Democracy and the Case for a New American Founding with Osita Nwanevu
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Osita Nwanevu argues that the United States cannot be accurately described as a democracy due to deep-seated structural flaws inherited from its founding era, which prioritized elite control and property rights over popular sovereignty. Although the Constitution was born out of economic crises and political compromises, such as Rhode Island's refusal to join regarding paper money, it established systems that entrench privileges rather than ensuring governance by the governed. Nwanevu challenges the reverence for founders like Thomas Jefferson, noting their own admission that constitutions should be revised frequently, and asserts that Americans possess the agency to reshape institutions rather than being bound by the "ghosts" of the past. He defines true democracy as requiring political equality, responsiveness to the public, and majority rule, distinguishing this from republicanism, which merely prevents entrenched power without guaranteeing popular rule.
The discussion extends to specific institutional dysfunctions, particularly within the Senate and the filibuster, which create a "tyranny of the minority" by distorting representation and forcing power into the unpredictable executive branch. Nwanevu highlights how these structures allow small states disproportionate influence compared to populous ones, leading to a lack of congressional oversight on critical issues like war powers and corporate influence. Beyond political mechanics, he advocates for economic democracy, linking citizens' freedom directly to their economic conditions and arguing that strengthening unions and collective bargaining is essential for worker well-being without sacrificing growth. Rather than romanticizing obsolete manufacturing jobs or attempting to reverse globalization, he proposes updating labor laws through sectoral bargaining and worker cooperatives to empower workers in a modern service-based economy.
Ultimately, Nwanevu contends that American politics suffers because elites construct static, idealized images of the public instead of engaging with a dynamic citizenry capable of change. He emphasizes that democracy is not a fixed entity but a set of processes allowing for fair competition and shifting majorities, warning that current institutions often empower specific groups at the expense of others to distort policymaking. Meaningful discourse must connect abstract democratic ideals to material benefits and everyday realities, rejecting nostalgic views of the mid-century economy or ineffective solutions like tariffs in favor of portable benefits and sectoral organizations. While maintaining humility about the direct impact of his writing on policy debates, Nwanevu stresses the responsibility of scholars to produce careful research over fast-paced opinion pieces and urges creators to make explicit arguments for humane principles against the backdrop of eroding shared assumptions and the dangers of Silicon Valley elites lacking democratic accountability.
Read the full video transcript
Welcome to Virtual Sentiments. I'm your
host, Kristen Collins. On today's
episode, I talked to Oceanvo.
Oce is a contributing editor at the New
Republic, a columnist at the Guardian,
and a Democratic Institutions fellow at
the Roosevelt Institute. He is a former
staff writer at the New Republic, The
New Yorker, and Slate. and his work has
also appeared in the New York Times, the
New York Review of Books, The Nation,
Harper's Magazine, the Columbia
Journalism Review, and These Times,
Flaming Hydra, and Gawker. His first
book, The Right of the People: Democracy
and the Case for a New American
Founding, was recently published by
Random House.
We recorded this episode on July 6th,
which is a perfect date because this
year is the 250th anniversary of the
American founding. And this episode is
one of three that we've devoted to the
American political experiment. Each
episode takes a different approach to
commemorating the founding, emphasizing
America's past, its present, or its
future. Our first of this little series
within our series was with Laura Field
released on July 3rd which focused on
America's present how some figures on
the new MAGA right interpret the
founding and the role those
interpretations play in their critiques
of liberalism today. This episode with
ACA explores his vision for America's
democratic future. Arguments he develops
through rigorous engagement with
contemporary political science history
and the works of the founding fathers.
We discussed the founding fathers
intellectual arguments but also the
actual political compromises that they
made on the long road that they traveled
from revolution to the articles of
confederation to the constitution
itself. Rather than treat the founders
as having the final say on our politics
and simply appealing to their authority,
Acea draws on their spirit of change of
breaking with tradition, citing Thomas
Jefferson's own concerns in a 1789
letter to Madison that a country's
constitution should change with
successive generations. As Acea says
later in the episode, "We have more of a
capacity to shape this country than
ghosts do." I hope you find our
conversation as thoughtprovoking as I
did.
On today's episode of Virtual
Sentiments, I'm talking to Ocea Noan
Nevu. Osa is a contributing editor at
the New Republic, a columnist at the
Guardian and the Democratic Institutions
Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute. He is
a former staff writer at the New
Republic, The New Yorker, and Slate. And
his work has also appeared in the New
York Times, the New York Review of
Books, The Nation, Harper's Magazine,
The Colombia Journalism Review, In These
Times, Flaming Hydra, and Gawker. His
first book, The Right of the People:
Democracy and the Case for a New
American Founding, was recently
published by Random House. Thanks so
much for joining me on the podcast
today, Asa.
>> Thanks so much for having me.
>> Um, I am so excited because we are
recording this I my understanding
towards the end of your book tour, so
hopefully you're not too sick of talking
about all this, but also it's July.
We're right kind of at we're at the end
of the major celebrations downtown for
America's semiquincential, but we're
still kind of very much in that year,
right? And I do feel like your book is
such a perfect thing to be reading right
now and to be thinking about um because
you're reflecting on the past of
American politics and of the founding of
the republic of the Declaration of
Independence. You have a recent piece on
that as well that we can talk about uh
too. But you're also kind of doing that
in order to take stock of the present.
And what really I I loved about this
book is that you were willing to be
super ambitious about your claims that
America is not a democracy and that it
should be one. and you take really great
care to explain what that means to you,
what we should think of democracy,
engaging with really uh cutting edge,
important and relevant political science
research, which you know, I will say not
to be too negative, but a lot of times
when you read pop science or more
journalistic accounts of American
politics, it can be frustrating as a
political theorist, as a political
scientist because you feel like that
literature is isn't being engaged with.
And you did so so deafly. I mean, it was
it was excellent. But then in doing
that, you're engaging with this theory,
giving us a sense of what American
democracy should look like, and then
also leveraging such an an in-depth
understanding of like American history,
but also the policy landscape right now.
And giving us like this really concrete
vision of the reforms and the political
actions we'd have to take in both, you
know, the public institutions and the
private sphere to actually make America
a democracy, which is really cool. So, I
promise I'm not just buttering you up,
but I wanted
>> by the book. That's that's the pitch you
guys need, right? But I wanted to frame,
you know, why I'm so excited to be
talking to you, uh, and how I wanted to
start this off. So, I thought maybe you
could start us off by reflecting a
little bit on two things, which is like
the motivation of the book. You know,
why did you decide to write this book?
And knowing that it takes time to write
this, what do you think about the fact
that it's, you know, you you've released
it, you're going on a book tour
coinciding with this anniversary of the
American founding? I mean, what does
that mean to you? What has that like
inspired for the book? and has it maybe
changed the way you look at the book or
has it kind of just sort of fleshed out
and help you show the impact of what
you're trying to do uh to your
audiences?
>> Yeah, sure. So, it's funny you mentioned
the commemorations cuz I was actually
out there in DC on the 4th of July. It
was like 102 degrees. So, there was some
kind of sickness in me that pulled me
there despite the fact that it was a
terrible time to be out and about
>> for American Patriots
which might be one in the same thing.
Well, you know, I was there partially
because I wanted to write something for
one of those newsletters you mentioned,
Fred Hydra, but I think it would have
been there anyway. And um I actually
went to the National Archives for the
first time. Like I I'd grown up in the
DC area, been to a lot of the museums in
the DC area, but I'd never been to the
archives, never seen the Constitution,
and I figured, well, hell, today's the
day to to do it. Um so I was out there
for a couple of hours in line, you know,
102 degrees with all these sweaty sweaty
but determined people. Um, and then you
finally get to this space and it's this
really huge kind of retunda where
they've got the Constitution, they've
got the Declaration, they've got
documents like the 19th Amendment, but
you get in there and there's just sort
of this mob or gaggle of people in front
of the Constitution, which is the
central document in the space, and you
can't see it. Like, it's very hard to
get close. There are people who are
huddling over it, who are taking
selfies, taking pictures of their kids.
Nobody can actually see the document.
I'm sure in these pictures, you're just
getting pictures of other people taking
pictures. And so it was this remarkable
moment where I got to see kind of in
person one of the reasons why I wrote
the book which was to kind of demystify
and bring that document in particular
down to earth. Um I think the
constitution is an extraordinarily
important document in the history of
republican governance. I think it's an
important document in the history of
political theory. I think it did a lot
to make this country possible. And
that's not to, you know, that's not
something to to take lightly, but I do
think it has these fundamental problems
that are really really bedeing our
politics and have for some time. And as
I was writing, you know, I started about
10 years ago writing about politics and
the middle of the 2016 campaign, you
know, over the course of my still young
career, it just occurred to me over and
over and over again that we were facing
problems that were products of the
Constitution and sort of products of a
kind of misunderstanding or kind of
mislication or a kind of shallow
understanding of what democracy actually
means. And so you can think about the
2016 elections being part of this. you
know, Donald Trump wins an electoral
college victory
>> while losing the popular vote. But even
beyond that, you know, I was as I was
covering the 2020 Democratic primary and
all the policy issues people were
talking about then, whether it was
Medicare for all or immigration reform
or gun control,
>> climate change policy, Green New Deal,
that kind of stuff. I found myself
having to say over and over and over
again, well, yes, you know, this might
be a good policy idea for this or that
reason. It might have the support of
this or that plurality or majority of
the American public, but it's very very
unlikely that it's going to pass
Congress even if Democrats win the
presidency. Even if they win Congress.
>> Yeah. Y
>> given certain structural features of our
federal system. And I found myself
having to describe that situation over
and over again without having the
opportunity to really explain it or
think through why that was. Why do we
have a federal system that is structured
the way that it's structured? Is it
right to call it a democracy given those
kinds of challenges? When Republicans
say, "Well, we're a republican, not a
democracy, and that justifies the way
the system's set up." Is that true?
>> Um, and is democracy even desirable? You
know, like, can we sort of in this
moment where we're dealing with
misinformation and the public not being
informed about certain things and all
these anxieties we have about,
>> yes,
>> the voting populace, polarization. um
should we even feel as gung-ho about
democracy as we often do without taking
a step back to question those things. So
that's that's kind of where the book
came from. Um I wanted the space and the
time to leave the news cycle a little
bit, consult political theory, consult a
lot of books that have been sort of
lying dusty on my shelf since college
and get to the bottom what democracy
actually is and and use that as a entry
point for really evaluating the
political system without a kind of
rosetinted perspective.
>> Yeah. Yeah. No, I mean, and I think that
that comes through in the work. And I
also think I will also say, I mean, I
think there's something that political
theorists, you know, the experts in
academia can't do that you can do with
the incredible experience you have
writing about politics and being
immersed in um political discourse. And
there is this weird there is this
strange thing though where
distinguishing between like punditry and
you know ideas and theory and then
actually thinking though a big picture
politics because you see I think similar
you know I won't name names but similar
people who have you know huge audiences
who made a name for themselves as being
very knowledgeable about the literature
who then kind of treat everything as
like a horse race politics and kind of
give their they're almost more like
acting like political consultants in
their punditry as opposed to kind of
helping us clarify and understand where
we're at right now in this political
moment and what direction we're going in
and how to pull us into a direction that
will be more consistent with um the
ideas and the values that we claim to
care about like democracy, like
equality, like liberty. Um so let me
then let's get in a little bit more to
the substance of the work then. Um, and
so thinking about kind of the way you
start off the book, you do start with
kind of a reading about the beginning of
the Declaration of Independence. And so
I want to dig in a little bit more, you
know, as we're commemorating this year,
kind of the way that you approach this
moment of commemoration and instead of
kind of looking at it through the
rosecolored glasses like you describe.
And so, you know, what does the
Declaration of Independence kind of mean
for you in this moment in terms of like
what should we be thinking about when we
look back on that? And specifically, you
know, what does it mean to think of it
less in terms of this uh you put it at
the end of your recent article on the
Declaration of Independence that, you
know, thinking of these founders as one
generation of founders and thinking of
the document not as mere artifact but as
example. So, what does that mean and how
does that play out in the book too?
>> Yeah. So, as you say, I did write this
essay for the New Republic on the
Declaration for their 250 issue. And
part of it's a history of the
Declaration and its drafting, but also
part of it is looking at how those words
have been used, appealed to by different
groups across American history up
through the president. And I think one
of the things you sort of realize as you
work through that history is I don't
know, it's kind of like a death of the
author perspective. People have used
this document to different ends. But the
the the animating ideal is, you know,
here is a set of words that contains a
set of political principles that are
alive to all people at all times. Like
it makes certain claims about what human
life is about, what it's for, how
government exists to honor those things,
protect those things, and what you're
entitled to do when your governments
don't do that very well. That is what
justified a political revolution back in
1776. And I think it's an odd attitude
to sort of look at that historical event
and come away with a sense that actually
our institutions are just there to be
revered and deferred to. That is not
what the founders did. That is not how
this country was founded. You know, if
you read the words of somebody like
Thomas Jefferson in particular on
constitutions, I mean he famously wrote
that he didn't believe constitutions
could justly last I think more than 19
years. Yeah. And anything further than
that was the dead hand of one past
generation oppressing all future
generations. I think 19 years is a
little short by my estimation, but you
know, I think that there there's
probably some reasonable medium between
19 years and more than two centuries
when it comes to thinking about our
founding documents and institutions. And
that's kind of the thing I'm I'm trying
to to say, I think, in that essay and
also in in this book. I don't think that
we have to rever the founders as saints.
I think we should take them seriously as
political actors and political
theorists. If we think that there's
something to respect about the
revolution, certainly it is in you know
the the way of thinking that's
encapsulated in the declaration. We are
supposed to think deeply about whether
our institutions match our principles
and match our first uh premises about
what human life is for and about. Um and
we should be willing to challenge those
institutions when it seems like they're
falling short. That is, you know,
another thing I think the book exists to
do, to give people the permission to
believe that and believe about
themselves, as you say, like I think
that the founders were only our first
generation of founders. And there have
been many, many people in the time since
who've fundamentally reworked this
country and its institutions to our
collective benefit. Whether that's, you
know, the radical Republicans, you know,
around reconstruction or the people who
fought for women's suffrage, civil
rights movement, there all kinds of
figures we could look to
>> who've really reshaped this country in
fundamental ways since it was founded.
And to sort of only hold up and revere
the founders in 76 and 87 and their
creations as, you know, definition of
what this country is. and to sort of
give those documents a kind of patent
where it's like, you know, they were
>> taken down some mountain and
>> Yeah.
>> like like stone tablets, you know, it's
it's not that's I I think that's a weird
attitude to have, especially given again
that we are by my lights falling short
in so many respects um in our politics
because there are these flaws to the
Constitution in particular.
>> No, I think that's exactly right. And I
think I think you do put it um in in
your writing about this. It's an
invitation to engage in political
philosophy. I mean, how many countries
can have that as a part of their
founding myth, you know? I mean, and I
mean that myth not necessarily in a in a
negative or false way. I just mean like
of course that moment has this
incredible historical legacy for us. But
when we kind of encase it within glass
and kind of treat it as this as
something more revelatory then we forget
the inherent participatory kind of
deliberative aspect of what is happening
in that moment. And that's you know I'm
putting that in a still relatively
beautiful idealized way. And what I
wanted to also invite us to talk about,
and this is what I I just think a lot
about because uh you know, right now
we're in a political moment that seems
very fraught. I mean, January 6 is still
I think anyone who's thinking about
American democracy has to reckon with
that blemish or or that uh undermining
of the tradition of a peaceful transfer
of power, which is the one of the major
kind of basic institutional definitions
of what uh a dem democracy means um in a
modern kind of political science sense
when we kind of categorize these regime
types. And so, you know, we we have all
this tension, all this fear. People are
are worried. And yet, you know, we've
gone through arguably even worse moments
in our past that we've had to go
through. And the revolution being kind
of this also in inherently violent
moment in terms of uh reckoning with and
creating this country uh out of the
empire, right, the British Empire. And
so in that moment, it's not this perfect
revoly and pure founding uh experience,
but it is something that's also fraught
with political compromises. And as you
were saying, as you were indicating, I
mean, these were compromises that were
not peacefully negotiated over time. it
it institutionalize and formalize major
um forms of oppression and forms of uh
you know inequality and uh in order to
achieve the the establishment of the
country and I think there are people who
are very when you when you say that to
them they get so upset because it feels
like a personal front and it means that
you can't draw inspiration from this but
it's more like we have to hold these
things at once and also maybe there's
some a lesson about politics there for
us in terms of understanding that so I
wondered if you kind of if Do you have
any thoughts on that in terms of the
political compromises, the processes
also from like the articles of the
confederation that period of time to the
the the uh constitutional convention and
the constitution?
>> Well, I mean I think that's the the
period of time where this is sort of
most most obvious when it comes to
thinking about the founders. I mean, you
know, we had an initial constitution in
the articles. Um I think that this is
one of the things that your basic
American history education gets right.
It was a terrible document. I mean it
took uh supermajorities to basically get
anything done or unonyimity to get
anything done. Made it basically
impossible to have a national trade
policy. Made it impossible to do a lot
of things that you need to do uh to sort
of get a fledgling country off the
ground. Um and there was a process for
amending the articles. Um they need a
unanimous agreement from all the
different uh states and as you know the
founders convened in Philadelphia
without by the way Rhode Island for
reasons I get into the book. Um,
>> and I do want to hear those, but you can
set that.
>> Yeah. Yeah. So, they know at the outset,
like look, we're not going to get
unanimous agreement for anything that we
do here, but we're in a situation that
is bad enough by our lights. And we
could talk about whether or not they
were justified in thinking some of the
things that they did, but they know like
by our lights, we're not actually going
to be able to resolve this crisis unless
we come to a new document, and we're
going to ignore the rules that exist for
amending the articles. we're going to
ignore the mandate we're sent to to
Philadelphia with only to amend the
articles and come up with a different
set of governing institutions for this
country. Yet another radical move from a
revolutionary generation and again to
sort of understand the document the
result of the constitution is something
that we have to keep etched in stone and
respect for all time is kind of strange
given its origins there.
>> Yeah. Um but if you read the notes uh
from the convention, if you read the
letters that the founders were sending
back and forth between themselves as the
constitution was being drafted and then
ratified, this is not a document that
was produced purely as as a function of
political theory or high-minded ideals.
There were there are a lot of practical
compromises they had to make. A lot of
things that Hamilton and Madison did not
want in the final document that ended up
in the final document that they had to
defend.
>> Yeah. And I think again it's it's just
important to sort of have that in mind
so we don't think that this is something
that was created without any mistakes or
any possibility of improvement or even
radical redesign. It is a political
document for a particular time
>> made by people with particular economic
and political concerns. We now have ours
and we should have the right or feel
that we have the right to sort of think
about fundamentally different
arrangements on on that basis. And you
know if 100 years hence having done that
uh some other generation says well
looking around us and you know uh our
colony on Mars or whatever uh we think
we might need a new constitution now you
know they may I just think that that
process of regeneration is just how
societies sensibly rationally respond to
their own circumstances. We have one of
the oldest and hardest to amend
constitutions on the planet.
um average lifespan I think there's a
study at the University of Chicago you
know a few years ago or maybe a decade
ago
>> that found that the average lifespan of
constitutions in the developed world is
something like 30
>> 32 years I believe we're very very out
of whack and I think part of it has to
do with this reverential attitude or not
feeling we have the permission
>> even though we know more about
governance we have political science we
have the ability to evaluate political
questions with more rigor than the
founders did
>> despite all of that not to speak of our
belief in equality and the fact that we
we believe that black people and women
and all kinds of minorities deserve
right. Despite all of that,
>> we still don't think that we are
>> enough or that we measure up enough to
to make our own decisions here. And I I
think that that's something that uh the
book really tries to challenge.
>> Yes. No. And I I think it does. And I
want well and there's so much now we can
we can shift to talking about that more
and moving more towards the present and
and how to make it democratic. But you
know because this is we have a little
bit of the historical bent here. I and
you did get to bracket that why wasn't
Rhode Island included because I think
that's such an important part of that
history.
>> Yeah. So to do like a very very
condensed version um
the United States leaves the revolution
in a state of economic crisis. Basically
a lot of property has been destroyed. A
lot of people farmers people in the back
country are really struggling to pay
their debts and to pay you know new
taxes. And there are movements up and
down the country to address this
situation. kind of early populist
movements um by a variety of measures.
Some of them are things like paying for
your debts and taxes in kind with
certain goods, other kinds of debt
relief. But I think the thing that
really ends up influencing the founders
uh the most is this desire to print
paper money
>> um in order to put more money into
circulation and make the discharging of
debts and and the payment of taxes
easier. Um Rhode Island is one of the
states that really really takes to this.
Yeah.
>> And the founders are horrified by the
situation overall. They think that these
measures and printing of paper money in
particular basically undermines the
stability of contracts, indulges people
who've been spending too much from the
founders's perspective and and not uh
being fiscally responsible. They think
it might lead to attacks on private
property in general. Yeah.
>> And so one of the main reasons why the
constitution ends up being drafted is to
sort of create a sovereign and active
federal government that's capable of
controlling
>> the economic situation in the country
without leaving it to state governments
that are much more active and much more
powerful functionally than the Congress
under the Confederation. Rhode Island
knows that this is what's up.
>> Yeah.
>> And they refuse to send delegates to the
convention on that basis. And that
creates a dilemma because again the
founders know I mean this is one of the
provisions of the articles you cannot
really fundamentally amend the document
without unanimous agreement from all the
different states
>> and that is one of the things that I
think forces them to the conclusion that
they have to with some completely new
arrangement.
>> Um yeah there's been a lot of you know
historiographic debate about this over
the last century especially I mean
people talk about the beard thesis early
in the 20th century.
thesis, you know, reductively was, well,
the founders did all this because they
personally were going to profit from the
development of a new constitution that
has been overstated. It wasn't so much
the personal finances that were at stake
as much as this general principle of who
gets to control the economy and also the
principle of democracy.
>> It is one of the things this crisis that
convinces people, Washington says this
in one of his letters, I believe, maybe
the British were right.
>> Yeah. to doubt that mankind was fit for
its own governance without superior
authorities. Maybe this this crisis
shows us and rebellions like Sha's
rebellion which is one thing I think
that people do learn about in school.
You know, there's a real cynicism and
anxiety about the level of public power.
>> Yes.
>> That arises after the revolution and the
constitution is written to to bring that
under control. Let's then respond
head-on to those who would say, you
know, if we complain today about how
undemocratic our institutions are, um
who would say, well, America's not a
democracy, it's republic. So, what would
be what's kind of you think like the
best way to respond to that? Because we
see like you just said, there was
anxiety about public power and so to
some degree there was an attempt to kind
of exclude this democratic energy,
right? But, you know, why should we not
be satisfied with that? Why should we
not just then defer to our fathers,
let's say? So I think we have to define
our terms and that's what the first
couple of chapters in the book well
before I even get into the history are
about uh in the first chapter you know I
define certainly beyond any controversy
or debate or disagreement what democracy
is for all time exactly
>> I'm sure that's a definition that nobody
will have tr any trouble with ever again
um but to me you know democracy talk
about you know the gap between Athenian
democracy and representative democracy
and you know why is it that we call both
of these kind of systems that are so
difference the same name.
>> Yeah.
>> And what I say is well I think that in
either case what we're trying to achieve
or bring about is uh governance by the
governed public. In a democracy the
people are the ones
>> who do the governing for themselves or
in Lincoln's construction you know
government of by and for the people.
There is no superior class of elites
>> or you know people with hereditary
privilege who have the privilege of
controlling society. The people who are
themselves subject to governance are the
ones that doing the governing. many many
different systems you could create to
try to achieve that ideal but that's
what we're trying to achieve
>> and by my lights you know the three main
components of any democratic system that
actually accomplishes that are political
equality
>> again there's no class of people that
has an entrenched privilege
>> or a different set of rights
responsiveness democracy is not a
suggestion box and people come together
to act something does happen might not
happen directly or immediately but the
system is obligated to respond in some
to the public coming together. And the
third thing is majority rule.
>> Yeah.
>> So of all the different ways we might
make a collective choice together from
>> you know supermajority agreement all the
way to some form of minority rule.
Majority rule is the decision rule that
respects the equality of all the
participants.
>> Those are the three components of
democracy as I see it and I again go
through in the first chapter why I think
that system is good. Now I also offer in
these early chapters a definition of
republicanism.
>> Yeah. And this is something I I derive
mostly from the work of Philip Pettit
and people in that kind of political
theory school and republicanism where
they talk about republicanism as a
system designed to prevent uh entrenched
power that might dominate others. So if
we think of liberalism as a political
philosophy that's about you know
preventing active abuses you know
somebody in government or governments in
general
>> not having you know the right to or the
ability to de directly uh abuse you in
some kind of way or take something from
you.
>> Um republicanism is about okay how do we
prevent institutions, governments,
parties in society from acquiring that
much power to begin with?
>> Yeah. Yeah. like it's a possibility.
>> It's a possibility. How do we sort of
prevent that possibility from happening?
And government might not be abusing me
today.
>> I might be able to go to court if it
does
>> or have some other recourse if it does.
Um republicanism is about well, how do
we sort of ensure that you're not never
in that situation to begin with?
>> And there are many different
institutions you can create um to thwart
the creation of power in that kind of
way. You can talk about written
constitutions, uh institutions that
protect the rule of law
>> and so on and so forth. But those
institutions and those systems are not
intrinsically democratic in the terms
that I describe democracy. And we can
look at history like we think about the
Roman Republic for instance some
democratic features you tribune of the
pleb and so on but was not a
representative democracy in the way that
we understand it now. We could talk
about the Italian city states of the
middle ages and renaissance. Yeah.
Right. Widely understood as republican
governance. They had very very complex
systems for distributing power. Most
people in those societies could not
participate in politics. So they weren't
democracies.
>> So there is a real difference there.
>> And I think you know at the end of the
day the people on the right mostly who
say that we're a republic of some kind
certainly non-democracy
>> I think have the better side of the
argument to me and I think this is one
of the most controversial things in the
book because if you're on the left like
I am you're supposed to reject that. No.
No. All they meant by republicanism, you
know, at the founding was representative
democracy. I complicate that in the
fourth chapter. It's a lot of like very
deep textual whatever I can't really get
into now. But there is there is a real
difference there. You are talking about
different systems. You can certainly
have and I think we should have
>> democratic republics
>> that you know take everything that is
worthwhile and meaningful and good in
republican governance
>> and sort of nonetheless respects
majorities and respects the public's
right to rule. That is not what we have.
We have a system of distributed power in
this country that happens to empower
minorities,
>> people who happen to live in certain
parts of the country, people of certain
ideologies and so on. And I think that
that's what ought to change. Those those
those inequities are the inequities that
motivate the book in the first place. So
it's a very long-winded answer, but I do
think that there is there there are
fundamental differences between
Republican governance and democratic
governance. You can have democratic
republics, and that is what I'm urging
us to move towards in this country.
>> No, I I don't think there was longwinded
at all. I mean, it's a big question,
impressively condensed and clear answer
for that. And and it's something that I
will say I struggle with because when
people ask me that it's like you know I
guess for me it's also at the end of the
day I might see the point and say sure
at that moment they didn't want a
democracy and they didn't they didn't
create one but why should we defer to
that? I mean why should we be satisfied
with that? I mean I you know both of us
were very much excluded from the
institutions they created at that
moment. So you know how could I possibly
totally defer to it? I I think that this
is this is
this is like the is ought problem,
right? Like I think that people believe
that if you win the debate
>> against the rights, let's say
>> on whether we were founded as a republic
or democracy,
>> you fundamentally resolve the question
of what America is and should be. And
that is not the case. Like it is it from
my perspective true
>> the republic uh that people at the
founding
>> intended to create a kind of republic
that was not democratic by my lights and
by I think most of our lights that is no
bearing
>> to me on where we ought to go as a
country and the kind of country we ought
to be. But this perspective on history
where if you sort of win an argument
about the fundamental character of
something that happened 200 years ago,
you've settled for all time what America
is is, I think, wrongheaded. I think we
see it in all kinds of debates, not
necessarily constitutional debates even,
but
>> just in our general kind of discourse
about American history where I think
people want to say often with great
intentions and progressive intentions,
we're afraid by this DNA. we're afraid
by this kind of evil or this kind of
action that happened.
>> You know, I just I think that we have
the agency to look at that and take it
seriously and think critically about the
ways in which the past still influences
the present,
>> but also to say, well, we're here now.
>> Yeah.
>> And, you know, we have more of a
capacity to shape this country than
ghosts do, and we should continue to do
so. Um, so yeah, that's that's I think
the the the motivating impulse behind
the republic versus democracy debate is
this kind of attitude towards history
where it's just I I don't think that the
stakes of that debate are whoever wins,
they've decided what America governing
institutions ought to be like. I just I
just don't have that attitude towards
thinking through that question.
>> No. No, and I do think that what but I
also what I love about the book is that
while you know you you're very ambitious
in it and you're taking a you are I
think challenging those who would just
oversimplify how we commemorate and
remember the founding I also do but
there is this deep I mean also it's
deeply historical what you're doing and
it's also you still value and and I
wouldn't say you're not you still have
like a a I don't want to say reverence
necessarily but you still have a deep
respect for this moment and for the
history and for the the text. And it's
actually precisely because of that
respect that you're able to understand
it in this in it all of its complexity
and all of the disagreements and the
dissent and all of the the politics of
that moment that I think is very
valuable and very unique. And so, you
know, I I I do want to make sure we kind
of underscore that as we say, yeah, why
should we just be led by the dead hand
that Thomas as to put to use Thomas
Jefferson's words. Yeah.
>> Yeah. I think I say at some point in the
fourth chapter, you know, I take the
arguments that, you know, these were a
group of, you know, dozens of white men
who own slaves and there were no women
and they, you know, participate in the
genocide of Native Americans. I take all
of that seriously. If that were all that
I had to say for my argument, it would
be a much shorter Yeah.
>> book. So, I thought it would be more
interesting. Okay. Like, you know, all
of that is true. And yet, you know, if
we take them at their word,
>> um, and we take the the action of the
revolution seriously,
>> I think we're still left with a lot of
reasons to have a different attitude
towards these documents. Um, and that's
worth saying
>> partially because I think the people are
used to the other arguments, which is
not to to deny its significance
>> or its substance,
>> but you know, I think, you know, I I I'm
interested in these people as political
theorists. I'm interested in the
revolution as, you know, one of the most
extraordinary things I think has ever
happened in human history. I I don't
think that that's that's that's wrong to
believe or to say. Also, I don't think
saying that is is uh dismisses all the
complexity of the revolution. I just
think it was an extraordinary thing. I
think the constitution was an
extraordinary document. But there are
still events and still documents that we
have the right to sort of think
critically about.
>> Yeah. Yeah. No, and I I will say I think
it's really important that we grapple
with the contradictions of the moment in
terms of these men writing this, you
know, writing the you know the
Declaration of Independence but also
creating the Constitution. All of this
you know so in and there is you know
there is also literature that critically
engaged republicanism in terms of like
its definition of liberty on the basis
of the existence of slavery. I mean both
in terms of just intellectually defining
freedom you know in respect to the other
of the people who are enslaved in that
system and and the existence of slavery
but then also it's the way in which you
know the freedom the the ability to kind
of think deeply and um spend all this
time on political philosophy on
citizenship on civic action is dependent
on the fact that you are free from labor
because you have oppressed and you've
enslaved others and that so we have to
grapple with those things you can't you
know ignore it and I I think um and that
is that is true true for the you know
early America but it's also true for the
ancient you know heritage that they were
drawing on intellectually in terms of
Athens uh or in terms of Greece and in
terms of uh Rome as well and so you know
that's just also a part of that has to
be a part of the discourse you can't
neglect that
>> I think I think that's absolutely right
I mean I think the book is ultimately a
work of political economy
>> yes yes great
>> you know so we talked about that a
little bit as far as the origins of the
constitution were concerned But, you
know, as I work through towards the end
of the book, the features of the
American system that I think ought to
change,
>> you know, there's a chapter on political
institutions. Yes.
>> Um, you know, I talk about all the
things you would expect, the electoral
college, the Senate, redistricting,
money, and politics, all of that kind of
stuff. But the last chapter,
>> perhaps more prosperively, here at the
Mercada Center, uh, is about economic
democracy. It's about, you know, the
extent to which our freedom, our
liberty, and our agency,
>> um, if we care about democracy is shaped
by our economic institutions and the
power that we have or don't have as
workers,
>> you know, and one of the reasons why I
think it's it's worth considering ways
we might power ourselves um, as workers
in the economy is precisely, you know,
one of the things you said, which is,
you know, your freedom and leisure time
to think critically about the society
you're in, your ability to participate
in politics
>> uh with any meaningful kind of power.
No, it depends I think a little bit on
the extent to which you live in
egalitarian society and the amount of
economic resources you have available to
you. So yeah, this is something that I'm
obviously thinking about a lot uh now
when it comes to the tech industry and
AI and its impacts and so on. But you
know the book if the book had been
written you know even a year after uh I
started if I had started it even a year
later there would have been so much more
about AI.
>> Yeah in it
>> it's to the benefit of the book that I
was not obsessed in the way that I am
now.
>> That's what I was about to say. I was
about to say thank goodness because I
don't think it would I think it has
>> a enduring kind of features of the
arguments where you can I when you read
it now you can clearly think about AI.
Yeah. But I also think that this is what
really just you've seen me like more
emotional than I'm going to get here.
But it it just it does grind my gears
the way that you know AI has also people
have kind of treated it as this so
fundamentally novel question and moment
that we're in. And of course there's a
lot of novelty. Of course there's a lot
of uncertainty. And yet if you take a
longer view and if you also think about
what we've been dealing with in America,
it is dealing with the rise of
automation before AI and and the changes
in all sorts of people's lives in terms
of their work environment and also a lot
of those changes themselves. You can't
just reduce a tech to technology. It is
shaped as you said by the economic
institutions that are shaped by laws and
policies. And so, you know, I think no
matter what people, like you said, that
part of the argument, you know, if
you're if you got very excited, you're
like, "Oh, I'm gonna I'm gonna um I
shouldn't I shouldn't read the book. I
shouldn't look at the camera." If you
got, you know, if you're listening this
this conversation, you got really
excited. I can't wait to to read the
book. And you're somebody who's maybe a
a died in the wool free market classical
liberal, you should know, maybe you're
going to get a little riled up by the
the later chapter on economic democracy.
But I think it's worth engaging with uh
especially for that because I think we
need to have these conversations because
I also think in not having these
conversations we are making it you know
we're obscuring and we're kind of not
providing answers to people who are
going through truly disruptive
experiences in their work lives in their
personal lives over the past again not
just from AI but going back to the 90s
going back further than that um and so
you know I I do think that that's
crucial so I but I want to take these
different parts of your argument in turn
but like you like you just said it is
very much a book of political economy.
Um and so why don't you why don't we
first focus on the public institution on
the political institutions because I
think the other thing here is that there
are a lot of people who when they make
the argument that America is a republic
and not a democracy they will rely on
the fact that the founders and also just
and this is I think common I don't think
this is I don't think all of liberalism
has to be motivated by this but I think
it's a common theme among liberals
especially is that there is an anxiety
of democracy and there is an anxiety of
tyranny of the majority and so that's
the thing they want to avoid. You know,
for me, I'm always a little bit like,
well, do you maybe think that you got to
also avoid tyranny of the minority,
right? I mean, that's also a historical
problem. Uh, and also, you know,
something that we we don't want to have.
And if you I don't want tyranny of
anybody, right? But, um, and so why
don't you uh I the thing that really
stuck out to me was how much like I
could give that chapter to people who
are interested in those debates in terms
of understanding, well, here's why. Yes.
I don't think that America is, you know,
is is under a tyranny of majority. And
in fact, we have to reckon with the way
in which maybe the bigger threat is
tyranny of of minority and not
necessarily in a way that was designed
by these, you know, pretty undemocratic
founders, but actually dynamics and
institutions, things like the filibuster
that were not original to the
constitution. So, you know, I know you
won't be able to get into all of that,
but maybe give us a little bit of an
image of the the argument you make there
in terms of the nature of our political
institutions, why they're not
democratic, how we can make them more
democratic.
>> Yeah, sure. I mean I think you know a
lot of people who listen to this
probably are familiar with some of these
arguments but there is some comparative
work uh on the set in particular where I
point to research that's like you know
even to the extent you might believe
that having a bicimeal legislature is
desirable in certain ways and uh you
know the extent to which you might
desire some kind of filter mechanism I'm
you know very far left respect but even
if you're somebody who believes that you
know empirically we have one of the most
malortioned upper houses in the entire
world I think only Argentina and Brazil,
according to one study, has an upper
house that's more egalitarian than the
Senate on a vote to vote basis. So, I
think that matters. I think it matters.
I think it distorts policy that somebody
in Wyoming has about 60 times
representation in that chamber as
somebody in California does. Um I think
that's unhealthy for for policym.
>> Yeah.
>> You know, and I think that there there's
some familiarity with some of the
arguments there. But um one of the
things I think I try to say in the book
um in that chapter on the set in
particular and the filibuster in
particular that um maybe people aren't
familiar with is first of all this is
one of the areas where Hamilton and
Madison were very disappointed. Yeah.
>> Madison says at the convention that the
Senate as it's currently constructed is
a very stupid idea. Yeah.
>> It would create all of these different
minoritarian
uh distortions. It would you know upend
stability in the country. Um it was just
bad and they were forced to the Senate's
current design and the what people know
as a Connecticut compromise um because
the small states basically threatened to
walk out of the convention.
>> Yeah.
>> You have Gunning Bedford of Delaware
getting up to make a speech to say look
if we don't have equal representation in
the Senate, we might secede
>> from the United States and join some
other foreign country. So really the
kind of impass there that they had to do
something about. And to Madison's
disappointment and his disappointment
you can actually read in the federal
papers like he's a very he's he's very
very half-hearted in describing the
Senate and and why it makes sense you
know to a disappointment that's the
arrangement we are stuck with you
obviously we have the direct collection
of senators now we did not have before
and that's that matters um but it's a
really really crazy institution the
filibuster as you say which was not part
of the original design only you know
makes it crazier um we functionally have
a non unfunctional Congress. It passes
certain things. Certain major laws do
get passed, but um it's very very hard
to pass legislation. You have to do all
these workarounds through reconciliation
perhaps that actually end up distorting
the policy that you're trying to craft
because you have to meet the
requirements of the the bird bath.
>> And there are also these kinds of social
and political impacts too that I don't
think people think enough about. I mean,
you know, if you're concerned about
polarization and you're wondering why
we've gotten so polarized and what we
might do to resolve that, I think it
matters that many many people are
sending people to Congress,
>> knowing that Congress is not going to do
a whole lot.
>> And if Congress is not going to do a
whole lot as far as policym is concerned
and also your political opponents aren't
going to do a whole lot if they win,
>> the stakes to you of the vote you make
in a primary are going to be very, very
low. Like why not elevate somebody who's
like a talk show host or a political
influencer that just makes you feel good
if you know that you're not actually
going to get a a working Congress that's
productive and that's constantly passing
legislation. So all kinds of things like
that and dynamics I think are really
really deranging our politics. Um and
there are fixes. So I you know I'm not
somebody who supports having an article
5 convention tomorrow. Yeah,
>> I I see the idea of replacing the
Constitution as a long-term movement
that's going to take many decades and
generations and it's going to take, you
know, building more buyin from the
public
>> on a lot of these ideas. Um, but there
are some things we can do very, very
quickly, relatively speaking, um, that
take only majorities in Congress or when
it comes to the electoral college, I
talk about the national popular vote
interstate compact. That's something
that state legislators can do are on
their way to doing. Frankly, there are
like 200 electoral votes
>> committed to that process. So, I I talk
about feasible solutions that are not
pie in the sky solutions that don't
require on constitutional amendments for
the most part.
>> And yeah, I hope that that chapter reads
practically to people, even people who
are not, you know, fire breathing
leftists like myself. I think on on
basic good governance grounds, we have a
federal government that's not working
very well. And a lot of that could be
attributed to either the constitution or
>> you know institutions that we've
developed that are functionally parts of
our small C constitution at this point.
>> Well, and I think that that's really
important because I think that the
executive branch now just has and and
whoever is in the White House has
incredible power and I mean to some
degree that power is brittle. I mean you
know it's been always increasing. I mean
Trump has had you know a huge increase
in executive orders but there's just
there's also been an uptick uptick over
time of executive orders and also you
know the next president when the first
thing they come in is kind of undo all
those executive orders. So that's those
things are not you know they're not
there but the power that it has is
immense unpredictab unpredictability and
uncertainty and and the reason why
that's happening is partly because of
how powerless how dysfunctional Congress
is and that really is the more
representative institution and and that
is like what I'm very frightened by I
will say is that increasingly it feels
like people are forgetting at least I
thought that public discourse and kind
of the understanding of American
democracy was an understanding that
Congress was really the the most
representative institution and it is
supposed to be kind of the main way that
you know popular power kind of functions
and we can see that that at the federal
level in terms of responsiveness to
constituents. You know like you you're
the president power might not represent
you in in the sense that you voted for
the other party but you have this but
legislation is supposed to be taking
place at the congressional level anyway.
So you don't you know there's a certain
check on terms of how much that national
election matters and now it feels like
that is the most important thing and
that which coincides with you know
Americans partly the media environment
people identifying more with national
identity with and and paying attention
to national politics because of the
decline of local media um all these
again economic political economic
conditions but that's very frightening I
don't think so when you when you worry
about tyranny majority in congressional
legislation you've just now created the
autocratic threat that we were oh that
that we know they were worried about.
>> Absolutely. Absolutely. You know, this
is another one of the things where if
the book had been written a little bit
later, you know, it would have been
different in a substantive way. So I I
mean I'm focused mostly on Congress in
that chapter, but I do talked about the
executive and I would have talked about
the executive more especially given what
we've seen in the last year. the idea
that, you know, somebody donates $250
million to a campaign. They're given a
special place in the subsequent
administration where they get to unwind
programs and
>> uh dismantle departments and so on and
and there's no congressional oversight.
I mean, that's that's a remarkable
situation. Um, look at this war with
Iran we're in the middle of, right? I
mean, we one of the things the
Constitution does say that I think it
makes sense is Congress has the power to
declare war. Well, it's functionally no
longer true. Um, so yeah, we have this
kind of runaway executive and I think
partially because to your point,
Congress is now ineffectual. We have
presidents coming in, you know,
understanding that their legislative
pushes aren't actually going to go
anywhere. And so they issue all these
executive actions that get reversed in
the next administration. You know, the
the White House gets to take in a lot of
power. There's a lot of trying to
legislate either through the courts or
through uh through the agencies. All of
that's more opaque and less transparent
than it might be if you were actually
>> having legislators do their job and and
and
>> and craft legislation in the public eye.
So all of that really matters
>> and is is is I think symptomatic of of
the ways in which the system is very
unbalanced and and dysfunctional right
now.
>> Yeah. Yeah. No. And and that and that
also points to the fact that there is um
this other kind of way we we need to
kind of take a holistic view of the
American democratic experience and the
threats that we face because you know
then let's you know get on the table a
little bit but again I think we're going
to zoom out so that it's more you know
relevant no matter what is happening in
the state of technology but right now
you know there's all this discourse
around AI regulation. In fact, I was
somewhere and uh I was in London this
last week and you know people there were
really kind of they and I've heard this
from other people too. there's this sort
of like oh like even Trump seems to
think we should regulate I AI and that
gives them kind of some kind of hope and
there's something very frightening I
will admit to you know even though I'm
somebody who's not I'm not a priori or
inherently against regulation by any
means but I don't see I I'm very afraid
of the fact that we are in this
incredibly disruptive technological
technologically and economically
disruptive moment and yet we have this
incredibly dysfunctional
um government that is probably even
easier for you know the best organized
well-funded companies for example to
lobby to influence that decision- making
uh at that kind of central authority
executive level and that so when I think
about what regulation might is most
likely to you know be successful I don't
have a lot of confidence it'll be in the
support of
>> Americans more broadly of people I care
about I mean how am I supposed to be
optimistic about that
>> uh I don't think there's much reason to
be unless unless certain things change.
I mean I do so as I said you know I talk
about money and politics a good bit um
in the fifth chapter and one of the
things I try to do is sort of complicate
or frustrate this conception people have
where it's like everything that's wrong
in Congress is like this company shows
up in an office with like a big bag of
money they put on a desk and then they
get the legislation they want.
>> Um you know that happens sometimes. uh
it's not usually the way that these
things work. I think that the channels
of influence are much more diffuse. Um,
you know, there's this great paper, I
think from 20 years ago, I think it's
called something like why isn't there
more money in politics where
>> they basically say, well, relative to
the resources that corporations have,
they actually underinvest in politics a
certain way, it takes very little. Um,
and so I I try to think through like,
okay, how is this actually working based
on research? And a lot of it is like,
you know,
>> people come into Congress without a
whole lot of technical knowledge for the
most part on all the issues they might
have to legislate on. they might know a
lot about a given issue that's, you
know, relevant to their constituency and
so on. When it comes to like technology
and like very very technical fields,
they often just don't know a whole lot
about the thing they're supposed to be
regulating or crafting legislation
about.
>> And so that creates an opportunity for
whether it's anthropic or open AI or
whatever in this case to come to
Congress and say, "Well, look, like we
know about this issue. We're developing
this technology, you know, and we are
we're here as like fair-minded, good,
objective people, you know, we're not
here just to make money. We're here to
inform you as to how this technology
works. how it might be best regulated.
We saw this parade over the last couple
years of them doing this
>> and because people don't have the
resources, the knowledge, the background
to
>> interpret
>> those kinds of claims and that
information critically.
>> Yeah.
>> A lot of cases companies end up getting
what they want. And it might not be that
money changed hands at all.
>> Yes. Yeah.
>> So it's it's it's there all kinds of
ways in which that power manifests
itself. It's not just through well I
think we should reform campaign finance
and formal lobbying.
you know, they prop up a think tank that
puts out a report
>> on a given issue and you know, some
staffer picks it up and shows it to
their member and they read it and that's
how they think about that issue or that
very very granular policy issue. It
might be, you know, people are hanging
out and doing golf with the people of
this set like so money manifests itself
in all kinds of ways. Um, and you know,
one of the arguments for the sixth
chapter on political economy is as much
as we might hope to regulate the more
direct forms of influence, campaign
financing and lobbying, we still have an
economy where if things are very very
unequal,
>> all of those other channels get utilized
nonetheless
>> to shape policym in contention of of
what the majority either wants or would
benefit from.
>> Um, and that's worth taking seriously.
And I think that AI, you know, this is
this is one of the things that makes me
the most worried. I mean, hell, we have
congressmen who still don't know what
the internet is, let alone generative
>> generative AI. Um,
>> and, you know, going back to the the
dysfunction of the Senate and and um how
Congress has struggled to pass
legislation in general, you know, we've
seen over the last 20 years bipartisan
legislation on whether it's gun control,
immigration, different issues get taken
up and fail nonetheless. Yeah.
>> Um, you know, I say this as somebody
again who's like a fire breathing left.
There's no love for bipartisanship
intrinsically, but if you're somebody
who believes that we have to come
together to pass laws and all that jazz,
you know, that we've we've seen that
happen and get thwarted by the
institutions in so many cases and that's
another I think hurdle to having some
kind of reasonable arrangement uh get
made on AI. Well, I think what you're
also pointing to there is that and
bringing us into that next chapter on
economic democracy, but it but it is
related to conversations I've had this
season on the podcast with Sam Bag uh
who has a book dispersion of power on
thinking of democracy as like a a as a
negative ideal as kind of diffusing
power and and and reducing the risk of
state capture by you know any one large
group. But that that what that requires
uh is a civil society and and this is
what's interesting to me is I think that
there's a way in which liberals have
often thought of civil society as this
kind of nice fuzzy a-olitical space. You
know people are you know the sort of
toillian volunteeristic associations
where people don't rely on the state.
They don't you know engage in the kind
of political lobbying and the kind of
political associations and they're able
to kind of solve their own problems
together. neither through profit nor
through that kind of political action.
And of course that is very true. But
there's also a way in which ci civil
society goes handinand with politics,
handinhand with democracy because it
shapes it. It allows for people to
create these organizational forms, these
organi organizations, these collective
group memberships that also kind of
challenge uh power within that private
sphere too. So, so Sam talks about, you
know, civil society organizations which
also include things like unions. And so,
again, unions might be somewhat
controversial for some people, but uh
they what they do represent is this idea
of people having a right to form
organizations together. And so and that
being a part of potentially challenging
the way in which you know management at
companies, executives at companies have
also the biggest say in terms of how
they might be influencing you know the
way that these these these technologies
are discussed and debated and how
they're conceptualized even though like
you said no money is changing hands. Um
but that's also you know kind of then
just thinking about this idea of like
the private sphere civil society being a
part of democratic life as well and it
itself kind of both creating and shaping
democracy but also being shaped by the
political institutions that we have and
so I wanted to yeah so just as a general
invitation to then moving us you know
campaign finance is a kind of good
bridge to get us into the economic
sphere and what it means to be thinking
in terms of economic democracy and and
what does that look like?
>> Yeah, sure. So I mean I don't really say
this much in the uh the book itself but
I have been doing some background
writing on liberalism here and there for
the past couple of years and I talk a
lot about some of that writing the
freedom of association right so when it
comes to politics you can't really do
anything by yourself
>> uh you can write a letter to your
congressman you can do some things you
mouth off on social media but any kind
of actual political activity depends
upon people working together in concert
through civil society institutions other
organizations are informal and so on. We
do politics together. Um and we develop
the capacities that we need to sustain
democracy in particular together. Um
again, if you are concerned about
polarization, if you're concerned about
the tenor of our political debate,
you're concerned about the extent to
which people can read political
information literally and so on. Um, you
know, I think that a lot of that
discourse is also pointed to the absence
or the decline of civic institutions
that help provide those skills to
people. I think that unions can be
understood as an important part of that
civic infrastructure. like setting aside
the rest of the economic argument. If
you want more places in American life
where people come together with people
who are different from them
>> for a collective purpose, who get
socialized into politics and political
participation,
>> who learn how to make arguments and
rally people like that, that's all work
that unions help do and helped do when
they were stronger uh in this country.
And I so I think that you know they
should be understood as organizations
that contribute to that civic
infrastructure. And I think that might,
you know, danger our politics less
>> if people had the opportunity to develop
those capacities. Um, even more
controversially, you know, I talk about
ways that we can sort of
institutionalize this within firms
themselves when it comes to works
councils and other kinds of labor
organization
>> internal to firms that you see more
commonly in in Europe. But part of the
argument there is certainly that people
need and we collectively as a society
need places where people learn how to do
politics or to practice some of the
basic capacities that we need to make
democracy work.
>> Um and yeah, I just think that in in in
a very real absence, we should be
turning to unions. I think for all kinds
of reasons, but for for that reason in
particular, I think I think the argument
uh makes sense. Yeah. And I think I I
think there's a way in which you know
there might be some kind of liberal
argument about you know not necessarily
enthusiastic but at least accepting of
unions as sure that should be one among
many contractual
uh you know organizational forms that we
can allow. But what are the ways in
which you know America is itself
currently the way our institutions are
structured that shape unions that is
fundamentally hostile to the possibility
of people forming unions in the first
place right now because there have been
increasing labor movements and
organizational um actions in you know
Amazon for example but there it seems
like things are very much uh on the side
of people who uh people at these
companies who want to stop their workers
from unionizing. Well, I think at the
outset, um, we have a labor law system
that makes it very very hard to organize
from beginning. The idea that you have
to sort of work from firm to firm to
firm
>> um to organize a given workplace
>> through a very very extended process
where even when you get to the
bargaining table, you might not succeed
at the end of the day in getting a
contract meaningful amount of time.
>> That process alone creates a lot of
hurdles
>> for organizers. I think the economy has
also changed dramatically from the day
of the labor movement decades and
decades ago.
>> Uh where it's not these you know maybe
massive factory where people working all
together in the same place same space
and so on.
>> Um
>> you know we have different levels of
organization firms where things are
being contracted out to different
parties might not necessarily even know
what the what the parent firm
>> Yeah.
>> uh is that you're actually working for
in a given case. That's been exacerbated
>> by the rise of the gig economy
certainly. Yeah, it get it's it's all
very very complicated in ways that the
labor law has not really been updated to
>> to reflect
>> and you know you get to then after that
the active efforts and made to frustrate
organizing right to work laws that kind
of thing.
>> So there are a lot of
>> hurdles there. Um, but I think that
we're at a moment where it's sort of
also incumbent upon the labor movement
to think critically about the extent to
which their existing modes of organizing
and the policies that they're advocating
for might not reflect the realities of
the current economy.
>> I think it's a time to think critically
about new labor structures, new forms of
organization
>> um that might make a little bit more
sense, which is not to say that
traditional unions aren't important,
that shouldn't grow. I think they should
support the proact but you know we live
in a rapidly changing economy
>> a more complex economy than these laws
written for and these modes of
organizing were developed for and that
matters. So I I talk about the work of
people like Sharon Block at Harvard on
this question where these she and others
are thinking really really ambitiously
about um what different forms of
organization might look like.
>> Um I offer some of the those ideas at
the at the end of the book. Yeah, it's a
difficult world to be doing organizing
work in, but you know, I think that we
have models and ideas that are worth
drawing from and worth worth exploring.
>> Yeah, let me dig into that a little bit
further because I think that that's a a
common so this is where again and we we
could talk more about this, but the sort
of tensions between liberalism and
democracy come into play is that and I
and again I don't want to um I I also
think liberalism is a very compatious
school of thought and and tradition. And
so, you know, I think there are liberals
who would have no problem whatsoever
with the unions with uh more democratic
uh structures within firms uh being
incentivized or or at least embraced um
if not part of you know institutional
theory. But you know let's let's take
this other kind of view which is that
you know a dynamic economy is the way to
deal with potential problematic or
undesirable forms of governance within
firms because what you you know yes it
might be without a union without kind of
these um kind of stickier and more
restrictive contracting you know like
obligations around contracts then it
might be easier for a worker to be fired
but ideally that means that it'll be
easier to get hired by a different firm.
So there is this maybe there might be
this emphasis on exit as opposed to
voice. And so then the concern would be
if we embrace or try to make it easier
for people to collectively organize then
it makes it harder we kind of make by
strengthening labor rights you make the
dynam the economy maybe less dynamic and
less able to have that kind of I don't
want to I mean it's a little weird but
there's sort of an interoperability
aspect to that. Right.
>> Yeah. I mean I think that there are real
trade-offs. At the same time though, I I
do wonder even if we believe in exit as
a mode of recourse for bad working
conditions, how adequately have we
protected the worker's right to exit. We
have a kind where non-competes for
instance really really restrict your
ability to just sort of leave your job
and find a better one.
>> Yeah.
>> Um that's something that labor
organizing and the advocacy of
progressives is trying to fix. So, you
know, I I think that there's like an
idealized world where, you know,
everybody's kind of frictionless. You
don't like this job, move to another
one. That's not actually the world we
live in. Even if without non-competes,
even if we fix that situation, it's very
very hard to sort of like get up and
find a different job. Americans are less
mobile than ever in many respects. So
those are those are problems that I
think should incline us to say, well,
yeah, you should have the right to exit,
but what are the tools and resources we
have within your workplace to improve
conditions? And to your point, you know,
how do we balance the desiraability of
that with the desiraability of economic
dynamism and economic growth? I take
growth very, very seriously. I'm not
somebody or you know one of the people
on the left who sort of dismisses the
the reality that growth lifts um people
up in the from their you know worse
economic circumstances into better ones.
We have to have an economy that grows
that is dynamic where people can start
new business and so on.
>> But also we're very very very skewed
against the worker here in this country
in ways that I do think have a
dilitarious impact on their well-being.
And I don't think that, you know, we
have to believe that strengthening
workers and improving that situation
means that we give up economic growth
and give up innovation and give up a
dynamic economy. We have to strike a
balance here. And I think that there's
just a lot of interest in not trying to
work out a balance. And I think that's
that's a real problem. So, you know, the
book offers some ideas. It offers some
uh trade-offs maybe for for some of
these policies, but I think there's a
lot here that's worth considering and
worth taking up. we don't have to sort
of import the German labor model
directly into the United States and
believe it's going to work out in the
same way. But, you know, I think there
there's room here to to experiment and
work out what better labor arrangements
might be.
>> Yeah. Well, and I think you're exactly
right that that's the thing is I I think
you know growth is so important and then
there's this way in which by if you but
if you if you're talking to somebody who
just lost their job or somebody who has
faced a hostile work environment and you
still say well we don't want to mess
with the way that our you know labor
relations work because we're going to
lose our ability to grow. I mean that
doesn't mean anything when you're living
in that kind of experience and that that
and that is why you know when we talk
about political theory when we talk
about political economy and these
different traditions and we think about
domination matters I mean we can't just
avoid talking about that and when
somebody you we you have to wonder you
know what happens if you feel as though
you're powerless in those private spaces
you're what do you what hope do you have
that you think you can make a difference
in the public spaces? Yeah, I think
that's right. I think that's right. And
you know, it's just like who is growth
for ultimately and how how broadly is
growth distributed. It's not just about
the growth happening as a matter of
aggregate statistics. It's like who is
actually the beneficiaries? How much of
that is actually going to the workers at
these firms relative to investors,
executives and so on. And I think those
are questions that are worth asking
especially now. I mean people are
dissatisfied with the state of the
economy in kind of unprecedented levels.
>> Yeah. That's discontent that has to be
wrestled with and wrestled with
seriously. And I think the people who
believe in a kindic economy sort of
don't pay attention to that and sort of
like sideline these kinds of
conversations. I think the people who
end up appealing to that discontent are
people going to offer much worse
economic solutions and and kind of uh
panaceas that that don't actually work
and actually make things worse. We see,
I think, immigration policy playing some
of that role here. So through you know
the the the discontent here matters. I
do think there are cues we can take from
places where labor laws are stronger and
I think the serious question is you know
how can we integrate all of that within
the need
>> again I believe in in to have a a
dynamic and growing economy.
>> Yeah.
>> The book offers a few provocations
uh in that direction but I just hope it
it sparks and opens a conversation here.
Well, and let me let's like let's also
get into more of the details here about
the way that because I do think I'm I'm
struck by the fact that you are taking
seriously because there are people who
maybe romanticize the 20th century and I
think there's maybe some way that we can
go back to the economy of the 20th
century or to also the landscape of
unions in their heyday when we're we are
you know the sort of dynamics towards a
gig economy are so much harder to
control or prevent right and so what
then does it look like to update our
understandings of how to help the
American worker, how to think of labor
and the possibility of Americans being
able to collectively organize in their
in the private sphere while partly
because of appreciation of growth but
partly just knowing the reality of our
economy is that it it has shifted in
terms of the way people even like to
work. I mean there are people who who
are appreciative who really benefit from
the kinds of gig economy relations and
labor uh experiences that provided by
apps um provided by Uber and other apps
who who want that flexibility that you
wouldn't have had in the 20th century.
>> Yeah, I think that's real. So first of
all, I think that this is actually one
of the places where the political
inequities I'm talking about and
economic policy really really intersect.
the idea of going back to the 20th
century very reductively. I think that
we have a trade policy in this country
right now that is built around the hope
of returning the state of Michigan
>> and all the rest of states which you
need to win the electoral college back
to the magic of the 20th century. Right?
>> So it's it's it's it's this idea well
you know we now have a globalized
economy where many things are being made
overseas that are contributing to our
economy.
>> Obviously there have been people in this
country who've lost out.
>> Yeah. And so, you know, the the kind of
sloppilist solution to that is, well,
we're just going to like restrict trade
and then all those factories just kind
of going to pop up out of the ground in
the rust belt states again.
>> And, you know, it's manufacturing in
particular
>> that made those jobs good. There's
something intrinsically good about
working to build a car or working, you
know, uh, in a sheet metal factory
that's better than other kinds of jobs.
We need to bring those jobs specifically
back. Um, I think that's like very
unserious
>> to me.
>> It's very naive. It's very naive. Um to
me, and you know this is the analysis
you would expect from somebody on the
left, but like to me the thing that made
those jobs stable and renumerative for
many workers at the time was the fact
that there were organized jobs. There
were unions that were very very strong
um in these places in those industries.
We have in the south of this country an
auto industry that does not look at all
like the 20th century auto industry in
the rust belt. I think part of the
difference there is it's not a unionized
sector in the same kind of way. And to
me, there's no reason to believe that
the only kinds of jobs that are good or
the best kinds of jobs that are good are
going to be those kinds of manufacturing
jobs in general, which is not to say we
shouldn't have manufacturing jobs, that
those jobs aren't important and so on,
but like,
>> you know, I think that working at
Walmart should be a good job that puts
you on a pathway to making more money
and that builds your wealth. I think
that working in the service industry and
other kinds of healthcare as you get
like these should all be good jobs and
we should be thinking about the ways in
which we are not doing enough to ensure
those jobs are enumerative as it could
be and I think that labor is part of the
the answer and the solution there. What
was I forgot what the second thing you
said was?
>> Well, it was about also, you know,
people when we talk about the gig
economy, I think especially especially
on the left, a lot of critiques. I'm
very sympathetic to them certainly, but
at the same time, you talk to people who
who do make money through Uber through
these other especially people who are
doing more care work too, like you know,
taking care of children and things like
that. I mean that they want the
flexibility that those jobs give them.
Um, and maybe are less concerned from
like the left critique of the way that
these workers are exploited.
>> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, I mean I think
you know even if you have that critique
the existing models for labor
organization are not going to work with
an Uber
>> or with a Door Dash. It's just reality.
>> Um and so there have been people who
thinking very creatively over the last
decade or so about different forms of
organization. You know let's bring you
know groups of rid share drivers
together for instance in kind of
cooperatives so that they can negotiate
with Uber
>> on that basis or like appeal to Uber on
that basis advocate for their own
rights. So it's not just you and this
opaque company mediated
>> you're interacting with through an app
but like you as a collective of workers
>> coming together and it's not even just
the gig economy where you see those kind
of dynamics in place. So I did a piece
um in the last couple of years about the
direct care industry in Colorado. So
people who go into people's homes who
are elderly or disabled and they work on
a very very intimate one-to-one basis
with those people might work for a
company or a firm but not interact with
anybody else in that company.
>> You can't organize that in the way that
you'd organize a traditional union. And
so there's this body that's been set up
in Colorado called the direct care
stabilization board where they bring
together uh worker representatives,
representatives from the state,
representatives from the companies
themselves to come together and talk
about working conditions maybe propose
some basic standards
>> and it's part of you know this wave of
wage and workers boards we've seen over
the last I 105 years.
>> Yeah. Seen as a kind of step towards
sectoral bargaining.
>> Yes. You know, there are stronger
versions of this and weaker versions of
this. Especially, you know, California,
they have a fast food board, for
instance, that has the ability to just
set wages. You know, those kinds of
things, I think, have to be explored for
a lot of reasons, but partially because
it is much much easier to fit that kind
of model for labor into the current
economy than the traditional firmtomir,
placetoplace model. And if you had those
kinds of uh institutions, I think you
you would preserve a lot of the dynamism
and the freedom that people see in being
able to work for themselves through an
app and use that as part of their their
supplemental uh income. But again, like
I think that the the presumption that
you know once upon a time we had good
jobs and they were in these four
industries and we just have to bring
those jobs in those industries back
through magic or insane trade policy or
insane immigration policy. It's just not
it's not going to work.
>> And incumbent upon people from whatever
ideological perspective you have to
think more, you know, deeply about what
actual empowerment would look like.
>> Yeah. Well, and and and yeah, and you
know, when you were talking about the
idea of like factories popping up from
the ground. I mean, it made me laugh,
but it's also like I don't laugh because
I make light or because I don't respect
the people who miss those jobs and who
want those jobs, but I also I do I just
I have to be honest. I mean being around
members of the elite who make this
rhetoric around and try to appeal and
try to create this kind of romantic
ideal of you know mid-century America
and then also of this sort of maybe you
know masculine
you know uh worker who works with his
hands and it's just so tired and strange
and just like I said naive and almost
it's almost infantilizing to think that
that that people are going to be
convinced that this is what the future
of our economy is going to be able to
look like and and and instead and it's I
think demeaning to the people who are
now making up so much of the actual
American worker today people in care
work especially women in care work right
there's a there is a certain kind of
gendered nature to the way that this
discourse
>> absolutely I mean I think that you know
political elites don't really know
>> very much about
a a lot of things but you know the the
composition of the economy is I think
one of the areas is where you see this
disconnect between the rhetoric and
reality um in ways that end up mattering
for economic policy. So, you know, for
instance, whenever people talk about
rural America,
>> you know, and campaigns and you do these
aerial shots of like fields of corn and
so on, it's like everybody everybody in
rural America is a corn farmer. Um
whether you look at actual statistics,
it's it's not that different from job
composition terms from the other parts
of the country. Like the big industries
are service,
>> education, healthcare, government, like
the these are increasingly no matter
where you live, the basic features of
the economy. And if you actually spend
time in rural America, you go out to
rural Kentucky,
>> you know, you end up at a Walmart and
you realize like that Walmart is
employing like dozens of people and it's
like the economic center for maybe a
couple of miles around, you know, and it
it's and this is one of the things that
I think
>> understanding this might also make our
politics a little bit more insane,
>> right? So the idea that we are not
living these kind of like vastly
different unintelligible lives but
actually like are you know many of us
are all just working for more
>> you know could could all of us build a
kind of common economic agenda
>> rather than you know depending on these
pre presuppositions that there are these
radically different agendas that
different parts of the country need or
radically different kinds of political
representation that other parts of the
country need. many of us, you know, as
different as we might be in certain
respects, have the same bosses and are
being shaped by the same forces. And I
think that matters and I think that we'd
have a better politics and better
policies if politicians realize this.
>> Well, and I think that I mean, yeah, to
to your point, I mean, and also to bring
it back to democracy. I mean, this is
why I think on the one and you talked
about this in the book, but there's
there's a lot of cheap talk around
democracy, a lot of kind of like flowery
language about democracy. And then uh
but the reason why democracy really
matters is because political elites all
the time are going to conjure images of
who the ordinary citizen is, who the
person is that they supposedly speak to.
But they will, you know, unless there's
like actual democratic institutions that
actually have any kind of power that are
is really responsive to the people
themselves. And and even in that case,
so often those images that are evoked
are really going to be the things that
they benefit from or the world that they
want to see or the particular group that
they're actually speaking to and not the
ordinary citizen. And so that is also a
form of cheap talk, you know, and then
and then at the same time kind of make
this flower flowery language towards
democracy. I mean you realize that um
the image in your head is not the public
but you also realize through democracy
that the public itself is very very
dynamic is capable of change.
>> So one of the things I point out in the
early chapters of this book is you know
I'm not
>> offering a model of democracy where
there is this this mass called the
people or they majority that is a stable
entity that you just appeal to and refer
to every time you have an election. Um
what democracy is is like a stable set
of processes through which you know
through fair competition and through the
assembly of majorities you know the
public makes itself heard but you might
have a different majority or a different
governing coalition in the next election
or the next couple of years and there's
this dynamism to it because I think that
there are people who appeal to democracy
in contrast
>> by reference to a people um or a
majority that is also kind of imagined
in the very same way you And it's it's
it's the public is very complicated. And
one of the things we want democracy to
do actually is to give the public the
opportunity to say, well, we had an
election and this group of people want
as the majority, their policies either
did or did not work.
>> And we might have reason to try a new
set of policies or a new set of
candidates next time around. That kind
of dynamism and that change is part of
the reason why I think democracy is is
desirable. So I think the politicians
they they construct in their heads the
images of the public that they want and
>> I think that they are enabled in this
any time that the structures of our
institutions empower some people at the
expense of others. If some people end up
winning
>> much or most of the time,
>> yeah,
>> it's easier politicians to say, well,
that is the actual public they're
responding to. And it's, you know, it's
exurban or rural
>> people who live in these parts of the
country and people who live in
>> Washington DC or people who live in New
York or Los Angeles or Baltimore don't
really matter. Like the actual public is
this
>> majority that ends up shaping elections
every every couple of years.
>> Yeah. That distorts policymaking. leads
to to incorrect conclusions about the
public and its desires. And I think it
uh it makes us a less dynamic society
than we could be.
>> And I think there is a way in which like
this is always and I will also just kind
of bring it back to maybe maybe some
reflection on how you see your work as
some as a journalist as a as a scholar
as an author and talking about somebody
who is also influencing the way that
people think about American politics.
And so you know politicians do this but
also pundits do this. you know, I do
this, uh, scholars do this. So, kind of
how do you think about like the
responsibility of having a platform and
of of of trying to make sense of this
environment and knowing that what you
say matters?
>> Well, I'm not sure it does. Uh, I kind
of hope
>> that's a good point. I mean, I will say
actually it is very good to not be, you
know, so egotistical that you think what
you say will necessarily matter. I mean,
especially now given that like all of us
who write are competing with like Call
of Duty streamers for the attention of
the of of the voting public. I mean, I I
really don't I don't know how much uh
work like this actually shifts things. I
think that the model for me for you know
most of the time I've been doing this is
well you know like most people are not
going to pick up this book or are going
to be aware that it exists but maybe
people who are like in the policy space
or in politics working campaigns working
in advocacy groups they read this and
they shift their thinking about how they
message or how they approach a policy
issue and you know the extent that I
understand that people have been doing
that I've heard a lot from democracy
groups and other nonprofits in that
space I mean they are in the moment
right now where I think they're trying
to figure out given the failure to move
on a lot of these issues under the Biden
administration, they had the For the
People Act and so on, they're trying to
regroup and and think about what's next.
There's been this discourse in the last
uh year and a half or so after the 2024
election about whether it was wrong to
focus on democracy.
>> Yeah.
>> And whether Democrats should continue
even using the word democracy in their
appeals. Yeah, you know, I think the
book is an intervention in that debate,
too, because it it's it says from the
outset, literally from the first
chapter, we talk about democracy in a
very blinkered
>> and unappealing and kind of sterile way.
>> People don't believe that there is
democracy in America to save in the
first place and to sort of run as though
there was was a mistake.
>> People also want from democracy or from
their institutions in general real
material benefits. And if you're talking
about democracy a way that's abstracted
from all of that, they're going to lose.
>> Yeah.
>> At least on that issue.
>> So, you know, I I think that the book
has been, at least I hope it's been a
useful intervention on those fronts as
far as influencing discourse in general,
my responsibility. I don't know. I I try
to be
I'm a very slow writer.
>> Yeah. And I think that that has been to
my detriment in certain respects, but
also it is how I think you come to
conclusions that are actually worthwhile
and novel. There's a version of this
book that was much easier where I did
not read, you know, the latest in the
literature about redistricting and I
also did not read The Republic again by
Plato
>> and just sort of did
>> the standard democracy's broken whatever
and it just would have been a lesser
work and there's all kinds of books like
that already. But the fact here and in
my other work that I do take the time to
know what I'm talking about and not just
fire off takes and consult academic
literature and consult political theory
and so on. I mean that that I feel is
all me trying to meet my responsibility
to put new information into the world or
new arguments at the very least into the
world.
>> Um and to try to shape how people see an
issue
>> with more than just conventional wisdom
and more than my own presuppositions.
>> Yeah. Yeah.
>> And that's I think the attitude that you
know whatever kind of writing you do,
whatever kind of journalism you do, you
ought to have.
>> Yeah.
>> Um because then what you know what's the
point?
>> I'm again skeptical about whether there
is a point even doing work at this
level. But I think if if it's worth
doing at all, it's it's worth doing in
this way.
>> Well, I think I mean you brought up
Plato. So that I mean there is this
interesting thing with the republic
where you know there's these different
ways to read it and I think one way is
even to read it as like almost an
anti-political work in the sense of like
the philosopher might read it and see
and think like well the the real kind of
way to live your life is to kind of like
abstain from politics right but then
it's like why would the philosopher
engage in politics and it would be to
not be ruled by those worst and so there
is this thing with with writing and with
you know engaging in public discourse
course especially you know if you're
somebody who has you know a certain
expertise or you know rec being
recognized as a figure in some capacity
or having a platform in some capacity
where the thing that I I worry about is
that there's such a demand like you like
for content for like for for for fast t
like hot takes for for writing fast and
what happens with that is is and
actually this also something that play
talks about we we'll bracket that but
you where you you get sort of immersed
in opinion and and and then distracted
from kind of higher quality deeper
research and reflection and then if you
I think it's if if you don't if you do
think that you're this is what what I'm
struggling with is that I think there
are people who don't have the humility
you have who you you just stated the
idea of like you're not sure anything
you do say has an impact and I think
it's very valuable to have that humility
humility and we need people like that
who have that humility because they're
more I think careful about what they say
they think with a lot of consideration
in terms of how they express themselves.
But then there are people who I think
maybe don't have that humility who are
very confident and then are being heard
are being listened to and then
potentially perpetuating certain kinds
of scapegoating of getting us away from
the fundamental problems you know and
flaming things around um immigration
around trans people for example and and
not realizing that to some degree what
you are saying might lead public opinion
in certain directions. Um especially
again the more follow followers you have
the more people who are buying your
books and listening to you. I mean, I do
think there is a responsibility that
comes with that field. And so then we
need people who are willing to express
themselves in careful and slow ways. Um,
and even if that means that, you know,
they have to, you know, it's it's a
certain kind of pressure to kind of be
doing that. But I guess what I'm trying
to say, maybe there's a way in which
when you think that you aren't
necessarily going to have an impact,
maybe that's something that helps you
kind of be willing to kind of take the
time and then therefore like say
something that you're proud of because
of the integrity that you have.
>> Yeah, maybe. I mean, I just um I mean I
I I do do this because I would like to
have an impact.
>> Yeah.
>> There's also like a an absence of
humility there where part of reason why
I'm doing this is because I I want to I
want to change the things in the world
around me that I think are are wrong.
But, you know, like I I think being
detached from
the kinds of vicissitudes of day in
dayout discourse is very important for
all of those reasons you described. Just
I think maybe it is to the benefit of
writers in general that they're no
longer competing
>> for all of these views and retweets or
whatever because more and more the
discursive field is shifting over to
other mediums. And so writers, if you're
going to do this, have to be doing it
for other reasons beyond that kind of
gratification. So yeah, I'm not really
sure. But also, you know, because I'm
doing this because I want to have an
impact. Like I've been thinking about,
you know, video and other mediums where
I could be expressing these ideas. I've
certainly appeared in a hell of a lot of
podcasts for this book. So that's part
of it.
>> Um, yeah. No, I think we're we're in a
moment though where it's just um I mean,
I wrote something for the Columbia
Journalism Review a few years ago. I
think the title was like, "What is the
point of political writing?" both
because you know it's often unclear how
much you're influencing the public but
also you know to bring it back full
circle to democracy a country where it
does not actually necessarily matter
what majorities believe or think or want
anyway. So even if you were successful
in persuading like the majority of the
public to agree with you it necessarily
do anything in the world like in in that
case then like what is the point of any
of this and I still don't have an
answer. So I think one of the you know
self-interested reasons why I want us to
be democracy is because then it makes
writing matter a little bit more because
then if people agree with me that it
actually it does something. So I don't
know I I it's all it's all very
complicated. I think this is a very um
unsettled and challenging time to be a
writer in many respects but I also think
it's a you know perversely a very very
interesting time
>> and a time where ideas matter and a time
where you know a lot of the gatekeepers
and a lot of the
norms and presuppositions have kind of
been eroded to the point where we have
this free-for-all and we can return to
things like the constitution with new
eyes.
>> Yeah.
>> And without the kind of reverence that
we've been uh we've inherited.
>> Yeah. And I think there's a lot of uh
intellectually promising work that can
come from an environment like that.
Yeah.
>> But I think it's also very dangerous.
Yeah.
>> Um and so it's up to each of us as
writers to to know what we're about and
know what our principles are and
hopefully approach these questions with
a humane public-mindedness and that's
what I try to do.
>> Yeah. No, I think that's great. And I
mean not to, you know, throw, you know,
it's not like we won't have time to
fully flesh this out, but to some degree
that's by per on purpose, but you know,
one of the reasons why I asked that
question is because I I've been thinking
a lot about about why I write like why
does somebody write? Because AI has kind
of introduced this
I mean you say AI slop, you have all
this, but let's just say in the very
least way more competition in terms of
stuff that people could read online. Um,
and so for me it's like when I write I
am partly writing I am writing always to
some degree for myself. I mean that
sounds selfish and maybe to some degree
it is. I do think like AI is interesting
because it's like writing that's almost
entirely for the consumer like the consu
to some degree like the consumer
>> creates it. So if you if you're using a
chatbot you use a chatbot to create
writing for yourself for you to read. Or
there's also this way in which like
people are oriented around like well I'm
using AI because like it helps me you
know get more stuff out there like more
ideas that I wouldn't have time to kind
of write and it or maybe you know helps
me flesh out ideas like that's a little
bit of a separate thing but I think the
more people rely on it for content
generation it's like I'm I'm looking for
an audience that I'm like trying to send
this out to and it's like I write
because I'm trying to figure out what I
think in the first place, right? And so
like I hope that it might be indirectly
helpful if I end up publishing it for
other people and I I would like it to
potentially influence how other people
think, but it's also like I actually
will also say I'm eager for other people
to talk back at me to in a respectful
way to be clear, but I want a
conversation. It's like so the the part
of the process is selfish and individual
and that I'm I'm writing for myself as
my own audience and trying to figuring
out what I think in the first place, but
then after it has become an, you know, a
product, I guess, it still isn't
something that, you know, I just want to
send out there and hope that everybody
else is eating it up and loving it. It's
like I hope that I've become part of
something bigger than myself and I'm and
I am something I will learn through that
process from others, you know. No, I
think that that's that's exactly right
and it matches what I think as well. I
mean, I don't use AI for anything and
there are a dozen different reasons why
we can get into it. Uh, but we'd hear
here for, you know, five more hours. Um,
>> but I don't use it for anything. and and
and when it comes to, you know, thinking
through writing specifically, you know,
everything that's in this book is in
there because to your point, like I
consulted information and I consulted
data and consulted political theory and
and I came to the conclusions I make
having thought through all of that. And
so I trust it in that way.
>> If something appears before me on a
screen and I don't know where it came
from, I have no reason to trust it in
the same kind of way. Yeah,
>> even it's the rendering of somebody
else's ideas, you know, it matters to me
that I read, you know, William Reer,
>> you know, and I sort of worked through
that,
>> um, rather than sort of trusting a
summary that was produced by wherever,
you know, and that's just that's the
point for me. like I I want to trust the
things that I'm saying,
>> but also I want to engage in the process
of thinking myself and reasoning myself
and not outsourcing that to is kind
something opaque that I I don't really
know, understand that's trying to make
money from me.
>> So yeah, that's that's kind of my
orientation. But you know, the thing
about this moment that is again both
really really intellectually interesting
and really really scary is that those
premises are not universally shared.
>> Yes. And you have to actually make a
case for them. You cannot presume as a
writer or as a as an artist or as a
filmmaker or musician or whatever
happens to be that everybody's doing
those things from the same premises that
you are.
>> People do. It's been revealed very very
starkly in the last year, two years
>> have very different ideas about what
creativity means and what it means to
think and what it means to write and why
somebody should do any of these things.
And if we have our own perspectives on
all of that, we actually now we're in a
position where we have to make an
argument to people
>> that they should agree.
>> And I think we can, but yeah, it it
won't do to just sort of,
>> you know, hold on to a world where Yeah.
we all assumed that we all were on the
same page on what art was.
>> Yeah. you know, um,
>> and again, that's exciting because, you
know, it would be great to like write
the definitive set of arguments that
that actually tell us what art is all
about, what it's for, and so on. But
it's also, you know, if if we don't do
that, then the people end up making the
decisions are,
>> you know, uh, very very strange people
in Silicon Valley. So,
>> uh, you know, that's that's that's the
the promise and the, uh,
you know, the peril of the moment here.
>> Yeah. Very very well said. I I I really
have been very grateful this entire
conversation has been excellent. Um I
really enjoyed it. I do want to give you
an opportunity. Is there anything that
we talked about that anything that we
didn't talk about that you would like to
chat more on?
>> It covered a lot of ground. Um I don't
think so. I think I think we just about
covered uh covered everything.
>> Well, let me ask then also like what are
you working on right now? What's next?
>> So yeah, I have um some reviews that I'm
doing between now and the end of the
year. I have a book on literacy I'm
reviewing or the literacy crisis if
there is one for the New Republic. I'm
reviewing
>> uh a book on uh the college educated
working class and kind of economic
discontent amongst sort of like educated
people and its impacts. Um I am going to
write something about AI between now and
the end of the year that's going to be
like a Jeremiah of some kind. I just
need the time to to do it. Um, so yeah,
like little things like that. But also,
you know, I'm thinking about the next
book project. I have an idea of what it
is. It is going to be about the American
idea and American nationalism and sort
of thinking about it from the left and
whether there's the recoverable vision
and purpose for this society that we
should be talking up in this moment now.
So yeah, that's kind of what I've on the
dock and we'll see what happens. There's
an election this year.
>> That's right. I'm sure you'll be writing
something about that.
>> That's right. So yeah, that's that's
what I've got so far.
>> Well, great. A lot to look forward to
then. Well, thank you so much for taking
the time to talk to me today.
>> Thank you so so much for having me.
As usual, there's a few reflections that
I want to share before we wrap things
up. OSEDA intervenes in debates today
about whether public discourse,
especially among politicians and
pundits, anybody trying to influence
politics, should appeal to American
democracy. Ace argues that people too
often talk about democracy in the
abstract, separate from any kind of
material benefits or the everyday
difficulties that Americans deal with in
their daily lives. He argues that
America is actually not a democracy, but
it should be. Ace defines democracy
using three metrics. Political equality,
that is to say, no person or class of
people has an entrenched political
privilege or distinct set of rights.
responsiveness. That is to say,
eventually and on some measures, the
legislation and government action often
reflects Americans preferences or
interests and majoritarian rule. But his
vision of democracy includes freedoms
and rights constraints that are
typically referred to as liberal, such
as freedoms of speech, freedoms of
association, and is a dynamic vision of
democracy. That is to say that the
composition of majority coalitions are
always shifting and whoever wins or
loses elections is always changing.
While even the title of Ace's book calls
for a new American founding, he is clear
that he's not calling for some sort of
immediate national convention to amend
the Constitution as outlined in article
5. Instead, he emphasizes that changes
need to be developed through long-term
mobilization with the general public's
genuine participation and buyin. That
said, he argues that some of the
dysfunction of American politics, such
as our institutions's lack of
responsiveness to voters preferences or
lack of opportunities for
self-governance, can be mitigated at the
state level and in civil society
organizations and participating in
organizations and smaller institutions
exercising collective action can help
Americans exercise agency and practice
the civic habits that efforts at more
constitutional level changes would
require in the first place. Bita's book
also addresses what he calls economic
democracy. He argues people in power
can't just dismiss the economic
discontent and frustration of Americans
even as we acknowledge that policy
responses that emphasize tariffs won't
work to bring back the good jobs that
they promise. He argues for people on
both sides of the political spectrum to
cease making these false promises about
a return to a mid-century manufacturing
economy that will not come back and to
come to terms with the many changes that
our economy is defined by. From
automation to the gig economy and other
distinctive features of our time. Aita
criticized how much the law makes it
difficult for workers to unionize or
otherwise act in concert. and his work
shows how sectoral organizations can
help workers find resources and fight
for improvements in their workplaces.
Here I think I have to note that many
economists criticize unions as
economically inefficient. While they
initially increase wages for the
original unionized workers, these gains
dissipate. In terms of a classic text,
though there's more recent research, you
could see Gordon Tollik's 1975
transitional gains trap. However, many
economists will also acknowledge that
those who support unions and other
organizational structures to enhance
worker power often do so for reasons
that are beyond wages or economic
efficiency, such as the ability to
exercise voice to shape the direction of
a firm and to remedy oppressive
workplace conditions. In his book, Acea
discusses the massive surveillance and
widespread injuries suffered by workers
in Amazon warehouses and drivers, as
well as the company's efforts to thwart
unionization, to give one such example.
But if you're skeptical of unions,
economists also argue for other policy
solutions that can help workers more
than tariffs ever will. My colleague
Leah Pelosi works on portable benefits
for independent contractors from
truckers to care workers, which are
designed to help gig workers and other
independent workers access employment
benefits such as healthcare and
retirement funds. Despite their
differences, I like that Asz and Leah's
approaches start from a cleareyed view
of many kinds of real people who fall
under the commonly evoked image of the
American worker and the need for policy
solutions to avoid naive nostalgia for a
past that we will never get back. Given
this year's anniversary of the Wealth of
Nations, I couldn't help but think of
Adam Smith's critiques of tariffs and
subsidies, which usually helped some
merchants and industries at the expense
of many of the poorest workers in the
population as a whole. I discussed these
arguments in earlier episodes this
season with Smith scholars Maria P.
Paganelli and Glory Lou. So, if you're
interested in more, check those out.
I'll add that this conversation with Osa
reminded me of some of my other favorite
passages from Wealth of Nations where
Smith criticizes how laws made it easy
for merchants to meet and coordinate
together while prohibiting their
employees, poor workers from doing the
same. To be clear, this is a very
different historical context. Smith was
not talking about unions. But as long as
we continue to turn to Smith as a
resource for political economy, it's
important to keep in mind that he
himself considered not only how laws and
policies shaped wages or economic
efficiency, but the power that employers
and industry leaders can wield in the
political system and in the private
sphere over their own employees and the
market as a whole. I'm so grateful to
Osa for joining me and to you for
listening. Till next time.
Heat. Heat.