Arms Control and Alliances | Arms Control 101 Module 3

Welcome back to Arms Control 101. In this module, we will investigate the relationship between nuclear arms control and US allies. While arms control is primarily a tool to manage competition between the United States and its adversaries, the US must also consider arms control's impact on its ability to reassure allies. The United States must balance arms control reductions [music] against its ability to maintain extended deterrence, guaranteeing the security of its allies by including them under its nuclear umbrella. In [music] this video, we will explore how arms control interacts with US alliances, shapes extended deterrence, influences alliance cohesion, and supports non-prololiferation objectives. In December 1979, NATO adopted the dual track decision in response to the Soviet deployment of SS20 intermediate range ballistic missiles. European NATO members feared that the new Soviet missiles could drive a wedge between the US and its European allies by threatening Europe without using its longer range forces, [music] signaling that the United States was not a target. To address these fears, the US and NATO allies agreed to a strategy with two simultaneous tracks. The US would deploy ground launched intermediate range missiles in Europe to reinforce its commitment to defending Europe, bolstering extended deterrence. [music] At the same time, the United States would pursue arms control negotiations with the Soviets [music] to reduce the threat of a missile war in Europe. This approach reassured allies by showing that the US was both willing to defend Europe and reduce the nuclear threats they faced [music] through diplomacy. The strategy eventually culminated in the INF treaty of 1987 where the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to eliminate all ground launched ballistic [music] and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km. This example shows that while arms control is often viewed as an interaction between adversaries, it cannot be meaningfully pursued without considering the perspective of allies. US nuclear policy and by extension arms control is deeply shaped by its commitment [music] to defending allies within the nuclear umbrella. How then do you reduce nuclear risks with adversaries [music] without undermining the confidence of allies who rely on your nuclear deterrent? Let's explore three key ways that arms control can strengthen alliances. Bolstering extended deterrence, building alliance cohesion through consultation, and encouraging non-prololiferation. US extended deterrence refers to the United States commitment to deter and defeat attacks against US allies even if to do so would require using nuclear weapons. Arms control when approached with care can benefit extended deterrence by reinforcing the stability and predictability of deterrence relationships. It is far easier for the US to make a firm commitment to protect its allies when the risks of war or miscalculation have been minimized. Additionally, the United States sometimes has the necessary leverage to negotiate limits on adversary systems that US allies find particularly threatening, as was the case with the INF [music] treaty. However, arms control agreements can risk undermining extended deterrence if allies are not frequently consulted in the process. If agreements require the removal of systems that are especially important to allies without imposing equivalent limits on adversaries, [music] allies could begin to doubt American commitment to their defense. US allies all have their own unique threat perceptions. So what looks like a fair balance from Washington may still unsettle allied capitals. To keep extended deterrence credible, allies must consistently be consulted in the arms control [music] process. When arms control is executed in close consultation with allies, [music] it can reinforce alliance cohesion while enhancing the agreement's durability and avoiding strategic surprises. [music] This was evident during the negotiation of the INF treaty where NATO's earlier dual track decision ensured European allies were deeply involved at every stage of the negotiating process. By pairing deployments with diplomacy and engaging allies throughout, the US helped build a treaty that not only constrained adversaries, but also left its alliances stronger. Ela Bun, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense [music] policy, lays out the importance of consulting with allies throughout the arms control process. Some people forget when it comes to arms control, especially when arms [music] when allies are not directly involved in the negotiations is when we're negotiating over their heads. Uh it is so important. They've got an interest in this. It affects their security. INF was a a great example. But don't forget that it's all our nuclear forces that provide extended nuclear deterrence. Whatever you're negotiating, you need to really consult with allies. Really consult, not fly over, land, give a briefing, and leave. Actually, it's [music] the it's the listen as well as talk. And most importantly, don't surprise your allies. Just they can disagree, you can talk it out. Don't surprise them. That's really not good for alliances, >> especially when combined with credible security commitments. Regional arms control helps reduce allied insecurity, lessen those allies perceived need for nuclear weapons, and in turn uphold the global non-prololiferation regime. For example, the conventional armed forces in Europe treaty, which limited the sizes [music] of conventional militaries across NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, [music] ensured that neither side could rapidly shift the conventional balance of power. While this treaty didn't directly restrict US allies from developing nuclear weapons, treaties like it play a role in reducing the pressure to proliferate by ensuring no side feels the need to compensate for conventional inferiority with nuclear weapons. Arms control has another important benefit for US allies. It can help them manage the political pressures surrounding nuclear deterrence. For allied states where nuclear weapons are unpopular with both parliaments and publics, arms control can improve domestic support for participating in alliance nuclear sharing. For example, [music] the US's willingness to engage in the INF negotiations throughout the 1970s and 80s provided political cover for Western European NATO members to allow the US to deploy intermediate range missiles in their countries. A move that would have been deeply unpopular in some host countries without the accompanying promise to [music] pursue arms control with the Soviet Union. Today, emerging nuclear risks have also prompted US allies to take more proactive roles in arms control and risk [music] reduction initiatives. Russia's nuclear bullying during its invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the risks of conventional wars going nuclear, reminding US allies in Europe and Asia that they have vested interest in making sure regional conflicts do not escalate into larger nuclear wars. [music] The United States and its nuclear allies in the UN Security Council, the United Kingdom and France [music] will need to cooperate with Russia and China to ensure that adequate guard rails and [music] crisis stability measures are in place to prevent catastrophic escalation. Arms control is no longer the domain of just the United States and Russia. [music] And the sustainability of future arms control agreements will depend on incorporating the inputs, preferences, and security concerns of US allies. If arms control is to remain a stabilizing tool in US strategy, it must evolve from an instrument [music] focused on bilateral stability and better integrate alliance management tools co-produced by the states it intends to reassure.