Compound Hazards - Physical Science for Integrative Risks | 2026 ASP Colloquium
Watch on YouTubeVideo summary
The lecture by Colin from UCLA introduces compound hazards as integrative risks arising from the complex interplay of physical and non-physical dynamics, moving beyond historical multi-hazard events like the Peshtigo Fire to modern climate science landmarks such as the 2012 IPCC report. These hazards are defined by multiple drivers interacting to create impacts greater than the sum of their parts, categorized into four types: multivariate occurrences where events happen simultaneously, temporally compounding sequences over time, spatially compounding events affecting global systems like crop markets, and preconditioned scenarios where a non-extreme event sets the stage for a subsequent extreme impact. To study these phenomena, scientists employ diverse approaches ranging from physical analysis of large-scale weather systems and oceanic processes to statistical methods using copulas and Markov processes, alongside qualitative storylines that blend narratives with quantitative data to explore complex possibilities where traditional attribution is difficult.
The presentation illustrates the severity of these risks through specific examples where interactions between natural forces and human vulnerabilities lead to catastrophic outcomes. For instance, Hurricane Helene caused severe flooding and health outbreaks because heavy precipitation from a cold front saturated soils before the storm arrived, while locust outbreaks in East Africa were triggered by a sequence of monsoon rains followed by warm, dry conditions. Similarly, premature blooming in Turkey was destroyed by a sudden cold snap with hail, disrupting food prices, and the 2025 Los Angeles fires overwhelmed resources due to extreme winds and outdated risk maps that underestimated neighborhood vulnerability. These cases highlight how infrastructure designed for safety, such as levees, can paradoxically increase exposure when events exceed design limits, and how psychological factors like recency bias can influence critical decisions, such as dam operations during the Oroville crisis, ultimately creating a "long tail" of recovery where health and infrastructure issues persist long after media attention fades.
Addressing the challenges in measuring and managing these risks, the speaker notes that risk metrics are sensitive to model definitions and spatial scales, making it difficult to quantify the exact magnitude of anthropogenic climate change impacts without standardized extreme event definitions. Significant gaps in both quantitative and qualitative data hinder a full understanding of compound events, while the rapid increase in such hazards outpaces the slow pace of scientific assessment and policy adaptation. This disconnect is exacerbated by communication challenges where experts retreat to their specific domains due to uncertainty, failing to integrate physical science with human geography, sociology, and governance. The session concludes by emphasizing that avoiding this fragmentation is essential; fostering interdisciplinary collaboration and incorporating traditional community-based knowledge are vital for addressing the bottom-up interactions and systemic feedback loops that define future integrated risks.
Read the full video transcript
[music]
welcome Colin to give us our first
foundational lecture here on compound
hazards. Colin is actually one of the
speakers who I did not meet before
today. Um so I'm very excited to have
him here. But when as Mariana mentioned
a year ago when we were writing the
proposal for this colloquium, we
obviously knew we wanted to send her um
systems engineering and convergence
thinking and we kept thinking like
what's the hook? What's the big problem?
What's the topic we want to focus on?
And then I think it was right around a
year ago that we said look I think it
needs to be compound hazards and we were
doing quite a bit of literature
reviewing orienting oursel more deeply
to compound hazards including looking at
UN reports United Nations reports and
other things and I came across a paper
that Colin was a co-author on and a lot
just kind of went from there once we got
the proposal funded then when we were
starting to think about who do we need I
saw Colin's name in many different
spaces as somebody who does have
expertise and compound hazards. So, we
are very excited to welcome you, Colin.
Thank you so much for being here. I hope
you'll also introduce yourself more
fully to the students. Okay. And take it
away.
>> Thanks a lot.
>> Uh the organizers have seen fit to allot
me and also the other foundational
speakers uh 90 minutes. So, I don't know
if I'll use that all of that time. I I
did put about 15 or 20 minutes of
discussion prompts kind of in the middle
to break things up a little bit. We can
also take a short break or something if
we feel like it. Um, I'm a research
scientist at UCLA. Uh, for the moment I
have a career change uh coming up later
this year, but the last few years I've
been at UCLA doing research on compound
hazards and um the meteorological
drivers of them, especially focused on
extreme heat. And it's it's been an
interesting uh journey, you know, living
in LA. I'll talk at length um in the
second half of the presentation about
the LA wildfires.
So I have been thinking about
compounding for quite a while along with
many others whose work will be cited
here. Um but the LA fires really
encapsulate, I think, a lot of the both
physical and non-physical dynamics that
drive things that we care about like
yeah integrative risks. Uh maybe more
more generally. Um this is my first time
actually back at ENCAR. I was here as a
prospective graduate student um over 10
years ago. So it doesn't seem that long
really, but I guess I'm kind of an
established scientist now and I
certainly wasn't at the time. So I I
also around the same time attended a
summer colloquium um at the other uh
Encar lab down in in the valley. So I
yeah it doesn't feel that long ago that
I was sitting kind of in your in your
shoes.
Um yeah so I guess that's probably
enough by way of introduction. Um
so the outline kind of the talk is that
you'll see at the top and so I want to
start off with a a broader kind of pitch
about compound uh hazards. of course
you're interested in them to a degree
because you're you're here and there's a
temptation to kind of say well this is a
new thing that especially in climate
science is is you know the frontier of
how we're thinking about the earth
system and humans and stuff but really
if you look at like natural hazards or
just kind of human experience more
generally there's a lot more um
background to this we just were using
different terminologies at the
So the top left is a a painting that was
done in the 19th century shortly after
this fire that occurred in Pesiggo,
Wisconsin on the same day as the Chicago
fire actually. And it um burned many uh
thousands of acres. I think it killed
more people than than the Chicago fire
too, but it was in the backwoods of
Wisconsin, so it doesn't get as much
attention. Um, and the reason it's a
compound hazard, of course, is not only
was it super dry, there were high winds.
Um, but those winds actually blew the
fire all the way across the Bay of Green
Bay, so like 100 kilometers or so, and
of course, people and animals then like
dove into the water to try to escape the
raging flames. Um, another type of
disaster that has always kind of been
multi-hazard or compound in a way are
hurricanes. This is um photo from 1925
what's called the great Miami hurricane
obviously caused a lot of flooding. You
can see the high winds um and yeah
devastated South Florida and really
affected actually the whole trajectory
of the development of the region. So
people of course knew about these things
and cared about them but didn't you know
have the tools or terminology to study
them the way that we study them now. The
kind of modern story of compound events
at least from like my corner of climate
science is usually uh thought to begin
with this 2012 I IPCC international
panel on climate change a special report
on extremes
which kind of summarized the
understanding at the time of how
compounding
um effects across for example um the
heatwave and drought dynamics ics uh
could lead to
events that were more impactful than
either extreme would be by itself. So a
somewhat you know narrow framing um and
it was drawing from a lot of literature
again kind of in the heat drought space
a lot of kind of European expertise
um but really kicked off this this
concept in a lot of people's brains like
the the sort of proverbial light bulb
like wow this could really affect how we
think about climate change going forward
maybe we shouldn't just be looking at
you know change in the 90 changes in the
95th percentile of extreme heat or
something but what are the interactions
of that with, you know, storms and
droughts and things like that. So, it's
been sort of an evolution in the past
decade and a half and and and obviously
a huge blossoming of work. Um,
but this was a a conceptual landmark.
Uh, another conceptual landmark I
suppose has come from the the changes in
the climate in the western US in the
last 10 or 20 years. um especially all
the droughts and wildfires and then
their uh knock-on effects. Um this is
from a nice summary paper by Amir
Agakuchock at UC Irvine and his team
which is a beautiful illustration of a
really devastating event, the Monaceto
mudslide.
Um to people of my slightly more
advanced age, this is still considered
recent. You might not consider 2018
recent anymore, but as you can see, the
the sequence was quite like stark,
right? There's a drought, there's heavy
rain, there's strong winds as well as,
you know, dry a dry atmosphere
associated with that. And then more
heavy rain shortly thereafter. And
because of the amount of vegetation
there was to burn, the wind the fires
are very intense um also driven by the
the flames or the driven by the winds.
And then because the soil is loose and
there's no more vegetation when the
heavy rain subsequently comes you get
debris flows. And this was a a really uh
devastating event for Monaceto. So it's
about you know not only the extremes of
each type but also the timing and the
sequencing. If there hadn't happened to
be a heavy precipitation event in that
winter of 2018 maybe it had been pretty
if things are pretty mild and it didn't
um core until the next fall. all the
vegetation would have had time to grow,
debris flow might not have been as
extreme.
Okay, so kind of getting down to the
level of more technicalities. Um the
most there are a million definitions of
compound hazard. It's one of these
things people sort of love to argue
about. I was part of this this paper um
which maybe profered the most commonly
one used one uh so far which is multiple
drivers
I I'll kind of explain what these mean
um multiple drivers um andor hazards
that in in the climate space usually
that interact
and create an impact potentially greater
than the sum of the parts.
Uh so what what does that mean? So a
module so there's a modulator first but
that sort of is behind all of this at
the biggest level we can say you know
climate change is changing
[clears throat]
impact of or the the characteristics of
ENSO for example but then you have ENSO
itself or or other things um different
types of uh you know the NAO for example
then you have you know the N so ENSO is
affecting say drivers so the drivers
might be like what we call you know
weather kind of broadly right um Rosby
waves. Um there might be a lot of rain
in a particular season that causes
saturated soil, something like that.
Then you kind of drill down to hazards
and try to represent hazards are some
sometimes kind of um this there's a
blurry uh line between them. But a
hazard is maybe something that we
isolate and really say this is the most
direct threat to
things we care about. So wild and things
we have a kind of specific name for
fire, heat wave, flood. Um these can be
problematic of course and how to define
them. There are, you know, how do you
talk about extreme heat in the tropics?
It's not really a heat wave, right? But
generally speaking, you can kind of talk
about specific episodes that lead to
impacts. impacts are also hazily defined
but something like consequences that we
care about for people, assets or
ecosystems.
Okay, so compound hazard then
can be driven by an extreme I guess it
could be driven by an extreme actually
modulator too like this upcoming extreme
ENSA we're likely or Elino event we're
likely to have
um so we can have an extreme driver so
we can have say a really severe cold
front or something like that uh we can
have an extreme hazard that's the most
common um
that's the most common framing uh of
compound kind of hazard is this box from
extreme hazard driving an impact an
extreme let me go back you know an
extreme wildfire an extreme heat wave um
whereas an extreme yeah driver would be
something like the soils were extremely
wet so just a small additional rain
event caused a huge flood for example or
there was a there was a there's a very
deep snow pack so then there was a small
rain event that caused an extreme flood.
So that's the the less common then you
can have that and then of course you can
kind of focus on the extreme impact and
work backwards. As climate scientists we
don't tend to do this because we're
interested in the extremes in the system
we kind of are most trained to look at.
But you can also start from okay there
was a really terrible um harvest in this
you know country in this year. What were
the drivers of that? And maybe they
weren't necessarily extreme but in
combination they they they caused some
problem. you know the timing of the rain
or something like that. Um okay so a
couple kind of notes then. So extreme
impact can be defined well really all of
these but let's say extreme impact can
be defined by percentiles or thresholds
um you know the the interactions
across drivers hazards impacts can be
modulated by the earth system the built
environment social systems
um and the modularities of interaction
are really kind of what convergent
science is all about. Um again as as a
climate scientist I tend to my myself
and my colleagues tend to focus on how
the earth system modulates these these
interactions but you can also focus on
um you know agriculture
um cities
governance
um yeah
economics.
All right. So, kind of more
conceptually, I guess the way I would I
would I would suggest these things are
normally thought about is that you have
on the y-axis risk.
Many definitions of risk. I'll kind of
say potential damage from a compound
hazard is generally somewhat higher than
single hazard although not necessarily
so. And then kind of on top of that you
have sort of bad bad luck or unlucky
decisions. So in the LA fires again
which I'll talk about at length there's
a number of bad uh number of instances
of bad luck or kind of poor decision-m
that led to greater risk. So there's
both kind of earth system, this is just
another way of talking about I guess
earth system and social system
interactions that lead to greater risk
um and yeah greater greater impact uh
greater concerns. Okay. So the typo so
the other thing about this paper that I
was part of a few years ago is that it
defined kind [snorts] of in a canonical
in a canonical way different types of
compound hazards. So without stressing
this too much it's important I think to
to
lay this out at least you can can have
it in mind. So there are four main ones
that uh we we talked about with some
somewhat subtle distinctions between a
few of them. So the first one uh
multivariat which is multiple drivers or
or hazards which cause an impact at the
same time in a certain location.
So for example
um heat heat and drought occurring
simultaneously leading to crop damage.
Um then you have um kind of compounding
or interactions across time. So again
kind of in a given location but over
time
uh multiple things happening. So for
example I already talked about like wet
soils followed by um you know rain heavy
rain that causes wet soils followed by
more rain that causes really severe
flooding or potentially landslides. This
is very much the Agakuch
mudslide example. things distinct things
happened in a distinct sequence that led
to this outcome that was very severe.
Then you can kind of imagine spa for
spatially compounding it's it's uh
multiple things happening at the same
time or more or less the same time
across different places. So this is
created this is driven
um in its impacts very much by which
particular locations you're talking
about. They can either be uh contiguous
so or more or less contiguous. So the
the images of the massive Canadian
wildfires I think in 2023
um which you know Canadian wildfires
although they're somewhat new kind of to
those of us living in the US Canada's
had boreal forest wildfires a pretty
significant extent for you know decades
centuries. Uh however the like when you
get to a certain size uh in aggregate of
those fires like you know 25% of a
province burning then you have huge
amounts the the smoke is so much that
you can transport it very far downwind
and create kind of a qualitatively
more um you know serious impact uh for
example in the eastern US or even they
they even had uh smoke problems in uh
Europe. up as a result of the the
transport of the smoke. So if you'd had
a few smaller fires, it wouldn't have,
you know, been nearly the same or the
more kind of classic examples like red
basket failure. So there are multip you
know the US Midwest and Argentina and
Brazil or the US Midwest and Brazil and
India or something all having uh you
know like heat and drought or something
around the same time which maybe really
impacts the total global available
amount of some crop like wheat or corn
that's traded on global markets driving
price increases and you know potentially
famine in places that are uh unable to
afford the higher price. So that would
be yeah the most classic example of
spatially compounding. Um but I wanted
to pick something that was a little bit
different than agriculture um for for
the example there in the in the image.
And then you have preconditioned which
is kind of a a subset of temporally
compounding I guess but it's more like
there wouldn't really the kind of way to
think about it when people use this term
is the the first event wouldn't really
cause an impact by itself. It's only by
virtue of the second impact that
anything really mattered. So for
temporally compounding it's like maybe
there was heavy rain and a minor flood
but then there was more rain so there's
a huge flood. Preconditioned is more
like there was a bunch of snow and it
would have melted gradually but then you
had really heavy rain which obviously
added more water and also melted the
snow creating sort of something above
and beyond either one individually. Um,
and the example, I know it's kind of
small, but there was a um rain on what's
called rain on snow event that
devastated um this village in the French
Alps um a year or two ago.
Uh so it's kind of harder to find good
examples of that, but as a kind of
category, it's useful to keep in mind.
Okay. So I already I guess mentioned
that the overlap, you know, when I say
at the same time, that can be defined
from either a physical or social
perspective. If you have something like
heat and drought, it really has to be at
the same time to affect the crop in my
understanding anyway. Whereas something
like bread basket failure, if you have,
you know, crop uh shortages in the US in
September and then you have a drought in
Brazil in December, that still affects
the markets because crops are traded
over many months. Um and then I was part
of this um summary paper uh this past
year and we kind of suggested that that
there's maybe a need for this additional
category and we're not the only ones to
have suggested it but we we called it
cross cutting. So basically things that
intrinsically involve multiple of these
at the same time. Um and the LA fires I
think as I'll explain are a good example
of that.
Um okay so then other terms that people
use that are useful to kind of map onto
this one of them is co-occurring. So
co-occurring is at the same time, right?
So it's either it could that could be a
multivariate event or it could be a
spatially compounding event. Similarly,
consecutive as I mentioned could be
either temporally compounding per se of
hazards or preconditioned some system
state followed by kind of an extreme
hazard. And then people also use
cascading which is a little bit uh a
little bit vague. Um, to me it primarily
refers to like impacts. Um, I suppose it
could refer to some of these others, but
I guess when I personally use cascading,
it kind of means
um things happening within the impact
space more so than in the hazard space.
Okay. Well, enough of that. I suppose um
the existing literature in kind of
climate compound hazards was nicely sum
summarized by this paper last year and
they did some text analys an analysis
and sort of broke up uh of the published
papers that they found you know kind of
using these terms compound hazard and uh
compound event uh which of these
topologies were they based on and
multivaria is the huge uh lion in the
room or uh Yeah, elephant in the room.
Um, not sure why the cursor is there.
Um, oh, that's just a from the
screenshot. Uh, anyway, uh, so a lot of
this is heat and drought. So, there's
been a huge number of heat and drought
papers, um, because it's relatively, you
know, easy to understand, easy to
quantify. Uh, some of these other ones
you can see are kind of minor. Um so
things are growing uh of course across
all of these but Multivaria is yeah
has by far the sort of largest um head
of steam.
>> Okay. I guess I'll ask if there's any
questions at this point. Yes.
Do you think that also reflects
I think it's pretty much uh an example
of um people
following the trends.
um the the 2012 IPCC report by Sonia
Senatne and her colleague um I mean
she's she's well known for her heat and
drought work and was doing it 20 years
ago. So I think that from that sort of
nucleus things have ended up uh being
like this. And also I would say that
there's there's plenty of work on the
other compound hazards that don't
necessarily use those terms like natural
hazards literature for example. Um,
so yeah, it's kind of a phenomen. It's
kind of a sociological phenomenon in my
opinion that it's it looks like this.
All right. Um, okay. So now I thought I
would survey some of the approaches that
people use um to study compound hazards
as well as give a number of examples
that maybe make this a little more
tangible.
So, and I tried to make this um a bit
like qualitative. So, this is my kind of
understanding of compound hazard um comp
of of compound hazard science, I
suppose, how it's practiced um and the
mindsets and frameworks people use. So,
I would say so there's going to be a few
different examples within each of the
categories. So the first category is
kind of a physical analysis at the large
scale. So one of those framings people
use is they use the weather systems
themselves, cyclones, ridges, fronts.
This is a um an example of from a paper
that was looking at um well using this
meteorological approach. The image is
from hurricane Sandy.
So as you can see uh from the plot they
are colllocating the areas of extreme
waves, extreme wind and extreme
precipitation. All of which of course
played a role in the coastal flooding
that occurred um in New York and New
Jersey. And then the um like the the
dark um the solid dark purple is where
there's the the triple hazard. So all
three of those were extreme, right? I
think a percentile metric. Um and that I
mean kind of the center of that is
basically where the worst flooding
occurred.
Um so kind of you know straightforward
mapping um but obviously driven by the
storm the meteorological characteristics
of the storm itself. Um you can also do
this kind of thing for like um
you know understanding where hot and dry
conditions occur. based on ridges and
the position of of atmospheric ridges
and winds for example.
Um another sort of approach is to use
the seasonal interanual modes of climate
variability for example ENSO uh you know
the El Nino southern oscillation north
atlantic oscillation um in the tropical
regions monsoons
um so in this uh paper that I was part
of we plotted and the the what the
x-axis is in days so basically the
composite
in the composite right around the time
of the monsoon onset within a week or so
after it is when the specific humidity
rises and even though the air
temperature falls a bit, the wet bulb
temperature increases
um pretty significantly and then kind of
falls off as a specific community comes
back down. Um so you know there's a very
distinct sort of period when the
meteorology of the monsoon drives the
greatest risk of humid heat stress in
northwest India. Um so you can also look
at you know how um something like uh
ENSO shapes the risk of you know global
droughts or something like that.
Then sort of somewhat distinct from that
there are papers that really focus on
the atmospheric dynamics that drive
compound hazards. This is an approach
that's most natural maybe for um for
spatially compounding hazards although
not necessarily
the the most uh common um the most
common uh
framing I guess has been to look at uh
the most common approach has been to
look at rosby waves. This what this
paper from Kaiicorn Huber and colleagues
is about. So they you know his whole uh
chain of research is around how there
are different modes that the atmosphere
favors. So like wave number five
basically means there five troughs and
ridges in a semi-stationary uh pattern
which drive of course extreme uh heat
drought risk as well as flood risk in
certain regions
per se and then also different regions
at the same time. So like in this you
know in this composite of wave number
five um situations if you look at the
bottom it's surface air temperature
anomaly. So there's you know there's
there's simultaneous heat risk when this
pattern occurs in central North America
as well as in Eastern Europe.
Um and you know certain ones certain
patterns like this have been growing in
frequency of occurrence and duration and
so on but that's it's it's fundamentally
related to there's this type of large
scale atmospheric dynamics and this is
how it's changing and this is how it
drives compound hazards. Um other things
of this nature include like tropical
easterly waves and their effect on
tropical cyclones and heat and drought
in the tropics. um sudden stratospheric
warmings which drive again heat and and
uh extreme precipitation risk.
And then sort of similar to that large
scale, relatively large scale dynamical
view, but more focused on the ocean. um
not as familiar with this literature,
but people also look at you know how
ocean waves create extreme conditions in
the ocean which then of course feed into
the atmosphere as well as of you know
affect conditions in the ocean for for
marine life um and uh storms and things
like that. Uh people also, you know, so
uh this example is kind of focused on
upwelling and um variations in the um
Hishio current. Um yeah, and then you
know and this this is of course a
dimension of things like Enzo with the
the the Rosby and Kelvin waves that it
sets off.
Okay. Um yeah. And and then I guess the
one of the points from the atmospheric
point of view is that on the right side
you have the 2 meter temperature and 2
meter humidity anomalies. So with this
particular set of conditions, high SSTs
driving high turbulent um heat flux on
the left, you had both um really high
surface um atmos atmospheric near
surface temperature and specific
humidity
um which creates humid heat which is one
of my focus areas. Um, okay. So,
hopefully I'm not boring you too much
with this whole list, but I thought it
might be yeah, useful illustration of
things. Um
so another framing is around
and and this is this can be done at the
large scale but usually more local or
regional scale is how the particular
conditions often extremes of the land
surface state drive
um compound hazards usually through
their interaction with some atmospheric
phenomenon.
So on the left you have the fire
continuum quote unquote which is kind of
similar to what was introduced in the
aguchak
um paper where you have basically say if
you start maybe at 4 or 5:00 there you
have maybe a fire you um which burns
most of the vegetation then you have
some um precipitation which recovers and
the vegetation recovers then you have
maybe more fire and so on um around and
around and in California, this has been
shown to happen on three to kind of 10
year time scales in the coastal areas.
So, it's very like well established
continuum of changes in the land surface
state. And then if you look at the
right, you can see that the um risk of
flooding given
um some spot on this land on this fire
continuum is really strongly modulated.
Um it in the paper they have different
plots for different um different periods
after a wildfire but um the other
dimension is like at a certain time
point the more land that's burned the
greater the risk of really extreme
runoff and therefore flooding because
there's no vegetation to hold on to
things um to hold on to the soil and so
the erosion is very fast and so this is
from a model um and in this particular
um watershed the gray dots are the
observed flood peaks. So in other words,
if you plot if you if you don't consider
this effect and this compound effect and
you just plot the distribution of
observed floods, most of which didn't
occur within a year of a wildfire
because wildfires are,
you know, relatively rare and to have
something within a year of a wildfires,
an extreme flood within a year of a
wildfire, relatively rare. Um so if you
plot the observed distribution you kind
of get okay the recurrence interval of
100 um cubic meters per second in the in
the in the in the stream is something
like n is something like 10 uh 10 or 11
years. But if you include the fact that
you could have really um
you could have this really unlucky
situation of an extreme flood happen or
extreme precipitation event happening
within you of a wildfire that and and
burning your entire watershed that
adjusts the up the the peak flow that
you would expect upward um quite
significantly.
All right. Hopefully I explained that
somewhat reasonably. um is a bit
complicated perhaps. Okay. So then kind
of looking at the meteorology but at the
at the smaller scale you can look at
things like seab breezes
um
uh downslope winds, thunderstorms,
many of the things that people mentioned
were some of their favorite weather
phenomena uh including myself. Uh so
this is from a paper that was just
showing like the humid heat risk in the
Persian Gulf area is really tightly
connected to the seabbze. You don't
consider the seabbze, you're not going
to get the combination particular
combination of air temperature and
specific humidity that drives the most
extreme humid heat risk. Um
yeah, and people also of course look at
extreme inversions. Um
downs slope winds are really critical
for wildfire risk, that kind of thing.
Um then there's hydrodnamics by which I
mean things like river flow storm you
know how storm surges and tides work um
extreme tides interacting with storm
surges in particular groundwater
dynamics. Um
this this is from a fascinating paper
which um
tracked uh in great detail this uh
glacial lake outburst flood goff uh that
happened in in Pakistan
and yeah it's plotting like along the
whole course of the river um all these
flood damages took place so there was a
really extreme um yeah there was a
really extreme flood
driven by really extreme um uh upstream
precipitation which then created kind of
these extreme conditions all the way
down the river and landslides and other
things. um and a number of people I
think maybe several hundred people died
uh okay so then I think this is the
final category now so then there's you
know stat statistical and and numerical
kinds of approaches which I'm not going
to belabor but of course there are many
of these uh probably the single most
common one and this is maybe the reason
why heat and drought are so uh well
represented in the literature is that
there are many Python packages and
things for using copulas to model heat
and drought. So copulas are a way of
a a numerical technique or I guess a
statistical technique that um take into
that takes into account both the
individual distributions
of two variables for example heat and
drought as well as their interaction. So
the probability of
of say um a season or a month being in
this corner up here is a function not
only of what is the risk you know what
is the 95th percentile of of heat and
the fifth percentile of drought.
uh but the fact that the uh say the
fifth percentile of drought influences
being in the fifth percentile of drought
influences the 95th percentile of heat
you know and amplifies it um in some
places like Europe quite quite strongly
um and then you know the what's what's
plotted here is the um the crop loss of
wheat in the Iberian peninsula but the
basic point is yeah it's a bariate
distribution that hope you know that um
is kind of well established and there's
different types of copulas of course. Um
another framing marov and proson models
um proson processes are things that
happen uh kind of randomly in a time
series. So like this kind of
illustration is what what is the risk of
event type A happening and and event
type B happening within a certain time
period of each other. This of course
matters a lot if you're concerned about
two particular things that have
different probabilities happening around
the same time and amplifying each other.
Um, marov models are a way of measuring
stoasticity basically. Uh, so it's uh
when um the it's it's it's a class of
models where the the current state
depends only on the prior state and not
the many states before that. So it's
it's just a way of kind of doing a
random walk through
earth system um possible earth system
states.
Um another thing that is useful to know
about generalized extreme value model
fits. Again there's many ways to do this
um to estimate like really extreme the
point is to estimate really extreme
return periods from relatively short
observational or model simulations. So
like you know we have data for all the
stuff that's in in solid colors and then
you know what is the rest what is the
thousand year 10,000 year event um in
terms of the thing we care about in this
case minimum temperature. So this isn't
really this isn't compound specific or
anything like that. It's just useful for
um it's useful for using in combination
with with other tools. Um again because
we're often focused on extremes when
we're thinking about compound
hazards. Um something that is a little
more compound specific this whole class
of things this paper um and I have all
the literature um at the end I guess
you'll have the slides so you can look
these things up. This is a really good
review paper on this um and other
approaches.
Uh essentially causal influence causal
inference algorithms are ways that to
use observational data first to build
a network of how different um different
elements of a system interact with each
other and then to uh incorporate
interventional data like we change one
thing what happens to the to the other
things in the system and then eventually
to get to the point of okay if we have
this whole complicated system and we
change a few things at a time. How does
the whole system and its impacts change?
So this is very useful for compound
hazards where we don't have maybe a
clear priority idea of of how different
elements interact. Um
especially when you consider variations
in space and time. Um so I'm not going
to pretend that I know everything about
this, but it's a useful approach uh for
sure. Okay. Um I think this is the last
category but I can't promise. Um so
another I would say set of things is
high resolution system models and
usually kind of focused on relatively
small scale interactions. So as opposed
to you know global models which have a
lot of assumptions and um average over
wide relatively wide space and time
scales you can really drill down to what
is happening on the scale of maybe some
kilometers or less
for different types of compound uh
drivers or hazards and this can reveal
really interesting interactions. This
paper from about 10 years ago was
looking it was one of the best papers
that um made the convincing
uh argument and and quantified how
droughts affect extreme heat. Um, and
they were able to produce these plots,
you know, that at a certain level of
relative soil moisture, a certain amount
of heat adection because this parcel
that they're manipulating in the model
heats up because the the energy input is
going more toward um warming the
atmosphere than is to evaporating the
moisture which is no longer there. So
you can kind of build these more
conceptual
pictures of what happens you know how
compound hazards are really created.
Uh okay so that then there's regional
and global models which you can use to
obviously aggregate things on larger
scales. This is from a paper looking at
uh the co the coincidence
in consecutive years of
drought followed by rain. So like
basically wildfire risk
to to some order of approximation
with global climate change the risk of
that increases in Europe. So it's just
uh you know regional global models have
have their uses as well because you can
kind of average things and efficiently
calculate risks at at large scales.
Uh and then okay this is this is the
last one now. So I've been quite
interested recently in story lines and
scenarios. I there are other
cross-disciplinary approaches too but I
sort of picked this one because I think
they are really flexible and useful in
this space. I'm sure they'll come up
many times in the course of the next two
weeks. Essentially they there's a blend
of them ranging from quite quantitative
ones like okay we had this flood and
from a certain storm and what if we
increase the storm precipitation by 20%
because we expect that it's going to
happen in 2050 and then what would
happen you know as that propagates all
the way through the the drainage system
of the city or whatever and then there's
there's quite uh quite qualitative ones
um I was or a co-organizer of a workshop
that happened last year. We developed
these pretty handwavy storylines
where a whole bunch of things for
example happened in the Great Salt Lake
and there was a toxic dust storm and you
know people didn't prepare for it and it
affects everything down to the level of
like ski tourism and things like that.
But if you do these things with one of
the maybe secrets of like science is if
you do something that seems kind of
crazy but with experts then you can
actually have credibility. So we
actually had you know agency managers
and stuff who contributed to these
storylines and they were like yeah this
is you know if such and such happened
this is probably how we how we would
respond and how the government would
respond um and how businesses would
respond and people you know are prepared
for drought but they're not prepared for
drought followed by whatever. So it's a
useful way of kind of integrating across
expertise and you can have multiple of
them and all this kind of thing and then
you can use them of course I guess
coming back to like climate science um
which is my specialty you can use those
things to then inform what you care
about right instead of just saying well
droughts in Utah will become 30% more
severe or something you can say well the
risk of this particular scenario is
going to become
30% more likely and is is more
meaningful at least to a certain group
of people and has more obvious um
takeaways right to
um for for the meaning um of the
science.
Okay. So moving on maybe I'll ask if
there's any questions if I go to the
third section. Yeah. Um, how much
overlap is there between hazards and
like the attribution worlds? Because I
imagine probably a lot of the things
that people want to attribute are like
actually compound hazards, but I feel
like a lot of attribution papers I've
read haven't really like used that
language or kind of that framing.
>> Yeah. Um, this was a hot topic of
conversation at a workshop I was at a
few weeks ago. Um, some of the same
people are in both worlds, but the most
fair thing to say is there's not a whole
lot. the attribution literature is a bit
formulaic, I might say, and they haven't
really developed good formulas for doing
compound attribution. Um, and part of
that comes down to it's it is hard to
define what a compound hazard truly is.
It's it's much easier to say there's a
certain heat threshold and we have these
simulations from these models and we
trust them.
So I think it's about model it's about
developing the the frameworks which we
can do and then it's also about trusting
the models and the more elements you
kind of add into the mix the harder it
is to say here is like the answer and
the then and you know here's the clear
baseline that we had pre-industrially or
50 years ago and here is the the
situation now. And that's why story
lines and scenarios are so useful
because it's difficult to quantitatively
account for
all the possibilities that go into
especially the most damaging compound
hazards.
Yeah. But I think there's a lot of
potential for attribution. I think I'm
sure we'll see compound attribution
become a lot more prominent in the next
five years or something.
>> Yeah.
>> Um I have two questions. First, could
you talk about the attribution
literature because I'm not familiar with
it. Um just Yeah. I I don't know what
that is um as much. And then also I
guess I'm curious about um how do you
define what T0 is? How do you define
what the first compound or the first
hazard is especially when it's
sequencing events? Because I imagine it
must be hard because the landscape
itself is shaped by meteorology. Um so
yeah, I imagine that there's debate
around that. So I'm curious if you could
speak to that.
>> Yeah. Um those are both excellent
questions. Um for the second one
um
it's yeah it's really tough and it
depends I guess the answer that you get
depends on who you ask. So if you talk
to heat people they'll say okay you know
there's a heat wave and it started when
the temperature or the temperature
humidity metric went above the 90th
percentile and ended when the metric
went below the 90th percentile or you
know some cumulative version of that.
Um, if you talk to like sociologists,
let's take the European heat wave, you
know, that just happened, they'll say,
well, there was another heat wave in May
and then we just had this one the
beginning of July and people haven't
fully recovered from that, right? I
mean, both from a sort of maybe
physiological standpoint, from a maybe
government resource standpoint. Uh, so
those things are intimately connected.
Um, but if you take the meteorological
view, they're not really connected.
different, you know, different uh
meteorological drivers. Of course, they
are connected in a sense of like will
the warmer climate and that kind of
thing. Um and maybe soil moisture didn't
fully recover or something. Um and
especially if you take the more systems
view, I don't want to yeah take the
systems like uh
like eat this the social system
perspective like lunch before it
happens. But um if you take that kind of
view that people will say in my kind of
experience well you know we have the
same like governance right and those
kinds of things are a through line
through everything that that's happening
you know and and all the different
tropical cyclones and um droughts and
fires that impact like southeast US all
kind of have a cumulative effect and the
governance you know and the trust in
government government is low and you
know all this kind of
Um
yeah. So I think from the meteorological
point of view, most compound events have
something of a starting point where you
can
at least make the argument that a system
is kind of near some resting state.
There's also people use like the term
poly crisis, you know, that everything
is just becoming more extreme and there
is no normal. And I'm not sure I
completely agree with that. But yeah, I
guess you know one the world is so
complex one has to sort of start
somewhere and usually that somewhere is
something was not having an extreme
impact and now it is having an extreme
impact or could have had an extreme
impact
and hazy. Um what was the other question
again? Sorry. Oh about attribution.
>> Yeah. So the brief the brief answer is
um people have uh groups have model
simulations of
various hazards and so they have a
distribution of those hazards under a
pre-industrial climate usually um is how
it's defined. So you know we for a
certain region in a certain month you
know we have the distribution of like
the temperature possibilities
um then
we've put the current like uh greenhouse
gas and aerosol
um loads and maybe the current land
surface state into those models and run
them again and say okay here is the
distribution of this particular
um metric over this particular scale in
the new climate and what is the
difference between those and you can
measure that either by like the
temperature uh you know the the the
difference between the means of those
distributions is whatever 2 degrees or
the risk of exceeding a certain
temperature threshold 35 degrees is
increased by 50 times or something like
that. So it's quite um sensitive to the
model and the definition of the event.
Like if you take you know recent
European heatwave and you take a box
over Paris right you might find the risk
is such and such but if you take a
slightly larger box the risk is
different. So it's um on one on the one
hand very well established and like hard
to critique but on the other hand there
are a lot of assumptions that go into
it. Um like in the most basic version of
things you know anthropogenic climate
change has absolutely increased the risk
of heat waves in Europe by but by how
much
>> and maybe people will comment more on
this later.
>> I actually don't think
>> listening for me. Thank you Colin for
explaining what glove was. Um but just
if anybody's interested this coming
Thursday actually the nationalmies is
releasing a report on attributions of
extreme weather events in the context of
climate change. So there are a lot of
resources that we could certainly point
you to as well. Just wanted to add that
to Colin's definition.
>> Yeah. So when we're talking about
defining the original event, do you
think that given like how crossar just
kind of would it be limiting or would it
be helpful to have a standardization
for defining the initial event?
>> Yeah. Um, so when you're defining the
original event,
would it be helpful or harmful to have a
standard
system for defining the event given that
it's so cross-disiplinary? Would that be
is what I'm asking?
>> I don't think it would be too limiting
limiting, but I think it would be very
challenging to get people to agree.
>> Yeah.
>> Um,
but I think it's worth attempting also.
Yeah, I was just going to add to your
response that um setting baselines for
extreme events like that and going
towards a crossd disciplinary
perspective it's um an ongoing
discussion in the extreme event science
world now because when you define an
event someone might say what's the
criteria for defining the event that way
and why didn't you consider another
criteria so that is where stuff like um
significance testing and you sensitivity
testing comes in. So if you're writing
like a paper or doing a research in that
light, it will be very very beneficial
to have like significance testing and
sensitivity testing your analysis. So it
helps.
All right, I realize I've been talking
quite a lot longer than I kind of
intended to. Um so I'll try to focus on
what's most important here. And I also
had some discussion questions. Maybe we
can one or two of them. um in the
interest of not being here forever. So
um this next section I was going to get
into I will get into disaster
ingredients and by disaster I mean kind
of compound hazard in together with its
impacts.
So most broadly you know any weather
climate event whether it's extreme or
not has contributions from the
meteorology
variability climate change across these
different spheres of the earth as well
as human
um action and then to make a compound
hazard basically some of these have to
kind of be not in your favor.
So
perhaps based on the questions it's kind
of useful to talk about these. So one of
them I would say is hurricane Helen from
the southeast US almost two years ago.
So the the main story from this one is
your cold front that led to heavy
precipitation saturated the soils.
Few days later hurricane Helen comes up.
There's way more rain. Um it was I guess
in inches. there's like 15 to 20 in some
places 30 in that led of course to
floods and landslides. Then you had
various societal factors like
infrastructure
um socioeconomics,
insurance and and lack thereof. And so
there was a huge loss, a lot of deaths.
And some of that loss and some of those
loss losses and deaths could have been,
you know, uh reduced by addressing the
societal factors um generally before the
event had happened. Um but maybe
responding to it as well. Another one
you might not have heard of or perhaps
did if it was a number of years um
before was big locust outbreak lasted
three or four years across I think it
actually went all the way to India but
the main impacts were in East Africa and
Arabia. So you had a heavy monsoon in
2019 I think that saturated the soils
but then you had warm and dry conditions
and apparently this is the combination
that locusts uh that that makes
grasshoppers become locusts.
Uh of course there's a lot of poverty in
that region there were the early
warnings for this were not very good. So
you had many impacts across um health,
livelihood
um and ecosystem. Another kind of more
minor one, but this is a good like
preconditioning example. So I threw it
in uh last spring in uh Turkey, they had
a warm March that led the fruit trees
and the flowers to bloom early and then
they had a real strong cold snap in
April which um also had a lot of hail
associated with it. can see this guy
kind of mindfully looking at his I think
tulips. Um so you know this train trade
networks and so on that affected the
outcomes which included mainly the large
increase in food prices that lasted most
of the following year. Um and of course
the farmers in the local economies were
strongly affected too. So um maybe we'll
just do this one for discussion. So
maybe we all can reflect on compound
hazard like that you personally have
experienced.
What was it? What would you say was well
understood or well managed about it and
what maybe was less understood? So maybe
like one kind of good and one bad
aspect. So just think about that for a
couple minutes, chat with your neighbor
and uh we'll skip the other discussion
questions for the sake of time.
anything.
>> Yeah, maybe just chat with your neighbor
and then and then we can share out a
couple examples.
>> Uh just like two or three minutes.
heard of the New York.
>> No,
>> it doesn't exist.
Relax.
Oh, no.
[laughter]
>> All right. Any volunteers to share what
they've discussed?
Any volunteers?
I could also just stare at somebody.
I can start. Um, I thought of a noraster
that hit New York when I was a kid and
it was on I think New Year's Eve and we
got really heavy precipitation and wind
and flooding and then it was followed by
a deep freeze and so then everything uh
all the streets froze. Um, I'm not
really sure about um what was well
managed about it because I was young and
and wasn't really aware, but it was
definitely quite damaging and and hard
to travel afterwards.
>> Yeah, it's a classic combination. And
I'm from the Northeast, so I I'm
familiar with that. Like heavy
precipitation, high winds, and then
extreme cold. When I was a kid, I guess
one of the things that got me into
meteorology is we had one of those and
there was a there's an ice storm and
then it was extremely cold. We lost
power and it was very dramatic.
Anyone else?
>> Maybe one other example and then we can
see where you are. Um, I was talking
about an experience that I've had with
fires, smoke, and heat where uh sort of
the focus was on evacuation and getting
ready to go, but sort of less attention
or we knew less well what to do about,
okay, we're feeling bad because the air
quality is really sucky. Our power's
out. Um, you know, do we open the
windows because it's cooler outside than
inside? Uh, but then we can't clean the
air. So, how do we decide to do that
when we're not at the point of like
getting out of town yet? but sort of the
individual level decision-m and the
relative priority across these events
happening at the same time that maybe
have different feelings of urgency.
>> Yeah, absolutely.
>> Do you want to do one?
>> Yeah, we can do one more for sure.
>> Um I didn't give a super big chance. We
ran out of time. Um but um so I went
through Hurricane Helen. Um, and one of
the things that I don't think was
actually mentioned and isn't very well
known about is that uh, Western Carolina
and into Tennessee as well had a really
big issue um, with bacteria in water
outbreaks across Wells Springs and even
municipal like city water. Um, and that
was just one of several instances of
like health outbreak issues. um
especially that we have a really large
elderly population in the area and so
like I've met women who were having um
urinary tract infections and it turned
out to be ecoli in their water and there
was no education there was no knowledge
of that um and so that was a really
interesting experience um and a lot of
like underlying things are still
happening in the region that just aren't
really well known because it's very
niche I should say
>> yeah and these things are also rare like
we may hopefully experience experienced
something like that only once in our
lifetime. So it's it's not the way that
people usually learn, right, from
experience when you're faced with
something novel. And then also, yeah, a
comment is frequently something that's
frequently commented on, but not still
really addressed about compound hazards
is the long tale of recovery when the
media attention and the emergency
funding have gone away, but there's
still like an aftermath
often in the health space or something
like that or infrastructure. Okay. So,
I'll skip these other scintillating
questions. Um, all right. So, I want to
talk through and I don't have too much
time, but I want to talk through a
little bit about the LA fire and how it
kind of encapsulates LA fires and how
they encapsulate some of these compound
elements. So, it's a huge disaster, 200
billion or something and losses, 440
deaths, the really really strong
hurricane strength wind gusts.
The compound nature of it included that
there had been essentially no
precipitation leading up to this. This
is early January. Um then you had really
strong winds, very dry air,
and you had then multiple fires at the
same time in LA County. So it burned all
this area in dark uh in dark brown. This
is satellite image. Um the blue line is
about what what burned. and the same
slightly different scale, but the black
line on the bottom is that same area
that was burned. And you can see that
the Calire threat map didn't even
include
uh a lot of the burned developed area.
So Cal Fire, in their opinion, there was
essentially no risk of these
neighborhoods burning that then burned
under these extreme conditions.
And the updated map isn't much better,
by the way. So then this kind of fits
into this general
framing of quote unquote surprises.
Something I've been thinking about quite
a bit. Many elements to a surprise.
Headlines from across the world about
how different things were supposedly
surprising or maybe actually surprising
but shouldn't have been as the one
indicates.
So when I mean surprise, I kind of mean
the severity of each hazard by itself.
the compound or multi-hazard
nature of those things as well as other
systems like human systems interacting
with those compound hazards to produce
yeah surprising and and disastrous
effects. The the actual potential for
extreme wildfire behavior was very well
forecasted. If you follow NSF uh sorry
uh National Weather Service NWS
um bulletins, this is like as dramatic
as they could possibly be.
Uh this is from the day before. Um and
then a few things that happened that
really I think encapsulate the
challenges of compound hazards
um and the interaction again with you
know human systems um emergency response
planning emergency response that kind of
thing. So I boxed um the most relevant
parts. So one of them is that they as
kind of the icons at the bottom right
indicate that it turns out and I had no
idea living in LA that this was true,
but it turns out that they basically
were completely counting on being able
to drop water and flame retardant on the
on the fires to slow them down so the
firefighters could put them out just as
a general method of firefighting. Well,
the winds were so strong that for for
firefighters safety, they couldn't fly
either the helicopters or the planes. So
then the fire, you know, not only did
they lose the ability to fight the
fires, they also lost the ability to
monitor in real time where the fire was
going. So this was, yeah, extremely
devastating. And almost all the
destruction occurred while the winds
were so strong that they couldn't fly.
As soon as they could fly, they
immediately kind of knocked the the fire
stopped moving so quickly and they were
able to contain it. Another thing was
the multiple fires happened at the same
time. So the one fire, the Palisades
fire started around midday and the the
Ian fire um further east started in the
evening. So they had dedicated LA
County's most of LA Countyy's copious
fire resources to the one fire. Then the
other fire broke out and then there were
a few other smaller fires too. And the
LA fire chief literally said, "We
prepared for one or two but not four."
So they just didn't have enough people.
And it was really surreal if you saw the
coverage of this like media people
wandering streets where all the houses
were burning and there would not there
wasn't a single firefighter around.
There were just so many so many
firefronts that even in LA County with
its 20,000 firefighters or something
they still couldn't cover them all. Um
and then another one um was failures of
the emergency communication system which
we supposedly have and supposedly test.
Many people in particular neighborhoods
didn't get any alerts. There were number
of false alerts. The fact that the power
was off and people's devices might have
died was maybe another factor. Um
there's just so many things that went
wrong basically and contributed to the
devastation and the loss of life.
Um so kind of to summarize then
you can you have this set of
extreme hazardous physical drivers like
fire weather. So like yeah so mo soil
moisture and vegetation moisture is very
low. Wind speeds are very high. Then you
have other things um like no one
apparently thought about houses and like
paint and gas burning. You know uh a lot
of the houses were old so there was lead
in them.
Um, yeah, this reservoir was didn't have
any water in it because it was under
maintenance. Anyway, so there's all
these other factors in addition to the
ones I mentioned before that can implode
a system that's already primed for
disaster. We have this phrase disaster
waiting to happen, which maybe is really
appropo. Um, so the ignition point was
at the top right. The winds were from
the northeast and many I mean 9,000
houses were burned in that fire. entire
neighborhoods were basically leveled. Um
yeah, so there's a common a commonly
used schematic in the disaster kind of
risk community including at the uh
United Nations level which the different
versions of but one of them can kind of
be represented by this. You have hazard
at the bottom, exposure and
vulnerability, the responses to the
hazard
obviously including the exposure and
vulnerability and then you have the
impacts and you have a it's a whole
cycle and these things kind of like
obviously a lot of the time you go from
hazard to impact via the other things
but they can also feed back on each
other. So you can enter the cycle in
different places and it can spin around
and then that maybe is situated within
the pre preconditions
across different systems and then as I
was kind of mentioning about the long
tail you have the post- disaster
outcomes again across different systems
which can modify this risk cycle over
time plus other climate non-climate
drivers like you know climate change for
example Um
yeah so like with story lines for
example the question we kind of pose is
what interactions might push systems
past their breaking point. The usual way
of approaching you know changes in
climate hazards is what is changes in
compound events? What are the changes in
climate hazards individually and
collectively and how does that go
through the cycle but you also might
just start with the cycle as a whole.
This is I guess getting at the what is
the appropriate scale and approach
question and a bit of the systems
gesturing at systems thinking. Um so you
can both of course when you ask this
question about pushing systems past the
breaking point you can of course
generate new risk knowledge that way. Um
you can also better operationalize
existing knowledge that's siloed within
different comm um communities of
research and practice. Um
so uh one of the most common
kind of phenomena within this cycle is
reservoir and levy effects. So when you
build kind of illustrated at the bottom
there when you it's well documented that
you build a levy people then kind of
like you know the phenomenon that people
like football players are more
aggressive when they have helmets
compared to rugby players right when
people have a levy then they start build
they say oh I'm safe then they build
things closer to the water that they
wouldn't have built otherwise and then
things are maybe fine for a while but if
you have a really extreme event like say
hurricane Katrina then you have much
more devastation than you would have had
if you hadn't had that levy. So, it's
obviously kind of a fra ethical
um and economic and whatever problem. Um
but suffice it to say that there are
these things called levy effects or
maybe reservoir effects on the on the
drought side and those um are modulated
or those modulate
exposure and vulnerability primarily um
I guess the hazard maybe as well. Then
you have sort of psychological effects
like recency bias for example which can
contribute to certain
uh problems in the Orville dam crisis in
2017.
It was documented that the dam operators
were trying to conserve water because
California had just been in a huge
drought, but it was a flood and the
flood was it turned out quite severe and
so they were kind of pushing the
operation of the dam toward conserving
water when they really should have been
trying to get rid of water and the dam
um was damaged and yeah, there was a
spillway.
There's a spillway that was damaged and
people worried about the dam collapsing
because of how the dam was operated. But
that was a understandable kind of
psychological
outcome of the dam of the the recent
drought that California had just been
through. So that affects the responses
and then you have um yeah kind of things
that involve the hazard, the impact, the
vulnerability kind of all interrelating
um to cause devastating impacts. And
just some examples of those like just
take the bottom one I guess meanwhile
some communities in response to the
water scarcity had migrated. This is
kind of similar to the drought one to
the dam one just a minute ago. The the
communities have kind of been scarred by
a drought, so they moved closer to
water, but then because they were closer
to water than they were usually when the
floods came, they were more affected. Um
various other things like at the top
example about vegetation being damaged
by the drought, the soil was compacted
leading to more runoff increasing the
severity of the flood. So you kind of
have to look kind of quite closely just
to understand some of these important
dynamics of compound hazards. You're not
going to get these things from running
your global model. Um but it also makes
it a bit hard
not impossible but hard to generalize um
because the same I mean you don't have
transient communities um in you know I
don't know Southeast Asia the same way
you do in East Africa. So you're not
going to have like a migration effect on
exposure for example you have other
things.
Um just kind of skip this. Um
maybe I'll do it actually. I guess I'm
almost at the end. Um so another example
of compound dust storms.
Just another kind of example about
dams and drainage and agriculture.
Then you throw in the climate a drought
because you have irrigation dependent
land that's not being irrigated and a
drought then you have a lot of loose
soil and that can be lofted by strong
winds to create severe dust storms. So
it's a whole set of interactions
that lead to that are necessary really
and sufficient for creating uh severe
dust storms.
Okay, in in the case of Iraq anyway. So
this is a modification of a figure that
I made um a few years back where we
kind of were this is another example of
the kind of hazard impact response
feedback loops. Um
the x-axx is just upon further
reflection I I feel like exposure and
vulnerability don't really directly
create hazards but they do create
impacts and they also are affected um by
the responses to things and on the
bottom. So comp combinations of physical
drivers basically lead to impacts uh
hazards impacts responses. Then you have
sort of both um
uh yeah you have exposure vulnerability
of physical drivers. Then you have
environmental decisions, human decisions
um that affect the hazard and then of
course the response is a human decision
that flows essentially from the impacts.
Anyway, um so maybe that's not useful,
but um
yeah, I think basically the the point
I'm trying to make, I guess, is that a
lot of time compound hazards are often
thought about only considering a few of
these boxes, as I said at the start. And
it really is important to try to at
least in very rough terms approximate
what the chain what each of these terms
in the chain kind of approximately are
before you start your analysis. Um yeah
and these things are also time varying.
Um uh okay so I guess I'll kind of wrap
up with the the questions and the kind
of direction of compound hazards.
The most commonly
framed question and the most proaic one
is you know how can we improve research
and practice around you know hazards and
impacts and responses and environmental
decisions and all this kind of stuff.
And then that ranges through then you
know how do we like learn from events?
How do we keep the memory of the lessons
of events alive all the way to you know
how do we change our risk attitudes so
that we're valuing things appropriately.
So the example I'll use to maybe capture
your imagination a little bit is this is
from an event 2004 called Hurricane Pam
which caused this whole range of events
kind of multi-hazard event I guess you
can say compound event um but it was
actually fictional it was just a s a
scenario exercise put on by this
institute called the institute of emer
emergency management I think which
simulated a strong I think category 5
hurricane hitting New Orleans. Then a
year later an actual category 5
hurricane hit New Orleans and the event
and the impacts are actually remarkably
similar. So
question this begs is well well if they
had the knowledge all this stuff was
going to happen why didn't anyone do
anything? The answer is a few things
were were changed like people in the
aftermath of hurricane Katrina said yeah
that actually participating in hurricane
Pam exercise which included like the
city and state emergency managers and
the state government and all the all
these people like it did help us like
know that we should preposition you know
medics and that kind of thing but
the the larger at the larger scale I
would argue this didn't really do that
much because the levies still broke you
know uh and there still a huge um
problem with the recovery of
neighborhoods even decades later. So um
maybe if it had been 10 years before
Hurricane Katrina's impacts if Pam had
been 10 years earlier before Hurricane
Katrina, maybe things would have been
better, but I'm not encouraged. So um I
think it speaks to how our decision-m
processes are not really set up to
manage the most extreme kind of compound
impacts. Um because something like levy
maintenance is not directly connected or
motivated by the fact that uh you know
we could have
40 or 80 billion dollars in in damages.
There's a million examples of this kind
of disconnect between people who have
the power to do something and the people
who are kind of faced with the
aftermath. And this is true for every
kind of you know climate hazard but
especially I think for compound ones
because of their inherent complexity.
Um, and this is
uh one of the closing um images here of
Sunset Boulevard
and um during the well the photo was
taken just after the Palisades fire
where they had warnings the fire was
coming but it's moving so quickly
uh that people all had to evacuate on
mass and because people are evacuating
on mass and it's LA there's a huge
traffic jam. Was it really anticipated
there's going to be a huge traffic jam?
really. And people actually had to
abandon their cars because they were
stuck in this huge traffic jam and the
flames are coming their way. Um, and
sadly, you know, there's this is kind of
been LA as a as a prototype or um as a
as a place on the front lines of climate
hazards has been known for a long time.
There's this really incredible um LA
Fire Department video from the early 60s
that I recommend uh watching. It's very
60s in a way called design for disaster
and it's all about how like the land use
and emergency systems are not set up for
big disasters
um affecting tens or hundreds of
thousands of people at the same time.
Uh and yet 60 years later we're kind of
making the same mistakes.
Um okay so in my last couple minutes
here uh you can read some of this on
your own time but um
what what should I highlight? Um yeah,
nonlinearities in compound hazards I
think are a real frontier. We have a lot
of regions we don't know that much about
that. You know, part of this sort of
sociological element of this is that
we're lacking quantitative and
qualitative data that we need to even
know that events are happening much less
to sort of understand them.
A lot of dynamics. I kind of won't get
into that, I guess. um
assessing I I think we need better ways
to assess what kinds of compound events
matter. So we have physics based models
that we usually use. Expert judgment is
something that is brought in with like
story lines or scenarios. But I think as
the Pam hurricane Pam example
illustrates is under underused
especially from domains that are not
directly connected to um physical
science physical science or meteorology.
And I think that's why this you know
workshop is so great bringing in some of
you who have really more divergent
expertise from my own. Um obviously
community traditional knowledge so many
times you talk a handful of times I've
gotten to talk in a structured way to
people who have traditional knowledge or
you know live in communities that have
been affected by disasters. They say oh
yeah it was obvious that such and such
you know would play out that way but you
know how many times is that in a
peer-reviewed article right? Um and then
yeah I think as I already uh referred to
yeah these areas of exchange are across
different disciplines of research in
practice and ways to incentivize them
give people credit for them addressing
key bottlenecks are really really
critical. Okay so um this is the final
slide now I promise. So um I'll I'll
talk a bit about like some of these
things in the practices panel tomorrow
but you know funding knowledge silos are
both really critical issues. Um
yeah decision making integration
um communications and trust
really for the most rare and complex
events are especially challenging. Um
and also yeah people's lack of um
personal experience
is maybe part of that you know you don't
kind of you kind of bewildered and I was
um in the evacuation zone for one of
these fires so I yeah I got to
experience what that was like very
bewildering
um
and then getting down to the bottom two
points there I mean compound events
compound hazards are increasing really
dramatically
in many ways and that I think there's a
fundamental time mismatch between
those events both kind of the
quantitative change as well as the
attention that we're paying to them
compared with the plotting pace of most
assessments in the scientific and
technical space and yeah the intrinsic
time scales you might say I'm not sure
yeah there's no answer to any of these
things but just issues that come up you
know when trying to understand compound
events and impacts better. And then and
then yeah also like these things are
uncertain that affects the
communications and trust that affects um
how we how much we can say with
confidence and that yeah it tends to
encourage us to retreat I think a little
bit to our corners of expertise but it's
important not to retreat and that's why
this workshop is so important to give
you all the skills and that's I'm sure
it'll help me too for the days I'm here
to have the confidence to um the
confidence in the tools to to address
some of these things to the extent that
we can.
So there's the literature to look at
later and thanks a lot
>> before you go. So
>> Colin didn't think he was going to use
his 90 minutes, but he had a lot more to
say, which I think we're all very
grateful for, Colin. So thank you for
that. And I love this take-home point.
It's important not to retreat.
when is something outside of our own um
deep expertise. Mariana, may I steal two
or three minutes from our morning
reflections? We'll sort of segue into
that. Colin, are you willing to take a
few kind of questions more reflecting on
the entire talk from anyone?
Yes,
>> here.
>> Thank you so much for the the
presentation.
uh at least we know how to read uh
scientific literature right now. Yes. Uh
my question is um I like the question
you raised that what interaction might
push the system back from your
presentation. I noticed that there is a
pattern when it comes to this um area of
research is always from trying to know
the hazard behavior know the impet and
the response. So my question is it's
always like a top bottom interaction and
I know that when you talk about cross
disciplinary and all that I said oh this
is it this might bring the interaction
from the woman's perspective angle but I
kind of see that it's still like at the
emerging level in order to know how we
can bring in this um system is it
possible going with the trend of
research is possible to change this from
the bottom to top. Not looking at the
expert view alone, looking at the users
because they the one that have this
major impact. Is it possible going
forward? Thank you.
>> Yeah, this is the kind of thing that is
more considered within the domain of
natural hazards I suppose. So that
really more integrates domains of
expertise like human geography,
sociology,
um governance and planning. Um you know
my like I guess I can only speak to my
own motivation and interest which is to
use the insights from that kind of work
to inform
physical to to inform physical science
to sort of optimize the questions we're
looking at and the tools we're using.
But um
in the end when you have a hammer
everything looks like a nail. You know
we have these physical models people
want to use them to to understand
the propagation of risk and there are
there's so much space one of the
motivations you know for me is there's
so much space to better design our
studies to take into account those kind
of bottomup interactions like you're
talking about. But I I would say that
I'm not an expert in that and that's
more what natural hazards as a science
is kind of about. Um I identify more as
a climate scientist. So I want to use
that and be motivated by that.
Yeah. Hopefully this is a good kind of
grounding from the physical science
perspective, but it's certainly yeah not
the only perspective or the most
valuable one or anything like that.
>> And hopefully to think about partnering
with people who have that different kind
of expertise as you're thinking about
your modeling, right? like closely and
as part of teams. That's sort of like
where the future of this is going to
kind of co-inform each other and blend
those ideas.
>> Absolutely.
>> Yeah. Maybe one more question.
>> Yes.
>> Thank you. My question is on the
scenario example of hurricane Pam and
Katrina because I also work on scenario
based research and I was curious. So you
mentioned like the time element that it
was only a year before. Were there any
other sort of lessons I guess like was
there anything that was improved based
on the scenario exercise or was it just
considered to have been ineffective? I
hadn't heard of this example before. So
just curious to hear more.
>> Yeah. Yeah. And there's a really nice
afteraction or after exercise report
that came out um last year like yeah on
the 20th anniversary of Hurricane
Katrina I think um I think I think they
the emergency managers who wrote this
report said that they thought the
evacuation was better organized that
hospitals had beds prepared. Uh that
kind of thing but it was pretty it was
pretty marginal.
Yeah.
And while it's possible that more time
could have led to better results for
Hurricane Katrina,
it's also possible that that was kind of
all that was going to be done
realistically cuz
it's a perennial problem, right? To
there are many things that could happen
and people aren't generally motivated
politicians,
utility companies.
Another good example is undergrounding
of utilities. There's been a lot of
examples of power lines starting fires
in California. They're still reticent to
do so even though the the payoff
economically is like 100 to one or more
between the cost of the damage from the
wildfire and the cost of underground and
the utility. But unless someone is sort
of forcing them to make that that
investment for the benefit of everyone,
they say, "Well, why should I spend 50
million to do this? It's not going to
benefit me. It's right." So there's a
sort of [clears throat]
there's a sort of regulation and
cultural norm aspect that's very
strongly ingrained um behind that that
underlies a lot of these compound
hazards and their responses.
>> Let's thank Colin again everyone.
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