"Elon Musk Shouldn't Have Done This..." - Elite Corruption, Immigration & Collapse | Rory Stewart
Watch on YouTubeVideo summary
In this discussion, Rory Stewart addresses the fragility of Western economies, identifying demographic shifts and immigration politics as primary drivers of current instability. He argues that falling birth rates in wealthy nations have inverted population pyramids, creating a heavy burden on shrinking workforces to support aging populations reliant on expensive medical care. While acknowledging that immigration currently fills labor gaps in service industries and skills sectors, Stewart contends it cannot be an indefinite solution due to density limits and the eventual need for those immigrants to age as well. He suggests that true sustainability requires increasing productivity through AI and robotics rather than relying solely on population growth or endless migration flows. Furthermore, he links the rise of populism directly to these demographic anxieties, noting that while immigrant communities often have higher birth rates due to poverty levels in their countries of origin—a factor more significant than culture—the perception of "replacement" fuels far-right movements across Europe and the US who feel elites are failing to control borders. The conversation shifts to the mechanics of populism and social media's role in destabilizing democratic norms. Stewart defines populism as an exclusionary worldview that claims a monopoly on truth, framing opponents not just as rivals but as traitors or aliens. He attributes this dynamic partly to human psychology, where people feel lost and seek certainty from strongmen who offer simple narratives over complex realities. A major point of contention arises regarding social media platforms like X (formerly Twitter) under Elon Musk; Stewart expresses deep concern that the owner's disregard for fact-checking allows dangerous lies—such as false claims about immigrants or government plots—to spread rapidly, inciting real-world violence and riots before corrections can be made via "community notes." He contrasts this with a more regulated approach in Europe but acknowledges the difficulty of balancing free speech against the immediate harm caused by viral misinformation. Stewart emphasizes that while algorithms prioritize engagement over truth, society must draw boundaries to prevent chaos, even if it means accepting some trade-offs between total freedom and safety. Stewart also explores the concept of empire collapse through Ray Dalio's debt cycle theory, arguing that while empires like Britain or America may lose global dominance, this does not necessarily mean material decline for their citizens; indeed, average living standards in the UK are far higher today than during its imperial peak. However, he warns that transition periods between eras are often devastating for those living through them rather than future generations who will inherit a different world order. To mitigate political polarization and restore faith in democracy, Stewart advocates for decentralization, arguing that local governments understand community needs better than distant federal officials. This philosophy extends to his work with GiveDirectly, an organization he supports which provides unconditional cash grants of approximately $900 directly into the bank accounts of extreme poverty households rather than imposing specific projects like building wells or schools. He cites rigorous randomized controlled trials showing that this approach yields sustainable economic multipliers, allowing recipients to invest in their own priorities—whether fixing roofs, buying livestock, or accessing education—which traditional aid models often fail to achieve efficiently due to bureaucratic overhead and a lack of local knowledge. Finally, the dialogue touches on the ethical implications of direct cash transfers versus disease eradication efforts championed by figures like Bill Gates. Stewart argues that while extending life through vaccination is noble, it can inadvertently trap people in "grinding poverty" without offering them the opportunity to improve their material conditions and escape extreme deprivation. He illustrates this with examples from Rwanda and Zambia, where small capital injections allow farmers to cultivate previously unusable land or access markets they were previously too poor to reach. The discussion concludes that these cash programs are not about jump-starting entire national economies but about enabling individuals in remote areas to integrate into existing economic systems by overcoming the initial barrier of lack of capital. Stewart maintains that despite inevitable historical cycles and technological disruptions, a pragmatic approach involving local empowerment, honest data sharing from organizations like GiveDirectly, and careful regulation of digital spaces offers the best path forward for navigating these complex global challenges without resorting to authoritarianism or mob rule.
Read the full video transcript
Why are so many Western economies right
now very fragile?
Well, I think one answer is that nobody
really knows. I mean, it's amazing how
often very distinguished Nobel Prize
winning economists get this stuff wrong.
But clearly, we have certain problems.
And the most obvious one is demographic.
So, most of our countries, our birth
rates are falling. And we're getting
older.
And as we get older, we become more
expensive to look after, particularly
medical terms.
Uh in in Britain, the statistics are
very stark. When we set up the welfare
state before the First World War, there
were 20 working people for every one
retired person.
Today, we've got just under three
working people for every one retired
person.
So, you can see the balance has changed
very dramatically in terms of who's
paying for who.
Um second bit that comes out of that, of
course, is that our economies are
increasingly dependent on immigration.
And that's particularly uh for running
care systems,
running service industries, but it but
it's also increasingly true for skills.
And the problem there is that
immigration is very unpopular
with large swaths of the population in
the US and in Europe. And it's driving a
lot of votes for the populist right.
And I guess the center hasn't really
worked out how to deal with that.
So, maybe there's the two things to be
getting on with.
All right, those are two very good
things. Um so, let's first address the
demographic bombshell. Um
as we have this happen, the pyramid gets
inverted. We have a ton of people at the
top that are going to require a lot of
care. They're no longer in the
workforce. Um
is immigration going to be the only
response to that? Or do you look at
something like AI and you say AI AI is
going to solve the problem? or do you
take a totally different approach to
this?
Well, I think ultimately
immigration can't continue always to be
the answer. Because if you did that,
your population would keep growing
indefinitely.
And the United States, I guess, is a
very, very large country.
But in somewhere like the United
Kingdom,
uh we're already more densely populated
than India.
So, uh if the pyramid inverted, and then
you tried to build the bigger base to
the pyramid by bringing in more and more
people indefinitely over the next 300
years, you'd end up in an impossible
situation.
Ideally,
you want not to have a pyramid at all.
You want to
have something that's pretty static and
sustainable.
And to get to that, you've really got to
work out how to become more productive.
And that includes more productive in the
care industry, so that does involve
learning from Japan
on what can be done with machine
learning, what can be done with
robotics.
It involves thinking seriously about
jobs that we currently do that may be
replaced by AI. And that, of course,
we're often reluctant to do, cuz we're
very risk averse. Uh we can be very
impacted by regulations, by unions, and
by others.
Um
but no, I don't think the answer can be
indefinitely bringing in more and more
younger people, because those people get
old, and they in turn will have to be
looked after by more and more younger
people, and you'll end up
with a never-ending growth.
Okay, well, here is uh an interesting
hypothesis. So, one thing that does seem
to be playing out is that the immigrants
that are coming into the country are
coming from countries that have higher
birth rates. Now,
that could give you that static column
that you're looking for. Over time,
obviously, you're going to have this
sort of weird transitionary period. But
what becomes fascinating is you get this
very populous spark against that, um
because what drives the higher birth
rates is a wildly different culture.
That's that seems unarguable. And
without putting any value judgment on
whether one culture is better than
another, I will say it is
the architecture of the human mind is
very tribal by nature. We grow up in the
culture that we grow up in. We tend to
hold on to that. And so anything that
disrupts that is going to cause this
sort of weird moment that I see us
living through.
Do you think that is an accurate read on
why we're seeing populism now, or is
there something else a foot?
So,
I think that that's partly it. Although
remember that immigrant communities have
often had much higher birth rates. So,
if you look at the Irish-American
community,
when it began to come into large numbers
in the United States late 19th, early
20th century, they had significantly
larger families
than the native And you Do you think
that's a function of being an immigrant?
It's usually a function of poverty. It's
not really a question of of which part
of the world you come from. Poorer
people tend to have larger families. And
that's partly because if you're a
coming from a subsistence economy, you
feel you need
firstly, the labor of your children, but
secondly, most importantly,
you're worried some of the kids are
going to die. And you need a lot of
replacement.
So,
birth rates come down
for a number of reasons. One of them is
that you think that the children you
have, you hope, are likely to survive
into adulthood.
Secondly, kids become more expensive.
They they no longer seem as they might
do if you're a a
a small farmer in Ecuador or in Ireland
as though
they're a net positive income
contributor to the the
Instead, you get into a worldview where
you think, "Oh my goodness, I'm going to
have to pay for that college education,
this, that, and the other, and they're
not really going to bring me much in in
return."
Um so, we can see that as countries get
wealthier,
uh their their birth rates fall very
dramatically. And that the biggest birth
rates in the world, place like Niger,
which at the moment is in the
Sahara in Africa,
has a birth rate of about 7.6 on average
per couple.
Whoa.
But that's one of the very poorest
countries on Earth.
And I assume they still have a pretty
dramatic um
infant death rate.
Huge infant mortality rates. Whereas
countries like Italy, which had very
high birth rates in the 1950s, are now
in a position like the United States
where the indigenous population is
shrinking.
[snorts]
So, it's it's it's it's not a simple
question of culture and religion in the
way that we used to think. We used to
think,
you know, the point is that, I don't
know,
people from Italy or people from Ireland
had big families because they were
predominantly Catholics, and there were
prohibitions on the use of birth
control.
It now seems more uh plausible that the
reason they had bigger families,
generally speaking, was that they were
poorer.
Is the the rise of populism predictable?
Or is this a totally unrelated thing to
immigration, totally unrelated to the
economies, and it just happens to be
happening at the same time? Because in
my current mental model, they are
effectively one in the same phenomena.
Yeah. So, I think that the first thing
is that you're right. There there's a
very, very strong um
factor there. Immigration is clearly
driving the rise of far-right populism
across
Europe and the United States. And if you
were trying to explain why the far right
in Germany just got nearly a third of
the vote
in the latest state election, that's
very closely related to immigration. You
just have to see their
literature, you have to interview their
supporters, it's immigration. And the
perception is that the
ruling elite has failed to control
borders.
It's not It's a little bit a more
nuanced than you might think because to
often the people interviewed
will say, "Look, we're reasonably happy
with having a more diverse society. We
just want to know that we've got control
of our borders. In fact, we don't even
mind
more people coming in provided we think
the government's making the choice to do
that."
rather than being forced to do it by in
Britain, for example, a a debate between
people who are very, very focused on the
absolute numbers,
uh which is a minority, and the people
who are focused on people who are
legally crossing on boats,
which seems to be the thing that's
upsetting people most. Um on your second
question, which is
are immigrant populations generally
having more children? Yeah, there is
some evidence for that. I mean, this
stuff is all very controversial. Um and,
you know, I'm wading into tricky
territory, but
it in London, for example, it seems as
though over 60%
of uh the children born in London are
born to people whose parents were not
born in the United Kingdom.
When looking at this problem, there are
obviously conspiracies that abound, the
great replacement theory. People get
very paranoid that there is something
that is happening intentionally. Now,
you've said that one of the ways to
offset the um inverted pyramid is to
bring in immigrants. Not going to solve
the problem the whole way, but when you
have an economy that is based on growth,
which I would say in the West is is the
primary um base assumption of our
economies. So, you have this economy
that requires growth, you are the elites
making policies, you probably you're
going to be pretty pro people um coming
into the country.
Uh then, if you have stats like this in
London, over 60% of the people are born
to mothers that are foreign, all of a
sudden,
uh
I
I hate even using the phrase replacement
theory, but it's like that is a fact
that is happening, that the people that
are locally um that are already there
our birth rates far lower.
And so, they're just
you know, again, trying to use very
neutral language. It just begins to
shift. Yeah. I mean, I And again, this
uh interesting um thing that I need to
learn from you about, which is the
difference between uh the United Kingdom
and Europe.
Uh and and the United States on the
other hand. So,
the UK and Europe,
predominantly, um if you looked at the
genetic profile of people living in the
United Kingdom in the 1950s, 1960s,
a very high proportion were descended
from people who had been there 6,000
years ago.
It's now clear that uh the these Viking
invasions, the Norman Conquest, didn't
really change the gene pool
of Britain very much.
Uh the United States is different.
Uh and and that's what I never quite
understand in the great replacement
theory. I mean, the great replacement in
the United States was of course the
great replacement of the Native American
population.
Uh and and therefore, as a European
looking at the US, I get a bit confused.
I mean,
what exactly is it that people are
anxious about? Their own parents great
grandparents great grandparents were
immigrants not that long ago.
So, presumably, that's a little bit
different
to uh what's going on in Europe.
it is. So, this feels to me like the uh
a phrase I will say a lot, this is just
the architecture of the human mind. So,
Dave Chappelle has a quote that I think
can be broadly applied, which is
everything is funny until it happens to
you. Uh when you're the person coming in
and conquering and getting the land,
hey, it's all good. When you are the
person being conquered, it's like,
"Whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa." And now
all of the sudden, it's all breaks all
the time. What the hell is happening?
And um so that to me, I understand. I
think it is just going to be the natural
human response. I would have expected
Native Americans to be
wildly pissed off as people roll in and
start taking their land, and I would
expect them to, as they did, fight to
the death, to feel betrayed every time a
treaty was made and then broken, to have
long-standing generational bitterness
over what happened. I think we see the
exact same parallels between the Israeli
Palestinian conflict.
All of this feels like, yeah, this is
pretty predictable. Um the things I want
to tease out are how much of the future
can we see by saying, "Okay, I
understand the human mind. I understand
how it reacts to this stuff." And I
would like to predict as many of the
second and third-order consequences as
possible. So, um I think now would be a
good time to plant a flag in populism.
What is it exactly? And if I am correct
that populism happens when you feel And
in fact, there's one more thing I have
to put out there.
Uh I have a feeling
that people only conflict ethnically
once you have cultural
assimilation. If you don't have cultural
assimilation, then people will fight at
the level of culture. So, I would not
expect ethnically diverse UK to um
be where the battle lines are drawn. I
think people that sound and act, {quote}
and {quote}, British will all get along,
no matter what they look like. Uh and
then people who don't and are espousing
foreign values, that's going to be where
the line of conflict is. And so to me,
immigration is really a bigger question
of assimilation, which is why it
probably feels slightly different in the
US because I think the US ethos largely
is one of, "Yeah, give me immigrants.
I'm here for it, but when they roll up,
they better feel American. So, they
better want American values. If you roll
up and you feel like you're trying to
shut down the things that are
classically American, then you're going
to have a problem. That would be my gut
instinct.
Yeah. And the question of what's
American, of course, changes over time,
making it even more complicated because
I guess if you uh
part of the kind of Brahmin elites in
Boston in the
mid-1800s,
you would have seen a lot of the
immigrant communities turning up in the
1800s as not being classically American
in the way you defined it then in the
1850s, 1860s.
Um whereas whereas what's classically
what's classically American now, I
guess, is the kind of post-war
American vision.
No doubt. And you will when you look
back in history, you see the pockets of
discrimination, violence, et cetera when
they are perceived to be the other,
right? That they haven't assimilated.
And look, that's complicated. I know I'm
sort of rounding things just to be able
to
they didn't just to make it even more
complicated, it's not just that people
assimilate.
In assimilating, they change the
culture.
So, uh
it's partly because of immigration that
the culture of the United States in 2024
is quite unlike the culture of the
United States in 1954
or the culture in 1924. And the same
will be true in Britain. It's not that
there's uh
a given thing called British culture
into which people assimilate. In the
process of assimilation, British culture
itself
shifts and alters. So, for example, you
would expect um
in 20, 30 years' time, very different
views of the monarchy,
the royal family in Britain.
And that would be largely driven by
people coming from other countries who
didn't grow up with this royal family,
who think a lot of British traditions
are a bit peculiar.
And a a of those traditions will be
stripped out. And the same will happen
in the United States.
If you end up with a much larger
population, many of whose parents,
grandparents grew up in Latin America,
you will expect a a more hybrid culture
to emerge, which will have features
which were more associated with Latin
America and not associated with the
America of the 1950s.
Mhm. Yes, and uh final button I'll put
on that is uh no one likes change or the
vast majority of humanity don't. So, in
any transition everyone goes through a
transition, which is one of the big
questions of my life right now. I've
started paying attention to world
affairs. Is that just because I'm about
to turn 50 or is something actually
happening right now that's worth paying
attention to? I I have a hard time
parsing those. Um but it does feel like
there's there's a larger wave of
immigration, which I think is explained
by economics. We've already been through
that. Uh so, I do feel like this moment
is going to be more contentious, but I
think your point is well taken that
these moments are occurring basically at
all times. Uh and even if it's just
generational,
where they're assimilating new values,
you're you're always going to see this
movement.
Okay.
Uh
plant a flag in populism for me. What is
it exactly?
Populism, um at its core,
is a very
exclusionary worldview, by which I mean
the populist claims to speak
for the people against the elite and
usually claims
that the elite is somehow foreign or
alien to the country.
So, when a populist says
I'm speaking on behalf of the American
people or the German people,
in actual fact, often their supporters
are barely 50% of the population, but
that's not how they present themselves.
They don't present themselves in a
pluralist way.
They present themselves as having a
monopoly on truth and identity.
And people who are against them are not
perceived as fellow citizens who have a
equally valid but different perspective
on things. They're perceived as people
who are somehow traitors
to the cause.
Um so it's got a sort of monopolistic
structure built into it, and that's what
makes it so dangerous. That's why often
you'll see populists challenge the
Constitution,
challenge the rule of law, challenge
checks and balances because it's a
mindset that assumes
that they represent, in inverted commas,
the real people,
that they're right and everybody else is
wrong.
And therefore, anything that stands in
the way of doing things in the way that
they want,
constitutions, amendments, courts,
legislatures, are to be swept aside
because they are
defying the will of the people.
And of course, this is not just
phenomenon of the right. I mean, you
this was a very, very,
you know, apparent in the Bolshevik
Revolution in
that created the Soviet Union.
The Bolsheviks were, you know, a tiny
proportion of the Russian population,
but they claimed to be the people
and proceeded to rip up everything that
stood in their way in order to
fulfill the will of the people.
And anyone who opposed them was a
traitor to the people.
If they actually don't have a majority
behind them, why does that rhetoric work
so well?
Um
Well, I think it works partly because it
gives a great deal of confidence and
energy to their supporters, gives their
supporters a degree of
moral legitimacy
that they might feel they lacked if
their leaders were just saying to them,
"Well, you know,
we've got X million votes and they've
got a few more votes than us and we're
going to take it in turns." That removes
uh some of the
Yeah, some of the authority which is
necessary
for the extremism. It's also that
they're able to draw on very deep roots
of nationalism.
Blood and soil. If you say you speak for
the nation, you know,
you are making America great again, for
example, right?
You have a whole language which is not
available to your opponents.
Your opponents may be talking about, I
don't know, tariffs or economic
growth or how to fund a Medicare system,
but you are saying, "I am making my
country great again."
And and the whole structure of that
creates a very different type of
politics.
Okay, so I have a thesis on why this
works. Let me know what you think about
this. I suppose I should call it a
hypothesis.
Uh the reason that the strong man works,
the reason that populism works even when
they don't necessarily, in the
beginning, represent the majority of the
population is that um
leadership works because the average
person feels lost and confused. They are
looking for short hands, always. Th-
This is just, again, architecture of the
human mind.
And
a strong man will intoxicate people with
certainty. They will say, "This is the
problem. This is what we're going to do
about it and your life is going to be
better." I think it only works if there
is underlying um frustration in the
populace, even people that would not
have, at the beginning of this,
identified. There's It could be as
subtle as a malaise. Uh things aren't
growing. I don't know why it feels like
it's going to be worse for me than it
was for my parents. Things just seem
harder.
But if you have that open door of
frustration or malaise, and you come in
and say, "This is why you feel terrible,
and this is what you need to do about
it." People feel seen, they feel heard,
and now they have an answer. They don't
have to think for themselves, they just
have to identify with that person, and
it's like, "All right, well, things suck
now, so I'm going to get on board with
this."
Imagine breathing through a straw while
trying to run a marathon. That's what
life with sinus congestion feels like.
And I have battled with allergies for
years. That is why I'm excited about
Naväge nasal care. Naväge uses a
patented system of saline flow and
gentle suction to clear your nasal
passages effectively. It works in as
little as 30 seconds. It's completely
drug-free, using only purified saline.
The design is straightforward. If you're
ready to breathe freely again, here's an
exclusive offer for Impact Theory
listeners. When you order a Naväge
starter pack, you'll also get a free
cleaning kit. This offer is only
available by going to navage.com/impact.
Again, to order your Naväge plus free
cleaning kit, go to n a v a g e dot com
slash impact. Again, that's
navage.com/impact.
Yeah, I think that's right.
that? I I I think it's right. I think
any
successful
insurgent movement, and and populism by
its nature is quite revolutionary.
Always has to draw on a deep um sense of
dissatisfaction with the status quo.
I mean, the only way you can run a
campaign against the elites or the
establishment is if the elites and
establishment are associated with
something that seems to be failing
people.
Now,
some of that is objective, and some of
that can be made up.
Like, so objectively, the 2008 financial
crisis was a humiliation for the
credibility of markets and exposed
profound inequalities inequalities
between people's incomes, inequalities
between people's wealth, inequalities
between regions, right?
Difference between what it's like living
in Flint, Michigan and what it's like
living in Massachusetts.
The Iraq and Afghan wars were complete
humiliating catastrophes.
Three and a half trillion dollars is
three and a half thousand billion
dollars was spent by the United States
and its allies and they achieved
nothing.
Invaded to get rid of the Taliban, spent
20 years in Afghanistan, handed the
country back to the Taliban again,
right?
So, these are objective facts.
But,
it's also true that
such facts exist at many other periods
and the question is, are the political
entrepreneurs able to exploit
people's frustrations successfully or
not? So, the Vietnam war was an equal
catastrophe.
But, it didn't lead, in the way that the
Iraq and Afghan disasters did, directly
contribute towards the rise of populism,
right? Now, why is that?
Partly because of social media. I mean,
I think one of the most dramatic changes
in our lives
has been the introduction of Facebook
and Twitter and indeed the algorithms
that underlie Google and the way that
those have contributed
to very, very particular ways of
perceiving the world.
Contributed to polarization, continued
contributed to the erosion of borders,
uh
contributed to the dissolution of
traditional news networks.
And and that's necessary because
people in Flint, Michigan
were always
in a worse situation than, you know,
people living in fancy parts of Boston.
But, it's the modern world makes that
much more visible to people.
And I think
And also gives the populists an
opportunity they didn't have before.
Donald Trump, for example,
whatever you think of him,
was an immense beneficiary of the world
of social media.
Because he's able to benefit from the
fact that if he says something
provocative,
in the 1950s, he wouldn't really be
reported, right? The New York Times
could ignore him, the television news
anchors could decide not to cover him,
he wouldn't really go anywhere.
As soon as the world of social media
exists,
if he says something provocative, he
gets a double benefit. He gets the
benefit from his supporters who say,
"Whoa,
this guy speaks the truth. He's given us
permission to say things we haven't been
able to say." But, he also gets the
benefit from the people who are outraged
by him.
Cuz the people outraged by him are also
viewing his things, retweeting his
things, sharing his things. And a whole
revenue stream
comes in and an attention stream from
support and outrage, which wasn't
possible
uh really before this stuff really gets
going, I guess, in about 2014, when
smartphones become very, very available.
And when a critical mass of people are
are using these platforms. So,
this contemporary populism,
yes, it has some relationship to
fundamentals, but it's much better
understood as a product of a changing
media culture.
Do you think that social media is a net
benefit or a net detraction from
society?
I think politically it it probably has
been a net detraction. I think there's
huge things that we all enjoy about it
enormously.
I think it gives us wonderful access to
things with incredible ease.
You know, I spend a lot of time on on
Twitter X, and
like many people there are all kind of
wonderful rabbit holes that I go down
which I wouldn't have been able to go
down
uh
you know, 15 years ago, right? I can
look at cute cats. I can
work out. I can follow people with
strange theories on medieval Britain. I
can
[snorts]
look at lovely architecture. I can
learn how to follow a new diet regime,
right? All that stuff I'm able to do.
But
when Elon Musk decides to
take control of a platform like that and
then say
to people in Britain
on X that there is a civil war in
Britain
and is able to guess it to a very, very
large number of people instantaneously
this claim.
And is then able to do something that
wasn't possible in traditional media,
which is to have 500 replies
which seem to validate the post from
people saying, "Oh, yeah, there is a
civil war in Britain. I looked out the
window. Look at this, the whole thing's
out of control."
It has a power
um which simply didn't exist before. I
mean, it there was no equivalent to
this. There was no way of doing that
before.
And that that's what the Arab Spring it
was kind of the first hint of.
Now, when it happened in the Arab
Spring, did that feel positive or
negative to you at the time?
At the time it felt positive. At the
time I felt right the way through
that
social media and the internet more
broadly
was a wonderful, liberating phenomenon
that would allow us to speak directly
people to people, that would
push out the control of the old
hierarchies and elites
that would allow people to topple
dictators, to self-organize, um
and it took me some time to
understand
the risks associated with that.
What are the risks?
Well, the risks are exactly these
examples I've tried to give from Donald
Trump or Elon Musk
of being able to mobilize very, very
rapid, very aggressive, very
exclusionary movements
often on the basis of very scant facts
and getting visibility and support
and enthusiasm for projects which
previously would curate I mean
previously when
news anchors dominated, when uh the
newspapers dominated, there was a
normative structure, there was an
ethical structure
embedded in the editors
that chose what to display to the public
and what not.
And often that put an emphasis, for
example, on the truth. I mean newspaper
editors
uh you know, of course we're always
vulnerable to advertisers, they were
always um
you know, flawed human beings, but they
had some notion of public service, and
particularly publicly funded
broadcasters, you know, the NPRs, the
BBCs of this world
believed they had an obligation to the
public to try to check whether what was
being said was true.
But as those business models have been
destroyed, and they have been destroyed,
they've been destroyed so that these
platforms now are struggling to compete
with a YouTube influencer who can make
more money than the New York Times.
Then it it becomes much more vulnerable
to all these things we're talking about,
polarization
post-truth populism.
Do you think the um general public is
better off with a curated reality?
Well, it's a it's a really good
question. I don't know how I work my way
through that because
you can see so strongly the arguments on
both sides. I mean, on the one hand,
you know, I was the beneficiary of
social media. When I ran to be Prime
Minister in the United Kingdom, I was
able to come from nowhere
and use social media to develop a
momentum I would never have been able to
find before. I was able to get
huge support for my particular program
in a very unusual way. I was able to
circumvent the traditional party
structures. I was able to
crowdfund and do all that kind of stuff.
And of course, people like me who tend
to be on more on that side of politics,
we got very excited by
uh
President Obama's ability to do that.
You know, again, difficult to imagine
his campaign in the old world of the
Democratic Party machine.
On the other hand,
uh
if we are really losing any
sense of truth,
if
anything goes, if we can no longer
really rely on
serious journalists with serious editors
fact-checking,
we find ourselves in a very odd world.
Yeah, this I think is going to be uh one
of the defining arguments of our time
because
to your point, you can see the arguments
on both sides in terms of uh man, the
very sense of what is real begins to
break down when you just have a wall of
information coming at you.
Uh
you need algorithms to parse the
information in some way.
Uh even time-based
display of the information is a
decision, right? And not necessarily the
best decision, and it will be gamed and
all of that. Uh people will start
posting right when they think the right
people are waking up. I mean, it's it is
uh Uh, it's really interesting, but I
think it forces everybody to lay bare
what their base assumption is about the
what I'll call the the people.
And
I have a base assumption that
authoritarian rule is the only way to
enforce a controlled narrative, even if
you're doing it for the what the
quote-unquote right reasons, that you
you will eventually have to do it
through violence.
And given that, my fear is always always
that the authoritarian government is far
more terrifying than the mob.
Meaning a bunch of people let loose
going crazy, saying whatever they want
to say. But I guess what where you where
the founding fathers would challenge you
is they would say that that isn't really
or shouldn't be the choice. That the
idea of representative democracy
was supposed to be finding a middle path
between
authoritarian despotism on the one hand
and what you call the mob on the other,
right? That
these structures, the Electoral College,
the Senate,
and coming out of that things like the
presidency was supposed to be ways of um
giving some voice to the people, but
balancing that voice with other things.
Balancing it with the Supreme Court that
was supposed to be composed of highly
educated jurists,
balanced with a carefully written
constitution,
an executive balanced with a
legislature,
and elected senators and representatives
who were supposed to be using their
judgment and conscience, not simply
acting as a transmission mechanism
for whatever their voters said.
Because um
if you are Thomas Jefferson thinking
about
[snorts]
government,
yes, you want to get rid of the king.
You want a revolution, but you you do
not have much confidence in the idea
that
a kind of free-for-all
is the way to go, that things need to be
curated and organized.
Just as I suppose, you know, this
conversation we're having
follows certain kinds of rules, certain
kinds of expectations.
You know, you very courteously let me
speak.
I casually listen to you and ask a
question back.
Um the but the risk in the public sphere
is that those rules disintegrate.
And you end up with nonsense.
Yeah, I I aggressively agree with the
founding fathers. I am completely uh
enamored by what they put into place. I
don't think that they could have ever
conceived of social media, and it is
very possible that they would have put
different things in place had they been
able to predict that. But I look at the
first and second amendment, and I say,
"Yeah, word." Like, that's exactly how
you have to be thinking. So,
uh the first amendment says, "You,
barring an incitement to violence, you
have the right to say anything." And
that has to be
a as a matter of priority, as the first
amendment, that has to be protected. And
I can go into reasons why, but I'm
actually more interested to hear if you
agree with that or not. But the first
amendment, and then followed up with the
second one, which is the right to bear
arms. And once you understand that the
founding fathers were far more worried
about the government becoming tyrannical
and you needing weapons not to protect
against your neighbor going crazy and
coming and stealing your chickens,
though yes, that too, but that
it's really about the government
becoming problem. So, to your point,
they're trying to get away from the
king, authoritarian rule. They're like,
"We don't want that anymore." But the
people like, "Hey, you don't just want
anarchy." Love the third way idea. But
there I think there people need to, at
at a minimum, have a hypothesis of mind
reading into the founding fathers and
why they would put those as one and two.
That was mine.
Um how do you take that? How do you feel
about free speech? Well, so I I think
the the
uh
idea of free speech is a
a smart and good one and I think it's
good that you added short of inciting
violence. I mean, we've just had this in
the United Kingdom.
The people who've been prosecuted have
not been prosecuted
for um sharing ideas. They've been
prosecuted for
defining how to attack
immigrants and hostels.
Telling people to wear gloves, telling
them what fuels to use, telling them
which hostels to attack, right?
The these are not masters to um
expressing their views.
Right? The people who've been put in
prison been put in prison for stuff that
you would be put in prison for before
social media.
I did that that breaks your first
amendment.
Um on the second amendment, look, this
is a difficult conversation.
But
I come from the United Kingdom.
In 1960s,
we had
about 100 people a year being killed by
gun violence in the United Kingdom.
And you had about 15,000 people a year
being killed by gun violence in the
United States.
Fast forward since we're in about 2 and
1/2 million people have been killed by
gun violence in the United States.
We are now in a situation where in the
United Kingdom, we have about 65 people
killed a year
through gun violence and you have
approaching 45,000 people killed a year.
In other words, the number of people
killed a year in the United States by
gun violence has tripled when it's
almost halved in the United Kingdom from
a very low level to begin with.
In fact, it's such a low level that it's
pretty difficult writing a crime drama
in the United Kingdom. there's just not
enough people murdered to
be able to generate the plot, right? I
mean, it's it's our average
uh crime dramas are basically body
counts is mostly people that would be
killed in an entire year.
Um so, I think that um
the founding fathers' anxiety around
despotic government is a good thing to
be worried about.
I think they were right to be concerned
about it, but I also think that
governing involves balancing very
different
considerations.
It involves balancing the ways that
societies change over time.
Uh technology changes over time.
You know, would they have taken the same
view of an assault weapon as they would
have a musket, which is what they were
talking about?
Would their views of government change
once governments have the ability to
surveil in the way that it does now?
Would their view of government change
if they saw that 2 and 1/2 million
people have been killed by gun violence
since the 1960s?
I don't know.
But I I certainly think that one of the
things that we have to do is is
remain alert to the possibility that the
world changes, things change.
And the things that we once believed,
um we may change our beliefs on. I mean,
I think a classic example
in Ireland would be the debate around
abortion, which has changed very
dramatically in the last 40 years.
From a very strong Catholic opposition
to a compromise.
And
the United States is now this very
strange outlier. I mean, I had a
you know, I was a member of the
Conservative Party in Britain. I had a
friend come to one of our Conservative
conferences, who's an American.
Couldn't believe the fact we didn't
mention abortion at all in the entire
conference. It's just not a subject.
Nobody talks about it, nobody's
interested in it.
We have a pragmatic compromise on how
many days
and the number of days beyond which you
can't have an abortion and the number of
days within which you can.
And it settled the issue
basically permanently in Britain and
Europe.
And in the US it hasn't, but that that
that I don't think is
telling you much more than that
cultures change
and they change at different paces.
That is for sure. Um
talk to me about social media. So,
practically speaking
there is a collision
as an American that certainly seems
true. As an outsider looking at the UK
it seems even more true. As an outsider
looking at Canada it's downright
terrifying. Um
what do you think should be done with
social media? Should people barring a
direct incitement to violence um
should there be controls? Should the
platforms be held accountable to what
people publish on their platforms? Uh
what's your take on that?
I don't know. I mean it's
it's a very very difficult world to get
into this. A part of the problem is
there is so much money involved.
Uh
literally some of the very very
wealthiest companies in the world are on
one side of this debate.
And their entire business model
is predicated on these algorithms and on
this particular way. I mean, what's
striking is that and I I'm being a bit
provocative here towards you and many of
your listeners, right? But
what's striking is that
some of these companies, my sense is,
you know, Google began quite idealistic.
There was all this do no evil stuff
going on, right?
And
back in 2014,
it still seemed plausible to me
that these companies believed they had
an ethical purpose.
It feels to me as though the only thing
they care about now is profit.
And they have developed these
unbelievable
marketplaces,
advertising models, algorithms that
allow them often to take
80 cents in the dollar from an entire
industry.
Now,
to what extent can they then be trusted
really to think clearly about these
things?
I just had a, you know, I just had a a
long conversation with the guy called
Nick Clegg, who's very senior at
Facebook.
And I like Nick very much, but
can I really believe when he's earning
as much money as he is that he's going
to be
clear and honest with himself? I don't
think he's necessarily lying to me. He
may be lying to himself about the
negative impacts of what's going on.
So,
I don't know how you get through this,
but one thing I know for sure, these
algorithms are not sharing information
on the basis of
what they believe is true. They're
sharing information on the basis of what
gets attention,
which they can then sell
to a company that wants your attention
in order for you to buy their products.
And
think about X, sorry, go ahead.
Yeah, go on. Go on. Go on with that.
I was just going to ask, what do you
think about X's community notes?
A step in the right direction, fine.
If anybody pays any attention to them,
but often the community notes come when
the damage is done. I mean, Elon Musk
had got 45 million people viewing a post
claiming that
Keir Starmer was trying to
extradite people to a small island in
the South Atlantic
before any community notes get on.
I mean, why did Donald Trump just
produce in this debate this strange
story about immigrants eating cats?
Because he operates in a strange bubble
full of other people who believe this.
Why do they believe this?
Well, they believe it because it's
incredibly easy now to share
this kind of information. When he said
it, I guess
millions of people listening will have
been like, "Damn right." Because they
somehow have seen this stuff and he's
seen this stuff.
But these algorithms are not are not
acting responsibly. I mean, they're not
they're not attempting in any way. I
mean, Elon Musk is a very interesting
example of this. You would have thought
that as the owner of this company
uh he would bother
sometimes to check what he puts out. The
fact that he can't be bothered to spend
a little bit of time
checking whether the article he's
sharing is true or not,
checking whether or not the historian
he's endorsing has said that Adolf
Hitler was in favor of peace and Winston
Churchill was the worst war criminal of
the war. I mean,
what's going on?
I mean,
it's this, I think, that's
that's that's that's bringing it to a
head.
That previously, if you were a regulator
in Europe or Canada dealing with these
companies,
you could convince yourself that they
were well-intentioned and that when they
got things wrong, it was by mistake.
So, the model was predicated on the idea
that you would go to Facebook or go to
Twitter and say, "I'm sorry.
You've posted something dangerous or
untrue." And rely on them to take it
down.
But we're now dealing with a situation
where it feels as though
I'm afraid with Elon Musk that he's not
well-intentioned in that way.
That he's testing it. He's pushing the
boundaries as hard as he possibly can.
And that you're not going to have a very
productive conversation with him saying
"I'm sorry, what you just said was
completely untrue, unbelievably
dangerous, causing huge chaos on the
streets. Could you please take it down?"
The likelihood is he'll say no, that's
my free speech. I'm allowed to share
lies if I want.
And that changes the whole equation.
Um in what way?
Well, because if 44 million people
suddenly hear that, for example, I mean,
how did these riots start in Britain?
The riots started in Britain
because a post on social media claimed
that a Syrian immigrant
who's named
got off a boat in the last 12 months and
killed three young girls with a knife.
Right, this was completely untrue.
The girls were killed by a Christian
who'd been born in the United Kingdom.
Immediately, people are burning down
mosques.
And they're burning down mosques cuz
they believe it was done by a Muslim.
And then, being spread very rapidly
around social media, is details on other
mosques and other community centers and
other asylum seekers. And quite quickly,
the government begins to lose control of
the narrative.
Then, if other people are tweeting out
you know, "The government is trying to
crush you and they're going to take you
off to the South Atlantic and put you on
an island in the middle of nowhere."
Right, more and more people come out on
the streets
fighting against what they believe is
this kind of crazy repressive government
that's going to deport them from the
country.
So, I mean, that that was a very, you
know, obvious example to us a few weeks
ago
where lies spread on social media
quite literally led to asylum seekers
trapped in a burning hotel
with hundreds of people outside trying
to set light to it on the belief that
these people were somehow responsible
for stabbing
young women who they hadn't stabbed.
So, your own uh countryman Orwell was
very aware that there was always going
to be a battle for the truth and that
humans could be manipulated pretty
easily
uh with fear
being one of the greatest weapons. Um
that is where I start to get worried
because it it social media forces us to
confront
some really stark basic assumptions. So,
for instance, can the populace think for
itself?
If you don't think that the the average
person at large can parse through the
information that's coming at them, then
it's like we have to shut this down for
the good of the people.
If you believe that
uh
someone somewhere when you put that kind
of control on is going to have to decide
what is true
and that they are likely to become
corrupted by power if nothing else,
um you run into a situation where you
have tradeoffs before you and you are
simply choosing the lesser of the bad
tradeoffs. Does it not seem that way to
you?
I think you're I think I mean I think
where we probably disagree is I think
you you you're
imagining a a little bit like you're
mob against uh authoritarian rule.
You're imagining two extremes and you've
lost sight of the of the reality. I mean
the reality is that
each of us, including you and me,
are
fallible humans.
We often will end up believing things
that aren't true.
And you know, we you and I will be quite
proud of our ability to pass information
and judge, but we'll be aware that we've
got it wrong. We've been wrong about
friends, we've been wrong about world
events.
Um we're susceptible to certain kinds of
authority. Our memories are very weird
and flawed. I mean, we we are strange
creatures.
And so I I don't think one wants to I
mean, I'm very sensitive to this as
somebody who was an elected politician.
I mean, obviously as an elected
politician,
it would be uh
complete career suicide to suggest that
the public could ever be wrong about
anything.
Because your opponent would immediately
say,
you know, you're you're contemptuous of
the public, you don't believe in
democracy.
My view is that generally the judgment
of the public's pretty good.
It's generally why I like living in a
democracy. I think
people are pretty sensible.
Do I think that the decision to vote for
Brexit was the correct decision? No. I
think it's been very damaging for the
United Kingdom, but the majority of
people voted for it. How do I then deal
with that? I deal with that by saying to
myself, well,
we live in a society where there's lots
of different access to information, lots
of different levels of education,
lots of different data out there, and
it's a pluralistic society, and people
have the right to choose to leave the
European Union if they want to, even if
I disagree with them.
But that's about defining
uh a
a terrain of rules. It's uh defining a
stadium within whose bounds you play.
People can choose within that stadium to
leave the European Union. Right? They
can choose to put taxes up or taxes
down.
They cannot, in my view, choose to burn
down hotels with human beings in them.
And we have
I mean, our whole system is about
drawing boundaries and lines. And the
the risk of where
the real techno-optimists and apostles
of social media are going
is that they're forgetting how many
rules there are already in our
societies, how our whole society depends
on rules.
And they're asking, for example, for the
rules
for one particular form, forgetting that
our entire lives, liberty, and happiness
depend upon systems that constrain in
innumerable ways
what we can do.
Okay, so I think we actually agree on
all of the pieces, but we disagree maybe
on the conclusion. So, um we're
fallible. So, my whole
my whole world view is predicated on my
agreement with the following statement.
So, it's interesting that I think there
is some area though where we end up
drawing something different. So, we're
fallible, 100%. That that is why I am so
terrified of the government because a an
authoritarian government is a government
that says we know best. And I'm saying,
"No, no, no. You're just made up of
fallible people uh who believe things
that aren't true, who have memories that
are just wildly um manipulated by
themselves, by others. It's the way that
our minds work is utterly fascinating.
Um
so, all of those things that make us
a slightly scary creature, I agree with
all of that. And I come back to you, and
I suppose the question that I asked
about community notes is because that to
me feels like the only real solution.
So, I get it. There are going to be
times where 45 million people, 100
million people, 200 million, whatever,
they see a lie, a blatant lie, and that
will do just unimaginable damage before
it's corrected.
But, and um
I have not been able to articulate to
you in this that I look at the two
extremes so that I can find the third
way. I'm just trying to see what the
realities of the compromise are, not
because I'm saying, "Oh, you just go to
one of the other." I'm saying, "If you
understand what the tradeoffs are going
to be, hopefully you can find a better
way." But when I look at, "Oh, okay, uh
millions, hundreds of millions of people
will see a lie and that lie could have
tremendous consequences. So, what do I
do about that? Do I step on that from
the top down or do I let the people
battle that out in the arena of ideas?"
I think I was pretty agnostic until
COVID happened and all of a sudden I saw
people that had very credible voices uh
in terms of epidemiology being told to
shut up because what they were saying
didn't match the narrative and if you
believe in the scientific pro- uh
process as I do, you break that process
and so you are breaking the ability to
make progress when you tell people that
certain things are beyond the pale and
cannot be discussed. There are certainly
things beyond the pale that you can't
do,
but in terms of like, "Hey, here's my
hypothesis on
what is happening here?" Again, I'm not
saying that you should be able to
advocate for violence or anything like
that. I'm just saying,
we
when authoritarian rule comes in to say
misinformation, disinformation,
malinformation, those are all completely
off limits, you get a totalitarian
state.
So, I mean, I've I
you know, I agree and sympathize a lot
with what you're saying. I mean, I my
version of your experience during COVID
was
my experience in Afghanistan and Iraq.
So, I served in those places and
I saw very, very clearly
people pursuing completely crazy
policies that made no sense at all.
And I saw politicians and generals
and an enormous amount of the public
getting behind
projects which were just simply crazy.
Wasting lives, wasting money. I mean,
just And so, it's very easy on the basis
of that to think
the establishment, the elites got no
idea what it's doing, and we need to
blow up the whole system.
The question is, what is the
alternative?
And I don't think that what we're
describing with COVID or Iraq and
Afghanistan or indeed what I saw
as a
somebody working in international
development,
where I saw so many ludicrous, stupid,
wasteful
projects. Um I I don't think those
things are examples of
authoritarian rule. It can feel like it,
because if you disagree with the
conventional wisdom,
it it can feel pretty authoritarian.
But it's much more like what happens if
you're in a company
where the board has got the wrong end of
the stick.
These are much more the problems we face
in our societies are much more about
optimism bias,
groupthink,
risk aversion. So, if I think about, you
know, what's happening with COVID in the
United Kingdom,
it's not exactly that we're living in a
dictatorship. It's more that a bunch of
slightly complacent politicians and
scientists,
for for reasons which are often to do
with their psychology rather than the
evidence,
right? End up going down a particular
path.
And that's all of history.
You know, we It's now clear that the
economic policy of the 1970s was largely
ludicrous. The economic policy of 1980s
was pretty ludicrous. And that a lot of
the things we've done and believe in are
pretty ludicrous. I happen to believe
that there's a form of this groupthink
and optimism bias happening with social
media.
That in 20 years' time, people are going
to look at it, and they're going to look
at it in the way that they look at
Philip Morris cigarettes or Perdue
Pharma.
They're going to literally say, "What
were these people thinking? How did they
think this was normal and okay?
But, this isn't authoritarianism. This
is um
This is
groupthink. It's optimism bias. It's
financial interests. It's And And And
that's And the way to deal with it is
not through
um
the radical uh
opening of every narrative. The way to
deal with it is through checks and
balances.
The way to deal with it is through an
independent judiciary, through
independent universities, through
electoral cycles where people can get
rid of their government every 4 years,
through um
breaks between executives and
legislatures. I'm much more confident
that the
answer is the structures of liberal
democracy, not the kind of
that we're going to stop
authoritarianism by unleashing the power
of social media. I think the power of
social media is much more likely to lead
to the collapse of liberal democracies
and the development of authoritarian
states.
It's much more likely to embolden
populism, much more likely to embolden
uh people who are able to exploit
attention and advertising models to take
power and then challenge the
constitution.
Very interesting. If I'm right that that
only happens when the tinder is dry,
meaning the economics are bad, there's
an underlying sense of frustration, um
yes, I can see that, but I think that's
just you're supercharging the um
the voices to your point. But, if the
voices have nothing to rally in the
populace's soul, I don't think it will
take hold. When things are growing and
people feel good, you just don't end up
going down that path.
but, my answer to that is I'm I'm more
gloomy than you are. I think it's very
rare in societies for things to be
growing and for people to be feeling
good.
Our experience as humans is one of
perpetual dissatisfaction.
I mean
what do we meaning when we're saying
things are going well? Right? If you're
somebody on a low income in the United
States,
you now live in a world in which even if
your income was going up by 10% a year,
you know, you're still getting by on 40,
50,000 dollars a year and you can see on
television
people living lives where they don't
have to worry about their mortgage, they
don't have to worry about facing their
grocery bills.
You're stuck in Flint, Michigan and you
can see
the Kardashians having a good time in
California, right? You
you we cannot
as societies
produce the situation where
everybody or even the majority of people
are going to feel that their lives are
great. People are always going to be
incredibly conscious of
the un- the injustice of the world, the
unfairness of life. Most people will
always feel that.
And therefore we need to design systems
which are realistic about that.
Which find ways of explaining that
you know, in in the United Kingdom that
we can't pay for our health service
without paying much more tax.
That we can't expect to clean up our
rivers without investing far more in our
water system.
That we're not going to be able to have
an economy that grows as fast as China.
That we're not going to be able to run
our hospitals without having immigrants.
I mean
and and the tinder will always be there.
All societies are full of tinder. I
mean, there may be rare exceptions. It's
possible that in the United States
between about 1955 and 1975 you had a
a rare period of 20 years where the
tinder was a little wetter and where
people were not as enraged. But the
general condition of most of our
societies, doesn't matter whether you're
in China or Indonesia or Britain or the
United States,
is a lot of very angry people,
understandably,
because life is extremely unfair.
That is uh certainly a sobering uh
perspective. So, if we are living in a
state of perpetual dissatisfaction, the
Tinder is already there always there,
social media gives voices that create
this rise in populism, what do we
actually do?
Well, um I think on
we have to up the quality of the
non-populist politicians. They need to
have policies which are credible and
serious.
They need to be able to improve people's
lives. I mean, they're never going to be
able to deliver everything that people
crave,
but we certainly should be able to
deliver better health care to people in
the United States. We should be able to
deliver better infrastructure. We should
be able to deliver decent economic
growth, not Chinese-style economic
growth, but we should be able to deliver
2 or 3% economic growth.
And we should be able to have more equal
tax systems. These things are not beyond
us.
Secondly, I think we need much better
communication. I think one of the
problems is that the
Hillary Clintons of this world came
across as humorless and stiff and out of
touch. And if the center is to regain a
bit of momentum, it needs to develop a
sense of humor.
But finally, we need a sense of moral
purpose.
We need to explain why the populist
critique is not just
intellectually incoherent, but morally
wrong.
Why pluralism matters, why democracy
matters, why equality matters, why these
things are precious ethically.
So, that's on the side of the
politicians, but then I think there is
probably also room room for more
regulation of social media as part of
the story.
I see
um I mean, this is a very classic view,
but I see all of history, all of human
existence as a feedback loop. Uh
and quite frankly, a positive feedback
loop, so that the output of the system
itself causes the system to move faster.
And when I look at um the economy, I
don't know if you how much you know
about Ray Dalio, but um looking at his
study of empires rising and empires
falling, and it's all essentially a
cycle of debt. Um there seems an
inevitability. I know you and I slightly
disagree about um
Although, I will say in your answer, it
sounded to me like a lot of things that
you're saying that we need to do, better
politicians, better economy, uh more
humor, these are all things that that
put a little moisture on the tinder. And
I think that's right. I think that's the
right answer. Um but it does get at, I
think, my stance, which is, okay, the
tinder's always going to be there, but
it it does differ in degree of dryness.
Uh and so, there are times where it's
more likely to spark than others. So, um
I think the debt cycle drives a lot of
this, and that we are now, obviously,
the UK is an empire that has, I mean, I
would say it has collapsed, certainly.
It's it is not what it was when the sun
never set on the
British Empire. And the American Empire
feels like, to use Ray Dalio's language,
we are
mid to late stage five, and stage six is
total collapse.
Um
in this
moment, do you see do you perceive any
inevitability? Because that is certainly
how it feels from my perspective.
it depends depends what I mean, I think
you're right that debt is a big problem,
and we don't talk enough about debt, and
we don't talk enough about the way that
money works, and we don't talk about
what happens when debt is canceled or
forgiven, and what that can mean for
countries, too.
Um but
it also depends, when you talk about the
collapse of empires what you mean
and what you're worried about. So
the United Kingdom no longer rules an
empire.
Right, it's
a small island in the Mediterranean.
Sorry, small island in the Atlantic. I
don't know why I put it in
like, wow, you guys upgraded to the
Mediterranean. Nice. We've upgraded.
It's must be the weather here.
It's climate change making us seem more
Mediterranean.
Um
uh
but
the average person in Britain
is much better off than their
grandparents were. So at the period
where Britain ruled a quarter of the
world
life expectancy was in its early 60s.
Uh average incomes were down at 5 or
6,000 pounds a year.
People didn't have indoor lavatories,
indoor toilets. Um
they didn't have electricity, many
people.
And now we live in a world in which we
no longer get to send
white guys off to rule large chunks of
India.
But the average person in the United
Kingdom is far better off materially
than they were in the 1930s, 1940s. So
what are we talking about when we're
talking about the collapse of the
American Empire, right?
Perfectly plausible that within 20, 30
years time nobody in the Congo is going
to be interested what the United States
has to say about the world.
Perfectly plausible that nobody in Japan
or South Korea is going to rely on the
United States to save them.
But that doesn't mean that
the next generation or the generation
after might not live lives which are
longer, happier, more fulfilled and
richer than those of us that are alive
today.
Yeah, the the only thing that I lose
sleep over is that the transition moment
is almost always devastating. So, the
long arc of history, it won't matter,
it'll bend towards justice, things will
get better for everybody, but that will
be cold comfort to the people that have
to live through it.
But, setting that aside cuz there's some
other things that I want to talk to you
about. Um decentralization being one of
them. This is something you've put
forward as a way to improve politics, to
get out of some of the quagmire. And
then your recent work on um direct
giving. I think these two ideas are are
really powerful.
Well, let let let me talk about them.
And they're related in a way. So,
decentralization is about understanding
that often local people know more, care
more, can do more than distant
officials.
That you're much more likely to come up
with a good solution for your
neighborhood than somebody in
Washington.
And that there's another great benefit
for decentralization, getting power down
to a local level, which is that you can
end up with a lot of it.
You can learn from each other. Rather
than having a single centralized
structure, different states do different
things and they
learn from each other, compete with each
other.
I also think that at a time when we've
lost faith in democracy, the closer you
put government to people, allowing them
to vote in their local area and get
engaged in shaping their local area, the
more
faith and trust they redevelop in the
democratic system.
I think our our societies are basically
too big.
Our governments are too far away. And
that a lot of our problems come from
that.
The same would be true with industrial
strategies. I think that an industrial
strategy for California is much better
developed in California than in
Washington.
And probably much better developed in
northern California than in California
as a whole, etc.
On direct giving, I mean this is
something which is even more radical,
but
I used to run a $20 billion dollar year
international development program. We're
literally giving 20,000 million dollars
a year to people in developing world.
It's one of the largest development
programs in the world.
And we achieved so little.
And one of the reasons we achieved so
little is that we were obsessed with the
idea that we knew best.
We were coming in to an African village
and we were going to teach them
something. We had this great phrase,
"Give someone a fish, they eat for a
day. Teach them to fish, they eat for a
lifetime."
And we developed these mad
teaching people to fish programs, which
ended up consuming 95% of the budgets
and ending up with almost no good
results on the ground.
I then had the privilege a few years ago
visiting this nonprofit called
GiveDirectly, which was giving cash.
That's all it was doing.
Turning up in a village,
it was surveying people and then it was
transferring to their phones, cheap
feature phone,
about $900 in cash.
You go back a few weeks later, the
entire community is transformed.
People have new roofs, their kids are in
school, they're eating better, there's
electricity, there's water supply,
there's latrines. The whole place has
been completely transformed. And
transformed for, I would say, about 5%
of the cost that it would take you to do
it through a traditional program.
Whereas you could do 20 times as many
villages as you could do
through a traditional program. And why?
Well, because
it turns out that cash falls like uh
kind of water on a mountain landscape.
It fills every crevice and
cranny and it adjusts flexibly to
different people's lives. It adjusts the
fact that
you may have a different business idea
to me or your neighbor may be focused on
health care and someone else focused on
education or you may need to fix your
roof. I've already fixed my roof. I want
to buy a cow. You want to get a bicycle
for your business. I mean, and the cash
allows you to do that. Whereas the
traditional program comes in and says,
"The one thing that matters in village
is water." Or "The one thing that
matters in this village is education."
Or "The one thing that matters in this
village is a road." Or "The one thing
that matters is roofs." Or "The one
thing that matters is sanitation."
Right? It's It's nonsense. Every house
is different. Every need is different.
And if you give cash,
something very interesting happens.
People begin adjusting to each other.
Right?
You and your neighbors buy a bunch of
bicycles so you can take your products
to market. I open a store fixing
bicycles.
You buy a cow, I open a store selling
veterinary medicine for cows. Or I set
up a yogurt business processing the milk
from those cows.
There's amazing multiplier effects that
come out of cash. And above all, I think
just to finish on that, it gives
dignity.
It's saying that the poorest people in
the world know more than you or I do
about their village in Malawi. The idea
that you or I have any idea what their
lives are like, what their needs are,
what their priorities are, is just
madness.
We can begin to understand what they're
worried about day-to-day. And it would
cost us an incredible amount of money
trying to work it out, most of which
would be wasted.
All right, it is an utterly fascinating
um idea. So, as I try to wrap my head
around what this
uh is at its essence. So, it's
This is going to sound weird, but it's
basically a decentralized centralized
bank that is creating money out of thin
air from their perspective, right? So,
it just shows up in their bank account.
So, we're creating money, we're
distributing it. Now, given that that
must always happen to jump-start an
economy, whether you're digging gold out
of the ground, or you're harvesting
seashells, or salt, or whatever. Uh you
have to create a thing that is the money
that people want, and therefore they
will do a thing. It allows people to
specialize. I mean, this just is how
economies are born. But, the economy
must become at some point
self-sustaining, or you get what we're
having here in America, which is why I
think we're in so much trouble, which is
just printing money. But setting that
aside, how does this how does direct
giving, if you look at it like that,
jump-starting an economy, how does it
become self-sustaining? Well, what one
thing is that what we're increasingly
doing is giving one-time payments. This
is not a UBI. So people are not
receiving this money every month.
It's a one-time capital investment that
is going into getting that business off
the ground or fixing that roof and
and it's understanding, as you say, that
often what's holding people back is
capital, not knowledge.
The people in this village have a very
good idea
uh
what goods they can sell in in the
market town. The problem is they're 20
miles away from the market town and they
don't have a bicycle to get to it.
Or they did just don't have a plastic
bottle into which to put the yogurt that
they're milking out of the cow. I mean,
there's very simple things that they're
often lacking.
So it it's recognizing that's what's
holding or you know, you're running the
a little shop in town, you don't have
any money to buy any biscuits. I think
these are pretty straightforward things
or you can't buy in bulk.
A lot of the uh issues is that one of
the reasons the extreme poor in Africa
uh end up in a very bad position is that
they
can't buy a packet of 12 bits of toilet
paper.
They they have to buy it in tiny, more
expensive quantities because they don't
have the money to
to do any kind of bulk buying. There's
no economies of scale for them.
Once that's going
then, of course, it isn't about cash.
Once the motion of the economy for the
extreme poor is going, it's then much
more about the economy as a whole.
It's about is there a decent government?
Where's the tax rate? Where's the
infrastructure? Are there roads? Are
there schools? Are there clinics?
What's your tariff and trading position?
And and and so the cash is not about
kick-starting the whole economy. It's
about
allowing the extreme poor, and even
within a country as poor as Rwanda,
we're talking about a third of the
population, not the majority of the
population.
Allowing them to access
the infrastructure and the economy
that's out there.
Interesting. You said this is not about
jump-starting the whole economy. I'm
very surprised you say that, meaning
there's already an economy there or
Yeah, so let's take Rwanda. Rwanda's got
a gross domestic product of about $10
billion a year.
And the extreme poor are living on about
$2 a day.
And there's probably about
uh
say 2 million of them in that country.
What you're talking about is giving the
money to the people who are literally
struggling to work out how they're going
to eat for the next 2 days.
And allowing them to access services
which often already exist. There's often
already a hospital or a clinic, but if
you are
on the edge of starvation, you you just
can't get to that hospital or clinic.
There may be a school, but you just
can't afford to send your kids to that
school because
the basic
money that you might even need to buy a
textbook or the decision that your
child's not going to be hoeing
vegetables but go off to
school is too much for you to make.
Um
again, Rwanda, it's got an insurance
sector. It's got call centers. It's got
software developers.
It's got uh people employed as teachers
and doctors. I mean, there's lots of
stuff happening in the economy. The
problem is these remote villages.
And and that's where
the $900 suddenly transforms somebody's
opportunities and ability to better
themselves.
Okay, so what is it? Just uh not to pick
on Rwanda, but since you brought them
up, Yeah. why doesn't Rwanda do this
themselves? Is there corruption in the
system? Is there something broken? Like,
why didn't this problem resolve itself?
Well, fundamentally cuz the country
hasn't got enough money. I mean, the the
even with a GDP of 10 billion dollars,
it's it's got a population of about 10
million people. They're living on the
the average person is living on about a
thousand dollars a year.
And the tax revenue that you can
generate from that is not sufficient to
be able to deliver
900 dollars to a family in extreme
poverty.
You would need to bring in the money
from the World Bank or the IMF or some
other donor.
And it's not a loan you're giving
people. They're not paying you back.
It's a one-time cash grant.
Um so uh
without the taxation revenue, without
the ability to borrow, um you simply
don't have the money to give these
people.
Okay, so is this uh just trying to find
an analogy to help people wrap their
heads around this? And And I'm asking
this in the spirit of the following. I
don't think the average taxpayer cares.
So, they're like, why am I going to pay
for this? Like, if the Rwandan
government isn't able to do this for
their own people, why am I doing this?
And so then it becomes a humanitarian
thing. And I think people will get some
people, obviously, will get behind like,
okay, cool. I'm willing to do this. But
they're going to need to really
understand how this at some point become
self-sustaining. So, if the Rwandan
government is already not collecting
enough taxes to be able to do this with
their own populace, and this isn't
jump-starting the whole economy, but
attaching them to the economy,
does that like make this all work? Or
are we going to have a brief generation
where things are nice and then it just
falls by the wayside?
No,
I mean, one of the reasons why we're
quite confident about this is that
some very, very rigorous randomized
controlled trials have been run where
you compare the groups that receive the
cash with the groups that don't receive
the cash over 3, 6, 9, 12 years.
And we're seeing even 12 years into
these programs
the sustained impact of a few hundred
dollars given 12 years earlier in terms
of people's savings, their investments,
and above all their incomes.
And you're seeing those people becoming
taxpayers, and you're seeing those
people contributing in a productive
fashion to the economy.
So,
the evidence is is very very striking.
Um in a study in Kenya,
for each dollar going into these
villages, there's $2.50 of benefit for
the surrounding area. This is partly
because people are starting from a very
low base. It's not
I I think you were getting at this a few
minutes ago.
Capital in this context goes much much
further than it would in somewhere like
the United States.
It partly because things much cheaper,
partly because
uh
what is a dollar for us will end up
being worth about a hundred dollars for
the people that are receiving it.
But also that there is so much untapped
potential, so much untapped labor, so
much untapped resource.
You know, there's quite literally in
Zambia there is
um I was with a farmer in Zambia.
And I he said, uh I've just
uh got a house for my son. And I said,
well, what does that mean? And he said,
well, come with me.
And literally he just walked into the
bush, chopped down some trees, and stuck
up a mud thing. Now his son was
cultivating what was wasteland.
And still in an enormous amount of
Africa, there's incredible
land there which hasn't even begun to be
cultivated. So, the small amount of
money that you bring in which allows
somebody to get that hoe, buy a few
seeds, get a little bit of fertilizer or
pesticide, plant a few trees,
produces impact in a way that it never
could if you were
you know, giving the money to somewhere,
I don't know, in Kansas where it's much
more difficult for somebody in extreme
poverty to put their money to work.
If you guys have 12 years worth of data
on this, where can people learn about
that?
So, if you go to givedirectly.org,
they are fantastic and I think very
honest and one of the reasons I I
support this organization
I'm not paid by this organization, but I
support this organization is because
they're wonderfully honest.
And they've got a lot of research. They
talk very openly about things that go
wrong.
They talk about when they're surprised
by less impact. They talk about when
they're disappointed, but they also talk
beautifully about the things that have
worked and how much they've learned.
And they show right the way down to the
detail these academic papers. There'll
be more than 350 studies now. And these
are rigorous models on the way in which
you do a medical trial
in the way that you compare the control
group and the treatment group.
How does this compare to what Bill Gates
is doing?
He is doing something very different.
Bill Gates is concerned with health and
what he really wants to do in many
contexts is eliminate diseases.
So, he would like to eradicate polio.
He'd like to end malaria, for example.
He'd like to vaccinate people.
And that really is what he cares about.
If I'm looking at somebody in a village
house and you give them cash they get to
choose what their priority is.
Am I going to fix my roof? Am I going to
start a business? Am I going to put my
kids in school? Am I going to vaccinate
myself? That's not the Bill Gates view.
Bill Gates view is this person should
vaccinate themselves. The money is going
into vaccination. And my problem with
that
and I'm not succeeding in convincing
Bill Gates this and this would irritate
him if he listens to your show
is that what you're often doing is
letting people live longer lives in
extreme grinding poverty. You're not
giving them the opportunity to improve
their lives. They're just living longer.
Now
there's something to be said for living
longer, but I'm not sure that the weight
that he puts on living longer as opposed
to living a shorter life in better
material conditions is correct.
Right. Talking to you has been utterly
fascinating, man. I cannot thank you
enough for your time. Where can people
follow along with you?
Well, uh thank you. Um so, uh
couple of things. Um do go to the
GiveDirectly website because I'm
passionately proud of them.
Um uh I I tweet Rory Stewart UK, and
I've just written a book called
Politics, uh which is out in the US
called How Not to Be a Politician.
I love it. Awesome. Thank you again so
much for joining me today. Everybody, if
you have not already, be sure to
subscribe. And until next time, my
friends, be legendary. Take care. Peace.
If you liked this conversation, check
out this episode to learn more. First
off, the um the financial cliff
that we're rapidly driving off uh is is
pretty terrifying.
Um there you know, it's not just the $35
trillion in debt or the fact that um
that entry