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Expert: Why War In Yemen Is INEVITABLE – Almost

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The video discusses the escalating conflict in Yemen, warning that a third major war front is becoming increasingly inevitable on the Arabian Peninsula alongside existing conflicts involving Israel and Western powers. The situation has deteriorated rapidly following Saudi Arabian air strikes on an airport in Sana'a in July, which blocked an Iranian airliner from landing in Houthi-controlled territory. In response, the Houthi rebel group launched missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia's airports and oil facilities, seizing significant new territory along Yemen's west coast to control the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This move has allowed the Houthis to impose a blockade on Saudi shipping, effectively cutting off their oil exports from the Red Sea while Iran simultaneously tightens its grip on the Strait of Hormuz, creating a dangerous geopolitical squeeze that threatens global energy supplies and economic stability. The transcript highlights the deep historical roots of this crisis, noting that the war began in 2015 when a Saudi-led coalition, backed by the United States and the United Kingdom, intervened to support the internationally recognized Yemeni government against the Houthis. Over seven years, this conflict resulted in a catastrophic humanitarian disaster with hundreds of thousands of deaths, widespread displacement, and severe famine, largely due to collective punishment tactics such as starvation and indiscriminate bombing. The speaker argues that Western powers, particularly Britain and the US, have maintained their involvement through arms sales and logistical support despite the lack of accountability for war crimes, driven by a desire to uphold global order and protect strategic choke points rather than the welfare of the Yemeni population. Current geopolitical pressures are pushing major powers toward renewed direct military engagement, as Saudi Arabia seeks assistance from allies like the UK under Prime Minister Keir Starmer to reverse Houthi gains. The speaker critiques this approach, suggesting that further intervention would only prolong a futile conflict and exacerbate the humanitarian crisis, while also damaging the political standing of Western leaders who are attempting to build bridges with progressive voters. Although the US and UK have thus far avoided overt involvement in these new hostilities, the speaker warns that the logic of alliance credibility and strategic necessity will likely compel them to join the fight, potentially leading to another devastating war where the interests of superpowers override the desperate need for peace among the Yemeni people. The discussion concludes by examining the motivations behind Western military spending and interventionism, arguing that terms like "defense" often mask imperialistic agendas aimed at maintaining a specific global order rather than protecting national security. The speaker emphasizes that Britain's military capacity is deeply integrated into a larger American-led system involving allies like Saudi Arabia and Israel, which frequently engages in actions such as genocide and the use of starvation as a weapon of war. Ultimately, the video posits that without a fundamental shift away from these imperial interests and a genuine commitment to reparations and reconstruction, the region faces an unavoidable return to large-scale warfare that will once again leave the most vulnerable populations to suffer the consequences of decisions made in distant capitals.
Read the full video transcript
In the Arabian Peninsula, where two major wars are being fought by Western powers and their out of control proxy Israel, a third front looks increasingly likely to be opening up. Fears are rising that war in Yemen is returning with the rebel group Ansar Allah, also known as the Houthis, and their enemy Saudi Arabia, exchanging fire across the two countries borders and also in the vital Red Sea passage on Yemen's southwestern tip. The recent hostilities appear to have been triggered by Saudi Arabian air strikes on the airport in Yemen's capital Sana in July, preventing an Iranian airliner from landing in the Houthrolled city. At the time, the western recognized Yemeni government, which controls Yemen's airspace with the support of Saudi Arabia, claimed responsibility for the attack. And two US officials told Axios that Donald Trump gave Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman of Saudi Arabia his support for that military action. The Houthi struck back, immediately attacking Saudi Arabia's AB airport with missiles and drones. Since then, tensions have only risen further. Last weekend, the Houthi seized a swave of new territory running south along Yemen's west coast, essentially taking control of the Babal Mandeb Strait, a narrow passage, allowing transit of vessels from the Red Sea into the Indian Ocean. Houthi officials say that Saudi Arabia carried out 300 strikes in the course of a week in response to their seizure of further territory. This was their spokesperson Muhammad Albi speaking to Sky News last week. >> Government is actually seeking a a deescalation in all internal fronts. The target of escalation is actually the Saudis and what we are seeking from the Saudis is to end the blockade and to end the the aggression against Yemenes. So we say that that the ball is in the Saudis playfield. So it is their decision to stop this war. Actually stopping the war is a is a common uh win. It's it's a win-win situation. Uh the the Saudis have a lot more to lose than what Yemen has left to lose. And Yemen has already gained big military capacity. So, so ending this this operation, this military action is all in in Saudi's hand. Uh, all that we have done is uh is put the equation of a blockade for a blockade, an aggression for an aggression. The Saudis are the ones who started this war against Yemen. They started it 12 years ago with the with the fatal operation that started in 20 2015. But to start this uh in this moment and I know you're referencing uh the attack on the runway uh back uh when a uh plane full of Houthies was coming back uh from the Iranian Supreme Leader's funeral and and you say that this is in response to that. However, your critics would say that you're actually trying to secure uh the control over the Red Sea as the Iranians continue to tighten their grip on the Strait of Hormuz. So, this opening of a of a new front, a new theater is part of that. We don't need to actually overlook the Red Sea of Babel Mandep to to impose a blockade against Saudi ships. Thanks to our advancing military abilities, whether air abilities or sea abilities, we are able to impose a blockade whether we control Babel Mandep or we do not. >> This weekend, the Houthies retaliated again. On Saturday, thick plumes of smoke were seen rising from the location of the airport in Saudi Arabia's capital, Riyad, after the Saudi government had issued red alerts to inhabitants of the city, warning of possible attacks. The Houthis have since claimed responsibility for the strike, saying that a large number of ballistic and cruise missiles and drones had been used to attack sensitive sites in Riyad and Aramo State Oil and Gas Company facilities in Gamboo along the coast. So far, countries like the US and the UK have stayed out of the hostilities, at least overtly. The New York Times has reported that US President Donald Trump has decided to stay out of the joint strikes on the Houthis, at least for now. And British Prime Minister Andy Bernham is said to be considering bolstering Saudi Arabia's forces as they try to push the Houthis back, but he hasn't done anything yet. In a recent article for Zateo, assistant professor of international relations at the University of Sussex, David Wearing has explained why this is a bad idea getting involved and that Burnham should go further against Saudi pressure. He's argued that Britain must end its role in Yemen's brutal war, but also that it should pay reparations for its role in the last one. That was, of course, the humanitarian disaster that dragged on from 2014 all the way into 2022, during which time a UK and US backed coalition of Gulf States and other countries relentlessly assaulted Yemen. Over that period, some 377,000 people were killed in the country, around 150,000 of them by direct violence. Others died from disease and starvation including at least 85,000 children according to save the children and 5 million people at least were displaced on Britain's involvement in what the UN called the worst humanitarian crisis in the world at that time writes this many of the Saudi coalition's air raids were conducted with British-built aircraft and bombs at the start of the war then foreign secretary Philip Hammond declared that the UK would support the Saudi military in every practical way short of engaging in combat including the resupply of spare parts and ammunition. The British state and its arms industry, sorry, the British state and its arms industry lived up to this promise. More than 6,000 government and contractor personnel worked throughout the war to support and maintain the Saudi Air Force, enabling it to continue operating, as one BAE Systems contractor disclosed, the fighter jets in question would have been rapidly grounded without the maintenance provided by Britain. Today, BAE Systems has around 7,000 employees in Saudi Arabia. Despite there having been no meaningful accountability for Saudi atrocities in the 2015 to 2022 conflict, the British government appro approved arms exports worth 464.8 million to Riyad in the first quarter of this year, most of which is likely accounted for by the very air-to-surface missiles used in that early conflict. In approving the transfer of these arms, the Kisama administration showed a striking lack of concern for their past and possible future use by the Saudi regime. Indeed, the de facto impunity compared by this continuation of arm supplies only increases the likelihood of further war crimes as the conflict resumes. We wearing and his colleagues have also worked out how the UK could go further, not only by refusing to fan the current hostilities, but by helping to reconstruct Yemen. He writes this, "According to our estimates, a windfall tax on profits made by two leading British arms companies, BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce, from weapons they sold to the Saudis for likely use in Yemen between 2015 and 2022 could raise up to3.9 billion pounds. The British state could match this sum by restoring the UK aid budget to 0.7% of gross national income and drawing its portion of the reparation payments from these funds. A total reparations payment of 7.8 8 billion pounds targeted at urgent humanitarian reconstruction and development needs would go a long way to building a better future for Yemen, especially if it were matched by similar arms export bans and reparations payments by other culpable states, not least of all the United States. David Wearing, assistant professor of international relations at the University of Sussex, joins me now. David, thanks very much for coming in this evening. Um, before we get into the present danger, the the danger that's currently unfolding in the region, can you start by explaining, you know, how this all started? So, you know, a basic primer. Who are the Houthies? Who are what's often called the internationally recognized government of Yemen? And what does any of this have to do with Saudi Arabia? >> So, Yemen is obviously to the south of Saudi Arabia and the Saudis have often seen it as their kind of backyard. Same way as the Americans see Latin America as their backyard. What goes on in uh in Yemen matters a great deal strategically from Saudi. Now, Yemen has always been a kind of a weak state centrally. Lots of competing poles of power. um 2010 2011 your sort of viewers cast their minds back uprisings across the Arab majority world calling for peace calling sorry for democracy end of corruption stuff like that in Yemen some of the biggest protests challenged the then president Ali Abdasal um he was effectively toppled and then you've got this contest for power that happens after that on the one hand you got the Houth who are a kind of um little bit like Hamas I say they're like a political movement with a paramilitary group attached. They're religious fundamentalists. They're also nationalists and anti-imperialists. So kind of right-wing anti-imperialist kind of force. Um you've got them on the one hand and then you've got a whole kind of constellation of anti-Huthy forces. Um some of whom are loyal to the Saudis, some to the United Arab Emirates. The Houthies come down topple the interim government in 2014. the interim post sale government and then the anti- Houthy forces try and prevent them from taking hold of the country and then you've got this war 2014 15 to 2022 when it's the Houthies versus everyone else and it ends with the Houthies controlling um what used to be North Yemen during the cold war and the anti-houthy forces controlling what used to be South Yemen during the cold war. um North Yemen being where the majority of the population live and you got a cold peace from then until now. >> But what [clears throat] I I guess I still don't understand the interest of Saudi Arabia and then this coalition that was backed by the US and the UK. Like what was the what was the purpose of their involvement? Why why were why were they picking one side over over the other? >> Well, the Americans and the British one side over the other. >> Um I mean I guess there's a number of reasons. One might be just a kind of de facto. You support your ally, you know, in this when when your ally um is involved in a conflict in the region. You want to be seen to be supporting your ally. You want to be um sending them the message that you got their back. You want to be sending their enemies the message that you've got their back. The whole credibility thing that superpowers care about. But there's the bigger kind of geostrategic region reason sorry as well which is that Yemen sits next to one of these really important choke points. Over the last sort of six seven months we've all had this big like demonstration of the importance of um certain choke points in in global sort of um global sea routes uh with regards to the Gulf and and the um straightforward moves where so much of the world's oil flows. you choke off that sort of um choke off that straight and you could do enormous damage to the world economy. Now, if you think about the strategic leverage that Iran's got by being able to close a straight form, what would it be like if an Iranian ally an anti-British, anti-western, anti-Saudi group, the Houthis were able to control or threaten to control the kind of twin of the straight of Hormuz, which is the Babel Mandeb straight at the bottom of the Red Sea. >> [snorts] >> What the hoofers have done in the last few weeks is realize the fears of the Saudis but also the west as well. The pro Iranian group um or just an anti-western group taking control of that stray and using that strategic leverage against the west and against its allies that it was so so back in sort of 2015 to 2022 they were thinking about a scenario like this and trying to prevent it I guess. >> Right. I see. And so and that and that's why they were prepared to be engaged in a in a war for seven years against one of the poorest >> well the poorest state in the Gulf right just to maintain that strategic advantage over that straight >> I mean okay so as you point out there like none none of this is is happening in a vacuum right so you mentioned >> straight of hammurs and the global oil supply we as you said we saw the Houthis um uh really disrupt international cargo travel in in you know late 2023 early 2024 for um how does this new front here just you know taking the west coast of um of of of of Yemen how does that impact that and and the risk of the US and the UK getting involved once again? >> Um yeah, I mean it's difficult to see how this doesn't turn back into at least something like the 2015 2022 conflict which as you indicated was absolutely devastating. It was the scene of the world's worst humanitarian crisis and the Saudis in that conflict were really like using collective punishment against a population in Houthi controlled areas. The the rationale seems to me looking at the patterns of violence. It seems to me to be if we pulverize the civilian infrastructure, if we make the population suffer, they will turn against the Houthies. That seems to me to be the calculation, classic collective punishment strategy, not dissimilar to what the Israelis were doing in Gaza, right? um that that was devastating. It didn't work, but that was that was the that was the way it planned. It didn't work like in terms of, you know, military objectives of defeating the Hoofies, but it was devastating. It's difficult to be to see how we don't go back to something like that because what the Houthies have done is make the Saudis look ridiculous. >> The Saudis effectively started this latest round of fighting. They launched an air strike against the major airport in Huihill territory because an Iranian flight was landing there. They didn't want the Iranians to land. The Houthies have used this as an opportunity because they saw that the pro-Saudi anti-houthy forces in Yemen were weak. They used this strike by the Saudis as a pretext and have grabbed this huge swave of territory on the western coast of um of Yemen. They've gone right down to the Babel Mandeb. They've taken the strategic islands in the straight um and now they look like they could be heading westwards as well and seizing even more territory. And they're hitting Riad. the heck of the Saudi capital. Um, and when you feed that into look at that in the context of the wider war with Iran and how, you know, the Iranians are squeezing the global economy and squeezing the sort of pro- US alliance and in the region by shutting down the straightforward moves and now the Houthies are squeezing on the other side, the Saudis Saudis were trying to get their oil exports out of the Red Sea because they couldn't get them out the Gulf. Now that's shut off as well. From the Saudi point of view, it's go back to what I said about credibility. You can't have your opponents like achieve these wins over you and just let it slide. >> So, you almost have to I'm not trying to justify it, but I'm I'm trying to describe the mentality realist about it. >> Well, that's the mentality, you know, you have to strike back. >> Um, and the Saudis know, by the same token, the Saudis know, we we fought a seven-year war and we couldn't dislodge them. So now they're going to Trump, they're going to Burnham and saying, "Look, can you join with us and help us drive them back?" And obviously the Americans and the British know the same thing as the Saudis did, which is, you know, we've been bombing these guys for a decade. >> The previous central government was fighting them for the previous decade. No one's been able to beat them. So it's a you find yourself in this kind of checkmate scenario strategically speaking like these guys are hard to beat but at the same time what they're doing can't be allowed to pass especially with regard to the impact of all this on the world economy. So it's difficult to see how it would play out other than more protracted futile conflict and the people of Yemen being the ones who suffer. I wanted to ask about the the the Houthies interests because they must have interests themselves, national interest as you said they're right-wing nationalist um you know you know political movement in some sense. >> Um >> like in the west they're always described as Iranbacked militias, Iranbacked rebels or in sometimes just Iran proxies like they're just doing it for Iran. Um, is there no sense in which their interests can be appealed to in order to negotiate something independently of of this kind of network of events that's happening in the in the in the region at the moment? >> Yeah, definitely. I mean, they're an independent actor. >> Yeah. >> Um, in the same way as, you know, like Hamas and Hezbollah get described as uranium proxies, but they're all independent actors within a wider alliance. I mean, you might as well call Britain a US proxy. Like Britain has got a relationship with the Americans which is very unequal, but the Britain aren't literally US puppet. Um yeah, like the the hoops have their own interest. They're a real group in their own right, you know, with their own ideology. They make their own choices, sometimes choices which the Iranians don't like. Um, and I think what they're looking for here is kind of recognition from the international community for their kind of proto state that they're developing. Um, they want Saudi restrictions on their sort of um, [snorts] you know, there's been a longterm Saudi blockade, air and sea blockade on that part of of Yemen. They want that completely lifted. Not just alleviated, but lifted. um they want lots of things that people don't want to give them, but they do want certain things. They do have certain material interests. Um it's hard to see how there isn't an a [gasps] a diplomatic solution to all of this at some point. But unfortunately, you get all these, you know, interests of credibility, strategic interest, imperial interests, >> precedent. >> Yeah. Which which overrides the sort of interest that, you know, you and I might just want to see peace. People in Yemen know that want to see peace, but the big powers have their own interests and that's trampling over the interest of the Yemeni people unfortunately. >> Yeah. But the UK and the US haven't yet got involved. What do you think's holding them back at at this point? I mean, I know you said as a check made, they sort of know from history that it's, you know, probably not going to work, but that doesn't that doesn't stop them before. Um >> um is it threat greater threat to oil for example, blowing up of Saudi pipeline? I think it's the sense of futility >> like I mean you have to remember like not only have the Saudis fought this failed war against the Hoofies but the British and the Americans have intervened directly against the Houthies as well. So when the Houthies intervene in the kind of regional war around the Gaza genocide, they try and join in or do join in and um try and restrict Israeli shipping to put the squeeze on Israel to raise the cost of is Israel's actions to Israel. Then the British and the Americans come in and try and defeat the Hoofies, stop the Hoofies from doing that, which is effectively intervening on the side of Israel. And you might remember the parliamentary debates where Rashi Sunna was then prime minister making out that it was not just incorrect but almost offensive to suggest that any of this had anything to do with Gaza. Certainly did. They just didn't want it to be seen that way. But anyway, I mean point being British Americans intervened. Then the Americans had another stab at it for about 6 weeks last spring. None of this worked. Um, and you think about how much it's cost the Americans to fight this stupid war against Iran. How much, you know, the loss of munitions, the damage to bases, all of it to achieve literally like less than nothing. Can they afford to open another front? Probably not, you know. And one thing, >> not with the midterms coming up. >> Exactly. Exactly. Like oil's already at $100 a barrel. this goes, you know, even hotter than it already is, six weeks time, Americans are paying $7 at the the gas pump and um and the GOP were obliterated. So they're thinking about stuff like that and and just thinking about Burnham. Burnham will be deeply concerned that if Britain is involved in a Saudi war against the Houthies, it's anything like the 2014 1522 war and he's implicated in that. Um that undoes a lot of the work that he's been trying to do to reach out to the left. I mean it seems to me that Burnham understands that Labour's big problem is that it lost voters to its left and it has to win them back. And if you look at the moves Bernham's made since he came in, a lot of it's about building bridges with progressive voters. >> Um, if he finds himself embroiled in this, it undoes all of that. All the stuff with regard to the sanctions on settlement activities that they made such a song and dance about a couple of weeks ago, it undo all of that. So, there's lots of reasons for them to hesitate before getting involved. But it sounded like from what you were saying before, a kind of sort of natural law of like um alliance and bravado is going to eventually pull them pull them into this, right? Because it can't be allowed to stand that the Houthies make headway here. Like there's a well I was going to just say put this in the context of like military spending that's coming out. a big debate about um you know defense budget whether it should should increase um you know what does the case in in Yemen of the past tell us um you know about those very current arguments about about increasing our defense spending and remilitarization I it's always called defense but it doesn't necessarily feel like defenses in in the homeland right it's sort of out there >> yeah no people are calling for an increase in military spending I think that's really important to insist on that this term defense Ministry of Defense, defense spending. The I mean this is literally Orwellian language. If you look back at the wars Britain's fought over over a long long period, it's fought some wars of defense, some legitimate wars, but many many many wars which have been about upholding a certain global order, you know, in the interest of of Britain and in the interests of in British state power, in the interests of US agemony, which Britain committed back in the 40s to support as the replacement for the British Empire. wars that have been fought, you know, for for those reasons. Wars, you know, Iraq and stuff like that. This is what this increase in spending is is about. It's not just about there's a reality of Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. I personally think it's it's right that people should support the Ukrainians in in self-defense against Russia. Um, I think it's right that Britain should have alliances, and I think, you know, Britain, like any country, is always going to have some self-defense needs. But, you know, hawkish people, people who are pro increases in defense spending will always lecture people like us about the hard realities of the world. Well, one of the hard realities of the world is Britain doesn't just take defensive action and Britain's military is not just defensive. And the reality of British militarism is not only not just defensive and it's not just like imperialistic, it's also specifically not just a British military capacity. like Britain's military is a part of a much bigger military system run by the Americans with different nodes in different parts of the world. So NATO in Western Europe, but also the Israelis and Saudis in the UAE. Um, tied together with with arm sales and the interoperability that comes with that with like the relationships that Britain has with countries like Saudi where you not don't just sell them the the planes, you provide them on an ongoing basis with the training, the munitions, the spare parts and all of that. The whole thing links together and Britain jacks up military spending to 3.5% of GDP. It is feeding that larger beast. And that larger beast doesn't just do nice things like support Ukraine when it gets attacked. Most of the time that beast does pretty horrible things like committing a genocide in Gaza, committing actions which are not dissimilar to what Israel did. You know what the Saudis did in Yemen is not dissimilar. use of starvation as a war tactic, that sort of thing. [snorts] So when we think about this question of Britain's legitimate defense needs, which it has, um, and the threat from Russia, which is real, we have to also think about all these larger issues that are part of British militarism and try and unpack that rather than just, as Hawks wants to do, pretend that that other stuff doesn't exist and Britain is this kind of, >> you know, pure and noble force for good in the world, which it clearly isn't. It's being stunned. David, thanks very much for joining us this evening. >> No problem.