're talking really seriously about what the approach to China is going to be. Now, you can read that two ways. You can read that in one way, which is we're overdetermining from what the polling looks like more than a year out. Um, and the people who are in the know don't really think that matters. They think there's going to be a lot more movement. The other way in which you could read that is that it could be their equivalent of corbinism in 2019 where they're thinking about everything other than how to fight the next election that's in front of them. >> Yeah. I mean I mean obviously it's a while to these elections. We'll be talking about this loads. Um and I think in the first round sort of those head-to-head polls will obviously clearly be sort of a massive deal as they always are in the primaries in the United States. So we'll come back to that.