EuroPython 2026 - Security and Ethics in the Age of Generative AI Panel
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The EuroPython 2026 panel on Generative AI explored how artificial intelligence is reshaping software security, ethics, and community dynamics within the Python ecosystem. Experts highlighted that while Large Language Models offer flexibility to detect complex issues like business logic flaws and authorization bypasses where traditional static analysis tools fail, they also introduce new risks such as hallucinations. These errors can lead to "slop squatting," where attackers register non-existent package names suggested by AI to distribute malware, exploiting the trust users place in automated recommendations. Consequently, the consensus is that human critical review remains essential; developers must verify outputs using official sources and tools like `pip audit` rather than blindly installing packages or trusting unvetted suggestions from social media platforms.
The discussion further examined recent incidents, such as the compromise of the popular `lightllm` package via a third-party scanning tool vulnerability, which resulted in hundreds of thousands of malicious installs before detection. This event underscored the dangers of using "latest" tags without pinning dependencies and led to recommendations for implementing dependency cooldowns to allow time for community review and patching. To mitigate these threats, PyPI has evolved from an all-or-nothing approach to a system that quarantines suspicious packages based on heuristics and consensus among multiple reporters before final action is taken. While Generative AI lowers barriers for attackers by enabling rapid cloning of websites, it also exposes novice threat actors to mistakes; however, experienced groups continue to gain advantages as both offensive and defensive tooling advance rapidly together.
Beyond technical defenses, the panel addressed the sustainability of open-source maintenance in an era of increased automation and attacks. Although LLMs can democratize security research by helping more people find vulnerabilities, there are concerns about relying on autonomous agents that might perform unsafe actions without proper constraints. Initiatives like GitHub's Secure Open Source Fund aim to support maintainers with funding and training, fostering resilient communities where responsibility is shared intentionally rather than resting solely on single volunteers. The speakers emphasized focusing on current known problems over speculative future scenarios, advocating for strong human connections within communities to build collective resilience against overwhelm and ensuring that trust boundaries regarding credentials are maintained through practical tools like password managers.
In conclusion, the panelists advised engaging in direct conversations with project maintainers when considering ethical contributions of AI-generated code rather than seeking binary answers on policy acceptance. For those bridging the gap between AI engineering and cybersecurity, such as securing AI systems themselves, they recommended applying threat modeling principles to new contexts and utilizing iterative prompt testing techniques similar to human penetration testing. By combining these technical strategies with a commitment to community collaboration and shared responsibility, developers can better navigate the evolving landscape where Generative AI both enhances detection capabilities and introduces novel supply chain risks that require vigilant, informed management.
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I am extremely excited about this topic
and this panel and this all around for
these amazing and talented people. I
will not going to invest a lot of time
to introduce them because I think that
they are going to do it much better than
me. Then I would love to start with
everyone talking about who you are, what
do you work on and why do you think that
security and ethics is important please?
Um Julian can you start
>> from France where I'm software engineer
soon in my career I realized that
testers automated testers are very
important for software quality and that
software quality is very important to
have good products and so I iterated on
that and started to learn about
operations and product and now cyber
security. So, I'm working for a cyber
security uh company focused on fishing,
fishing detection, fishing prevention,
fishing technon.
>> Wow, sounds amazing. Please, Mike.
>> Hi. Uh I'm Mike Feedler. Uh I live in
New York City in the United States. Uh I
work for the Python Software Foundation
on pipi.org.
Uh doing security and safety uh for the
past three years. uh I think that in
today's landscape and historical
landscape but more so today uh having an
ethical responsibility towards each
other and towards humanity uh is taking
uh a backseat to some other concerns. So
we have to kind of bring it to the
forefront whenever we can uh to talk
about how we take care of each other in
this landscape.
>> My name is Sylvia. I'm a security
researcher at GitHub security lab. I
work with finding vulnerabilities in
open source software. So the topic of
security and uh open especially open
source security is uh very close to what
I work with. Um currently I'm also doing
a rotation with another software
development team uh working on the
private vulnerability reporting feature.
Uh and this is the feature on the
github.com platform uh that allows
security researchers to report
vulnerabilities privately uh to the
maintainers.
And what we've uh experienced recently
is uh this that is being uh used a lot
more in the last few months. Uh and with
and so uh this is uh also yeah very
relevant to the panel.
So my name is Visha and I'm from Kov
from here. Uh now I'm working as a
Python developer but my background is in
philosophy and social sciences. uh
during my academic years I was more
mostly interested in the human agency
and also cognitive science. Uh there was
also a notion of cyborgs this very
interesting way of uh approaching
certain uh questions about humanity and
about the boundaries of it. Uh so I feel
that may you know LM somehow are
allowing us to extend our mental
capabilities. uh so we are like there
are similar uh let's say uh aspects to
the cyborg notion uh and about ethics I
think that uh for me ethics is not so
much about obeying the rules and finding
the best uh sets of you uh rules to to
to comply with but it is about like
practical application of what you're
thinking about what the self is what
what we are uh so in this way uh also uh
like the geni like make me focus on on
us. What does it mean for us as a
humans?
>> Hello everyone. I'm Seth Larson. I also
work at the Python Software Foundation
along with Mike. I focus more on the
security of the Python programming
language, but then also packaging tools.
So everything that's outside of Pippi
that you end up installing Python
packages with. I focus there. And I feel
like security to me is about like
infrastructure making it so that it's
easy for people to do the things that
they want to do with Python without
having to be an expert in every single
thing. Right? Everyone in this room has
a different set of expertise. And so
like one of my goals and one of the
goals that I try to inspire others to
when it comes to security is thinking
about doing it for other people so they
don't have to learn everything about
security and they're able to focus more
on the domain that they're interested in
or that they're an expert in. Amazing.
Thank you so much. And as you will see
why I'm so excited uh with all this
diversity of backgrounds and let's start
with the same the the first part of the
panel that I want to have a more general
overview and I would love to start with
Sylvia maybe asking could you tell us a
bit what is your research about in
GitHub?
>> Yes. So um
when I do my research at u GitHub in
open source security usually what I do
is uh first of all I read the code
manually. I use static code analysis for
finding vulnerabilities um and maybe
some dynamic analysis run the code with
the debugger and uh the way that AI has
changed the picture a bit um is that it
fills some gaps that uh we have had for
many years in automated vulnerability
detection. Uh so if we take web
vulnerabilities as an example um
uh we have a lot of tools for example
for static code analysis that will find
vulnerabilities like injection type
vulnerabilities like SQL injection,
command injection, cross-ite scripting
uh but the way these tools work is that
they have these rigid rules and as long
and uh they would miss a lot of types of
vulnerabilities. uh so for example
authorization types vulnerabilities or
uh authentication bypasses business
logic vulnerabilities
and
um
and here where AI is well it's more
flexible in a way that it can read
understand the code uh and help us find
vulnerabilities in that way and so AI in
that way became another tool in my
toolbox in finding some also some other
types of vulnerabilities um yeah so
that's That's how I have been using AI
in my security research work.
>> Yeah. And yeah,
there was a small thing in here. Oh,
good. Okay. Yeah. As um as Silia was
sping, generative AI is having an
impact. Uh and Julian, what do how do
you think in which areas generative AI
have given defenders uh some kind of
advantage? For example, something that
the platform does today that two years
ago or six years ago, maybe even better
the comparison you can do down. It's
very difficult to detect what is fishing
and what is not fishing because most
fishing websites are made to look like
the actual website and some companies
publish websites that look like them the
original one but not very the same logo
or there are differences. So we have
really good actors that are acting like
like fishing ones and fishing ones that
are acting like good actors. So it's
very difficult to tell them apart and we
try to use AI and generative AI to do
that but that's not that much efficient.
We don't have much much gain on that.
Mhm.
>> But for example, we are using some NLP
techniques to do analysis of content and
for example on that I know is very much
helping us because it's very much NLP on
steroids you can very easily analyze
what is the intent what what is the
urgency of the messages that you receive
>> and so to determine if it if it may be a
fishing attempt so it's one more sing
but not a really good answer I is not
solving that for us. Oh, super very
interesting topic. Uh I have been
working a lot on NLP and I didn't
thought that this could have been a big
advantage in this in this area in this
way. Oh, very interesting. Uh someone
else has some other uh point of view or
thoughts on how your life changed in the
last uh years with generative AI in
general. Maybe
>> I I'll I'll try this. Uh so what what
what what Sylvia mentioned and what
Julia mentioned are very much uh taking
these tools and practices that we have
historically done manually and now we
are kind of accelerating our our
capabilities to use them, right? Uh lots
of people have uh described generative
AI models as a very eager uh unrelenting
intern, right? Somebody who has infinite
coffee and energy and is not going to
stop. they are probably going to get a
lot of things wrong. But if you kind of
teach your intern the same way you would
teach an AI LLM, you can get actionable
and good results. But you as the human
discerning have to have to apply that
critical eye to their output so that way
you are not kind of led down the path by
your intern into a dark tunnel that ends
in sadness. So for me, I'd say like
recognizing that reality has just helped
me kind of apply that critical eye.
Okay, the output is the output is do I
trust the output? Would I trust it from
a human? Maybe. Would I trust it from an
intern? Maybe less. So continuing to
kind of apply the like this is helpful.
This will get me further than I was
before. It's an accelerator, but it has
drawbacks. So being candid and talking
about those and and and kind of
recognizing those has helped me kind of
isolate what practices in my day-to-day
I am willing to delegate to an intern
versus which ones I would definitely
not.
>> Yeah, definitely. Super good point. I
will also now talk a bit about um code
generation and I would love to talk from
another perspective. In this case, I'm
going to ask to Maria, what is your take
on how generative AI is doing changing
the human side of coding?
>> So, I think that uh at this point we are
also in an early stage of the option.
So, we all use it but uh the things
haven't settled down yet and we need to
like find our ways of uh
uh like uh inter uh interacting with
this tool. uh I think uh well we there
was a talk like human envelope is tired
so uh
yeah this there is this this thing that
uh genetic AI produce so much output uh
that sometimes it's hard for our brain
to process and it's not only because
it's so sophisticated but also there is
so much of it and we are not used to it
uh and uh it can be intimidated
intimidating and it also can like uh
We may feel reduced to somehow just
accepting it and just letting go and we
are not fully uh we like cannot be fully
focused on what's going on there. So we
are not able to uh uh for example really
engage in well there is this this uh we
could but there's this danger that we
are not engaging in what is there. We
don't know anymore what is there. we
just clicking and accept accept
>> and um
so this taking like the sense of agency
of what we are doing uh so there is a
danger like this uh I think also that
there is a lot of anxieties because uh
you know we may uh like make a joke so
of that or anything like uh like it but
you know there's a spread of losing jobs
uh because of AI uh there is this
thinking that do we still need to uh
learn like manual programming. Is it
something that is really needed any uh
or it's just some kind of uh ancient
art? Uh it makes me think about uh like
uh carpestry and power tools and flatp
pack furniture like everyone now can
create their own furniture. So do we
still need carpenters? Uh and on the
other hand, yes, we do need them, but
they became some kind of um luxury
products. Uh so they are affordable for
a few maybe. So are we going to what
what will we have a similar situation
with with programs? Uh yep. But on the
other hand, I just want to uh like um be
more balanced. Uh we have also other
opportunities. For example, I am
dyslexic and like for me I struggle
every day. I struggle with these little
things of spelling of like putting my
thoughts into coherent uh uh words uh
etc. And LLMs are so brilliant in it. So
in this understanding uh it really helps
me to uh overcome my shortcoming and to
concentrate fully on on what I want to
do. So I don't need to struggle with
this all little bits and yeah I'm
selecting but there are a lot of a lot
of conditions like this others and yeah
so u sounds super interesting thank you
for sharing all of you was super
insightful um I would love uh to also
start another topic and move uh to some
situation that I had uh maybe one year
ago when I was uh using one LLM or some
LLM attempts to brainstorming
and in very specific sub field and
apparently provide me a solution with a
peep install library name
and sounds so good. It was so so so good
that it was like this feels so weird.
I'm going to go to my PIA website. I'm
going to check it if it's right.
Surprise for no one. It was an
hallucination. This library was not
real. There was some names that were
close but was not. And this may bring me
to the next topic and the next question
to Seth. Tell us a bit of a coin concept
that you you did that is probably I'm
gonna pronounce it very bad quing and
how do you see the um the scene about
this and if you expected the growth of
that
>> yeah so slop squatting it's like a port
manto on typo squatting I will say so I
I coined the term slop squatting but
there was a researcher that was doing
research on this for a few years before
I even was interested in this. Uh Joseph
Sprackcklin, so look up his work. Um but
yeah so this phenomenon is basically an
LLM will suggest you a package to use or
maybe I mean packages is the big one but
it will be a hallucination and if it is
a hallucination and you run pip install
whatever the package that they suggested
and an attacker who also has access to
the same LLM as you decides okay well
when I ask these specific questions I
get the LLM to suggest me to install
this incorrect name I'm going to go and
register this name and then when people
install it thinking that it's a real
package, they will get malware on their
system. Right? So, this is the the
attack pattern. And I feel like it is
still a thing that exists. It's LLM are
are not perfect. They will still
hallucinate. They have gotten better. I
do think that LLM companies that are
doing these sorts of trainings are aware
of this issue and probably have tried to
train it out. I do not know how
successful they are. Uh, but it is
definitely something to do just in
general when you're using the output of
LLMs is to if they're instructing you to
take an action, especially one that
crosses a security boundary like that
where you're choosing to install
something, you should do your due
diligence. Make sure that the thing that
is there is actually used. It's not
malware. We try our best to take malware
down within a matter of days or less,
but obviously there's always an
opportunity for there to be overlap. So,
please be diligent when you're using LLM
outputs.
>> Yeah. Yeah. And related to that, I
wanted to follow continue with you and
Mike because I would love to know has
Pipi considered proactly reserving
packages names that uh the LLMs commonly
uh hallucinate or could hallucinate
before attacker resist them.
So uh I I I find this topic so
fascinating because Python packaging is
very unique uh compared to many other
ecosystems. Uh and and some of these are
strengths. Some they're all trade-offs,
but some of you might consider them bad
or behaviors, but there's reasons for
all of them. We might not know them
today, but they're there's useful there.
So one of the reasons that that I have
found that hallucinations like these
happen is because a Python distribution
file does not have to match the import
name that the file is using. So if you
import pil you've probably installed
pillow. Uh and those two names are
different and LLMs don't necessarily
have that context of what that
difference is and what the import name
is versus the installation name is.
They'll also use uh console scripts or
entry points to again see that that is a
name that people have published in
documentation to say these are commands
you should run but that's also not the
package name. So LLMs are just as
fallible as humans when it comes to
context but they are far more confident
in their representation of you should do
this.
>> Yeah. So there's reasons for all of
these divergences uh and and they exist
and trying to kind of go after every
single possible one is a is a I'll say
it it's a fool's errand right because
there's no way we're going to catch them
all. So there's the the the point of
like well if we try to put effort in
that direction are we giving end users a
misplaced sense of security that we have
done that for you and you don't again to
Seth's point you don't have to do your
own due diligence.
>> Something everyone needs to remember is
you are downloading random software off
the internet from people you don't know.
>> That's terrifying. We should all be
scared of that all of the time and we
should do our due diligence and do
whatever processes and practices we we
should to vet what it is we are
downloading and consuming and publishing
out and betting our our careers on. It's
dangerous out there because it's free
and anyone can do anything. So trying to
proactively find every single potential
hallucination. We also have the same
problem with typo squatting. So we we
have decided actively to not try to ban
that because package names or project
names are sequences of characters and
and that's all they are. They are a
semantic symbol. Just because you have a
semantic symbol that is an acronym of
the PhD research you are doing this year
and someone else had one that is one
character off doesn't guarantee you
ownership of that name or that symbol.
It's just a sequence of characters. So,
uh, the the guidance I'd say is use copy
paste very carefully. Check your
characters that somebody hasn't hidden
some Unicode in between those characters
because that's another way to get at
people with non-printable spaces, but
packages won't accept them anymore. Yay.
Um,
>> but uh but but it's like you you you
have to be very very uh careful and
there are tools out there and methods
out there that will help you be careful
such as pip audit, such as copying names
off of Pippi as opposed to uh what
someone posted in a discord in response
to a help because that is another kind
of security vector or what your LLM is
out is producing. uh so many people are
basically not adopting the like I want
to be interested in the ingredients
where my my food has come from and this
is the same problem like you should be
you should be curious where your
software comes from
>> completely agree and thank you for all
the advices I think that all of us we
should follow them uh as you are already
with with the work can we discuss about
what happened with the light LLM uh
topic uh uh and also provide some
context to the audience and some
overview and how was solved and what
could have been done better or any
insights that you can provide us.
>> Sure. So for for context, light lm is a
very popular uh Python package on
pipi.org. Lots of people use it in order
to interact with their different LLM
products. And as you may have heard, AI
is kind of popular. Uh, and lots of
people write lots of software and
there's a lot of interest and lightm
gets millions of downloads every single
minute or day and it's it like like lots
of software, right? It it kind of hits a
popularity and hockey stick growth and
everybody loves it.
Attackers love going after big popular
things because they use that as a
multiplication effort. If I can get into
something big, now everyone has it. If I
have to go after Julian's company or
Maria's uh company, then it's harder.
But if I go after your supply chain, I
can get you easier, right? So, they're
looking for weaknesses. And with Light
LLM, they found a weakness in their in
not in their build or or they were using
a tool, a security scanning tool that
was intended to be download and scan
your your project for security problems.
And this security tool had a security
vulnerability and they had a malicious
project published. So anyone who was
using the latest version of that
security tool is now subject to all of
the supply chain attacks. Like they
weren't doing anything wrong per se
other than letting the latest come into
their universe without any vetting,
auditing or or a human in the loop
making a decision. Uh some of us may use
GitHub actions or use dependabot or
renovate bot to suggest updates and some
of us are like oh that's so noisy why
don't I just take latest is why you
don't take latest uh latest will give
you something that you did not
necessarily know about approve and it it
happened in minutes lightm was then
exposed by this other tool their
credentials were were kind of
exfiltrated to the attackers and a new
version of lightlm was published the uh
to Pippi that contains malicious
behavior that now millions of people or
hundreds of thousands of people were
were kind of systems not necessarily
people systems were consuming this in a
very rapid rate. Uh, and it's it's scary
how fast these things happen now, right?
We talk about acceleration in the age of
AI. And it's true like uh Seth and I did
a a blog post analyzing the traffic
pattern specifically around light LLM
and we can guesstimate about 120,000
installs in the time window where these
uh malicious versions were live on
Pippi. Whereas uh modern practices that
we are advising most people to use which
is called either pinning right pin pin
your dependencies don't use latest uh
and then secondarily use dependency
cooldowns so that way you aren't the
first right let's let let a security
team who you know their company their
they love downloading and analyzing
things let them be first don't be the
first right uh and like maybe you're
waiting for a specific patch or behavior
So, keep an eye on that tracker, but
don't use latest. Uh, the the incident
here got reported to Pippi while I was
asleep, right? Like it it happens 24
hours a day, and I'm not awake 24 hours
a day. Uh, uh, all the coffee in the
world won't do it. Red Bull doesn't do
it. Uh, and I'm too old for that. Uh but
the uh the the the part that I kind of
have to remind folks is that like the
the remediation of this happened when I
got up and saw the notices.
>> We I've been working on different
systems to try and automate and and
minimize that time. But there was three
hours of window where this is just
running rampant across the the the world
by anyone and any system that are doing
this and it's propagating that attack.
it's stealing more data and that that
time window is very fast. It happens
very quickly and then companies or or
individuals who have been subject to
this take days to either find out that
they that this happened to them and then
even further to analyze the impact that
it happened to them and their systems
and their companies to try and figure
out how bad has this been. So I I
encourage everybody to like take a page
out of that book and just don't use
latest.
Good. I will take u this uh as a
recommendation even for myself because
sometime we think the latest is the best
right is the better is it's the last
thing is this human feeling of w this
going to be the
>> yeah okay
>> I mean latest is good but it's it's it's
sharp right so if you follow like the
Debian project and their release cycles
they have stable unstable testing right
uh I may have gotten those out of order
but one of those is the sharpest edge
and it's like if you want to opt into
that that's great that's not the default
>> you can still opt into it and you can in
Python
>> and that is currently many tools default
but again maybe that shouldn't be the
case maybe it shouldn't be the default
>> yeah yeah well as we are talking about
trust uh and supply chain maybe Maria
can also give us uh uh her thoughts
about uh people have the possibility to
share code that they don't fully
understand that they don't they don't
fully even write and that is the still
the same kind of trust that is that the
same kind of trust that we have been
building in our open space communities.
What is your thought on that?
>> Uh so uh well first of all this is not
the new phen phenomenon. We have stack
overflow for years
>> so people were still able to do it. Of
course, now it's faster and more and
more and it's multiplied. Uh but uh
yeah, it's still there. Uh and um
we also have to have this this this
notion that we can do this, but should
we? So there's also the sense of it's us
that makes the decision and uh you
cannot really take away this trust uh
because uh even if the code is uh
generated I'm still uh
can take the accountability for it and I
just want to describe free notion of
responsibility which is like uh um you
can talk about so the first one is like
obligation and or duty so it's good for
uh some kind of security or complying to
safety. But uh if you hear about
responsibility in that context then you
probably oh it's heavy a bit dull I
somehow prefer to isade it you know you
you don't feel maybe very good about
this kind of heavy responsibility but
there are also two others uh so the
second one will be something like that I
want intentionally to do right job and
that means that um I'm thinking about
the outcomes both positive and negative
of my code, I'm thinking about the risk
I uh like put into this code and I try
to mitigate it and of course uh it's
only my effort. So I might not be
succeeded but at least I try and I also
am willing to be accountable for it. So
I'm not like evading from no this is my
code this is my decision that I wanted
to contribute that I wanted to share. So
uh I'm ready to take to take you know to
to then to then
yeah be responsible and but there is
also the third uh notion of responsible
responsibility and this is the ability
to response uh so in a way uh the word
the yeah around us asking us a question
this is like kind of method meth
uh
okay like meth methodic ah no I won't
say it today.
So, so yeah, you can say like it's
asking us a question but it's like also
like uh um pushing challenges in front
of us and this is about
ability to respond whether we will
respond to this challenges will we do
something. So this is like the call of
action really like are we ready to to
take the action because maybe we maybe
this is something that is really needed
right now. Yeah, definitely agree with
you. Someone wants to add something to
this more humanistic point of view or
should we jump into other topics more
into attacker defenders discussions?
Should we jump? Okay. Uh then let's
continue with uh thank you so much. It
was amazing this part. Let's also
continue with Julian.
And as I spoil already to you, I add
this as spoiler based on your experience
and okay, which is your um what do you
think that has the biggest advantage
right now? The defender, the attacker as
everyone can have access to this
generative AI and all the knowledge
previously. What is your point of view?
So today many people nearly everyone can
access very good LLMs and produce a lot
of code. But the question remains is it
good code and so that matters both for
attackants or defenders. So as attackers
you want to create fake website and
that's very very easy to do. Now you can
ask an LLM to copy any website and he
will do it apart from the new ones that
may not be very happy about it but you
can force them and any unalign LLM you
can ask whatever you want and they will
provide they are very eager to serve. So
it's very easy to replicate. If you want
to add a backend server that will
receive credentials that are get
excfiltrated, it's very easy. You can
ask them to do that for you. You can ask
them to deploy that for you on cloud
served servers. It's very easy to
automate that. So the the work of
attackers
has been made much easier to start with
LLMs because now like you can do a
website over the weekend for your
association. Now you can do a fishing
website over the weekend for your
criminal activities,
but LLMs are not very good at creating
fishing. Like they're very like most of
the time they're not very good at the
task we ask them. And so when you are
doing fishing or criminal activities,
what you actually want is not just to
fish victims, but to not get caught. And
the problem is there. LM are not very
good at being perfect. And so they will
do mistakes and if you are not good at
illegal activities, you won't spot the
mistakes. Like if you are not good at
Python coding, you won't spot coding
mistakes or anything like that. The
rules are the same for them as for us.
And so we are seeing a lot of people
starting to create fishing websites, but
it's very easy to to catch them because
they are not very good at web security
and they make
rookie mistakes. So on on one part it's
easier for them to do it but it's easier
for us to do it because um before
more experienced people were doing
criminal activities. Now regular people
try to do it and they are not very good
at it. So they have kind of an an
advantage but for experienced groups
that do criminal activities as a regular
basis that is their day-to-day work they
get a pretty good advantage from LLM
because they are they can more quickly
evolve against our detection methods. So
like you and I, we can more easily solve
the Jira ticket and move it to to the
next column and they do the same. So for
more experienced groups their job is a
bit easier but like ours us too we want
to detect their website. We want to
catch them. We want to find proof that
they are doing that they are wrongdoing
and so we are as any other developer we
are helped by LM to go faster on that to
be more efficient to try new things. So
we we are not seeing that much of an
advantage
>> over the previous actors, but the new
actors are not very good and so easier
to catch.
>> Okay, good to know. I am still curious
to know the opinion of Sylvia that
probably she's more into the defender
side, but let's uh hear her opinion.
>> Yeah. So um recently the situation I
feel is so dynamic and every new week
there comes a new AI tool for uh aiding
for example vulnerability detection as
well as uh attacker tools. Uh so in some
way I feel we are uh on somewhat even
ground in the sense that uh there are
both tools for attackers as well as for
defenders. And so for example at GitHub
security lab uh we've developed an AI
agent framework tool for open source
maintainers to find vulnerabilities in
their projects uh which we've been uh
using uh on a lot of uh open source
projects. Um it's basically an AI agent
with some MCP tools and some special
prompting and um what it does it runs in
some loops to verify the vulnerabilities
that is fine. So there are fewer false
positives and so uh the quality of
reports it produces are uh better.
Um but what another topic I wanted to
touch upon here was how much uh of these
vulnerability reports we are producing
um also thanks to those uh due to those
AI tools and uh we can definitely see
this uh trend in the data for example
from the GitHub advisory database. Um so
even if we compare for example to last
year the number of CVE assignments by uh
GitHub CNA uh in the last year GitHub
CNA assigned uh over 2,9 around 2,900
CVE and in this year today when I
checked in the morning so July 15th uh
we've already assigned over 7,400 so
it's over two and a half times more and
we are halfway through the year. So we
are on our way to have five times as
many uh assigned as five times as many
CVs for the whole year of 2026.
Uh as well as uh for the private
vulnerability reporting. So um basically
there are both uh users as well as AI
agents who use these tools to uh report
vulner uh to report vulnerabilities to
the maintainers. uh in January there
would be so for the whole month of
January there would be around a thousand
repository uh thousand reports and in
the month of May I believe there were
13,000 per month so this is 13,000 13
times more
>> wow wow it's imp it's impressive
I want life to
move a bit of topic
But I'm very curious Mike about uh who
is working when a package get
quarantined is this automated is a human
there can how is this working?
Um
>> yeah so uh Pippi for for many years uh
was an amazing tool for the community
for people to say I would like to share
software with others. Here it is Pippi
and everyone can use it which is a
wonderful thing. you are giving a gift
to the world. Sometimes that gift has
little bits that you didn't expect in
it. Uh and that's a problem, right? And
the the ability to continue and sustain
this this machine that like is a is a
really big engine. Nobody thought Pippi
would be used for malware. Nobody nobody
thought about that because to to Seth's
earlier point, not everybody is a
security expert, right? And we don't
expect everybody to be a security
expert, but we now need to be some
degree of security expert in some part
of our lives because it's too dangerous
to not be.
>> So, Pippi had to grow capabilities over
the years to start being a little more
discerning and kind of being able to put
uh uh projects in different states or
life cycle states. Uh and this this grew
out of a need where me as a Pippi admin
and responding to reports the only lever
I had to pull was destroy
>> right and that is a very aggressive move
and you don't want to get it wrong so
you defer that decision until your last
possible moment so you don't make the
wrong choice because destroy is
irrevocable that's it it's gone uh and
so I I introduced this notion of pro
quarantining a project which is
basically saying we don't know right
now. Put it in timeout. Put it in a
place where it is not destructive. It
can come back, but it is not installable
by users. It is still visible on the
website. If you want to, you can find
the content addressable URL to download
it. But pip install or UV install or
whatever tool you use should not respect
that and should not work uh for a new
install. If you've pinned it, that's a
whole other story. But this notion of
quarantine grew out of well, again, I
have to sleep. uh what do we do when
things are happening while we sleep? How
do we allow security researchers uh
responding to an incident to continue to
respond in a non-destructive manner?
>> So creating this life cycle status gives
the the Pippi engine the ability to say
timeout not install until a human can
review the quarantine status and either
verdict and and destroy or clear it from
quarantine. And uh that started out as
very much a manual operation of just
like I'm I'm out. I get a pig on my
phone. I can click quarantine and then
check it in the morning, right? Like I'm
I'm not going to deal with that right
now. And very quickly it was like well
the utility of this is limited by
whoever is an admin receiving a ping
making that distinction and decision
>> and why should we only let humans do
this? So uh I built out the capability
to have a set of huristics and other uh
signals that can place a project in an
automated quarantine session.
>> So uh I' I've built out a program with a
variety of security research teams,
individuals, companies around the world
who they are either interested, curious
people report malware to Pippi from all
corners of the earth. I don't know why
half of them do it. I don't care.
They're doing the job. It's great. Thank
you. Keep doing it. uh but then there
are other security companies who have
products to sell and they they are
invested in this. So they are partnering
and that's also very very cool. Thank
you for your support doing that. So now
that we have this variety of of of
individuals corporations performing
these initial rounds of triage I added a
heristic to say okay if two or three of
of this group or this cohort agree then
let's put it in automated quarantine for
now and then when I wake up I can make
that verdict. I can do the decisioning
for for the final verdict but in the
meantime we are protecting the community
from this proliferating and it
expanding. Uh so it's like it's already
out but can we min minimize and mitigate
the time in which this is a problem. So
there is still a a question of the
people who are reporting are they human
are they AI and the answer is maybe as
long as they have a high degree of true
positives
>> right if they if they start submitting
false positives they I have my own
personal brain reputation meter and they
start falling and then I don't trust
them as much uh and there uh one of my
most notable researchers uh is a
gentleman Kamill Monkovski from Cert
Austria.
>> He does this as a hobby. This is
something he does for fun. And he has
self-reported by himself well over 2,000
incidents. And he's been right all
along.
>> So people who love doing this, I support
you. Please keep doing it. Uh but if you
do it for work, please get your work to
pay for it and and help. uh but having
these these trusted community members
who truly they are passionate they care
about the security story for the Python
ecosystem like those are the people who
are the hidden figures of our world who
they're not up on stage right here I'm
trying to represent their work uh and
that's that's a hard task too because
that puts some focus on them that they
might not want so I try to be cautious
about who I name but the uh the the
ability there is how do I take these
people's work it IP AI augmented or
accelerated, but as long as they're
getting 100% accuracy or 99% accuracy, I
will continue to take that work and we
will all benefit from it.
>> Sounds amazing. And I love that you
mentioned community because this link
with the next correction that I would
love to be more focused and kind of
start closing the panel with the
community and I would love to uh to
invite set to answer the next question.
Of course this going to be share
question because I want to have
different um perspective.
uh but the question is is the volunteer
maintainer model still sustainable when
generative AI increase both
contributions and attack that is what
you were very well mentioning.
>> Yeah. So right now what I see with this
new age of LLMs is that there's a lot of
opportunity and the opportunity is maybe
changing how we're thinking about how
we're doing work these days. the maybe
the contributions you're getting are
looking different. The vulnerability
reports that you're getting are look
different or there's different volumes.
We're going to have to figure out what
this means for like on a projectto
project basis and on an individual to
individual basis. It's going to be a
kind of a a transitionary time is what I
would describe what we're in right now.
So there's lots of opportunity in a
transitionary time. We're allowed to
experiment. We're allowed to try new
things. Just because we were doing
things in the past doesn't mean that we
have to do them in the future or vice
versa. We get to choose our new path
forward. Um, and so I would make sure
that everyone has an experimental mind
when they're coming to open source and
how things are done. Uh, keep keep
curiosity at the forefront. Uh, and
especially in security. I think that one
of the things with security that I'm
most excited about is this idea that uh
in the past there was no contributor
ladder uh for security teams, people
that are remediating vulnerabilities
because there's this trust boundary,
right? There's this hierarchy that
existed because we were trying to keep
people like users safe and so only
security researchers are doing this
work. Now, in this new age of LLMs where
anyone with an LLM can find a
vulnerability, sometimes it's only a low
severity or whatever, but because now
that is more public, it makes it so that
there's potentially at least one rung on
the contributor ladder for security
researchers or people that want to work
on security teams for open source
projects. They can contribute to these
vulnerabilities because they're they're
basically public. Anyone with an LLM can
find them. And so in that way it it
provides an onboarding ramp that did not
exist before for security teams or
people that were interested in that type
of contribution to open source projects.
So that's just an example of of
something new that it unlocks, right?
And we would not have expected it until
we started to live it.
>> Yeah. Julian, what do you think? What is
your opinion?
So we we get asked a lot to go faster
using II and still today I'm not very
confident about the agents that I use
because we have to trust them a lot both
on doing the right job that the the brit
branch is working fine at the end but
also that the process to get there is
safe that they don't install un unwanted
dependencies and that they don't want
they don't do action on your system that
you wouldn't do. For example, reading
your own file and sending it off in
China, it happens to me. Or installing
uh untrusted software on running
commands to remove files. These are all
actions that we are not very confident
about. And today I I don't think we have
solved it and we are still in the
transition. We want to go faster but we
are increasing the risk that we take
and so we need to build trust in II and
right now I'm I don't know exactly how
to do that.
>> Yeah.
Sylvia, what do you think about that?
Yeah, I also believe there is there is
needed some change to the maintainer u
to to the model and one of the ways that
uh we can support open sources of course
for companies to support uh as well as
as well as I wanted to talk a little bit
about some of this new initiatives that
uh came up uh recently uh to support
open source software and offload some of
the security work from the maintainers.
So for example there is GitHub secure
open source fund which provides funding
and security training for uh maintainers
as well as potential u possibility for
uh collaboration.
Um there is uh OpenAI's patch the
planet. There is project AC uh which
also came out recently uh which is uh
meant to
uh provide a platform for triaging uh
new vulnerability reports and they
duplicate them because what happens
often is that uh maintainers get a lot
of similar vulnerability reports because
they use the same models and so they
produce similar vulnerabilities.
And so I think it's important to um
engage with the community and hear learn
about these initiatives and hopefully
and also take part in them. So uh which
this should hopefully support this um
community and open source model.
Mike or Maria, do you have any thoughts
on that or
>> I think that everything was said like
already. So,
>> well, as
>> well, I I have one just tag on that is
we we talk about community a lot, right?
And one of the biggest kind of security
signals that that trigger corporations
concerns is a single maintainer project,
right? Uh and there are lots of them out
there. I I have a few of my own, right?
Uh and when we talk about community,
it's how do we foster a community where
we are okay sharing our projects with
each other so that way we can not only
represent my perspective. Maybe Julian
and I would work on one, maybe Sylvia
and I would work on one and we can
represent different perspectives and
build a broader community base, but also
that limits the security boundary. It's
no longer, well, someone's going to
attack Mike's laptop. they have to get
both Mike and Sylvia or both Mike and
Julian or all three of us to agree that
this code should get pushed out. So by
increasing our own personal project
communities, we are then kind of
leveraging the wider community and kind
of bolstering each each other that way
as well.
>> Yeah,
I would love to close this section with
a last question for Maria that's going
to be a bit more deep. Um is generative
um this generative AI moment a real
turning point in humans uh progress or
is more a bubble and will be in the
books in 100 300 years as it was just a
bomb and it a bubble and it's not
something
>> uh well I think that at the moment is
really hard to tell because we had even
this discussion yesterday
uh because there's yeah we don't know
there may be some threshold that will uh
hold us back or maybe not uh it's hard
to tell but uh I think it's very
important to like handle the problems
that we have now what we know about and
there is so much to do uh so I don't
think of course like speculating about I
don't know AGI or something it's
fantastic and uh exciting
But let's we should focus on what we can
do what we see we see a lot of problems
already. So I think that we need to like
uh yeah do something with this uh
and of and yeah and then later on
prepare for what may come uh if AGI like
hits uh the market like we don't know
this is like we honestly don't know what
will happen so let's prepare how we can
and yeah we there is a lot of tooling to
be done education uh leg legislation
uh we should also be like because um
right now there is this uh kind of way
that uh the progress is pushed by mega
corporations from the just few countries
and come on do you want this like
significant
event in the human history to be drived
just by corporate profit or maybe by
some so-called dark LLMs that just are
focused on malicious exploits.
So I think we should be there uh also to
be involved in this in this process. So
it's also shaped by the needs of
community
>> and yeah open source is just
wonderful like uh community to do it.
Yeah.
>> Yeah.
I would love to kind of start to
wrapping up uh the panel before if we
have a couple of minutes maybe we can
also give the chance to the audience to
give uh to ask a couple of questions.
But I would love to ask um or to all of
you what do you recommend to all of us?
I know that we you share already some
tips but I would love also to hear from
all of you what should we do better and
what should we do to be prepared because
this room is full of te more technical
less technical different um section of
tech and I truly believe that all of us
we need to be prepared and have some
kind of minimum amount of knowledge in
security and I would love to know from
you what do you recommend
Please Seth will you start?
>> Yeah. So I I can start by maybe people
these days will like ask for open source
contributions go to a project that
you're interested in but I wanted to
specifically highlight uh something that
would be a differentiator which is to
try to make a human connection uh with
that community before contributing
because what we are seeing these days is
very different than what we were seeing
before. before people would come to a
project and signal interest on a human
level and now it is mostly just
submissions with code. And so if you can
go back to the basics and like connect
with the community before making
contributions or talk about what you're
interested in or try to figure out like
how you can contribute to a project, it
sets you apart so far compared to what
other like other people are doing what
we're seeing. So I would I would
recommend try to keep that human element
involved in open source contribution
because it is really really important to
have and it's the type of network and
tool that we'll need to be able to have
that like future ingenuity and be able
to take advantage of opportunities in
the future when they arise. We need that
human network to be there because if
we're all kind of in our own corner
doing our own thing we kind of lose that
ability to act collectively. So
>> uh so for me I will go back to this uh
human agency because like everything now
is happening so fast and can be
overwhelming. So we might like be in
this kind of passive attitude or there's
nothing much we can do. So but we we
shouldn't really go that direction. Uh
at least we can do is like change our
way of using LLMs. It's not like that we
are overflooded by it by it but it's
this tool that is supposed to help us.
So if we start just uh looking from this
perspective that this is the tool and we
decide what we do with this tool it can
maybe it will just be for our better own
like good but we also make have ideas
how to like uh contribute participate in
other projects and what can be done.
Uh I also wanted to touch upon the uh
human connection and maintaining this
human contact um in open source in
vulnerability detection and reporting. A
lot of us uh experience similar problems
and uh so I and so what I wanted to say
is whether you're overwhelmed by a
number of um vulnerability reports your
open source project is receiving, you're
also not alone. And um what I would
recommend is to engage with uh other uh
community members uh also here at
Europyon
and uh to exchange uh what worked, what
didn't uh what could be better uh as
well as uh share that with uh the
companies that might be that could uh
help and um as and these initiatives
that I uh that I mentioned before.
So uh something that I I've tried to
think about is how do we take what we
are sharing here because this is very
much a a a like a selection bias right
you all selected to be here which is
awesome thank you for coming
>> there are so many people who aren't
selecting to come to either Europyon or
specifically to a cyber security panel
uh who need to kind of hear these
messages of how do we go forward so I
would ask you all to kind of take these
messages and fan them out even further
to the folks who either did not want to
come and didn't feel the need to come or
just didn't have the resources to attend
to continue to share that it's it's not
simple, it's not easy. We're all working
to try and make it easier, but being
aware awareness is half the battle. So,
just knowing that downloading software
off the internet can be dangerous is is
a good message. So continue to share
these ideas. Share share a link to the
talk. Share share whatever you can with
the people who have either explicitly
opted out or could not come.
>> I like Seth's idea of trust boundaries
and to recognize them and to be careful
when you are crossing one. And for
example, your credentials, your
passwords, your tokens, they are very
sensitive and most of the time we deal
with them manually. And for example this
morning there was a talk about should
you trust trusted publishing and it was
very good because it was it made clear
that the name is is misleading and that
it's a special part of the supply chain
that it is about and not the wall supply
chain and so understanding better
how the system work makes you more
robust to attacks. And for example, a
very simple and practical step is to use
password managers so that you don't have
to remember them and every time checking
that you are entering them on the good
website. It works for tokens too. You
can use vaults. There are many practical
steps that makes your life easier and
more secure and so to make to not make
cyber security always painful but
sometimes very useful.
Thank you so much for all these uh
advice and tips and yeah definitely I
completely agree with all of you. Uh we
have two minutes left. I'm not sure if
someone has a very quick question. If
not we are going to Oh yeah I I see
people that is going to the mic.
>> Um
>> yeah there's a microphone in the center.
>> Microphone. Yeah. In the middle of the
room.
>> Yeah.
Hello. Um,
you spoke a lot about security and not
so much about ethics. So, some easy
questions will be about ethics. So,
using AI has a questionable ethics.
There are people who believe it's
unethical. There are people who believe
it they rather not know about that being
unethical and stuff like that. And um my
question is
is it okay for me to submit LLM
generated stuff that I trust to people I
don't know without their prior consent.
So to make it more realistic if I go to
an open source project and provide my
contribution that I trust I I verified
it. I I put my name on it. I believe
it's doing what it should be, but I used
something that the open source
maintainer on the other side might
consider unethical. Am I uh bordering
them with with my contribution? Should I
uh not do that without an AI policy on
their side or something like that? I
don't expect a yes or no else answer.
Just that would be too easy, I guess.
>> Yeah. So like you already mentioned kind
of uh part of the answer which is that
if a project has or does not have an AI
policy some projects have adopted these
and have either made it explicit that
they're against it or like you said
they're willing to accept contributions
from LLM substantially or
unsubstantially or whatever right to
varying degrees as long as you're
willing to put your name on it as long
as you're willing to represent that what
you're submitting is at the quality
standard that you're okay with right so
there's there's different degrees so
like Like you said, there's no yes or
no. I would definitely if you want to be
careful about this, you can always
engage in a humanto human conversation
with the project and ask like how do you
feel about this? Um because in the end
that humanto human connection is going
to be even more valuable than that
individual contribution will be.
>> We're going to have the only time for
the last question. I'm so sorry.
>> Yeah, no problem. Hi. Um good afternoon.
Thanks so much for the panel. Um so I'm
an AI engineer and tomorrow I'll be
speaking about um prompt injection and
things about AI engineering. From the
panel discussion I see there are two
layers. So there is the AI security part
of things where you're trying to secure
the AI and there's also using AI to
search for vulnerabilities.
Now um as an AI engineer I'm moving
towards this AI security thing and I'm
not so much into this um into the
community of cyber security engineers.
How do I get into that community so that
we can secure this AI because as things
improve AI the responsibility we give AI
is increasing. So now we have tools, we
have APIs, we have MCP and all these
kind of things. The responsibility
improves and we need to secure it in a
way just securing securing the end part
of it is not enough. We need to also
secure the um AI itself. So how do we
collaborate to get to this point where
we can secure the AI? That's one thing.
The second part of it is I think CIA you
spoke yesterday and you spoke about
having like 80 CVE that's what you guys
call it. So in AI we now have a lot of
CVS. How can we how can we try to get
more of this so that we avoid the
general public getting exposed to this
um security um
security issues. Thanks so much.
Um could you repeat the question?
>> Okay. Um
let me let me explain from the beginning
again. So we have two layers to the
security issues. We have the AI security
where you need to secure the AI and we
have using AI to search for
vulnerabilities. So we have two
different problems or two different
layers. Now, how do we I'm an AI
engineer and I'm trying to see how we
can secure AI systems. You are cyber
security engineers. You know how to
secure web and other systems. How can I
move from where I am to collaborate with
you so I can use some of the tools you
use to secure AI systems? So, that's one
part of it. The other part of it is I
know you guys have a way of doing this
old CVE and checking for vulnerability
things and now from what I do in AI
security I can see there are a lot of
them that we are like the zero prompts
from Microsoft and from copilot and the
rest of them what we are seeing these
days how can we get more of these so
that we can also protect the opensource
systems for AI systems
So I think answering your first question
I think it's uh securing whether we are
securing uh applications or AI systems
but it's still a threat modeling
exercise. Um so the similar concepts
apply and uh we're just looking at the
different kind of systems. So I would
recommend
u diving still into how uh well more
into threat modeling as well as um
how uh as well as well there are some uh
community projects uh especially from uh
OASP and some companies uh that provide
some more information about uh about
these uh securing these kinds of
systems.
Um
>> I I guess maybe for the second part of
that how do we find more CVES like like
Sylvia shared stats right like we we are
finding them uh I think it becomes a
matter of uh after you have threat
modeled and figured out the kind of
scope of your system is now go attack it
right just just keep poking it and
seeing what this is what human
researchers have done for a very very
long time they have different techniques
and some were easier than others so they
followed those paths but use use your LL
M you you know develop your prompt try
try again and just keep poking at the
system and you'll find new things that
you didn't find before.
>> Thank you so much. We need to close
here. The speaker is going to be around
the conference and thank you so much for
joining the panel and have a nice
afternoon.