Video summary
Professor Brianne Wolf explores the intersection of classical liberalism and moral judgment in her forthcoming book, *Beyond Rights and Prices: Liberalism with Taste*, drawing on the works of Hume, Rousseau, Adam Smith, and Tocqueville. Her research journey began with an undergraduate focus on Tocqueville's critiques of democracy but expanded to include Adam Smith and Hume following the 2008 financial crisis, aiming to understand market dynamics alongside ethical considerations. Today's students are increasingly concerned with inequality, environmental sustainability, political polarization, and social isolation, prompting a renewed interest in the Federalist Papers' arguments for restraining democratic passions through checks and balances. Wolf emphasizes that while there are robust historical links between the Scottish Enlightenment and the American founding, significant differences exist, such as the Americans' reliance on Locke's social contract versus the Scots' evolutionary common law account of rights. She argues that Tocqueville remains valuable specifically for his focus on sustaining freedom within democratic practice rather than merely theorizing about self-government.
Central to Wolf's argument is the concept of "taste," which she defines not as mere preference but as a cultivated faculty involving empirical experience and reason used to make aesthetic and moral judgments. She contends that classical liberalism often struggles against critics like Rousseau because it relies solely on data and reason, whereas critics appeal directly to human souls through compelling narratives. To counter this, Wolf suggests liberals must cultivate "liberal tastes"—reasons for liking things that respect human dignity and foster sympathy—rather than imposing specific preferences. This cultivation requires the difficult process of understanding others' perspectives before applying reason to discern good from bad, thereby building a robust civil society without resorting to illiberal state control or teleological planning. By engaging with human stories and examples rather than abstract systems, Wolf demonstrates how this approach makes complex economic concepts relatable, using vivid illustrations like linen manufacturers seeking privileges or the challenges of making wine in Scotland to show that free trade has exceptions based on human dignity and practical realities.
Wolf further argues that while Martha Nussbaum critiques cosmopolitan liberalism for demanding excessive stoicism toward distant strangers, Adam Smith offers a more sustainable approach by valuing "circles of sympathy" and partiality within families and nations. Smith's goal is human flourishing through institutions that respect natural attachments while maintaining the need for impartiality, avoiding the demand for impossible moral perfection. Addressing historical context, Wolf highlights Smith's strong condemnation of slavers as "refuse" and his praise for enslaved people as a "nation of heroes," viewing these sentiments as progressive for his time. However, she notes that recent celebrations of Smith's legacy sometimes reify simplistic caricatures of him as merely the father of laissez-faire capitalism or ignore his democratic emphasis on persuasion over imposition. There is a risk that renewed attention to his accessible style might overlook his nuances and humanity, particularly when contrasted with later thinkers like Hayek or modern economists who lack his profound sense of human connection.
Ultimately, Wolf advocates for a liberalism that integrates reason with cultivated taste to address enduring problems such as individual autonomy under external wills. She rejects both hagiography and critical condemnation in favor of using historical thinkers to navigate the tension between empirical reality and moral necessity. By fostering sympathy and understanding diverse perspectives, liberals can build a society that respects human dignity without falling into the traps of illiberal planning or detached impartiality. This approach allows for a more nuanced engagement with history, acknowledging both the strengths and limitations of past thinkers while applying their insights to contemporary challenges like social isolation and political division. Through this method, Wolf aims to restore a sense of humanity and connection to economic and political discourse, ensuring that liberal institutions remain grounded in the practical realities of human life rather than abstract ideals alone.
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>> Today is Tuesday, July 28th. I am here
today with Professor Briana Wolf. She's
a professor of political theory at the
James Madison College at Michigan State
University, where she also directs the
political economy minor at the James
Madison College. Brie is is working on a
book that's forthcoming. I I'm going to
mention this cuz I think it's relevant
for our conversation. It's called Beyond
Rights and Price,
Liberalism with Taste. And it's a work
that engages in a deep dialogue and
analysis with the writings of Hume,
Rousseau, Smith, and Tocqueville. So,
Brie, thank you very much for being on
the program with us.
>> I'm thrilled to be here. Thanks so much
for having me.
>> So, this is part of a series of
conversations that we've been having in
relationship to Adam Smith's
celebrations of the 250th
anniversary of the of the publication of
The Wealth of Nations. And you yourself
have been quite busy
in in in visiting around the world.
Maybe you could just tell us real
briefly about some of the the
conferences and and celebrations you've
been to recently.
>> Yes, I have had a a busy summer bringing
Smith everywhere to all audiences and
it's been fantastic. Um, I've talked to
undergraduate students in Athens, Ohio.
Um, I had high school teachers from the
state of Michigan in Grand Rapids,
Michigan to talk about Adam Smith and
other things. I went to Edinburgh,
Scotland with the US federal judges to
talk about Adam Smith in uh the place
where he lived and died. Um, and then I
also uh went to Chicago with graduate
students from around the world to talk
about Adam Smith and I've got some other
things coming up this year and did some
things last year. So, it's been a a full
year of celebration.
>> Yeah, that's awesome. I think I saw a
picture of you at the statue of Adam
Smith. Uh,
I don't know if it was from this trip or
another trip that uh that I saw.
Um, I've always wanted to go to
Edinburgh. I I I've never been there.
So, it's one of my bucket list things uh
to go.
>> Definitely worth it. You should um you
should definitely make a make a
pilgrimage.
>> Pilgrimage, yes. So, let's go back a
little bit. You're an undergraduate
yourself at James Madison College. You
go to University of Wisconsin uh Madison
uh to get your PhD.
One of the professors there is is
someone who's a specialist in Smith as
as well. Um, but can you describe how it
is that you yourself got interested in
Smith and Tocqueville or even the
broader realm Hume, Rousseau, Smith, and
Tocqueville?
>> Yeah, thanks thanks for this question.
So, I have liked
uh working with Tocqueville's thought,
struggling with Tocqueville's thought
since I was an undergraduate. Many have
tried and many have failed to to sway me
away and get me to think about new
things, but I I keep coming back to
those
um
back then I was really interested in
Tocqueville's critique of what happens
if we
overextend democracy or make uh
democratic institutions the only
priority, let's call it. Um, alongside
his critique of too much bureaucracy or
a kind of technocracy. And as you said,
I well, I stuck with my interest in
Tocqueville through my master's degree
at the University of Chicago. I actually
wrote my thesis on the concept of the
imagination in Tocqueville. And I came
to graduate school in Wisconsin. I
started fall of 2012. And I kind of came
to my interest in Smith and Hume
through a kind of confluence of forces.
So I found the Adam Smith fellowship at
the Mercatus Center, which I wrongly
thought was going to be all about Adam
Smith
>> [laughter]
>> and also Tocqueville.
Um but happily, happily I was wrong. I I
got exposed to so many ideas in
political economy that have that shaped
my career. And then we also hired she
was then a postdoc at the University of
Wisconsin, Michelle Schwarze, and she
started holding reading groups on
Scottish Enlightenment thinkers. She
also had a reading group on sincerity
and authenticity, which focused a lot on
Rousseau. I had also had a great small
course at the University of Chicago on
Rousseau with Nathan Tarco and
the interest in pursuing Smith deeper on
my own really came from being bothered
by the 2008 financial crisis and wanting
to better understand economics and the
dynamics of what was going on in that
situation. And so I started exploring
those kinds of economic questions in
Smith and Tocqueville and other
thinkers.
And as I said, I'd kind of been
interested in moral and literary
questions from my early grad school
days. So the interest in taste that I
that I focus on now in in the book I'm
almost done with
combines many of these threads, economic
and class questions, questions about
moral judgment and beauty, and my ever
persistent concern with how we realize
individual autonomy and robust
community.
Nowadays I would say that I'm exploring
these same thinkers with critiques of
capitalism at the forefront of my mind
and collusion and trying to understand
uh
takes on markets.
>> I wanted to ask you or pursue a little
bit of a question because you just
dimensioned about how you yourself as a
student were motivated by an external
event. And then that, you know, forced
you to want to study some issues in
greater depth than you would have
anticipated 3 years earlier, right? Or
something like that.
>> Yeah.
>> And you've now been teaching at James
Madison College. I've I've lectured
there several times, you know, prior to
you being there or whatever. So I know a
little bit about the school and its
origins and what's it all about. And so
I kind of, you know, had in my head a
certain kind of
uh student that is in the James Madison
College.
Uh and what motivates them
say when you first started teaching
there
versus what motivates them today, you
know, as and when you're like the ones
who decide to major in the or minor in
the political economy group?
>> Yeah, that's such a great question and
fun to think about. Uh I might think
about it through how they react to
certain texts. So first I'll say when I
tell them about concerns about the 2008
financial crisis, they look at me like
I'm a very old person. Yeah. It's not
even on their radar, even though it
shaped so much of um how we think about
housing policy, let's say. And none of
them have most of them haven't bought a
house, so they haven't thought about
these things. Uh but I tell them that
that they'll come to realize that it's
that it's important and not quite as
old. [laughter]
But a lot of what motivates them
nowadays inequality and I would say
that's been a persistent uh question.
And so we work through sort of why that
is bothering them so much. They get They
get the most animated, I would say,
about questions of inequality and trying
to clarify their concepts and where they
think it comes from and what's what's
possible. Since I've come, they've
really developed an interest in activism
around environmental questions. They're
really worried that there won't be a
planet to have when they they grow grow
up. They're grown-ups already, but that
this is the language that they use. Um,
they're also really animated by
questions of
political polarization and they talk a
lot about let's call it loneliness in
American life, people being isolated
from one another, being isolated from uh
social situations. That's really a newer
concern, I would say, post-COVID. So, I
came to James Madison College in fall of
2019. So, it has shaped a lot of things
um that they're they're thinking about,
but but more so on the latter half. One
interesting shift I've noticed in their
reading of things that I'm not sure how
to categorize, but I've noticed it.
When we read the Federalist Papers, I
teach that as part of a class on
constitutionalism and democracy, where
we're trying to understand the origins
of the American experiment in liberal
democracy, the intellectual influences,
but also the debates between the
Anti-Federalists and the Federalists at
the founding in the
we read Tocqueville and other sort of
normative questions about the future of
the American republic going forward. But
when we used to read the Federalist
Papers, the Federalists are very
concerned about things like direct
democracy and they want to put a number
of checks between the people's passions,
let's call them, and then the exercise
of power through various levels of
government.
When I first started, students were very
frustrated about those parts of the
Federalist Papers. They thought them
elitist. They want more and more and
more democracy, democracy is always
good, let's say.
Now, when we read the Federalist Papers,
they really like those parts of the
Federalist Papers and want to restrain
people's power, so much so that they
want to go towards some kind of
elitist control over democratic
institutions. They don't trust the
average person anymore and we could
maybe easily explain that with some of
the tensions around the presidencies of
Donald Trump one and two. That would
seem an easy explanation, but it seems
deeper than that. They have a lot of
concern about expertise and also I think
frustration at inability to quickly fix
problems that they're diagnosing in
society. That's what I would say.
>> Yeah, that's awesome. Maybe COVID had
something to do with that as well and
besides Trump cuz the issue is is that
the polarization aspects and this
distrust is actually international not
just US-centric. So
So Trump might be explaining too much.
You know, like it's it's it's too much
of a explanation.
All right, let's go back to to thing.
I'm sorry for that little detour, but I
was fascinated by this idea and what it
is that resonates with the current
generation about the issues that relate
to these questions. And I like the way
you tied that back to the the readings
in the Federalist papers cuz this is my
second line of questioning for you
because you have interest both in Adam
Smith and then also in Tocqueville and
there's you know, a century between them
and they are different, you know,
entities, but yet they're also
connected. And you know, it relates to I
think this issue of the American
project. And so I wanted to ask you if
you had any strong views on the
relationship between those two thinkers
and the American project in general or
whether or not you find the arguments
like in historians like Garry Wills or
Gordon Wood that try to draw a line from
the Scottish Enlightenment to the
founders. Do you find that persuasive or
you know, do you think it's a little
fanciful because earlier writers
stressed Locke a lot and they came along
and they stressed you know, Adam
Ferguson and some others, you know,
and so I was just wondering if you had
any thoughts on that debate and
discussion.
>> Yeah, so first I would just say on the
the previous question, I really
appreciate thinking about the
opportunity to think about what my
students are most concerned with, which
what bothers them. Partly why I like the
tradition of the history of political
thought is that enduring questions are
asked. And I'm not looking back at these
thinkers as they're always right on any
question or any kind of
hero worship, although sometimes I think
it ends up looking like that. But the
idea is that the the questions they're
asking still matter for us today and
they can give us this lens
to get us outside of our own particular
moment and think in different ways.
And it's fun with the students. They
their concerns what bothers them today
gets me to look at these these thinkers
that I've considered for a long time in
a new in a new light. So I think that's
a great question. But back to to the one
about the sort of through line, if there
is, from the American case back to the
Scottish Enlightenment or across the
Atlantic, so to speak. So on the one
hand I do find those kinds of
connections helpful. I think I'm
grateful for scholars who have done the
work uncovering the philosophical
connections between the American project
and the Scottish Enlightenment. I think
that's gotten a lot more robust in in
recent years.
We know a lot more about what people
were reading in particular, what
particular threads of different thinkers
connected. So we know
James Wilson's jurisprudence brings the
Scottish Enlightenment to the American
founding case. We know that Madison's
theory of the extended republic we
thought it was primarily maybe from
someone like Hume. We now think maybe
it's actually from Smith's comments on
religion towards the end of Wealth of
Nations or both are there.
We know a lot about now what was on
college syllabi that for example Smith's
Theory of Moral Sentiments would have
been assigned frequently. So those kinds
of things are really neat and cool to
think about that the potential
connections, but I also think that there
are important differences that maybe are
getting covered over now that we're so
excited about finding all these
connections. So,
um essential for the American founding
project, as you said, is the social
contract theory coming out of Locke. Um
Montesquieu, after the Bible, is the
most read thing in in the colonies. So,
his separation of powers theory is a a
big source of debate between the uh
federalists and anti-federalists, right?
So,
the Scots, like Hume and Smith, are
interested uh in a more common law
evolutionary account of rights. And so,
that's one important difference that
could have helpful discussions. Uh I
think the social contract is a very
helpful idea, but it's not the only one,
right? Um and then political their
political economy is both sort of less
agrarian focused than a Jefferson, who
calls Smith's Wealth of Nations the best
book on political economy extant, right?
And also less industrial and focused on
the domestic economy than Hamilton, who
sort of quotes Smith to his own ends in
the report on manufactures and report on
public credit to Congress. So, I think
there are these these through lines, uh
but maybe they are overdrawn sometimes.
Um and then I think you were asking me
about Tocqueville too on this and and
the American
project. Uh I mean, Tocqueville is
concerned with democracy generally, but
he's using the American project
sort of his, let's call it his jumping
off point or as this key comparative
example. Uh but he's actually sometimes
really criticized by scholars of
American political thought because he's
not focused on the importance of the
Declaration, right? Which is kind of
interesting in the 250th year of that
and uh Wealth of Nations as well. It
doesn't bother me as a scholar as much.
Um not because I don't think the
Declaration of Independence is
important. It is, it's essential. But
Tocqueville is more interested in the,
let's call them, the practices needed to
sustain freedom in democratic times
more than he is in the theory that makes
the argument for self-government
possible and I think that allows us to
do different things with his his
questions and his ideas than if we were
just sort of focused on this one through
line about the American project.
>> Yeah, that's fascinating. I I don't know
if you and I have ever sat down and had
any kind of extended conversation on
methodology.
>> No, I don't think we have.
>> Cuz I was quite intrigued by you
raising the issue about the purposes
from which we do political theory or
history of economic ideas or history of
political economy because I completely
agree with you in the idea of that we
don't want to do hagiographic history,
that a lot of people do that. Uh we also
don't want to just do Whig history, the
history of the victors, right? Kind of
thing. We also don't want to do critical
condemnation, which is another thing
that people do, right? They apply the
the hermeneutics of suspicion to all
writers in the past in some sense. So,
we're kind of stuck in this weird thing.
No hagiography,
you know, no just, you know, the history
is written by those who succeed.
And three, no like just outright
condemnation in advance. So, what are we
doing? We're doing something where we're
looking for them to be part of our
extended present and our current
problem. And this is relates to what you
said on enduring problems. You know, so
like I don't like the way Rousseau
solves his enduring problem.
But the but the enduring problem of how
can an individual be free while subject
to wills other than their own, it's
still with us today. It goes back to
what your students were complaining
about as well, right? Uh how is it that
we can still be free while we're subject
to these
uh you know, Yahoo's, right?
>> [laughter]
>> They're imposing They're imposing their
world on us. And so, I do think that
this issue of what it is that we can
learn. And so I guess I wanted to ask
you, when you were meeting with the
judges, it's a very practical field,
right? US judges. And you're talking
about Adam Smith. They're not
necessarily intellectual historians that
want to know about, you know, what did
Smith mean or whatever, and they don't
necessarily want to match up. Like I
mentioned this Garry Wills book. You
know, what he does, it's called
Inventing America. And what he does, he
takes the Declaration and then tries to
match the language in the Declaration to
the language in the philosophical
treatments in the Scottish Enlightenment
and tries to show that the words, you
know, come across. That's kind of
fascinating, but that's not what these
judges were interested in, right? So
what is it that the judges were getting
from Adam Smith? And what did you help
them see in Adam Smith?
>> So I gave two lectures on Smith and
there were other scholars uh talking
about various other things, but for me,
exactly as you're saying,
I want them to be able to think about
why we might still read Smith or or care
about them him in a way that might be
relevant to some of the questions that
they're thinking about as as judges.
He's not going to map on exactly. He's
not going to be part of their precedent
that they're considering, but maybe they
think about some of the roots of these
ideas and exactly as you said, um how
can we do robust thinking about the the
history of thought? What are the ideas
that have persisted? So to some extent
the thinkers that we still read, we're
still reading them for a reason. They
quote unquote won out for for a reason,
but um how can we think about that in a
robust a robust way? So I gave lectures
on uh the connections between some of
the American founding ideas and Smith on
the problem of plutocracy. So thinking
about um the wealthy ruling and what did
Smith have to say and then especially
John Adams, but also the Federalist and
anti-Federalist debates um overall. And
that was kind of fascinating and
surprising to them, I think, because
they're thinking about inequality
questions, I think, in a different way
than the academy is and the way that my
my students are. They're thinking about
all of the cases and what does this do
with property rights and what does this
do with people's ability to acquire
wealth and amass it? What does that
mean? And then the second lecture I gave
them was on Adam Smith's political
economy as moral philosophy. And both
were very fun. Um the the second one was
fun in particular because
like many people, they have a real
misunderstandings, I would say, or weak,
let's call them weak conceptions of
capitalism, sort of cheap shots at what
it means to have a market society. And
so I wanted to think through some of
that with Adam Smith. So how we started
was right in the beginning. It's the
third paragraph of Wealth of Nations and
he says, "Who wealth acquisition is
for?" And if you ask people who wealth
acquisition is for in capitalism,
generally, {quote} {unquote}, they'll
say, "Corporate elites, uh the 1%, the
very, very wealthy." And that's not what
Adam Smith says. He says it's for the
least advantaged, so that the young, the
old, and the diseased don't have to be
abandoned, which he says was is the case
in a subsistence society where you can't
care for those who can't work. And I
think that's a really surprising insight
that sort of flips a switch when people
are considering the rest of what Smith
has to say about about trade.
>> You know, it's fascinating. There's two
two references that I'd like to make.
One of them is to uh a paper recently
published by Maria Pia Paganelli,
which was in is was in Social Philosophy
and Policy, which talks about Smith in
this very point that you're talking
about, that Smith's general concern was
always with the least advantaged and the
most vulnerable among us and how you
address the the structures of the of the
system in order to you know, address
those concerns. And it's also the case
that our colleague Irwin Decker, he has
this great paper introducing the for the
first time the translation of Carl
Menger's celebration of Adam Smith's
death,
you know, 100 years after Adam Smith's
death. And in it, Menger is criticizing
the Germans who are viewing Smith as
greed works, right? So, these these
these uh you know, characterizations
aren't brand new to the modern times,
right? This is the the source of the Das
Adam Smith problem and all these things
like that. And what Menger says in
response to them, he says there's not a
single instance instance in Adam Smith's
writings where when it comes down to a
judgment, and I'm going to come back to
that word in a second, a judgment
between the interests of the wealthy
or the elite and the interests of the
least advantage and most vulnerable,
that he doesn't side with the interests
of the least advantage and most
vulnerable.
And you know, that's a that's not how
people
think of it, right?
>> Yeah, that's powerful.
>> Yeah. So, anyway, that's fascinating.
So, let me ask you a little bit about
the reason why I said the thing about
judgment is you use the term taste,
okay?
Um and you put a premium on this
aesthetic judgment, you know, kind of
idea. And to me, I see you as explaining
Smith as someone who's trying to as a
moral teacher
cultivate taste in the people. So, this
emphasis on the aesthetics, do you see
it at all at odds with enlightenment
values of reason and evidence?
Right? Or do you see them as not so much
in tension? And a follow-up question on
that is why not the term sensibility? I
think if you were in modern moral
theory class,
what you mean by taste, correct me if
I'm wrong on this cuz you're closer to
this literature, but what you mean by
taste, they would call it moral
sensibilities because taste is viewed as
too sub is too personal and subjective
nowadays, right?
>> Yeah.
>> But when you're talking about taste, you
mean this cultivating of this sort of
you know, moral sense I guess in in some
sense. Yeah. Uh
yeah.
Maybe I'm wrong about that, but but let
you know, let me know what you think.
>> Yeah. Uh this is fantastic. So,
I am using taste because that is
the language that's being used in the
18th century both by the Scottish
Enlightenment thinkers, but also by the
French Enlightenment thinkers, and I
think
how many times can I say thinkers there?
I I I really
they're doing this for an important
reason,
which is that they want to make a
connection between our senses, let's
say, our empirical experience of the
world and then the reason we use to make
a judgment from that sensory empirical
interaction with with the real world. In
French, the French context, the language
is the same for our actual eating of
things and the taste we experience, that
sense, and then
what an aesthetic judgment would be.
It's interesting to think about though
why not sensibility in particular
because even though other folks in the
18th century, someone like Francis
Hutcheson, Adam Smith's teacher, Hume
also interacted with him, does use the
idea of moral sense theory, and he means
that when we're making
judgments about taste, sometimes also in
the in the moral sense, that we have
kind of a organ within us that that us
to decide whether things are are good or
bad. What I'm after involves more
discernment than that. I think it's not
just a reaction and in that sense it's
also different than
an economic preference. I like it
because I like it. We have to give
reasons for it. So I'm interested in
both the tastes as you said that people
express and what they might find
beautiful or good. I think the thinkers
are interested in that, too, but also
the faculty like how do we make
an aesthetic judgment? What is the
process? And I find that that's helpful
for politics and also morality. So I'll
say a little bit more about that. So
reasons why I put a premium on taste. So
one, I'm genuinely concerned
thinking about these enduring questions
I've been talking about about the
current crisis in liberalism.
And part of my concern or why I think
we're in this place. There are there are
many, many reasons, but one is that I
think as classical liberals or people
concerned with the liberal tradition, we
could do a much better job explaining
our normative commitments. In other
words, explaining to people why
they should actually care about liberal
institutions. And I think we often give
them empirical results, which are not
unimportant. They are very, very
important that people are wealthier,
healthier, more educated, freer, better
political institutions. All of these
things are essential and crucial. But I
think that sometimes the critics have,
for lack of a better phrase, sexier
arguments that are more persuasive to
people, right?
You were complaining about Rousseau a
few minutes ago. I had regularly have
occasion to teach him to my
undergraduate students in a course on
radical challenges to liberal democracy,
and I always find that they are, with a
rare exception. They they usually are
really excited about his critique. They
find it so persuasive. It speaks to all
these problems in their soul. They feel
seen by him. This is exactly what's
wrong with modernity. But I also think
it's really important to turn to his
solutions, exactly as you were saying,
and they a lot of them get off the
train. They find that to be harder
harder to digest, but speaking to
people's souls, I guess, about what
really matters to them, what what they
want their life to look like, their
values. I think sometimes liberalism
doesn't do a great job, and taste
um is all over the proto-liberal
tradition, let's call it. No one's using
that that language yet. And it's an
important
uh idea that they're thinking about for
how we have social coordination
uh
outside of formal uh political or
economic engagements. And so, what I'm
trying to bring out is that it's not
just properly aesthetic philosophers who
are concerned about understanding all
the inner workings of um
aesthetics as its own self-contained
study, but I want to understand how
the way we make judgments about the good
and the beautiful affect our everyday
lives and our economics and our moral
judgments and our and our politics.
>> No, so I'm So, I I was struck as you
were talking about how this relates
again back to your students and their
sense of loneliness.
>> Yeah.
>> Because it's it's the our current
conception of modernity
it has delivered for them a sense in
which they feel alienated, you know, and
and lonely and and disconnected. And so,
how is it that you This is what
motivates the post-liberalism stuff,
which you know, in my head, I you know,
I find it abhorrent because usually it's
followed by we need to have a teleology,
and you know, the next thing I I see is
like some grand planner, you know, again
telling me what it is that to my highest
value, you know, in society or whatever
as opposed to the liberal pluralism of
my youth. Um, but I think that you're
right. I mean, this is a this is
something that
relates. I I think I've maybe I've told
you about this, but I read this book by
a guy named Bernard Yack. I don't know
if you know him from years ago, but he
he wrote this book called Longing for
Total Revolution.
Um, I mean, it's like really old now,
like 30 years old or more. And uh I was
struck by it when I read it because what
he argues is that Rousseau, Marx, and
Nietzsche are
non-enlightenment thinkers. And as a
result, what they do is the reason why I
raised the issue about the aesthetics,
what they do is they paint an aesthetic.
And either you as a reader find it
pleasing or whatever, but most of us
most people in some sense because of
their success, they found it to be
pleasing, the picture that they paint.
And the picture that they paint is one
of you know, horrendousness about
modernity, but people buy into it, and
we respond as enlightenment thinkers
with reason and evidence.
And it
like it falls flat, you know, for two
>> having two different conversations.
>> Yeah, so for two centuries, this has
just been, you know, like boom, boom,
like not working, and yet we keep
beating our head against, you know,
thinking about it. And so if you think
about even, you know, like Steven
Pinker, you know, writing about his
defense of the Enlightenment or even,
you know, Jonathan Israel in this
massive tome about, you know, the nature
of the Enlightenment or whatever. I read
those those books, and I'm like, yeah,
you know, like that.
>> [laughter]
>> But at the same time, you know, it's not
clear that a someone who sees loneliness
or this sort of
this alienation from the current system
as that they would find those arguments,
you know, all good and well. And I think
this relates to you mentioned earlier
like the the historians of capitalism,
they paint a picture about the nature of
capitalism which economic historians
have exposed as being, you know, really
at some level fundamentally flawed, but
yet it doesn't matter at some level. It
still marches forward.
>> How how do you
you know, just just very briefly cuz I
want to ask you more about your own work
here in a second, but you know, how do
you think that that is like for
liberals, like classical liberals
how are they supposed to respond to
that?
>> Yeah, um and I want to add something to
your list too about ways in which the
empirical response or just focusing on
reason doesn't speak to a lot of
people's concerns and they can
contemporary I mean I think another big
critique of liberalism is coming from,
let's call it identity politics, but
real concerns about persistent racism in
society,
sexism, these kinds of questions. And
then especially let's take the racism
question, the way in which the power of
the state is used to further illiberal
attitudes, undesirable attitudes. And I
think my sort of one of my takes on that
is that when we continue saying like
here's why the enlightenment was such a
success, we act like the project towards
freedom is is done. I mean, your one of
your books, The Struggle for a Better
World, is trying to convey that no, it's
not done. Like it's a continued
struggle, but I think sometimes when we
just say things like look how much
higher GDP is, look how much wealthier
we are. People who still are struggling
and are poor hear the project is done.
Or look at all these rights we have, but
then people who don't experience those
rights being respected in their own life
here the project the project is done,
right? So, I do think that's why it's
really important to think about
these aesthetic questions and it's not
to say like here's the liberal aesthetic
and everyone has to jump on in to it.
In a way that would contradict some of
the aims of the liberal project which is
a plural one, right? But it's how can we
relate to connect to people who are
viewing the good and beautiful maybe in
ways that are different than than ours.
So, some of the thinkers Hume for
example has a really interesting idea
about how we sort of enter into what the
taste of other people are and make
reasons and defenses about why we like
things.
And one of the things that I think is
important about it is in so much of
these questions the post liberal ones,
the identity politics ones,
when we are talking to people who think
differently than we do we start with the
most controversial thing and then are
surprised when we butt heads and can't
get along and then we go nowhere.
And this I think is also rooted in some
of these enlightenment sort of debates.
So, when we're not working with the only
the empirics and and reason and I'll say
something more about that in a minute.
The emphasis is on sympathy that we can
do this this really difficult process of
I'm going to put myself in your shoes
and I'm going to think like you and then
I'm going to bring it home to myself and
think about how I feel. It is natural
many of the thinkers are saying but
that's kind of hard especially if we are
viewing someone as really different from
us and already opposed. For someone like
Hume we sort of catch feelings by
contagion but anyway. And so taste is
another effort to say what if we can
find connections with people on things
that aren't the most difficult
philosophical questions or in the 18th
century it's the religious questions.
Like Hume says like you know like what
if we don't start with like our
doctrinal views about God. And what if
we started with something else and then
can we build
ways to make judgments and it's not
complete subjectivity like anything
goes. We still have to make claims about
what is good and what is right but how
can we do that while respecting other
people's human dignity? And maybe that
starts by not making um those
controversial questions the most
important. So, that second part of what
I said, it isn't just our feelings.
Those are important for understanding,
but then we we do use our reason to
discern better and worse, good and bad,
ordering like that.
>> So, I really like the way you put that
because uh you know, I I really like
this book uh by Sam Fleischacker
comparing Human Smith on the issue of
empathy and sympathy and whether or not
we're talking about proximity or whether
or not we're talking about projection,
right? And in order to be able to do
what you said, which is like the
projection issue, we do have to
cultivate that skill. That's not
something that just naturally comes to
us. Maybe proximity might just naturally
come to us because we see the person
right in front of us like our dog or
whatever. I mean, at some level like,
you know, we our animal is is is whining
and we're like, oh yeah, of course, you
know, like I feel bad for you and we
anthropomorphize, you know, what's going
on with the animal. But the proximity of
seeing ourselves in somebody that's far
remote from us, but seeing what, you
know, living in their shoes in that
sense, that's a different kind of of
moral sense moral taste. Uh and so, it
requires cultivating. By the way, when I
was reading your stuff about this, it
busted me up because when I was a uh you
know, I was I I grew up in a very weird
sort of family because I had very
working class, you know, things, but
then I also had these pockets of people
who had escaped from that and were very
elite. So, you know, my my uncle uh was
an architect and and an interior
decorator in in Manhattan. He lived this
very lavish lifestyle. And I had an aunt
who was a professor and you know, like
that, but like other people who were
like an you know, a great uncle who, you
know, was a uh uh
washed out minor league baseball player
who spent his life as a drunk, you know,
living in a bar in Elizabeth, New
Jersey, you know, like that. So, I had
all these various, you know, things that
were all impinging upon me at the time.
So, but I was not very a
studious person. I go off to college and
my uncle gave me a series of tapes
to learn classical music. Cuz he said,
"Look, you're going to college now. You
need to learn, you know, classical
music." And then, you know, I I listened
to some of it, so I was like, "Yeah,
this is pretty cool." And I made the
mistake of telling him that. So, the
next year he gave me opera,
>> [laughter]
>> learn all about opera. So, you know,
whatever. I never quite took to that in
the same way. But, I So, okay, that's a
weird story, but now let's go back to
Adam Smith. I think it's really
important to remember that Adam Smith
was a teacher,
right? Of And he's trying to teach
people like in the Theory of Moral
Sentiments, he's trying to teach them a
certain aspect. Now, when I read the
book, to some extent, I think he's
trying to communicate the like the
wisdom of the Stoics.
Uh
but, there's even in doing that, you
have to cultivate that sense that you
have in that. Is that what you are
talking about in terms of the necessity
for a liberal society at some sense to
sustain itself that we must develop a
certain, you know, set of liberal
tastes?
>> Yeah, um I I'm not sure that there is a
set of tastes that then count as liberal
and nothing else is. However,
I think we can identify things that are
illiberal tastes. So, the desire to
dominate other people, we could say is
an illiberal
illiberal taste. Um and also, I think
along these lines that we
it's not as though the the the process
for making a judgment of taste and
aesthetic judgment that
the the thinkers Hume, Smith, and and
Tocqueville in in my telling, it's not
this process isn't going to by itself
generate liberal institutions or a
liberal society. It might help us
sustain them. It might help us
talk about the kinds of things that
would lead towards that, make
self-government easier, make uh civil
society more robust, social connections
easier. Um so I I'm hesitant to sort of
say that there are only certain things
that count as liberal tastes. Um I think
for me it's much more about the the
process of interacting and liking opera
could be part of liberal taste, but
liking whatever pop music just came out
and I'm not going to date myself or show
how little I know about my students.
[laughter] Like um
but those kinds of things could both be
in the choice set of liberal taste. But
why we why we like it, the reasons we
give for making that judgment uh are
what we could classify as liberal or
not. And also the ways that we cultivate
or pass down judgment. So Rousseau's in
the book. I'm not claiming Rousseau is
has liberal taste or that he is
cultivating liberal taste. He has really
innovative ideas about how we might make
aesthetics an important part of society.
Some of the ways he suggests we
cultivate them are really illiberal.
Let's have um a one-on-one situation
between a tutor and a student where all
of the quote unquote experiences or
empirical uh living in the world that we
would have is extremely cultivated and
constrained by the tutor so that you get
specific outcomes.
>> Yeah.
>> That doesn't seem like a liberal process
to me. The state forces people to only
read uh specific things or listen to
specific music so that you get a given
output that makes them good citizens uh
submissive to state ideas. That doesn't
seem like a particularly liberal process
to me. Um so, that's more um what I'm
after and thinking about. Hume, for
example, is kind of concerned that we
need really specific taste. I think he's
thinking about all of these new people
that are going to be part of what today
we would call the {quote} middle class.
They're going to be part of the people
making decisions and self-governing.
They're going to be in civil society and
he's sort of worried about the unwashed
masses sort of changing everyone's
understanding of what is beautiful and
he has really good strong opinions about
authors that are good authors and
paintings that are are good paintings.
And yet, he still thinks that the the
process would involve reason-giving for
why we think a particular uh writer or
thinker or painter or sculptor is better
than another. So, even as he has this
maybe elitist uh strand in him, he's
still thinking about process over uh
what the thing is.
>> You know, I wanted to go back very
quickly to your point about um you know,
the kind of responses that liberals
sometimes give to their critics that
fall short. And the reason why I was I
wanted this is that um
I just recently res- reacted to an
argument by Corey Robin, which I
disagree with about Hayek.
And my response, which I don't think
succeeded, uh was to stress something,
you know, which I thought was was
you know, a winning argument, was that
classical liberals
are formally committed to the idea of a
political structure that exhibits
neither
uh
relations of domination nor, you know,
discrimination. So, you have
non-domination, non-discriminatory
politics. That is a means by which we
try to have a absence of any relations
of coercion and the abolition of
privileges that are handed out by the
state to different people. So,
liberalism was born, Adam Smith, you
know, aggressive assault on all of
British commercial life. British
commercial life at that time was filled
with privileges and power relations that
were done, the East India Company or
whatever. And so, but yet like someone
like that's a critic, they hear you say
that and their response is basically but
you really don't mean it.
Right? Because, you know, like what you
said before about corporations or
whatever, you know, you know, who is the
profits for? Well, it's profits, not
people, right? And and these kind of
things. And no matter, you know, how you
respond back,
um they do it. So, I think that one of
the things that, you know, that might be
valuable is for us to think back
critically on our own points of emphasis
of what it is that we're missing in
this. So, it's like, you know, how do I
effectively, as you put it, robust
argument? How do I effectively respond
to these different sort of criticisms?
And it may be that you have the only way
that you can respond to them is to talk
about these aspects of what are these,
um you know, tastes or whatever that can
cultivate What is it that's a
liberal sensibility is what I would call
it like what's, you know, what are a
liberal liberal attitude or liberality
as I used to, you know, the phrase that
sometimes used to be used.
What do you What do you think about
that? That's like
>> Yeah, I mean, as you were talking, I was
thinking about something that I find
really valuable in Smith's work and I
think why
reading Smith with many different
audiences works well. And it was a big
debate I was I was at what's known as
Smith Camp this last last week with a
bunch of graduate students where we
write most of Smith's work and we always
start with Theory of Moral Sentiments
and students were sort of wondering
about why that is. Smith is really good
at giving human examples. He has
characters that he brings you in to
their experience and even in Wealth of
Nations,
students of mine who I'd teach a seminar
on Adam Smith are sometimes nervous
because they they don't do economics.
They don't do numbers. They can't do
this
math. They don't they don't want any
part of it and I tell them, well,
neither can I, but that's a whole other
whole other issue. But even Wealth of
Nations has a number of examples that he
brings you in and I was thinking about
as you were talking about all the
special
privileges. The the very beginning of
the famous chapter on free trade, which
even within that chapter he gives a
number of exceptions to free trade,
which we could talk about why he's doing
that, but um it's book four, chapter
two.
It starts right away with uh and this
kind of manufacturer gets a special
privilege and this kind and this kind
and this kind and the linen
manufacturers are up next. They want
what everybody else is getting. He has
this way of bringing you in along to
make it real to you, to make you
understand. An example I've been playing
up in that same chapter recently, he
says you could use greenhouses and hot
hot houses and all these things and by
all those means you could make halfway
decent wine. Halfway decent. And it's
nothing compared to a burgundy in
France. And I I tell students he's he's
saying like you could do a lot of things
that use a lot of energy, maybe are not
good for the environment. He He brings
you along and also who wants a Scottish
burgundy? You don't you don't want that.
You can't even make it, right? And so I
wonder if it's not a matter of the
fundamental liberal value or and a fund
to me fundamental to liberal sensibility
alongside the things you said is to take
seriously the human dignity of every
person, which is why we don't want to
dominate them and why we don't want to
discriminate against them. And I think
part of that is telling the stories and
they're not just stories and not making
them up. They're not fictions, but
relating to who people are as human
beings with values, with all the things
that they're they're worried about. And
I think that's why for me Smith is very
fun to teach and helpful because he
gives us the stories that mean something
to us and then can help us do something
with them.
>> So, you wrote a paper about cos Smith
and cosmopolitan liberalism. I want to
ask you to to imagine a conversation
that you get a chance to go to dinner
with Martha Nussbaum. And Martha
Nussbaum wrote a book about cosmopolitan
liberalism as a failed ideal. And in her
chapters, she has two chapters at least
in that book devoted to Adam Smith
talking about his ideas. And the way I
read her, and again, it might be, you
know, the economist mistaken reading,
you know, which cuz I, you know, the way
I read her is what she says is that
Smith is demanding too much of us as a
human being because we must be stoic in
the face of a lot of deformities and
things like that that in order for us to
have the system. He's asking us to quiet
our discomfort
that leads to like these concerns that
many of the critics have because in
order to sustain cosmopolitan
liberalism, there's a greater aspect of
that than responding to any one of these
things. I mean, is cosmopolitan
liberalism in your mind sustainable? Is
it a a project that can overcome what
Nussbaum is talking about? Or is And And
how would you respond to her in this
part about Adam Smith?
>> This is fun. Um so, the paper is about
Smith as a cosmopolitan liberal, as you
as you said. And I think, because I
wrote the paper, that genuinely Smith is
a cosmopolitan liberal in some senses.
He cares about the dignity of all human
beings, and we know this, as we've
discussed, cuz he expresses concern for
the least advantaged outside of his own
class. He also condemns slavery, again,
not as strongly as we would like from a
21st century perspective. But he has he
has lots of things like this. And he
it's important to him that we extend the
market as far as possible to realize all
of the gains possible from the division
of labor and exchange. So yes, he is a
cosmopolitan liberal in those senses,
but he also has, and this I would say to
Nussbaum's emphasis on his stoicism, he
also has arguments taking very seriously
what he calls circles of sympathy, which
is just that the people who are closest
to us,
we can most most naturally be concerned
with and connected with.
That could be your family or those you
interact with most often, your your
close friends, people you work with. And
he even goes so far to talk about people
in your nation, and then there's
everybody else, strangers, right? And he
doesn't condemn this. He says it's good,
in fact, in some places that we we have
this, cuz this is where we can actually
have the most meaningful relationships
and the most meaningful connections, and
maybe even make the most impact, I think
he would say. And that is at odds with
this cosmopolitan sensibility that we
have to be, let's say, Nussbaum
sometimes calls it a citizen of the
world, okay? That we have to care a lot
about everyone else. And at times Smith
is critical of that, and the Stoics who
say we have to care, what does he say?
We have to care about the world and the
moon, right? And that is so against our
our human nature. I mean, even in some
places he's advocating for policies that
might defy a kind of cosmopolitan
liberalism in favor of strengthening
national ties. So I would say that Smith
is not systematic in that way, actually,
on those things. It depends on the
particular policy. Um, think the
fundamental goal for him overall is
human flourishing, human prosperity,
freedom, but I think partly Nussbaum
thinks it's a failed ideal because of
how she defines what cosmopolitan
liberalism demands of us.
Like we have we must if we are a
cosmopolitan liberal always prioritize,
not just the dignity of all, but the the
in a moral way we are compelled to care
about the greatest disasters farthest
away from us. It doesn't matter, right?
And so we should give everyone's moral
capacity our first allegiance and
respect and as you said always quiet, it
seems to me in my reading of it, those
particular interests that we have. I
think
I think she is demanding too much of us
and not and not Smith actually. Um, she
does acknowledge things like our local
ties and she sometimes talks about a
turn to institutions as a solution, but
they're still with treating our moral
obligation to all, let's say, and I
think that that is unachievable and
unrealizable and maybe not even helpful
for
for freedom. So I think Smith is like
other 18th century thinkers uh who
sometimes get a bad rap for thinking
about how we can have institutions that
take seriously our, let's call it,
partiality
and direct us towards some kind of
impartiality. I take very seriously for
him a kind of scale of both moral
capacity, so we don't all have to be
what he calls the wise and virtuous man,
like virtues along that scale are are
equally valuable.
And we don't all have to be the perfect
impartial spectator all the time. We can
be thinking about that and interrogating
our partiality, but institutions work
best when they utilize both aspects of
our nature. Um, I would also criticize
someone like like Peter Singer and
effective altruism, like caring about
other people, you can't um Smith says a
couple of times you can't force people
to be benevolent and I think holding
this
moral acts above their heads like if
you're not at all times concerned with
the whole world you're a failure isn't
productive.
>> I like that response.
I did want to say something about the
slavery aspect because again if you put
Smith in context right he refers to the
slavers as you know the refuse of the
jails of Europe. That's how he describes
and then
and the slaves themselves he refers to
them as a nation of heroes. Those
nations of heroes. So given the context
of his time this is actually quite an
amazing
you know statement
of words a powerful word words and I
think that you can see you know that
in many of the things that he's arguing
that he's
that you know you can build on
you know when he uses the man of systems
argument in the theory of moral
sentiments. The man of systems was not a
socialist cuz there wasn't socialism at
the time. They actually were the
physiocrats
who were his
compatriots in in in understanding that
markets are these great vehicles but
they wanted to impose them
on there as opposed to and he he argues
that the man the paragraph right above
the man of systems is about the man of
public spirit and he argues that the man
of public spirit should adopt no
violence towards you know his others
than he would towards his own parents
right kind of thing. He has this line in
there and so
you know
there's a kind of a fascinating thing
with Smith because he he is actually
even you know he's he's not an advocate
of because I have the right I have I
have the right idea I have the right to
impose it on everyone else. I instead
must only rely on the tools of
persuasion. It's a very democratic way
of thinking, a very
self-governing democratic society kind
of way of thinking.
>> Yeah, I mean everybody misses
the man of public spirit comments in
favor of the man of system, which is so
egregious. I mean it's
that discussion is fascinating about the
sort of difficulties of as you say that
kind of more democratic sensibility.
It's not easy to be motivated by these
things and then also sort of figure out
what would be in the best interest that
people actually want. Like what can I
what can I actually do? Um
>> Well, the constraint that I can't impose
on others what I think science has
taught me is the right way to do things,
but still nevertheless, I don't have
that right. All I can do is, you know,
the in the social world I I have to only
rely on my tools of persuasion and which
is another reason why it may be the case
that you need to cultivate taste so much
is because only a certain,
you know, person that has a certain
level of taste will appreciate certain
arguments. You know, again I I was
thinking this as you went as you were
going along in Smith's essays on
philosophical subjects, the one on
astronomy. He argues that science
advances through three stages:
wonderment, surprise, and then
appreciation.
But it it requires a cultivation to be
able to see those steps.
And that might be part of what it is
that you're getting at that I'm quite
fascinated by this, yeah.
>> That's such a helpful reading of the
history of astronomy, too, because I've
I've long wondered he sort of mentions
those three stages at the beginning and
then admiration kind of
falls off. He no longer talks about it
in the rest of the essay and he'll talk
about things like the division of labor
where once you've once you're you're
master of a craft, you no longer
experience wonder and surprise anymore.
But then I wonder if the problem is is
that we aren't experiencing the
admiration of the thing, a proper way of
explaining to other people why it is so
good. I mean, it's also persuasion as
you said, too, that is the thing that
makes exchange work.
You brought up animals earlier. He says
like the dogs don't persuade each other
to share the bones or benefit, but human
beings can do that.
>> We talk.
>> Yeah.
>> Human beings talk. Yeah, yeah.
>> I think there's something really
interesting there thinking about the the
man of spirit public spirit and what he
can do. I mean, he wouldn't be able to
know what the chess pieces want unless
he asks them, right?
>> Yeah. Yeah, and they have to they have
their own will of their own that that
that we have to appreciate.
The way I try to talk to people about
this nowadays is that
you know what we really want to do is we
have to recognize the aspirational
aspects and the chess metaphor misses
that because a pawn can't say I want to
be a bishop. A pawn,
>> [laughter]
>> right, can only be a bishop, but in
humans we actually speak back and you
know, but let me just wrap up going back
to these celebrations these last few
years because I think it's fascinating
to me and and I think to you as well
is an aspect of this which we could call
reception studies. So, a mutual friend
of our Glory Lu has written a you know,
very well received book and it's about
reception studies actually. It's not
about necessarily Smith's thought per
se, but how it is Smith was appropriated
and thought of by other people. So, this
relates to what you were talking about
with Hamilton or you know, others, too.
And then how it was in the 20th century
that he he he he was received. But it's
quite fascinating to me that you have
two major thinkers in the history of
Western, you know, philosophy that have
had, you know, opportunities to have
attention paid to them. So, just a few
years ago, we celebrated Adam Smith's
300th birthday. And that caused this,
you know, massive running around trying
to reevaluate Adam Smith. And then the
next year was Kant.
But like it didn't actually generate all
that, you know, like Kant kind of, you
know, and then right on the heels of
that, we celebrated the 250th
anniversary of the Wealth of Nations.
And again, this outpouring of discussion
or whatever. So, it's quite fascinating
because I think if you would have asked
me 15 years ago whether or not people
would have thought that Smith or Kant
would have generated more discussion,
people would be like, "Oh, well, Kant."
Right? This is, right? And so, what is
it that you, you know, this this sort of
new appreciation and attention that Adam
Smith has brought, you know, in many
ways we we benefited from it, you know,
cuz we work in that field or whatever.
But at the same time, what do you see as
maybe some of the the benefits and what
are some of the costs that have been
associated with this?
>> Yeah, this is a a fascinating question
and uh the the the Kant anecdote just
just makes me chuckle. I've also been
lamenting poor Edward Gibbon. It's also
the 250th year after the
>> [laughter]
>> Decline and Fall of the ROMAN EMPIRE AND
NOBODY knows that. Uh the Declaration
and Smith have completely eclipsed um
eclipsed that work. And Gibbon and Smith
are in the same drinking club in London.
So, I mean,
this kind of it's funny to think about
those things. But I I mean, I think it
goes back to the enduring questions,
although um and maybe accessibility, but
when I read Kant with students, they are
really interested in uh the sort of
moral improvement theory, let's call it,
in Kant that we are better in subsequent
generations than we were and they they
really like that that idea. Yeah, so I
think some of the benefits are that even
with all this attention that you've
outlined uh in the last uh several years
because of the the birthday and the the
250th, it's not even been several, like
five five to 10.
>> Right.
>> You know, even with all of that
attention, each audience I find myself
with uh still has the same
very deep preconceptions about what it
is that Smith is talking about as the
quote-unquote father of capitalism. And
so I think
there's still work to be done there. And
the work isn't everyone uh
one of the one of the graduate students
put it this last week that uh she
thought she was going to be baptized a
Smithian cuz it was so different than
what she thought and so interesting and
so nuanced. And I I thought, "Great." Um
but that that is not the goal, to
baptize everyone as Smithians, but to to
think through these questions in a in a
robust way. And I think
a lot of the questions I mentioned
earlier, concerns about inequality,
people are trying to understand
what capitalism is. And I think that
economics sometimes feels so far afield
from what they can understand or too
complicated. And and Smith is a way that
it can come home to them. And they're
shocked at how much nuance there is, but
also relatability. So I would say that's
a that's a benefit. Um maybe some of the
the drawbacks is that I think
in a kind of weird way, some of the
attention is reifying some of these
attitudes and ideas. Like here here they
are holding up their heroes and the like
we could talk about who the they is, but
the the Declaration and in Smith and
ignoring all the problems. And this is
why the the criticism is stronger. And
I'll I'll give an example. So the
uh Michigan teachers were telling me
that now in the required standards for
AP Gov uh classes, that they have to
talk about The Wealth of Nations. And so
they were excited to be able to talk
about it cuz they're all panicking, like
I have no idea what that book says. It's
a thousand pages long. Like what?
[laughter]
And it hadn't said, you know, like what
to teach, just that you should cover it.
But the unit that it's in is American
Attitudes and Public Opinion, which is
kind of a strange thing, but I think
also speaks to some of this that I think
I mean I don't know exactly, but I think
cuz I don't know who made the standards
or or what they read to put in there,
but I think what they want is a kind of
discussion about here's here's the the
preacher of laissez-faire no government
intervention socialism like these cheap
straw man arguments from from both and
that just speaks to the problem. So I
guess we've gotten Smith on some radars,
but they
don't understand what's what's going on
there, but I'm super curious too what
what you're thinking about here here
Pete from your perspective.
>> Well, I mean I I I just that that
relates to Glory's book, right? Because
in the in the the the bicentennial
celebration
of Adam Smith which is happened when I
just before I started college.
In fact, my volume of The Wealth of
Nations is the 200th anniversary volume
that Chicago put out on it is is you
know viewed as the you know the Adam
Smith wearing you know tie of the
conservatives and you know whatnot in
Washington D.C. who wanted lower taxes,
less regulation and and all this stuff
like that. So it misses the the Adam
Smith that has this
aspects that are associated with his
humanity and and you know, I mean I
think that one of the issues to me I'm a
Hayekian scholar and I've always keep on
thinking that you should be able to do
for Hayek what you do for Smith. Because
I think Hayek is much more subtle and
nuanced thinker than people treat him
as, but I don't think Hayek wrote with
the same sense of humanity that Smith
did. And I don't know if that's just a
language thing from you know, 18th
century to 20th century, you know, and
the differences of those worlds and the
nature of what you know, was
intellectual discourse, you know, in
those different times. But it it when
you read Smith, I think that this sense
of humanity just leaps off the pages.
You know, I mean, to me, you know,
compared to reading modern economics.
So, when you read you know, and and so
I I think that that's, you know, trying
to communicate that to people and expose
them to that and then try to show that
the continuation of that can be also
found, though in less
articulate forms, right? In modern
liberal economic liberal political
economists. I think that's a big
challenge, you know, because they they I
think there's a lot of tacit
presuppositions that people have about
what they expect to read you know, when
they they read Adam Smith. I'm always
reminded, by the way, of Jim Otteson's
story. Jim Otteson did his dissertation
at University of Chicago in in political
theory and his dissertation is his book
Adam Smith's, you know, in the
marketplace of life or whatever that he
he published. And do you know that his
very first question in his dissertation,
at least he the story he used to tell, I
don't know if it's accurate or
apocryphal, but was that he got asked a
question about the Exxon Valdez and how
Adam Smith, you know, would like allow
that because corporate profits or
whatever. And it's like, no, you know,
>> [laughter]
>> you know, what are you talking about?
And but that I think is like goes back
to what you're saying before, that is
some of the the issues that that and you
see it, it's fascinating that you were
able to do so many different audiences,
you know, high school teachers,
undergraduate students, graduate
students, judges. Because you get to see
across all of that the different what
sticks in the different group, right?
And so, how what a great experience
that's been.
>> It has been really fun at thinking about
the practical implications of all this
as we as we do these celebrations. And I
think there really is something to what
you said about different expectations in
academia and discourse between the 18th
century and the 20th century, right? So,
even that Smith is thinking about
political economy and not just economy,
right? Um these questions affect so much
of people's everyday lives. Uh
people ostensibly vote in elections
based on the economy. That's the old law
in political science and we've got
graphs to back that up. And then we
treat the understanding of economic
concepts like they're impossible for the
average person to understand. I always
like um
Chris Coyne lately has been saying the
casual empirics of everyday life as
economic sort of evidence. And I think
this is true, but getting people to
think sort of self-consciously about all
this uh knowledge that they have just by
by living in. So, what are the ways that
authors can can give us these
understandings or allow us to to think
about them? And as you said, I think
Smith brings a lot of that that forward
in a way that isn't impossible in these
other avenues, but maybe isn't uh as
accessible or isn't celebrated as much.
So, maybe that's that's a good thing,
but I think we have to be sort of
self-conscious about being aware of
where Smith wasn't perfect, where it
doesn't perfectly map on to our 21st
century situation, um gaps there because
otherwise
uh we we risk having sort of negative
side effects, I think, from all of this
attention.
>> Well, thank you very much, Bree. That's
wonderful, and we're really looking
forward to reading your book. Uh and so,
uh yeah, thank you for everything.
>> Thank you so much for having me, Pete.
This was great fun.
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