Video summary
The video examines critical security vulnerabilities found in Dominion ICX voting machines, which are widely deployed across over 17 U.S. states and used extensively for accessibility purposes by voters with visual impairments. Researchers acquired one of these devices from a Goodwill store for $100 and purchased an official configuration kit online that included essential access keys such as the voter key, poll worker key, and a "god mode" technician key available for purchase at approximately $150. The primary concern highlighted is that these security keys contain symmetric encryption codes directly embedded within them; once obtained, anyone possessing the card can decrypt system files because the same password used to encrypt data also serves as the decryption key. This design flaw allows malicious actors full administrative access without needing physical possession of a specific machine's internal hardware beforehand.
Once inside the terminal mode via these keys, attackers gain complete control over the election database and display settings stored in SQL-like formats within zip files. The demonstration reveals that hackers can easily swap candidate names, alter party affiliations, change ballot questions to mislead voters—for instance, flipping a question about marijuana legalization—and even remove entire candidates from the contest without leaving obvious traces in standard audits. Furthermore, because the system relies on symmetric encryption and HMAC signatures rather than robust certificate-based signing, an attacker can decrypt legitimate files, modify their content, re-encrypt them with the same key they already possess, resign the documents to pass validation checks, and install these tampered configurations onto thousands of machines remotely or during routine maintenance updates.
The implications for election integrity are severe because the printed ballots displayed to voters do not necessarily match what is actually recorded in the system's internal database; a voter might see themselves selecting "Charles Curtis" on screen while their vote is secretly registered under a different name like "EMTT." While audits could theoretically detect discrepancies if names were simply swapped, more subtle manipulations such as changing question text or using formatting tricks to influence votes would likely go unnoticed. The researchers emphasize that these vulnerabilities are currently active and will persist into the 2026 general elections unless manufacturers address them, noting that upgrading entire systems involving tens of thousands of machines is prohibitively expensive and logistically difficult for many counties facing budget constraints.
Ultimately, the video concludes with a stark warning about the reliance on symmetric encryption in critical infrastructure and urges immediate action from voters to mitigate these risks. The most effective safeguard identified is for every voter to carefully read their printed ballot immediately after casting it to verify that the names of candidates and questions match their expectations before leaving the polling place. Although many people may rush through voting or fail to scrutinize QR codes and text, this simple verification step can prevent malicious actors from successfully altering election outcomes without detection. The presentation serves as a cautionary tale about how easily accessible tools and poor cryptographic practices in widely used voting systems could undermine democratic processes if left unaddressed before the next major elections.
Read the full video transcript
What's up, Defcon? We are here at Voting
Village. I'm here with Phillip. We're
taking a look at a lot of different
voting machines around the space, but
we're looking at this particular one.
Philip, can you give me a rundown of
what we're looking at and why this is
relevant right now, 2026, got the
elections coming up in fall. Uh, give me
a rundown on what's going on.
>> This is the Dominion ICX voting machine.
It is used in over 17 states here in the
United States. Uh it is um touchscreen.
It prints your ballot for you. It
presents the votes for you. What it was
trying to do is basically make it
accessible for people with vision
issues, accessibility issues, etc. So,
it's a little system that they have used
ubiquitously in Georgia. [music] Every
county uses it as well as some of the
other counties, California, uh Arizona
and others.
So, I mean, widely used obviously.
[music] Um, something that some of the
people on here watching would recognize
when going out to vote if you're
participating in our democracy,
>> right?
>> Uh, give us a little more on So, I I
heard that you're you've done a little
work here. You've um done a couple of
attacks and been successful.
>> Uh, what can you give me a little
rundown on those attacks are?
>> Well, first off, where did we where did
we find this machine? We found this at
Goodwill. Uh, we purchased this at
Goodwill for $100 that a county had
gotten rid of and so they gave us the
access to this machine,
>> which is fun.
>> What?
>> Right. Then we went online to a place
called Elections Source at
electionsource.com.
They have a little package that you can
get and download for $150.
That includes configuration files, setup
files, as well as these security keys.
The first security key is the voter key.
This voter key is what you'll use and be
given whenever you go to register to
vote. You'll be placing this into the
voting machine and you will record your
vote. The second key is the pole workers
key. Now, this pole workers key will be
handed to every pole worker in your
county. All the keys have the same
password [music] on them. So, every
county will be issued these and you'll
be talking a couple of thousand for some
of the larger counties. The problem is
these poleworker keys have the
encryption code inside of the card
itself. So if you're able to read a
smart card, you can read the Randall AES
encryption keys.
>> And that I mean I'm just going to take a
guess here is not too hard to get into
to
>> not very hard especially where someone
at [music] Defcon. Right.
>> Right. The final card that they gave us
in this one is called the technician
key. This is a god mode key. All right.
So we were able to get this off the
internet download for 150 bucks. You can
put this in any Dominion ICX device.
Place it in, type in the password of
eight digits. In this case, it's 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8. And you can get to terminal
mode and pretty much do whatever you
want to to any of these voting machines.
>> For a couple hundred, I can go online,
get one of these keys that is going to
work [music] with these machines.
>> We did call the manufacturer of this
website and said, "That is not a good
idea. Will you please remove it?" But it
[music] doesn't stop the people who've
already purchased it and it doesn't stop
people from making copies of these keys.
>> That was going to be my next question.
Right. Because it's out now at this
point.
>> Right now he won't let me touch the key.
I have a special permission at this
point.
>> Of course. Of course.
>> Right. So now this terminal, this is an
Android device, right? And it it's very
very configurable because it has to
support multiple countries, multiple
languages, etc. So when we purchased
this configuration kit, they gave us a
election system that we're going to call
famous names election.
>> And so now we have a ballot here and we
have a configuration file for that
ballot.
>> Okay?
>> And what we can now do is using the key
on the card, we can decrypt the election
file. When you decrypt the election
file, it turns out that it's [music] a
zip file. Open the zip file, you have a
series of folders. Inside the folder,
you have a SQL like database that has
absolutely every single thing in it to
configure your display screen to your to
settings.
>> Is there anywhere that at that point
that stops you from modifying?
>> No, because a pull worker's job is to
take the configuration file, install it
into the machine for each election.
>> So, they're going to be going around to
up to 2 3,000 machines and installing
the memory card with this configuration
file. Got it?
>> Now, since you have the encryption and
you have the key in the configuration
file, a hacker could now decrypt that
database, edit the database, and load it
back up into the system because the key
they use is symmetric. So, the same key
I use to encrypt it, I can also I would
decrypt it, I can also encrypt it. They
also had the signature keys, the HMAC
keys in the database that I decrypted.
Therefore, I can sign it as [music]
well. So I decrypt it, edit it, encrypt
it, resign it, copy it to a mestick,
install it into the device. Device
checks the signature, everything looks
good, it runs that new version.
>> Would there be any type of flag based on
the signature that [music] you would be
able to go back and filter and say, "Oh,
anything with this signature
specifically
um should be flagged and therefore could
be uh could have been [music] under in
an attack." You could, but you're now
going to have to open up 20,000
different [music] tabulators, go through
every single one of them, look for that
signature,
>> but you don't know. Someone could have
come back later and restored it. Right.
>> Right.
>> So, it's it's it could happen. Right.
Because these machines are then going to
be almost always reused for the next
election, overwriting the files. And any
audit files that are on the system are
easily editable. So you can not only
edit it, but with the technician card,
you can even delete the auto box. So
we're going to let you vote.
>> Okay, let's let's take a vote. Let's do
it. Let's try it out.
>> So put it under here.
>> All right. I'm going to slip it in as
the voter.
>> Mhm.
>> It's going to be called the famous
names.
>> All right.
>> Configuration. You can hit next.
>> And now you're presented with a list of
choices.
>> But if you compare it to the list of
choices on the ballot, yes, notice the
first two names have been swapped. They
have been swapped
>> cuz I went into the database into the
choice table. Y
>> I took the text off the first person and
I replaced it with the text on the
second person and the second person back
with the first person.
>> So you're just playing some games with
me here, right?
>> Yes. Interesting.
>> The text in the database is HTML.
>> So I'm actually allowed to go in here
and change the HTML of what is
displayed. I can enhance. I can bold. I
can strike through. I can make yours
red. I can make mine blue. I can change
parties. I can make you a Democrat. I
can make me a a Republican if I want to.
I can even change questions. For
example, what if the question was, "Do
you want marijuana to be legal in
[music] the United States?" How would
you answer? I can guess.
>> Absolutely no.
>> Absolutely no. Now, what happens if I go
to the database and change your
question? Now, I've now changed your
question to illegal in the United
States. You' probably vote opposite of
what you feel.
>> Correct. [music]
>> Right. Correct. But when it prints your
result, all it's going to say is no.
It's not going to print the question.
So, I can trick you by just changing the
screen to make you vote opposite of what
you want.
>> And again, no one's the wiser coming out
of it. That's correct. Like just it's
just what you're feeding the voter.
>> It's going to say precinct proposition
one. I voted no.
>> That's wild.
>> That's wild. [music]
>> So, let's go ahead and you pick the
first person Curtis.
>> I'm going to Yeah, I'm going to vote.
Can I
>> If you pick the first one, it' be
better. All right, let's go for the
demo. Yep. Charles Curtis,
>> right? And then you can pick anyone you
want here. You pick your libertarian.
>> I'll pick I'll pick my libertarian.
Okay.
>> And then anyone is fine with this one.
>> Well, I'm going to go with Francis Scott
Key.
>> Fantastic.
>> All right.
>> Okay. I can actually skip the rest of
the ballot because there are front and
back.
>> Okay.
>> But we can go to review.
>> Now, here you can see you voted for
Charles Curtis.
>> Correct.
>> Okay. You and WC Redfield.
>> Correct.
>> Print your ballot.
>> All right. Let's print the ballot. This
is what I would do in any normal
>> circumstance when I'm out voting, right?
Then I would get this to get ready.
>> Very standard. Everyone's going to be
voting like this in Georgia.
>> You have your ballot. Who did you vote
for for the first person?
>> All right. Um, for the first person I
voted for, it says, uh, vote for Charles
Curtis.
>> So, you saw Charles Curtis on the
screen. You voted for Charles Curtis.
It's on the print. Who did you really
vote for? No, you actually voted for
EMTT.
>> Oh my goodness. Okay. So, this is from
the scan. Even though I've been fed and
everything it looks like that I voted
for on everything I see,
>> right,
>> for my real scan and what's going to be
actually tallied,
>> right,
>> is wow.
And there's no I mean I would be none
the wiser.
>> The wiser.
>> Yeah.
>> Because what you saw, what you was
printed, what you read, and what you put
into the machine, you agree with.
>> Yes. But the the QR codes that you're
seeing here, the only thing that the QR
code records, there's no names in there.
It's what position of person did you
pick. So you picked person number one,
>> right?
>> That's all it in here is position person
one. So when I was in the SQL database
and I changed the text, I changed what
one meant.
>> Right. It's going to be either one, two,
or three. In that case, I chose one. But
it just depends on what that option is
[music] in reality when it's tallied.
>> Exactly. Right. And I mean this is just
one modification. I mean I could see a
whole series of different ways you could
modify this to [music] give a lot
different outcomes.
>> That's right.
>> Right. Right.
>> Based on changing names, orders, uh
parties,
>> party affiliation. And a lot of this if
someone went to back and audit that,
they would see that the front did not
match the back. You could catch on an
audit. But changing the question, adding
bold, making one person bigger than the
other, striketh through, any of those
types is a presentation would never be
caught in an audit.
>> I could actually remove a candidate from
the contest I didn't want you to see.
You would be none the wiser. You'd pick
the candidates that you want, but that
person will not get any votes for that
ballot.
>> Wow, that is wild. What is the reality
we're going to be seeing anything like
this [music] happen? Well, the reality
is we've never actually encountered a
real circumstance of this. We've This is
all academic. This is just showing some
of the lack features by using symmetric
encryption, by using an HMAC instead of
a real certificate-based signing system.
But how would you know?
>> How would you know?
>> Correct.
>> Because they give you the keys. They
give you They give you everything you
need to be malicious.
Is this something I know this is [music]
we've only looked at one machine. Um
what about other machines in other
states that are running on you know
similar systems?
>> I'm concentrate on the Dominion systems
uh which is more than enough because
>> but places like Georgia they aware of a
lot of these problems. They were some of
the record ID problems and they are
wanting to upgrade but it's a very
expensive thing to upgrade.
>> They're looking at new systems that are
going to cost $100 million to replace
the entire system.
>> [music]
>> They're looking at having to open up
20,000 boxes and install new software,
[music] test the software. So, it's a
very difficult thing to upgrade and fix
>> and then the potential vulnerabilities
in those.
>> Exactly.
>> There's always going to be more.
>> Exactly. Right.
>> Wow. I I mean, so I kind of asked you,
but you know, are we should we be
worrying about this uh you know, this
this fall? Should we be kind of paying
attention to the pay attention? How do
we what what are the safeguards? What
are the guardrails that we can Are there
any is there anything we can do?
>> This will be used in the general
election for 2026
>> with these vulnerabilities. Act
currently active. Okay.
>> So, the number one thing I want you to
do is read your ballot. Make sure the
names on the ballot is who you voted
for.
>> Just that one task alone really helps
with a lot of these problems.
>> Yeah.
>> I would imagine though the majority of
people are not doing that.
>> They don't do that. You want to get out
of there as soon as you voted. You want
to get out of there.
>> You got a weird QR code. You got some
text underneath it. just take a few
minutes just read over make sure the
votes are there and if they don't match
please go back to your pole worker and
they will help you out.
>> Man, I I appreciate you giving us this
demo. I mean pretty wild that it's also
accessible and the vulnerabilities are
just right there at the surface level.
>> Uh but I you know and I I'm sure we
could dig around and look at a lot of
these other machines and have a great
time, but we don't have that kind of
time today. You're a busy man. You've
got things to do. You have voting
machines to hack for goodness
[clears throat] sakes. Thank you so much
for the tour, Philip. Absolutely.
Appreciate it.
>> All right,
>> we're out.