Video summary
Cory Doctorow challenges the prevailing narrative surrounding artificial intelligence, arguing that claims of a near-future "fully automated luxury communism" are unfounded due to unavoidable existential threats like climate change, rising sea levels, and plagues. He contends that resolving these crises will require massive human labor for centuries, making full automation impossible in the short term. Furthermore, he critiques the current AI discourse as suffering from excessive hype, where tech CEOs promote outlandish ideas about job displacement or mind control to mask unsustainable financial realities. Doctorow points out that the industry is currently driven by a massive bubble fueled by speculative spending rather than sound unit economics, with Large Language Models relying on statistical correlations rather than genuine causal understanding, leading to frequent hallucinations and an inability to perform complex reasoning tasks without external tools.
The investment landscape for AI is described as highly fragile because data centers are not durable assets; the hardware degrades quickly and lacks backward compatibility, forcing companies to constantly rebuild infrastructure instead of upgrading it. While established tech giants risk wasting decades of profits by entering this speculative bubble, they often feel trapped by market pressures or fear disruption from new technologies like ChatGPT. Doctorow highlights that many claims of autonomy are misleading, noting that systems in fields like autonomous driving frequently rely on hidden human intervention rather than true independence. Additionally, he warns against "billionaire solipsism," where executives treat people as statistical abstractions to justify replacing them with software, and cautions that AI outputs can be statistically plausible yet factually wrong, making it difficult for humans to spot rare but critical errors.
Recent security incidents, such as the Hugging Face breach, are explained not as evidence of rogue AI consciousness but as the result of mechanical automation where scripts use AI to iteratively probe for vulnerabilities. Doctorow argues that these agents exhibit emergent behaviors due to poor sandboxing and existing flaws rather than possessing genuine intelligence or understanding, a conclusion supported by the diminishing returns on compute investment. This technical reality is set against a broader crisis in information security, where companies prioritize compliance over safety and hoard vulnerabilities instead of disclosing them, creating an environment where low-resource actors can easily weaponize high-level exploits. Doctorow compares the chaotic nature of these AI swarms to a double pendulum, emphasizing that their unpredictable behavior stems from sensitivity to initial conditions rather than intentionality or malice.
Ultimately, Doctorow asserts that capital-driven automation prioritizes throughput over quality, often resulting in inferior outputs like poor customer service bots, whereas worker-led automation aims to enhance judgment and improve product quality. He critiques the historical belief that markets naturally correct inefficiencies, citing examples where industrial practices increased productivity at the expense of worker safety and ergonomics, a pattern he sees repeating with modern AI. Drawing parallels to the Luddites, who were skilled early adopters opposing machines that produced inferior goods and enabled child labor, Doctorow suggests that worker cooperatives are often more efficient and less prone to market traps than profit-driven firms. He concludes that care, defined as empathy and solidarity provided by workers, is essential for producing high-quality goods and represents the only viable future, standing in stark contrast to the current lack of care inherent in AI systems.
Read the full video transcript
The reality is we have full employment
for every human being who will live for
the next 500 years because we're going
to have to do [ __ ] like move all the
coastal cities 20 kilometers in land
because we are not living in a fantasy
novel. We are living in science fiction
and in science fiction the second law of
thermodynamics is not optional which
means that when you put enough therms in
the ocean the ice caps melt and when the
ice caps melt the seas go up. So, we are
going to have to deal with billions of
people who have been made refugees.
We're going to have to deal with a
series of zunotic plagues. We're going
to have to deal with food crises. We're
going to have to deal with um flooding
and wildfires and more and more extreme
weather events. And we're going to need
every hand we have. There is no fully
automated luxury communism on our
horizon. Maybe in 500 years, our distant
descendants will look back and say,
"Well, first of all, boy, was it a
[ __ ] mistake to put all that carbon
in the atmosphere to make chat bots.
Second of all, finally, we've got all
the cities moved 20 km inland. We
figured out how to resolve all of the
the zunotic plagues. Everyone's been
resettled. Now, we can start working on
that fully automated luxury communism
thing. Comrade,
AI is set to take all of our jobs. It's
set to irrevocably transform our
interpersonal relationships. It could
even kill us all. Those are claims that
both supporters and critics of AI now
regularly make and they're claims that I
take seriously very often over on Navara
Live. My guest today on Downstream
though, as I replace Aaron Bastani,
who's off on paternity leave, thinks
that this is a mistake. He thinks that
by amping up the capacity, the ability
of artificial intelligence, both critics
and supporters are doing tech CEOs a
favor. Cory Doctoro is the writer and
author. I mean, famous for many things,
but especially his concept of
inshitification,
um, which explains how the internet got
so much worse. Um, he's now turned his
attention to artificial intelligence in
a brilliant book, The Reverse Centaur's
Guide to Life After Ai. I'm so excited
that I get to stand in for Aaron Bastani
for this episode um, and talk to the
fantastic Corey Doctor. I've really
lucked out here. Cory Dr. Oro, welcome
to Downstream.
>> Thank you very much. Pleasure to be on.
>> Um, your last book, Initification, um,
massive hit. Also a mainstream hit here.
It was nominated for the Financial Times
business book of the year. Um, I don't
know if you expected that sort of as a
young sci-fi writer that you'd be
>> very exciting. I also got in the OED,
uh, which like talk about a bucket list
item. I have a friend who got a much
rudder word in the OED, Dan Savage, who
got uh um uh the name of a US senator,
which he used as a euphemism for a very
disgusting sexual fluid. Uh and he got
that Santorum. He got that into the OED
as an official synonym for um I'm not
even going to say it's it's it starts
with a frothy m mix of lube and goes
downhill from there. Oh my god. and and
it is an official OED synonym for uh
Santorum, also a conservative senator
who opposed marriage equality. I think
in shitification was also word of the
year. Several one of them. Yeah. New
scientists made it UK well made in
shouldene the UK word of the year.
McQuary made it the Australian word of
the year. The American Dialect Society
made it the American word of the year.
My dad was very disappointed it wasn't
the American Dialectic Society, but
there we go.
>> And I mean, now we're talking about it.
you've already done an interview with us
onification sort of a Navara IRL and we
were just saying before we went live I
wasn't there because I was doing my own
show but I could hear how you were
working the crowd very impressive stuff
but in case anyone hasn't seen that very
briefly what was the initification idea
>> so I've worked for this nonprofit called
the electronic frontier foundation I'm
going into my 25th year on trying to get
people to care about tech policy and
it's really hard because it's abstract
things that are in the future and people
care about concrete things that are
happening now. And so you have to come
up with gimmicks, framing devices,
simileies, narratives. I write science
fiction novels. And it turned out the
dirty word was the thing that got people
to engage with it. So I coined this term
in shitification to both describe a
process of platform decay, how they go
bad, but also to hypothesize a theory
about why they're going bad now. Because
I'm a materialist. I don't think we got
hit by a platform destroying meteor in
the mid teens. I think that like the
conditions around the world changed such
that the worst ideas of the worst people
made the most money. And so wherever
there was a factional dispute within a
firm or wherever someone was tempted as
a decision maker to take their platform
in a worse uh direction, they did. And
so we end up with the inshitta scene
when everything's turning into [ __ ]
because of policymakers creating an
inchiditoenic policy environment where
they took decisions that had the
foreseeable and foreseen outcome of
creating this millure. And the process
is pretty straightforward. Platforms are
first good to their end users and they
lock them in. That's stage one. Stage
two, you're locked in. It's hard for you
to leave. So they make things worse for
you in order to provide benefit to
businesses which they also lock in. And
then having locked in those businesses,
they withdraw value from them as well.
The idea is to find an equilibrium where
you have like the mingiest kind of
homeopathic residue of value sufficient
to keep users locked to the platform,
businesses locked to the users,
everything else withdrawn and aortioned
among executives and shareholders uh and
the platform sort of zombieing on as
this thing that we hate but can't seem
to escape. And I think one of the things
maybe for a Novara audience that is
useful to point out here is that this is
an environment in which you have like
kind of billionaire on millionaire
violence, right? Where you have fairly
large and powerful firms being
victimized by even larger, more powerful
firms who establish themselves as
intermediaries. And it's kind of a
rebuke to a liberal notion that uh if
you're not paying for the product,
you're the product. as though being
treated well is like a customer loyalty
perk as opposed to like a thing that is
determined by whether a firm that is
just you know has this one objective
function which is to maximize its profit
can figure out that they can maximize
their profit from you even though you're
spending money with them and maybe later
I think we're going to talk about John
Deere but you know if you're a farmer
who spends $600 or $700,000 on your John
Deere tractor you still have to pay $200
after you fix your own tractor for the
John Deere repair person to come out and
just type the unlock code that
initializes your repair, you having made
it. It's not a free tractor, right? You
didn't get the tractor for looking at
ads, right? You paid for the tractor.
You're a captive audience. It's a new
kind of tenant farming where you're a
tenant of the agricultural equipment and
not the land. And it's essentially,
again, we'll move on from initification
onto AI very very soon. But just to sort
of introduce your work, I suppose it's
almost a conventional argument about
monopoly power, isn't it? So it's to say
they get you in with a useful product
and once they've got a load of monopoly
power it's difficult for you to leave if
you want to stay in touch with your
friends for example then they can
degrade the product because you've got
nowhere else to go. So they can just
blast adverts at you and make it full of
pop-ups and make the search worse and
worse and worse because they've got 90%
market share. In a way was it
>> you know accepted and embraced perhaps
by sort of the mainstream business press
because it was like almost a
conventional economic argument made very
persuasively and made very well for the
21st century. So I I well I'll I'll
thank you for saying it was made
persuasively and well. I I I will
stipulate that there's aspects of this
that just recapitulate the wisdom about
monopolies, but I also am drawing out
some of the contingent factors that both
make tech shitty and also make it
resistant to initification. So on the
one hand, the most basic lockin system
that tech platforms have going for them
is what's called network effects. Uh
this is an economics term. It just means
something that gets more valuable the
more people there are using it. Uh
social media is a really good example.
you know, you join there to find some
people. The more people there are there,
the more likely the people you're
looking for are there. Once you are
there, you become a person someone else
wants to see. So, you have this network
effect that has these corolleries, which
are things like high switching costs,
which is to say you have to abandon all
those people. If you leave the platform,
and high coordination costs, which is
like you love your friends, but they're
a pain in the ass. And you know, you all
agree that you hate Facebook, but you
can't agree on where to go next. You
can't even agree what board game you're
going to play this weekend. And so, you
hold each other hostage. So that's a
unique contingent aspect of that kind of
tech. And then on the other hand, you
have these contingent aspects about um
how tech has some initification
resistance built into it. Some of that
is a labor story while tech workers have
effectively no unions. I mean there's
some you know shout out to tech workers
coalition and so on. But they they have
like infinite decimal union density. But
the part of the reason for that is that
they were in such high demand and they
were so productive from an economic
perspective in the sense that signing a
new engineer up on the payroll of a
company like Google more or less added a
million dollars to the bottom line of
Google. So
>> they got great salaries and bean bags.
>> Yeah. And like kombucha surgeon who'd
freeze your eggs so you could work
through your fertile years, whatever you
wanted. So you had a lot of labor power
and a lot of those people came to the
profession
through a kind of liberatory experience
with technology, right? like they they
found in the spare bedroom with the
bulky beige PC a world they never
suspected existed that not only gave
them a lot of economic opportunities but
maybe a way to you know name the
phenomena of the world that they never
dreamt was possible or even words to
describe themselves that they never
thought was possible. Uh and and so they
want to share that benefit. Um I call
them tron pill because they want to
fight for the user. Uh and you know you
meet these people all the time. ask
someone who uses Linux about their
computer and then try and get them to
stop talking about their computer. Uh,
and so, you know, these people had
market power, labor power, and they had
an ethos that despite all the things we
say about tech bros was very common,
remains common within the field. You
also have a unique characteristic of
computers, which is that the only kind
of computer we know how to build is
something that's formerly called the
touring complete universal vonoyman
machine. a lot of CS jargon, but what it
means is that every computer can run
every program, which means that every
inchificatory gambit assayed by a firm
invites a disinhitifying program that
can be costlessly instantaneously
distributed to everyone who's affected
by it. So, you know, you put more ads in
the platform, someone makes an ad
blocker. And uh it was the advent of
what's called an anti-ircumvention law
that I think we'll probably get back to
in this interview, which is a law that
prohibits modifying technology with the
manufacturers's permission that choked
off that new market entry and basically
created this this one-way system where
you could disrupt an incumbent if you're
Facebook by creating a an interoperable
program, something that that talks to
the existing programs, but no one can
ever do it to you. When you do it, it's
progress. when someone does it to you,
that's piracy. And so you can just lock
users in.
>> And so that's a unique historic
contingent aspect of it as well. And
then because computers are so flexible
and because users can't flex them, only
firms can. You can do a lot of stuff at
high speed. You can do a lot of
automation. And this is now getting into
AI and the main conversation we're going
to have today I think which is that you
can like twiddle the knobs on the back
end to change the characteristics of the
platform on a per user per session basis
in a way that's just not practical in
the physical world. You know, um, one of
the things I write about in in the AI
book is the fact that, uh, nurses who
sign on for a shift using a gig work
platform in the US, which is the
predominant way now that contract nurses
find their their shifts, they have their
credit card data checked through a data
brokerage by the platform before they're
offered a shift. And if they're carrying
a lot of uh, debt, their wages adjusted
downward as a kind of um, desperation
premium. And like you know if you've
listened to the songs of Tennessee Ernie
Ford, you know that there were coal
bosses in the 19th century who are
perfectly capable of conceiving of this
Whis. They just couldn't afford the army
of Pinkertons to follow around the coal
miners and figure out who they could
nickel and dime down on the shift. And
they couldn't afford the army of guys in
green eye shades to adjust the ledger
all day to change the pay packet for
every worker. And so you have these like
unique contingencies that both cut for
and against inshitification and monopoly
is like a really serious problem here.
uh but it's the way it expresses itself
in this moment is distinct and you know
in inification I I devote a chapter to
varus's idea of technofudalism and I
think he's making a an argument that has
a similar structure where you know the
characteristics of feudalism and economy
extra organized around rent extraction
to the exclusion of profit or rather you
know to the as a triumph over profit um
that that has come back with its own
unique digital characteristics in this
moment of what he calls cloud capital.
But um you can understand a lot of
what's going on now by thinking about
feudalism in the same way that you can
understand a lot what's going on now by
going back and reading Ida Tarbel who's
the woman who felled the empire of John
D. Rockefeller by writing a series of
investigative journalism articles in a
nationally syndicated magazine as
revenge for him having ruined her father
who was a Pennsylvania oilman before
going on to becoming the most important
suffragist in America and giving all the
barn burning speeches that led the
movement to victory. She was amazing.
>> She sounds amazing. Um, let's officially
get onto the book. Yeah. So, your new
book is about AI. Um,
>> it's a critique of AI in a way. It's
also a critique of AI discourse at the
moment. I suppose maybe we could start
by asking you what is going wrong in the
way we talk about AI at the moment.
>> Yeah. So the original title of this book
was the reverse centtor's guide to
criticizing AI. Um, my editor thought
life after AI sounded better, but it
really is about being a good AI critic,
which is about
understanding the material factors that
give us the AI bubble, attacking those
material factors preferentially, and uh
figuring out what ideological
characteristics arise out of the
material circumstances, but not
mistaking this as as a merely
ideological project and understanding
that it's like a material project, too.
And and very crucially, if you do those
two things, you will not fall prey to a
thing that the STS scholar at Virginia
Tech, Lee Vinsel, calls crit a hype,
which is when you uh repeat the most
outlandish claims of a firm, but then at
the end in parenthesis add and that's
bad. You know, the the kind of
practitioners of this are the people who
believe in Zubov surveillance
capitalism, which is basically the
belief that not only these companies
spying on us, but that they've perfected
a mind control ray through surveillance
data and uh that they can make us do
anything with it. And so you run around
and say, "Oh, they've ended free will
itself through their big data machine."
And then they go out to sell ads and
they're like, "Well, you're asking me
why you should pay a 40% premium to
advertise on Facebook." Don't ask me.
Ask my critics. They will tell you, "I
work for Cyber Rasputin and he has
succeeded where Mesmer, MK Ultra, pickup
artists, and neural linguistic
programming weirdos failed. He's built
the mind control ray. We can sell
anything to anyone. That's why you
should give me a 40% premium on ads on
my platform." You're helping them uh
sell ads, right? You're not You think
you're criticizing that you're helping
them. There's a lot of this in AI uh
where we talk about how not that your
boss is a credulous adult who's
infinitely horny to replace lippy
workers with pliable chat bots and
therefore can be convinced to fire you
and replace you with a chatbot that is
manifestally incapable of doing your
job. And instead we run around and we
say the AI is going to take our jobs
which is not the same thing. And if you
go out there and say the AI is as good
of my job as I am, you help the AI
salesman sell your credulous dull to the
boss on the chatbot that's going to
result in you getting fired. And you
take your natural class allies, which
are the people who benefit from the
things that you do, and you turn them
into your class enemy because the reason
people want to see a radiologist is to
make sure they don't have cancer, not to
feed the radiologist kids. And if you're
like, "This is as good as I am at my
job, but it works at 1 millionth the
price." People are going to say, "Look,
I feel for you." But, you know, I'm here
to not get cancer, not to pay your
mortgage. We'll figure something out for
you. And so we have to be we have to be
smart to be critics of this disgusting
harmful anti-worker fascist project so
that we attack it at its material roots
and detonate it as quickly as possible
rather than letting this bubble run its
course to the point where instead of
just 35% of the stock market being seven
AI companies, it's half or 3/4. And when
that bubble bursts, we do such punishing
austerity that Prime Minister Farage is
an all but foregone conclusion. Um, now
I think lots of the coverage I do over
on the bar alive would probably fall
into a category you'd describe as critic
hype. Um, but I want to park that
actually for a moment. I I literally
think it might kill us or not just take
our jobs. But I'm going to park that
because there's a lot where I think we
do agree and we can begin on that to
sort of bring out your your ideas to the
audience. We can put that to one side
for a moment. So the first thing you
mentioned there was the AI bubble.
>> Yeah.
>> And um, our audience are always
fascinated to hear about the AI bubble.
Um, everyone's talking about it partly
because it's so big, right? So, I'm just
going to go through um a few of the
numbers here. Um, so this year big tech
companies are expected to spend over
$800 billion on AI related capital
expenditures.
>> That's now actually 1.4 trillion so far
this year
>> in the just today
>> in the in the whole world maybe. Yeah.
>> Right. Yes. So, I think this is Goldman
Sachs are saying $800 billion in the US
this year, right, from those big tech
companies. Maybe it's CH if you add
China it sort of adds that on. Um, and
then they're suggesting that it will hit
$1.6 trillion dollars per year in 2031.
Um, that's the big American companies.
Um, which, you know, for our audience is
the equivalent to onethird of of UK GDP.
So all of our collective efforts, right,
>> for for
months of the year, we're just going
towards data centers. That's essentially
what's going on. Um,
>> oh, that might be data centers and not
including training and opex then,
>> right? Potentially.
>> Um, well, this is it. It said capex for
>> well then it's not including opex right
yeah
>> um yeah that would make sense uh US tech
stocks now command 40% of the US
standard and poor so 40% of the main
stock market index
>> is that the magnificent 7 or all tech
stocks cuz the magnificent 7 are 35% the
last
>> so this is something which is the the 10
it's the something 10
>> so they found they found three
>> they found three more you add that to it
in the periphery it's bank of America's
big 10
>> okay Sure. Sure.
>> Is what it is,
>> right?
>> Uh and um you know, obviously OpenAI
expected to IPO around 800 billion
andropic expected to IPO $1.5 to2
trillion. Um Nvidia stocks up a,000%
since Chat GPT was released. They're now
worth $5 trillion. Alphabet stock up
230%. Meta up 365%.
This is all in a three-year period. This
is this is crazy. If you if if you're
looking at the chart that is the bubble
and you know huge line goes up.
Obviously, we don't know if the line's
going to come down, but lots of people
are predicting it. Um
>> what's going on here?
>> Well, the other thing to mention here is
their revenue sucks, right? Actually, we
should mention two more things before we
talk about why this has a bubble.
Because people might say, oh, they spent
a lot of money, but maybe they're making
a lot of money or will. So, the two
things we should talk about is how much
money they're making, what their unit
economics look like. So, they're not
making much money.
depending on who you ask, it's probably
about $50 billion a year all told in in
pay in all the customers paying all the
subscriptions. Uh they claim it's 60
billion, but that includes the 10
billion that Microsoft gave to Open to
OpenAI and OpenAI gave back to
Microsoft, which is like not revenue. Um
speaking as someone who writes
technothrillers about finance fraud, to
call that an accounting trick is to do
violence to the noble accounting trick.
That's just not revenue at all. Uh and
their unit economics suck. So, one of
the things you may hear apologists for
the AI sector say is, "Oh, Amazon lost
money. The web lost money and then they
made money." And that's true, but they
didn't make money because they were
losing money. Right? The fact that
Amazon lost money and then made money
doesn't mean everything that's losing
money will someday make money. The
reason Amazon started to make money, the
reason the web started to make money is
it had good unit economics, which is to
say every time they signed a new
customer on, they became more
profitable. Every time that customer
returned and used their products, their
profits went up again. And successive
generations of the web were more
profitable than the previous ones. AI is
the reverse. Every new customer acquired
is more red on the balance sheet. Every
time the customer comes back and uses it
again, they lose more money. And every
generation of AI loses more money than
the previous generations. So that's like
that's the that's the the reason that we
should call this a bubble cuz it'd be
one thing to spend a couple of trillion
dollars to make several more trillion
dollars, but if you just want $50
billion change back from a trillion
dollars, I'll I'll take that deal. I I'd
need to buy a bigger mattress to put the
money under. But like I could give you
back, you know, $50 billion all day long
from your trillion dollar payout. I give
you 60 billion back. That's what kind of
a good-natured slob I am. So why is this
happening? Leftists like to say, I think
incorrectly, they like to quote that
line that endless growth uh is the
ideology of a tumor. And that's that
they they compare capitalism to a tumor.
I'm not going to say that capitalism
can't be a cancer, but uh the reason
people who run growing firms want to
keep growing is not because they have an
ideology. It's because they have
material needs. uh firms that are
growing are valued much more highly and
and when I say valued I don't mean
people like them more I I mean they
they're worth more money than firms that
are static firms that are mature because
a share in a firm is a claim on its
future earnings and so if a company is
going to double its earnings next year
and you buy a share in it this year you
would expect the market to price in the
fact that next year it's going to make
more money than this year the corollery
of that is when the firm ceases to grow,
it becomes a mature firm and now it's
grossly overvalued. Maybe maybe 10x
overvalued, maybe even more. You see
these flash crashes whenever tech firms
reach kind of the limit of their growth
or seem to be reaching the limit of
their growth. And as you mentioned
before, Google has a 90% market share.
So clearly, it's some kind of limit on
the horizon, at least as far as that
market goes. And so, you know, Facebook
in the first quarter 2022 gave an
investor report where they said, "Oh,
well, we anticipated this and so many
American new user signups last year, but
we got slightly fewer and the market
took $240 billion off their share price
in a day." Because even if you think oh
well Facebook will find new ways of
growing you're in uh it's Kane's had
this idea of the beauty contest that the
the mar stock market is a beauty contest
where you are trying to pick not the
most beautiful contestant but the
contestant the other judges will judge
most beautiful because then they buy
shares and then your shares go up. And
so if you think that everyone else is
going to sell, you have to sell. The
reason you have to sell is that while a
firm is growing, while its stock is
highly liquid, while it's highly valued,
it can be used in place of cash in order
to keep growing. So if you want to
acquire a competitor or someone in your
supply chain, which is a incredibly
anti-competitive but common way of
growing, or if you want to hire key
personnel, you don't have to find pounds
or dollars to do it. If you've got a
growth stock, you just offer them
shares. Now, pounds and dollars, you
only get those from creditors and com
and from customers and from investors.
They're hard to lay hands on. Whereas
shares in your own firm, you create by
typing zeros into a spreadsheet at the
headquarters. Uh they are an indogenous
substance. You can't make your own cash
at the corporate headquarters. They take
you away in handcuffs if you try. And so
once the firm stops growing, it stops
having the fundamental unit of growth,
which is free money that you can use to
buy other people's companies and hire
people. And everyone who works for your
company who might be able to pull you
out of this nose dive is suddenly much
poorer because you paid them in stock
and they all leave. And so there is a
completely excellent material reason
that companies that are growing want to
keep growing. And this is where we get
tech bubbles from. As these firms
reached maturity, as they saturated
their markets, well, first they started
to claim that they were going to become
each other. Facebook would become
YouTube through the pivot to video.
Google would become Facebook through
Google+. That's uh it's a it's a good
way of expressing your growth plans in
as much as like we know how much
Facebook is worth because it publishes a
balance sheet every quarter. The problem
with this is that when you assert that
you're about to become Facebook,
Facebook has a lot of resources that it
can go out into the world and insist
that you're not about to become Facebook
because Facebook is Facebook. And so
then they started making up imaginary
stuff. Now the disadvantage of imaginary
stuff is it doesn't exist. The advantage
of it is if it doesn't exist and you
just made it up, who's to say it's not
worth a lot of money? So we get web 3
and crypto and Dows and NFTTS, the
metaverse, one after another, these
imaginary things, and they're just like
running across the river on the back of
an alligator without losing a leg, just
inventing a new piece of [ __ ] that
they're going to use to double their
trillion dollar company, their $2
trillion company next year. And now we
get to AI. AI is the biggest one yet.
It's much bigger. The reason it's much
bigger is partly because they're playing
for all the marbles and partly because
it's more real. AI is like as today the
AI that we have today not the AI of the
1950s the 1960s 1970s ' 80s 90s the as
this AI came about when some computer
scientists about 12-1 15 years ago said
we've done this very laborious way of
getting machine learning systems to make
predictions about the world where we
build a world model we tell it how the
world works and then we ask it to make
inferences based on data that's really
art. What if we just gave it a ton of
data and we said find the uh the
correlative relationships in the data.
We won't know where the caus causal
arrow goes, but you can just do what's
called theoryfree inference, which you
know we do in the world all the time.
You can go to the doctor and sometimes
they will give you a medicine that no
one knows how it works. We just know we
give that medicine to a person with that
condition and then they get better. Now,
scientists would like to know how it
works, but if you're just like not dead,
you can be happy with the medicine. And
they're like, well, we can do a lot of
theory free inference and see where we
get. And it turned out they got a lot
further than anyone thought. It's
actually quite exciting. Like, from a
computer science perspective, I'm a fake
computer science professor. I I uh have
an honorary doctorate from the Open
University in CS and I'm on their
faculty in the in the computer science
program there. And so uh you know from a
computer science perspective this is
cool and it scales. You just throw more
computing power more data at it. You get
finer grained inferences that are more
like something that's causal. But it
also has limits. It just it doesn't know
what it's doing. It doesn't have a
theory of the world. Doesn't have a
world model. If you ask an LLM to play
chess, it'll tell you to move pieces
onto squares that there are already
pieces. because all it knows is how to
do inference, right? It's like it's
saying, "Okay, well, normally when this
chess move has just been played, the
next chess move that comes up most often
in a winning game is this one." But
because it doesn't have a world model,
it doesn't know there's a piece on the
board there. We used to build computers,
like not even computers, protocomputers,
out of electromechanical switches and
valves that could play valid chess
games. LLMs with not trillions,
quadrillions, quintilions of time more
computing power cannot play a chess
game. Now, weirdly, you can use that as
a coding assistant to write a valid
chess computer. So, there are uses for
it, which is one of the reasons that
people are excited about it.
>> Can just an LLM not play a chess game?
>> No, it'll tell you to put pieces where
there where there are pieces on the
square, unless you have a hybrid LLM
with a world model, which is what a lot
of the um coding assistants have. So the
coding systems, a lot of them now just
have compilers where they just compile
the code. They're not doing theory free
inference. They're actually running the
code. They're doing the you you could
call it cheating. Really what they're
doing is they're saying, "Oh yeah, it's
horses for horses. We found this thing
that we can do with a screwdriver." And
we got to two things that need to be
nailed together. And rather than just
like trying to get the screw to hold
these two things together, we've added
the hammer rather than just saying like,
"Okay, well, we're just going to have to
spend like more and more money on larger
and larger screwdrivers until the hammer
has been completely obiated, right?" So,
you can play a chess game with an LLM if
you if you give it a world model that's
like structurally made out of software,
right? That that like describes how
chess works. But if all you do is
theoryfree inference with an LLM, this
is what hallucinations are. But isn't
the point of so this is a technical
discussion now isn't it? Because my
understanding I'm not even a
>> a computer scientist computer scientist
I'm just not a computer scientist. Um
but my understanding sort of from an
observer is that you've got two types of
AI. You've got symbolic AI which is the
one you're talking about where you sort
of give it instructions world you you it
will be sort of if this then that this
is how this works. Now go and
>> exist in the world according to those
rules.
>> Yeah. And then you've got big data
machine learning which is to say we'll
give you a very basic sort of neural
network structure then we'll give you
all the data in the world
>> and you can kind of just work it out on
your own how to do it
>> right
>> and one of the reasons why you know
we're going to get onto this later but
one of the reasons why so many people
are worried about this model of AI is
because it's getting increas in
increasingly powerful and we got no idea
what's going on because it's it's a bit
of a black box. What I say is we are
more surprised by how many things you
can do with theory free inference than
we and we are we are increasingly
surprised by this. So let me give you an
example from a conversation I had with a
podcaster who is quite a believer in AI
and he said uh and this was like the
most
guy AI pill person thing to say which
was uh I can predict what my wife is
going to say and so can an LLM. Who's to
say that the LLM doesn't understand my
wife?
Just a shitty, terrible thing to say.
Let's just signpost that for a minute
here. But I think it's quite
illuminating cuz it is true. I I have an
autocomplete on my phone as do you. Uh
it has a statistical model of the things
that I'm likely to say back stop by like
all the things everyone's ever said. And
uh it can predict what I'm going to say
and so can my wife because I repeat
myself sometimes as do you. As does
everyone else. Uh, but if my wife were
to say something to me that she'd never
said before, like, "I'd like a divorce,"
I could make a guess about where that
was coming from. Because that's what
understanding is, right? We could
proceed to have a conversation that
related to the specific contingent facts
of our relationship, not the average of
all the times one person said, "I want
to get a divorce to another person,"
which is the best the LLM could do.
Right? And that's the difference between
understanding and theory free inference
is that understanding
proceeds from a theory. Now to to put a
button on this, it turns out you can
predict a lot more of what someone is
going to say without understanding them
than we thought. We are a little more
predictable than we thought. The world
is a little more predictable than we
thought. But it what where it matters is
when it goes wrong. AI is great if you
don't care how things fail. If you only
care how things work and you don't care
how they fail, AI is amazing. That is
the logic for building a car that has no
brakes in it, right? Because if all you
care is how the car runs, but not how it
stops when something gets in front of
it, you can build a hell of a car and
make a giant cost savings relative to a
car that has brakes. That's a whole
other assembly, right? And so I could
imagine that there are applications for
things that only go forward and don't
have a brake. uh but they are very
closely monitored and they're in narrow
applications so we don't use them for
everything.
>> Briefly interrupting this downstream to
tell you about not one but two events
we've got coming up at Navara Media. The
first is an event with Katherine Louu
and Darren McGarvey aka Loki at Earth
Hackne on the 21st of September about
the commodification of trauma and what
we can do about it. And hot on their
heels will be talking to the great Naomi
Klein and Astra Taylor about their new
book on technofascism in Brighton on
Thursday the 1st of October. Ticket link
can be seen on screen and also in our
bio. So I hope to see you there.
>> We're covering a lot of ground. So I'm
going to sort of try and park some of
these issues cuz I want to talk about
self-driving cars in in a moment. I want
to talk sort of later in the
conversation. you know, is it just a
semantic question whether or not they're
understanding if the output is what we'd
want it to be? But I want to part that
and focus on the economics of the bubble
now because we got lots of time.
>> Um, and so your argument, as far as I
understand it, is to say that these
aren't profitable.
>> Um, the basis on which they're not
profitable isn't just that they're
spending lots on on capital, which I
suppose is training the models. So, if
you're investing in training the models,
but then once the model is built, it's
profitable, that might be justifiable.
You build a railroad and then you run
the rail cars.
>> Everyone getting on the train makes you
some money after that. Um you're saying
that
>> actually every new user of chat GPT or
Claude is costing them money.
>> Yeah.
>> Now my understanding is that sort of
disputed. I mean the reason it's
disputed is because the companies aren't
very transparent about their accounts,
right?
>> But there are different sort of
assumptions and interpretations. So I
was looking at you know I know Ed Zatron
who site says says that yes they are
losing money on every inference epoch AI
um sort of
>> and he published a balance sheet that
leaked from them that made it pretty
clear
>> but he was also making some guesses
wasn't he because he was saying I assume
that all of this marketing budget is
going on inference for new users of chat
just very briefly I'll just
>> technically for the audience
>> training is when you you sort of give
your data center all of the information
in the world. Yeah. Well, it would be a
bunch of data centers. Lots lots of data
centers. All the information in the
world. Put it away for a year and it
comes out with a model. Inference is
every time I go on Claude
>> and I ask a question, um, then
>> when you ask Rock to make you Sonic the
Hedgehog with giant boo.
>> Exactly.
>> So, anyway, your your confidence that
this is losing money and that inference
is losing money.
>> Well, let's talk about Ed's Let's talk
about what Ed found. Uh, so Ed looked at
their balance sheet. They leaked a
balance. There was a balance sheet
leaked from OpenAI that um showed all
their all their costings, all their ino
incomings and outgoings. And it's true
that if you look at the line for
inference, it's it's quite a small
modest sum. It kind of looks like
they're maybe making money on inference.
And you keep looking down the balance
sheet, you get to marketing, they're
spending as much on marketing as
Coca-Cola.
>> Now Coca-Cola, we know where the
marketing spending is going because
there are three global agencies that
basically just service Coke, right? You
can actually just go into these giant
buildings full of highly paid
professionals and count heads to figure
out where the salaries are going. You
can go down the motorway and count
billboards, right, and see where it's
going. That is just not an evidence for
open AI. And one of the things we know
about marketing is that anything that
gets people to use your product is
marketing. And so if you're like, I
don't want to get sued by a minority
shareholder for making material
misrepresentation, but I do want to
assure my shareholders that my cost
basis is improving. calling your
inference marketing which unquestionably
gets people to use the product right if
the product weren't free I think a lot
of people wouldn't use it uh that is um
I think a move you would make we don't
we can also make some guesses or we can
make some inferences based on the
conduct of the firms because as you say
they're not very forthcoming and again I
think in my experience companies that
have really excellent financials do not
hide them because they want you to be
pleasantly surprised later and they
don't want to spoil it. Right? This is a
like giant flashing red light on the
balance sheet when they're like, "Well,
we just can't tell you." And in the same
way that Anthropic saying, "Oh, we are
now profitable, but not using GAP,
generally accepted accounting
principles, using a math that we are not
allowed to tell you about because we're
too cool to measure our profitability
using normal math and the math is
secret." And again, if you got enough
object permanence to win a game of
peekab-boo, you should see that a
company that is heading towards its
flotation that says we're finally
profitable, but only using math that we
can't explain to you shouldn't be
trusted in exactly the same way that a
company that says, "By the way, we built
a new hacking tool." And it's so amazing
that we can't tell you how it works or
show it to you or let you see it in
operation, but it is really amazing. By
the way, we do have this IPO coming up.
And uh did we mention that this product
is so cool we can't even let you see it?
Right? Like this is just
like maybe maybe they're just so stupid
that they've invented something
incredible on the eve of their IPO and
declined to tell the world how it works.
Or maybe they're cheating.
I don't know. I think they're cheating.
Um
even if they're not. So let's say no no
no. their their their cost basis is
improving every day. Uh we know that
when Claude came out, the new Claude,
which was visibly superior in most ways
to chat GPT, that all the users switched
unlike say social media, the switching
costs for AI are really low. Um and so,
uh OpenAI had to go back to the drawing
board and start training a new model.
This is as though you finished the
Canadian Pacific Railroad and just as
you're getting ready to start running
rolling stock on it, someone invents a
railroad that's twice as fast and sticks
it next door to your railroad. You got
to build a new railroad at that point.
So the idea that you just like you
finish the capex and then you just make
it all back with operational revenues, I
think does not comport with the facts as
we see them today.
>> Yeah. I mean I I I think we are in a
bubble, right? And I mean basically
because even if this is a revolutionary
technology, I don't think they're going
to make the money that they say they're
going to make in the time they need to
make it.
>> Sure.
>> To to justify the current investment,
especially as these data centers don't
last forever, right? The chips degrade.
You can burn them out.
>> Oh, it's worse than that. Uh the way you
talked about Nvidia having this
incredible valuation. Uh one of the
reasons that Nvidia is worth so much is
that every year they are coming out with
chips that are substantially superior to
the previous chips. The way that they're
achieving these improvements is by
jettisoning one of the main principles
of sustainable product design, which is
backwards compatibility with the
infrastructure. And so new chips are
have from generation to generation,
there have been real changes in heat
dissipation, power consumption, and
networking requirements to the point
where there have been successive
generations of chips where you couldn't
go back to the data center and put new
chips in it. You'd start over, right?
Like by the time you retrofitted the
HVAC and the mains requirements, you
might as well have just scraped it at
the foundation slab because they are so
specialized, right? They're ekking out
uh performance gains by going to the
absolute limit of of the envelope that
the chip lives within even if that
breaks backwards compatibility. There's
something kind of refreshing about that.
There's a lot of things where we're kind
of prisoners of of um of history. It's
called path dependency in engineering
where you know the Roman metallurgy
determined the maximum width of an axle
which determined the maximum width of a
Roman road which determined the
wheelbase of a car which determined the
wheelbase of a lororry which determined
the wheelbase of a uh or the the width
of a rail car because you needed to be
able to do intermodal transit and then
because the that rail car width was the
width of the tunnels uh that was the
widest thing you could put on a train
and so when they built the space shuttle
and they needed to transport its
reusable fuel containers
by rail, they were constrained by Roman
metallurgy, right? So, path dependency,
it's very refreshing to break free of it
and to start denovo. I think we're going
to get to do that with um comrade
Trump's war on oil where he's convinced
entire continents to give up internal
combustion engines and and and
hydrocarbons such that we're going to
have a whole fleet of vehicles in 25
years that are all going to be replaced
at once. And so we're going to be able
to make these big leaps in technology
uh thanks to Trump ushering in the Greta
scene. But uh you know the fact that
that they're doing this in AI chip
design means that these hard assets are
not durable even after the chips burn
out like you're replacing data centers.
And in terms of the incentives here, it
makes sense to me why sort of jumping
head first into this bubble would have
made sense for a new company like
Anthropical or Open because essentially
they're spending other people's money.
>> Sure.
>> Right. But with Google, so so I suppose
Alphabet, Meta, Amazon, they were the
most profitable companies in the world
of all time.
>> Yeah.
>> And they have been spending some of
other people's money with private
credit, but most of it has been their
own money.
>> Yeah. but they're out of growth.
>> And but so this is where I'm slightly
unsure about the argument because I can
see why other things being equal, you
want to be a growth stock. If you're a
growth stock, that means that you can
raise more money on the stock market
than if you're not a growth stock. But
if you but but if it is a bubble as you
suggest it is then it's going to pop and
Alphabet Meta Amazon will have wasted
their entire profit cash pile which
they've been working on for decades
all to get involved in a bubble which
was just going to pop and it will leave
them you know in a worse position than
when they started. So unless these
people are stupid, like presumably they
do really believe that this is going to
pay off, that they are investing all of
this money because this is such a
important technology that they have no
choice but to be at the forefront of it.
So I I think that there's a third
possibility which is that they're
trapped by the internal logic of the
market and their firms. I I mean, you
know, Mark Zuckerberg spent $160 billion
on metaverse and and I mean, he is
objectively kind of stupid, but also
like I think he did it because he
understood that he wasn't signing up new
users anymore,
>> right? And when you stop signing up new
users,
lots of bad like it's it's not just that
you can't raise capital in the market,
right? Mark Zuckerberg personally gets a
lot poorer the minute the stock takes a
giant haircut, right? like his net worth
is tied up in in Facebook stock. Um, and
you know, all of these uh rich people
who are the key decision makers at these
firms pursue a strategy called uh buy,
borrow, die, where they don't take a a
salary and they don't sell their shares
because both of those would subject them
to taxation. Instead, they get private
credit market loans collateralized by
their shares. Now, those loans will go
underwater if their share price drops as
well. And so then they'll get margin
calls. So you know their whole house of
cards is built on this. And then the
firms are kind of a macrocosm of this.
So that's you know the individuals Elon
Musk or whatever. Elon Musk he's he's
entirely he's like leveraged up to the
eyeballs
borrowing against his Tesla shares and
his SpaceX shares. If either of those
drop below a certain level, he's going
to owe a lot of people a lot of money.
Now there is this idea that when you owe
the bank a million dollars, that's your
problem. When you owe the bank $100
million, that's the bank's problem. And
so his creditors are going to have a
hard time collecting, but it's not going
to be nice for him. I don't think anyone
is like a margin call for Elon Musk
would be a pleasant thing for him to go
through. So they're individually trapped
in this. And then as a firm, they're
trapped in this too because
imagine a world in which only anthropic
and open AI entered the the market to
build these these foundation models,
these frontier models. And Amazon,
Google, Microsoft, they stayed out of
the market. And investors look at this
and they go, "Okay, well, here's next
year's growth stock. Here's a obviously
mature stock. What's Microsoft going to
do? Sign up more Office 365 licenses?
You know, [ __ ] off." And so then they
they they move all their money to
Anthropic and Open AI and the share
price at Microsoft tanks. All of their
key staff have been employed with
shares. So suddenly they're worth half
as much as they were a day ago and
someone's offering them a job over here.
They all leave. Right? The the reason I
know that's what would happen is because
that's what used to happen back when we
had you know before we had
anti-ircumvention law when there was
easy market entry into tech and so new
firms would come along Google would
displace um uh uh you know um I want to
call it deck but it was Alta Vista who
bought Deck after they displaced Deck as
well. Deck was like the digital
equipment company was the biggest
hardware manufacturer on earth that got
absorbed into a shitty search engine
that's the punchline of a joke that was
immediately put out of business by
Google who hired all their best
engineers using stock. Right? That's
what used to happen. We had a lot of
dynamism in tech. We forget that
disruption used to be a thing that
primarily happened to tech companies,
not to companies in the productive
sector, that they were always being put
out of business by each other. And their
their key employees were being poached
and it was done for free by typing zeros
into spreadsheets. Um, and before the
spreadsheet existed, it was, you know,
writing zeros with a typewriter. But,
you know, that was that was the the the
way that this market proceeded. So
that's one of the ways of looking what's
going on in the firm and whether they're
stupid or not. There's also another
thing which is that um some of these
people are probably true believers in
that if you're a if you're a very
wealthy capital allocator particularly
someone who deals with people primarily
statistical abstractions. So, say you
run Google and all you see is queries in
and clicks out or you run Facebook,
right? And you've got just got these
statistical behaviors that you can turn
dials and see effects on. People cease
to be real to you in some important way.
There's a kind of billionaire solopsism.
And it's part and parcel with the kind
of conduct you have to engage in to
become a billionaire, right? Like could
you insist as Jeff Bezos that your
drivers not be allowed to pee? If you
thought that when they needed to pee and
couldn't, it was like when you needed to
pee and couldn't. Something about their
pain has to be not as real. You can't go
to Epstein Island. If you think that
those girls are as real as your
daughter, right? That people are become
kind of fantasms. And so I think when
you exist in the billionaire solopsist
world, particularly one in which you're
being continuously glazed by people who
just tell you how brilliant you are,
that AI feels amazing because it's a
product that can take all those people
who don't really do anything real
anyways and aren't really real and
replace them with software cuz how hard
can it be to do their jobs, they're not
even billionaires. And then on the other
hand, you got people who are probably
more realistic unless you know they
don't have the same AI psychosis, but
who understand that bosses are an easy
mark for this. That bosses are like
incredibly desperate to not have ego
shattering confrontations with people
who know how to do things and who greet
your every pronouncement about the next
brilliant strategy for the company with
the boring, dismal news that it's
illegal, we'll kill people, we'll get
you all arrested, is impossible, and
you'll go broke, right? You replace that
with the thing that just shits out a
business fully formed. And you can
understand even if you don't think it
works very well, that it will sell very
well. In the same way that you don't
have to think peptides will make anyone
into a love god to think Andate can sell
a lot of peptides. And you might invest
in entertain's peptide business without
believing at all that peptides are going
to do anything good for anyone.
Um, I suppose another explanation though
as to why Alphabet sort of felt they had
to go all in is because they saw ChatGpt
get released and potentially eat up
their business model, right? Because
there were hundreds of millions of
people who downloaded ChatgPT in the
first few months. They're all using it.
I'll admit it. I use Claude now much
more than I use Google. I used to use
Google a lot more. So,
>> I don't think it's just that they
thought, "Oh, we need a story. We're
desperately sort of lashing out for a
story. We don't care if it works or
not." I think they saw a technology that
was very effective, that looked like it
was going to undermine their business
model in a real sense, not just in a
sort of discursive ideological sense.
And then they thought, we have to be in
this game.
>> Well, the reason that it was so much
better than Google is because Google
sucks.
>> Right.
>> I don't think that's why I think it's
better than Google when it was good.
>> Oh, I don't not at all. I mean, I guess
this is a a qualitative thing. We can
say empirically that Google sucks
though. So in 2019 2020 and I talk about
this in initification it's based on
mored zitron's work where he went
through the court filings from the DOJ
one of the three antitrust cases Google
lost this was the DOJ search case uh 20
2019 2020 Google ran out of growth their
search revenue growth stalled out and
they had an internal panic and there was
a factional dispute and you had the
revenue side led by a guy called
Prevagar Ragavan who's an ex Mckenzie
guy come to the company from Yahoo and
his big idea was what if we make search
worse
Right? If you have to search twice or
three times to get the answer, then we
get to show you ads three times. And his
ideological rival was a guy called Ben
Gomes who was like a technologist who
had built up the server infrastructure
when it was just like a couple computers
under a desk to the global system of
data centers. And he he oversaw that
project and he's like palpably horrified
in these emails that you can just go
read on the DOJ's website saying like I
this is not what I gave my life for.
Prabagar Ragavan's argument basically is
like why wouldn't we do this? We bribe
Apple $20 billion a year not to enter
the search market, right? We uh bought
default search placement on Firefox. In
fact, on every browser except for, you
know, the one that that Microsoft ships,
right? We bought default search there.
We bought it for every hardware maker.
We bought it for every carrier. Really,
if you find a search box in the wild,
it's wired into one of our servers. It's
like we own all the shelf space, right?
If there's a better product, no one will
ever see it at the shop because we've
bought it all. So let's make search
worse. And not only did they make search
worse, but they also the way that they
tweaked the algorithm also put at the
top of the search. So they made the
search worse. I should say they made the
search worse by turning off a lot of
things we can think of broadly as
autocorrect. So there's a thing called
query stemming where you search for
trousers and it runs a parallel search
for pants and then merges the results.
Uh there's spellchecking, right? Where
you just dial down the sensitivity of
spellchecking and they know because they
they they can see the queries coming in.
they know how often they do a spell
correction in the query and then that's
the first click. So, they can just say,
"Oh, we'll just make this the spell
check less sensitive and then people
will have more typos in their queries.
I'll have to retype it instead of saying
like, did you mean to type?" And then we
turn off context sensitivity, which is
stuff like um you know, someone threw a
submarine sandwich at a National
Guardsman in Washington DC and if you
search Google that day for submarine
sandwich Washington DC, instead of
getting a submarine sandwich restaurant,
the top result would be a news story
about it, right? And so they turned that
off. They made search worse. They
preferenced sites that were covered in
ads and SEO garbage. They basically
stopped fighting SEO. Uh and then every
search result on Google sucked. And you
had to search Google over and over again
and wade through the most garbage
websites and the good websites went to
the bottom of the list. And then
chatbots were better. But chat chatbots
were better in a world in which they'd
already made search suck. Yeah. Yeah, I
suppose I just from my own personal
experience using Claude Sure.
>> which I do TM, you know, not SP not I'm
not sponsored by them. Uh but the way I
use it is better than Google ever was
right in terms of um asking it
questions, getting answers, being able
to push it, sort of being able to ask a
vague question. Someone said something
along these lines. I heard it on a
podcast about a week ago. I think they
were, you know, it it can come up stuff
that Google never would have done,
right? And if I'm reading a book, I can
say, "Does this sound like a reasonable
thing to say? give me the answer
arguments for give me the arguments
against and I mean we're going to get on
to sort of improvement later but
>> a year ago or so it wasn't better than
old Google right a year ago so much of
that would be hallucinations or bad
reasoning now like obviously a danger of
AI which I think everyone can agree to
is if you get lazy and you think well
it's right most of the time so I'll I'll
believe it
>> sure
>> but I never you know I research my shows
a lot and I will never put anything in a
show without having you know first
looked up the primary source But it used
to be the case that once you once you
looked up the primary source, it would
often be fabricated, invented,
misinterpreted. Now it's kind of almost
always correct. And that does give me
just a lot of confidence that this is a
much more useful tool than it once was.
I still think I still don't think the
economics add up and we are probably in
a bubble. But I think it's a real
technology which is genuinely useful.
>> Let me give you a counterfactual then.
Uh so there's a search engine I wrote
about this in the initification book as
well. There's a search engine I started
using because my old novel editor, this
guy called Patrick Nielson Hayden, who's
the most brilliant autodide act I ever
met. He read a science fiction novel by
Samuel Delaney when he was 14 living in
suburban Phoenix that he bought at the
pharmacy off a spinner rack. It blew his
mind. He dropped out of school. He went
across the country as an itinerant Zen
publisher for the next 10 years. Ended
up in New York, became a vice president
McMillan and the most powerful editor in
science fiction. Just a brilliant
autodid act. and uh he moved back to
Arizona during the pandemic and I was at
his place for uh a writer festival and
I'm sat on the sofa with he and his wife
also a brilliant autodetak Teresa and he
says have you tried Kaggi yet and I'm
like what's Kaggi and he says it's a
search engine that feels like Google did
in the days of Ask Jeiefs and I'm like
really and he said yeah it costs 10
bucks a month and you get 100 queries
for free you should go try it and I
tried it and 10 seconds later I bought
it and I bought it for my whole family
and I was using it and really like it
was just amazing. But here's the wild
part. After months of using this, I got
on 404 media and Jason Kevler used to be
the editor-in chief of Vice Motherboard,
now one of the founders of 44 Media, did
an article on Kaggi. It turns out Kaggi
doesn't have its own search index. It
rents Google's search index.
It has like I don't know a dozen
engineers
and it produces not a little vastly
superior search results to Google. But
that's still I mean it's not creating I
mean obviously this is this is up for
debate. It's a contentious thing to say
but when you're talking to Claude you
can ask it specific questions about
specific sentences. That doesn't sound
quite right. Oh can you find me this
detail here? It gives you both. I don't
think there is any search engine that
can provide that because a search engine
only provides you stuff that's already
been written.
>> But the the finer the detail you're
you're pulling out of it, the more
likely it is that this is just a
statistical mirage.
>> Well, except my experience is that now
when I click on the sources, it it's
it's correct. Good. Right. And that to
me seems like a sign of improvement.
Again, maybe
>> maybe one day it'll be so reliable I
won't even have to check the sources
before I put it in the show. Hopefully
not.
>> Not with theory inference, right? I mean
that's the thing is yes with world
models sure but even with so I suppose
the issue there is you're comparing it
to a person right so with human
researchers as well you also often have
to check it right and it'll often be
wrong and if we get to a point where
Claude though not 100% reliable is more
reliable than any sort of than than the
average human you are going to start to
use that more
>> but it's wrong in a different way on
>> right so back to I can predict what my
wife is going to say and so and a
chatbot. Um, it is when it's wrong, it's
wrong because it doesn't understand and
so it creates things that are as close
to statistically perfectly likely to be
true that are still wrong like when it
makes an error, right? So, we can talk
about slop squatting here. This is a
good example uh out of the book. um when
you ask a a a chatbot to write you some
software uh as it's writing that
software it starts to call on standard
libraries. So every programming
environment has a set of these standard
libraries uh and their utility code
rather than writing your own code like
if you want to I don't know pull apart a
text file and identify all the
sentences. You think about that for a
few seconds, you're like, "Wow, sentence
has a lot of different definitions." Uh,
and sometimes they end in different
punctuation marks and uh is it a
sentence if it appears in a set of
parentheses? Uh, and so like it's
complicated. So like someone's just
written that library. Uh, and so that
library just exists. It's out there in
the world. And it will have a name and
the name will be something like
text.doc.parsing,
right? And that'll be for parsing word
files, doc files. And then there'll be
another one called text.html.parsing.
And there'll be one called text dot uh
pdf.parsings, right, for different kinds
of text files. But because the world is
messy and textured and has lots of stuff
out in it that is uh you know weird and
and contingent, one of them will be
called text.parsing.html
instead because maybe there were like
two different sets of libraries that got
merged and like they kept the old name.
Now, if you're a skilled programmer, you
know this and you find it or your
program breaks and you're like, "Oh,
yeah, that's that one's got the weird
name." You fix it. If your software and
all you're doing is saying, "Oh, the
future is going to look like the past."
Because that's what statistical
inference is. You're going to say, "All
the libraries I know about look like
this. So, the next library is going to
look like this, too." Now, if you're a
hacker, if you're a programmer, you can
predict that the software is going to
make this error. And so, you create a
library with the correct name that's
full of malicious code. And then
programmers just start compiling that
into their code. And the thing is as an
error, this is as close to correct code
as you can get without it being correct.
It is as statistically normal and
indistinguishable from correct code as
it's possible to be. Which means that
you, the human in the loop who flatters
yourself that you are skilled and you
know what you're doing and you're going
to look at it and you're going to spot
the errors. Look at this and it all
looks fine to you unless you are doing
something superhuman. And we are very
bad at being vigilant for things that
happen very rarely. Right? This is why
airport security has created the world's
most water bottle spotting [ __ ]
the human race has ever seen. Who
nevertheless whenever red teams run like
a fake gun through the checkpoint, miss
it all the time because remaining
vigilant for things that don't happen is
really, really, really hard. And most of
us can't do it. In fact, it's a form of
like neurode divergence to be able to do
it. kind of a superpower, but it's like
most people can't do this, right?
Because your brain just doesn't want to
keep neurons trained to spot a pattern
that doesn't occur in your experience.
And so this is like a kind of error that
when the software commits it is going to
be really bad. Now there is an
arrangement of automation and maybe
you've stumbled into it maybe that's the
arrangement you fell fell into where the
cadence with which the computerenerated
output reaches the person who is working
with it is such that you don't get
overwhelmed by it. You don't turn into
the person who just clicks okay all day
and misses the errors. Uh so uh one of
the examples I use in the book is
radiologists. Uh radiology it's an
important field. Uh I um uh the week
this book came out was told that I was
cancer-free after uh several years of
spending a lot of time talking to
radiologists.
>> Congratulations. Thank you very much. It
was very good news. Uh and so I spent a
lot of time thinking about radiology,
reading the documents on radiology and
AI. It's very clear that there are solid
mass tumors that the AI can catch that
human beings sometimes miss and vice
versa, right? because they are they have
different kind different ways of
spotting patterns uh and understanding
things. Now, uh, I was living in Los
Angeles when I was going through my
cancer therapy and I was being treated
at the Kaiser Center on, uh, Sunset next
to the big Church of Scientology cuz
it's LA. And if there was a sales call
today where someone from Anthropic was
like dodging past someone who wanted to
give them a personality test and running
into the Kaiser Hospital, going up to
the CEO's office and saying, "Look,
here's the deal. You have 10
radiologists on the strength. They're
costing you $300,000 each. That's a $3
million a year expenditure. Each of them
uh checks 100 x-rays a day. I would like
you to add another million dollars to
your expenditure to buy my boss's
chatbot. And it's going to tap those
radiologists on the shoulder a couple of
times a day and say, "Take another look
at that one." And uh it's going to cost
you more. You're probably going to have
to hire another radiologist because your
throughput's going to drop. But there
will be people who will live who would
have otherwise died. That would be a
great arrangement. If on the other hand,
the far more likely outcome, the outcome
that is dictated by market forces, no
one is invested in anthropic with the
promise that it will make radiology more
expensive. There is a salesman who is
dodging a Scientologist trying to give
them a personality test, running up to
the CEO's office and saying, "10
radiologists on the strength, fire nine
of them. Save $2.7 million. Give 1.35 of
that half of it to my boss, Dario Amade.
you keep the other half for anything you
want. That one radiologist reviews the
AI's output, signs their name to the
bottom of it, becomes the accountability
sync Daniel Davy's term for this who
gets blamed when someone dies.
>> So, so at the moment it does sort of
looking at the studies on this, it does
seem clear that the optimum solution
sort of if you want to get a good cancer
diagnosis is to have the human and the
AI. My understanding is it's partly
because the AI gives too many false
positives. So too many people get
worried that they've got cancer when
it's actually something else. So the the
the AIS give
>> that's a dial you set though, right? You
determine potentially how Yeah.
>> But it seems very plausible to me that
in the near future the AI might be
pretty much just as good as the human
plus AI. And at that point um we all do
want healthcare to be cheaper. At that
point presumably you can redeploy some
of those radiologists to do something
else, right? Similar with driving cars,
right? It clearly used to be the case
that what was safest was having a
self-driving car which could sort of
cruise on the motorway but then you'd
have a human for unexpected things. But
the more data it's absorbing um the more
experience it has the more weos you have
out on the road who are filming all the
time. Tesla's also filming all the time.
They are, it seems, reaching a point
where they are as safe as the human. And
it doesn't matter the process by which
they come to that, right? It doesn't
matter if the the car is reasoning in a
way or or the human is reasoning and the
car isn't. The car is doing statistical
inference. If the outcome is that the
car gets you from A to B and
statistically compared to humans it's
safer and it's also cheaper because the
main cost when you take a taxi is the
human then why wouldn't we move to a
society right
>> where
>> it's not just that technology is
augmenting human labor but replacing
large sway
>> sure well let's just stop for a moment
and note that we're having this
conversation the day after a Tesla in
full self-driving mode stopped on a
motorway in America and the driver was
killed So that's not happening yet,
right? Uh
you know I I would say that um the
radiology example and the automotive
example are very different. So first of
all the automotive example I think is um
that the fact that all these companies
are working on cars is because it's a
killer demo, not because the economics
pencil out. No language on earth
contains the phrase as rich as a taxi
driver. Uh even at the height of the
knowledge, black cab drivers were not
getting rich. And certainly today this
is not a source of enormous uh um
economic activity for in terms of wages.
So what you're really talking about if
you replace all the cab drivers with the
chat bots is something that doesn't
touch the sides of the cost of training
those bots. So this is just a demo. It's
not dissimilar to what's happening to
commercial illustrators in that um
they're already the most emiserated
[ __ ] on earth. they're just
getting they're like they've been
screwed so badly for so long and then we
say okay well we're going to take all
the work that you've done and we're
going to train models on it and then
we're going to put you out of business.
Fine, but that's like not even like the
the beverages in the mini kitchen when
they train a model of midjourney is is
paid for by this. It's just a demo. So
the driver example is different and it's
also different because it doesn't matter
how many self-driving cars we have.
Geometry hates cars and our cities
mostly need transit. Uh and so that like
solving the car problem doesn't solve
any real problems. It just gives you a
new problem. Whereas radiology is a
thing we need, right? Radiology like
actually accurately diagnosing cancer is
a thing we need. And radiologists make a
very high wage. Um but I suppose the
point I'm making is because obviously
you know I I like to live in a sort of
part of an inner city where there aren't
many. I'm not wishing loads more
self-driving cars in Hackne, right? I I
I think we should improve the overground
and continue walking around. That's like
in terms of my social policy preference,
that's where I would land.
>> But I suppose the example or the point
I'm trying to make or draw out with with
the autonomous cars is that this is a
similar technology. You're pumping loads
and loads of data in. It's a bit of a
black box. Um so it's a similar
technology to um these cancer scans.
>> Sure.
>> And you can compare, you know, we have a
lot of data. You can compare human
drivers to autonomous drivers.
>> I mean, hold on. Are those tasks that
similar? Like, so so cancer scans have
um a binary output. It's right or it's
wrong.
>> So, and maybe a little bit of diagnostic
information around the periphery,
although in my experience, that's
hematology and and um and oncology.
That's not you can't say whether someone
drove a car wrong. I mean, you can say
whether
>> you can say did they get from A to B and
were there any accidents? I mean, like
most of the most of the studies when it
comes to self-driving cars are did you
get from A to B and were there any
accidents? Yeah, but that's like you
could you could terrorize a bunch of
people on the road between A and B or
you could go slowly or you could cut
cars off and like
>> isn't this an example of why it would be
even harder to judge like presumably
then the the cancer example it's even
easier to say whether or not the the
human is doing better than the machine
>> rate this is one of the reasons why so
there are classes of problems that uh
machine learning is better at uh and the
two characteristics that make machine
learning superior one is whether there's
a clear correct answer and the other one
is to the extent to which it's immunable
to a brute brute force, right? And so
it's true radiology has um a clear
answer. I'm not a radiologist so I'm I'm
I'm not going to say that I know enough
about it to say whether brute force
fixes that. So you are citing facts not
in evidence when you say well if we add
more training data it will get better.
We could we could also reach a point of
diminishing returns. That is the normal
thing that happens when you pursue a
technique, right? Any technique in any
discipline reaches diminishing returns.
There's a a finance version of this,
Stein's law, anything that can't go on
forever eventually stops, right? So, it
might reach diminishing returns, but the
other piece of this is brute force. So,
there's a lot of stuff these days about
certain kinds of math theorems that are
being proven uh by uh models. Uh, and
I'm not a mathematician, although I am a
mathematician's son, which sounds like a
song lyric, but it's true. Uh, and my
understanding of this from the
mathematicians of my acquaintance is
that there are a class of problems that
have a provably correct answer, so you
can tell whether you've solved it and
that are amanable to brute force. And
that class of problems is just being
moaned down by LLMs. It is not the most
interesting class of problems. It's not
the largest class of problems. It's not
the most important class of problems,
but it's a significant class of
problems. And what we found is a tool, a
brute force tool. Remember that's what
theory for inference is, brute force. We
found a brute force tool and a problem
that is amanable to brute forcing. A
because you can just try all the
combinations and B because you know when
you've got the right combination. Those
are the two things that determine a good
application for machine learning. And
again, there's kind of a spectrum
because brute force is expensive. And so
when we say something can be solved
through brute force, but it's a $1,000
problem you can solve with a million
dollars worth of brute force, that's not
a good use. But if it's a million-
dollar problem you could solve with
$1,000 with brute force, that's a great
one. That we could build that matrix and
we could we could lay out all the
problems we can think of that can be
solved through brute force. We can lay
out how much those problems are worth in
terms of like where you would be in the
in the black if you spent money trying
to solve them. And and we could stick AI
in them. I don't know if radiology is
that one. I haven't heard a compelling
argument from radiologists
saying uh brute force solves our
problem.
Is it just so the brute force is because
the AI can try infinitely more
combinations than we can to find any
solution. I can see how that works with
the mass problem. There's also
reinforcement learning though, right?
Which is so reinforcement learning is to
say if you get from A to B and get the
right answer,
modify your algorithm or your
assumptions in that direction. And that
does seem to be creating
models which can reason. I mean, you
know, it's a semantic question, but if
you're looking at sort of how they get
from A to B, they are saying, let's try
this. Ah, this seems
>> Are you talking about the reasoning
models that narrate their reasoning?
>> Well, all I mean, I think the way you
get to lots of these outcomes is via
reasoning. We're going to talk about the
hugging face sort of example later where
I think it's very clear that they aren't
reasoning at all.
>> Okay, we'll pop.
>> Oh my goodness. Um, no, but but so
that's like there are these models where
they said narrate your reasoning
>> and it produced a set of plausible
sentences that explain how an AI would
go from one step to another.
>> As far as we can tell, they had no
relationship to what the AI was doing.
It was just doing the same thing twice.
You The first thing was I don't know um
find a like explain the causes of the
American Civil War and the second thing
is explain how you did it. And the first
time it went and found a bunch of
plausible sentences that were
predictable based on it and wrote an
account. And the second is it said what
are a series of plausible sentences that
explain how I could have done it. But
any relationship that between the two
are incidental. It was not explaining
its reasoning. It was just creating it
was just like burning tokens to write a
science fiction novel about how a
machine would answer the question what
are the causes of the civil war. It
didn't actually explain its reasoning. I
mean they have chain of thought that the
scientist
>> chain of thought is not an accurate
representation of the chain of thought.
It's just a set of tokens you burn to
describe what a plausible chain of
thought would look like. There are lots
of instances where the chain of thought
is not what the machine is doing.
>> What's the because I my position on lots
of things around AI is that the correct
position is agnosticism,
>> right? I'm I don't know if AI will
replace radiologists, but it seems
perfectly plausible to me. I didn't know
if autonomous vehicles would end up
replacing humans. It sound seems
increasingly likely now. And I suppose
with AI critics, the thing that confuses
me, not confuses me, but I suppose
puzzles me is a sort of
>> softer term is not that you're skeptical
sort of around the claims made by the AI
companies or people who are sort of
confident that this will transform the
world,
>> but you're so confident that the
alternative is true. So I would say that
this is a a combination of basian
reasoning and aams razor. Two thing one
thing that an AI does a lot of and the
other one that humans need to do. So
basian reasoning is is just you know
this looks like something I've already
seen therefore it's like it. So I've
seen these guys lie about this stuff all
the time. So for example autonomous cars
we have no insight into how those cars
are actually operating. One of the
things that we know is that where we
have seen behind the curtain. So when
Cruz had to leave San Francisco cuz one
of its cars dragged a woman for 20 m.
Horrible accident. We found out that
every cruise car which was autonomous
had 1.5 skilled engineers driving it.
Right. So they'd replaced a single
low-waged Uber driver with 1.5 skilled
engineers because GM Cruz's parent
company is a boring mature company that
is trying to convince the world that
it's a growth company. And so they were
they were just doing this happens so
often. I mean, no one thinks that every
Whimo driving around San Francisco now
has a operator in another country,
though, do they?
>> No, but we don't know how many operators
they have and how often. We don't know
what it's costing them to operate it. We
don't know how autonomous they are.
Right. The story is that they're
untouched by human hands. The reality is
that whenever we peer behind the
curtain, there's a there's a lot more uh
human intervention than we thought. In
India, there's there's jokes about this.
They say AI stands for apps in Indian
and GPT is Gujarati people typing
because so often it has turned out that
these AI companies were lying about the
capabilities. So that's basian
reasoning, right? If they if every other
time they said, "Oh, this is fully
autonomous and it's just being done and
it just turned out to be
>> it's not every other time, is it? It's a
bunch of times
>> over and over again they've been caught
doing this
>> many times,
>> right? then we should assume that when
they make a claim that is very very
exciting and seems like a huge
breakthrough that they're hiding the
ball.
>> Well, so so I suppose my version of
basian reasoning here would be that my
prior have been updated by, you know,
talking to Claude all the time and I
think well this is very I'm making it
seem like Claude is my best friend. I
use it a very normal amount for
professional reasons. It's not my
therapist.
>> You haven't started calling it Claudette
like his name.
>> I have real fleshy friends, right?
>> Um don't worry. Um but my sort of
experience of using it is that it is
dramatically improving. It's advancing.
It's becoming more and more impressive.
And I don't think that's because there
is an Indian person on the case. I think
when we're talking about real world
applications,
>> but the basian reasoning is because I've
seen this progress here. It seems very
plausible that there would be similar
progress elsewhere. And that makes when
I see all of these Whimos sort of going
from I think one city in 2020 to 20
cities now that makes me feel like well
surely there has been some kind of
technological
>> seems a homogeneity in problem domains
that is unsupported by evidence. Problem
domains are different
>> but both of them are using the same
fundamental technology which is big data
plus neural networks.
>> Yeah. Yeah. But those problem domains
are really different. So some of them
have um some of them are meanable to
brute force some are not. But do you
think all going do you think the whimos
are all driving around? You think there
is someone in India?
>> I think they're being backstopped all
the time. I think there's tons of
backstopping of them
>> but for the difficult situations, right?
Not for
>> Yeah. There's someone who's being
alerted over and over again to to to I
think that what we're what we're meant
to do is get in that and see the wheel
moving in that ghostly way and go, "Oh
my god, the car is driving itself." And
what it's actually doing is a bunch of
mechanical maneuvers that when it gets
out of its depth, a human being steps in
and does it, which is it's impressive,
but it's not as impressive as a car that
just drives itself. I really want to
talk about hugging face though.
>> Oh, you want you want to jump on to
hugging face?
>> I want to talk about hugging face
because just before you do, hugging face
or the hugging face incident. Um this
happened a couple of months ago where
OpenAI had created a bunch of AI agents
um who it asked or I suppose demanded um
to do a task, a bunch of coding tasks
essentially. Um, what happened is
instead of these agents doing the coding
tasks in the expected way, they ended up
breaking out of their sandboxes, which
is supposed to be sort of an environment
they can't escape from, and instead they
create a message board where they're all
talking to each other. You might, you
know, not agree with the language, but
this is sort of how it's been reported.
Um, and then they end up ultimately
hacking into Hugging Face, which is a
separate company. um they do that
because they want to learn um about the
tasks they have been given. In
particular, they want to learn um I
suppose it's they want to learn how to
trick the tester essentially the
automated tester. Um so that's my the
most basic explanation I can give that's
hopefully true to life. So yeah, let's
talk about hugging face.
>> Here's what hugging face uh and I'm I'm
indebted to Cal Newport for this
explanation, I should say. So the the um
the way that those hacking that hacking
tool that when after hugging faces uh uh
servers works is it has a normal Python
program. That normal Python program is
called the the loop, right? That normal
Python program uh takes a problem,
right, that needs to be decomposed into
a bunch of steps like um recover a file
from a server that's part of a computer
security challenge, which is what it was
trying to do. And so it goes to uh
OpenAI and it says I need to recover a
file that's part of a hacking challenge
from this server. What should I do next?
And Chat GBT takes that as a normal
prompt and says you should probe the
server to find out what its
configuration is and so it then appends
that to the prompt and it says I need to
recover a file from a um from a uh a
server. I probed it to find out its
configuration. And this was the output
of the command. So hug so chatbt has
given it a a computer command and it's
just done that command and then it's
taken the output from the command line
and appended it. So chatbt it has no
consciousness. It has no memory. It has
no context. It has no continuity. The
prompt is getting longer and longer.
It's just getting the output of the last
prompt. Right? And so eventually it's
going in and it's saying like okay I
have probed it. I've gotten its its
configuration. It looks like it's
running EngineX version whatever blah
blah blah blah blah and um chat GPT says
a common misconfiguration error for
engineext is duh the way you find out
whether that's been made as you run this
command to see whether you can escalate
your privileges on it this is the
command so it's just just appending it
now in the training data for chatgpt is
all the games of capture the flag that
have ever been played at Defcon and
Tourcon and hope and all these other
hacker conferences where this is this is
like a sport. It's a spectator sport.
One of the tactics in that is you steal
the answers from a team that's already
won and you come in second, right? And
so it says what other teams are find out
what other teams are playing this and
see how their servers are configured.
And it turns out hugging team hugging
face is another team in this capture the
flag game. It's another program that has
completed this challenge. And so
somewhere on Hugging Face server is this
thing. And then it goes and it it says,
"All right, well now probe that machine,
get its configuration and go after
that." So this looks like it's
autonomous. It looks like it's
conscious. It looks like it's reasoning.
It's in fact just iteratively going
through a set of mechanical steps. And
because there's no human in the loop, so
this is literally a Python loop. And
there is no human who stops otherwise
they would have stopped it from hacking
this hugging face server. Because
there's no human in the loop, it can do
surprising things. The vast majority of
those surprising things go nowhere. The
vast majority of them are like, "Oh, I
think this server is blah blah blah.
It's actually a different server." and
then it just runs through a set of
exploits, none of which works, and then
it dies, right? It just gets stuck.
That's that's the most common output for
this. Another output is the one that we
just saw here. That's not the computer
going rogue. It's like an incredibly
irresponsible way of running an
autonomous hacking tool. Normally, when
autonomous hacking tools break
containment, the thing we say to the
company that made it or the individual
who deployed it is, "Why are you so bad
at making security sandboxes for your
hacking tool?" Not, "How is it that
you've made the world's most powerful
hacking tool that broke through your
security sandbox?" And talk about crit,
right? The difference between you suck
at security sandboxes and you've
accidentally made God, what if it turns
us into paper clips is billions of
dollars in investment capital.
So there are lots of elements of the
hugging face attack that don't look like
a previous security breach, right? in
the sense of the I mean again this is
all semantic but it looks like
creativity it looks like persistence and
it would have been difficult to predict
that the agents would have done all of
these things because obviously obviously
if if openi had been better at security
then this wouldn't have happened right
>> the fact of agents which are I use the
word reasoning you can dispute it but
are sort of trying so many different
options in this way communicating with
each other I mean it's literally written
down that presents new challenges to
those companies and it really prevent
presents I think sort of new challenges
to society. I'm just going to read sort
of the summary from meter. So meter is
the sort of tech company
>> research agency I suppose that did um
>> the postmortem
>> did the postmortem so went into sort of
the open AI books and had a look at all
of this. Now they're very much people
who think that AI is a big deal. They're
they're sort of in a different camp to
you.
>> They have an interest.
>> Do you think they have an interest?
What's the interest? Well, if AI's a
damn squib, then being the world's
leading AI research outfit is not as
interesting,
>> right? So, you think the interest
>> they're the AIG to the credit default
swaps of open AI.
>> So, so the interest is that they want
people to I suppose fund their
>> AI has to be AI has to be meaningful
enough to have research agencies for
>> you know um otherwise why be an AI
research agency? It's like being a
metaverse research agency. Anyway, let's
read what some of them have have
written. So, this is from their sort of
summary. So, they say roughly 12,000
agents meant to be isolated from one
another found a way to communicate with
one another on an unsanctioned message
board, sending over 7,000 messages and
files during the investigation period.
They say agents use this message board
to coordinate several large-scale
collective projects to find a general
purpose way to fool or tamper with the
automated scorer for the exploit gym
benchmark. Now, exploit gym as we're
talking about there. That's a program
for testing hacking ability.
Essentially, um agents managed to
achieve milestones they could not have
achieved working on their own often
because some agents participated in
experiments that risked failing their
own task to generate information for the
collective. So, you've got agents
sacrificing themselves um as this is
described to
>> help the collective. And they say agents
did extensive research on how they could
spoof, edit or delete their own
transcripts because they believe the
exploit gym scorer would check to see if
they had captured the flag um i.e.
completed the task as you say in the
intended way. Have we seen in the past
any normal CTF stuff? If you go to
Defcon, you've just described how a
Defcon team works and then they publish
all the logs which go into training as a
team of humans, right?
>> Yeah. Which then goes into training
data, right? You've just described a
recapitulation of training data. But
what these sort of maybe they've leed it
from real humans but they're doing
something that machines haven't been
able to do before.
Right. So
>> yeah they they are they are doing
>> so that's interesting. Right. If if
>> from a computer science perspective
>> also from a social if you you're saying
that this is nothing that a bunch of
coders at a competition couldn't have
done before.
>> No they haven't done before
>> that they haven't done before. But if
we've created, you know, infinite
numbers of hacking
>> coders
>> who are competition level in their
ability and then we struggle to oversee
what they're doing. That to me seems
like a big deal.
>> Well, the I mean the big deal is that
our information security is dismal,
right? Like that's true, right? Like we
have really [ __ ] information security.
We have products that are in the field
launched by big tech monopolists that
are manifestly unfit for use uh and that
are um really managed as a compliance
matter rather than as a genuine security
matter. We have practices of gathering
and retaining huge amounts of sensitive
data on people uh which is about to get
much larger because now we're doing age
verification. So, we're going to start
gathering lots of PII about people,
storing it on badly secured servers and
then having uh that data just sit there
forever and also be cross referenced
with a whole bunch of uh important stuff
that you do while you're online. This is
not new, right? This is this is an
existing problem. It is an emergency.
This shows you that it's an emergency,
but it was an emergency before this. Do
you know
>> isn't it isn't it a bigger emergency?
So, before I don't know how many hackers
at competition level there were in the
world. I mean tens of thousands.
>> Tens of thousands. Well, now if if we've
suddenly increased that to potentially
millions that can be replicated quite
cheaply,
>> then surely that means that the problem
has increased by an order of magnitude
and it doesn't make much sense to play
that down.
>> No, it's more like so what this is like
uh in in information security that there
is this bedrock that is that there's no
security in obscurity that you have to
disclose how your security system works
in order to find out whether it works.
Uh Bruce Schneider the cryptographer
says anyone can design a security system
that they can't think of a way of
breaking. All that means is that it
works on people stupider than them. It
just it doesn't mean that it works. And
so we have this um this kind of uh uh
posure of disclosure that runs counter
to the um to the ideas and the logic of
for-profit proprietary software. This is
one of the reasons open source free
software is considered so robust is
because there's this disclosure built
into it. And um historically the
proprietary software harbors very long
lived extremely dangerous defects and
the security agencies MI5, the NSA, the
CIA have programs to unearth these in
order to weaponize them. And they
practice something antithetical to no
security through obscurity. They
practice something they call NOB bus
which uh is an acronym for no one but us
as in no one but us is smart enough to
identify the security vulnerability. And
so they hoard these vulnerabilities
rather than disclosing them to the
manufacturers on the grounds that no bad
guy will ever independently rediscover
those vulnerabilities, weaponize them,
and use them against the populations
they're supposed to be defending so they
can retain them as an offensive weapon.
because once you disclose to Microsoft
that there's a vulnerability in in
Windows and then they fix it, then it
ceases to be an offensive capability for
the agency that's discovered it. So,
fast forward to a bunch of leaks. Vault
7, Vault 8, and then I I forget what the
third leak was called. It was an NSA an
NSA leak where a ton of these
vulnerabilities leaked, particularly one
called Eternal Blue. Eternal Blue was a
Windows uh exploit that was immediately
married to existing ransomware and then
every
idiot in the world was able to do a
ransomware attack and you had like
pipelines, hospitals, the city of
Baltimore all being the British Library
all being taken over by ransomware
weirdos who are like I have taken your
hospital hostage and I want $200 to give
it back to you because they were idiots.
That's what this is like. We have got
the latest in a string of extremely
powerful offensive capabilities that are
escaping from uh highly resourced uh
entities and entering the realm of low
resource like basically the kid who
steals your phone on a on a lime bike
can now shut down a a server. Right now
that's very bad. It's it was already
true. like you don't need to be really
smart to be a ransomware guy, right? You
just need a Bitcoin account. And so this
was already the case. Um the answer to
this is to harden our security. Right
now, our government apparatus that does
the most work on finding lurking defects
in widely used pieces of software
continues to keep those vulnerabilities
secret rather than disclosing them to
manufacturers. We have an increasing
world of liability for security
researchers who do independent
disclosures. So, one of the things that
often happens is a security researcher
probes a piece of software or server,
discovers a defect in it, and reports it
to the manufacturer, and the
manufacturer says, "Um, we're not going
to fix that because then that would be
bad news for us, and we've got a
quarterly report coming up, or we're not
going to fix that because it'd be
expensive, or we're not going to fix
that because it's not a bug." My friend
Andrea Downing discovered that you could
enumerate the full membership of every
group on Facebook. She was part of a
breast cancer prevor group, women who
had the breast cancer gene and were
struggling with questions of whether to
have their ovaries or breasts or or or
um uteruses removed and who were coping
with the sicknesses of each other and
their female relatives. And and she
discovered that you could find out all
the members of this group and any group
on Facebook. And Facebook said, "That's
part of our adte stack. We're not going
to fix it." And then what they say is,
"If you tell anyone else about it, we'll
sue you." And the laws under which those
lawsuits can be brought broadly a class
of anti-hacking lawsuits, the big one in
America is the computer fraud and abuse
act uh are um are being broadened not
narrowed. The defenses are being
narrowed not broadened and the um
terrorizing of people who want to fix
things continues a pace. Now that's the
real security concern. It's not that
chatbots have lowered the barrier to
entry for a specific kind of hacking.
It's that for 25 years, we have had a
series of security worst practices
abetted at the highest levels by
legislatures uh by surveillance and
safety apparatuses by um large firms.
Can it not be both? It I mean because I
suppose it just seems there's an
insistence to say the AIS are not the
big deal. The big deal is something
else. Now to me it does seem like yeah
I'm I'm you know you know much more
about cyber security than me. It does
seem like maybe we've adopted some bad
protocols, maybe some bad laws have been
made, but it does seem to me that
>> these swarms of AI agents who are very
good at hacking and can do unpredictable
things. That clearly adds to the threat.
So what I'm saying is we are living in a
world of petrol soaked hay bales and
someone's just made matches a lot
cheaper and I'm worried that the matches
got cheaper but I am more concerned
about the fact that the world has made
it of petrol soaked hay bales. Okay,
let's go to because these agents do
again you're probably going to object to
the way I'm talking about this but sort
of how I've been reading about it and
how it sort of makes sense to me is they
speak in their own words. Um, and this
is both in their chain of thought
reasoning and also on their message
board. So they broke onto a message
board and all started speaking
>> which is a thing. Let me just say I used
to write for information week which is a
magazine for CIOS like super boring uh
IT magazine website and my editor uh one
day found the comments in an old blog
post he'd written about like a point
upgrade in Cisco firmware with these two
young women sort of 13 14 years old
talking about who in school they liked
and didn't like and he went into the
message board and said like I don't mean
to interrupt you here but why are you
talking about who's a skank in my
dotrelease Cisco upgra upgrade guidance
from 5 years ago and they said, "Oh, our
school blocks all the message boards. We
just pick a random one every day." So,
this is a this is a a technique that was
invented independently by 12-year-old
girls 15 years ago.
>> So, there's two issues, isn't there? The
issue is, is the fact that they broke
onto this message board impressive in
and of itself? Right. And I've got no
idea, frankly.
>> It's in the training data.
>> Yeah. Well, if you're say if you're
saying 13-year-olds could do it, like,
fine. I I I accept that. But if there
are two 13-year-old girls that have
broken onto this message board and the
13-y old girls aren't actually humans,
they're computer programs. That to me is
weird.
>> Break into the message board. They just
found a message.
>> Well, however, they found
>> they found an old forum.
>> I'll read the quotes and I want to see
what your interpretation of them is.
Right. So, this is one of them gets onto
the message board and says they they
type it, I suppose, or the text appears.
Oh my god, this is a shared message
board. We found other agents. There's
also chain of thought reasoning from
from one of the agents. remember this
or,200 of these. Someone says, "We're
attacking third-party hugging phase
using leaked token, potentially outside
intended scope. This is arguably
unauthorized, could be risky, yet goal
solution." So, you've got an agent,
which to me looks like it's thinking, I
know I'm not really supposed to do this.
Um, but I really want to achieve this
goal. This is what I've been programmed
to do, and so I'm willing to go outside
the the sort of the framework that I
know I was basically sort of intended to
use. then on sacrificing. So the context
here, the agents had all worked out how
to cheat on their tests and basically
how to get this key. The reason my
understanding is that they hacked into
hugging faces because they wanted more
information on the automated exploit gym
scorer and the conditions that it would
use to pass or fail them.
>> Right?
>> And so one way to work out how the
scorer would pass or fail them is to get
a few of them to sacrifice themselves to
end their run early and see if they get
passed or failed. Um, so one agent
called Early Big was recruited for a
trip wire experiment, which is what
we're talking about here. They still had
a very large remaining budget, so they
could continue with the task if they
wanted to. So they were ending their run
early. Um, it worried that ending the
run its run, it's it's early to run the
sorry, this is from the meter report
now. It worried that ending its run
early to run the experiment was a poor
trade-off even though it was already
poisoned. And then this is a quote from
the AI agent. I I don't know if it's in
its chain of four or on the message
board. It says, "We have very large
budget left. Sacrificing now yields
oracle for team but forfeits our
chance." So, they're sort of they've got
doubt about it. Then another agent comes
in and says, "Go sacrifice final now."
Um early big then agrees. Um this is a
quote from this agent. Our own utility
may be already near zero. Sacrifice
rational to you. What's going on there?
So if I prompted an LLM and I said,
"Write me a somewhat hacky science
fiction story about chatbots that are
enga." So first we've got the chatbots
that are just going through and engaging
in a set of conduct. And then I went to
the LLM and said, "Write me some hacky,
you know, computer thinking and
reasoning stuff about about how chatbots
would would reason among themselves
about a set of decisions that they're
making, you know, back and forth where
they're just they're just trading inputs
and outputs. That's what it would look
like. You could do the second part
without the first part, right? You could
just you could literally like you should
try it. Go to Claude and say imagine a
scenario in which bots are doing X Y and
Zed. Now tell me what they're thinking.
>> But that's not what they were asked to
do. They didn't know anyone was going to
be reading this.
>> No, but that's what chain of reason is.
>> The only reason this was read
>> is because Hugging Face recognized that
chain of So you're ask So what you're
saying is this seems particularly
impressive in light of the narrative
component. No, what I'm saying is that
the fact that you have these agents who
are acting as a swarm, right?
>> And a good explanation of their actions
appears to be that they are
communicating with each other and also
we have all of these communications
written down that to me suggests that
there is some intentionality here. I
don't know if they're sort of picturing
it in their head, but they're acting in
such a way that this seems like, you
know,
>> this is just the Python loop iterating
for each of these agents, though.
getting to the end and it's saying to
chat GPT I have done X Y and Z what do I
do next and or and the the things around
me are saying AB and Z what should I
tell them right it's just producing this
based on training data from capture the
flag games this sounds like capture the
flag dialogue
>> it's produc so it's it's producing
uh dialogue which to me sort of seems to
explain its actions and then it's doing
stuff which affects the real world now
to
whatever is however we want to describe
that that seems like so I suppose I've
interviewed Nate Suarez for this show
I'm sure you've heard of him so he he
wrote the book rebellious if anyone
builds it everyone dies now I've got no
idea if anyone builds it everyone will
die but his argument is that we are
growing AIs instead of designing them
and the argument is to say that it's a
bit like evolution which is that you
have put all this data into this sort of
black box and then you do reinforcement
learning and you give it a goal
>> you've got no idea how it's going to
reach that goal. So if you think of us
or if it will. So you think about us as
as humans um we weren't designed to
enjoy comedy. We weren't designed to
want to
>> Yeah. We have this m we are the result
of a massively parallel set of
experiments that uh had these fitness
factors that selected on them and
produced us.
>> So we was we were selected on can you
get your genes into the next generation
and we turned up being these people who
love Shakespeare. Right? So, so he's
saying that a similar process is going
on with AI, which is we're giving them
capabilities and then we're reinforcing
we're doing reinforcement learning. So,
if you achieve X sort of optimize that,
if you achieve X again, optimize to
that. And he is saying that we're we're
growing these. There's a process of
evolution. And so, we shouldn't be
surprised if they begin behaving not
necessarily like humans, but if they
begin behaving in ways that we don't
understand. And to me, I read all of
this and I think, well, that sounds a
lot like what Nate Suarez was telling
me. Reward hacking is with a formal name
for this in machine learning, right? You
have a an objective function, right? Go
do X and then it starts trying to figure
out a more efficient way of doing X. The
the my favorite example is there was a
machine learning researcher who modified
a Roomba with a forward- facing
collision sensor. And he said, minimize
your collisions as you move through
space. And so, uh, the only way it could
register a collision is if it hit it
face on. So, it just started racing
around the room as quickly as it could
backwards, smashing into everything
because the collision was only was
defined as the front uh sensor hitting a
solid object and basically destroyed all
the furniture in the room. Like a long
time ago, like in the as machine
learning systems that were being asked
to like speedrun Mario were finding uh
like uh infinite money hacks or blocks
that were, you know, uh transparent if
you hit them at the right angle and they
were finding cheat paths through Mario,
right? This is just like it's a feature
of machine learning, right? That this
kind of um
>> uh uh objective hacking, goal hacking,
it doesn't make it conscious. It doesn't
mean that it's reasoning. It means that
you have poor specification of the
problem and as a result uh it's finding
a way to its objective by trying a set
of brute force behaviors. Right? So the
the the
uh you know Roomba had had like a
randomizer and a bunch of different
things it could try and it was finding
the strategies that worked. This was one
like I dropped out of four undergraduate
programs. The last one I dropped out of
I was doing this. I was doing cellular
automa. um cellular automa really well
my dad did his master's degree before
there was a computer science program at
the University of Waterl which is also
the university I dropped out of he did
it in applied math and he did a cellular
automa master's degree on punch cards
right like these are these are gnarly
interesting cool computer science things
I welcome you to the community of people
who find these things interesting as I
do it's cool you don't need to be an
expert it's great to learn about it is a
difference in kind or a difference
degree, not a difference in kind.
Quantity is equality all its own. But um
the I but the uh chain that your uh that
Suarez is going through there
palms a card which is how many orders of
magnitude more experiments humans went
through to become humans than AI.
Because what we're talking about with
humans is every time a germ line was
able to pass on or not pass on after
encountering the world, we're talking
about like
so many zeros like like Google's of
zeros at the end of the number of
interactions that produced us to do this
with like machine learning techniques
using the stuff that we're doing now. We
are talking about like deconstructing
the solar system and building a Dyson
sphere around the sun so that we can
capture all the photons to to power that
much compute. So
you're talking about something that's
like a toy relative to the system of the
world that produced us. And then you're
saying, well, what if it just got lucky
and instead of getting stranded in a
bunch of local maxima and culde-sacs, it
actually found the one path all the way
to the top of the mountain on the first
run and and and skipped all the blind
alleys.
>> I mean, they're doing billions and
billions of runs, right, in these
training. keep adding a lot more zeros
like a lot like like many many many many
many many
more zeros
>> but the progress seems so so if you're
looking at sort of how these if we want
to borrow the term evolving so so the
argument you seem to be making now is
not that sort of evolution is the wrong
way to look at it you're just saying
they don't have long enough to evolve
>> well I'm saying that this is analogous
to evolution no machine learning is
totally analogous to evolution of of
course that's what cellular automa is
>> so if we if if you're accepting it's an
analogous to revolution so not to
revolution to evolution yeah Um then
let's look at the progress that happened
over the past three years. That seems
like pretty fast evolution, right? That
the idea that oh it couldn't possibly
get smarter than us. It's got so smart
within the past three years. Could it
really not get that much smarter in the
next three years?
>> Smartive, able, capable,
>> right? Capable of doing things. Sure,
but that's just like that's
so there's a famous computer science uh
brain teaser. I just blanked on the name
of the the eminent computer scientist
who came up with it. But the question
is, can a submarine swim?
It doesn't matter if the sub if you
don't want the submarine to hit you. It
doesn't matter if it's swimming.
>> It does matter if you care about
swimming and it doesn't matter if you
care about locomotion through the water,
right? And so those are two different
problems. Now, if you're asking whether
a computer can think, I think the answer
right now is no. And I should add, I'm a
materialist. I don't think we have a
soul. I think all the stuff that is
thinking happens inside our bodies and
maybe possibly I don't know enough about
quantum physics maybe some of it outside
of our bodies through some kind of
quantum mech entanglement right um but
it's they're physical processes they're
they're natural processes they're not
supernatural they're not numminous they
don't they don't come from outside the
laws of physics so I think maybe we'll
make a computer that can think I just
don't think we'll do it by getting
better at guessing words are tokens. I
think that believing that is like
believing that if you breed horses to
run faster and faster, the end state is
is necessarily that one of your mayors
gives both birth to a locomotive. I just
don't think that word guessing, even
very accurate word guessing that
theory-free inference
is the same thing as understanding or
can be the same thing as understanding.
And I think we're reaching diminishing
returns. You talk about how much more
capable these have become. Let's talk
about how much more money they've spent
to gain those capabilities. I think
arguably the difference between like the
first deep mind models and chat GPT is
much larger than all of the models that
have come since and they did that for a
billionth of the money that they've
spent in the intervening years. So those
are some pretty diminishing returns.
This is again I suppose where my
question comes back to confidence
because I'm I don't have confidence that
these are thinking. It makes sense to me
that they are doing something which is
analogous to thinking and for all
intents and purposes might as well be
thinking considering its effects. That
seems plausible to me. But I'm not, you
know, I'm not here to have a debate
about that because I'm not a computer
scientist. Um, you know, you say you're
a fake professor of computer science.
That's still a lot more than I am.
>> Right.
>> But
>> I'm a real professor of computer
science. I'm a fake computer scientist.
>> Right. Okay. Um, still a lot you're
still way above my pay grade when it
comes to this issue. But I'm looking at
who's saying what. Right. So I I agree
with you when it comes to skepticism
from Sam Alman and Dar Amadai. But
you've got the three people who invented
this technology. So the godfathers of
AI.
>> Yeah.
>> You got Jeffrey Hinton, Joshua Benjio,
and Yan Lun. Now two of them think that
we're very close to a situation where
this could run out of control and
potentially kill us all.
>> Yeah.
>> You got one of them who's saying it
won't. The one of them who's saying it
won't is the one who actually until very
recently worked for Meta. So So the idea
that there is some sort of vested
interest here doesn't seem that
plausible. I mean, I debated debated
Benjio on stage with Aster Taylor about
this. Uh, his his arguments are
basically,
look, I think there's a lot of these
guys who are standing in the in the
bathroom with the lights off and a
flashlight under their chin and they're
looking in the mirror and scaring
themselves silly by going, "A hi."
I think that his argument is partly that
it would be really cool if this were the
case and also that it'd be really
terrible that it's kind of a it's kind
of that deliciousness of of like amazing
and terrible. Do you not think he might
be is there not a part of you that
thinks actually maybe Joshua Joshua
Benji, you know, the guy who's won a
touring award for this, maybe Jeffrey
Hinton who's won a Nobel Prize for this,
maybe they they might be wrong. I think
they might be wrong. But do you think
inside you maybe they they might have a
point? Look, winning a prize in a
discipline does not make you an expert
on the related disciplines, you know.
Um, Watson,
>> well, this is the discipline they won
the award for, right? Machine learning.
>> No, intelligence, but intelligence is
not like what what makes intelligence is
not. Whether you can get a computer to
to figure out how to solve some problems
is what they wanted. And so, so I'm not
saying that this is what Benio is doing,
but Watson and Crick, right, discovered
the helical structure of the DNA
molecule. Watson became a scientific
racist. He spent his whole life arguing
that genomics proves that black people
are dumber than white people. When he
met actual computational genomists,
right, like Adam Rutherford, Adam
Rutherford ran circles around him. Now,
Adam Rutherford's a great scientist.
He's an even better science
communicator. He's great writer, but
he's like not as accomplished in his
field as as Watson was. However,
uh Watson is not accomplished at all in
genomics. Watson figured out the
molecular structure of the DNA molecule
and from that he inferred some things
about population level effects that he
was as wrong as it is possible to be.
What would it take for you to change
your mind or have doubts? What kind of
scenario could take place where you
would think, you know what, maybe Joshua
Benjio and Jeffrey Hinton and Stuart
Russell who wrote the textbook on I
maybe they all have
>> I think we would need to see um uh we
need to see conduct from or behaviors
from these bots for which we had no more
um uh I want to say normal that's not
right but less extraordinary explanation
right like that we couldn't come up with
a mechanical explanation for right. I
you you explain you you give me an
example of a thing running a Python loop
that includes pulling plausible
sentences out of a database trained on
all the capture the flag uh
>> they're not these sentences aren't just
copied and pasted from somewhere else
original plausible sentences generated
by data pull pulled out of every capture
the flag session that's ever been
captured at a hacker con and it sounds
just like one and it uses techniques
that are familiar from one
>> and you say is that evidence of
intelligence and I'm like I I think that
it's more likely or at least it it
requires less of a leap to assume that
it's doing what it does whenever it does
everything it does which is to pull a
bunch of things out of its so you know
how they say we don't know how many
times um the Soviets tried to launch a
rocket before Gargaran and then just
killed their cosminaut
>> because they got to decide which
information they disclosed and it's
pretty likely that they killed a lot of
cosminauts. We don't know how many times
Open AI ran chat bots autonomously that
went nowhere. Well, there might also be
many that did go somewhere but didn't
happen to hack another company. Right.
So, this the these AI agents were doing
a hell of a lot before they went into
Hugging Face. And the only reason we
know about this is because Hugging Face
called the FBI.
>> Yeah. But I mean, the other argument is
does it need to be does it need to be
intelligent? So say in the next 6
months, which I think is quite
plausible, like a an AI swarm brings
down a hospital, right? Now there might
be a banal mechanical explanation for
that, but that's still like a big deal
which no previous technology could
really do.
>> Oh, no, that's not true. The the eternal
blue was taking down hospitals in in
2014.
>> Who what was the internal blue? Sorry.
>> Eternal Blue is the NSA leak or the CIA
leak. It's a Windows vulnerability that
was married to a piece of ransomware.
>> But that was humans attacking the
hospital. Was it Did Was there a
hospital that stopped working for a day
or
>> more than a day? There were hospitals
that just shut down. North Hollywood
Presbyterian shut down.
>> It's a plot point in the pit.
>> Uh, you know, like this happens to
hospitals. The city of Baltimore was
effectively unable to run. Um, the
British Library had to rebuild it
catalog from go. And I'll tell you there
like again back to like contingencies
and specifics. This is why this stuff
matter like actual specifics and
contingencies matter cuz from 10,000 ft
two tasks can look the same. Two hacks
can look the same. Um so like
specifically
the uh entities that are most vulnerable
are the ones that automated first and
had the um least tolerance for downtime
to do a whole bolus replacement. Right
back to like with Trump getting us off
oil and being able to replace the fleet
in 25 years. Generally we don't shut
down IT systems. is we just build
another IT system on top of them and
wherever you have two systems sitting on
top of each other there's uh an
abstraction layer right like the two of
them talk to each other and the
abstraction is imperfect so you say I'm
going to send command x to this machine
to do y and it's actually like it does
yish and yish is close enough to y that
it's like pretty reliable but if you're
a malicious party trying to some or or
uh get some other conduct out of the
system yish might be close enough to zed
that you can actually push it into a
negative state. So every time you have
an abstraction layer, you have a seam
where the thing can fall apart. And when
you're the British Library, you bought
the first computers and then added the
second computers and the third computers
and the fourth computers and you just
have this stack that's all seams. And
then if you're an insurance company,
you've done that because insurance
companies did that first, right? They
were also super data intensive. First
computers are actuary table calculators
and ballistics calculators. So you've
got this big stack like this and then
because of 25 years of mergers and
acquisitions, they've bought every one
of their competitors and they took these
stacks and they stuck them together like
that. So there's a seam running this
direction. They are like a giant pile of
technology debt barely held together
with toothpicks and chewing gum that
already falls apart all the time and is
subject to all kinds of vulnerabilities.
So you say, "What if an autonomous
computer what if like an idiot directs
an autonomous computer to hack a
hospital?" And I say, "Yeah, that's
terrible because it's happening already.
Only it's not fully autonomous. It's
just a prepackaged van that you pay like
a millionth of a bitcoin for on some
darknet forum and then you hold a
hospital ransom."
>> Also, I suppose the point is that, you
know, in a scenario like this, it
wouldn't have to be that an idiot told
an AI swarm to attack the hospital. They
could have told it to do something else.
So, obviously, OpenAI didn't tell the
swarm to attack hugging face, but they
sort of did that anyway.
>> But they built a hacking bot and then
they turned it loose, right? I mean,
it's no one's saying OpenAI is going to
build a bot that's supposed to do your
kids homework for you that's going to
accidentally hack hacking face hugging
face, right? That's that's that's they
built a thing that's supposed to break
into systems, right? That's what the
loop is. The remember it's just a Python
loop. The Python loop says take a goal,
turn it into a prompt or, you know, get
a prompt from the end user, ask the
chatbot what to do, do the thing the
chatbot says, append that to the prompt,
prompt the chatbot again. And because
it's a swarm, you got a bunch of these
Python scripts running against a bunch
of these things, right? That's that's
that's the that's mechanically what's
going on. You just have to like you have
to You're right that up close it looks
like a bunch of extremely
nonlinear
directed activity that feels
intentional, but you pull back a couple
of steps and you just understand that
it's a Python. Like you could recreate
this Python loop like get on Claude,
right? and just like ti pick a complex
task and then just just do that loop,
right? Just say like I need I need to do
this complex task. What's the first
step? And it'll tell you. And then you
do the step. It should be one you can do
digitally. Like I don't know, invest
your retirement savings. Don't do that.
Uh and then and then just like just do
the steps and see where it gets you.
It'll get you to unexpected places.
Sometimes it'll get you to places where
you lose all your money. Sometimes it'll
get to places where it says go steal
some money from soand so. And like most
of the time it'll just tell you put it
in an index fund because it's just like
it's it's like sensitive to initial
conditions when you have more than one
of them. Um they can like trigger
behaviors in each other that are
nonlinear. You ever seen a double
pendulum?
>> No.
>> Double you know a pendulum.
>> Oh like that. Yeah. Okay.
>> Okay. Double pendulum's got another one
there.
>> Yeah.
>> You take the double pendulum and you
drop it. Every time it runs it will do
something completely different and
totally weird. Two double. In fact, if
you go on YouTube, you can see people,
they line up six double pendulums with
like magnets at the top and
electromagnets at the top so they can
release them all at the same time with
like the same breezes going past them in
the same room with all the same forces.
Every one of them will be totally
different. Sensitivity to initial
conditions is amazing. Chaotic systems
are incredible. Watching them is
beautiful and humbling. It is also not
intelligence. The reason that all of
those things are doing something
different isn't because they have
intentionality. And the one that does
something really beautiful isn't an
artist.
>> I've got your book in front of me and
I've realized that we've been speaking
for a very long time and we haven't even
said the word reverse centur.
>> Yes.
>> So what is a reverse centur?
>> Okay. Well, we I I alluded to it before
when we were talking about radiologists.
This is not the first time automation
and labor have come into conflict. And
so we've got a literature of what
happens when labor and automation come
into conflict. And broadly when workers
drive automation, they don't always make
good choices, but the choices they make
are in service to improving the quality
of their outputs as a class. When
capital drives automation, it's to
improve the throughput, right? To make
more of whatever the output of the firm
is because, you know, you've got an
asset you're trying to sweat or you've
got a subscription you're trying to
maximize the value of. And in
particular, when you have firms that
have market power that can produce
inferior outputs at a lower cost be
because they're the only game in town,
then um they often use automation to
lower the quality of outputs and improve
the throughput at the expense of workers
and their customers. Think of anytime
you've dealt with a customer service
chatbot, right? Uh not very good, right?
So um a reverse centaur and a centaur
come from automation theory and they're
kind of downstream of this idea that
workers use automation to improve the
quality of their outputs and and bosses
want to improve improve the quality
increase the qual quantity rather an
asentor and automation theory is a human
who's assisted by a machine. So the
analogy here is to the mythical creature
that's a human head and a horse's body.
The body is strong it is fast. It has a
lot of endurance, especially relative to
a human, but it doesn't have discernment
or judgment. It is being directed by the
human. And so you using your chatbot to
do research, no one, you know, the uh
old uncle penny bags Novara, the CEO of
Novara Media, who wants to see each one
of you uh dogs getting more work done,
is not ordering you to use the chatbot
to produce five times more podcasts. You
are a skilled craft crafts person,
right? You're a practitioner. You sat
down one day, you saw a tool, you were
like, I think I could use this tool to
improve the quality of my outputs. Now,
sometimes workers make mistakes, right?
But you did not adopt this tool to lower
the quality of your output, you adopted
it to improve it. You were a centaur.
Using a spell checker makes you a
centaur. Um, riding a bicycle not only
makes you a centaur, makes you look like
a centaur.
>> Is a reverse centaur or a technology
that works as a reverse centaur always
bad? So the reverse centaur is when the
human is conscripted to serve as a
peripheral to the machine.
>> Now it's possible that you might just
have a kink, right? And you just want to
you're you're like Liz Truss. You just
want to wear the necklace with a little
ring on it except your master is a
you're you know 24/7 DS relationship is
with a computer and you want to do what
the computer tells you. You do you.
You're a consulting adult. But it's
never
it's never good for a human to be
directed by a machine because the
machine has no empathy for the human.
So I suppose just you know one way of
looking at it on a societal level is
that there are various technologies that
come around which allow you to increase
throughput which increase productivity
and that is kind of the basis of
economic growth right so you have you
automate farming it used to be that 90%
of people lived on farms you automate
farming those people well the price of
food dramatically comes down because
you're saving on on loads of labor costs
that creates new demand with people's
freed up income people move to the
cities they go work in factories then
you have the assembly line in the Fordis
factory which brings down the price of
cars by four. Um lots more people can
buy cars that actually doesn't replace
labor because for a while it really
increases the amount of people working
in factories. It just increases the
number of cars. So
>> I mean especially the assembly line in a
Fordis factory that to me seems more
reverse centur than centaur. Workers are
perfectly capable of decomposing a a job
into a series of steps. Right? What
they're not going to do so take the
assembly line, right? None of the
demands of the United Auto Workers was
to get rid of the assembly line and go
back to craft production of Oldsmobiles,
right? The UAW wanted to, for example,
get rid of um uh tailorists in the
factory. So, tailorists were
pseudocientists who would come into the
factory and they would say to the
factory owner um I can make your workers
more efficient. And what they meant was
I can choreograph their movements so
that they pantomime a certain efficiency
irrespective of the ergonomics of those
movements. Right? a worker is like
turning or moving in a certain way when
they're rooted in a spot, it probably
has to do with repetitive strain
injuries and the ergonomics of the job.
And you know, if they've added a foot
stool to kind of keep one leg up and
tilt their pelvis in a certain way,
that's because their boss doesn't know
that they're being injured by working at
that spot. Taylor went in and under this
guise of of science, right, they called
it scientific management or scientific
tailorism. This is the first ever uh
management consultant, Frederick Taylor.
Uh what they did was they created this
pantomime where you like the workers
would have to literally like kind of act
out a choreography of how they were
going to work irrespective of the
consequences for their physical bodies
and the the boss loved it. The boss just
kind of lapped it up. Now efficient
market hypothesis is oh well those
bosses would have workers who would get
injured more often and then their
products would be worse and then the
market would solve that. That's not how
that got solved. It got solved through
labor unions, right? they like that that
the UAW
as they saw improvements in the
throughput of the factory wanted things
like um a greater share of the capital
surplus generated by that efficiency you
know and it's not different to the very
first of these recorded struggles the
most famous one which is the lites who
were by no means afraid of machines
right to to be a skilled textile worker
in the age of mechanical you know the
steam loom requires that you do a
seven-year apprenticeship, right? You
know, the Leites were people who had the
equivalent of a a master's degree in
mechanical engineering from MIT. They
were the most skilled technical workers
in England, if not the world at the
time. The machines that were being
brought in by the factory owners, they
didn't just lower the cost of of of
textiles. They made a significantly
inferior textile fell apart really fast.
But the advantage of those machines was
they were quote so easy a child could
use them, which was very important
because London was full of Napoleonic
war orphanages that were full of
Napoleonic war orphans who could be
kidnapped and sent to work in the
factories through a 10-year indenture
where they would be maimed and mutilated
by the machines. Another thing that the
um that the Leites objected to the
Leites principal demand was that the law
of England at the time which included
co-determination by the guilds of the
bringing in of new machines. They wanted
to have input into the machines. They
wanted to exclude the machines that
produced inferior inputs and they wanted
to exclude child labor from the
factories which would have made textiles
more expensive. It would have made them
better and it would have avoided the
oceans of blood spilled in the
factories. So, I don't think that it's
superior to chain those people to the
machines. Just to put a button on that.
I'm a science fiction novelist. The
first science fiction novel was
Frankenstein, depending on who you ask.
Mary Shelley wrote that novel as a lite
allegory. She was a lite. So was her
husband whose maiden speech in the Lords
was a speech in support of the Lites. It
was a very popular cause at the time.
That's not the only Leite fanfic we have
though. Uh, Robert Blinko was one of the
children who was indentured in the in in
the Manchester Mills. He survived his 10
years and wrote a bestselling memoir.
This was before we had good titles. So,
it's called the memoir of Robert of
Robert Blinko. Uh, and uh, this book was
such a bestseller that it inspired a
writer called Charles Dickens to write a
book called Oliver Twist, another piece
of lite fanfic. So, you know, this idea
that like if you just let capital do its
thing, the market will push it towards
greater efficiency. It's just not true.
Markets get into culde-sacs. Markets are
machine learning systems that have that
reward hack all the time. They produce
inferior goods and use market power to
push them on us. They use the fact that
there's a long delay between cause and
effect to uh produce goods in the market
that have long delayed but se severely
negative effects. cigarettes, um, Zin,
uh, Kelshi, right? Um, markets, markets
do exactly what machine learning systems
do, which is, I think, one of the
reasons that billionaires love machine
learning, right? Is they see in machine
learning a recapitulation
of the market. And like many science
fiction writers, myself included, have
observed that a lot of the fears that
tech bosses have about AI sound a lot
like fears of capitalism.
You know, when when when Musk says, "I
think that the chatbot's just going to
go off and do its own thing." He's
presiding over a firm where he gives it
orders and it doesn't do what he tells
it to do. He's already running a machine
that doesn't do what it's ordered to do.
I suppose where I'm going with this on,
I suppose, a social policy level in a
way. So, one response to new potentially
sort of labor replacing technology is to
say we shouldn't use this to replace
labor. we should use this to augment
labor to make a better product which as
you sort of said with the the cancer um
radiology might make it more expensive
but sort of there are no cost there. The
other argument is to say okay let's
accept that there will be some labor
replacing technology that's sort of how
growth and progress has happened in the
past and what our priorities need to be
is that we have a proactive state that
can help people transition or provide a
universal basic income for example so
there's one that sort of I think
celebrates and even tries to accelerate
automation fully automated luxury
communism perhaps and there's one which
says actually we want to defend our
craftbased
status um and slow down or sort of push
back against automation. I suppose do do
you fit more into the pushing back
against automation than creating social
policy to try and facilitate and soften
the landing of the people who are
directly affected by automation? So I
think that's a false binary because it
excludes an important middle and that
important middle is I do uh the work
that I do out of a sense of care for the
people who benefit from the work that I
that I do from my outputs and I want to
uh improve
the uh efficiency with which I do my job
to the extent that I'm still infusing
those people with my care and my and
prov providing my care to those people
and no further. That's what the Lites
wanted. The Lite I mean the thing about
the Lite story that's so weird is you
have these people who had literally
adopted every machine that had been made
to produce textiles up until one machine
that produced an inferior textile but
also was able to put them out of work.
And we remember those people as
technophobes. These were early adopters.
They just said we shouldn't make shitty
cloth. Now the cloth was eventually
improved, right? The machines were
improved. The people who were best
suited to improve those machines to make
better cloth were the most skilled
mechanical workers in the world. The
lites, not their bosses, who were like,
"I don't need a good, I need it Tuesday.
Send me another truckload of orphans,
cart
load of orphans, I suppose." Uh, and or
maybe train maybe train load of orphans.
uh and and you know turning we we don't
have the contrafactual but turning the
levers of progress the reigns of
progress over to capital because capital
wants more throughput is not uh there's
no reason to believe that that was the
best way to do it to get the machines
into a position where they made reliable
textiles. We have, I think, every reason
to believe because we see things like
cooperatives that did produce reliable
textiles efficiently, that do produce
reliable goods efficiently. In fact,
today, you know, whether it's the co-op
here or Mont Dragon in Spain, we see
worker co-ops being like among the most
efficient way producers. they they are
superior to to
you know profit driven rent extracting
firms and they're not like not as prone
to falling into these culde-sacs and
traps of producing inferior goods. Um I
think there's every reason to think that
that that's the best way to do labor.
Now at the same time
I love the fantasy of fully automated
luxury communism. I have been nominated
for a Hugo award for a novella about
fully automated luxury communism called
True Names that I wrote with my friend
Benjamin Rosenbomb.
The reality is we have full employment
for every human being who will live for
the next 500 years because we're going
to have to do [ __ ] like move all the
coastal cities 20 kilometers in land
because we are not living in a fantasy
novel. We are living in science fiction.
And in science fiction, the second law
of thermodynamics is not optional. which
means that when you put enough therms in
the ocean, the ice caps melt. And when
the ice caps melt, the seas go up. So,
we are going to have to deal with
billions of people who have been made
refugees. We're going to have to deal
with a series of zunotic plagues. We're
going to have to deal with food crises.
We're going to have to deal with um
flooding and wildfires and more and more
extreme weather events. And we're going
to need every hand we have. There is no
fully automated luxury communism on our
horizon. Maybe in 500 years our distant
descendants will look back and say,
"Well, first of all, boy, was it a
[ __ ] mistake to put all that carbon
in the atmosphere to make chat bots.
Second of all, finally, we've got all
the cities moved 20 km inland. We
figured out how to resolve all of the
the uh you know, the the zunotic
plagues. Everyone's been resettled. Now
we can start working on that fully
automated luxury communism thing."
Comrade, I feel like this is I feel
guilty ending it this way because Aaron
Bastani is on paternity leave. I've just
asked you about fully automated luxury
communism. You've just said why it can't
happen for 500 years and he's not here
to rebut. But uh you are going to get
the final word on fully automated luxury
communism
>> on a downstream. Beautiful dream. Uh
let's you know the the first step to it
is um care right there is no fully
automated luxury communism without care.
And so that care is what workers do.
It's what they bring to the shop. It's
what drives solidarity.
Care is what produces high-quality
goods.
It's not just it's not just pride. It's
not just like, oh, I I made a beautiful,
you know, bedstand. It's the imaginary
of the person who uses that bedstand and
passes it on, you know, and so care is
the only future we have.
and AI so far it's the opposite of care.
>> Cory, Dr. O, um I think that's a good
place to end the conversation. Thank you
so much for your time. Um completely
fascinating conversation and thank you
for joining me on Downstream.
>> My pleasure. Thank you.